Finland Winter War, the Soviet view

[Panzer Joe]

I have an interest in the Soviet operations of the WW2 era, recently I have developed an interest in the Winter War of 1939-1940, information from the Finnish side is commom place and straight forward- hostile invasion and the efforts to repel it- What I am interested in is the Soviet view.
I read somewhere long ago that the Soviet Units in the initial invasion were briefed that they were going into Finland to Liberate the workers from an unpopular Goverment, an interesting snippet which I could not follow up on.
Could anyone point me towards good information on the Soviet Russian viewpoint during the Winter War ?

[California Joe]

Look up posts by Lokos. He's probably posted more on it than any other poster here. And he knows what he's talking about.

[Teme]

Infantryman memoirs:
http://www.iremember.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=2

Intersting book:
http://sonic.net/~bstone/archives/020210.shtml[/URL]

A hijacked discussion:
[URL]http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=98393&page=8 (http://sonic.net/~bstone/archives/020210.shtml)

[Thor]

I read somewhere long ago that the Soviet Units in the initial invasion were briefed that they were going into Finland to Liberate the workers from an unpopular Goverment, an interesting snippet which I could not follow up on.
That's like a carbon copy for reasons given for every Soviet invasion around the globe.

And he knows what he's talking about.
He is dishonest. Blows smoke for 10 pages when he gets going.

[asch]

That's like a carbon copy for reasons given for every Soviet invasion around the globe.
oh, man. now i'm impressed. i mean - you just come to a "MH&T" forum and begin your usual bitching without any glimpse of doubt. my applause.
He is dishonest. Blows smoke for 10 pages when he gets going.
sure thing, his info don't suit your point of view.
p-)

[Teme]

He is dishonest. Blows smoke for 10 pages when he gets going.

He's not dishonest. He just picks only the right information that suits his posts.

For example:


Zero The Hour:

Interesting you should ask. I, for example, am not a Russian or former Soviet citizen, so I was never taught anything at all about the Winter War. I'll tell you, though, what my - somewhat biased - view of the war has become, after a fair amount of research.

1) Who started it?

The Soviets escalated it to the point where a shooting conflict was inevitable. This is not a judgement on the Soviets, as such political plays were modus operandi at that time in modernity. They sought security for Leningrad through a healthy buffer zone, as well as control over a number of strategic points in and around Finland. This was not so much a measure against the Finns, but a preemptive move to block potential German invasion jump off points.

2) For what motives?

Look to above.

3) How many died?

71,214 KIA
16,292 died in hospital
39,369 MIA

= 126,875 irrecoverable losses



4) Who won?

There are a number of things that need to be pointed out, here.

The first is that it is a Finnish myth that the Soviets had overwhelming numerical superiority at the onset of the war. They massed 200,000 men for the invasion, whilst the Finns mustered 130,000. This was not an ideal correlation of forces. It is a commonly held military maxim that a force superiority of 3:1 should be achieved when on the offensive. This, as much as anything else, damaged the Soviet offensive potential.

The second major mistake on the part of the Soviet leadership was to draw upon formations from the black soil regions of the Ukraine for the bulk of the invasion forces. Not only were the Ukrainians unused to the temperatures in Finland, they were also untrained for it, and illequipped.

The third major mistake on the part of the Soviet leadership was beginning the war in 1939, whilst the Red Army was still in the throes of the Purges. More than 80% of the senior officer corps had become victims, and replacements were not adequately trained or experienced enough for the tasks assigned to them.

The fourth major mistake was the failure to ensure a fluid logistical situation. Lack of basic supplies and equipment severely hampered Soviet forces throughout the campaign - even well into its terminal stages.

The fifth, and perhaps most important, mistake has a lot to do with the second. Most of the Soviet troops employed during the Winter War were led by men who did not have the practical skills needed, and were in turn terribly trained when it came to basics such as: a) combined arms b) co-ordination c) reconnaissance d) effective application of artillery forces e) attacking fixed defences etc.

Another unfortunate factor was that the weather during the Winter War was horrific. It was one of the three worst winters in recorded Finnish history.

DESPITE THIS:

The Soviets won the war.

