View Full Version : Falklands war and Nato.
Guerrier_Franc
02-02-2007, 11:58 AM
Why Nato didn't support the British army during Falklands war ?
Article 5 of Nato say:
the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all
Royal
02-02-2007, 12:09 PM
They did...
Guerrier_Franc
02-02-2007, 12:33 PM
Not militarily.
Royal
02-02-2007, 12:39 PM
No?
Where did our sidewinders come from then?
Where did our stingers come from then?
Where did the AvGas at ASI come from then?
Where did our IMINT come from then?
-Max2-
02-02-2007, 12:56 PM
Why Nato didn't support the British army during Falklands war ?
Article 5 of Nato say:
the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all
From NATO webiste :
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Falklands Islands are located in the South Antlantic so NATO could not intervene directly.
Guerrier_Franc
02-02-2007, 01:02 PM
From NATO webiste :
From NATO webiste :
Quote:
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Falklands Islands are located in the South Antlantic so NATO could not intervene directly.
OK thank you for theses precisions.
Mastermind
02-02-2007, 02:08 PM
As I recall, I read at the time that Maggie T was not interested in NATO help or much help from any allies. She declared this to be a British problem for aid to British citizens. The Brits were highly enflamed by the Argentine aggression and outright invasion of British soil. I think the Argentines were utterly amazed at the political fall out over the islands and the reaction in Britian...one of the grossest diplomacy blunders in the 20th century.
I think also, the US assisted with satellite recon and weather prediction. I think they also dispatched a few rescue AC to help protect the Vulcan crews during their extreme long range flights...of course, this had to involve some NATO procedures and possibly equipment in order for the coordination of these efforts. But, not one NATO nation seems to have complained. I had it in the back of my head the US supplied some refueling capacity...but, I can't find that anywhere now...so, must have dreamt it. MM
oldsoak
02-02-2007, 02:59 PM
The US did help, but it was toeing a very fine line as regards its S American policies. No reluctance on the part of its military, just the politicians. We got sidewinders from German production lots, use of US INT facilities, plus they turned a blind eye to us turning up at Ascension.
Mastermind
02-02-2007, 05:57 PM
Ah...yes that was the refueling point, wasn't it? I could not remember if we had actually deployed aerial tankers....MM
marktigger
02-02-2007, 06:00 PM
NATO also turned a blind eye to NATO declared units being stripped of Kit to supply units going but they drew the line at releasing major units like inf bns. The French provided dissimilar aircraft training.
foxtrot023
02-02-2007, 06:01 PM
As I recall, I read at the time that Maggie T was not interested in NATO help or much help from any allies. She declared this to be a British problem for aid to British citizens. The Brits were highly enflamed by the Argentine aggression and outright invasion of British soil. I think the Argentines were utterly amazed at the political fall out over the islands and the reaction in Britian...one of the grossest diplomacy blunders in the 20th century.
I think also, the US assisted with satellite recon and weather prediction. I think they also dispatched a few rescue AC to help protect the Vulcan crews during their extreme long range flights...of course, this had to involve some NATO procedures and possibly equipment in order for the coordination of these efforts. But, not one NATO nation seems to have complained. I had it in the back of my head the US supplied some refueling capacity...but, I can't find that anywhere now...so, must have dreamt it. MM
NATO did not participate because article 5 was not called, as the Flaklands are not covered in the NATO chart. Other places not covered per example are Spain´s 2 cities in North Africa, other colonies in the pacific and the Americas, etc
Ordie
02-02-2007, 06:03 PM
Washington was cautious because the Argentine Military regieme was active in anti-Communist activities in Central America.
MM,
You're right about the Argentines being in shock. They placed all thier bets on the Monroe Doctrine forgetting about the "Special" relationship between the UK and the US.
Keep in mind that France, a NATO ally, were providing weapons and technical support for the Argentines.
Hellfish
02-02-2007, 06:23 PM
Washington was cautious because the Argentine Military regieme was active in anti-Communist activities in Central America.
MM,
You're right about the Argentines being in shock. They placed all thier bets on the Monroe Doctrine forgetting about the "Special" relationship between the UK and the US.
