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Mr. JOSHUA
03-08-2007, 11:21 AM
China's spies 'very aggressive' threat to U.S.

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
March 6, 2007


China's intelligence services are among the most aggressive at spying on the United States, followed by Cuban, Russian and Iranian spy agencies, according to the U.S. government's top counterintelligence coordinator.

"These services are eating our lunch," Joel F. Brenner, the new head of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, said in his first interview since being named to the counterspy post in August.

Mr. Brenner, a former inspector general at the National Security Agency, told The Washington Times that the U.S. remains the No. 1 target of "virtually every significant espionage service on the face of the Earth."

China's intelligence activities have been "very aggressive" at acquiring U.S. advanced technology, often before it is fully developed here. "The technology bleed to China, among others, is a very serious problem," he said, noting that the FBI is improving its efforts to identify and protect sensitive technology.

Beijing also succeeded in penetrating, and thus frustrating, U.S. intelligence against China through Katrina Leung, a Los Angeles businesswoman who was a long-time FBI informant secretly loyal to Beijing, Mr. Brenner said.

Mr. Brenner's office, known as NCIX, is working on a new presidential strategy for counterintelligence. The goal of the office is to provide strategic direction aimed at bolstering counterintelligence agencies, including the FBI, CIA and Pentagon counterspy units.

Another key priority is using counterintelligence techniques, such as turning foreign agents or recruiting supporters, against terrorist groups.

"Hezbollah or al Qaeda don't do a terrorist operation without doing an intelligence operation first," Mr. Brenner said. "They are very thorough and capable in the way they do their advance surveillance and reconnoitering. We've got to get better at that aspect of supporting counterterrorism, and that is one of our core missions here in this office."

Additionally, the NCIX is pressing counterspies to do more to stop computer-based intelligence-gathering, something he called a growing threat.

"You can now, from the comfort of your own home or office, exfiltrate information electronically from somebody else's computer around the world without the expense and risk of trying to grow a spy," Mr. Brenner said.

"We've got to start addressing that in a big way," he said. "Network vulnerability is a huge issue, and it's an issue in the private as well as a public sector."

Mr. Brenner also said he is trying to recruit more-capable people to join counterintelligence services.

"You can't leave counterintelligence to the fanatics and paranoiacs," he said. "We really need our best people, and so training and education and supporting national security studies is something we're paying a lot of attention to."

He also plans to speed up damage assessments, or lessons learned, after spy cases and to conduct aggressive follow-up to make sure recommended changes are implemented.

Currently, the NCIX is conducting a damage assessment of the Leung spy case, examining how Leung secretly spied for China by ******ly entrapping two of the FBI's most senior counterspies, FBI agents James J. Smith and Bill Cleveland.

The Leung case was a "very serious espionage case," Mr. Brenner said, a view that contrasts with that of FBI officials who have sought to play down the spy case, saying it was mainly about improper ****** relations between the FBI informant and her handlers. Leung, through her lawyers, has denied spying for China.

Mr. Brenner said China, however, was in fact running Leung as their agent. "That was an intelligence operation, and it was a very successful intelligence operation," he said. "It was a classic honey trap" -- spy jargon for ****** entrapment.

Leung was initially charged in 2003 with spying for China, but the charges were dropped and she eventually pleaded guilty in 2005 to minor charges: making false statements and filing a false tax return. Smith also pleaded guilty to lying to investigators.

In addition to China, Cuba's intelligence services continue to pose a major intelligence threat, as do spies from Russia and Iran, Mr. Brenner said, noting that Cuban intelligence remains a "a very professional service."

"They were trained by the KGB, and now they're training the Venezuelans," he said.

Russia's intelligence service remains "very aggressive" against the United States, and "the Iranians also have a mature and capable service," he said. All "are running significant operations against us."

Overall, the problem of stopping foreign spies is daunting, both due to the number of spies and as a result of problems among U.S. agencies charged with stopping them, namely the FBI, domestically, and the CIA, overseas. Mr. Brenner said he is trying to reform counterintelligence as the mission manager within the office of the director of national intelligence.

Various counterspy agencies, from the Defense Department to the FBI and CIA, have regarded counterintelligence "as an intramural sport."

"We're trying to turn the [counterintelligence] community into a community in reality as well as in name," he said.

"Americans are going to wake up one day and realize that the place in the world we have come to take for granted isn't ours by some God-given right. We have to defend it," he said.


http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070306-122226-3827r.htm

http://www.homestead.com/prosites-prs/index.html

Hispeed1
03-08-2007, 05:52 PM
Interesting read. Thanks for posting.

shocker1
03-08-2007, 06:10 PM
This explains all those blocked ip addresses my firewall traced back to China. To think I thought the were just memory thieves grabbing 30mb from 100,000 computers massing memory to play their games on old computers.p-)

sinophile
03-08-2007, 06:30 PM
I've been waiting for a thread like this for a long time but didn't realize it until now.

The greatest probably (not sure) untapped asset for CI and I (IMHO) are the resume/job boards and recruting firms. If you're a foreign agent looking to steal US tech you're going to plug into these pathways into the right jobs, or as avenues to connect with the right people who may one day get those jobs. Its an asset and a vulnerability. I really hope folks in the USGOV are looking at this.

Laworkerbee
03-08-2007, 07:18 PM
I've been waiting for a thread like this for a long time but didn't realize it until now.