By February 1940, reorganized, reinforced, re-quipped and competently led Soviet forces broke through the Mannerheim Line and were advancing upon significant Finnish population centres. The Finns had an exhausted, smashed army that could no longer effectively resist. Only the threat of Allied intervention kept the Soviets from outright rejecting the 5 March terms offered by the Finns, and led them to accept them on 12 March.

For their efforts, the Soviets were awarded with significant territories.

On the other hand, some would say that Finland won it based on the fact that their nation managed to stay in existence. I find this to be an unconvincing argument. The military situation, on the ground, in March 1940 was firmly in the favour of the Soviets. The peace deal saw them gain territory. A limited victory, perhaps, but a victory nonetheless.

Lokos
1. Stalin started the war. If he knew Germans are going to attack (through Finland?), why was he caught pants down in 1941?

2. Why did he create People's Republic of Finland puppet goverment?

4. Lokos numbers above are from Karelian isthmus only(not from the whole front) from the very beginning of the war when Stalin was expecting a parade march like in Poland. He also forgets to mention the Soviet superiority with tanks, artillery and airforce. As he says above, the reason why Stalin did not have time to finalize his plans was that he was afraid of the British-French intervention:
(http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=105444)

However in other posts he says there there is no reason to believe Stalin wanted to occupy whole Finland: http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showpost.php?p=2276670&postcount=125

Lokos is very eager to ask for sources or links like in post:
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showpost.php?p=2281369&postcount=138
But he never or seldom gives sources or links for his posts.

[Thor]

oh, man. now i'm impressed. i mean - you just come to a "MH&T" forum and begin your usual bitching without any glimpse of doubt. my applause.
I'm quite sure I posted here well before you. I just provided an opinion, you provided bitching.

But please, let everyone know what Soviet invasion you had in mind that didn't come with the standard references to the global communist revolution?

sure thing, his info don't suit your point of view.
p-)
Apologetic and Stalinistic references shouldn't suit anyone, but more importantly they crumble under an academic review.

[asch]

But please, let everyone know what Soviet invasion you had in mind that didn't come with the standard references to the global communist revolution?
Winter War is a perfect example.
From soviet side war was justified as action, desired to put a buffer zone and ensure safety of Leningrad in the light of changed geopolitics in Eastern Europe.

[asch]

double post

[Smashed!]

I'm quite sure I posted here well before you. I just provided an opinion, you provided bitching.

But please, let everyone know what Soviet invasion you had in mind that didn't come with the standard references to the global communist revolution?


Apologetic and Stalinistic references shouldn't suit anyone, but more importantly they crumble under an academic review.


What is this communist revolution you speak about going global? No because the last man speaking of such was axed in Mexico that same year.:roll:

Stalin issued the general line in 1933 Revolution in a sole country. Means No more global revolution...the fact was that a year before he was buddy buddy with a certain Stresseman! Instead of that HUAC-grade language you better try and read something real about USSR politics. Oh and it gets really touching when finland is regarded as a target for revolution...

But Foremost people are you serious? This is really old s*it.

[Lokos]

So much bitterness, here. Oh, well.

1. Stalin started the war. If he knew Germans are going to attack (through Finland?), why was he caught pants down in 1941?


It was a potentiality. He knew that war with Germany was inevitable all the way back in 1939 (John Erickson, 'Road to Stalingrad', p80-85). In 1941, there were numerous half-measures taken to both acknowledge the looming nature of the Soviet-German conflict, and to absorb the impact of an attack the Soviet military theorists believed would come in the form of a two-pronged surprise assault north and south of the Pripyat Marsh. For example, the belated construction of a new defensive line well to the west of the Stalin Line.

The gradual concentration of armies in the Western Military District, too. The ongoing periods of 'special military preparedness' (nothing such, in reality, but at least lipservice was paid, duly, to the reality of the situation) etc.

The truth is that - fully cognisant of the Red Army's unpreparedness to wage war in 1941 (read: the results of the 1940 wargames speak for themselves - Kulik's little ego trip having thwarted the re-mechanization of Soviet forces for far too long didn't help, either) Stalin issued directives that amounted to 'Don't shoot if it's just a provocation, only shoot if it's war'. The distinction between provocation and war was never made.

The Red Army, on 22 June 1941, was not tactically surprised in many areas. But on a strategic scale it was caught in the most difficult of post-Purge transition periods.