Keep in mind that France, a NATO ally, were providing weapons and technical support for the Argentines.
Didn't they pull that support right after the war started, if not earlier?
stonecutter
02-02-2007, 06:55 PM
Keep in mind that France, a NATO ally, were providing weapons and technical support for the Argentines.
You've got to be kidding me. Do you guys really hate the French that much? For fvck's sake.
Note that France did provide Argentina with weapons, but this was only before the conflict started. All exocet and other shipments were halted right away at the outbreak of hostilities.
Try this:
France was Britain's greatest ally
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2002%2F03%2F13%2Fnot13.xml
How France helped us win Falklands war, by John Nott
By George Jones, Political Editor
Last Updated: 11:03pm GMT 12/03/2002
FRANCE was Britain's greatest ally during the Falklands war, providing secret information to enable MI6 agents to sabotage Exocet missiles which were desperately sought by Argentina, according to Sir John Nott, who was Defence Secretary during the conflict.
In his memoirs he reveals that while President Reagan was pressurising Lady Thatcher to accept a negotiated settlement France helped Britain to win the conflict.
Although Lady Thatcher clashed with President Mitterrand over the future direction of Europe, he immediately came to her aid after Argentine forces invaded the Falklands in April 1982.
"In so many ways Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies," Sir John says. As soon as the conflict began, France made available to Britain Super-Etendard and Mirage aircraft - which it had supplied to Argentina - so Harrier pilots could train against them.
The French gave Britain information on the Exocet - which sank the Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor - showing how to tamper with it.
"A remarkable worldwide operation then ensued to prevent further Exocets being bought by Argentina," Sir John says.
"I authorised our agents to pose as bona fide purchasers of equipment on the international market, ensuring that we outbid the Argentinians, and other agents identified Exocet missiles in markets and rendered them inoperable."
He contrasts the French attitude with America's attempts to find a face-saving deal for President Galtieri, the Argentine dictator."For all Margaret Thatcher's friendship with Ronald Reagan, he remained a West Coast American looking south to Latin America and west to the Pacific. Sometimes I wondered if he even knew or cared where Europe was."
Caspar Weinberger, the US defence secretary, supported Britain but the State Department was "dominated by Latinos".
"There was incredible pressure from the White House and the State Department to negotiate. It was hugely damaging," Sir John told The Telegraph. "They couldn't understand that to us any negotiated settlement would have seemed like a defeat."
Asked if he found it irritating that the Americans expected Britain's total support in the war against terrorism, Sir John said: "I am against the Americans smashing things up with bombing raids, then letting us be the auxiliary policemen to pick up the pieces."
Sir John says he held the Foreign Office "in deep contempt" for the caution it displayed when Lady Thatcher proposed sending the Task Force to the Falklands.
Ghelp
02-02-2007, 07:05 PM
Argentina had alot of Belgian and British equipment to.Doesn't mean they were being supported by them during the war.
ronnieraygun
02-02-2007, 07:42 PM
April 26, 1982 - Time (American) Magazine
Haig shuttles grimly, the British steam, and Argentina digs in
The white Boeing 707 taxied to a stop at Buenos Aires' Ezeiza Airport, and Alexander Haig stepped wearily out into the glow of television lights. The Secretary of State was nearing the end of an arduous diplomatic shuttle that had taken him some 30,000 miles and was in serious danger of stalling. As he prepared to negotiate yet again, he sounded a familiar theme: "It is clear tonight that the task will not be easy, but what is in play is so important that everyone has to apply all the strength possible to achieve a political accord." What was in play was nothing less than the threat of war. In personally mediating the crisis over the Falkland Islands, Haig had committed the prestige of his office—and that of Ronald Reagan's presidency—to a goal of preserving peace. He had also in a highly visible way placed the U.S. in the increasingly uncomfortable and unfortunate position of seeming to be unable to choose between siding with its closest ally or with a repressive government run by a military junta. But that was the unavoidable price of such a mediation effort.
