Dennis G
04-20-2004, 04:02 PM
The US military today has several CSOF units operating today. Most notable (in no particular order) are the US Navy SEALS, US Army Rangers, US Marines Force Recon, US Army Special Operations Aviation, US Air Force Special Operations and US Army Special Forces (SF). Many will notice several glaring errors in the listing; this is deliberate. I listed only those units which have a DIRECT combat mission. Both aviation organizations have organic attack assets.
Of all of these organizations, the two most alike are the SEALs and SF. The SEALs are a small-unit maritime special operations force. SF is a small-unit GROUND special operations force. Both have a broad mission charter that reads the same:
Conduct the following:
1) Direct Action Operations (direct combat).
2) Collect Intelligence.
3) Conduct Unconventional Warfare (train guerrillas behind enemy lines).
4) Foreign Internal Defense (fight guerrillas behind friendly lines).
5) Counter-Terrorist Operations (kill guerrillas who don't follow the rules).
6) Coalition Warfare (advise foreign armies on regular warfare issues).
7) Special Activities (none of your business!).
Another way to describe this mission charter is: SEALs and SF can Snoop, Shoot, or Teach someone else how to snoop-and-shoot. They can do this behind friendly lines, behind enemy lines, by themselves or with friends.
An important item to mention at this juncture is the transportation of SEALs and SF. Without special vehicles, planes, boats, subs and helicopters to take them into harm's way, both groups are nothing more than Light Infantry with a Bad Attitude. While their training is just as vital; it means nothing without a ride to the job site.
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History.
Special Forces predates the formation of the SEALs by almost a decade. The first Special Forces Group 'stood up' in 1952. Special Forces can trace its direct lineage back to the Second World War. Two of the most notable ancestors were the 1st Special Service Force and Operational Groups of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
1st SSF was known by the German Army as the "Nacht Teufels Brigada' or "Black Devils Brigade". The 'Force', as they called themselves, had their own nickname: Freddy's Freighters. The Force had an international reputation for the heavy loads (40 kilograms) they routinely carried on forced marches of 90 to 100 kilometers. Their commander, W. Frederick (Freddy) set and led by example; hence their nickname. Colonel Frederick had the entire regiment go through jump school in Montana in one week; with Colonel Frederick making his first jump in slippers. The 'Black' in their German nickname comes from their preference of operating at night.
1st Special Service Force was a regimental-sized unit that rarely went above 2000 personnel in assigned strength. It was one of the few Allied units to fight both the Japanese and Germans (Alaska, Italy and France). Their principal mission was sustained behind-the-lines combat and reconnaissance-in-force operations to harass lines of communication and command and control.
The Operational Groups, or OGs, had the principal mission of training irregular forces to harass the enemy. These groups varied in size from 2 personnel (an officer and "piano player" or radio operator); to 30+ native soldiers recruited from Allied Prisoner of War camps. It should be noted that quite a few radio operators were women; it enhanced the cover of the OGs by not standing out as much as two males. Probably the most famous, or notorious, OGs were the Jedburgh teams deployed ahead of the Normandy Invasion.
Over the past 40 years, both the size and number of SF Groups changed considerably. Currently there are five Active Duty SF Groups and two Reserve SF Groups:
1st SF Group (Pacific and Asia East of the Urals; excluding Southwest Asia).
3rd SF Group (Africa and the Caribbean).
5th SF Group (Southwest Asia).
7th SF Group (Central and South America).
10th SF Group (Europe and Asia West of the Urals).
19th and 20th SF Groups (Reserve Units which reinforce the active Groups).
Mission Terminology.
Rather than detail each of the seven missions outlined; I'll stick to my 'simplified' mission statement:
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Snooping.
Collection of information is the most vital service any SOF unit can provide to the conventional force commander. SF acts as the "deep eyes and ears" of the commander. There are four basic types of processed information, or intelligence, that a commander can access: Human, Signal, Imagery and Technical. SF primarily supplies human-gathered intelligence.
Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, consists of information collected by people without using sophisticated methods; like listening to conversations, watching a road, taking hand-held pictures, or roaming through an area to see what's there.
SF Intelligence Collection, or "Snoopin' and Poopin' " , consists of either reconnaissance or surveillance operations. Reconnaissance are those actions taken to obtain data about the characteristics of a specific area (like a bridge) or zone (the county the bridge sits in). Surveillance are those actions taken to obtain data about the actions or activities of specific targets (humans, bridges, rivers, etc.) or areas (airfields, harbors, Garth Brooks concert, etc.). Surveillance can either be fixed or moving (following the target without detection).
In simpler terms a reconnaissance (recce) 'measures' a target; surveillance (stag) 'watches' the target. This distinction is important because a recce mission means having to walk over the target to get the intelligence. If the high commander can get the recce information from a distance, why send an SF team? Stag ops can get their information from a distance; it doesn't involve contact with the target of any sort (at least it better NOT have contact).
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Shooting.
This category refers to operations that result in loud noises and unwanted attention. European SF units refer to these as "Bash and Dash" operations. Contrary to popular belief, 99% of all experienced CSOF personnel do not like revealing themselves except under conditions that heavily favor them. Shooting ,or combat, operations has a few subsets like intelligence collection. The target's characteristics define these categories:
1) Raids (we go to the target).
2) Ambushes (the target comes to us).
3) Stand-Off Attack (reach out and whack the target).
4) Security Ops (find a target to whack).
Traits that all four types share are speed, surprise and violence of action. These traits are occasionally the only force-multiplier SF has deep in Bad-Guy country. Both SEALs and SF understand that in a direct conflict with the enemy they will be outnumbered. Amazingly, when the shooting starts, the casualties on the enemy side are far heavier than on the CSOF side. This in turn provides ample testimony to the selection criteria and training all our operators receive in the US.
Raids are operations to swiftly penetrate enemy-controlled territory to seize equipment, capture personnel or destroy something. It ends with a planned withdrawal once the objectives are met. SF conducts raids against fixed or static installations. Most raids are for destruction of material. The proper term is demolition raid.
Demo raids focus on the partial or complete destruction of a target or target system. Usually the conventional force commander hands down their intent; which the SF unit uses to come up with plans to support the Commander's Intent. Complete destruction means that not one part of the target or system can be re-used. If the target was a bridge, this means every span, both abutments, intermediate supports and access ways must all be reduced to rubble that is useless. A small 15 meter bridge slated for complete destruction would require close to 4 metric tons of explosive. If the same bridge, however, required only partial destruction, the explosive load could drop to 100 kilograms.
Commander's intent is very important to the mission planning process. It has the greatest influence on the load requirements for any type of mission. If the big boss says no one will EVER use that bridge again, then SF orders up a mule train to carry the demo material. However, if the Kahuna only wants to impede vehicle traffic over the river, a regular SF team can carry the load.
Ambushes are attacks against moving or temporarily halted targets. The objectives are the same as a raid; followed again by a planned withdrawal. An effective ambush requires good intelligence or a lot of bodies to cover all contingencies. One does not usually initiate an ambush on a heavily armed, numerically superior foe; unless one has a death wish or is backed up by an Armor Battalion.