The buffer zone in Finland - forgive the digression - was therefore a logical extension of a policy centred on placing the Red Army in a more easily defensible position in the event of general war with Germany; something that was seen as inevitable by the leadership of the SU.

2. Why did he create People's Republic of Finland puppet goverment?


To administer conquered territories? To pave the way for future expansion? Who cares? The point of the matter is: what were the immediate reasons for the 1939-1940 invasion? Naked ambition? Sheer malevolence? Or cold calculation? Stalin's particular brand of evil was wholly paranoid, and ruthlessly calculating. Though the answer might be a mixture of the aforementioned elements, you make a mockery of your own case by claiming that there was no 'legitimate' security concern in attacking Finland, on the part of the Soviet Union.

4. Lokos numbers above are from Karelian isthmus only

As are the numbers for the Finnish forces, champ.

However in other posts he says there there is no reason to believe Stalin wanted to occupy whole Finland:

My points do not contradict each other. The Soviet Union's capacity for waging war was undiminished in March 1940. Yet, the Soviet Union accepted a peace treaty drafted by the Finns. Why? Ostensibly, because Stalin feared a Franco-British intervention. Would Stalin have occupied all of Finland, given the chance (taking into regard cost vs benefit)? Absolutely. Was that a war aim of the Soviet Union? Most likely not.

He also forgets to mention the Soviet superiority with tanks, artillery and airforce

When the tanks, artillery and air force are as badly missused as they were by the Soviets in the Winter War, I don't consider it pertinent to even mention it. If anything, they were liabilities. Enormous supplies were expended keeping equipment going that did not tangibly benefit Soviet formations fighting in Finland.

Lokos is very eager to ask for sources or links like in post:
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...&postcount=138
But he never or seldom gives sources or links for his posts.

If you want a source of mine, you ask for it, like I ask you for yours. It's rude to make me foot note or end note every single post with a historical theme. I know where I got the information from, and you can know, too. Just ask.

He is dishonest. Blows smoke for 10 pages when he gets going.

Aha. Where have I been dishonest, dirtbag? Back up your petty accusations, troll.

Lokos

[California Joe]

He asked for information from the Soviet point of view. I thought my answer was appropriate.

[IronFinn]

I´m not sure if this is allowed here (advertising another forum) but for a balanced and nonbiased view visit http://forum.axishistory.com and there either section "The Soviet Union at War 1922 - 1945" or "Winter War & Continuation War". You probably need to do some searching.

There are tons of info from both sides and it is well balanced. Lokos here has info but he is obviously leaning to SU side and so his view is a bit biased.

[Kippari]

Well, the faith of Finland was about the same as the faith of Belgium before the Great War, if Germans wouldn't have invaded then the British would have done that anyway. It's true that we technically lost the war, but Soviets got their asses whopped big time. The war showed the weakness of Soviet armies, thus invoking Germans to invade such an easy prey. Lokos, the soviets had better equipment and more manpower. I think it was not because of the fear for Allied intervention that stopped the Soviets. It was the sheer fact that occupation, even if it had succeeded would have been a rather pyrrhic victory and left a low morale army occupying a country with strong guerrilla activity. More so it would have alienated the allies even further, even so far that they would not accept SU as a part of them and left SU to be crushed by Germans.

[Teme]

So much bitterness, here. Oh, well.

If you want a source of mine, you ask for it, like I ask you for yours. It's rude to make me foot note or end note every single post with a historical theme. I know where I got the information from, and you can know, too. Just ask.

Lokos

I should not post when I'm tired and grumpy. Anyways I have enjoyed the discussions and in the end of the day it's good for the discussion to have an opponent who brings another biased viewpoint, however fair and balancedp-)

[Panzer Joe]

Thanks to all, some good info there on the links too.
I find that whole era of post purges operations interesting (I refer to Khakin Gol, Eastern Poland Sept 39, the 3 Baltic states in 1940, and Moldova or whatever it was called then, also in 1940).

The Finland War I find fascinating, I first read about it many years ago but could find very little information on it back then.

[Esteban McLaren]

what was the finnish MBT of the Winter war? Has Finland any at all?

[kosse]

what was the finnish MBT of the Winter war? Has Finland any at all?

