Operation Unthinkable: Russia - a threat for the Western Civilization [Archive]

Lokos

12-26-2006, 01:44 AM

A nuke on baku would make things very interesting and the rest of the oil installations conventionally bombed

You say that as if a nuke on Baku could significantly diminish Soviet oil production. Which it couldn't. The oil fields were large, as was the transport hub. Much larger than Hiroshima, Nagasaki etc.

So you send a thousand-plane raid with one nuke. The likelihood of them shooting down the one with the nuke would be slim.

To destroy any city of great significance, those thousand-bombers would have to cross territory far outside the range of any escorts. That's one thousand strategic bombers making a one way trip. In essence, in exchange for killing a hundred thousand or more Soviet civilians, you would sacrifice a large portion of the WA strategic air arm - losing anywhere up to five thousand trained air force personnel.

Tankograd was too far away to be hit by anything, in any case.

a thousand bomber raid, with one carrying a nuke, with say 1500 mustang escorts, taking off from a british bases in the middle east.

Which British air bases in the ME could handle the logistics and physical requirements of 1,000 strategic bombers and 1,500 long-range escort fighters?

Organizing such an endeavour would require time and a radical reshuffling of WA air force deployments. The Soviets would - without a doubt in the world - have discovered such re-deployments and acted accordingly.

A conventional war in Europe in 1945 between the WA and the SU would have been interesting, to say the least. The WA had never seen anything like a Soviet Tank Army or a Mechanized Cavalry Group. They had never seen anything like the wall of fire the Soviets could put up using their tens of thousands of tubes of 76mm calibre and above. They had never seen anything like Soviet SMG companies in CQB. They had never seen the kind of close-air support provided by an IL-2. They had never had to deal with a Soviet multi-****ged strategic offensive.

The SU, on the other hand, had never seen the level of motorization prevalent in WA armies. They had never seen the WA air forces in action. They had never seen the flexibility of WA logistics and the operational/strategic flexibility of complete naval supremacy.

It would have been something truly terrible.

Lokos

nagant_m44

12-26-2006, 02:37 AM

[quoite]Simple. Send in the B-29 with the bomb, and have many, many escorts. Also, soviet aircraft at the time were not very good at high altitude, so they could just come in at high altitude and be fine.

A couple of immediate problems. First of all the west didn't actually have that many nuclear bombs and was not in a position to make more very quickly. Second, what targets inside the Soviet Union could such a force of B-29 and large fighter escort reach... and even if It could that would be a one way mission for all of them. And third, the Soviets had aircraft that could operate and fight at high altitude, like the Mig-3. The Germans had a high altitude recon aircraft at the start of the war and they kept disappearing... it was only later found that the Mig-1 and Mig-3 were the reason for them disappearing. A modified Pe-3 would have made an excellent high altitude fighter, in the interem.
If any country could absorb such damage then it would be the Soviets... remember allied fire bombing of dresden and tokyo actually killed more people than either of the nuclear weapons actually used. They real threat from nuclear weapons was that it was one plane delivering it instead of thousands. If they had plenty of nukes then they could continue to rapidly wipe out cities. Japan capitulated because they thought the US had plenty of nuclear weapons. The Soviets would have had the spies in place to know they didn't, and also potentially to sabotage those they did make so they dropped near complete nuclear weapons on Soviet territory which the Soviets could fix up, and use in Europe.[/quote]

mig-3 was inferior to the p-51D in high altitude performance. Also, woudnt using the bomb as a tactical weapon against enemy troop concentrations be effective in this case? the SU already had manpower shortages at this time.

Lord Of War

12-26-2006, 09:03 AM

Also, woudnt using the bomb as a tactical weapon against enemy troop concentrations be effective in this case? the SU already had manpower shortages at this time.

Operation Downfall itself was due to commence on the 1st of July (However British High command said it was militarily unfeasible, therefore never carried out), At that time the US had no atomic weapons in their inventory.

If the operation was carried out however, The winner IMO would of been the numerically seperior force ie. Soviet Union

Another link concerning operation unthinkable: http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/church.htm

perdurabo

12-26-2006, 09:38 AM

two soviet tank commanders in Paris: "dude who won war in air?"
If we delete nuke out of this "game", Allies would need to ally with both Germans and Japs, if they are out, my bet goes on looooong war with peace eventually, and death tool in bilions. Soviets couldn't reach main factories in USA also Allies reaching factories east of Ural i hard to imagine, so we have two realy big economics pumping thousands of planes, tanks, and milions of soldiers fighting prabably somwhere beatwin Berlin and Moscow. Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Baltics would prabably disapear.

lightfire

12-26-2006, 10:26 AM

They had never seen the WA air forces in action. They had never seen the flexibility of WA logistics and the operational/strategic flexibility of complete naval supremacy.

It would have been something truly terrible.

Lokos

they have seen WA AF in action at certain(small) level. If I am not mistaken, there had been several engagements between soviet fighter aircraft and US AF Mustangs. Although, as it's claimed, soviet fighter shot down two mustangs (accidentlly), there were some different evaluations of WA forces by the Soviet Air command. And talking about logistics/naval power, the SU has seen that when WA helped the SU with supllies comming to Murmansk.
but I agree, it would have been terrible experience, no matter how much many people have waited for this.

Hellfish

12-26-2006, 11:18 AM

Also, remember that the US never mobilized for total war. The US could, if it really wanted to, field as many divisions as the Soviets (though industry may have taken a hit). For the most part, life continued as normal for everyone in the US while the boys went overseas.

Had a war broken out with the Soviets, the US probably would have had to mobilize for total war, though no additional forces would likely come on line until 6-12 months later (though there were forces in the US that didn't make it overseas by war's end).

Another thing the western allies had going for them was the ability to strike just about anywhere along Russia's border. The US had something like 20 divisions in the Pacific, another 10 or so in Italy, plus the 40 or so in western Europe. If the US wanted to, I think it was well within their ability to land several divisions at Leningrad if they so chose. I don't know if there would be much of a Soviet force to stop them - this is something the Soviets would have to take into account, and I'd be willing to bet that the Soviets would have had to pull some of their divisions off the line in order to defend the Baltic, Arctic, Black and Japan Seas.

As for Soviet material superiority, by 1945, the US had begun fielding the Pershing tank, which was a rough equal of the T-34/85 (see later combat records in Korea), the Skyraider was ready for production (though probably not with the USAAF, it was a dedicated CAS aircraft on par with the IL-2/10) and 1200 T29 heavy tanks were ordered for production - roughly equal to the IS-2s and IS-3s.

It would certainly be a difficult war, as everyone was pretty much exhausted by the autumn of '45.

Lokos

12-26-2006, 01:35 PM

Although, as it's claimed, soviet fighter shot down two mustangs (accidentlly),

Not accidentally. Quite intentionally. Without knowing the craft were WA, of course. This was after several strafings of Soviet columns by WA aircraft.

The US could, if it really wanted to, field as many divisions as the Soviets

The US could have never supplied a land army of six million men across the ocean. By 'army' I mean combat forces (approximating the Soviet total), not the military institution as a whole. Furthermore, to equip some three to four hundred divisional equivalents to a uniform standard would not have been feasible.

The US had something like 20 divisions in the Pacific, another 10 or so in Italy, plus the 40 or so in western Europe.

The Soviets retained far greater forces on Manchuria's borders - forces that were extensively mechanized. In Europe... literally hundreds of divisional equivalents.

If the US wanted to, I think it was well within their ability to land several divisions at Leningrad if they so chose

What would have been the point of landing several divisions in the ruins of Leningrad - a city of virtually no strategic importance in 1944?

Regardless, any convoys travelling through the Baltic sea would have incurred extensive attacks from PVO and VVS aircraft. Soviet coastal artillery was nothing to laugh at, either.

and I'd be willing to bet that the Soviets would have had to pull some of their divisions off the line in order to defend the Baltic, Arctic, Black and Japan Seas.

Arctic?

As for the rest, the forces were already in place.

the US had begun fielding the Pershing tank

The Soviets were fielding prototypes of the T-44.

Skyraider was ready for production (though probably not with the USAAF, it was a dedicated CAS aircraft on par with the IL-2/10)

Did the USAAF/Army have eight or so thousand of them? Hehe.

It would certainly be a difficult war, as everyone was pretty much exhausted by the autumn of '45

Though I refute many of your points, I agree with your conclusion.

Lokos

Hellfish

12-26-2006, 02:43 PM

The US could have never supplied a land army of six million men across the ocean. By 'army' I mean combat forces (approximating the Soviet total), not the military institution as a whole. Furthermore, to equip some three to four hundred divisional equivalents to a uniform standard would not have been feasible.

Not immediately, no. But I think it would be feasible given time - if not 100% equivalent to the Soviets, at least 50-75%, which is more than adequate for a defensive scenario. Of course, I'm throwing numbers out here, so I might be way off base. The fact that the US was able to sustain as many divisions overseas as it did was pretty amazing, and I don't think I've ever read that the US was particularly strained to do so.

The Soviets retained far greater forces on Manchuria's borders - forces that were extensively mechanized. In Europe... literally hundreds of divisional equivalents.

Can you explain this further? Are you saying that in 1945, there were still extensive Soviet forces on the Amur River frontier? IIRC, the Soviets transferred many forces from Europe to the Far East when they invaded Manchuria.

What would have been the point of landing several divisions in the ruins of Leningrad - a city of virtually no strategic importance in 1944?

Regardless, any convoys travelling through the Baltic sea would have incurred extensive attacks from PVO and VVS aircraft. Soviet coastal artillery was nothing to laugh at, either.

Leningrad was just an example - I think the US was largely free to invade anywhere on the Soviet coast if they chose to.

And you're right, the PVO and VVS would have done everything in their power to stop them in the Baltic, but I then offer you the fact that the figures quoted for the USAAF do not include the additional thousands of naval, Marine and AAF forces that were in the Pacific. Add those to the American totals in Europe and I'd be willing to bet that you've at least got numerical parity. And the US Navy had extensive experience by this point, while the Soviets had never encountered a CVBG yet (or massed bomber formations for that matter). Plus, every one of the 12000 Soviet planes diverted to hunt the US Navy is one fewer aircraft available over the battlefield.

My knowledge of Soviet coast artillery is largely limited to pictures I've seen of the Sevastopol defenses - would you consider the Soviets superior to the Japanese in their coast defenses?

Arctic?

As for the rest, the forces were already in place.

Murmansk, Archangelsk, etc.

I'm largely under the impression that the vast majority of Soviet forces were in Europe or the Far East. How many and what kinds/quality of Soviet forces maintained their shores?

The Soviets were fielding prototypes of the T-44.

I honestly don't know how that tank would have compared against the M26/M46. From what I can gleam, it wasn't a giant leap forward over the T-34/85 (at least not like how the M26 was a leap above the M4s). As I also understand it, even by 1950 the T-44 wasn't fully satisfactory.

An early fielding of the T-54/55 would have been a huge leap forward for the Soviet tank forces, however.

Did the USAAF/Army have eight or so thousand of them? Hehe.

No, of course not. Within a year, they would have had probably a thousand or so. The US didn't have any dedicated CAS aircraft (except the Navy's dive bombers) and the vast majority of our ground attack aircraft were pressed into fighter-bomber service, due to the lack of any Luftwaffe opposition, or medium and heavy bombers.

Don't get me wrong - I'm by no means a "rah-rah" American here, but I think a lot of people tend to dismiss the US military in WWII. Could they have beat the Soviets... probably not. But I also don't think they'd be a pushover, nor collapse in the face of a Soviet Guards Tank Army.

Yeah, the Panther outclassed the American tanks, but people have to remember, American tanks weren't supposed to fight other tanks, docrinally or otherwise. The M4 was kept in service with the 75mm gun for so long because it had an excellent HE round and nobody really felt it was worth taking that away for a 76mm gun with better armor penetration. These were all concious decisions on the part of the Army - and the right ones, giving the enemy we were fighting - not a sign of American incompetence or lack of innovation.

Kilgor

12-26-2006, 06:14 PM

nagant_m44

12-26-2006, 10:26 PM

Obviously the west's trump card would be nuclear weapons and it would have been foolish to launch a attack without them. Soviet strength in land forces would have been too much to bear without them.

Carriers with massive escort in the Baltic could have provided fighter cover for B-29's providing a "incentive" for Stalin to withdrawal to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact territory.

I doubt any carriers would even get close to launch range without VVS noticing them. They would not be able to withstand an attack from VVS either. A massive, surprise attack with mechanized forces might work for a few days, but after it is halted the soviet counter attack would be devastating. They would encircle and destroy any advancing mechanized forces.

Kitsune

12-26-2006, 11:10 PM

Lokos wrote:
The WA had never seen anything like a Soviet Tank Army or a Mechanized Cavalry Group. They had never seen anything like the wall of fire the Soviets could put up using their tens of thousands of tubes of 76mm calibre and above. They had never seen anything like Soviet SMG companies in CQB. They had never seen the kind of close-air support provided by an IL-2. They had never had to deal with a Soviet multi-****ged strategic offensive.

The SU, on the other hand, had never seen the level of motorization prevalent in WA armies. They had never seen the WA air forces in action. They had never seen the flexibility of WA logistics and the operational/strategic flexibility of complete naval supremacy.

Somehow this seems to be an immensly arrogant statement. But Lokos isn't the only one who can do that. And as far as its content is concerned, I do not see why it should be true at all: both West and East had already fought against the best army in the world. A war between both "Allies" (which indeed seemed possible or even likely for some time) would have mainly been a continuance of the WWII.

The question "who would win?" is difficult to answer. As far as material is concerned, the western Allies, meaning mainly the US, was clearly in a better position. The Sovietunion was completely exhausted, they faced an acute shortage of man, had become quite reliant for US supplies and the situation for the civilians in Russia was nothing short of catastrophic. While the Red Army had 400 divisions in the field they simply were running out of steam. In a way it would have been a better chance to get rid of them then, than would come for decades afterwards (and when that one came, it did so as a surprise - in 1985 western experts usually assumed a continuance of the Cold War well into the 21st century).

On the other side, the problem with the US is mainly psychological. It would have been difficult for the American leadership to motivate the American people for another act of a great war, with possibly hundreds of thousands soldiers dying again in Europe after victory supposedly had been achieved. And it would have been pretty difficult to explain that the new enemy are now the nice Soviets, who had been, out of some reason, supported for years (and some of which would still wearing GI smocks or drive jeeps or eat US food) while the dastardly Germans are now friends and have to be supported. (Using probably still a lot of those typical "Nazi" gear when fighting aside US troops...)
The whole situation would basically scream: "Our foreign policy is completely messed up!" to everyone.

One thing shouldn't be overestimated, though. The bomb. It usually assumed that the US, once it had that weapon, was undefeatable. That isn't so. The bombs back then were only slightly larger than todays tactical warheads and America could only produce a few a year, using an incredibly inefficent method for Uranium enrichment. And those few bombs would not have been very important, even their psychological effect would have diminshed fastly. A couple of years later, the Soviets, if still around, would have started to build the first of their own.

All in all, the question seems to hinge on the degree to which the Americans could be made to lean into the matter. If they do, the Soviets would have collapsed over the next few years, I would say. But since I also the think the US commitment would have been limited, it would have ended by throwing the Stalin's forces out of Germany (sans some of ist most eastern territory) and maybe Poland at best. That should have been possible. In the end, it did not even come to that. It was preferable for both sides to shake hands, dissect Germany, leave Poland be and start to dig oneself in. The rest is history.

Lazarou

12-26-2006, 11:13 PM

Obviously the west's trump card would be nuclear weapons and it would have been foolish to launch a attack without them. Soviet strength in land forces would have been too much to bear without them.

Carriers with massive escort in the Baltic could have provided fighter cover for B-29's providing a "incentive" for Stalin to withdrawal to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact territory.
The Baltic Sea is a small, shallow inland sea and thus not suitable for large warships or massive convoys. And how would you get the carriers safely through the narrow Danish straits?

Kilgor

12-26-2006, 11:18 PM

I doubt any carriers would even get close to launch range without VVS noticing them. They would not be able to withstand an attack from VVS either. A massive, surprise attack with mechanized forces might work for a few days, but after it is halted the soviet counter attack would be devastating. They would encircle and destroy any advancing mechanized forces.

Whilst being no push over, I doubt the VVS could match the sheer volume of fighters needed for air dominance that land based and carrier based US and British fighters could put up.

Lokos

12-27-2006, 06:31 AM

But I think it would be feasible given time - if not 100% equivalent to the Soviets, at least 50-75%, which is more than adequate for a defensive scenario.

Wasn't the scenario intrinsically offensive? In any case, I strongly doubt it would have been feasible. The US and British merchant marine would have been more than a trifle taxed by maintaining roughly twenty million men (as the ratio of US riflemen/combat personnel to service and support personnel was much higer - I'm actually underestimating the military personnel total required for the upkeep of six million combat personnel) across an ocean in France and Germany.

The fact that the US was able to sustain as many divisions overseas as it did was pretty amazing, and I don't think I've ever read that the US was particularly strained to do so.

Whilst amazing, the ability to support less than ninety divisions across an ocean is not the same as maintaining three or four hundred divisions.

Are you saying that in 1945, there were still extensive Soviet forces on the Amur River frontier?

In April 1945, before the build-up for August Storm had begun, there were 40 Soviet divisional analogues in the Far East. With sizeable armoured forces (approximating over a thousand tanks and hundreds of armoured vehicles).

Add those to the American totals in Europe and I'd be willing to bet that you've at least got numerical parity.

Assuredly. But the Soviets only had to keep the WA air forces busy - i.e. prevent them from achieving daylight dominance. In the meantime, the bases for those a/c would have been overrun (or at least that would have been the aim).

Plus, every one of the 12000 Soviet planes diverted to hunt the US Navy is one fewer aircraft available over the battlefield.

To patrol the Baltic/Black Sea they wouldn't have needed 12,000 a/c. It would have been a matter of a few hundred planes protecting the obvious lanes of approach. Besides, the tactical air force would never have been employed in a naval hunt. That was a job for other craft.

would you consider the Soviets superior to the Japanese in their coast defenses?

In volume, certainly.

I'm largely under the impression that the vast majority of Soviet forces were in Europe or the Far East. How many and what kinds/quality of Soviet forces maintained their shores?

The Soviet Union maintained forces on every significant border. Certainly not the elite - but enough to offer credible resistance before a strategic redeployment could take effect. At the time, for example, the 7th Tank Army was being formed in the Ukraine for service wherever needed.

I honestly don't know how that tank would have compared against the M26/M46.

In the worst case scenario, the Soviets had enough IS-2s and an increasing number of IS-3s (not to mention the SU-152s, SU-100s, SU-122s) to combat the heavier WA tanks.

As I also understand it, even by 1950 the T-44 wasn't fully satisfactory.

Mainly because a better tank was already in the pipeline, hehe.

Don't get me wrong - I'm by no means a "rah-rah" American here, but I think a lot of people tend to dismiss the US military in WWII.

I most certainly don't. Easily the third best military on the planet in WW2 (second best post-1944) - and by the standard of the time, this was no small honour.

But I also don't think they'd be a pushover, nor collapse in the face of a Soviet Guards Tank Army.

I am most certainly not one to suggest that Americans would have either been pushovers, or that they would have collapsed in the face of a Soviet Guards Tank Army. But this was the beginning of a thirty year period during which Soviet operational art was unmatched the world over. It would have been a devastating and saddening conflict.

Yeah, the Panther outclassed the American tanks, but people have to remember, American tanks weren't supposed to fight other tanks, docrinally or otherwise

Absolutely! People should remember that about Soviet tanks, too, hehe.

The M4 was kept in service with the 75mm gun for so long because it had an excellent HE round and nobody really felt it was worth taking that away for a 76mm gun with better armor penetration.

Replace M4 with 'T34' and 75 with '76/85' and it's still an absolutely truthful statement. The Americans and the Soviets had very similar design doctrines in WW2.

These were all concious decisions on the part of the Army - and the right ones, giving the enemy we were fighting - not a sign of American incompetence or lack of innovation.

Agreed!