Stand-Off operations involve no direct contact with the enemy; yet still impedes their operations. This includes:
1) Indirect fires (mortars, rockets or artillery).
2) Terminal Guidance (laser designation, radar beacons, forward observation).
3) Sniper Operations.
Security missions are a hybrid between collecting information and acting on that information. The reconnaissance-in-force best describes most security operations; the SF patrol collects information and attacks the enemy based on that information. Security operations can either move around or stay in one spot; depending on the job requirements.
SF operations in Vietnam contained numerous examples of roving security patrols that would look for the enemy, fix their position and either bring in follow-on forces or direct artillery and air strikes against them. One SF element during Operation Just Cause in Panama performed a classic fixed security operation when guarding a bridge. The Commander's Intent stated that the Panamanian Battalion 2000 could not reinforce Noriega's thugs in downtown Panama City. The only realistic route was over a bridge. Due to some timing problems, the SF element tasked with stopping all traffic arrived on the bridge just before the lead element of the Battalion 2000 crossed it. Two troopers ran up onto the middle of the road and started firing AT-4 rockets at the lead vehicles while the rest of the unit deployed and engaged the convoy. Also on station were two AC-130 gunships which greatly influenced the outcome: nothing made it across.
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Teaching.
This is the "Bread and Butter" of Special Forces; and which makes a very dangerous force. One Special Forces A-Team can recruit, organize, train, equip (with outside help) and 'advise' a Light Infantry Battalion. This includes rifles, mortars, anti-tank launchers, command, control, communications and intelligence. An unconventional warfare (UW) mission means they do this behind enemy lines. The usual objectives of UW are to help overthrow the current regime; or influence it in a manner favorable to the guerillas and US policy. No guerilla army has won a campaign without heavy support from a sponsor. US sponsorship is often in the form of SF detachments and supplies controlled by Special Forces.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the flip side of UW. Only now the light infantry battalion is raised to support the current government and hunt down guerillas trying to overthrow it. FID also includes improvement of existing foreign forces through better training and supplies.
All the training in the world means nothing if the will to fight isn't there. Without a fighting spirit and cohesive motivation, teaching operations of any type are useless. This is often a major factor in why the US doesn't go into every 'opressed' country or region and create order.
Coalition Warfare is like Foreign Internal Defense; only it applies mostly to foreign conventional units and the mission is mostly advisory. This mission came from the Gulf War when attack aviation units said they would not provide close air support unless there was a US element on the ground to control the strike. Special Forces got the call to send teams to brigade-level and higher headquarters of the allied units to act as liaisons. The role expanded to include language interpretation, tactical advice and act as a direct link to the Theater Commander as necessary. If a US unit had to interact or coordinate with an Allied unit; there was good chance an SF liaison team played some role in making it happen. In certain cases, SF sent liaison teams all the way to the battalion and company level help the war effort.
Allied Units with an SF liaison team benefited from exposure to more sophisticated communications equipment; as well as navigation aids. All of the SF teams had GPS satellite navigation sets that gave the same positional benefit to our Allies as the US. It also gave the Theater Commander real-time information on the exact location of every unit in the region.
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Organization. The basic administrative and tactical unit of US Army Special Forces is the A-Team; also known as an Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA). The ODA has 12 personnel assigned to it:
-Team Leader, Captain (O-3); Commander.
-Team Technician, Warrant Officer (W-1 to W-3); Second in Command.
-Team Sergeant, Master Sergeant (E-8), NCO in Charge of the Team.
-Operations/Intelligence Sergeant, (E-7), Assistant NCO in Charge of the Team.
-Two Weapons Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
-Two Engineer Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
-Two Medical Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
-Two Communications Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
The ODA has a redundancy of skills in all key areas. Both Officers go the same Officer's Course; and the Team Sergeant and O/I Sergeant attend the same school as well. The Warrant Officer has the same basic functions as the Team Leader; only the Technician is a prior-service SF Sergeant who worked as a Team Sergeant or O/I Sergeant, plus two other duty positions (weapons, demo, commo or medical). Thus the Technician should have an enormous amount of SF experience built up sitting in an officer's duty position. Team Sergeants generally have 6 to 10 years SF experience, O/I sergeant usually has 3 to 6 years. The remaining personnel vary from entry-level experience to 10+ years.
The Weapons Sergeants are trained to expertly use every weapon available to a Light Infantry Battalion. This includes rifles, pistols, sub-machineguns, mortars, heavy mortars, air defense missiles, anti-tank weapons, sniper systems, grenade launchers and machine guns. They train on US and the most popular foreign weapons in the world. They also act as advisors for weapons employment to the team or foreign units.
The Engineer Sergeants are a "triple threat" duty position. They are the experts for construction of Theater of Operation buildings, bunkers, fortified positions, obstacles and obstacle crossing. They are also responsible for destruction of most everything built in the world; to that end they receive demolition training ranging from passive sabotage to explosive removal of objects. They also know how to 'improvise' demolition devices where none exist. SF Engineers receive training in every major industrial system that could be a military target: bridges, airfields, electrical plants, ports, communications centers, refineries, etc. Their third major responsibility is the ODA's logistics. They act as the supply guys and logistics advisor to the Team Leader and any attached allies.
Communications Sergeants are probably the most valuable members on the team. Everyone else can be replaced by simply making a call back to the main base. No commo, no call. Communications links to the outside world are tenuous at best; it's their responsibility to make sure the link stays 'up' when needed and where needed. It's a point of pride among communicators that they can maintain contact at least 97% of the time; under any conditions, over any distance. They also receive training and advise the Team on electronic warfare; both guarding against and using it to find targets. There is some talk to expand their responsibility and training on Information Systems (PCs and networks).
Medical Sergeants are Special Force's answer to finding Medical Doctors for A-Teams. Their training is the longest and most academically strenuous in SF. Their primary focus is emergency medicine (to include minor surgery), preventive health care and disease diagnosis and control. All SF medics at some time in their career will be responsible for opening up a area to normal US relations when all other attempts failed. SF Medics can establish clinics and triage centers anywhere in the world under conditions that the Red Cross won't touch. Foreigners view Americans in a different light when a couple guys in funny green hats come and start fixing boo-boos in their village; all of a sudden, they have real proof that US soldiers are not the Great Satan their leaders refer to. To get people to work for you, you need to capture their "hearts and minds"; SF Medics doing their job get the best results and the best loyalty.
The second type of SF unit is the B-Team; or Operational Detachment-B (ODB). This is also a tactical unit but has the primary responsibility of command and control of SF operations in a defined area. There are approximately 14 personnel on a B-Team:
1 B-Team Leader; Major (O-4), Commander.
1 SF Captain (O-3), Executive Officer.
1 SF Warrant Officer (W-2 to W-3), Operations Officer.
1 SF Sergeant Major (E-9), NCO in Charge of the B-Team.
8 SF Sergeants.
2 non-SF Sergeants (Chemical and Supply).
Only the ODA and ODB typically deploy into a tactical zone. An ODB may function independently on operations; or control and support between two and eight ODAs doing tactical-level work.