Afaik the concept of MBT was not known back then. Finland had some light tanks, mainly Renault FT-17 and Vickers 6 ton tank. I think most of the renaults had been dug as static defenses and vickers were not ready in the beginning of the war.

[Smashed!]

Afaik the concept of MBT was not known back then. Finland had some light tanks, mainly Renault FT-17 and Vickers 6 ton tank. I think most of the renaults had been dug as static defenses and vickers were not ready in the beginning of the war.

Woods! It was the finish primary MBTrofl.

[J4ckRy4n]

You might want to check this link also:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simo_H%C3%A4yh%C3%A4

It's about Simo Häyhä. He's considered to be one of the best snipers in the history.

edit: sorry, you were looking for soviet view..

[California Joe]

And that's it folks. "Simo" has been invoked so the argument is officially over. There is no point in continuing. :)

[Teme]

And that's it folks. "Simo" has been invoked so the argument is officially over. There is no point in continuing. :)

I thought the whatwasitagain-law is that when you bring Stalin into the discussion, it's over:)

[California Joe]

Godwins Law is when you invoke Hitlers name in any discussion.

Here at Milphotos the name Simo is invoked in threads involving the Winter War or any and all sniping threads to end the argument because in the minds of the Finns here there are only 2 sacred things: Simo Hayha is the God of all Snipers and Tom of Finland drawings are a blueprint for life. ;)

[IronFinn]

Godwins Law is when you invoke Hitlers name in any discussion.

Here at Milphotos the name Simo is invoked in threads involving the Winter War or any and all sniping threads to end the argument because in the minds of the Finns here there are only 2 sacred things: Simo Hayha is the God of all Snipers and Tom of Finland drawings are a blueprint for life. ;)

I lol´d :)

[Hecatonchiros]

what was the finnish MBT of the Winter war? Has Finland any at all?

Like Kosse pointed out, MBTs were not around back then. The finnish armoured forces at the beginning of Winter War were:

34 Renault FT-17 tanks. 15 of them had the 37mm Puteaux gun, the rest had Maxim machine guns. These tanks were hopelessly outdated by this time, and the armor piercing capability of the 37mm Puteaux gun was extremely poor. Therefore these tanks were dug in and used as bunkers, like Kosse said. They never saw combat in this role either, as far as I know. When the war ended and the border was moved, nobody bothered to dig them up, so the Soviets got them.

32 Vickers 6 ton tanks, bought in 1938. These were more modern than the Renaults, but because of limited finnish military budget they were bought unarmed & without radios (some didn´t even have seats), and were in that condition when the war began. They were then hastily fitted with 37mm Bofors guns, Maxim MGs, and some also had a tank-version of the Suomi SMG.

The only true tank battle of Winter War, the minor battle of Honkaniemi, ended disasterously for the finnish tank force, with 6 Vickers tanks destroyed and left to the hands of the Red Army, against 2 Soviet T-26´s destroyed (both of which could be repaired & put back to use afterwards IIRC). A couple of days after that, lone Vickers tank fought against Soviet tanks that had managed to break through the finnish lines, and knocked out 2 T-26 tanks, before getting knocked out itself by a T-28 and a T-26.

And that was just about it for finnish armored forces and their battles in Winter War. After the war, most of the remaining Vickers tanks were fitted with captured Soviet weapons, and became known as "T-26E".

[Kilgor]

As are the numbers for the Finnish forces, champ.

Lokos

Why not read page 13, chapter 1 of Erickson's "Road to Stalingrad" the last paragraph ?

I believe Erickson discuses some troop numbers there. Soviet manpower superiority was over 5:1

[J4ckRy4n]

Godwins Law is when you invoke Hitlers name in any discussion.

Here at Milphotos the name Simo is invoked in threads involving the Winter War or any and all sniping threads to end the argument because in the minds of the Finns here there are only 2 sacred things: Simo Hayha is the God of all Snipers and Tom of Finland drawings are a blueprint for life. ;)

Haha, I guess he's mentioned "few" times before..:) I'm still a bit newb here.

[Mamont]

Why not read page 13, chapter 1 of Erickson's "Road to Stalingrad" the last paragraph ?