Somehow this seems to be an immensly arrogant statement.

Why?

both West and East had already fought against the best army in the world.

The 'best army in the world' was not the best army in the world in 1944. By that time period - the time period during which the WA experienced the bulk of their land based conflict with Germany - the Wehrmacht was being constantly, consistently and thoroughly outflanked and enveloped by Soviet forces. It is not inaccurate to say (as Keegan, Glantz, Erickson and Duff have already said) that by the middle of 1944 Soviet offensives were being halted by logistical considerations, not German resistance.

I would think it disingenuous to compare the Western and Soviet experience of combat against the Wehrmacht and to draw particular analogies.

The Sovietunion was completely exhausted, they faced an acute shortage of man,

The class of 1945 was 2.1 million strong, and completely replaced losses (KIA/MIA) for both 1944 and 1945. The RKKA was certainly being less liberal with the spending of lives, but it is wholly inaccurate to suggest that the RKKA (or the Soviet Union) was bereft of manpower.

Most people point to the decreasing strength of Soviet divisions as a sign of manpower weakness. But, at the same time, the number of new independent regiments, brigades and new divisions was on a rapid increase.

While the Red Army had 400 divisions in the field they simply were running out of steam.

As evidenced by August Storm - arguably the largest strategic operation since Barbarossa - in August 1945?

Whilst being no push over, I doubt the VVS could match the sheer volume of fighters needed for air dominance that land based and carrier based US and British fighters could put up.

There wouldn't be air dominance for either side in this hypothetical conflict. More like a long, drawn out air war.

Lokos

Doublethinker

12-27-2006, 08:01 AM

Somehow many people here seem to have forgotten that the West is supposed to be on the offensive, not on defense.

Kitsune

12-27-2006, 08:37 AM

Lokos wrote:
The 'best army in the world' was not the best army in the world in 1944. By that time period - the time period during which the WA experienced the bulk of their land based conflict with Germany - the Wehrmacht was being constantly, consistently and thoroughly outflanked and enveloped by Soviet forces. It is not inaccurate to say (as Keegan, Glantz, Erickson and Duff have already said) that by the middle of 1944 Soviet offensives were being halted by logistical considerations, not German resistance.

When the Soviet Army invaded Germany in early 1945, it was a fight of 2.5 million against less than 150.000. Soviet superiority in tanks, artillery, aircraft...whatever, was between factor ten and twenty. Its not so difficult to "constantly, consistently and thoroughly outflank and envelope" an enemy with such a superiority (but possibly people like Glantz may forget to tell you that). I bet, had the Wehrmacht ever faced a Soviet army with those odds, the resulting affair would have entered the annals of military history not as an invasion but rather as an occupation.

My claim stands: the Sovietunion was running out of steam. Had the Americans leaned into it, they could have boosted their forces with enough German and Polish troops to counter the Soviet "class of 1945". (Take Germany alone: with systematic allied support, especially raw materials and pre-fabricated parts, the German arms industry would have been able to produce quite some amount of weapons and gear withing a quarter of a year again, while the German manpower situation was about as good or bad as the Soviet one - that alone could have helped the logistical situation of the west a lot.

Admittedly, I do not think that the US military was "the best in WWII" - it was not an overly effective one, Hollywood movies notwithstanding. But it was backed by the largest industry on the planet. And for the Soviet it would have been a challenge to continue the war with no Western supplies at all - or even with western attempts to damage their arms industry. I know very well, that American arms deliveries weren't very important. But the US supplied the Soviets with food, machine parts, vehicles, rawmaterials..., even boots. Especially important was medicine, without it, the Soviet losses were bound to increase by quite some margin.

It seems to be a common theory among Russians that Stalin could have easily swept aside any Western resistance in 1945. But in fact, he couldn't really risk a war against the West. Its no secret that he didn't like the situation too much: the Soviets had done almost 80 percent of the fighing but only got a half of the territory for it - inhabited by only roughly a third of the German population. They even had to share Berlin with the West. It seems quite unlikely that Stalin would submit to such unfavorable an agreement if he had truly felt superior in might.

Lokos

12-27-2006, 11:46 AM

When the Soviet Army invaded Germany in early 1945, it was a fight of 2.5 million against less than 150.000.

Is that a matter of fact? Check your numbers, Kitsune. Seriously.

Soviet superiority in tanks, artillery, aircraft...whatever, was between factor ten and twenty.

Perhaps at points of operational force concentration. This, by the way, was also true for the Germans in Barbarossa - they wouldn't have achieved the rapid, easy successes that they had without massive force superiorities at the point of decision.

Its not so difficult to "constantly, consistently and thoroughly outflank and envelope" an enemy with such a superiority (but possibly people like Glantz may forget to tell you that)

1) Glantz has nothing but respect for the Wehrmacht. Have you even read his work?

2) The superiority was brought about by Soviet operational and strategic art - and was therefore not some inherent natural feature that meant it did not reflect on their own prowess at all. I don't understand you. When the Germans managed to accumulate force superiorities of 10:1 and walk over dispersed opponents who could not mass quickly enough to offer resistance you call it prowess. When the Soviets do it you call it 'human waves' and 'the Germans lost because they were outnumbered'.

I bet, had the Wehrmacht ever faced a Soviet army with those odds, the resulting affair would have entered the annals of military history not as an invasion but rather as an occupation

For someone who purports to have an understanding of WW2, I find your lack of understanding of fundamental military maxims, truths and factualities disheartening. The Wehrmacht DID have such superiorities and odds during much of Barbarossa. A Soviet tank corps, on paper, may have had over a thousand machines. Yet if the German panzer regiment facing it was concentrated in a space of a square kilometre or so, whilst the tank corps is strung out over twenty kilometres, the individual tank companies did not have sufficient mass to combat the panzer regiment.

My claim stands: the Sovietunion was running out of steam

Your point stands because you ignored my rebuttal?

Had the Americans leaned into it, they could have boosted their forces with enough German and Polish troops to counter the Soviet "class of 1945". (Take Germany alone: with systematic allied support, especially raw materials and pre-fabricated parts, the German arms industry would have been able to produce quite some amount of weapons and gear withing a quarter of a year again, while the German manpower situation was about as good or bad as the Soviet one - that alone could have helped the logistical situation of the west a lot.

Leave your hopeless fantasies out of this. What were the Americans going to lean into the Soviet Union with? Fifty-sixty divisions (if they ever managed to concentrate them in the first place)? There were individual Soviet Fronts with more men than the US was fielding in Europe...

Admittedly, I do not think that the US military was "the best in WWII" - it was not an overly effective one,

It was more effective in 1944 than the German one - don't let Dupuy's nonsense cloud your eyesight. 1.25:1 kill ratios mean jack-all.

And for the Soviet it would have been a challenge to continue the war with no Western supplies at all

Which supplies, in particular?

Especially important was medicine, without it, the Soviet losses were bound to increase by quite some margin.

Is that so? Which medicines, exactly?

But the US supplied the Soviets with food, machine parts, vehicles, rawmaterials..., even boots

Let's quit pretending that what stood true in 1943 still stood true in mid-1945. The SU was no longer desperate for food, raw materials or machine parts. Vehicles, too, were increasingly Soviet in origin.

It seems quite unlikely that Stalin would submit to such unfavorable an agreement if he had truly felt superior in might.

Soviet war aims were achieved. Annexing portions of Germany was never a Soviet war aim. Therefore, there is no need for an offensive war.

Lokos

Indiana Jones

12-27-2006, 01:03 PM

Mind if I join you two ? ;)

Quote:
When the Soviet Army invaded Germany in early 1945, it was a fight of 2.5 million against less than 150.000.

Is that a matter of fact? Check your numbers, Kitsune. Seriously.

I do not have my literature here, so I cannot make any references now, but afaik the actual force ratio was more in the vicinity of 2,5 million RKKA
vs approx. 400 000 Wehrmacht & 450 000 Volkssturm. The RKKA could field more than 6000 tanks & self-propelled guns, supported by 40 000+ pieces from 76mm upwards, as well as at least 3000 Katjushas and had amassed 7500 aircraft. While German air support & conventional artillery was negligible, they had about 850 Panzer& Sturmgeschütze, and several hundred (min 500, exact numer uncertain) Flak 36 drawn from the Berlin air defence.

Quote:
Its not so difficult to "constantly, consistently and thoroughly outflank and envelope" an enemy with such a superiority (but possibly people like Glantz may forget to tell you that)

1) Glantz has nothing but respect for the Wehrmacht. Have you even read his work?

2) The superiority was brought about by Soviet operational and strategic art - and was therefore not some inherent natural feature that meant it did not reflect on their own prowess at all. I don't understand you. When the Germans managed to accumulate force superiorities of 10:1 and walk over dispersed opponents who could not mass quickly enough to offer resistance you call it prowess. When the Soviets do it you call it 'human waves' and 'the Germans lost because they were outnumbered'.

I for one have read Glantz, and as you certainly know, he only represents one (rather extreme) end of the argument. First of all, the Germans seldom managed to amass sufficient forces to establish such massive a superiority operationally as you postulate after the very initial stages of Barbarossa. I have followed this thread, and in Kitsunes defence I have to add that he does not remotely present the issue as simplistic. That aside, one thing remains which you seem not to consider or at least not weigh adequately-the sheer total superiority of the RKKA allowed it to much easier "walk over" the Germans (Heeresgruppe Mitte´44 is certainly the most striking example) than vice versa. If the odds are heavily stacked in your favor, diverting and concentrating your resources is a feat much easier accomplished, therefore, requires less "operational and strategic art." The Stavka and Soviet doctrine in general did of course make significant progress from 41 onwards, but that was about time. The Soviets reconquered the territory which the Wehrmacht covered in about 4 months in little under 3 years, so sub specie aeternitate it remains questionable whether Soviet prowess was as advanced as you proclaim, and whether Soviet victory in the historical timeframe was an archievement at all, especially if you consider the highly unfavorable casualty exchange rate.

It was more effective in 1944 than the German one - don't let Dupuy's nonsense cloud your eyesight. 1.25:1 kill ratios mean jack-all.

Dupuy´s nonsense ? That is a bold statement. Creveld and his followers, too, full of nonsense ? Zetterling full of nonsense ? What are you questioning ? The data, methodology, conclusions ? If it gets too academic, just write me a PM.

Quote:
Don't get me wrong - I'm by no means a "rah-rah" American here, but I think a lot of people tend to dismiss the US military in WWII.

I most certainly don't. Easily the third best military on the planet in WW2 (second best post-1944) - and by the standard of the time, this was no small honour.

The RKKA was certainly the strongest conventional military factor on the planet from 1942 onwards. I am, however, under the impression that you are deluding yourself when it comes to its effectiveness.
That said, perhaps our standards of effectiveness are quite different. The RKKA suffered massively at the hands of the Wehrmacht until the very end of the war, whether at the offensive or on the defensive when given the imbalance in all major logistic factors it should have just literally swept it away.
Winning itself does of course constitute a feat, but you have to measure yourself honestly to the competition, and I am under the impression that for the means available to it, the RKKAs performance was not overly imposing.

Alan

12-27-2006, 01:40 PM

Lokos! Lokos! Lokos!

Go Lokos!!!

Kilgor

12-27-2006, 05:54 PM

Which supplies, in particular?

From memory, the problem areas for soviet production was high octane aviation fuel (something that cannot be produced easily) and explosives. Nearly 50% of these stocks came from lend lease.

Alloys and rubber to a lesser degree.

Kitsune

12-28-2006, 12:10 AM

Lokos wrote:
Perhaps at points of operational force concentration. This, by the way, was also true for the Germans in Barbarossa - they wouldn't have achieved the rapid, easy successes that they had without massive force superiorities at the point of decision.

It was NOT true for Barbarossa at all. When the Germans invaded with 3.3 million men, the soviet army had more than 5 million under arms. The Soviet superiority in artillery and planes was by about factor four and five, respectively, the superiority in tanks was around times seven. Still this army was all but destroyed. When the Soviet army was on the offensive they had almost never (I can't think of one single case) anything but a solid superiority in numbers of men and material of any kind.

Lokos wrote:
The superiority was brought about by Soviet operational and strategic art - and was therefore not some inherent natural feature that meant it did not reflect on their own prowess at all. I don't understand you. When the Germans managed to accumulate force superiorities of 10:1 and walk over dispersed opponents who could not mass quickly enough to offer resistance you call it prowess. When the Soviets do it you call it 'human waves' and 'the Germans lost because they were outnumbered'.
I don't do anything of the kind. I just want to remind you that when the Germans made it to Moscow in half a year they were outnumbered. That's a fact. And when the Soviets made their way back, they outnumbered the Wehrmacht - but still needed more than two years to reach Berlin. Any superiorty in numbers the Germans had anywhere was usually punctually through better concentration of forces.

Lokos wrote:
Glantz has nothing but respect for the Wehrmacht. Have you even read his work?

I have read his "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler". Any of Glantz praise does only serve one end: to show how great the achievement of the Red Army was. That's the objective of this book.

Lokos wrote:
It was more effective in 1944 than the German one - don't let Dupuy's nonsense cloud your eyesight. 1.25:1 kill ratios mean jack-all.
Actually, according to Dupuy, it was overall Wehrmacht effectiveness that was about 1.25 times higher than the one of American and Western Allied forces. The relation of the respective kill ratio was more ****ounced, usually between 1.4 and 1.5 - and that goes for the whole year of 1944. And it seems rather plausible to assume this that means something, does it not?
That Dudpuy comes to the conclusion that the Western Allies needed their quantitative superiority and that they, all things being equal, almost invariably lost in an engangement, may not be to everyones liking. But despite criticisism of such people, so far I have seen no one who brought forward any valid arguments that disprove him. He is just the one guy who really has done boring, thorough, bone grinding research with the data of lots of engagements - unlike so many other military historians.

Thor

12-28-2006, 12:13 AM

I have read his "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler". Any of Glantz praise does only serve one end: to show how great the achievement of the Red Army was. That's the objective of this book.
Somehow that sounds familiar :D

Lokos

12-28-2006, 12:15 AM

I do not have my literature here, so I cannot make any references now, but afaik the actual force ratio was more in the vicinity of 2,5 million RKKA
vs approx. 400 000 Wehrmacht & 450 000 Volkssturm.

According to Overmans the Wehrmacht suffered roughly 1,230,045 KIA/MIA in 1945 - the vast majority having fallen on the Russo-German front. Unless we're talking about a casualty rate of nearly one hundred percent, someone's figures are off. In January 1945 there were 146 German divisions on the EF. In February 173. In March 173. In April 163. In May 78. In 1944 the manpower strength of the Wehrmacht was 9.1 million (total - including support branches).

Enlighten me.

he only represents one (rather extreme)

What, exactly, is 'extreme' about his view? If by 'extreme' you actually mean 'balanced' then, certainly, you are correct.

First of all, the Germans seldom managed to amass sufficient forces to establish such massive a superiority operationally as you postulate after the very initial stages of Barbarossa.

Poppy ****! Both operationally and, especially, tactically the Wehrmacht and its Axis allied armies achieved massive superiorities in force and means over the RKKA at focal points. Most RKKA units were not even on a war footing on 22 June 1941. Stories of Soviet units joining unequal combats by dribs and drabs are the norm for most of the third quarter of 1941. The vaunted tank corps and mechanized corps were defeated in detail (i.e. in dribs and drabs) by their own logistical network and skillful German maneouvre groups.

The Reserve Armies formed to counteract German thrusts in August, September, October and November hardly deserved to be called 'RKKA'. They were untrained, poorly equipped and, yet, when massed in sufficient force (the winter counteroffensive) did not have undue difficulties punching through German lines. The destruction of the regular RKKA piece by piece, the inept mobilization and massing of Soviet forces initially - all were factors that were to introduce numerous tragic cyclical and intrinsic problems for the Soviet military institution.

aside, one thing remains which you seem not to consider or at least not weigh adequately-the sheer total superiority of the RKKA allowed it to much easier "walk over" the Germans (Heeresgruppe Mitte´44 is certainly the most striking example) than vice versa

The destruction of Army Group Centre was achieved by the massing of 10:1 superiorities in men, means and materiel by STAVKA. That was not the strategic balance. Other fronts were drained, maskirovka was employed successfully and the Germans were caught by utter surprise. This points to Soviet strategic skill moreso than it points to force superiority (which only exceeded 4:1 in the last months of 1945, and was 1.25:1 in favour of the Germans for much of 1941).

You do not give nearly enough credit to Soviet planners for Bagration. Not only did they employ tailor made assault and shock forces skillfully, they intricately planned the utter destruction of dozens of German divisions through operational maneouvre. In doing so, for the first two weeks (and the most pivotal of the operation), they were inflicting vastly disproportionate casualties on the Germans. For the Germans June 1944 was more tragic than November-January 1942-1943.

If the odds are heavily stacked in your favor, diverting and concentrating your resources is a feat much easier accomplished, therefore, requires less "operational and strategic art."

During Barbarossa the same held true for the Wehrmacht. You might find it interesting to note that accounts of Soviet combat personnel from the initial period of the war invariably discuss 'Nazi hordes' and 'human waves' in much the same way that German combat personnel did later in the war. The successful massing of forces for decisive battle was the pivotal operational doctrine of the Wehrmacht.

The Soviets reconquered the territory which the Wehrmacht covered in about 4 months in little under 3 years

This is a false analogy, and you know it.

I can also say that in four years the Soviets conquered more territory than the Germans, period. And?

especially if you consider the highly unfavorable casualty exchange rate.

The 'unfavourable' casualty rate was a result of the continuing need to introduce untrained combat forces into offensive action in the fourth quarter of 1941 and beyond by the Soviets, who had lost their entire regular military in June-October 1941.

When the Germans were forced into similar measures in 1944 and beyond, their forces suffered similarly unfavourable casualty rates.

It is an age-old military maxim that - all other factors being equal - the attacker will suffer more casualties than the defender in the initial stages of the combat, unless the attacker manages a total rout of the defender in the process. From 1943 onwards Soviet casualties continuously fell, German casualties continuously rose (culminating in the Germans suffering more KIA/MIA on the EF than the Soviets in 1945) and the balance of forces was decisively destroyed.

Note that it took the 1942 and 1943 spring operational pauses to create a proper balance between veteran divisional cadres and the new recruit intake.

Dupuy´s nonsense ? That is a bold statement. Creveld and his followers, too, full of nonsense ? Zetterling full of nonsense ? What are you questioning ?

Not so bold, if you look at it more expansively. I question the methodology of looking at kill ratios to judge combat effectiveness. I may be old fashioned, but in my mind victory is the only measure of success. That the Germans managed to - surpassed in means and manpower - achieve a 1.25:1 kill ratio against a foe on the attack is not surprising. Even a 2.2:1 kill ratio (as was the case for the Soviets in 1942-1943) is not particularly striking.

By 1944 the Soviets and the Americans could - at will - smash through any German obstacle. Manpower/industrial advantages aside that bespeaks an ability to maintain the integrity of field forces whilst destroying that integrity in an opponent. That the Germans fought well and hard is not in doubt. That they were possessed of a better army in 1944-1945, however, is more than simply in doubt. That Soviet forces, for example, were halting offensives merely because combat units had outrun their railheads and logistical networks does not fill me with confidence in the Wehrmacht's ability to win wars.

The RKKA was certainly the strongest conventional military factor on the planet from 1942 onwards.

The latter stages of 1943 onwards.

I am, however, under the impression that you are deluding yourself when it comes to its effectiveness.

Soviet operational art, when employed unobstructed and unimpeded by political considerations (i.e. arriving in Berlin as quickly as possible, paying disregard to the practical difficulties of emphasising speed to such an extent) produced victories such as Bagration, August Storm, Iassy, Crimea, Orel, Belgorod-Kharkov, Oder etc. These victories were as effective and as cost-efficient as anything the Germans had ever accomplished against comparable foes.

Am I truly the one deluding himself?

whether at the offensive or on the defensive when given the imbalance in all major logistic factors it should have just literally swept it away.

The classic argument of the apologist.