Another SF organization is the C-Team (ODC). It is a pure command and control unit with operations, training, signals and logistic support responsibilities. It's very rare to see a C-Team in a tactical zone. More commonly it's co-located with the conventional force commander it's supporting; at the operational or strategic level. Its basic organization follows the same lines with a Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) for a Commander and a Command Sergeant Major (E-9) for the leading NCO. There's an additional 20 - 30 SF personnel who fill key positions in Operations, Logistics, Intelligence, Communications and Medical.
A C-Team will deploy to support just one B-Team if necessary. If the B-Team goes Tactical, a C-Team will deploy close to the B-Team in a non-tactical area to provide direct support. A C-team can control up to five or six B-Teams plus 18 to 30 A-Teams simultaneously. Although it keeps the C-Team extremely busy.
For administrative purposes, ODAs, ODBs and ODCs are grouped together using the following scheme:
Special Forces Company consists of:
6 ODAs. Two of the A-Teams are special infiltration teams:
One Combat Diver team and One Free-Fall team.
1 ODB.
When deployed, an SF Company can establish one Advanced Operating Base (AOB) and control 6 ODAs.
Special Forces Battalion consists of:
3 SF Companies.
1 ODC.
1 SF Battalion Support Company (Admin, Ops, Intel, Log, Commo, Med, Transportation)
When deployed, an SF Battalion can establish one Forward Operating Base (FOB) and control 3 ODBs and 18 ODAs.
Special Forces Group consists of:
3 SF Battalions.
1 Headquarters Company (Group Commander-Colonel and Group Command Sergeant Major)
1 SF Group Support Company (same as the Battalion Support Company only larger).
When deployed, an SF Group can establish one Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB) and control 3 ODCs, 9 ODBs and 54 ODAs.
All told, one SF Group has 54 A-Teams with a total of 648 "Trigger-Pullers" assigned to them. World-wide, there are approximately 3,240 personnel assigned to A-Teams.
It is also interesting to note that all five active SF Groups combined have 45 Combat Diver A-Teams with 540 Combat Divers assigned. This is in comparison to approximately 1,024 SEALs assigned to SEAL teams in the US Navy (16 man platoons, 8 platoons per Team, 8 Teams in Naval Special Warfare).
The British 22d Special Air Service Regiment has between 250 and 300 "Trigger Pullers" in the entire unit. This equates to one Special Forces Battalion.
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Comparison.
It's almost impossible to compare SEALs and Special Forces at anything but the highest level. But many people love to do comparisons in a light unfavorable to one side. This section will highlight some key differences between the two and the justification for both to exist.
As I stated before, the principal difference between SEALs and Special Forces is their environmental orientation. Both are small-unit special operations forces. SEALs work in a maritime environment, SF works in a ground environment. To quote Commander Stubblefield (a SEAL of some note) "The SEALs like to keep one foot in water".
Special Forces views water as another obstacle to negotiate for the mission. Moving through, or on, water is a means to an end. Maritime environments are so unique that it requires a unit dedicated to operating exclusively in that realm. SEALs view water as a means and an end to mission accomplishment. This does not mean that Special Forces is handicapped; Working in an exclusive ground environment far away from water is every bit as challenging.
The general operating area for SEALs are the oceans, seas, large rivers, and the coastal land areas. Special Forces starts at the shore line and goes in from there. Can the SEALs go further inland? Yes. Have they gone further inland? Yes. Can Special Forces perform water operations like the SEALs? Yes. Have they done SEAL-type operations? Yes. It sounds like there's some redundancy here; which is true. This mission 'overlap' is deliberate. If needed, each organization can help the other to some degree. If a carrier group commander has an immediate requirement for a deep ground strike, his attached SEAL platoon will get the nod. If a US ground commander has a requirement to eliminate some coastal patrol boats, he'll tell his attached SF Company to take care of it.
The duration of missions is another key difference. SEALs typically have operations that last from 3 hours to 3 days. Most SF missions last from 3 days to 3 months. This is why SEALs and SF "load out" differently. Given the same target and mission, most SEALs will have less equipment than their SF counterparts. This does not count gear needed for infiltration by either side; whether it's sea, land or air.
Most SF units assume there will be a follow-on mission once the primary mission is over. SEALs usually focus on one mission at a time; then withdraw to prep for another one. So SF will pack like they're going to be "in-country" for a while; SEALs don't. If an A-Team only has one mission, they may have to walk out afterwards; which can last a week or two. It could take an A-Team a week to remove a coastal radar site; it may take the SEALs a few hours to do the same. The final decision comes down to who's available and their location when the 'go' signal is given.
These mission profiles influence how SF and SEALs select and train their personnel. Special Forces focuses on orienteering, solo performance, teamwork performance and long duration marches and bivouacs. This web site does a great job of describing the SEAL selection process.
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Strengths.
This will be the most controversial section of the lot. Before going further, I want state that this is MY OPINION; good or bad, right or wrong. I base it on my two decades worth of experience working in Special Operations.
Special Forces brings several key strengths to Special Operations. The most obvious strength is sheer numbers. Given the skill set present on most teams, SF can task-organize better to suit the mission requirements.
Another strength is their response time. Special Forces is the only US Special Operations Force (SOF) that maintains a permanent presence overseas. Unless a Carrier Group or Amphibious Group is sitting ON the crisis site, it may take 4 to 7 days for the attached SEAL platoon to reach an operating area. In the same time frame, Special Forces can have a battalion on the ground. At a minimum, they can put an SF Company into a crisis area within 18 hours via USAF aircraft. SF routinely practices Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE) involving entire SF Companies and Battalions.
Another way to view response time is how many SEAL or SF personnel can be on site in a given period of time. Assuming a Carrier or Amphibious Group is on station, here's how I see the force response:
Time SEALs Special Forces
0 to 12 hours 1 Platoon (16 pers) 0
12 to 24 hours 1 Platoon 1 Company (72 pers)
1 to 7 days 1 Team (128 pers) 1 Battalion (216 pers)
1 to 3 weeks 4 Teams (512 pers) 1 Group (648 pers)
A point to remember is this deployment matrix shows them with ALL of their equipment on hand. The SEAL team is the first unit level that can establish a base of operations by themselves; an SF Company has a base capability. So SF can put an operating base on the ground for sustained special operations quicker than the SEALs. A 4 SEAL Team deployment represents half of their available strength world wide. One SF Group represents 20% of the available strength; and they can still cover all other contingency areas. Four SEAL teams in one crisis area is highly unlikely because they have so many other duties and areas to cover.
Because of it's size, SF can afford to be regionally oriented better than it's counterparts. ODAs usually spend two to eight weeks a year focusing on a particular region; memorizing all of the key attributes and weaknesses. In addition to studying the area, Special Forces requires that all of its A-Team personnel to speak the regional language. SF soldiers spend between 8 weeks to 4 months a year studying foreign languages and cultural traditions. Foreign language ability is a job requirement to stay in Special Forces. If you can't speak in tongues, you're fired.