As Haig began his talks in Buenos Aires, a 45-ship British task force, led by the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Hermes, entered the South Atlantic headed for the Falklands, the remote British colony that Argentina had invaded a fortnight earlier. Steaming at an estimated 18 knots, the armada was expected to be on station by midweek. Meanwhile, the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had already stationed four submarines, three of them nuclear powered, inside a 200-mile "maritime exclusion zone" around the Falklands, and threatened to fire on any Argentine ship that challenged the blockade. Argentina must unconditionally withdraw from the Falklands, Thatcher insisted to the approval of 80% of her countrymen, or Britain would fight.
Argentina's military rulers seemed surprised at Britain's vehemence, and stunned by the nationalistic forces it had unleashed. "The English reaction is so absurd, so disproportionate," lamented Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez. "This seems like a chapter in a science-fiction novel." The junta had miscalculated international opposition to its invasion and grossly underestimated the risk of war. Its seizure of the Falkland Islands nonetheless remained popular at home. Activist Perez Esquivel, who won the Nobel Prize for his human rights crusade against the government, offered his support to the junta last week, as did an organized group of mothers of Argentines kid naped in a wave of police repression.
As the cold southern autumn settled in, the government ordered its 9,000 troops on the islands to dig in for a long siege. According to one senior officer, the Malvinas, as the islands are called in Spanish, were so heavily fortified that the British could never retake them. "If they intend to," he said, "it will be a butchery." In the island capital of Port Stanley, General Mario Benjamin Menendez, the newly appointed Argentine governor, was ensconced in the office vacated by Britain's Rex Hunt.
Haig crisscrossed the Atlantic in an exhausting attempt to arrange a military pullback. As a possible compromise, he suggested a temporary British-Argentine-U.S. administration of the Falklands, pending a final settlement to be negotiated. Britain said it could accept such a tripartite government, but only if Argentina first surrendered sovereignty. Argentina refused, and even insisted upon leaving behind an Argentine police force once its troops were withdrawn. That in turn was unacceptable to the British. As the negotiations wore on, Haig tried several variations of the joint-administration scheme, but each foundered on the sovereignty issue.
The marathon shuttle began the week amid hopes of a breakthrough. Argentina had removed its fleet from the blockade zone, and long sessions with Argentine President Leopoldo Fortunate Galtieri and Foreign Minister Costa Mendez had convinced the Secretary of State that the Argentine government was ready to show some flexibility. Haig departed Buenos Aires on Easter Sunday with what he called "some specific fresh ideas." The next day, after an 18-hour flight, he landed in London, where he met with Thatcher, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and Defense Secretary John Nott. Optimism over the "fresh ideas" quickly vanished, however, and the two sides spent most of the grueling eleven-hour talks doggedly searching for common negotiating ground. "We made some progress," said a visibly fatigued Haig when he emerged from No. 10 Downing Street, "but time is slipping away from us."
At that point, around midnight London time, Haig and Costa Mendez spoke by telephone, and the situation worsened. Argentina, Costa Mendez insisted, would withdraw its troops only if Britain agreed to 1) recall the task force; 2) end the blockade; 3) restore normal economic relations; and 4) leave the Argentine flag flying in the Falklands as a sign of Argentine sovereignty. The new conditions represented a major departure from the terms Haig had brought to London. When he reported them to Thatcher, the tired Prime Minister was furious.
Then, as tempers apparently cooled in Buenos Aires, Haig and Costa Mendez spoke again. Costa Mendez's new proposals remained secret, but, as one British spokesman put it, "they [the Argentines] rowed back a bit. The message Secretary Haig received wasn't as awful as the midnight proposals." The new proposals were sufficiently less awful for Pym to visit Haig at his suite in London's Churchill Hotel for a 90-minute chat. As he left the hotel, Pym told reporters that the "new ideas" advanced by Costa Mendez "may provide a way forward." Though he warned that "easy optimism would be out of place," his reaction breathed new life into Haig's diplomatic steeplechase.