The RKKA was on the defensive at four points:

1) Barbarossa - the RKKA suffered massively
2) Blau - the RKKA suffered significantly, but not incredibly moreso than the Wehrmacht
3) Citadel - the RKKA fought off a major German offensive for the first time (without losing significant ground), with heavy vehicular casualties but relatively light manpower losses, finally going on the counteroffensive immediately thereafter and destroying German redoubts in Belgorod-Kharkov and Orel.
4) Balaton - the RKKA easily sweeps aside a German thrust made up of hundreds of tanks, SPGs and other armoured vehicles. RKKA casualties light; German casualties catastrophic.

The RKKA was on the offensive at numerous points:

1) Winter 1941 - the failure of the offensive is usually attributed to the dispersion of combat means across a three thousand kilometre front and stubborn attacks on relatively well defended hedgehog positions. Massive Soviet casualties.
2) Mid-1942 - the Kharkov offensive is annihilated by the massed forces the Germans had prepared for Blau. Huge Soviet casualties.
3) Winter 1942 - the Soviets trap and destroy the 6th Army at Stalingrad, as well as portions of 4th Panzer. Casualties roughly comparable.
4) Mid 1943 - having waited for the Germans to spend their own energy at Kursk, the Soviets would never again lose the initiative, launching numerous counteroffensives that produced great casualties on both sides - though the balance finally begins resembling a level of equality.
5) Mid 1944 - Bagration becomes the single most destructive offensive faced by the Germans, who lose the equivalent of sixty divisions in six weeks of combat. Soviet losses are directly comparable.
6) 1945 - final offensives into Germany, the Germans begin suffering more casualties than the Soviets, despite being on the defensive.

Therefore, when the RKKA was weak and on either the defensive or the offensive it suffered higher casualties. When the RKKA became stronger and the Wehrmacht weaker, the balance significantly shifted, until it finally tilted in the favour of the Soviets.

The point is: the RKKA of 1941 was not the RKKA of 1945, and the Wehrmacht of 1941 was not the Wehrmacht of 1945, and the analogies to be drawn between them in 1941 cannot be drawn in 1945.

the RKKAs performance was not overly imposing.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but which side planted a flag in their opponent's capital?

Casually dismissing massive Soviet successes in favour of bland generalities that when looked upon in detail do not even hold true is an exercise in futility. Your choice, though.

Lokos

Lokos

12-28-2006, 12:30 AM

When the Germans invaded with 3.3 million men, the soviet army had more than 5 million under arms

How many in the Western Military District? How many actually under arms, as opposed to on paper? How many facing the Germans on the morning of the invasion? If in doubt, refer to the ratios given by Glantz in the tables section of 'When Titans Clashed' for enlightenment.

We've had this discussion before, you and I, and I don't recall you winning the argument. If you're glutton for it, though, we can go through it all again.

I just want to remind you that when the Germans made it to Moscow in half a year they were outnumbered.

No, they were not. Not even close. In November 1941 the German forces (approximating 3.5 million including satellite armies) were faced by some two and three quarters million Soviets. In tanks, the Soviets were outnumbered three to one (believe it or not). In a/c, similarly. Only in artillery did the Soviets maintain a semblance of superiority.

And when the Soviets made their way back, they outnumbered the Wehrmacht - but still needed more than two years to reach Berlin.

Yes, walking over a much weaker opponent in four months does tend to be easier than fighting an opponent of great strength for the same territory. Kudos for that snippet of gospel.

Any of Glantz praise does only serve one end: to show how great the achievement of the Red Army was. That's the objective of this book.

If you DID read the book, and not simply the title, you would have seen that Glantz's aim was to educate a primarily American audience in a WW2 they didn't have much of an idea about. The introduction section of the book serves to rebutt your thesis by heaping praise on the prowess of the Wehrmacht, and using that to highlight just how immense and horrifying an achievement the GPW was for the RKKA.

And it seems rather plausible to assume this that means something, does it not?

I have dealt with this argument above.

He is just the one guy who really has done boring, thorough, bone grinding research with the data of lots of engagements - unlike so many other military historians.

And forgot the nature of conflict in general in the process. That the Wehrmacht used weapons more effectively (1.25 times) than the WA and moreso than the Soviets may be true, and it still doesn't make the Wehrmacht a better military force. Military force is a concept that encapsulates logistics, force regeneration, strategic planning, massing of forces, doctrinal evolution, application of doctrine, understanding of belligerent forces and formulation of plans to defeat said forces. Dupuy should have understood this.

Lokos

Violet Fashion by Mindy

12-28-2006, 12:46 AM

According to Overmans the Wehrmacht suffered roughly 1,230,045 KIA/MIA in 1945 - the vast majority having fallen on the Russo-German front. Unless we're talking about a casualty rate of nearly one hundred percent, someone's figures are off. In January 1945 there were 146 German divisions on the EF. In February 173. In March 173. In April 163. In May 78. In 1944 the manpower strength of the Wehrmacht was 9.1 million (total - including support branches).

Might want to check your numbers again Lokos

163 times lets say 13,000 (average divisional strength = 2,119,000 men.

163 multiplied by 20,000 (The maximum divisional size) still only goes to 3,216,00

And thats provided these divisions were at full strength.

Kitsune

12-28-2006, 12:54 AM

@Lokos:

About the 150,000 number. I was just referring to the most Eastern line of defense, not the overall strength of the German armed forces. I was just mimicking Lokos usual kind of argumentation, when he claims that the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army. It had the effect I intended. ;-)

About the overall war situtation, as I gathered it:

According to Overmans, the German military losses (KIA and permanent MIA, including not only Wehrmacht but Waffen SS, police units, essentially everyone employed by the German state) against the Soviets were 2.7 million men. If one includes the losses on the Heimatfront (the fighting in Germany in 1945 with often little better than some rag tag forces of Volksturm), almost exactly four million died fighting Soviet forces.

As far as I know, Krivosheev comes to the conclusion that a corresponding figure of losses for the Soviet military in WWII was 8.6 million. If I may, just to emphasize my point, assume that the Soviet losses until the end of 1944, against the German military only, numbered 6.5 million then the ratio of those two numbers (Soviet military losses against German military losses as long as there was still an German military to speak of) would be 2.41 - that interestingly is roughly what Dupuy says about the difference in combat effectiveness of the German armed forces compared to the Soviet ones(independently from Overmans by the way, since he died before Overmans published his book).

Kitsune

12-28-2006, 01:04 AM

Indiana Jones wrote:
The RKKA was certainly the strongest conventional military factor on the planet from 1942 onwards. I am, however, under the impression that you are deluding yourself when it comes to its effectiveness.
That said, perhaps our standards of effectiveness are quite different. The RKKA suffered massively at the hands of the Wehrmacht until the very end of the war, whether at the offensive or on the defensive when given the imbalance in all major logistic factors it should have just literally swept it away.
Winning itself does of course constitute a feat, but you have to measure yourself honestly to the competition, and I am under the impression that for the means available to it, the RKKAs performance was not overly imposing.
I agree with this statement. Perhaps the cause for our row here is the confusion of "overall strength" with "effectiveness". That one could at least take from Lokos statement about who hoisted his flagg about whose capital. Is it really so difficult to understand that it is possible that in a war one army can fight better than its opponents and still lose? Or that to win not always means that you were also smarter, braver or more skillful in every regard than your enemy was?

Kitsune

12-28-2006, 01:32 AM

Lokos wrote:

No, they were not. Not even close. In November 1941 the German forces (approximating 3.5 million including satellite armies) were faced by some two and three quarters million Soviets. In tanks, the Soviets were outnumbered three to one (believe it or not). In a/c, similarly. Only in artillery did the Soviets maintain a semblance of superiority.

There, he does it again. The invading German forces faced a Soviet military of more than 5 million in strength all in all. That not all of them were in the west is nice but it still means that the Sovietsunion wasn't done for until all were beaten. Simply because the Soviets could shuffle forces.
Soviet casualties until the end of 1941 numbered 4.5 million - 2 million more than those 2.5 million you quote above (see how they shuffled?) and more than 1 million than the Germans had soldiers. In the same time German losses numbered about 700.000.
As far as tanks are concerned, you simply declare more than a half "not combat ready - while assuming that the 3.500 German tanks were always ready to 100%. Tsk. Whatever.
About planes - it is readily admitted that a lot of the Red Airforce was destroyed on the ground. Which was good for the Germans, otherwise things would have turned ugly fast, concerning that the Soviets had much more planes. (Allegedly, in Chukovs memoirs he says something about 17.745 planes having been delivered to the Red Air Force in the time from January 1st 1939 to June 22nd 1941 - now that would be a hell of a lot more...)
But good to see that we at least seem to agree as far as the artillery is concerned. ;-)

GazB

12-28-2006, 03:51 AM

mig-3 was inferior to the p-51D in high altitude performance.

Over home territory that doesn't matter... as long as the Mig-3s can shoot down B-29... and in unmodified form I doubt they could myself... they would probably resort to ramming like they did with the Polikarpovs at the start of the war...

Also, woudnt using the bomb as a tactical weapon against enemy troop concentrations be effective in this case?

Two main problems with that. First I doubt you'd get support from the Germans or other europeans if you start nuking their territory. Second actually making nukes was a slow process and they woldn't be ready for mass production for a few years.

At that time the US had no atomic weapons in their inventory.

One to test and dropping two on Japan used up most of the weapons grade material they had.

but I agree, it would have been terrible experience, no matter how much many people have waited for this.

No matter which side won that kind of war everyone would have lost. Nuclear explosions all over Europe would have rescued or liberated no one.

Leningrad was just an example - I think the US was largely free to invade anywhere on the Soviet coast if they chose to.

Remember the British and US military were riddled with spies. An opposed landing is unlikely to succeed.

(and some of which would still wearing GI smocks or drive jeeps or eat US food) while the dastardly Germans are now friends and have to be supported. (Using probably still a lot of those typical "Nazi" gear when fighting aside US troops...)
The whole situation would basically scream: "Our foreign policy is completely messed up!" to everyone.

Tough explaining away to the western public once those survivers of German concentration camps started telling their stories.

Needless to say, the guys in the field said it all. Have read plenty of stories of German pilots landing at Allied airfields asking for permission to load up weapons and start attacking Soviet targets. The reply was usually a jeep ride to the nearest holding area for prisoners.

The bombs back then were only slightly larger than todays tactical warheads and America could only produce a few a year, using an incredibly inefficent method for Uranium enrichment.

They were also physically so large only a restricted few aircraft types could actually carry them any sensible distance.

But since I also the think the US commitment would have been limited, it would have ended by throwing the Stalin's forces out of Germany (sans some of ist most eastern territory) and maybe Poland at best. That should have been possible. In the end, it did not even come to that.

Personally I think that if the allies didn't play fair with stalin then he wouldn't have settled for just east germany. The result would have been most of central Europe being a radioactive wasteland, with the Soviets having a few extra million dead, but the US and the British also leaping out of the sub million club into a few million dead of their own. If the allies wanted to get Japan on their side I am sure China and Korea would have been happy to supply troops to the Soviets. With proper training and decent equipment I think an invasion of Japan wouldn't have been out of the question.

Easily the third best military on the planet in WW2 (second best post-1944) - and by the standard of the time, this was no small honour.

Especially considering their isolationist policies before WWII that would hamper having a powerful armed forces with global reach.

The Americans and the Soviets had very similar design doctrines in WW2.

The only differing doctrine was german and we know who won... and why.

It seems quite unlikely that Stalin would submit to such unfavorable an agreement if he had truly felt superior in might.

If all the countries of eastern europe were to be absorbed into the Soviet Union and therefore occupied territories become Soviet territory then you would have a point. The reality is that Germany was a threat to the Soviets. They had done great damage to the Soviet union. The purpose of the division of Germany was to neutralise that threat. The countries between the SU and German became a useful buffer between the SU and the west, but never became Soviet Territory. You'd think if conquest was what Stalin planned the first thing he'd do is ship all the people of the various countries to different places and then delete all the borders so the previous countries no longer existed...

First of all, the Germans seldom managed to amass sufficient forces to establish such massive a superiority operationally as you postulate after the very initial stages of Barbarossa.

When the Germans attacked the Soviets were still deploying their tanks as support vehicles for their infantry rather than in concentrated units to fight like units.
If you had a unit of Machinegunners and they attacked a large unit with MGs dispersed throughout the whole unit then local superiority would be huge even if the other larger unit had more MGs overall. That is the advantage of the attack. Concentration of forces at one point and if your recon is any good you focus on a point that is already weak.

When the Germans invaded with 3.3 million men, the soviet army had more than 5 million under arms.

And did those 3.3 million germans attack everywhere on the front line or did they concentrate their attacks at certain points to encircle most of those 5 million to cut off their supplies and support?

The Soviet superiority in artillery and planes was by about factor four and five, respectively, the superiority in tanks was around times seven.

And how many of those planes were destroyed on the ground by surprise? What effect did those tanks have after they were bypassed and left cut off from supply?

When the Soviet army was on the offensive they had almost never (I can't think of one single case) anything but a solid superiority in numbers of men and material of any kind.

The Soviets were attacked by surprise, but blaming them for preparing all their offensives by making sure they at least have superior numbers is an interesting charge. I guess you go to the olympics and tell off all the athletes for having coachs and practising in their particular event before they perform at the olympics... imagine wanting superior numbers before attacking German or Japanese forces... what were they thinking?

I just want to remind you that when the Germans made it to Moscow in half a year they were outnumbered. That's a fact. And when the Soviets made their way back, they outnumbered the Wehrmacht - but still needed more than two years to reach Berlin. Any superiorty in numbers the Germans had anywhere was usually punctually through better concentration of forces.

What a difference surprise makes. And of course the Soviets had to liberate on their way back... something the Germans never had to do.

First of all, the Germans seldom managed to amass sufficient forces to establish such massive a superiority operationally as you postulate after the very initial stages of Barbarossa.

So their mobility and excellent communications meant nothing? They were beaten by commie lemmings pushing sleds?

Kilgor

12-28-2006, 05:00 AM

Over home territory that doesn't matter... as long as the Mig-3s can shoot down B-29... and in unmodified form I doubt they could myself... they would probably resort to ramming like they did with the Polikarpovs at the start of the war...

Honestly.. this is statement is just moronic.

How do you expect those Migs to get anywhere near the bombers ?

They would be torn to pieces by fighters of superior performance and who can dictate the terms of the engagement by superior speed. This is exactly how the poor pilots Of p-40s learned to fight against zeros.

they would probably resort to ramming like they did with the Polikarpovs at the start of the war

Sending valueable pilots on ramming suicide missions. Great tactic

Lokos

12-28-2006, 08:30 AM

Might want to check your numbers again Lokos

No, actually, I won't, because the figure of 9.1 million is for the Wehrmacht as a whole - i.e. the entire military institution - not the combat personnel. There were 12 million men in the RKKA as a whole, but only 6 million in combat branches. There were also 12 million men in the US army, believe it or not, but the vast majority were in the service branches.

I was just referring to the most Eastern line of defense, not the overall strength of the German armed forces

And you're still badly mistaken unless your argument is that there were roughly 85 Volkssturm divisions on the EF in conjunction with 85 regular Wehrmacht/SS divisions all with an average strength of 4,500 men or less. Since divisional strength in the Wehrmacht did not fall far below 8,000 men during the most catastrophic period (June 1944-May 1945) I find your numbers bewildering.

I was just mimicking Lokos usual kind of argumentation, when he claims that the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army

From June 1941 until December 1941 it did. Fact. I've posted the numbers before on these very boards, in a discussion with you. You STILL have yet to respond to that post.

If I may, just to emphasize my point, assume that the Soviet losses until the end of 1944, against the German military only, numbered 6.5 million then the ratio of those two numbers (Soviet military losses against German military losses as long as there was still an German military to speak of) would be 2.41 - that interestingly is roughly what Dupuy says about the difference in combat effectiveness of the German armed forces compared to the Soviet ones(independently from Overmans by the way, since he died before Overmans published his book).

And it was a constant ratio of 2.41:1 throughout the war, was it? What about the 6:1 of 1941? Here is a newsflash: the ratio of German/Russian KIA was constantly changing throughout the war. Does Dupuy's theory allow for evolution of combat means and methods? Well?

Is it really so difficult to understand that it is possible that in a war one army can fight better than its opponents and still lose? Or that to win not always means that you were also smarter, braver or more skillful in every regard than your enemy was?

To me it is more a measure of skill, resourcefulness, bravery and imagination that a state which - at its greatest industrial output - was not the match of even Germany proper in terms of industrial potential managed to (having lost 60% of even that paltry base and having its economic activity fall to the level of Portugal's (not in a military sense, of course)) by February 1941 outproduce the Germans in just about every sense and that, having lost the entire pre-war regular army in a series of brutal yet futile border battles, still managed to continuously field vast reserve armies, won a conflict of that magnitude.

Not only did the Axis powers outnumber the RKKA's WMD (Western Military District; i.e. the only relevant forces in Barbarossa), not only was the WMD wholly outclassed in the beginning of the war and not only was the WMD the worse off after August 1941 in terms of who had greater access to tanks and a/c - but the Soviet state had also lost more than half its industrial potential, and nearly seventy million people across the occupied territories. That lowered its manpower base to something like 120 million - far less than the Axis total!

Still this state managed to triumph.

The invading German forces faced a Soviet military of more than 5 million in strength all in all.

I have already explained this to you, Kitsune. You're just not getting it. My patience is on a steady decline.

Hear this:

1) The WMD did not have 5 million men.
2) The units deployed in the WMD were not up to strength
3) As a result, at the points of decision, the Wehrmacht wholly outnumbered its opponents and, by November 1941, significantly outnumbered them in EVERY sense except artillery.

That not all of them were in the west is nice but it still means that the Sovietsunion wasn't done for until all were beaten. Simply because the Soviets could shuffle forces.

That's all good and well until one realises that this did not happen until December 1941, making your rebuttal entirely besides the point.

Soviet casualties until the end of 1941 numbered 4.5 million - 2 million more than those 2.5 million you quote above (see how they shuffled?) and more than 1 million than the Germans had soldiers.

Soviet losses for the third and fourth quarter of 1941 include the greater part of the regular army and the reserve armies raised and levied throughout August, September, October and November. There was no shuffling from the Far Eastern Military District up until very late November.

As far as tanks are concerned, you simply declare more than a half "not combat ready - while assuming that the 3.500 German tanks were always ready to 100%. Tsk. Whatever.

More than half? Well more than half. Regardless of German maintenance difficulties, in November 1941 they had well over twice the number of tanks available to the Soviets.

(Allegedly, in Chukovs memoirs he says something about 17.745 planes having been delivered to the Red Air Force in the time from January 1st 1939 to June 22nd 1941 - now that would be a hell of a lot more...)

There were some 8,000 in service, and well over two thousand were destroyed on the ground during the opening of the attack.

Lokos

Indiana Jones

12-28-2006, 12:16 PM

What, exactly, is 'extreme' about his view? If by 'extreme' you actually mean 'balanced' then, certainly, you are correct.

Lokos, Glantz does present a highly partisan view of the affair and hardly embodies the mainstream opinion- I guess you know that. While his command of Soviet primary accounts is certainly excellent, (which I admittedly cannot properly judge, since my Russian is somewhat underwhelming) he falls short direly when it comes their German counterparts, which I can assess. Just take a look at his bibliography and sources, it tells the entire story. His primary and somewhat groundbreaking merit is to have provided the Soviet perspective to a broader Western audience, yet I consider his main works as a missed chance. He has been presented with the historic opportunity to merge both approaches into an organic whole, yet succumbed to exactly the temptations he accused many of his predecessors to have fallen for on the other side of the fence whose access was limited to the German perspective for the most part. One can indeed not help to think of him as a man on a mission...

According to Overmans the Wehrmacht suffered roughly 1,230,045 KIA/MIA in 1945 - the vast majority having fallen on the Russo-German front. Unless we're talking about a casualty rate of nearly one hundred percent, someone's figures are off. [...]
I am in fact quite inclined to believe that Overmans figures are scholarly very problematical, to say the least. For an in-depth recension (in english)
please follow this adress:
http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/overmans.pdf

In doing so, for the first two weeks (and the most pivotal of the operation), they were inflicting vastly disproportionate casualties on the Germans. For the Germans June 1944 was more tragic than November-January 1942-1943.