Special Forces enjoys a reputation for their orienteering abilities. It is a skill needed to apply for SF duty in the first place. Overland movement is time-consuming and requires a very high degree of positional accuracy. More often than not boats and planes don't always land you where should be; this implies trying determine where you are while still trying to accomplish the mission. Given the "week-month" mindset, movement and navigation occupies 95% of an SF mission.
Endurance goes hand-in-hand with long-term operations. Most SF personnel on A-Teams are NOT physical studs; but they can put on a rucksack and go for days on end. They're not fast, but SF people can slowly grind you into the earth after few days of "yomping". More than a few foreign and US units found out the hard way about SF loads and distances. The Special Forces Museum used to have a bumper sticker quite appropriate to this condition: "Special Forces - Goes Deeper, Lasts Longer and Packs a Heavier Load".
Special Forces provides better mission flexibility than other Special Operations units. This comes from the skill set present on the A-Team. Every year there are jobs that the US government can't quite figure out who to give to. Examples of this are natural disasters and humanitarian relief operations. Special Forces came back into the limelight after the Gulf War because of the refugee camps they set up for the Kurds and Shiites near Iraq. Now whenever there's a large-scale disaster, the United Nations usually requests assistance from Special Forces as a first response. They usually go into areas with large-scale unrest and begin assessment of the region for follow-on relief. Because of their cultural sensitivity, they seem to get along better with the natives with fewer 'incidents'. They also act as an "authority figure" for other relief organizations who spend a great deal of time arguing with each other.
Retention of qualified personnel is a very important issue for Special Operations Units. SF has a higher retention rate for two key reasons: A soldier cannot apply for Special Forces without 3 to 4 years active service; so many applicants view SF as a possible career, not a 'hitch'. The second reason is because SF is so large, there's greater opportunity for "down-time" with family and relaxation.
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Weaknesses.
The biggest weakness Special Forces has is timidity of the commanders above the A-Team level. The command institution in SF wants maximum visibility with minimum risk to their careers. In essence, SF has sheep at the head of an army of lions.
Part of this problem stems from the short terms the SF Captains spend on A-Teams. Upon graduation, an SF Captain is considered "Branch Qualified" after serving 18 months on a team. After that time, he will never see a team again for the rest of his career. It is extremely rare for any SF Captain, or SF Major, to spend any meaningful time in tactical assignments. Because SF commanders spend so little time in a real command, they focus their efforts on what makes them look good and making sure no one has an opportunity to screw up on their watch. The best way to control screw-ups is to sharply limit what A-Teams are allowed to do.
Another weakness is the SF Warrant Officer. They came into being because of the "revolving door" at the officer level in Special Forces. They were established to provide stability in select positions needing institutional knowledge. Nowadays SF Warrant Officers have less than 3 years SF time, with none of it in leadership positions. They also have to fight for "high-visibility" positions on staff if they want a promotion. This condition leaves the A-Team in the lurch. The SF Warrant Officer also diluted the authority and quality of the SF A-Team Sergeant. As anyone knows, NCOs are what makes the US Army work; quite a few SF Soldiers became Warrant Officers because they didn't have the abilities to be a good Team Sergeant.
If this sounds like back-stabbing; it is. The only reason I became an SF Warrant Officer myself was to get back to an A-Team. As a senior NCO, I was had only desk jobs to look forward to; after 4 years as a Team Sergeant. The Warrant Program was the only way I could sneak back onto an ODA. So I selfishly put my needs ahead of Special Forces'. As a SF Warrant Officer, I deliberately skipped promotional opportunities because I wanted to stay on an A-Team.
Close Quarters Battle is another weak point in Special Forces. CQB takes place in buildings and towns; which is a nightmare for Army combat units. This reluctance transfers over to SF in large doses. There is also greater opportunity for disaster to strike; so SF commanders keep their teams away from built-up areas to protect their careers. If the commanders withhold CQB training, they can justifiably avoid urban-related assignments because no one trained for it. There are conventional units in the Army and Marines with better skills and experience fighting in cities than Special Forces. World demographics shows that people are moving to the cities, which means SF has to go to the cities sooner or later to get the job done. Or SF can let the SEALs do all of the work.
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Improvements.
The key areas where SF can improve is their base organization and basic SF training. As I see it, Special Forces should re-think the base structure of SF: The A-Team. The size should increase and the number of officers should decrease.
A better basic organization should consist of 16 personnel:
1 SF Captain
1 Team Sergeant
4 SF Intelligence Sergeants
4 SF Communications Sergeants
4 SF Engineer Sergeants
2 SF Medical Sergeants
The Weapons duty position is eliminated; instead ALL personnel would go to SF Weapons school. Everyone needs formal weapons training anyway. The SF Warrant is eliminated altogether; it's not serving the original intent of keeping experience on the A-Team. There are only two medical personnel because of the length and toughness of training. This layout gives the A-Team the same redundancy of skills on a slightly bigger scale.
The Team would now have two maneuver elements; both the size of an infantry squad. This in turn provides for more flexibility and better security. It can further break down into two fire teams each of four personnel. Each fire team has an Intelligence, Communications and Engineer capability. Two of the teams have medics and the other two have command presence (Captain and Team Sergeant). Most transport systems work in multiples of four (cars, trucks, etc.); so a four man fire team fits nicely.
Reducing the Officer presence on an A-Team simply brings it into line with the rest of the world. US Special Forces had the highest percentage of officers in a tactical unit anywhere. The current A-Team is 17% Officer; my proposed A-Team would have a 6% officer presence (less than the SEALs). Reducing the Officer strength is a good cost-cutting measure and reinforces the strength of the Team Sergeant.
Above the A-Team level I'd reduce the number of A-Teams to five per SF Company: One Combat Diver, One Free-Fall , and two regular A-Teams. The fifth team would lose two demo men and replace them with two communicators. This team's mission would focus on Electronic Warfare.
At the SF Battalion Level I would add an extra SF Company; bringing the total to four. Each SF group would still keep 3 SF Battalions. Above the SF Group Level, I'd keep only three SF Groups instead of five. The reduction is necessary because the Army manpower pool to draw from has reduced also; like or not.
Below is a comparison of total "trigger pullers" in the current organization and my organization:
Current Proposed
A-Team 12 16/TD>
SF Company 72 80
SF Battalion 216 320
SF Group 648 960
The five groups in existence today have 3,240 Trigger Pullers spread over 270 A-Teams. My organization would have three groups with 2,880 Trigger Pullers over 180 A-Teams. This represents a 12% cut in personnel; but a 33% cut in the number of A-Teams (to include Captains and Warrant Officers).
With only three SF Groups, each one needs to "look" in a different direction: One SF Group 'looks' West; covering the Pacific Ocean and Asia east of the Urals. Another looks South covering Central America, South America, Caribbean, and North America. The last SF Group looks east and covers Europe, Africa and Southwest Asia (middle east).
Captains would extend their stay on a team to 4 years from 18 months to "Branch Qualify". Basic SF training would extend about 5 months to include the SF Weapons Course and CQB training.
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Closing.
If you made it this far, congratulations! This article was necessarily long to provide the depth of knowledge many people seek on Special Operations. If our roles were simpler, I'd just write how great SF is and leave it at that. SEALs and SF are both similar and diverse at the same time. There are gunslingers in both camps who think highly of each other; and wouldn't want the other's job under any circumstances.