I believe Erickson discuses some troop numbers there. Soviet manpower superiority was over 5:1
That's about right correlation for any offensive operation at that time. Some sources claimed that numbers were 11:1 in favor to soviet troops, but according to russian sources numbers were about 3:1 in manpower, 6:1 in artillery and about 10:1 in aviation..

[Kaapeli]

Too few posts about the Soviet point of view on the conflict and too much nationalist boasting.
Please save the thread before it's too late.

[Panzer Joe]

The only Soviet viewpoint I heard about before was in the book STALINS SECRET WAR, written in I think 1981, a small but interesting snippet it mentioned was that in some camps of the Gulag, the rumours of Finnish resistance raised hopes of some prisoners that here at last was a people taking on the Soviets. With some prisoners hoping for a Finnish victory, in hindsight this may seems inprobable, but 1940 was really a different world than it is now.
1940 was really a active year for the Soviets under Stalin- the aforementioned take over of the Baltic States, the Finland War, the takeover of part of Romania, Trorsky been killed, the Katyn massacre etc.
A lot was happening, I wonder what the Russian troops were told about the Finns before the invasion, what type of people were they? how would they fight?
The Book STALIN SECRET WAR mentions the improvished state of Russian troops who advanced into Eastern Poland in late September 1939, and how many of them were amazed at the goods available in Polish towns, a legacy, the book says, of 20 years of Soviet rule.
I just find this whole era very interesting, especially from the Soviet point of view, and this board is the only real information that I can find- so keep it coming please !

[Beast]

That's about right correlation for any offensive operation at that time. Some sources claimed that numbers were 11:1 in favor to soviet troops, but according to russian sources numbers were about 3:1 in manpower, 6:1 in artillery and about 10:1 in aviation..

At the start of Winter War finland had less than 82 airworthy planes and 37 very outdated planes from previous decades.

Of those 82 planes only 36 where Fokker D XXI figher planes, and 17 Blenheim bombers and 29 Fokker C X recon planes, while Soviets had at the start of war over 1000 planes what where 600 Fighters, 300 bombers and 100 recon planes and the Soviets increased the amount of their planes constatly during the war so at the end Soviets had over 3800 (1500 fighters, bombers 1700 and recon 600)

While the active Finnish planes did not never get over 130.


And when FAF lost 61 planes where 34 got lost in dogfight, others either AA or accidents. The Soviets lost 200 planes to dogfight, 600 to AA and 200 to random causes over Finnish soil.

[Mamont]

At the start of Winter War finland had less than 82 airworthy planes and 37 very outdated planes from previous decades.
Hmm, let's see...

Of those 82 planes only 36 where Fokker D XXI figher planes, and 17 Blenheim bombers and 29 Fokker C X recon planes,

From what i have on hands at the start of the war finns had:
Fokker D.XXI - 36
Bristol "Bulldog" - 12
Bristol "Gamecock" - 9
Bristol "Blenheim" - 17
Fokker C.V. - 13
Fokker C.X - 31
Blackburn "Ripon" - 14
VL "Kotka" - 6
Junkers F-13 - 2
Junkers W-34 - 5
Avro "Anson" - 3
Fi-156 - 2
In total - 168, from which 119 were combat planes.


while Soviets had at the start of war over 1000 planes what where 600 Fighters, 300 bombers and 100 recon planes and the Soviets increased the amount of their planes constatly during the war so at the end Soviets had over 3800 (1500 fighters, bombers 1700 and recon 600)

Not really. Let's be alittle more specific. At the start of the winter war Baltic fleet had 469 planes: 111 bombers(SB-2, DB-3), 246 fighters(I-15, I-16, I-153), 102 flying boats MBR-2 plus several other types. RKKA - about 1500 planes. So in total in the beginning of the war there were about 2k planes. And not only f/b/r types. At the end of the war there were about 3k planes. Of course not all of them were flying combat missions.


While the active Finnish planes did not never get over 130.
During the war finns received/aquired/captured about 200 planes. And used them in combat. If they could not utilize what was in their disposal - sign of a poor worksmanship.


FAF lost 61 planes where 34 got lost in dogfight, others either AA or accidents.