Vastly dispropotionate ? While numbers vary vastly indeed, Krivosheev (which I consider relatively authoritative in this regard) puts the total number of soviet casualties (including the 1. Belorussian Front) at 770,000 while, according to Zetterling, German casualties amounted to 399,000. If you add HiWis and Hungarians, this figure rises to 450-500000.
Preservation of their manpower was never an area in which the RKKA excelled, even in victory. That said, Soviet losses in material were even more distinctly exceeding those of the Germans...Your conclusion, however, is accurate in my opinion. Bagration finally and irreversibly broke the backbone of the Wehrmacht.

When the Germans were forced into similar measures in 1944 and beyond, their forces suffered similarly unfavourable casualty rates.

This is precisely the point. They never did. Soviet estimates of German casualties which I assume you employ have been proven time after time to be utterly inflated...On a microtactial level, there can be no doubt that the RKKA often outfought the Wehrmacht and its Allies, but this continued to be the exception and not the rule until the closing weeks of the war.

Not so bold, if you look at it more expansively. I question the methodology of looking at kill ratios to judge combat effectiveness. I may be old fashioned, but in my mind victory is the only measure of success. That the Germans managed to - surpassed in means and manpower - achieve a 1.25:1 kill ratio against a foe on the attack is not surprising. Even a 2.2:1 kill ratio (as was the case for the Soviets in 1942-1943) is not particularly striking.

As Kitsune already pointed out, Dupuy puts the numbers at 1,4-1,5:1 against the WA and more than 2,5:1 for the RKKA in 1944.
Once the initial penetration is archived and the fight "in der Tiefe des Raumes" ensues, the old, pre-war maxims concerning casualty figures simply do not hold water. If anything, this has been thoroughly proven by Fall Gelb and Fall Rot.

Quote:
The RKKA was certainly the strongest conventional military factor on the planet from 1942 onwards.
The latter stages of 1943 onwards.

Well, we will have to disagree here. Once the situation was consolidated, no amount of incompetence could have lost the war for Soviet Russia.

CPL Trevoga

12-28-2006, 04:54 PM

It was NOT true for Barbarossa at all. When the Germans invaded with 3.3 million men, the soviet army had more than 5 million under arms. The Soviet superiority in artillery and planes was by about factor four and five, respectively, the superiority in tanks was around times seven.

Bunch of bricks doesn't make a house, on paper RKKA was a powerful force. In reality it lacked experienced senior officers, Stalin pretty much destroyed his officer corps. Also it's very important to understand that Stalin did not want the war, units close to the border did not even issued live ammo.

Air force was pretty much destroyed by Luftwaffe on the ground in the first day. In the first days of Barbarossa Stalin went into some kind of depression, no real guidance was given in those crucial first days.

Even with numerical superiority, those odds were against Soviets and of course let's not forget the Werhmacht, which was well led, well equipped, battle hardened, most powerful army in the world.

[QUOTE=Kitsune]
When the Soviet army was on the offensive they had almost never (I can't think of one single case) anything but a solid superiority in numbers of men and material of any kind.

That's pretty much true for any offensive doctrine. To achive success on the offensive you have to archive fire superiority and numerical advantage at least 3 to 1. Unfair advantage is the key. Anything less will be a failure.

I don't do anything of the kind. I just want to remind you that when the Germans made it to Moscow in half a year they were outnumbered. That's a fact. And when the Soviets made their way back, they outnumbered the Wehrmacht - but still needed more than two years to reach Berlin. Any superiorty in numbers the Germans had anywhere was usually punctually through better concentration of forces."

Again Wehrmacht was not a push over, later in the war it was real slugfest between equal opponents, it's no wonder it took much longer to drive Germans out.

Indiana Jones

12-28-2006, 09:43 PM

You do not give nearly enough credit to Soviet planners for Bagration. Not only did they employ tailor made assault and shock forces skillfully, they intricately planned the utter destruction of dozens of German divisions through operational maneouvre.
I do give them credit. I fully acknowledge the fact that even in academic circles the efforts of the RKKA have been reprehensibly underestimated when considering the outcome of the conflict, and especially so when it comes to the role and influence of Stavka...Bagration saw indeed the Soviet High Command successfully and skillfully orchestrate the destruction of Heeresgruppe Mitte with all the classic ingredients, however it did so on the basis of a massive strategic superiority and by adapting stratagems that had been mastered by their counterparts basically since the "Vernichtungsgedanke" (annihilation concept) had been formulated. I concur, Stavkas innovation certainly lies in the large-scale application of strategic deception which enabled them to archieve complete surprise, still the implementation of their policies obviously left a lot to be desired. The massive losses sustained by the RKKA during Bagration in both men and material would have crippled any force of lesser total size, and does indeed pose the question whether the Soviets had already caught up tactically and operationally (strategically, they certainly did) and consequently how they would have fared had the odds been more equal.

Soviet operational art, when employed unobstructed and unimpeded by political considerations (i.e. arriving in Berlin as quickly as possible, paying disregard to the practical difficulties of emphasising speed to such an extent) produced victories such as Bagration, August Storm, Iassy, Crimea, Orel, Belgorod-Kharkov, Oder etc. These victories were as effective and as cost-efficient as anything the Germans had ever accomplished against comparable foes.

Am I truly the one deluding himself?

I do not want to bore a fellow historian to tears, but with the exception of August Storm all cited examples involve a much higher toll on the Soviet side than on that of its respective adversaries. The RKKA, even on its very zenith, never managed to reduce the butchers bill to the corresponding figures of the Wehrmacht. Since you point to political interventions, it has to be taken into account that the Wehrmacht was even moreso blessed by the guidance of its dillettantic leader whose considerations were a constant nuisance to the OKW, and while Manstein and others have certainly and conveniently blown the problem out of proportion, it can be hardly ignored as a relevant factor...

Casually dismissing massive Soviet successes in favour of bland generalities that when looked upon in detail do not even hold true is an exercise in futility. Your choice, though.

Lokos
That is quite an imputation, and a particuarly superfluous one at that. I do hold the RKKA in high regard, however I do consider perseverance, organisational effectiveness and long-term logistics to be its key qualities; and esteem tactical and operational (mind you, not strategical) aspects to be of relatively subordinate importance to its eventual victory. That is not to say the RKKA did not evolve, even evolve dramatically in these fields, but it never attained the excellence which distinguished the Wehrmacht even during its demise.

GazB

12-29-2006, 12:41 AM

Honestly.. this is statement is just moronic.

How do you expect those Migs to get anywhere near the bombers ?

They would be torn to pieces by fighters of superior performance and who can dictate the terms of the engagement by superior speed. This is exactly how the poor pilots Of p-40s learned to fight against zeros.

The Mig-3s wont be dogfighting, they will be attacking bombers... it will be La-5FNs and Yak-9s and Yak-3s that will be dogfighting...

Sending valueable pilots on ramming suicide missions. Great tactic

A tactic of desperation, but armed with 12.7mm MGs what chance has a Mig-3 got of shooting down a B-29? It is probably too high for rockets to be carried...
Besides when Polikarpovs came up against Bf-109s what other choice did they have? There were several pilots who rammed enemy planes multiple times and not only survived, but returned to base.

Lokos

12-29-2006, 01:37 AM

Lokos, Glantz does present a highly partisan view of the affair and hardly embodies the mainstream opinion- I guess you know that.

As a point of fact, for a number of years now Glantz has held the distinction of being the pre-eminent military historian of the Eastern Front. His work has become as mainstream as anything published on the subject. Feel free to show me that his view is radical and 'partisan' - stop telling.

he falls short direly when it comes their German counterparts, which I can assess

In which sense? He uses German military archives to an adequate degree.

One can indeed not help to think of him as a man on a mission...

Hah! Please, don't veil your accusations too effectively.

I am in fact quite inclined to believe that Overmans figures are scholarly very problematical, to say the least.

You are inclined to believe it because that is what you wish to believe. Overmans is the authority on German wartime casualties. His work I certainly consider of greater accuracy than the Wehrmacht's own ineffective book keeping. Your posted critique of Overmans' work concludes not that Overmans was [i]wrong[i], but that he presents the upper end of the range of possible German casualties. Yet it also admits the problems of the card system (i.e. not properly taking into account what happened to wounded following their wounding, the fate of missing, those who died of disease, those not in regular units etc).

Vastly dispropotionate ? While numbers vary vastly indeed, Krivosheev (which I consider relatively authoritative in this regard) puts the total number of soviet casualties (including the 1. Belorussian Front) at 770,000 while, according to Zetterling, German casualties amounted to 399,000. If you add HiWis and Hungarians, this figure rises to 450-500000.

'The first two weeks' must have skipped your attention.

Why bring up Soviet casualties for the operation as a whole?

Why bring up Soviet casualties as a whole, when a categorical breakdown would have been more telling?

Soviet casualties 22 June - 19 August:

KIA/MIA: 178,507
WIA/sick: 587,308

German casualties (Niepold, Zaloga, Adair):

KIA/MIA: 260,000 killed
POW: 116,000

Preservation of their manpower was never an area in which the RKKA excelled, even in victory.

Is that why by 1944 the Soviets were fielding manpower efficient divisional equivalents with far greater firepower than their German equivalents?

That said, Soviet losses in material were even more distinctly exceeding those of the Germans...

The Soviets had more materiel to lose... That is to say, there was greater opportunity for the Soviets to suffer loss of materiel than the Germans. The vast majority of their AFV losses were suffered at the hands of AT artillery. So why even mention it?

This is precisely the point. They never did.

Iassy-Kishinev? Oder (first weeks)? Balaton? Berlin?

Yes, they did, as a matter of fact.

old, pre-war maxims concerning casualty figures simply do not hold water. If anything, this has been thoroughly proven by Fall Gelb and Fall Rot.

In what sense? Are we under the impression that the Germans did not achieve tactical force superiorites of incredible proportions in breaking through and exploiting the French rear areas? Like I said, the relationship between casualties suffered and initial superiority achieved is a relative one.

Well, we will have to disagree here. Once the situation was consolidated, no amount of incompetence could have lost the war for Soviet Russia

The situation was not consolidated in 1942.

however it did so on the basis of a massive strategic superiority

You do not give much credit to the OKH/OKW, do you? They achieved such superiorities very, very frequently. This is what enabled most of their victories. This is how military force is employed effectively. There is no shame in outnumbering your opponent at the point of decision. Rather, it is a requirement of cheap and easy victory.

The massive losses sustained by the RKKA during Bagration in both men and material would have crippled any force of lesser total size

Soviet losses, relative to the strength of the units involved, fell during every consecutive stage of the war.

but with the exception of August Storm all cited examples involve a much higher toll on the Soviet side than on that of its respective adversaries.

No, they do not, actually.

The RKKA, even on its very zenith, never managed to reduce the butchers bill to the corresponding figures of the Wehrmacht.

The RKKA, unlike the Wehrmacht, spent two years on the offensive against capable opposition - not opposition that was institutionally doomed to defeat as soon as battle was joined.

Since you point to political interventions, it has to be taken into account that the Wehrmacht was even moreso blessed by the guidance of its dillettantic leader whose considerations were a constant nuisance to the OKW, and while Manstein and others have certainly and conveniently blown the problem out of proportion, it can be hardly ignored as a relevant factor...

And if Hitler hadn't ordered the formation of hedgehog positions in 1941 the entire German front might have cracked wide open... Take the good with the bad.

and esteem tactical and operational (mind you, not strategical) aspects to be of relatively subordinate importance to its eventual victory

Funny, I do not recall one German operational success of note after the middle of 1944.

That is not to say the RKKA did not evolve, even evolve dramatically in these fields, but it never attained the excellence which distinguished the Wehrmacht even during its demise.

You're right; it surpassed it.

Lokos

nagant_m44

12-29-2006, 04:23 AM

The Mig-3s wont be dogfighting, they will be attacking bombers... it will be La-5FNs and Yak-9s and Yak-3s that will be dogfighting...

A tactic of desperation, but armed with 12.7mm MGs what chance has a Mig-3 got of shooting down a B-29? It is probably too high for rockets to be carried...
Besides when Polikarpovs came up against Bf-109s what other choice did they have? There were several pilots who rammed enemy planes multiple times and not only survived, but returned to base.

Why would the P-51's go down to fight the La-5FM, Yak-9, and Yak-3? while great(yak-3 is arguably the best) at medium and low altitude, these fighters suffered at high altitude. Maybe they could upgun the Mig-3 to the ShVAK 20mm cannon or the Berezin B-20 cannon?

Kilgor

12-29-2006, 06:31 AM

P51D: 7620@703
LA5FN: 6250@634
Yak 9U: 5000@6572-700
Yak 3: 4100@646

figures in metric

No soviet production fighter could touch the mustang at that altitude. Down low of course it would be the revers

nagant_m44

12-29-2006, 02:40 PM

well the Yak-3U could touch the mustang at that alititude, but it wasnt produced in numbers because the war ended.

Ea$y-8

12-29-2006, 03:57 PM

Patton did wanna use German POWs against the Soviets. I think Britian probably would have fallowed I don't know about the rest of the 'lesser' allies. We had whole Armies of German POWs that had already been through some of the best military training on the planet.

One issue we kinda need to look at is the Sherman vs the T-34. Now, There are many a WWII buff (such as myself) who will rant that a Tiger is better than the T-34. But it is clear that a T-34 could kick a Sherman's tail. Also is the Pershing vs IS-2 or IS-3. I personally don't know about who would come out on top in that case. However the US could do what I personally think should have been done after the war - just adopt the Tiger by sending the designs for the tank back to the US.

I don't know how good the Soviet fighters were but the P-51s were the shiz and we had bombers up to yen yang. And our first jet the P-80 Shooting Star had just come out and the MiG-15 didn't come out until 1949. So I would say we would control the skies

On ground war you would of course see a lot of Kharkov and Kursk style battles. The Soviet military machine was very powerful in offensive action and could destroy entire Army Group's when deployed far enough forward as we saw at Bagration. What we also know from that offensive is that the Soviet war machine was not like US forces it could not just keep 'going and going and going' without the supply line shapping (Look at the dash threw France!)

Also the Wehrmacht did not employ Airborne units on the Eastern Front. So we really have no idea how it would work against them. However Paratroopers proved themselves very effective against the Wehrmacht in every battle they fought. I don't see why the Paratroopers couldn't drop behind enemy lines and wreck havoc on the flow of supplies and hold out against much larger forces. As was proved in Market Garden however... You must find away to relieve the paratroopers once they have really stepped in the ant hill. The Soviets had Paratroopers but IIRC made no jumps at all. So we have something that the Soviets did not. US troops were also better trained then his Soviet counterpart which made him man for man superior it could however be argued that the Soviet Forces had been threw 5 years of none stopped war and must have toughened up quiet a bit. However the Soviets had much more artillery and tanks which gave them a lot more firepower.

Also in the Pacific the US had 26 divisions 19 Infantry, 6 Marine and 1 Airborne. The Soviets on the other hand had 60 Divisions that made up the 1st and 2nd Red Banner Armies. The Marines much like the Paratroopers were and still are a solid force with tough men who serve in them. They could probably do a large amount of damage to formations much larger than their own. However the plains of Manchuria and Siberia would give the Soviets the perfect place to deploy their massive amount of firepower at their deposal. Aircraft from the carriers would be flying in and out day and night none stop providing US troops with much needed air cover. And if they get driven onto the beachs and began getting forced out the gunfire from US battleships would cut the Soviets within range of their huge cannons to bits. There would be no march on Moscow seeing as how supporting such a long march would be almost impossible. If they were to win Siberia however the Soviets would lose a lot of their resources.

Snoshi

12-29-2006, 05:37 PM

^^^Listen to ma man Easy 8!! :/

Hellfish

12-29-2006, 05:44 PM

^^^Listen to ma man Easy 8!! :/

The guy who has absolutely no idea what he's talking about?

Hydro

12-29-2006, 05:46 PM

The guy who has absolutely no idea what he's talking about?

Oi, how can you not take comments like

However the US could do what I personally think should have been done after the war - just adopt the Tiger by sending the designs for the tank back to the US.

seriously?

Kilgor

12-29-2006, 06:35 PM

well the Yak-3U could touch the mustang at that alititude, but it wasnt produced in numbers because the war ended.

The mustang and yak are similar speeds, but the mustang can do this speed at much higher altitude. The yak would certainly not have been as fast at the same height.

The VK-107A engines powering the yaks were already being pushed very hard and had a extremely short service life of 25 hours.

Kilgor

12-29-2006, 06:42 PM

as for atomic bombs and shortages, the US could have had 3 more in september and 3 more in october. No shortage.

Indiana Jones

12-29-2006, 07:57 PM

As a point of fact, for a number of years now Glantz has held the distinction of being the pre-eminent military historian of the Eastern Front. His work has become as mainstream as anything published on the subject.
Glantz is reputed to be the foremost Western expert on the RKKA in WW2, especially when it comes to staff work. Hardly the "pre-eminent historian of the Eastern Front"...If there was such a thing in the first place. This subject is, after all, an immensely complex one...and then there are Erickson and Zemke and Seaton, to name some distinguished individuals from the Anglo-Saxon school of historiography.

Feel free to show me that his view is radical and 'partisan' - stop telling.

My pleasure, always at your service...
Taken from the introduction of "When Titans clashed":

"This book summarizes ongoing research and reinterpretation of the Soviet-German conflict based on newly released Soviet archival studies. Because the bulk of new sources are Soviet, this study emphasizes the Soviet side as much as previous histories exaggerated the German version of events"

That is quite telling indeed, I guess; this tendency to almost exclusively rely on the Soviet point of view is lucidly manifest throughout the entire volume.(His uncritical use of Krivosheevs obviously exaggerated figures of German dead/POWs from ´44 onwards, etc.) By his own admission, Glantz expressis verbis never even attempted to provide a definitive and/or even balanced account. He does not cover the middle ground. His stated goal was to enhance Western understanding of the conflict by making the distinctly Soviet perspective available to a broader audience.

In which sense? He uses German military archives to an adequate degree.
Not even remotely. In fact, he hardly uses them at all. There is an absolute maximum (I have actually counted) of perhaps 15, largely indirect references to German archival material. This cannot however be blamed on him, since his approach, as pointed out above, was a diametrally different one.

You are inclined to believe it because that is what you wish to believe. Overmans is the authority on German wartime casualties. His work I certainly consider of greater accuracy than the Wehrmacht's own ineffective book keeping.
Rüdiger Overmans himself considers the "Wehrmachts own ineffective book keeping" to be quite accurate until December 1944. And yes, Overmans is a very controversial figure within the German historic community and there is ample reason to believe that his findings are quite arbitrary. They are almost certainly too high, the question remains to which degree.

I am too tired right now to really get into this, and I also have work to do. However, I will be again at your disposal tomorrow evening.

nagant_m44

12-29-2006, 08:42 PM

Oi, how can you not take comments like

seriously?

no, its a great idea. Copy a tank that is a mechanical and logistical nightmare. :roll:

nagant_m44

12-29-2006, 08:44 PM

Kilgor

12-30-2006, 12:38 AM

there is much more to air combat that just speed...if worst came to worse, im sure the soviets could obtain a copy of the rolls royce merlin and start local production.

They could have copied the design, but could not produce the high octane fuel needed to run properly.

At the allies high octane fuel came from America, it was not easy to produce in volume.

there is much more to air combat that just speed....

Yes of course, but as the combat pilots have said for 90+ years...

"speed is life"

Lord Of War

12-30-2006, 01:54 AM

However the US could do what I personally think should have been done after the war - just adopt the Tiger by sending the designs for the tank back to the US.

Why would they? That would cost time and money trying to copy the tiger's design, Needless to say the US already had a tank capable of taking on the T-34 with ease: The Pershing (or as some of you like to refer to it as: "the tiger tamer") In addition the US had ordered the T-29 to go into production which was more or less and equal of the Soviet heavy tanks that they would face in eastern eroupe. So there was really no need to design a new tank based on the Tiger or copy it.