Maig did not return directly to Argentina. Instead, he flew to Washington and, despite his weariness, was at his desk at 8:15 on Wednesday morning. Shortly before 10, he went to the White House and for 50 minutes briefed Reagan on the state of the negotiations. After more telephone calls with Costa Mendez and Thatcher, Haig gamely announced that he would try again. From the tone of his statements, however, it was clear that he was as impatient with Britain's intransigence as he was with Argentina's. "The leaders of both countries have assured me... that they are prepared to go on working with us," he said on the eve of his departure for Buenos Aires. "That will require flexibility on both sides—not abandonment of principle, but responsible and defensible adjustments."
As the talks resumed in Argentina on Friday, Costa Mendez expected Haig to "bend his arm—or maybe break it," according to one senior Argentine diplomat. Haig never lost his temper, but the five hours with Costa Mendez were the toughest of the entire shuttle. "I want to know the limit, limit, limit of the Argentine position," Haig insisted. Costa Mendez did not budge. Though he offered the British sovereignty over South Georgia, he stressed that "we can never go back to April 1 [the day before the invasion]." On Saturday Haig postponed his departure in order to meet again with the Argentines.
Thatcher reiterated her firm position at an emergency session of Parliament. As it turned out, there was little debate—and virtually unanimous support for the government's policy. The negotiations, she told a cheering House of Commons, are "complex, changing and difficult, the more so because they are taking place between a military junta and a democratic government of a free people—one which is not prepared to compromise that democracy and that liberty which the British Falkland Islanders regard as their birthright." The British government would continue to listen to plans that might break the deadlock, but it would enforce its blockade of the disputed archipelago. "If the [war] zone is challenged," she declared, "we shall take that as the clearest evidence that the search for a peaceful solution has been abandoned. We shall then take the necessary action. Let no one doubt that."
The statement was a thinly disguised promise to fire on any Argentine ships inside the 200-mile limit. Later, Thatcher increased the pressure by ordering a second, smaller flotilla to leave for the Falklands. Along with support vessels, the new force included the Atlantic Conveyor, an 18,000-ton container ship modified to carry 18 Harrier jump jets, and the newly recommissioned H.M.S. Intrepid, an amphibious assault vessel capable of carrying as many as 700 troops, eight landing craft and five helicopters. In addition, the government requisitioned the cruise liner Uganda, which last week disembarked 1,295 vacationing passengers in Naples before steaming to Gibraltar, where it will be converted into a 1,000-bed hospital ship. Meanwhile, the Royal Air Force was ferrying troops to Ascension Island, a British possession in the South Atlantic, to await the new task force. "The place is chockablock with soldiers, airmen and sailors," reported an eyewitness.
British strategists have ruled out an amphibious invasion of the Falklands. Direct assault, they believe, would cost too many lives and could be used only as a last resort. "If a lot of people get killed, the government would lose support at home, in Europe and in the U.S.," explained a Cabinet minister. "If we lost the backing of any of these three elements, we would be in trouble. If we lost the support of all three, we would be faced with disaster."
Accordingly, London's plans called for a naval blockade of the islands—and perhaps of the main Argentine naval base at Puerto Belgrano, 800 miles to the northwest. "The objective," said one Cabinet member, "will be to starve the Argentine garrison on the Falklands into submission. Starve them of supplies, food and the will to resist." To do that, the British would also have to cut off air supplies to the islands, which they frankly admit they would be unlikely to do until an additional force of Harrier jet fighters is ferried to the scene and can be transferred to the two carriers, the Hermes and the Invincible. In all, the British would be able to send 38 Harriers into combat to oppose the sizable Argentine air force (see box). Said another Cabinet minister: "We could be in for a very long haul over a period of months rather than weeks. We are preparing for a long, harsh South Atlantic winter."
Argentina's military rulers showed no sign of backing away from the advancing British armada. They ordered their only aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo, and most of the rest of the fleet out of Puerto Belgrano, apparently in anticipation of a blockade. Despite the government's claim that two small coast guard patrol boats had run the British submarine gauntlet—a report unsubstantiated by London—there were no signs that Buenos Aires was prepared to test the blockade in any significant way. Argentina's main concern seemed to be keeping up morale in the ranks. In an Easter message to the armed forces, the junta sounded as though the shooting had already begun. Argentina's troops, the message said, were "protagonists in historic and spiritual circumstances of unusual transcendence."