I hope this helped.
Tracy-Paul Warrington
Chief Warrant Officer (retired)
US Army Special Forces
Of all of these organizations, the two most alike are the SEALs and SF. The SEALs are a small-unit maritime special operations force. SF is a small-unit GROUND special operations force. Both have a broad mission charter that reads the same:
Conduct the following:
1) Direct Action Operations (direct combat).
2) Collect Intelligence.
3) Conduct Unconventional Warfare (train guerrillas behind enemy lines).
4) Foreign Internal Defense (fight guerrillas behind friendly lines).
5) Counter-Terrorist Operations (kill guerrillas who don't follow the rules).
6) Coalition Warfare (advise foreign armies on regular warfare issues).
7) Special Activities (none of your business!).
Another way to describe this mission charter is: SEALs and SF can Snoop, Shoot, or Teach someone else how to snoop-and-shoot. They can do this behind friendly lines, behind enemy lines, by themselves or with friends.
An important item to mention at this juncture is the transportation of SEALs and SF. Without special vehicles, planes, boats, subs and helicopters to take them into harm's way, both groups are nothing more than Light Infantry with a Bad Attitude. While their training is just as vital; it means nothing without a ride to the job site.
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History.
Special Forces predates the formation of the SEALs by almost a decade. The first Special Forces Group 'stood up' in 1952. Special Forces can trace its direct lineage back to the Second World War. Two of the most notable ancestors were the 1st Special Service Force and Operational Groups of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
1st SSF was known by the German Army as the "Nacht Teufels Brigada' or "Black Devils Brigade". The 'Force', as they called themselves, had their own nickname: Freddy's Freighters. The Force had an international reputation for the heavy loads (40 kilograms) they routinely carried on forced marches of 90 to 100 kilometers. Their commander, W. Frederick (Freddy) set and led by example; hence their nickname. Colonel Frederick had the entire regiment go through jump school in Montana in one week; with Colonel Frederick making his first jump in slippers. The 'Black' in their German nickname comes from their preference of operating at night.
1st Special Service Force was a regimental-sized unit that rarely went above 2000 personnel in assigned strength. It was one of the few Allied units to fight both the Japanese and Germans (Alaska, Italy and France). Their principal mission was sustained behind-the-lines combat and reconnaissance-in-force operations to harass lines of communication and command and control.
The Operational Groups, or OGs, had the principal mission of training irregular forces to harass the enemy. These groups varied in size from 2 personnel (an officer and "piano player" or radio operator); to 30+ native soldiers recruited from Allied Prisoner of War camps. It should be noted that quite a few radio operators were women; it enhanced the cover of the OGs by not standing out as much as two males. Probably the most famous, or notorious, OGs were the Jedburgh teams deployed ahead of the Normandy Invasion.
Over the past 40 years, both the size and number of SF Groups changed considerably. Currently there are five Active Duty SF Groups and two Reserve SF Groups:
1st SF Group (Pacific and Asia East of the Urals; excluding Southwest Asia).
3rd SF Group (Africa and the Caribbean).
5th SF Group (Southwest Asia).
7th SF Group (Central and South America).
10th SF Group (Europe and Asia West of the Urals).
19th and 20th SF Groups (Reserve Units which reinforce the active Groups).
Mission Terminology.
Rather than detail each of the seven missions outlined; I'll stick to my 'simplified' mission statement:
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Snooping.
Collection of information is the most vital service any SOF unit can provide to the conventional force commander. SF acts as the "deep eyes and ears" of the commander. There are four basic types of processed information, or intelligence, that a commander can access: Human, Signal, Imagery and Technical. SF primarily supplies human-gathered intelligence.
Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, consists of information collected by people without using sophisticated methods; like listening to conversations, watching a road, taking hand-held pictures, or roaming through an area to see what's there.
SF Intelligence Collection, or "Snoopin' and Poopin' " , consists of either reconnaissance or surveillance operations. Reconnaissance are those actions taken to obtain data about the characteristics of a specific area (like a bridge) or zone (the county the bridge sits in). Surveillance are those actions taken to obtain data about the actions or activities of specific targets (humans, bridges, rivers, etc.) or areas (airfields, harbors, Garth Brooks concert, etc.). Surveillance can either be fixed or moving (following the target without detection).
In simpler terms a reconnaissance (recce) 'measures' a target; surveillance (stag) 'watches' the target. This distinction is important because a recce mission means having to walk over the target to get the intelligence. If the high commander can get the recce information from a distance, why send an SF team? Stag ops can get their information from a distance; it doesn't involve contact with the target of any sort (at least it better NOT have contact).
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Shooting.
This category refers to operations that result in loud noises and unwanted attention. European SF units refer to these as "Bash and Dash" operations. Contrary to popular belief, 99% of all experienced CSOF personnel do not like revealing themselves except under conditions that heavily favor them. Shooting ,or combat, operations has a few subsets like intelligence collection. The target's characteristics define these categories:
1) Raids (we go to the target).
2) Ambushes (the target comes to us).
3) Stand-Off Attack (reach out and whack the target).
4) Security Ops (find a target to whack).
Traits that all four types share are speed, surprise and violence of action. These traits are occasionally the only force-multiplier SF has deep in Bad-Guy country. Both SEALs and SF understand that in a direct conflict with the enemy they will be outnumbered. Amazingly, when the shooting starts, the casualties on the enemy side are far heavier than on the CSOF side. This in turn provides ample testimony to the selection criteria and training all our operators receive in the US.
Raids are operations to swiftly penetrate enemy-controlled territory to seize equipment, capture personnel or destroy something. It ends with a planned withdrawal once the objectives are met. SF conducts raids against fixed or static installations. Most raids are for destruction of material. The proper term is demolition raid.
Demo raids focus on the partial or complete destruction of a target or target system. Usually the conventional force commander hands down their intent; which the SF unit uses to come up with plans to support the Commander's Intent. Complete destruction means that not one part of the target or system can be re-used. If the target was a bridge, this means every span, both abutments, intermediate supports and access ways must all be reduced to rubble that is useless. A small 15 meter bridge slated for complete destruction would require close to 4 metric tons of explosive. If the same bridge, however, required only partial destruction, the explosive load could drop to 100 kilograms.
Commander's intent is very important to the mission planning process. It has the greatest influence on the load requirements for any type of mission. If the big boss says no one will EVER use that bridge again, then SF orders up a mule train to carry the demo material. However, if the Kahuna only wants to impede vehicle traffic over the river, a regular SF team can carry the load.
Ambushes are attacks against moving or temporarily halted targets. The objectives are the same as a raid; followed again by a planned withdrawal. An effective ambush requires good intelligence or a lot of bodies to cover all contingencies. One does not usually initiate an ambush on a heavily armed, numerically superior foe; unless one has a death wish or is backed up by an Armor Battalion.
Stand-Off operations involve no direct contact with the enemy; yet still impedes their operations. This includes:
1) Indirect fires (mortars, rockets or artillery).
2) Terminal Guidance (laser designation, radar beacons, forward observation).