I don't know how good the Soviet fighters were but the P-51s were the shiz and we had bombers up to yen yang. And our first jet the P-80 Shooting Star had just come out and the MiG-15 didn't come out until 1949. So I would say we would control the skies

Indeed, But the P-80 had just been introduced into the USAF (in 1945) and it would take considerable time before the USAF could feild them in sufficent numbers.

Brute

12-30-2006, 03:29 AM

The mustang and yak are similar speeds, but the mustang can do this speed at much higher altitude. The yak would certainly not have been as fast at the same height.

The VK-107A engines powering the yaks were already being pushed very hard and had a extremely short service life of 25 hours.

There were quite a few high altitude interceptors the Soviets were toying with since 1942:

the MiG-3U's derivative I-231 that hit 707km/h at >7000 meters
http://www.airwar.ru/image/i/fww2/i231-i.jpg
and in parallel the whole I-220/222/224/225 (the last one did 726km/h at 10,000m) series:

http://www.airwar.ru/image/i/fww2/i224-i.jpg

http://www.airwar.ru/image/i/fww2/i225-i.jpg

The program wasn't seriously pursued primary due to the lack of a high altitude threat and then finally cancelled because of the advent of the jet age.

Lokos

12-30-2006, 04:43 AM

Hardly the "pre-eminent historian of the Eastern Front"...If there was such a thing in the first place. This subject is, after all, an immensely complex one...and then there are Erickson and Zemke and Seaton, to name some distinguished individuals from the Anglo-Saxon school of historiography.

Erickson's excellent 'From Stalingrad to Berlin' and that books predecessor have been made obsolescent by 'When Titans Clashed'. Newer sources, newer data - Glantz simply had more accurate information at his disposal. Erickson was the pre-eminent EF historian of his time, however. Yet, Erickson, too, used an immense number of Soviet sources, though I do not see you extending your campaign against him.

this tendency to almost exclusively rely on the Soviet point of view is lucidly manifest throughout the entire volume.(His uncritical use of Krivosheevs obviously exaggerated figures of German dead/POWs from ´44 onwards, etc.)

Since what is in question is the strategic overview of the entire war on the Eastern Front, I cannot understand your continuing fixation on casualties. Glantz himself concentrates primarily on Soviet casualties - citing German casualties only when he believed it to be necessary. Aside from the casualty question (and in full knowledge that Krivosheev's figures of German casualties are meaningless), what, exactly, makes his view unbalanced?

It is one thing to consider the war from one point of view, and another matter entirely to be unfairly biased or unbalanced in doing so. We are not talking about clear-cut balancing between points of view, but balance in terms of historiographical accuracy as we know it. Present your case.

By his own admission, Glantz expressis verbis never even attempted to provide a definitive and/or even balanced account

Ditto.

Not even remotely. In fact, he hardly uses them at all. There is an absolute maximum (I have actually counted) of perhaps 15, largely indirect references to German archival material.

And which faults, exactly, do you find with his archival work? Will I be seeing the word 'casualties' again?

And yes, Overmans is a very controversial figure within the German historic community and there is ample reason to believe that his findings are quite arbitrary. They are almost certainly too high, the question remains to which degree.

Until a better study of German wartime losses presents itself, we all must make do with the best sources available. Since there are clear, massive omissions and inaccuracies in the card system, Overmans' study presents itself as the most viable thesis on this issue. Ditto Krivosheev.

Needless to say the US already had a tank capable of taking on the T-34 with ease

With ease? Which tank of the war could take on the T-34 'with ease'?

Not the Tiger, not the Tiger II, and certainly not the Pershing. That is not say that it couldn't take on the T-34 - but with ease?

What we also know from that offensive is that the Soviet war machine was not like US forces it could not just keep 'going and going and going' without the supply line shapping (Look at the dash threw France!)

The 'dash' through France?

Heh.

Lokos

Lord Of War

12-30-2006, 04:52 AM

With ease? Which tank of the war could take on the T-34 'with ease'?

Not the Tiger, not the Tiger II, and certainly not the Pershing. That is not say that it couldn't take on the T-34 - but with ease?

Maybe "ease" wasn't the approate word for me to use in regards to my comment, I do believe that the Pershing was seperior to the T-34 on paper, But on the battlefeild that may be a different story.

Doublethinker

12-30-2006, 06:38 AM

They could have copied the design, but could not produce the high octane fuel needed to run properly.

Why do you think that they couldn't? Just because the Allies supplied the USSR with it?

Nice logic ;)

Kilgor

12-30-2006, 06:49 AM

Why do you think that they couldn't? Just because the Allies supplied the USSR with it?

Nice logic ;)

Maybe you missed the bit about high octane fuel being very difficult to produce.

Doublethinker

12-30-2006, 07:25 AM

Maybe you missed the bit about high octane fuel being very difficult to produce.

I know this quite well.

But this part "but could not produce the high octane fuel" looks like you think that the USSR couldn't produce its own hi-octane fuel, when in fact a special refinery which produced high octane ful with a coefficient of 80 instead of the regular 56 was built in Chernikhovsk.

And while the USSR lacked behind the US in terms of volume of high-quality octane fuel, it DID have its own refineries to produce it.

Kilgor

12-30-2006, 07:40 AM

I know this quite well.

But this part "but could not produce the high octane fuel" looks like you think that the USSR couldn't produce its own hi-octane fuel, .

"the allies high octane fuel came from America, it was not easy to produce in volume."

is what I wrote and thanks for agreeing with it.

GazB

12-30-2006, 11:15 PM

"the allies high octane fuel came from America, it was not easy to produce in volume."

is what I wrote and thanks for agreeing with it.

They also didn't produce trucks in large volumes either... did that mean they couldn't?

If you pay someone to make a brides dress for your future wife and you pay someone for flowers for a wedding and you pay a caterer to provide food for the guests at your wedding does that mean you can't sew, grow flowers, or cook? What sort of idiot would arrange for a brides dress, some flowers, and food and then make all those things themselves too?

No soviet production fighter could touch the mustang at that altitude. Down low of course it would be the revers

Couldn't possibly be because there was no threat at that altitude to the Soviet Union? Equally if a threat did materialise that steps would be taken to address that threat? By 1946 you'd have La-9s and even La-11s, pehaps even Yak-15s.

Indiana Jones

01-01-2007, 01:45 PM

Sorry for my tardiness. Too much work on German wannabe revolutionaries.

Yet, Erickson, too, used an immense number of Soviet sources, though I do not see you extending your campaign against him.
Erickson was not the issue...Intimate knowledge and use of the Soviet sources naturally is the conditio sine qua non for any reputable historian when dealing with the eastern front, but the same applies to the German side. This is of course merely stating the obvious.

Since what is in question is the strategic overview of the entire war on the Eastern Front, I cannot understand your continuing fixation on casualties. Glantz himself concentrates primarily on Soviet casualties - citing German casualties only when he believed it to be necessary.
You are already yourself providing the answer to your following question:
what, exactly, makes his view unbalanced?

But again, Glantz is not at a loss here, since a "balanced" approach, either quantitavily or qualitatively, was never the focus of his work at all. I am not trying to discredit Glantz per se, his work has contributed greatly to the discourse, but it should be properly understood as what it is and wants to be.

And which faults, exactly, do you find with his archival work? Will I be seeing the word 'casualties' again?
Yes you will, and I will not let it off the hook. ;)The primary reason why I am riding the casualty issue is because it seems to seems to utterly stultify your assessment that the RKKA eventually surpassed the Wehrmacht in operational ability and produced similarly cost-effective victories. By employing Krivosheevs statistics Glantz significantly distorts the picture and flatters the Soviet ability of conducting mobile warfare in the same destructive yet economic manner the Wehrmacht exhibited during the early years of the war.
More on this tomorrow.

Lokos

01-02-2007, 12:59 AM

Yes you will, and I will not let it off the hook. The primary reason why I am riding the casualty issue is because it seems to seems to utterly stultify your assessment that the RKKA eventually surpassed the Wehrmacht in operational ability and produced similarly cost-effective victories. By employing Krivosheevs statistics Glantz significantly distorts the picture and flatters the Soviet ability of conducting mobile warfare in the same destructive yet economic manner the Wehrmacht exhibited during the early years of the war.
More on this tomorrow.

The rest of your post substantively leads up to this, as you do not have any ground to stand on criticising Glantz's archival work otherwise. That is to say that, casualties aside, it (his information) is accurate.

Your entire thesis (that the Wehrmacht remained a more capable (tactically) war machine than the RKKA based on casualties traded) is ludicrous. Allow me to elaborate:

In June 1941 a Wehrmacht at its most experienced, most well led, most well equipped (relatively), most motivated, most well supplied and strongest (all relatively to other combatants) begins the invasion of the SU. The RKKA, in comparison, is crippled by poor deployments (very little strategic depth), a woefully slow mobilization (with many units committed to battle at cadre strength), ineffective leadership (men who were commanding regiments simply woke up on day to find themselves commanding divisions), poor C3, non-existent logistics (the vast majority of Soviet tanks were abandoned for lack of fuel and ammunition, not destroyed), ineffective air support and an indecisive high command.

By establishing localized tactical and operational superiorities, the Wehrmacht quickly punches through Soviet 'lines' (if they can be called that), within days. The defeat in detail (in dribs and drabs, that is) of the RKKA WMD begins. The only credit that can be given to the RKKA is that, throughout the horrific months of July, August and September the institution continued to display its ability to field reserve armies - untrained and poorly equipped as they were - to at least slow down the German advance. Needless to say, such formations did not have a very lengthy lifespan, and most were rendered combat ineffective after mere days or weeks following committal.

In this time, the Germans are inflicting vastly disproportionate casualties (6:1) and capturing incredible numbers of Soviet prisoners (culminating in Kiev). However, by late August the raspu****a is entering the pivotal stage, and operational movement slows down to a crawl. This buys the RKKA time to reconsolidate strategic positions and reserves. As the fighting draws to a climax in the north, the Wehrmacht (AGC) fails to break through to Moscow itself, having detoured to Kiev. Winter sets in, and German predictions of a six week war are made to look absurd.

As the temperature takes its toll on German equipment, morale and manpower, the Soviets launch the incredibly ambitious winter counteroffensive of 1941, fuelled by a vast, accumulated strategic reserve. German lines draw back under enormous pressure, yet the lack of a focus for the operation renders it useless - apart from clearly spelling to the Germans that the RKKA still remained a viable fighting force - and it ends without fulfilling its initial promise.

Meanwhile, the Germans begin replenishing manpower and equipment stocks and preparing for Blau - an operation promising fruitful, if not immediately decisive, results. However, to the dismay of German commanders and staff, the number of German divisions available for offensive action - as opposed to June 1941 - is far smaller. Blau is restricted to less than half the total front. The Soviets, whose production of T34s and other AFVs has picked up, experiment with a mechanized cavalry group, significant tank forces and other combat elements by committing them to a thrust against Kharkov. These forces blunder into the assembly areas for Blau and are quickly rendered combat inoperable. More prisoners and war machines are lost.

The Soviets ready themselves for the inevitable onslaught. Finally, the Germans launch their second great offensive and begin rolling up the Soviets. To their surprise, however, the Soviets are yielding far fewer prisoners than what had become custom. The Soviet strategic withdrawal is the first sign of a STAVKA that was employing its forces with greater skill and vision than was the case prior.

The Wehrmacht anchors its offensive to the Soviet industrial city of Stalingrad. Months of intense urban fighting - in which casualty rates approximate equality - is capped by an offensive of which the Germans had no idea about. Operations Uranus and Saturn destroy the German Sixth Army, and parts of Fourth Panzer Army, as well as armies of several satellite states.

What conclusions can we draw from the initial period of war?

That the Germans attacked at the best possible time (strategic vision and luck), and did correspondingly well until the RKKA addressed some of the most serious issues facing it - including poor commanders, obsolescent equipment, poor C3 and the failure of the doctrinally massive, mechanized formations of 1940-1941 is fairly obvious. The Field Regulations of 1942 enshrined some of the lessons learned - simplifying Armies to a standard of six rifle divisions backed with tank brigades where required. Centralizing control of artillery. Shrinking logistical support (on the theoretical AND the practical level) for Soviet formations. Reducing the ratio of service personnel to combat personnel. Standardizing the replenishment system (formation basis, rather than individual basis).

These accomplishments (ongoing throughout 1942 and 1943) were coupled with a massive increase in industrial output throughout 1942. Achieving more than the Greater German Reich with fewer resources and a smaller industrial base. That, too, seems clear.

The second period of war was a formative experience for the new age RKKA. This period can be loosely defined as March 1943 until April 1944. During this period a strengthened German Wehrmacht (the manpower losses of Stalingrad/Blau were made up for, and the Wehrmacht actually achieved the apogee of its manpower strength in mid-1943), with new equipment, equally brilliant officers, a mostly high-quality, well trained reserve system and high motivation for summer campaigns attempted to pinch off the Kursk salient in mid-1943. On the balance of it, relative to other combatants, the 1941 Wehrmacht was more powerful, but the 1943 descendant was more effective, in an absolute sense.

Yet, the Kursk offensive failed, and failed badly. The Soviets, according to the Germans themselves, had mastered the art of rigid defense. Whatever the truth about the Prokhorovka engagement, the Soviets halted a major German counteroffensive on their own terms for the first time. That they immediately thereafter went on the counteroffensive, and rolled up numerous German positions (Orel, Belgorod-Kharkov) is telling. The Soviets were gaining in confidence and skill in both attack and defense. The period of August 1943 until April 1944 is one of experimentation in the attack. It saw the true rebirth of vast tank armies supported by highly motorized logistical formations. It saw the practical reintroduction of the Corps system. The practical indotruction of proper communication networks.

The Field Regulations 1944 were to be the mainstay of the Soviet system for the remained of the war. The standard practice of the attack was to breakthrough with artillery-supported infantry formations, before exploiting with mechanized forces.

Obviously, this was to result in higher casualties for the Soviets during the breakthrough attempt - especially if the breakthrough failed. The German practice of breaking through with armour - when up against competent AT defenses, motivated infantry teams with RPGs, mobile TD units and CAS - was shown to be obsolete by 1944. Utterly obsolete. Both in the Ardennes and during the Lake Balaton operation was this shown to be only practicable against weaker foes with few AT defenses available to them.

The Soviets were forced, by their own doctrine, to sacrifice greater numbers of men for the sake of retaining the ability to exploit a rapidly evolving operational situation. This was not a Soviet weakness, or a Wehrmacht superiority, but the natural result of diametrically opposed doctrinal positions on the role, method and scope of breakthrough in the operational art.

The third period of war - June 1944-May 1945 - saw the last vestiges of the Wehrmacht's dubious superiority (rigid machine gun defenses reminiscent of 1916 felling Soviet breakthrough infantry I do not see as 'tactical superiority') eroded away by the increasing use of Soviet manpower efficiency, SPA, heavy firepower in leaner infantry divisions (the average strength of the 1945 infantry division was between 2,500 and 3,000 men - but its firepower was enormous).

Bagration, Korsun, Iassy, Berlin, Balaton, Kerch-Crimea etc... These were signature Soviet offensives, in which they traded blow for blow with the Wehrmacht and came off better. That in 1945 German casualties were greater than Soviet is certain. But Soviet strategic, operational and tactical superiorites were fact by the middle of 1944.

Lokos

Lokos

01-02-2007, 01:00 AM

But again, Glantz is not at a loss here, since a "balanced" approach, either quantitavily or qualitatively, was never the focus of his work at all. I am not trying to discredit Glantz per se, his work has contributed greatly to the discourse, but it should be properly understood as what it is and wants to be.

Like I said, balance in this case is a matter of historiographical accuracy, not point of view. Show me where Glantz is inaccurate. Apart from the relatively paltry difference in casualties.

Lokos

Hellfish

01-02-2007, 01:05 AM

This is why I never bothered with graduate school.. hehe..

Indiana Jones

01-03-2007, 12:52 PM

This is why I never bothered with graduate school.. hehe..
That is where the fun starts...

Indiana Jones

01-03-2007, 02:10 PM

Well, I have to concede that on a board such as this and within the timeframe one simply cannot post a satisfactory overview, but your answer is still full of sweeping generalizations.
Let us consider some points en detail:

Yet, the Kursk offensive failed, and failed badly. The Soviets, according to the Germans themselves, had mastered the art of rigid defense. Whatever the truth about the Prokhorovka engagement, the Soviets halted a major German counteroffensive on their own terms for the first time.
Regarding Kursk, we are in the fortunate position of having access to recent authoritative study (Zetterling) which extensively and exhaustively cover the course of the action and employ both German and Russian primary material, though markedly less so in the latter case, which will be the realm of the upcoming work by Lawrence. Since you obviously attest Glantz great credibility, it might comfort you to know that he co-edited Zetterlings study...First of all, I think you are operating on faulty premises. The Germans hardly attacked on their own terms. The area in question was perhaps the single most heavily fortified on the entire Eastern front. The Soviets had acquired fairly detailed knowledge of the German attack weeks beforehand and therefore ample time to deploy a large strategic reserve in-depth, to the degree, that they were enjoying a comfortable operational(!) numerical superiority in soldiers, AFV´s, ATG´s, artillery and aicraft when Zitadelle was finally launched. Secondly, the outcome, given the mentioned factors hadly supports the conclusion that the Offensive fared catastrophically. Total German casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA): 57 000; Total Soviet casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA): 177 000. Note that these numbers are for the actual battles of Kursk only. Respective figures for Zitadelle, bundled with the ensuing Soviet counteroffensive (Orel, Charkow, according to the customary Soviet definition) are the following:
German total: 203 000; Soviet total: In excess of 800 000.
Numbers are drawn from Zetterling/Franklin (German) Krivosheev (Soviet).
For vehicular losses, consult Frieser. Especially enlightening concerning the engagement at Prokhorovka...
Got to get back to work now.

Marmot1

01-03-2007, 03:58 PM

You forgot POLAND :-)
There were several polish division on western front in line, new units were formed mainly form ex german POW (Poles impressed into Wermacht). Also loyality of Polish Peoples Army, which fought alongside RA on east lies in question, since Allies were never considered enemies. In case of war there is huge chance that those hunderd of thousands man who were already armed would hit RA in the back or switch side. If you consider that they would have support from local polish population, this is serious factor.
There was still a lot of manpower left in Poland and a lot of will to fight for INDEPENDENT from SU Poland. Take consideration that partisan movement in eastern europe on the back of soviet forces would tie several divisions at least. Not to mention that there was great chance for Romania, Hungary nad Bulgaria to shift to alies again or at least start partisan movement. There is also big "?" how would Turkey behave... seeing good oportunity to seize some teritory on caucasus
they might consider joining war. British empire also had large manpwer reserves avaliable in India... There was of course Finland which minght consider joining on alied side in order to retake teritory.

Question is how would sweeden behave, since they were quite Alies friendly during war and supported Finland before.

There is also question how would france (with large manpower reservers behave).

Also how would i.e. ukrainians and belarusians react on lets say alied promise of independent state.

Also remember there was lithuania estonia latvia with rather antisoviet attitude, and probably there was a lot of SU soldiers not quite happy from comunism, some of them were already on the west, with combat experience gained in Wafen SS and Vlasov Army.

My bet is all those nations would prefer or at least greatly consider fighting on alied side

Lokos

01-03-2007, 08:46 PM

...First of all, I think you are operating on faulty premises. The Germans hardly attacked on their own terms. The area in question was perhaps the single most heavily fortified on the entire Eastern front. The Soviets had acquired fairly detailed knowledge of the German attack weeks beforehand and therefore ample time to deploy a large strategic reserve in-depth, to the degree, that they were enjoying a comfortable operational(!) numerical superiority in soldiers, AFV´s, ATG´s, artillery and aicraft when Zitadelle was finally launched. Secondly, the outcome, given the mentioned factors hadly supports the conclusion that the Offensive fared catastrophically. Total German casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA): 57 000; Total Soviet casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA): 177 000. Note that these numbers are for the actual battles of Kursk only. Respective figures for Zitadelle, bundled with the ensuing Soviet counteroffensive (Orel, Charkow, according to the customary Soviet definition) are the following:
German total: 203 000; Soviet total: In excess of 800 000.