At the army's main staging center in the port of Comodoro Rivada-via, 600 miles west of the Falklands, the soldiers continued to arrive, one company after another, bundled up in their padded, dark olive winter uniforms. The young pilots, the idols of the Argentines, filled the port's two small hotels. But the atmosphere was subdued, as if the new arrivals were participating in an event that still seemed so unreal as to be an impossibility: the prospect of going to war against Britain. A second lieutenant, whose parents now live in England, seemed bewildered by the preparations. Said he: "We like the British. We play their sports, and they have done very well here. The English took the islands by force and held them by force. What did we do that was any different?"
Though they officially denied it, Argentina's generals apparently got some help from an influential friend last week. As the British fleet steamed toward the Falklands, its movements were reportedly shadowed by Soviet trawlers and reconnaissance planes, which were flying out of bases in Angola. Soviet spy satellites in polar orbit kept a watchful eye on the disputed archipelago. Overlooking the problems of ideology, the Communist superpower was said to be passing on the resulting intelligence to the right-wing military dictatorship in Buenos Aires, apparently hoping to cause Britain and the U.S. as much trouble as possible.
Although Reagan called on the Soviets to "butt out," Western analysts saw little danger of the Falklands dispute ballooning into a confrontation between Washington and Moscow. The Soviets had not vetoed the U.N. Security Council's resolution condemning the Argentine invasion and, as one U.S. intelligence officer put it, "What are they going to tell the Argentines anyway?" Britain has purposely made no secret of the size and makeup of its Falklands task force, and Soviet satellites cannot locate the British submarines. Said the U.S. analyst: "We don't even know where they are."
In supporting Argentina, the Soviets seem simply to be advancing their interests. The crisis offers an opportunity to drive a wedge between Argentina and the U.S., and that in turn could affect the course of events in Central America. Moreover, supporting Argentina may help Moscow mend fences with nations in the Third World, many of whom resented the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Most important of all, the Soviet Union needs Argentina's meat and grain exports to make up for a serious food shortage.
The U.S., meanwhile, was quietly doing what it could to help the British. U.S. satellites were being used by the British to communicate with the task force in the South Atlantic. British ships and planes would be serviced at the American base on Ascension Island. Washington was passing on military intelligence to London, but not to Buenos Aires.
Fearful that Haig's mission might be compromised, U.S. officials sought to play down the significance of the pro-British tilt. As close NATO allies, one U.S. analyst pointed out, the two countries' intelligence services are "interlocking at almost every level." Moreover, the facilities at Ascension Island are leased from Britain under terms that require the U.S. to make them available on request.
As Haig shuttled between Washington, London and Buenos Aires, he was criticized by officials at the State Department for being on the road when tensions were mounting dangerously in the Middle East and when issues ranging from Central America to arms control demanded his attention. Haig's detractors, both in and out of the Government, argued that the main job of the Secretary of State was to set broad policy, an aim the Administration has yet to fulfill. Britain and Argentina, on the other hand, welcomed Haig's personal involvement because he provided an influential—indeed the only—channel between them.
But as time went by, more and more resentment was building up in Britain against Haig's scrupulous neutrality in the negotiations. America's most faithful ally, the British reasoned, should not be equated with an unsavory military dictatorship.
Grumbled Denis Healey, the Labor Par ty's shadow Foreign Secretary: "The time has come when we must tell the U.S. that the attitude of an evenhanded broker is not quite enough." In contrast, Prime Minister Thatcher and her ministers last week accepted the fact that Haig had to take a public stance of neutrality, but the British government made it clear to the Secretary that it would expect the U.S. to change its posture if his mediating talks failed; the U.S. would be expected to join in the European trade and economic sanctions against Argentina. Warned a British Cabi net member: "If the President were to choose neutrality between a Britain countering an aggression against its territory and an Argentina which had broken the rule of law, the alliance between our two countries would suffer a blow from which it might take years to fully recover." As Foreign Secretary Pym told the House of Commons: "Freedom under the law is at stake."