If i'm not mistaken finns claimed that they lost 67 planes of which 21 in the air, with another 69 heavily damaged. Additionally 304 airmen were killed, 90 MIA and 105 wounded. I personally find it most intriguing, as most finnish planes was 1-2 seated with only Blenheims with 3 crewmen. And i doubt that they flew without chutes, like japanese pilots. At the start of the war finns had 168 planes, plus 195 they received during the war. At the end of the war if i'm not mistaken again they had 166 planes, so even such crude calculation gives the number of losses as 139 planes.


The Soviets lost 200 planes to dogfight, 600 to AA and 200 to random causes over Finnish soil.
200+600+200=1000 planes? Acording to russian sources, soviet aerial losses were less than 590 planes total. RKKA: 224 shot down/landed behind enemy lines, 86 MIA, 181 lost through incidents, Baltic fleet lost 17 planes in battle and 46 due to incidents, North fleet ended war without losses. In general Soviet army conducted 84307 combat flghts: 44041 by bombers and 40266 by fighters, dropped 23146t of bombs. Battle losses: 261 airplane, 321 pilot. The loss rate was 0.3% relative to actual combat flights.

[Kaapeli]

If i'm not mistaken finns claimed that they lost 67 planes of which 21 in the air, with another 69 heavily damaged. Additionally 304 airmen were killed, 90 MIA and 105 wounded. I personally find it most intriguing, as most finnish planes was 1-2 seated with only Blenheims with 3 crewmen. And i doubt that they flew without chutes, like japanese pilots. At the start of the war finns had 168 planes, plus 195 they received during the war. At the end of the war if i'm not mistaken again they had 166 planes, so even such crude calculation gives the number of losses as 139 planes.

72 air crew killed and 22 wounded.
Maybe your number includes FAF ground crew also (for axample airforce AA crews lost 169 men). Airman is an airforce rank and it can refer to any member of the air forces wich includes air traffic controllers, observers, aircraft mechanics, guards etc.

I have different numbers for FAF aircraft remaining immediately after the war: 297 planes and 225 of those operational.

[Lokos]

Why not read page 13, chapter 1 of Erickson's "Road to Stalingrad" the last paragraph ?

I believe Erickson discuses some troop numbers there. Soviet manpower superiority was over 5:1

Erickson speaks of the entirety of the extent of the Soviet deployment for the duration of the war - and his Soviet figure includes other fronts (apart from the KI). My numbers are for the Karelian Isthmus at the start of the conflict, in particular.

Why not try your hand at some reading comprehension?

Lokos

[Teme]

Erickson speaks of the entirety of the extent of the Soviet deployment for the duration of the war - and his Soviet figure includes other fronts (apart from the KI). My numbers are for the Karelian Isthmus at the start of the conflict, in particular.

Why not try your hand at some reading comprehension?

Lokos
The Man of Steel sent only 200 000 Soviet soldiers (and tanks, planes and guns) agains 130 000 finns in the beginning of the war at the Karelian Isthmus.

Why would the Invinsible Genius of military tactics make such a mistake of not sending enough troops to the war? Stalin was under ideological illusion that Finland would not dare to resist and finnish workers would welcome them as liberators. He was expecting a cakewalk like stabbing Poland into the back.

For the second push he had learned his lesson and Soviet Union massed 750 000 soldiers, 2 000 tanks and 3 000 artillery pieces against 150 000 finns in the Isthmus.

[Kilgor]

Erickson speaks of the entirety of the extent of the Soviet deployment for the duration of the war - and his Soviet figure includes other fronts (apart from the KI). My numbers are for the Karelian Isthmus at the start of the conflict, in particular.

Why not try your hand at some reading comprehension?

Lokos

If we are going to get into specifiecs, why not use a example like the battle of Suomussalmi, the soviets had far in excess of 3:1 superiority and were re-enforced with tanks and they were still slaughtered wholesale.

Why would the Invinsible Genius of military tactics make such a mistake of not sending enough troops to the war? Stalin was under ideological illusion that Finland would not dare to resist and finnish workers would welcome them as liberators. He was expecting a cakewalk like stabbing Poland into the back

In his own words "all we have to do is fire a few artillery rounds and the finns will capitulate".

[Mamont]

The Man of Steel sent only 200 000 Soviet soldiers (and tanks, planes and guns) agains 130 000 finns in the beginning of the war at the Karelian Isthmus.
That's an incorrect statement.