Are you under the impression that I was not aware of these factors?

Which of the above negates anything of what I said?

The relative casualty ratio is of no consequence. The offensive was stopped inside the Soviet defensive network, having made little operational progress, and was nowhere near pinching off the salient. They halted this offensive on their own terms, and then began an immediate counter offensive that resulted in far more extensive gains.

I don't think anyone was arguing that Citadel was not skilfully conducted. Yet, it still failed. Soviet strategic vision, resilience and planning ahead doomed it to failure. It is a sign of the times that, before the offensive started, the STAVKA co-ordinators assumed it would fail, and, as such, carefully orchestrated the follow-on operations.

Lokos

Son_Of_Suvorov

01-04-2007, 12:11 AM

Also how would i.e. ukrainians and belarusians react on lets say alied promise of independent state.

The more interesting thing to consider is how the Allies would attempt to integrate this with Polish demands for return of western Belarus and Ukraine. I think your whole Polish partisans scenario is completely unrealistic - if Polish demands for return of eastern regions are met, Ukrainians would resume their war for independence, and it is very likely that Belarussian partisans would join them (there were no arms or motivation for them to do this before WWII). If they are not met, I very much doubt that many Poles would be willing to fight too hard in Russia. Ditto for Lithuania.

DIU

01-04-2007, 07:34 PM

You forgot POLAND :-)
It seems you transfer your today’s prejudices to quite different epoch.

You’d better consider another question, how the Polish, French and other troops from the ex-occupied countries would take the offer to treat the recent SSmen as the new allies in the offensive war against the Red army. I guess their reaction would be directly opposite to that you attribute to them, the total demoralization at least. And even the American and British troops could be embarrassed a bit, after observing the concentration camps, millions of enslaved workers from the occupied territories (who were absolutely necessary to support the German military economy in 1945), hearing the stories about execution of hostages in France, starving population in the Netherlands etc. etc.

Kilgor

01-04-2007, 08:11 PM

And even the American and British troops could be embarrassed a bit, after observing the concentration camps, millions of enslaved workers from the occupied territories (who were absolutely necessary to support the German military economy in 1945), hearing the stories about execution of hostages in France, starving population in the Netherlands etc. etc.[/FONT]

Conditions in the gulags (which did power a sizable amount of soviet industry and labor) were hardly better.

DIU

01-04-2007, 10:13 PM

Conditions in the gulags (which did power a sizable amount of soviet industry and labor) were hardly better.
The American, British, French, Polish etc. troops in the West couldn’t observe the GULAG convicts and the life in USSR, whatever it would be, and were fed by propaganda only (which was rather pro-Soviet in 1941-45), but the German atrocities were before their very eyes in 1945. Do you feel difference, or still prefer to feign idiocy?

Kilgor

01-04-2007, 10:28 PM

Do you feel difference, or still prefer to feign idiocy?[/FONT]

The difference is that the Stalinist had little moral authority over germany at the time.

I doubt that any western soldier like the soviet soldier believed they were truly friends.

Flamming_Python

01-05-2007, 04:41 AM

The difference is that the Stalinist had little moral authority over germany at the time.

I doubt that any western soldier like the soviet soldier believed they were truly friends.

I can assure you that even though I have never been to your country, or talked to any American veterans of WW2 at all, that during and up to the end of WW2 just about every Western soldier saw the Soviets as allies and would have just as surprised to turn their weapons against them as the Soviet soldiers would have been to turn their weapons against the Western troops.

Stop trying to fan the flames Kilgor. Stop trying to fan the flames...

Kilgor

01-05-2007, 06:22 AM

I can assure you that even though I have never been to your country, or talked to any American veterans of WW2 at all, that during and up to the end of WW2 just about every Western soldier saw the Soviets as allies and would have just as surprised to turn their weapons against them as the Soviet soldiers would have been to turn their weapons against the Western troops.

Stop trying to fan the flames Kilgor. Stop trying to fan the flames...

So the decades of anti western propganda which the soviet state pumped into its citizens were forgotten in the year the germans invaded ? Your have to be kidding yourself. Right until the last minutes Stalin dismissed western warnings of a german invasion as a imperialist campaign of disinformation and treachery to bring the peace loving soviet union into war.

oldsoak

01-05-2007, 07:25 AM

I can assure you that even though I have never been to your country, or talked to any American veterans of WW2 at all, that during and up to the end of WW2 just about every Western soldier saw the Soviets as allies and would have just as surprised to turn their weapons against them as the Soviet soldiers would have been to turn their weapons against the Western troops.

Stop trying to fan the flames Kilgor. Stop trying to fan the flames...

There is a point here. There was a general feeling that with the collapse of Germany, WWII was over and everyone wanted to go home. Most people viewd the partition of Germany into occupation zones as a good thing and most UK troops did not see the USSR as the next enemy. We were glad they had fought as long and hard as they did as an ally. The view at the top was different because politicians were looking at the next threat. Could we have gone to war with Russia ? Yes - but look at us - war weary soldiers, short of manpower, most of our supplies having to come from the US - to start again would have been insane.

Lokos

01-05-2007, 10:22 AM

Right until the last minutes Stalin dismissed western warnings of a german invasion as a imperialist campaign of disinformation and treachery to bring the peace loving soviet union into war.

Is that so?

Why did Stalin in April 1941 implement the 'special threatening period of war' pre-mobilization orders?

Why did 26 April-10 May signify a period during which forces from remote theaters were being dispatched to the WMD?

There are many factors behind the reasoning at the root of why the warnings of imminent war were ignored, not least of which was the institutional failure of GRU under Golikov to detect and report the massive German build-up and preparations in Poland. But that is not to say that Stalin did not comprehend the danger of invasion. He, however, made the mistake that so many politicians before him that dealt with Hitler made: he believed in Hitler's rationality. That is to say, he believed Hitler would first make some sort of diplomatic demand - giving the SU a short time to prepare - before initiating the invasion.

His error was to result in a lot of grief for the Soviet Union.

Lokos

Kilgor

01-05-2007, 05:20 PM

There are many factors behind the reasoning at the root of why the warnings of imminent war were ignored, not least of which was the institutional failure of GRU under Golikov to detect and report the massive German build-up and preparations in Poland.

Lokos

The soviet union had numerous credible warnings of a German attack. Here is a excellent article about it.

Historians have long known that Soviet agents supplied highly prescient intelligence about Operation Barbarossa in the months before the German invasion. Six years ago, the Israeli scholar Gabriel Gorodetsky published ''Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia,'' an outstanding book on the subject, drawing on, among other things, hitherto neglected Balkan archives. Murphy provides additional, copious detail.

As early as May 1939 Stalin was sent a six-page document outlining ''The Future Plans of Aggression by Fascist Germany,'' based on a German briefing obtained by Soviet spies in Warsaw. In December 1940 the Soviet agent Rudolf von Scheliha (code-named Ariets) reported that Hitler planned to declare war on the Soviet Union in March 1941. By Feb. 28, 1941, the same agent provided a provisional launching date of May 20. This intelligence was corroborated by sources in Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Rome, to say nothing of the information provided by the famous spy Richard Sorge (code-named Ramsay) in Tokyo. On April 17 a Prague informant predicted a German invasion in the second half of June. The precise date and time of the invasion were revealed by a reliable source in Berlin fully three days before the Germans attacked.

All of this Stalin ignored. Typically, he scrawled on the bottom of the Prague report: ''English provocation! Investigate!'' On May 19, Sorge predicted that 150 divisions were being readied by the Germans for an invasion of the Soviet Union. Stalin retorted with an expletive.

The result was that literally nothing was done to prepare for the German assault. Soviet planes were not camouflaged. Troops were not in defensive positions; indeed they were ordered not to occupy such positions, for fear of provoking the Germans. Worse, Stalin responded to the gathering storm with yet another purge of suspected threats to his own authority. In June 1941, on the eve of the tempest, around 300 senior service personnel were arrested, among them no fewer than 22 who had been awarded the highest Soviet military decoration.

Two things stand out in Murphy's account. The first is the extent to which the Soviet spy network in Europe continued to deliver first-rate intelligence, despite Stalin's best efforts to purge it out of existence. It was not just the British establishment the Soviets managed to penetrate; there were agents in the German economics ministry, air ministry and foreign ministry, not to mention the American Embassy in Moscow.

The second point is that Germany relied not on secrecy to conceal the preparations for Barbarossa but on disinformation, assuring the Soviets that their troops were being massed on the Soviet borders to keep them clear of British air raids, that dozens of German planes were violating Soviet airspace merely because their pilots were inexperienced and that talk of a German invasion plan was a cynical British smear designed to provoke a Nazi-Soviet war.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E4D71638F931A25755C0A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=3

If I also remember correctly too, Stalin did have people shot for continuing to suggest the German Army would invade in 1941.

Lokos

01-06-2007, 05:23 AM

Re-read my post. Stalin, like the entire senior leadership of the SU, knew war was coming. Conflicting reports as to when, however, were to result in tragedy.

As early as May 1939 Stalin was sent a six-page document outlining ''The Future Plans of Aggression by Fascist Germany,'' based on a German briefing obtained by Soviet spies in Warsaw. In December 1940 the Soviet agent Rudolf von Scheliha (code-named Ariets) reported that Hitler planned to declare war on the Soviet Union in March 1941. By Feb. 28, 1941, the same agent provided a provisional launching date of May 20. This intelligence was corroborated by sources in Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Rome, to say nothing of the information provided by the famous spy Richard Sorge (code-named Ramsay) in Tokyo. On April 17 a Prague informant predicted a German invasion in the second half of June. The precise date and time of the invasion were revealed by a reliable source in Berlin fully three days before the Germans attacked.

March, May, early June etc... These dates came and went - and yet the same sources purported that they should retain credibility. The single most significant factor in the strategic blindness of the Soviets was the ineffectiveness of GRU under Golikov. Nothing else comes close. If one source reports a major German build-up in Poland, or the onset of hostilities within months, and GRU detects no significant strategic movement or danger, then, obviously, this is going to be a problem.

Lokos

Kilgor

01-06-2007, 07:56 AM

Re-read my post. Stalin, like the entire senior leadership of the SU, knew war was coming. Conflicting reports as to when, however, were to result in tragedy.

March, May, early June etc... These dates came and went - and yet the same sources purported that they should retain credibility. The single most significant factor in the strategic blindness of the Soviets was the ineffectiveness of GRU under Golikov. Nothing else comes close. If one source reports a major German build-up in Poland, or the onset of hostilities within months, and GRU detects no significant strategic movement or danger, then, obviously, this is going to be a problem.

Lokos

Everyone knew a war was comming, the whole world did. The conflict between fascism and communism was inevitable. You know pefectly well the real question was the attack going to be in spring 1941 or sping 1942. And you are well aware that the balkan campaign did delay the attack by many weeks, hence another reason the intelligence changed. Stalin's mind was set, there would be no attack in 1941, despite all the evidence to the contrary. I cannot find the quote now but Molitov said "We all remember in 1941 when Stalin said there would be no german attack!"

Is that so?

Why did Stalin in April 1941 implement the 'special threatening period of war' pre-mobilization orders?

Why did 26 April-10 May signify a period during which forces from remote theaters were being dispatched to the WMD?

Stalin grudgingly agreed in march to zhukov's in request to call in reserves.
He also agreed to Timoshenko's request to transfer more men to the western district, however over a 4 month period. This hardly can account itself to be a rapid call to arms.

March, May, early June etc... These dates came and went - and yet the same sources purported that they should retain credibility. The single most significant factor in the strategic blindness of the Soviets was the ineffectiveness of GRU under Golikov

Did it occur to you that golikov was telling stalin what he wanted to hear ? Disagreeing with stalin, especially if your worked in the often purged intelligence sections was not a good idea. Gorlikov follwed stalins line to the letter. Sycophantic yes men are not rare in dictatorships. It was all a British trick and the intelligence was doubtful, and there would be no attack in 1941. This was the public line and on june 14 the soviet news agency TASS published a stinging a stinging rejection of any suggestion of a german attack. The rumours were spread by "by forces hostile to the Soviet Union and Germany, interested in the further expansion and speading of war" Ie.. the British.

As for the intelligence, Richard Sorge provided Microfilmed documents on march 5, and a gave accurate troop picture on may 19. A Czech espionage source who provided water tight information no doubt paid for this with his life when stalin said "find out who is making this provocation and punish him"
And 180 overflights into soviet airspace by the luftwaffe, should have made even the most arrogant of leader take note.

You can blame Golikov if you like. But you know exactly why he dismissed the intelligence and the consquences if he dared question otherwise.

In 1966 Zhukov described it well, that if he did give the order to deploy against stalin's wishses, he would end up in the Beria's Basement.

Lokos

01-06-2007, 10:25 AM

Did it occur to you that golikov was telling stalin what he wanted to hear ? Disagreeing with stalin, especially if your worked in the often purged intelligence sections was not a good idea

GRU was almost untouched by the purges. Golikov may have reported what he believed Stalin wanted to hear, but that in itself is what we call 'ineffectiveness'. With GRU shaping Stalin's perceptions of the strategic situation in Poland, it is small wonder that the claims of Swedish railyway workers, communist German sympathisers, deserters, Sorge and myriad other sources were discounted, especially as the April, May and June slated dates for the invasion came and went. Each subseqent warning had that much less substance.

And 180 overflights into soviet airspace by the luftwaffe, should have made even the most arrogant of leader take note

300. And they did take notice. Wishful thinking and a desperation to avoid 'provoking' the Germans went a long way. Stalin without a doubt believed that, whatever the Germans were up to, it was a ploy to pressure him into giving them a reason to invade (i.e. provoking them).

In 1966 Zhukov described it well, that if he did give the order to deploy against stalin's wishses, he would end up in the Beria's Basement

What Zhukov wanted was an offensive in February 1941 to destroy the German build-up in Poland. His plan was roundly rejected.

You can blame Golikov if you like. But you know exactly why he dismissed the intelligence and the consquences if he dared question otherwise.

You believe Golikov was instructed to make the reports more 'acceptable'? That's pure foolishness. Why would Stalin instruct his own intelligence agencies to lie to him? GRU field agents were reporting startling, foreboding German strategic movements - yet Golikov simply brushed them aside, and assured Stalin that all was fine. If Golikov had had the courage - regardless of Stalin's reputation - to relay the truth, obviously Stalin would have had a better picture of the true strategic situation from his own army intelligence agency.

This was the public line and on june 14 the soviet news agency TASS published a stinging a stinging rejection of any suggestion of a german attack. The rumours were spread by "by forces hostile to the Soviet Union and Germany, interested in the further expansion and speading of war"

Don't be a fool. Of course TASS would be tasked with issuing such a statement. Enormous efforts were being expended to avoid the outbreak of war at that stage. Any suggestion of hostile intent on the part of Germany could be seen as 'provocation'.

And, believe it or not, it was believed in many Soviet circles that the British were actively trying to bring the Soviets into the war, by any means available to them.

Lokos

Violet Fashion by Mindy

01-06-2007, 06:44 PM

And, believe it or not, it was believed in many Soviet circles that the British were actively trying to bring the Soviets into the war, by any means available to them.

Lokos

That I can agree with. It's fact that England was courting the USSR. As well as the US. Likewise Germany was trying to get peace with the UK. For basically the same reasons.

Kilgor

01-06-2007, 07:27 PM

GRU was almost untouched by the purges. Golikov may have reported what he believed Stalin wanted to hear, but that in itself is what we call 'ineffectiveness'. With GRU shaping Stalin's perceptions of the strategic situation in Poland, it is small wonder that the claims of Swedish railyway workers, communist German sympathisers, deserters, Sorge and myriad other sources were discounted, especially as the April, May and June slated dates for the invasion came and went. Each subseqent warning had that much less substance.

Lokos

Actually, the GRU was purged heavily by Yezhov in 1937. Its former leader Berzin was "tried" as a german spy and strangled with piano wire. Many other high ranking officers were also destroyed. His temporary successor, Solomon Uritski was also shot. Yezhov was ordered by stalin to purge both the NKVD and the GRU, both services taking their turns on each other in typical stalinist fashion. To claim was "almost untouched" is clearly false. Yet another organ was filled with stalinist lackies who no doubt pandered to his desires and viewpoints.

You believe Golikov was instructed to make the reports more 'acceptable'? That's pure foolishness. Why would Stalin instruct his own intelligence agencies to lie to him? GRU field agents were reporting startling, foreboding German strategic movements - yet Golikov simply brushed them aside, and assured Stalin that all was fine. If Golikov had had the courage - regardless of Stalin's reputation - to relay the truth, obviously Stalin would have had a better picture of the true strategic situation from his own army intelligence agency.

Lie ? Hardly. To see things in his way. Clearly you have no idea of the climate of fear, suspicion and sycophantic behaviour that stalinism generated. Maybe you missed the fact before that Stalin had people shot for daring to suggest that the germans would invade in 1941. Stalin's mind was set, no invasion in 1941 and Golikov followed his masters line and told him what he wanted. Im sure he was aware of the fate of his predecessor.

Don't be a fool. Of course TASS would be tasked with issuing such a statement. Enormous efforts were being expended to avoid the outbreak of war at that stage. Any suggestion of hostile intent on the part of Germany could be seen as 'provocation'.

And, believe it or not, it was believed in many Soviet circles that the British were actively trying to bring the Soviets into the war, by any means available to them.

TASS was virtually stalin's mouthpiece, the TASS statement only confirms that in stalins mind it was all a British trick. Even until the last moments until the attack. How many sources of information do I have to post to prove the man's mind would not be changed ?

Marmot1

01-07-2007, 05:16 PM

The American, British, French, Polish etc. troops in the West couldn’t observe the GULAG convicts and the life in USSR, whatever it would be, and were fed by propaganda only (which was rather pro-Soviet in 1941-45), but the German atrocities were before their very eyes in 1945. Do you feel difference, or still prefer to feign idiocy?

Wrong.... There were several thousands of Polish soldiers who were in GULAGS from 1939 until 1941, after german atack on USSR and Sikorski-Mayski agrement betwen USSR and POLAND they were released from prisons, GULAGS, departiations, good only knows from where else. Intention was to create Polish army to fight against germans, however Stalin did not provide enaught supply and equippment to them so they were evacuated through Iran, Iraq to Palestine where Polish II corps was formed under UK supervision.

Those soldiers and civilians evacuated from USSR were very well aware about conditions in USSR. And there were thousands of them. Not to mention that they were already in Europe (Northern Itally) after succesful campaign. (Monte Cassino for example)

Marmot1

01-07-2007, 05:34 PM

It seems you transfer your today’s prejudices to quite different epoch.

You’d better consider another question, how the Polish, French and other troops from the ex-occupied countries would take the offer to treat the recent SSmen as the new allies in the offensive war against the Red army. I guess their reaction would be directly opposite to that you attribute to them, the total demoralization at least. And even the American and British troops could be embarrassed a bit, after observing the concentration camps, millions of enslaved workers from the occupied territories (who were absolutely necessary to support the German military economy in 1945), hearing the stories about execution of hostages in France, starving population in the Netherlands etc. etc.

Well most of reinforcements from Polish Forces on western front in 1944 and 1945 were actually ex- wermacht soldiers who were in alied POW camps... Most of them came from those parts of pre-war poland that were annexed directly into reich and were conscripted into german army as volsdeuthses. Situation betwen Poland and Gemrany is very complicated... look at germna national team on mundial... their two top players were born in Poland. Same situation was before WW2. There were some Poles who were germanized and loyal to reich (gen. von Oppeln-Bronikowski- for example) but there were also germans loyal to Poland (like gen. Rómmel - guess with which german field marshal he had familly ties....? ;-) )

Smersh

01-08-2007, 12:02 AM

I can't beleive this thread still continues... a bunch of fanatical anti-socialist anti-soviet memebers frantically defending a ridicilous proposed invasion of the soviet union, which would have employed the same people who the americans, british and soviet soldiers and civilians had been fighting for 6 years, at a enourmous price. from the first page any sensible person would say, that plan is nonesense, instead there is pages and pages of, 'we'll nuke you', huge air armadas, etc.

secondly Kilgor keeps going on and on about anti-western propaganda in the soviet union. first look at what your talking about, invading the soviet union picking up where the nazi facists left off. not exactly a freindly position. secondly what about decades of anti-soviet propaganda in the west? or did you forget?