Seeking to quiet those fears, the Ad ministration reportedly assured the Thatcher government that it would side with the British if all prospects of talks with the Argentines broke down. Meanwhile, Haig was not yet ready to give up his efforts to find a way out of a developing crisis between two nations both convinced they are right on a matter of honor and principle.
— By John Nielsen. Reported by Frank Melville/London and Gavin Scott/Buenos Aires
With reporting by Frank Melville/London, Gavin Scott/Buenos Aires
LordWilliam
02-03-2007, 01:05 AM
I wonder if the Argentinians would ever start another war to reclaim the Falklands "Malvina's Islands" ?
Switek
02-03-2007, 01:53 AM
IIRC The key helper was US which trasnfered intelligence info and made accesible their airbases.
CMNot
02-03-2007, 05:22 AM
Interesting article on the French, thanks for posting.
The US didn't need to come out and openly back the British, there are a myriad of ways to 'help', as some have already pointed too.
DeltaWhisky58
02-03-2007, 06:10 AM
As Royal has already said, we were supplied certain weapons from NATO war stocks - especially the AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM, along with other assets.
Outwith other US aid such as intel, fuel and the use of their base on our territory (Ascension Island), we received considerable covert assistance from two other nations - Chile and New Zealand. Chile provided various facilities, whilst New Zealand's contribution was mainly in the form of Elint support.
NATO support outwith that detailed above - not a lot - but there again did we ask for it?
oldsoak
02-03-2007, 08:59 AM
kiwis offered us their only frigate armed, crewed and ready to rock - this after we shut them out of our markets - I'd have given every damn kiwi in their armed forces citizenship for that one gesture. Aussies gave us access to their intel network and got some jobs done on the sly for us - cheers fellas . Saffies offered us Simonstown for basing RN ships ( politically a non starter then ). French helped by ensuring exocets in Frence didnt end up back in Argentina, and they designed and tested an MG mount for the Gazelles in a matter of weeks.
Doublethinker
02-03-2007, 09:18 AM
I wonder if the Argentinians would ever start another war to reclaim the Falklands "Malvina's Islands" ?
If they ever have a decaying Junta in power once again in need of diverting the public attention from internal to external affairs - then the answer would be "yes", I think.
a_very_ex_STAB
02-03-2007, 10:02 AM
I wonder if the Argentinians would ever start another war to reclaim the Falklands "Malvina's Islands" ?
It's impossible to 'reclaim' something they never had.:roll:
California Joe
02-03-2007, 10:44 AM
Is this the same Junta that raped and murdered and dissapeared 30,000 of it's own people in under 7 years? I can understand why the Falklands might have been a little less than excited about the prospect....I just saw that in a movie last night. Heh.
Ordie
02-03-2007, 10:50 AM
Thanks for the clarification.
marktigger
02-03-2007, 11:55 PM
kiwis offered us their only frigate armed, crewed and ready to rock - this after we shut them out of our markets - I'd have given every damn kiwi in their armed forces citizenship for that one gesture. Aussies gave us access to their intel network and got some jobs done on the sly for us - cheers fellas . Saffies offered us Simonstown for basing RN ships ( politically a non starter then ). French helped by ensuring exocets in Frence didnt end up back in Argentina, and they designed and tested an MG mount for the Gazelles in a matter of weeks.
I suspect if you check you'll find it was one of their 2 frigates and i think it was to replace an RN frigate in the far east. Great jesture though and we should have given them the 3rd & 4th leander for nothing over that. or offered them t22/III's at a much more reasonable price.
btw when did the UK forces begin using shrike?
DeltaWhisky58
02-04-2007, 04:58 AM
btw when did the UK forces begin using shrike?
Around April 1982 I would guess! ;-)
Zorro C9
02-04-2007, 05:30 AM
I think we actually had three or four frigates at that stage, not one or two. Don't quote me on that. :p
oldsoak
02-04-2007, 09:20 AM
I suspect if you check you'll find it was one of their 2 frigates and i think it was to replace an RN frigate in the far east. Great jesture though and we should have given them the 3rd & 4th leander for nothing over that. or offered them t22/III's at a much more reasonable price.
btw when did the UK forces begin using shrike?