3) Sniper Operations.
Security missions are a hybrid between collecting information and acting on that information. The reconnaissance-in-force best describes most security operations; the SF patrol collects information and attacks the enemy based on that information. Security operations can either move around or stay in one spot; depending on the job requirements.
SF operations in Vietnam contained numerous examples of roving security patrols that would look for the enemy, fix their position and either bring in follow-on forces or direct artillery and air strikes against them. One SF element during Operation Just Cause in Panama performed a classic fixed security operation when guarding a bridge. The Commander's Intent stated that the Panamanian Battalion 2000 could not reinforce Noriega's thugs in downtown Panama City. The only realistic route was over a bridge. Due to some timing problems, the SF element tasked with stopping all traffic arrived on the bridge just before the lead element of the Battalion 2000 crossed it. Two troopers ran up onto the middle of the road and started firing AT-4 rockets at the lead vehicles while the rest of the unit deployed and engaged the convoy. Also on station were two AC-130 gunships which greatly influenced the outcome: nothing made it across.
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Teaching.
This is the "Bread and Butter" of Special Forces; and which makes a very dangerous force. One Special Forces A-Team can recruit, organize, train, equip (with outside help) and 'advise' a Light Infantry Battalion. This includes rifles, mortars, anti-tank launchers, command, control, communications and intelligence. An unconventional warfare (UW) mission means they do this behind enemy lines. The usual objectives of UW are to help overthrow the current regime; or influence it in a manner favorable to the guerillas and US policy. No guerilla army has won a campaign without heavy support from a sponsor. US sponsorship is often in the form of SF detachments and supplies controlled by Special Forces.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the flip side of UW. Only now the light infantry battalion is raised to support the current government and hunt down guerillas trying to overthrow it. FID also includes improvement of existing foreign forces through better training and supplies.
All the training in the world means nothing if the will to fight isn't there. Without a fighting spirit and cohesive motivation, teaching operations of any type are useless. This is often a major factor in why the US doesn't go into every 'opressed' country or region and create order.
Coalition Warfare is like Foreign Internal Defense; only it applies mostly to foreign conventional units and the mission is mostly advisory. This mission came from the Gulf War when attack aviation units said they would not provide close air support unless there was a US element on the ground to control the strike. Special Forces got the call to send teams to brigade-level and higher headquarters of the allied units to act as liaisons. The role expanded to include language interpretation, tactical advice and act as a direct link to the Theater Commander as necessary. If a US unit had to interact or coordinate with an Allied unit; there was good chance an SF liaison team played some role in making it happen. In certain cases, SF sent liaison teams all the way to the battalion and company level help the war effort.
Allied Units with an SF liaison team benefited from exposure to more sophisticated communications equipment; as well as navigation aids. All of the SF teams had GPS satellite navigation sets that gave the same positional benefit to our Allies as the US. It also gave the Theater Commander real-time information on the exact location of every unit in the region.
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Organization. The basic administrative and tactical unit of US Army Special Forces is the A-Team; also known as an Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA). The ODA has 12 personnel assigned to it:
-Team Leader, Captain (O-3); Commander.
-Team Technician, Warrant Officer (W-1 to W-3); Second in Command.
-Team Sergeant, Master Sergeant (E-8), NCO in Charge of the Team.
-Operations/Intelligence Sergeant, (E-7), Assistant NCO in Charge of the Team.
-Two Weapons Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
-Two Engineer Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
-Two Medical Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
-Two Communications Sergeants (E-5 to E-7).
The ODA has a redundancy of skills in all key areas. Both Officers go the same Officer's Course; and the Team Sergeant and O/I Sergeant attend the same school as well. The Warrant Officer has the same basic functions as the Team Leader; only the Technician is a prior-service SF Sergeant who worked as a Team Sergeant or O/I Sergeant, plus two other duty positions (weapons, demo, commo or medical). Thus the Technician should have an enormous amount of SF experience built up sitting in an officer's duty position. Team Sergeants generally have 6 to 10 years SF experience, O/I sergeant usually has 3 to 6 years. The remaining personnel vary from entry-level experience to 10+ years.
The Weapons Sergeants are trained to expertly use every weapon available to a Light Infantry Battalion. This includes rifles, pistols, sub-machineguns, mortars, heavy mortars, air defense missiles, anti-tank weapons, sniper systems, grenade launchers and machine guns. They train on US and the most popular foreign weapons in the world. They also act as advisors for weapons employment to the team or foreign units.
The Engineer Sergeants are a "triple threat" duty position. They are the experts for construction of Theater of Operation buildings, bunkers, fortified positions, obstacles and obstacle crossing. They are also responsible for destruction of most everything built in the world; to that end they receive demolition training ranging from passive sabotage to explosive removal of objects. They also know how to 'improvise' demolition devices where none exist. SF Engineers receive training in every major industrial system that could be a military target: bridges, airfields, electrical plants, ports, communications centers, refineries, etc. Their third major responsibility is the ODA's logistics. They act as the supply guys and logistics advisor to the Team Leader and any attached allies.
Communications Sergeants are probably the most valuable members on the team. Everyone else can be replaced by simply making a call back to the main base. No commo, no call. Communications links to the outside world are tenuous at best; it's their responsibility to make sure the link stays 'up' when needed and where needed. It's a point of pride among communicators that they can maintain contact at least 97% of the time; under any conditions, over any distance. They also receive training and advise the Team on electronic warfare; both guarding against and using it to find targets. There is some talk to expand their responsibility and training on Information Systems (PCs and networks).
Medical Sergeants are Special Force's answer to finding Medical Doctors for A-Teams. Their training is the longest and most academically strenuous in SF. Their primary focus is emergency medicine (to include minor surgery), preventive health care and disease diagnosis and control. All SF medics at some time in their career will be responsible for opening up a area to normal US relations when all other attempts failed. SF Medics can establish clinics and triage centers anywhere in the world under conditions that the Red Cross won't touch. Foreigners view Americans in a different light when a couple guys in funny green hats come and start fixing boo-boos in their village; all of a sudden, they have real proof that US soldiers are not the Great Satan their leaders refer to. To get people to work for you, you need to capture their "hearts and minds"; SF Medics doing their job get the best results and the best loyalty.
The second type of SF unit is the B-Team; or Operational Detachment-B (ODB). This is also a tactical unit but has the primary responsibility of command and control of SF operations in a defined area. There are approximately 14 personnel on a B-Team:
1 B-Team Leader; Major (O-4), Commander.
1 SF Captain (O-3), Executive Officer.
1 SF Warrant Officer (W-2 to W-3), Operations Officer.
1 SF Sergeant Major (E-9), NCO in Charge of the B-Team.
8 SF Sergeants.
2 non-SF Sergeants (Chemical and Supply).
Only the ODA and ODB typically deploy into a tactical zone. An ODB may function independently on operations; or control and support between two and eight ODAs doing tactical-level work.
Another SF organization is the C-Team (ODC). It is a pure command and control unit with operations, training, signals and logistic support responsibilities. It's very rare to see a C-Team in a tactical zone. More commonly it's co-located with the conventional force commander it's supporting; at the operational or strategic level. Its basic organization follows the same lines with a Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) for a Commander and a Command Sergeant Major (E-9) for the leading NCO. There's an additional 20 - 30 SF personnel who fill key positions in Operations, Logistics, Intelligence, Communications and Medical.