Why would the Invinsible Genius of military tactics make such a mistake of not sending enough troops to the war? Stalin was under ideological illusion that Finland would not dare to resist and finnish workers would welcome them as liberators. He was expecting a cakewalk like stabbing Poland into the back.

The first mistake is to suppose that Stalin was under illusion.
The second mistake is to compare Finland to Poland(collapsed goverment vs strong command).
The third mistake is to presume that he expected a cackewalk in that climate.

[Smashed!]

That's an incorrect statement.


The first mistake is to suppose that Stalin was under illusion.
The second mistake is to compare Finland to Poland(collapsed goverment vs strong command).
The third mistake is to presume that he expected a cackewalk in that climate.

Even if it was correct, given the looks of the war at the time, it seems feasible. Especially with a supposedly weak army.

[Mamont]

Even if it was correct, given the looks of the war at the time, it seems feasible. Especially with a supposedly weak army.
"Weak" was not a correct word about finnish army. "Small" is more suited.
And do not forget heavy fortifications, hard terrain, heavy climate. Soviet army never fought in such conditions before, so many mistakes were done.

[Smashed!]

"Weak" was not a correct word about finnish army. "Small" is more suited.
And do not forget heavy fortifications, hard terrain, heavy climate. Soviet army never fought in such conditions before, so many mistakes were done.


Supposedly was the key term.

[Beast]

Hmm, let's see...

From what i have on hands at the start of the war finns had:
Fokker D.XXI - 36
Bristol "Bulldog" - 12
Bristol "Gamecock" - 9
Bristol "Blenheim" - 17
Fokker C.V. - 13
Fokker C.X - 31
Blackburn "Ripon" - 14
VL "Kotka" - 6
Junkers F-13 - 2
Junkers W-34 - 5
Avro "Anson" - 3
Fi-156 - 2
In total - 168, from which 119 were combat planes.


And out of those planes less than 40 are suited for any kind of aerial combat.

During the war finns received/aquired/captured about 200 planes. And used them in combat. If they could not utilize what was in their disposal - sign of a poor worksmanship.

During the war Finns captured/salvaged less than 40 planes of all sorts, most of them fighters inferior to our own, and besides.

You can't train pilots to fly enemy aircrafts in couple months, and make them compatible with FAF standards in couple months either, but in the contination war a lot of the captured Soviet equipment from Winter War used.

If i'm not mistaken finns claimed that they lost 67 planes of which 21 in the air, with another 69 heavily damaged. Additionally 304 airmen were killed, 90 MIA and 105 wounded. I personally find it most intriguing, as most finnish planes was 1-2 seated with only Blenheims with 3 crewmen. And i doubt that they flew without chutes, like japanese pilots. At the start of the war finns had 168 planes, plus 195 they received during the war. At the end of the war if i'm not mistaken again they had 166 planes, so even such crude calculation gives the number of losses as 139 planes.

At the end of war 15.3.1940 FAF had 297 planes of all sorts, and 225 of them in working order. And during the war FAF lost 32 officers either dead or missing, 11 wounded, 31 lower officers dead or missing, 9 wounded and 9 dead foreigner pilots so it adds total of 72 dead and 22 wounded while 62 planes lost to enemy and 35 damaged but repairable.


200+600+200=1000 planes? Acording to russian sources, soviet aerial losses were less than 590 planes total. RKKA: 224 shot down/landed behind enemy lines, 86 MIA, 181 lost through incidents, Baltic fleet lost 17 planes in battle and 46 due to incidents, North fleet ended war without losses. In general Soviet army conducted 84307 combat flghts: 44041 by bombers and 40266 by fighters, dropped 23146t of bombs. Battle losses: 261 airplane, 321 pilot. The loss rate was 0.3% relative to actual combat flights.

Sorry, should have been more detailed. The FAF airplanes shot down 203 planes of all sorts, while AA units shot 302 planes of all sorts down in winter war.

[Lokos]

If we are going to get into specifiecs, why not use a example like the battle of Suomussalmi,

Or, instead - let's go out on a limb, here - could we stick to the point in question (i.e. the strategic force ratios)? The point you disputed, and then were schooled on? Let's do that, instead of going off on tangents.