IIRC, one was in refit/laid up , so that left them with 1 avaliable. 3rd and 4th Leanders were ex Dido and Bacchante, which I hope we gave them mates rates for.
Violet Fashion by Mindy
02-04-2007, 01:22 PM
Ok for sure there is NATO
But how come the US didn't enforce the Monroe Doctrine?
MichaelF
02-05-2007, 12:42 AM
The Monroe Doctrine (which, for the bulk of US History, has been enforced primarily by the Royal Navy...) specifically exempts established colonial/imperial assets. IOW, the Falklands were recognized (by the US, at least) as British territory, inhabited by British citizens.
Considering that enforcing the Monroe Doctrine would have led to a diplomatic (or, if it went far enough, military) confrontation with the UK, it's not hard to see why we decided to back the UK.
Chile also lent a hand, stationing a big chunk of its Army on the Argentine/Chilean Border. This radically cut into potential reinforcements for the Falklands.
Not hard to see a resurgent (not soon..) Argentina trying again. I imagine they'd end up facing the US Navy as well. Britain has quite a few markers they could call in, nowadays.
We are Back in control, force them to surrender
Take what is ours, restore law and order
Back in control, push them further out to sea
Falklands in our hands, back under british reign
-Sabaton, "Back in Control"
MichaelF
02-06-2007, 12:47 AM
Pity the MoD cut the Scots Guards' 2nd Batt. Hell of a fight those guys had on Tumbledown.
Hellfish
02-06-2007, 01:00 AM
Ok for sure there is NATO
But how come the US didn't enforce the Monroe Doctrine?
Good question. We went into Grenada - ostensibly British - without hardly even a consultation.
That said, I've always been largely under the impression that the Monroe Doctrine applied primarily to the Caribbean basin, as South America mostly has had its act together (relatively). IIRC the only time we do anything down there in the post WWII era is against communists (see Chile, Colombia, Peru). Had it been Argentinian leftists invading the Falklands, you may well have seen a chunk of the Atlantic Fleet down there.
Royal
02-06-2007, 02:40 AM
Good question. We went into Grenada - ostensibly British - without hardly even a consultation.
Greneda was independant. A Commonwealth member, but independant.
Hellfish
02-06-2007, 08:50 AM
Greneda was independant. A Commonwealth member, but independant.
Right, and didn't Grenada appeal to the Brits? I'm just trying to argue that this is an example of where the Monroe Doctrine empowered the US to act in another major power's sphere of influence.
SamHamam
02-06-2007, 03:43 PM
Greneda was independant. A Commonwealth member, but independant.
with the same head of state as the UK, who was rumoured to have been a trifle irritated at the lack of consultation.
M1A2U2
02-06-2007, 04:41 PM
It's my understanding that the US was about to give the Brits a mothballed aircraft carrier but the war ended.
OldRecon
02-07-2007, 04:17 AM
An interesting sidelight is that the Britts apparently got some intel. help from the Soviets. Though neither intentionaly nor voluntary at that :lol:.
About 1-2 years ago a story showed up here in the Norwegian press at least, about NATO eavesdropping on Soviet Sattelite telemetry during the 1980's.
And only the Soviets apparently had recce-sattelites orbiting over the Southern Ocean at the time.
Ordie
02-07-2007, 01:02 PM
An interesting sidelight is that the Britts apparently got some intel. help from the Soviets. Though neither intentionaly nor voluntary at that :lol:.
About 1-2 years ago a story showed up here in the Norwegian press at least, about NATO eavesdropping on Soviet Sattelite telemetry during the 1980's.
And only the Soviets apparently had recce-sattelites orbiting over the Southern Ocean at the time.
I think the nearest Soviet activity point was in Luanda, Angola. I don't know if they had Bear Maritime Patrol aircraft based out of there at that time.
FYI: The South American liberation movements (Led by San Martin, O'Higgins, and Bolivar) was partially supported and underwritten from London. They did so on the premise to open new ventues for markets and commerce.