Kilgor

01-08-2007, 12:16 AM

secondly Kilgor keeps going on and on about anti-western propaganda in the soviet union. first look at what your talking about, invading the soviet union picking up where the nazi facists left off. not exactly a freindly position. secondly what about decades of anti-soviet propaganda in the west? or did you forget?

Prove me wrong in my debates about lokos or STFU.

I have posted numerous facts in the previous posts with verifiable content. If this hurts your feelings then you dont have to post here.

Finally, If you dont see stalinism as a threat just like national socialism was, then are you are truly on a level of idiocy beyond words.

Smersh

01-08-2007, 12:28 AM

you didn't address anything I brought up in my post, as usual.

If you noticed I never said your posts where false, althought I have not red all 7 pages, I pointed out that their one-sided and never in context. ex:you bring up anti-western soviet propaganda and don't mention anti-soviet western propaganda.

Now your changing the subject into a dicussion about stalinism and nazism. and I don't want to go down that road. Of course, stalinism was dangerous, but no where near the level of nazism. I'm going to repeat-- I don't want a dicussion on this issue, I don't have the time to keep up.

lightfire

01-09-2007, 05:10 AM

a bunch of fanatical anti-socialist anti-soviet memebers
are you pro-socialist pro-soviet to defend that..imaginible possition then?

frantically defending a ridicilous proposed invasion of the soviet union, which would have employed the same people who the americans, british and soviet soldiers and civilians had been fighting for 6 years, at a enourmous price. from the first page any sensible person would say, that plan is nonesense, instead there is pages and pages of, 'we'll nuke you', huge air armadas, etc.
it was quite a nice discussion about possibilities, resources and mean, that Could have happened. If you don't like-no need to read it (as you did not) or comment, how you don't like any arguments provided.Did you provide any arguments, except "that's nonsence, that's one sided western propoganda"..?

first look at what your talking about, invading the soviet union picking up where the nazi facists left off. not exactly a freindly position.
not exactly friendly possition by the SU as well for many of those teritories after nazi occupants left, esspecially in 1944-1949, with repetions in 1956, 1968 etc..many in the west from SU (Eastern and Central Europe) have waited for such an invasion, esspecialy after the soviets came, so the unfriendly possition might look mainly for the SU or its' suporters.

secondly what about decades of anti-soviet propaganda in the west? or did you forget?
well, who started it anyway..?even being an ally of Anglo-american alliance..

Smersh

01-09-2007, 01:40 PM

my point was no one has any problems talking about a essentially sneak attack of the soviet union, right after the end of the second world war in which it was an ally. you could see moves like this buy churchill has the start of the cold war.

kilgor's talk about anti-western propaganda was about the pre-war years. but he fails to mention, how in the west there was not only anti-soviet propaganda but also an invasion by western powers, also including japan and turkey who aided anti-soviet forces during the civil war.

things like we'll nuke you and gaint air armadas are not a practical dicussion.

edit:have you guys red Operation Unthinkable paper before posting? because the conclusion the writers come to, from what I rememeber, essentially is that the plan is 'unthinkable' and un-doable.

Kilgor

01-09-2007, 06:59 PM

edit:have you guys red Operation Unthinkable paper before posting? because the conclusion the writers come to, from what I rememeber, essentially is that the plan is 'unthinkable' and un-doable.

At the end of ww2, it was not a "unthinkable" scenario that the conflict between capitalist west and communism would start right back where it was (of course Hitlers little fascist adventure interrupted things). I have read numerous stories of how Stalin saw the capitalist west ie, the UK, France, and the US as the real enemy that would take decades to counter and defeat. When you have two giant superpowers and their allies with vast and irreconcilable differences looking at each other with nervous trigger fingers in a divided Germany, why would a war be so surprising ?

Smersh

01-09-2007, 08:48 PM

At the end of ww2, it was not a "unthinkable" scenario that the conflict between capitalist west and communism would start right back where it was (of course Hitlers little fascist adventure interrupted things). I have read numerous stories of how Stalin saw the capitalist west ie, the UK, France, and the US as the real enemy that would take decades to counter and defeat. When you have two giant superpowers and their allies with vast and irreconcilable differences looking at each other with nervous trigger fingers in a divided Germany, why would a war be so surprising ?

A few problems with your post. Why do you consider 'Hitler's facist adventure' an interruption and not part of a 'confict between capitalist west and communism'? And I have red numerous stories of how the west (USA,Britain, France) saw the Soviet Union as the real threat, not Nazi Germany. Most spying by the west during this time was aimed against the Soviet Union and not at Germany I think Hitler even assumed that Britain and other countries would help against his crusade against communism (had he played his cards right he may have pulled this off, I bet some people on this forum would have perfered that). Operation unthinkable and other real covert actions by Western intelligence agencies had no quams about using nazi war criminals and troops. And What about Pattons proposals to use the Germans to fight the Soviet Union.

Yes, it wouldn't have been suprising had a war began, but world leaders would have caused that war, not the political-economic-social situation or irreconcialable differences between capitalism and socialism. Most people really wanted peace after the 2nd world war, and by the time nuclear stockpiles where built leaders relized that it would mean suicide. Both sides assumed the other would start the conflict.

Alan

01-09-2007, 09:02 PM

At this point I'm wondering, did a Russian kid beat up Kilgor when he was little?

As for the argument itself, here's my two cents.

If the west even for a second thought that it culd succeed, it would've attacked. But no, it didn't.

Kilgor

01-09-2007, 09:36 PM

A few problems with your post. Why do you consider 'Hitler's facist adventure' an interruption and not part of a 'confict between capitalist west and communism'? And I have red numerous stories of how the west (USA,Britain, France) saw the Soviet Union as the real threat, not Nazi Germany. Most spying by the west during this time was aimed against the Soviet Union and not at Germany I think Hitler even assumed that Britain and other countries would help against his crusade against communism (had he played his cards right he may have pulled this off, I bet some people on this forum would have perfered that). Operation unthinkable and other real covert actions by Western intelligence agencies had no quams about using nazi war criminals and troops. And What about Pattons proposals to use the Germans to fight the Soviet Union.
.

Communism was a grave threat to the stability of Europe, considering there were numerous communist uprisings & rebellions no doubt funded with soviet money. So it was no question that they saw the SU as a menace. The SU was hardly innocent Smesh, they were sponsoring coups.

As for suggestion it would have been better if the west & nazi germany finished off the SU, its another brain dead comment. The best solution would have been for Nazi Germany and Stalinist SU to bleed each other white and both collapse, ending the two worst dictatorships in history. And the west helps neither side.

Smersh

01-09-2007, 10:14 PM

Communism was a grave threat to the stability of Europe, considering there were numerous communist uprisings & rebellions no doubt funded with soviet money. So it was no question that they saw the SU as a menace. The SU was hardly innocent Smesh, they were sponsoring coups. And what where western countries 'sponsoring'?

"Stability of Europe", hah. The biggest opponents of the Soviet Union during this time where monarchists, facists, and colonialists. not exactly institutions which should be defended. or are they Kilgor? By 'stability' you mean status-quo.

Why the invasion by western powers then, and support of white forces? what was the Soviet Union 'guilty' of during the civil war to justify invasion by over 100,000 foreign troops and millions of dollars of aide to monarchists.? Oh, right disrupting the "stability of Europe" :).

P.S. sponsoring coups is the past-time of the United States.

As for suggestion it would have been better if the west & nazi germany finished off the SU, its another brain dead comment. The best solution would have been for Nazi Germany and Stalinist SU to bleed each other white and both collapse, ending the two worst dictatorships in history. And the west helps neither side. That was exactly what Stalin feared the west wanted. he felt that Britain was trying to create a war between the Soviet union and Germany. then you go and say Stalin was a paranoid lunatic and his fears where unjustified. I don't understand this.

What makes you think Germany would have been successful this time? Would the West give aide to lossing side, to perpetuate the conflict? and you wonder why their was an anti-Western attitude. your little suggestion means millions tens of Germans and Russians and other nationalities being killed to maintain Britain's status quo, which isn't exactly human-rights freindly either.

The Soviet Union routinely called for "popular fronts" against Nazi Germany, but Western, particualrly british, distrust made it impossible for this to be successful. and the Soviet Union was kept out of the Munich agreement or the 'Munich Betrayal' as the Czechs and Slovaks call it . Why exactly should the Soviet Union have been trusting of the West?

...this dicussion is really stupid. I'm getting really tired of your blind hatrage Kilgor. and your disregard for peace and human life. The Plan is called "Operation:Unthinkable" for a reason. The authors of it realized this yet you keep saying the opposite.

Indiana Jones

01-10-2007, 09:38 PM

The rest of your post substantively leads up to this, as you do not have any ground to stand on criticising Glantz's archival work otherwise. That is to say that, casualties aside, it (his information) is accurate.

Lokos

Like I said, balance in this case is a matter of historiographical accuracy, not point of view. Show me where Glantz is inaccurate. Apart from the relatively paltry difference in casualties.

Lokos
Balance is of course always a matter of "point of view". Both factors are inextricably intermingled. That said, perhaps we stem from different traditions of historiography...and let us just leave it at that.
As for Glantz, on a final note:
I have already outlined some grave omissions on behalf of Mr. Glantz'es work regarding the Wehrmacht which I became instantly aware of upon first reading some of his publications, most notably, but not solely, "When Titans clashed". It can be reasonably expected of anybody within the community to carefully check outrageous figures such as Krivosheev provides, which in turn grotesquely skew the public perception of individual engagements as well as the entire campaign. Mind you, the differences are most certainly not negligible. We are talking about millions of alleged casualtieshere which have no footing whatsoever in reality. In any basic seminar, employing nonsensual or downright propagandist data without properly contectualising and labeling it as such, and doing so repeatedly, would get one into serious trouble. It appears that Mr. Glantz never once graced the BA/MA with a visit to verify his claims, and that his German is not sufficient for scientific work.
In addition, during the course of the last couple of days I have contacted some colleagues who are more knowledgeable on the RKKA and the course of the contemporary debate than I am and their near unanimous verdict on Glantz'es research was less than exhilarating, pointing to the fact that the bulk of Soviet archival material has still not been declassified and Glantz therefore was forced to rely heavily on secondary material. As far as I currently know, Mr. Lawrence of TDI is the first western Historian accessing primary Soviet sources on a larger scale. Some of those aforementioned fellows even went as far as to denounce Glantz as the "Ambrose of the Eastern Front" (sic!). Now that is perhaps a stretch, but the general tendency is quite related.

That in 1945 German casualties were greater than Soviet is certain.
Sources ? Krivosheev and then what ? Roughly comparable, perhaps.
I´ll get back on this tomorrow.

PS: If you are by any chance orthodox, I wish you a happy new year.

Smersh

01-10-2007, 09:57 PM

according to Kirosheev his sources are de-classified materials.

Flamming_Python

01-20-2007, 10:18 AM

CPL Trevoga

01-20-2007, 12:05 PM

So with all that in mind, who really started the hostilities between the USSR and the West?

Evil western bourgeois and capitalists, exploiters of working people and oppressors of the world.

Flamming_Python

01-20-2007, 02:34 PM

Evil western bourgeois and capitalists, exploiters of working people and oppressors of the world.

Listen, I try my best to have a balanced view of history, and I don't look at things from one side.

But at that time in the world, the Bourgeois and Capitalist class in Europe looked at the revolution instantly as a complete abomination. How dare the underlings revolt against their masters!? Ridiculous that they think they can manage their own production!

They and every single government in Europe were instantly against any sort of socialist movement, for what it could mean for their own populations of workers who could get similar ideas and start to demand concessions for better working conditions (which were completely abhorent throughout Europe in the early 20th century), if not outright revolt following Russia's example.

The Bolsheviks of course advocated a dictatorship of the proletariat, and viewed the Bourgouise as people who tried to get more than they deserve from society, and therefore have to be deposed, and deprived of any democratic rights for fear that they might try to get back to power.

So looking back at it, the 2 sides were simply natural enemies, and hostility wasn't started by one or the other, it was simply always going to be there until one side won and the other side lost. For those who seek to attack the USSR for surpressing Hungary and Czechoslovakia, you are completely correct (although there were understandable fears of paranoia which caused those events to happen). But of course the principles of the revolution were already corrupted long before those events happened.

However, it also does not serve people to look at it from one side of the story, and it should be remembered that the USA also betrayed it's principles when it cancelled the Italian elections of 1948 and re-instated the Mafia in order to subdue the people's will, and Britain's actions in post WW2 Greece also leave much to be desired. But just as for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, these events also happened because of the mutual fear of lack of security in the Cold War.

CPL Trevoga

01-20-2007, 02:54 PM

Listen, I try my best to have a balanced view of history, and I don't look at things from one side.

Lighten up man, I thought you would get this. I used a text book perfect propoganda cliche.

GazB

01-20-2007, 03:03 PM

Communism has nothing to do with this. Russia was portrayed as the bad guy well before communism. I have been reading a book written in the 19th Century by a British naval artilleryman and he talks about Imperial Russia as being half asian and not to be trusted. Ironic considering the British empire stretched over the entire globe but he was worried about the Russian threat to India.
The Current US relationship with China shows that not only can the west get on with a communist country but that both sides can profit from the arrangement.

Hellfish

01-20-2007, 03:48 PM

China is communist only in name.

Flamming_Python

01-20-2007, 04:07 PM

China is communist only in name.

America has been cosying up to China since Nixon. Not saying it's a bad thing. On the contrary it's good.

Flamming_Python

01-20-2007, 04:07 PM

Lighten up man, I thought you would get this. I used a text book perfect propoganda cliche.

Sorry man I thought you were taking Kilgor's side p-)

Hellfish

01-20-2007, 04:29 PM

America has been cosying up to China since Nixon. Not saying it's a bad thing. On the contrary it's good.

I agree.

Now that we've got nearly 20 years since the Soviet Union dissolved, do you think it would have been a good idea for the Soviets to embark upon a path similar to China's? Would it even have been possible?

I get the idea that China saw the collapse of the USSR and learned a lesson from it, which is what brought about their reforms. But I'm just curious to know if the Soviets could have done it too.

Flamming_Python

01-20-2007, 04:53 PM

I agree.

Now that we've got nearly 20 years since the Soviet Union dissolved, do you think it would have been a good idea for the Soviets to embark upon a path similar to China's? Would it even have been possible?

I get the idea that China saw the collapse of the USSR and learned a lesson from it, which is what brought about their reforms. But I'm just curious to know if the Soviets could have done it too.

Yes I completely agree.

The USSR could have tried something like China's model, although personally I would advocate more democracy and less capitalism. Still though, it remains to be seen if China's path of change will be completely successfull in the end. So far so good, but they still have a while to go. In particular, their growing middle class could soon start to put pressure on the ruling party, which could equal instability.

It should be remembered that the Soviet Union swung between periods of reform and stagnation for the last 40 years of it's life, culminating in Gorbachev's push for liberal economic reforms and democratic processes. However, how the changes are managed and the pace at which they are implemented is at least as important as the changes themselves, and unfortunately it's something that Mr. Gorbachev failed to take into account. However, with better management, the shelving of shock-therapy economic theory and close control & supervision of any liberalisation of the economy that might have taken place, I reckon that the USSR may have been able to pull it off, albeit over a larger time period of 10-15 years.

Smersh

01-20-2007, 07:17 PM

In my mind, the Soviet Government should have made every effort to preserve the integrity of the Soviet Union and not allow the break up of the country. Possibly with the exception of the Baltic states. But this means doing things before it became impossible, i.e before 1990.

Oh yeah, the whole shock therapy idea is totally discredited. Shock theropy supporters turned out to be completely wrong in their predictions. Shock therapy caused much more damage and negaive effects then any possible benefits.

GazB

01-21-2007, 08:24 AM

The main problem was economic. Personally I think a socialist compromise where strategic industry and of course the military and energy sector should remain under government control with private enterprise allowed to grow gradually rather than a sudden change overnight would have been best for the Soviet Union.

The real advantage the Chinese have had is export markets prepared to accept Chinese goods. They started out with clothes and cheap plastic stuff, but western investment has added electrical goods and electronics and the range has just expanded. Most of their success comes from that western investment that never really happened in Russia. Most western countries have a very low opinion of Russian stuff and that is usually based on stereotypes rather than actual experience. (I have Russian binoculars that are just as good as the $6,000 dollar German pair in the shop that I have to preorder and wait 6 months for delivery for).
The Russians would fit in the necessity item area with a skilled workforce able to work for comparatively low wages, rather than the pure budget range, or the luxury range. The only scope for entering the luxury range of goods would be caviar and vodka.

Murray B

01-23-2007, 07:53 PM

It does not look like a plan or even a proposal for a plan but a report on a plan. Governments get lots of reports like this expecially from military planners who really like to plan things. Canada probably has a similar report on a proposal for a plan to invade the U.S. but it is filed under crazy plans and is just gathering dust somewhere.

This information, although interesting, does not mean that any government seriously considered adopting such a plan.

Did you hear about the proposal for a plan a few years ago by a mathematician who wanted to use nuclear weapons to blow off mountain tops to straighten the earth on its axis.

Seems crazy to us today but isn't he really just proposing to perfect the environment? No more seasons, what you got is what you'll always get. Now that really is different.

Smersh

01-23-2007, 09:02 PM

It a little too plausable to some people.

Belrick

01-23-2007, 10:17 PM

GazB

01-23-2007, 11:21 PM

A war between USSR and the WA would of been very nasty.

But there was no possiblity of USSR winning. Without lend lease to sustain them then within a year USSR:

-Would of faced starvation.
-No moblity. (no spares for the studebakers)
-Crippled airforce (no high grade aluminium or av gas)
-Massive manpower shortages.

So what you are saying is that the British are morons?
I would expect the US also considered something similar as well... with the excellent spy network Stalin had in Britain no wonder he didn't like his alies very much.
But both the Brits and the Americans seem to have decided that siding with the Germans and fighting the Soivets would not be a good idea, but it seems you know better.
Wonder how many of those american and british pilots who were Jewish or had jewish friends would like to share bunkrooms with some die hard nazis... because they were the ones most keen to fight.

What excuse would they give their public... the same public they had been telling of the evil of hitler and germany... who started the war of their own volition... there was nothing like self defence involved here. Equally the newsreels had been showing the Soviets bearing a large amount of the fighting and were seen if not as heros, at least as someone helping the west to fight a mutual foe.
What are you to say?
Change sides and help Germany to prevent Communism hurting eastern Europe? How was Hitlers Germany going to make life for the non german countries around it better than the communists? Do you really think the germans would be prepared to give up their Fascist state, especially any time before 1943?

Smersh

01-23-2007, 11:59 PM

Jaguar

01-24-2007, 02:10 PM

But there was no possiblity of USSR winning.

The inicial question is about an WA attack, to win SU would have just to stop it. Very doable.

All the allies would of had to do is hold out long enough before grinding USSR into the dust much like they did with Germany.
Not hard to do with an airforce that would of walked all over the VVS in 1945.

There was no airforce in the world that could compare with the training Western fighter pilots received, throw in the P-80...
B-29, nothing USSR had could shoot these down in enough numbers to count.

If USAAF "would of walked all over the VVS in 1945" it would be up high and it can be said that VVS "would of walked all over the USAAF in 1945" down low. Both are exagerations of course.

Untill you redeploy the entire B-29 fleet to places far from the well organized bases in Britain, stablish lines of supplies, set plans for the attack (not as easy as it seems) your troops on the ground would have been in deep trouble facing hordes of Sturmoviks and the best propeller fighters in the world (Yak-3, Yak-9U, La7) at medium to low altitudes. Even with WA pilots better training it was a war they weren´t used to, but was soviet pilots bread and butter.