A C-Team will deploy to support just one B-Team if necessary. If the B-Team goes Tactical, a C-Team will deploy close to the B-Team in a non-tactical area to provide direct support. A C-team can control up to five or six B-Teams plus 18 to 30 A-Teams simultaneously. Although it keeps the C-Team extremely busy.
For administrative purposes, ODAs, ODBs and ODCs are grouped together using the following scheme:
Special Forces Company consists of:
6 ODAs. Two of the A-Teams are special infiltration teams:
One Combat Diver team and One Free-Fall team.
1 ODB.
When deployed, an SF Company can establish one Advanced Operating Base (AOB) and control 6 ODAs.
Special Forces Battalion consists of:
3 SF Companies.
1 ODC.
1 SF Battalion Support Company (Admin, Ops, Intel, Log, Commo, Med, Transportation)
When deployed, an SF Battalion can establish one Forward Operating Base (FOB) and control 3 ODBs and 18 ODAs.
Special Forces Group consists of:
3 SF Battalions.
1 Headquarters Company (Group Commander-Colonel and Group Command Sergeant Major)
1 SF Group Support Company (same as the Battalion Support Company only larger).
When deployed, an SF Group can establish one Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB) and control 3 ODCs, 9 ODBs and 54 ODAs.
All told, one SF Group has 54 A-Teams with a total of 648 "Trigger-Pullers" assigned to them. World-wide, there are approximately 3,240 personnel assigned to A-Teams.
It is also interesting to note that all five active SF Groups combined have 45 Combat Diver A-Teams with 540 Combat Divers assigned. This is in comparison to approximately 1,024 SEALs assigned to SEAL teams in the US Navy (16 man platoons, 8 platoons per Team, 8 Teams in Naval Special Warfare).
The British 22d Special Air Service Regiment has between 250 and 300 "Trigger Pullers" in the entire unit. This equates to one Special Forces Battalion.
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Comparison.
It's almost impossible to compare SEALs and Special Forces at anything but the highest level. But many people love to do comparisons in a light unfavorable to one side. This section will highlight some key differences between the two and the justification for both to exist.
As I stated before, the principal difference between SEALs and Special Forces is their environmental orientation. Both are small-unit special operations forces. SEALs work in a maritime environment, SF works in a ground environment. To quote Commander Stubblefield (a SEAL of some note) "The SEALs like to keep one foot in water".
Special Forces views water as another obstacle to negotiate for the mission. Moving through, or on, water is a means to an end. Maritime environments are so unique that it requires a unit dedicated to operating exclusively in that realm. SEALs view water as a means and an end to mission accomplishment. This does not mean that Special Forces is handicapped; Working in an exclusive ground environment far away from water is every bit as challenging.
The general operating area for SEALs are the oceans, seas, large rivers, and the coastal land areas. Special Forces starts at the shore line and goes in from there. Can the SEALs go further inland? Yes. Have they gone further inland? Yes. Can Special Forces perform water operations like the SEALs? Yes. Have they done SEAL-type operations? Yes. It sounds like there's some redundancy here; which is true. This mission 'overlap' is deliberate. If needed, each organization can help the other to some degree. If a carrier group commander has an immediate requirement for a deep ground strike, his attached SEAL platoon will get the nod. If a US ground commander has a requirement to eliminate some coastal patrol boats, he'll tell his attached SF Company to take care of it.
The duration of missions is another key difference. SEALs typically have operations that last from 3 hours to 3 days. Most SF missions last from 3 days to 3 months. This is why SEALs and SF "load out" differently. Given the same target and mission, most SEALs will have less equipment than their SF counterparts. This does not count gear needed for infiltration by either side; whether it's sea, land or air.
Most SF units assume there will be a follow-on mission once the primary mission is over. SEALs usually focus on one mission at a time; then withdraw to prep for another one. So SF will pack like they're going to be "in-country" for a while; SEALs don't. If an A-Team only has one mission, they may have to walk out afterwards; which can last a week or two. It could take an A-Team a week to remove a coastal radar site; it may take the SEALs a few hours to do the same. The final decision comes down to who's available and their location when the 'go' signal is given.
These mission profiles influence how SF and SEALs select and train their personnel. Special Forces focuses on orienteering, solo performance, teamwork performance and long duration marches and bivouacs. This web site does a great job of describing the SEAL selection process.
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Strengths.
This will be the most controversial section of the lot. Before going further, I want state that this is MY OPINION; good or bad, right or wrong. I base it on my two decades worth of experience working in Special Operations.
Special Forces brings several key strengths to Special Operations. The most obvious strength is sheer numbers. Given the skill set present on most teams, SF can task-organize better to suit the mission requirements.
Another strength is their response time. Special Forces is the only US Special Operations Force (SOF) that maintains a permanent presence overseas. Unless a Carrier Group or Amphibious Group is sitting ON the crisis site, it may take 4 to 7 days for the attached SEAL platoon to reach an operating area. In the same time frame, Special Forces can have a battalion on the ground. At a minimum, they can put an SF Company into a crisis area within 18 hours via USAF aircraft. SF routinely practices Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE) involving entire SF Companies and Battalions.
Another way to view response time is how many SEAL or SF personnel can be on site in a given period of time. Assuming a Carrier or Amphibious Group is on station, here's how I see the force response:
Time SEALs Special Forces
0 to 12 hours 1 Platoon (16 pers) 0
12 to 24 hours 1 Platoon 1 Company (72 pers)
1 to 7 days 1 Team (128 pers) 1 Battalion (216 pers)
1 to 3 weeks 4 Teams (512 pers) 1 Group (648 pers)
A point to remember is this deployment matrix shows them with ALL of their equipment on hand. The SEAL team is the first unit level that can establish a base of operations by themselves; an SF Company has a base capability. So SF can put an operating base on the ground for sustained special operations quicker than the SEALs. A 4 SEAL Team deployment represents half of their available strength world wide. One SF Group represents 20% of the available strength; and they can still cover all other contingency areas. Four SEAL teams in one crisis area is highly unlikely because they have so many other duties and areas to cover.
Because of it's size, SF can afford to be regionally oriented better than it's counterparts. ODAs usually spend two to eight weeks a year focusing on a particular region; memorizing all of the key attributes and weaknesses. In addition to studying the area, Special Forces requires that all of its A-Team personnel to speak the regional language. SF soldiers spend between 8 weeks to 4 months a year studying foreign languages and cultural traditions. Foreign language ability is a job requirement to stay in Special Forces. If you can't speak in tongues, you're fired.
Special Forces enjoys a reputation for their orienteering abilities. It is a skill needed to apply for SF duty in the first place. Overland movement is time-consuming and requires a very high degree of positional accuracy. More often than not boats and planes don't always land you where should be; this implies trying determine where you are while still trying to accomplish the mission. Given the "week-month" mindset, movement and navigation occupies 95% of an SF mission.