The Penninsula Wars was a watershed moment for Latin American Criollos, who felt jilted from the lack of power at home and who have fought against the French in Spain.
DeltaWhisky58
02-07-2007, 01:18 PM
The British Naval task force was regularly "shadowed" byt Soviet bear aircraft, these operated from Cuba and Angola usually taking off from one and landing in the other.
lta1979
02-12-2007, 01:50 PM
Article 6 (1 (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm#FN1))
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2 (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm#FN2)), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.I don't know where the Tropic of Cancer is, but maybe the Falklands isn't included!
Article 5 states that you must defend any other member, but it doesn't dictate with what means. It can be from military response to political condemnation!.... Probably put in there to avoid going to Nuclear war if good old Russia decided to expand during the cold war!
Atlantic Friend
02-12-2007, 01:53 PM
Basically calling in NATO would have been using a sledgehammer to get rid of a wasp here. The Argentines had very respectable military capacities, but taking on the United Kingdom was completely unrealistic. By and large the "Malvinas" operation was dictated by internal politics and the need to sidetrack growing dissent from the population, and not by realistic assessment of attainable war goals.
martinexsquaddie
03-01-2007, 06:03 AM
theres an airbase with a sqd of f3s and bvr capability a sub and shed loads of sams there now
there's nothing in south america that can pull off a succesful raid on mpa against that or land any sort of force in strength
EsoognomEhT
03-01-2007, 12:28 PM
It's my understanding that the US was about to give the Brits a mothballed aircraft carrier but the war ended.
I believe it was briefly entertained at the start of the war (why would we need near the end when Lusty was pretty much finished/on her way by that point?, but people came to senses; ie how exactly would we staff it...
edit;
Offer from the Americans
The departure of Invincible and Hermes to the South Atlantic raised one important question in those both in the Falklands and at home- what would happen if either carrier was disabled or destroyed? Their presence was paramount to the mission. As Admiral Woodward had said "Loose Invincible and the operation in severely jeopardized, lose Hermes and the operation is over". The other British commando carrier, an earlier sister ship of Hermes, Bulwark, was laid up in No.3 basin Portsmouth Dockyard. She underwent a survey to see the suitability of sending her if the war continued or a carrier was rendered inactive and work was started to take her out of mothballs. However her re-entry into service would take some time by which time the war may well be over and at worst lost. The other option was waiting for the completion of Illustrious. She was in fact completed 3 months early and after hurried and brief sea trials headed down south, commissioning en-route (20th June 1982). Lessons learnt from the war had already been put into practice and she was fitted with the Phalanx close in weapon system- previously considered too expensive. Illustrious arrived on scene as the conflict ended but if it had gone on any longer her arrival would have given the battle weary fleet a significant boost. If one of the carriers had been lost it was likely that the British forces would have been pulled back, regrouped and waited for Illustrious and Bulwark before attempting to retake the islands a second time. Although never officially acknowledged there are reports that during the conflict the United States offered Britain the loan of a US Navy aircraft carrier should the worst happen to either Invincible or Hermes. One source claims the American carrier in question was the U.S.S Eisenhower* while another source suggests that it was the Keersage† . The Guam and Oriskany are also mentioned and it is rumoured that Royal Navy officers visited the Norfolk navy yard to inspect two Iwo Jima class vessels. Regardless of the ship and regardless of weather the offer was even made it is almost certain that it would have been turned down or would never have materialised. The problems involved with manning and equipping a foreign vessel of this size in a time of the war would be difficult to say the least. Where would the Royal Navy get the manpower for a capital ship of this size? After all there were and still are significant technical differences between RN and USN equipment. Then there are the political implications. The US and UK had always had a 'special relationship' but this would be pushing it to its limits. By merely supporting UK the USA were jeopardizing relations with South America and additionally the American public may not have the same resolve to lend American equipment to fight a battle thousands of miles from not only the United States but also from Britain. * The Secret War for the Falklands by Nigel West † Falklands Documentary on the Discovery Channel.
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