Thousands, even hundreds, of P-80s or Skyraiders couldn´t have been fielded in the feasible future, the same with SU new projects, none jet propeled though.

Back to up high. After months of preparation WA strategic air forces are ready to wage serious battle. If memory serves me well, B-29s had lots of accuracy troubles because jetstream in Japan, it was solved when the bombing altitude was lowered (couldn´t remember the figures), a part of your altitude advantage is lost. Anyway, somehow you managed to divert a sensible proportion of your much needed fighters (P-51s mostly) from the front to scort duties. Now SU has serious trouble, bringing down a Superfortress is a hard task (saw the thing at Duxford, even sided by a B-52 it´s massive!). Relatively light armed SU fighters would have to resort to tarans (collision). Very costly and not consistent effective. But again, strategic bombing took sometime to show it´s effects. SU oil production facilities would have been the more likely target, but I don´t have the time to search where they were and from where they could have been reached in force.
Of course you can divert your strategic bombers to battlefield interdition (like in Overlord preparations), but without complete air supperiority it would be a measure of last resort.

Let´s say, if the war lasted more than around a year I would bet WA would have the upper hand in the air warfare. Nevertheless, it´s extremily unlikely WWIII could have lasted for so long. The casualties...

China with a surrendered Japan on USSR doorstep?
Nukes.
Large casualties for the allies but only one posible outcome.

And why nukes? Mercifully even at those times the "Nuke them!" mentality wasn´t so "popular" as it is on this boards. "The debate about the morality - and indeed efficacy - of the bombing raids was already under way in the closing stages of the war", and this against German, The Evil Enemy. Absolutely no political conditions to use nukes in an unprovoked, to the public opinion, attack against a former ally, specially with those swastyka marked equipment and uniforms fighting alongside your troops.

Last but not least, I very much doubt american society would have been prepared to accept the huge eastern front standard death toll in exchange for such ethereal, again to the public opinion, goals.

Murray B

01-24-2007, 02:35 PM

You realize that the soviet union was paying in blood for that lend-lease equipment. Stopping lend lease to the Soviet Union, Hitlers main opponent would have severly hurt the American and British war effort. You realize that the USSR, USA and UK where allies!? or am I missing something here.

The Soviet Union was paying in blood because they chose to stop the Fascists. If they did not do this then the war would have been lost. Today all that would remain of humanity would likely be the "Aryans" and a few slavs to serve them.

Most Soviet casualties came from enemy terror troops murdering civilians. I am convinced that if the Soviets had failed and the Nazis were stopped in North America then then the U.S. casualties would have been in the tens of millions as well. It is unfair to blame the Americans for not having enough civilians murdered to equal the Soviet totals. What more could they do?

P.S. As you say, we were all allies back then, so don't blame the U.S.A. for what a European country did to yours.

P.P.S. When I wrote an article on Russian tanks I found out what "Zvierboi" really means. This is something I did not put in the article, out of respect for a former ally. Shall I tell them now, or is it still too embarassing?

GreySpawn

01-24-2007, 03:15 PM

"zveroboy" means "beastslayer". isu received that nickname because it killed "panthers" and "tigers". what meaning have you found?

Murray B

01-24-2007, 03:56 PM

"zveroboy" means "beastslayer". isu received that nickname because it killed "panthers" and "tigers". what meaning have you found?

"Beastslayer" is good but a cow is a beast. My translator gives it as "predator killer" which is similar but without harmless animals. One of the world's experts gives the meaning as "Animal hunter" which could be funny if the animal is a rabbit. There was a Monty Python movie with a "killer rabbit" in it but I don't remember what it was called.

Anyway, the origin of the word is "The Deerslayer", note the capitalization of the words and the inculsion of "The".

This information came from a local Russian who was a linguist. Will you expand on this or shall I?

Smersh

01-24-2007, 03:57 PM

The Soviet Union was paying in blood because they chose to stop the Fascists.

the choice between life and death is a simple one.

Murray B

01-24-2007, 04:30 PM

the choice between life and death is a simple one.

Indeed, and I am very glad that the Fascists were stopped. It is a better world today for what those men did. At the same time I am sad [words cannot decribe] that so many millions of Soviets died, mostly murdered, by the monsters [words cannot describe].

As you say, for the Soviets, "there was no way out" and war with the Fascists was inevitable. [the quote is from Viktor Plotnikov's site]

Today, Fascist thoughts are spreading across the world again. Does that mean another war is inevitable?

GreySpawn

01-24-2007, 06:09 PM

Anyway, the origin of the word is "The Deerslayer", note the capitalization of the words and the inculsion of "The".
This information came from a local Russian who was a linguist. Will you expand on this or shall I?

maybe he was a linguist, but certainly not a weapons specialist or enthusiast. "the deerslayer" is not even close to original nickname and it's meaning. but maybe i don't understand something, so please expand.

Murray B

01-24-2007, 07:32 PM

maybe he was a linguist, but certainly not a weapons specialist or enthusiast. "the deerslayer" is not even close to original nickname and it's meaning. but maybe i don't understand something, so please expand.

She was a linguist and historian. The Russian word traces its roots back to a book called "The Deerslayer" by the American author James Fenimore Cooper. I have never read the book but I understand that it is about a young warrior who is teased because he has never killed anything dangerous. He is give the rude nickname "deerslayer" by his warrior friends. Later he defeats a monster attacking the village and becomes a hero. So he becomes "Preditor Killer".

If you were an artsy type then you might already know this.

I asked two local russians about the word, a Chemist and a historian/linguist. The Chemist quickly gave "predator killer". I asked him about "animal hunter" and he said no, the animal could be a rabbit and a "zvier" rabbit would be funny in Russian. If you translate it into English as "killer rabbit" it is also funny.

The historian instantly gave the translation as "The Deerslayer". I responded "a deerslayer" and she said no "The Deerslayer", a book by James Fenimore Cooper. She then went on to provide a lot of information about how the word can mean both "Predator Killer" and "The Deerslayer" based on context.

What are the ramifications of this?

Well a lot of Russians must have had a secret admiration for Americans to adopt this word. This, coupled with a kind of belief in their own inferiority created some friction during the war.

Most Russians at the time believed that American engineering was superior. Hardly anyone believed that the T34 was the best tank in the world for tank fighting, which it was. They all thought the American ones just had to be better. When the Shermans started to arrive most Soviets thought the Americans were holding back their best tanks. This created hard feeling but the Sherman really was the best the U.S. could offer at the time. It was not until they had created a heavy tank infrastucture that they could make a great tank fighter like the Pershing. The Soviets did not need any lease-lend tanks by that time ('44) because the Stalins and T34/85s were in the process of sweeping all before them back to Berlin.

"Zvierboi" also means that the SU-152 is not SPA. Not with a three and a half inch frontal plate. The vehicle was actually a tank hunter extraordinaire. Correct the penetration typos to 224-mm to correspond to "rule of thumb" for plasma penetrators and it becomes clear why all the Jagdtigers were sent west.

CyberSpec

01-24-2007, 09:32 PM

An excelent debate between our resident experts.

It took a while to read it all, but it was worth the effort.

Some interesting footage from the Eastern Front -1945:

1. Russian footage with colour added
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21Zd42pMSO0

2. German news from the front
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FUMXgstwkLE

GreySpawn

01-24-2007, 10:27 PM

murray, thanks. had a good laugh. but seriously - you just have to read that book. besides exellent read it will give you insight, why it's incorrect to draw parallels with isu and why that chemist was closer to the actual meaning, than linguist. similarity of words do not possesses similarity of meanings less the origins of them.

asch

01-24-2007, 11:35 PM

"Deerslayer" = "Oleneboy"
no ****.

GazB

01-25-2007, 01:34 AM

It is unfair to blame the Americans for not having enough civilians murdered to equal the Soviet totals. What more could they do?

What could the western allies have done to help? How about move D-Day up a few years. Sure they will have taken more casualties, but if you think about it they could have come from the west faster, relieved pressure on their Soviet Allies and done a bit more of the ground fighting in Europe. They certainly would have captured more of Europe and perhaps even "liberated" most of Eastern Europe too. The Soviets could have lost fewer troops and the various sieges in the Soviet Union might have had less pressure on them.

When I wrote an article on Russian tanks I found out what "Zvierboi" really means. This is something I did not put in the article, out of respect for a former ally. Shall I tell them now, or is it still too embarassing?

Zvierboi means animal hunter and refers to the ability of the ISU-152 to be able to kill the main German "animals". Those animals being the Panther, The Tiger, and The Elephant (Eliphant). The ISU-152 was something the west didn't really understand because they use artillery differently. In the west artillery directly supports a particular group of units and is "on call". In the Soviet Army the artillery is attached higher up and is less flexible. This was less of a problem than it initially appears as the units had the support of excellent 120mm mortars, the first use of such weapons in the world and immediately copied by the Germans who even put the Soviet 120mm Mortar into production and used it in a similar way. The ISU-152 was an extension in that they were considered direct fire artillery used for fire support, much like the much smaller Su-76 and SU-122. The Tank destroyer versions used high velocity guns like the 85mm and later 100mm guns in fixed mountings on T-34 chassis and the later long barrel ISU-152 was also a tank destroyer because it was found at Kursk that shell weight alone while not able to penetrate the armour could knock the turret off or kill the crew with the shock effect of the explosion.

The Russian word traces its roots back to a book called "The Deerslayer" by the American author James Fenimore Cooper.

More than half of the conscripts in the Soviet Army were illiterate, how many do you think are reading american books? Even if what you say is true regarding the origin, very few would know of it or understand that meaning. The ISU-152 was called the animal hunter because at Kursk it was the only gun that could kill Tigers, Panthers, and Elefants.

Brute

01-25-2007, 02:34 AM

Murray B

01-25-2007, 03:26 PM

How about move D-Day up a few years.

This shure would have increased casualties but it would make little difference in the East. The Germans do not need Panthers and Tigers to kill Shermans and Matildas. A PzIII with the long 50 is plenty. The Germans were deperate for resources like oil, chromium, cobalt and etcetera. They were not going to reduce the Eastern campaign one bit even if it meant losing occupied territory.

Zvierboi means animal hunter and refers to the ability of the ISU-152 to be able to kill the main German "animals".

Are you making a joke? A rabbit is an "animal" so is it, "rabbit hunter" or "killer-rabbit hunter"? Also a hunter generally hunts for sport or to eat but not usually for defence. I still like my translator's version "preditor killer" better.

More than half of the conscripts in the Soviet Army were illiterate, how many do you think are reading american books?

Look, I warned everybody that this secret American admiration would be embarassing especially considering the cold war and all. Nevertheless, this 'cat' won't go back into the bag.

Now, if you are a resident of a former Soviet Republic why do you insist on dishonouring your own dead by revising history to make them look stupid. I'm not looking for who to blame for the "cold war" and the disinformation campaigns that followed, only to record the facts correctly.

Don't you understand at that point in history we were allies and the dead now deserve the truth?

GreySpawn

01-25-2007, 05:39 PM

Murray B

01-25-2007, 06:35 PM

Animal= Zhivotnoye, животное.
Beast= Zver', зверь
Predator= Hischnik, хищник
Boi from Uboi, убой= Slaughter
Zveroboi, Зверобой = Beast Slaughterer, one who slaughters beasts.

Ah, so the direct translation is "slaughter house worker".

Beast in English does not mean dangerous unless it is stated as in "dangerous beast". A horse or an ox is a beast.

A slaughterer is a farmer or someone that works at a packing house. They are not at risk doing this nor are they protecting anyone.

I still like my translator's version better because she does not try to translate literally word to word but by concepts which better conveys the meaning.

Even better translation is "one who does the job of protecting others by killing dangerous big-game animals".

Now, if another resident of the former Soviet Union tries to explain English, my mother language to me one more time then BE WARNED that I will fart in your general direction.

asch

01-25-2007, 06:59 PM

haha, man, you quite a funky linguist.
a rabbit as "zver" as a wolf. sorry. can't help with your case. there is another 135 mil people who have different opinion on the subject than you.

Murray B

01-25-2007, 07:09 PM

man, you obviously have some problems with russian language and russian history. that "secret admiration" is hilarious to say the least. so bear with it and do not try to find complex answers to simple questions..

Actually, I did not do the translations, Russians did.

The Soviet belief in their own inferiority is the issue and I have no doubt that this is a common belief. The Soviets had the best tank in world and could not believe it.[Well maybe they did kind of believe it at the end of the second period, but not before]

My Russian history is far more accurate then the cold-war disinformaton we have been hearing from Russia for years. It was not even that hard to pick out the truth in a sea of crap. The truth is light and floats to the top, you see.

What I really hate about all these lies is that they make the Soviet fathers and grandfathers look like idiots. So stupid in fact, that it impossible for them to win the war.

Yes, the sons and grandsons may be idiots, the products of a failed school sytem, but the old guys, no way. "Illiterate" or not, they defeated the strongest ground force that the world has ever seen.

Take a day and think about what I have said and what it is you are defending.

Indiana Jones

01-25-2007, 08:14 PM

Yes, the sons and grandsons may be idiots, the products of a failed school sytem, but the old guys, no way. "Illiterate" or not, they defeated the strongest ground force that the world has ever seen.

While the Wehrmacht indeed holds the laurel of arguably being the most effective army of the 20th century (the IDF at its zenith being its contender), only for a very short time (1941) was it the single strongest military factor on the planet-
"Quantity has a quality of its own."
J. Dschughaschwili.

Murray B

01-25-2007, 09:07 PM

While the Wehrmacht indeed holds the laurel of arguably being the most effective army of the 20th century (the IDF at its zenith being its contender), only for a very short time (1941) was it the single strongest military factor on the planet-
"Quantity has a quality of its own."
J. Dschughaschwili.

Of course, Indiana Jones, I do not dispute this. I got a little excited because I'm getting tired of hearing the same old crap from the Soviet side, year after year.

Those Israeli's are really something. Especially what they can do with recycled equipment. I've seen a picture of a Magach that they made out of an old M-60. Apparently it works well.

So, I stand corrected, but those old "illiterate" Soviets did pretty good anyway despite what their sons and grandsons are saying.

Anyway, got to go but thanks for the reality check.

Brute

01-25-2007, 09:32 PM

Ah, so the direct translation is "slaughter house worker".

No, it isn't. It's only your interpretation of it. "Slaughter house worker" would be "Рабочий бойни/мясокомбината"

Beast in English does not mean dangerous unless it is stated as in "dangerous beast". A horse or an ox is a beast.
It's different in Russian. Zver' in Russian is usually reserved for dangerous wild animals: wolfs, lions, panthers, tigers, etc. A cow would usually be called 'zhivotnoye'.

Look, stop trying to explain the meaning of a russian word to a native Russian speaker, really, because, the more you try - the goofier it makes you look. It doesn't matter what it means in English, what matters is what it means in Russian. In Russian it means "one who kills/slays/slaughters dangerous animals", period.

P.S. these theories of yours about "secret admiration" and "belief in their own inferiority" are a bunch of horse**** on a stick and have no basis what-so-ever in reality.

CPL Trevoga

01-25-2007, 09:32 PM

Actually, I did not do the translations, Russians did.

The Soviet belief in their own inferiority is the issue and I have no doubt that this is a common belief. The Soviets had the best tank in world and could not believe it.[Well maybe they did kind of believe it at the end of the second period, but not before]

My Russian history is far more accurate then the cold-war disinformaton we have been hearing from Russia for years. It was not even that hard to pick out the truth in a sea of crap. The truth is light and floats to the top, you see.

What I really hate about all these lies is that they make the Soviet fathers and grandfathers look like idiots. So stupid in fact, that it impossible for them to win the war.

Yes, the sons and grandsons may be idiots, the products of a failed school sytem, but the old guys, no way. "Illiterate" or not, they defeated the strongest ground force that the world has ever seen.

Take a day and think about what I have said and what it is you are defending.

Dude, zveroboi means beast slayer. ISU-152 was called zveroboi, because it had ability go head to head with German Tigers and Panthers, because in 1943 Russian T34 were outgunned and out armored by those tanks. There is no hidden meanings.

There is a guy madeinmoscow he was translator/interrogator in the Army, why don't you PM him if you have further questions.

Brute

01-25-2007, 09:38 PM

Yes, the sons and grandsons may be idiots, the products of a failed school sytem, but the old guys, no way. "Illiterate" or not, they defeated the strongest ground force that the world has ever seen.

A Soviet school system is a failed school system?!:cantbeli:

And you insult the whole generation of Russians by calling them idiots. How "nice"! :slap:

Smersh

01-25-2007, 10:04 PM

Russian school system is much more disfunctional today then it was during Soviet times.

GazB

01-26-2007, 12:20 AM

This shure would have increased casualties but it would make little difference in the East.

It would have required the transfer of several units from the East to move to the west. That sort of relief in pressure would have made operations in the East easier, if not easy.
It also might have made the Soviets think their allies were not using them as the cannon fodder to fight the real ground war.

The Germans do not need Panthers and Tigers to kill Shermans and Matildas.

They didn't need Panthers or Tigers full stop. The Panzer IVs with long barrel 75mm guns were adequate to take on any T-34. They made Panthers and Tigers because of their egos.

The Germans were deperate for resources like oil, chromium, cobalt and etcetera.

Yet it didn't stop them wasting money and resources on super rail mounted guns and rocket powered aircraft and uber tanks like the Maus that were totally unpractical for the war they were actually fighting.

They were not going to reduce the Eastern campaign one bit even if it meant losing occupied territory.

Even to stop the threat of invasion of Germany itself? They seemed to transfer forces when D-Day occured...

Are you making a joke? A rabbit is an "animal" so is it, "rabbit hunter" or "killer-rabbit hunter"? Also a hunter generally hunts for sport or to eat but not usually for defence. I still like my translator's version "preditor killer" better.

No, I am not making a joke. What are they supposed to call it? They can't call it cat hunter as the elephant is not a cat. Preditor hunter makes no sense either for the same reason.

Look, I warned everybody that this secret American admiration would be embarassing especially considering the cold war and all. Nevertheless, this 'cat' won't go back into the bag.

The Soviet Union was a closed society. How many Soviets do you think even read american books?

Now, if you are a resident of a former Soviet Republic why do you insist on dishonouring your own dead by revising history to make them look stupid.

I am not dishonouring anyone... how many GIs do you think were reading Russian books at the time?

Can you imagine the front line... the ISU-152 is found to be able to kill the toughest enemy vehicle and some soldier who reads old American books says... lets nickname it deerslayer because I read an american book about it once... yeah... that is gonna fly.
The thing about nicknames is they actually have to make sense to the people using them for them to continue to be widely used... and Zieverboi was widely used.
There were no German vehicles named Deer, only Panther, Tiger, and Elephant, and Puma, though the latter would hardly require a 152mm shell to kill.

What I really hate about all these lies is that they make the Soviet fathers and grandfathers look like idiots. So stupid in fact, that it impossible for them to win the war.

Yes, they must be idiots if they don't call a direct fire artillery support vehicle called ISU-152 a slayer of deer, which has nothing to do with the enemy it faced in the battle it earned its name but from the title of some foreign book 99% of those fighting had probably never even heard of.

Yes, the sons and grandsons may be idiots, the products of a failed school sytem,

Why do you equate wisdom with knowledge? Are all people who can't read or write a foreign language idiots? In the late 20s and early 30s or before most of these peasants lived on collective farms where home schooling or proper schools in the western sense were hardly likely to teach English, or robotics.

BTW I know lots of Idiots that made it right through our education system and I know a few people that can't read or write that I would trust my life to.
Your definition of an idiot needs some examination perhaps.

"Illiterate" or not, they defeated the strongest ground force that the world has ever seen.

And they only held out because they had books like the Deerslayer and Huckleberry Finn and Moby **** and other US classics to keep them going... :)

In Russian it means "one who kills/slays/slaughters dangerous animals", period.

And while Tigers and Panthers and Elephants can be docile perhaps even friendly when hand reared, the Pathers and Tigers and Elephants in the battle of Kursk were dangerous animals that needed to be killed.