Endurance goes hand-in-hand with long-term operations. Most SF personnel on A-Teams are NOT physical studs; but they can put on a rucksack and go for days on end. They're not fast, but SF people can slowly grind you into the earth after few days of "yomping". More than a few foreign and US units found out the hard way about SF loads and distances. The Special Forces Museum used to have a bumper sticker quite appropriate to this condition: "Special Forces - Goes Deeper, Lasts Longer and Packs a Heavier Load".
Special Forces provides better mission flexibility than other Special Operations units. This comes from the skill set present on the A-Team. Every year there are jobs that the US government can't quite figure out who to give to. Examples of this are natural disasters and humanitarian relief operations. Special Forces came back into the limelight after the Gulf War because of the refugee camps they set up for the Kurds and Shiites near Iraq. Now whenever there's a large-scale disaster, the United Nations usually requests assistance from Special Forces as a first response. They usually go into areas with large-scale unrest and begin assessment of the region for follow-on relief. Because of their cultural sensitivity, they seem to get along better with the natives with fewer 'incidents'. They also act as an "authority figure" for other relief organizations who spend a great deal of time arguing with each other.
Retention of qualified personnel is a very important issue for Special Operations Units. SF has a higher retention rate for two key reasons: A soldier cannot apply for Special Forces without 3 to 4 years active service; so many applicants view SF as a possible career, not a 'hitch'. The second reason is because SF is so large, there's greater opportunity for "down-time" with family and relaxation.
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Weaknesses.
The biggest weakness Special Forces has is timidity of the commanders above the A-Team level. The command institution in SF wants maximum visibility with minimum risk to their careers. In essence, SF has sheep at the head of an army of lions.
Part of this problem stems from the short terms the SF Captains spend on A-Teams. Upon graduation, an SF Captain is considered "Branch Qualified" after serving 18 months on a team. After that time, he will never see a team again for the rest of his career. It is extremely rare for any SF Captain, or SF Major, to spend any meaningful time in tactical assignments. Because SF commanders spend so little time in a real command, they focus their efforts on what makes them look good and making sure no one has an opportunity to screw up on their watch. The best way to control screw-ups is to sharply limit what A-Teams are allowed to do.
Another weakness is the SF Warrant Officer. They came into being because of the "revolving door" at the officer level in Special Forces. They were established to provide stability in select positions needing institutional knowledge. Nowadays SF Warrant Officers have less than 3 years SF time, with none of it in leadership positions. They also have to fight for "high-visibility" positions on staff if they want a promotion. This condition leaves the A-Team in the lurch. The SF Warrant Officer also diluted the authority and quality of the SF A-Team Sergeant. As anyone knows, NCOs are what makes the US Army work; quite a few SF Soldiers became Warrant Officers because they didn't have the abilities to be a good Team Sergeant.
If this sounds like back-stabbing; it is. The only reason I became an SF Warrant Officer myself was to get back to an A-Team. As a senior NCO, I was had only desk jobs to look forward to; after 4 years as a Team Sergeant. The Warrant Program was the only way I could sneak back onto an ODA. So I selfishly put my needs ahead of Special Forces'. As a SF Warrant Officer, I deliberately skipped promotional opportunities because I wanted to stay on an A-Team.
Close Quarters Battle is another weak point in Special Forces. CQB takes place in buildings and towns; which is a nightmare for Army combat units. This reluctance transfers over to SF in large doses. There is also greater opportunity for disaster to strike; so SF commanders keep their teams away from built-up areas to protect their careers. If the commanders withhold CQB training, they can justifiably avoid urban-related assignments because no one trained for it. There are conventional units in the Army and Marines with better skills and experience fighting in cities than Special Forces. World demographics shows that people are moving to the cities, which means SF has to go to the cities sooner or later to get the job done. Or SF can let the SEALs do all of the work.
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Improvements.
The key areas where SF can improve is their base organization and basic SF training. As I see it, Special Forces should re-think the base structure of SF: The A-Team. The size should increase and the number of officers should decrease.
A better basic organization should consist of 16 personnel:
1 SF Captain
1 Team Sergeant
4 SF Intelligence Sergeants
4 SF Communications Sergeants
4 SF Engineer Sergeants
2 SF Medical Sergeants
The Weapons duty position is eliminated; instead ALL personnel would go to SF Weapons school. Everyone needs formal weapons training anyway. The SF Warrant is eliminated altogether; it's not serving the original intent of keeping experience on the A-Team. There are only two medical personnel because of the length and toughness of training. This layout gives the A-Team the same redundancy of skills on a slightly bigger scale.
The Team would now have two maneuver elements; both the size of an infantry squad. This in turn provides for more flexibility and better security. It can further break down into two fire teams each of four personnel. Each fire team has an Intelligence, Communications and Engineer capability. Two of the teams have medics and the other two have command presence (Captain and Team Sergeant). Most transport systems work in multiples of four (cars, trucks, etc.); so a four man fire team fits nicely.
Reducing the Officer presence on an A-Team simply brings it into line with the rest of the world. US Special Forces had the highest percentage of officers in a tactical unit anywhere. The current A-Team is 17% Officer; my proposed A-Team would have a 6% officer presence (less than the SEALs). Reducing the Officer strength is a good cost-cutting measure and reinforces the strength of the Team Sergeant.
Above the A-Team level I'd reduce the number of A-Teams to five per SF Company: One Combat Diver, One Free-Fall , and two regular A-Teams. The fifth team would lose two demo men and replace them with two communicators. This team's mission would focus on Electronic Warfare.
At the SF Battalion Level I would add an extra SF Company; bringing the total to four. Each SF group would still keep 3 SF Battalions. Above the SF Group Level, I'd keep only three SF Groups instead of five. The reduction is necessary because the Army manpower pool to draw from has reduced also; like or not.
Below is a comparison of total "trigger pullers" in the current organization and my organization:
Current Proposed
A-Team 12 16/TD>
SF Company 72 80
SF Battalion 216 320
SF Group 648 960
The five groups in existence today have 3,240 Trigger Pullers spread over 270 A-Teams. My organization would have three groups with 2,880 Trigger Pullers over 180 A-Teams. This represents a 12% cut in personnel; but a 33% cut in the number of A-Teams (to include Captains and Warrant Officers).
With only three SF Groups, each one needs to "look" in a different direction: One SF Group 'looks' West; covering the Pacific Ocean and Asia east of the Urals. Another looks South covering Central America, South America, Caribbean, and North America. The last SF Group looks east and covers Europe, Africa and Southwest Asia (middle east).
Captains would extend their stay on a team to 4 years from 18 months to "Branch Qualify". Basic SF training would extend about 5 months to include the SF Weapons Course and CQB training.
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Closing.
If you made it this far, congratulations! This article was necessarily long to provide the depth of knowledge many people seek on Special Operations. If our roles were simpler, I'd just write how great SF is and leave it at that. SEALs and SF are both similar and diverse at the same time. There are gunslingers in both camps who think highly of each other; and wouldn't want the other's job under any circumstances.
I hope this helped.
Tracy-Paul Warrington
Chief Warrant Officer (retired)
US Army Special Forces