The greatest probably (not sure) untapped asset for CI and I (IMHO) are the resume/job boards and recruting firms. If you're a foreign agent looking to steal US tech you're going to plug into these pathways into the right jobs, or as avenues to connect with the right people who may one day get those jobs. Its an asset and a vulnerability. I really hope folks in the USGOV are looking at this.

Christ thats depressing but thanks for pointing it out.

Nano
03-08-2007, 07:23 PM
I've been waiting for a thread like this for a long time but didn't realize it until now.

The greatest probably (not sure) untapped asset for CI and I (IMHO) are the resume/job boards and recruting firms. If you're a foreign agent looking to steal US tech you're going to plug into these pathways into the right jobs, or as avenues to connect with the right people who may one day get those jobs. Its an asset and a vulnerability. I really hope folks in the USGOV are looking at this.
They've been doing that already as I understand. It is not an untapped asset at all. Chinese intelligence agents have been working that route for decades now with some success. The folks at the USGOV have been aware of it for sometime, but very little imho has been done for various reasons
including conflicting foreign policy goals to open the Chinese market to U.S.
businesses. China's spying is so rampant now that one would have to be blind not to notice it. The FBI is ill capable/willing to track or indentifying them and most efforts are wasted in internal turf disputes or
covering someone else's (major defense contractors) embarrassingly incompetent security procedures. The impression that I get from U.S. counterintelligence is that looking the other way is how they have dealt with Chinese and Israeli spying. "FBI officials who have sought to play down the spy case, saying it was mainly about improper ****** relations between the FBI informant and her handlers" The FBI seems to spend most of its time downplaying threats or officials covering their incompetence to lead and being busy with career advancement politics instead of doing their jobs. I am not saying that there are not hard working FBI agents most of them are, but most of their efforts are hurt or otherwise seriously impeded by their superiors and fellow beaureaucrats. "Mr. Brenner said he is trying to reform counterintelligence as the mission manager within the office of the director of national intelligence." I wish him all the luck on that, because it is going tougher than the counter-intelligence operations themselves.

Nano
03-08-2007, 07:34 PM
Christ thats depressing but thanks for pointing it out.
I tend to agree with you that is a very depressing thing to know, but I'd rather know and get over my depressed feelings and do something about it as should U.S. intelligence. You would be very depressed to know some of the ethnic and national backgrounds of the Chinese spies.

Ordie
03-08-2007, 09:49 PM
We need to make a special effort to recruit more Mandarin Speaking Chinese Americans.

remo williams
03-09-2007, 12:34 AM
I've been waiting for a thread like this for a long time but didn't realize it until now.

The greatest probably (not sure) untapped asset for CI and I (IMHO) are the resume/job boards and recruting firms. If you're a foreign agent looking to steal US tech you're going to plug into these pathways into the right jobs, or as avenues to connect with the right people who may one day get those jobs. Its an asset and a vulnerability. I really hope folks in the USGOV are looking at this.

There is probably much more truth to that statement than you realize. My employer had made agreements to sell some specs on an older model generator unit we build a few yrs back. THey [China] wanted more than what we were offering, but the deal wen through anyway. I'm sure they acquired much more than they bought, as were were developing a newer unit that we build now. There is a noticible , um animus on the part of some mgmnt when referring to China now, as I'm sure there were some events that have been kept quiet. Business won't disclose an instance of infiltration , unless telling a lie is not an option. Notice the vast amount of laptops dissappearing? All these companies doing business, are most likely not only getting infiltrated, and pilfered. But since many of them have ties/contracts with the Gov't because of their international dealings, they could be likely conduits into Gov't infiltration to some extent. It's going to be a hard issue to deal with, especially when much of it relys on these companies maybe regulating themselves and/or being more inclusive of Gov't agencies while doing business.

deagle
03-09-2007, 11:43 PM
well, you can also say that the USA has many spy networks operating for our country's interests also. I don't think the USA is trying to be hypocritical , but its not as if we didnt deny we have agents working for us. Hopefully, we have better trained ones also !

I'm still a bit surprised the agent didn't see through it

n4292936
03-10-2007, 12:03 AM
I've been waiting for a thread like this for a long time but didn't realize it until now.

The greatest probably (not sure) untapped asset for CI and I (IMHO) are the resume/job boards and recruting firms. If you're a foreign agent looking to steal US tech you're going to plug into these pathways into the right jobs, or as avenues to connect with the right people who may one day get those jobs. Its an asset and a vulnerability. I really hope folks in the USGOV are looking at this.

They're way ahead of you. Your forgot to mention class reunion sites and stuff like MySpace. Basically the idea is to stear clear of posting any personal info on the net anywhere. As for people who don't already work in sensitive areas, all that can be done is being done in temrs of vetting applicants and maintaining good CI and security practices.

Cipher
03-10-2007, 12:13 AM
We need to make a special effort to recruit more Mandarin Speaking Chinese Americans.
We probably already have quite a few in the CIA.

They made an effort to recruit Chinese Americans sometime ago.

Wodan
03-11-2007, 09:30 AM
I read a similar article about chinese industrial espionage in germany, some time ago, but it was about the fact, that most of this happens by hacking, not by people that work at the corps..

remo williams
03-13-2007, 02:20 AM
What you have to remember is that the Chinese have been adept at using spies for centuries. It's been a tool for them to survive even before they were unified. To say they're pretty good at it would be an understatement.

Lerclair
03-13-2007, 04:41 AM
Everybody spies everybody... no double standards here...