Force ratios in a particular battle have no impact whatsoever on the realities of strategic force ratios.

Why you would even bring it into the discussion is beyond me.

Lokos

[ukasofisosaari]

"Weak" was not a correct word about finnish army. "Small" is more suited.
And do not forget heavy fortifications, hard terrain, heavy climate. Soviet army never fought in such conditions before, so many mistakes were done.
What heavy fortifications. If you're talking about Mannerheim line, then you're mistaken. Compared to the Maginot line, Mannerheim line is nothing more than trenches. There were bunkers in some places, but very few of them were modern by the standards of the 1939. Not only that, the men manning that line lacked any adeguate at weapons, aa weapons and artillery support. Calling Mannerheim line heavy fortification is soviet propaganda from winter war when they couldn't break it. But then again the mighty soviet "liberators" couldn't break it for about 2 months despite their numeric superiority in every sense, so I guess it must then be heavy fortification so as to lessen the taste of defeat for the soviets :grin:.

[Smashed!]

What heavy fortifications. If you're talking about Mannerheim line, then you're mistaken. Compared to the Maginot line, Mannerheim line is nothing more than trenches. There were bunkers in some places, but very few of them were modern by the standards of the 1939. Not only that, the men manning that line lacked any adeguate at weapons, aa weapons and artillery support. Calling Mannerheim line heavy fortification is soviet propaganda from winter war when they couldn't break it. But then again the mighty soviet "liberators" couldn't break it for about 2 months despite their numeric superiority in every sense, so I guess it must then be heavy fortification so as to lessen the taste of defeat for the soviets :grin:.

To me the "Hot Gates" come into mind...And I'd lioke to to reffer to Lokos and his post to explain you the realities of force decoupling in order to dismay a more important overall force.

As one old Italian man said : "-Just give me a proper lever and I'll lift the world.".

[Mamont]

And out of those planes less than 40 are suited for any kind of aerial combat.
All of them were suited for their corresponding missions combat or not.

You can't train pilots to fly enemy aircrafts in couple months, and make them compatible with FAF standards in couple months either, but in the contination war a lot of the captured Soviet equipment from Winter War used.
It's not like they were complex planes. So an experienced pilots sholdn't had problems with them. And characteristics were preatty close. As far as i know finns captured 5 I-15bis, 1 I-16, 8 I-153, 3(5)DB-3 and 6 SB-2. But that's not a point worth arguing.

At the end of war 15.3.1940 FAF had 297 planes of all sorts, and 225 of them in working order.

As far as i know that number is corresponding not to the number of the planes that were in service on 12.03.40(end of the war) but is rather general calculation of planes that finns had in service after written off old types and receiving all those ordered during the war. I looked again and found statement that at the end of the war in finnish service there were 196 planes with 112 being airworthy, but without detailed statistics per types.


Sorry, should have been more detailed. The FAF airplanes shot down 203 planes of all sorts, while AA units shot 302 planes of all sorts down in winter war.
Hmm, that's half lower than you stated first, i provided you with soviet losses. They are the most accurate to this day, with existing statistics of plane losses per regiment.

What heavy fortifications. If you're talking about Mannerheim line, then you're mistaken. Compared to the Maginot line, Mannerheim line is nothing more than trenches.
Yes, and comparing to alien fighting mashines with shields even nuclear bomb is nothing. So what are you trying to tell?

But then again the mighty soviet "liberators" couldn't break it for about 2 months despite their numeric superiority in every sense, so I guess it must then be heavy fortification so as to lessen the taste of defeat for the soviets .
And i thought that ego-stroking boys sticked to rants section.

[Teme]

That's an incorrect statement.

The first mistake is to suppose that Stalin was under illusion.
The second mistake is to compare Finland to Poland(collapsed goverment vs strong command).
The third mistake is to presume that he expected a cackewalk in that climate.

What is incorrect? The numbers?

Stalin was under illusion. Either self inflicted or caused by his servants. I'm going to refer earlier post:
The lecture starts with Stalins decision to invade Finland. It was based on assumptions that Finnish army was not capable of fighting, Finnish workers would welcome Red Army as liberators and war would be over in two-three weeks so France and Britain would not have time to react. Also Germany would allow Stalin free hand and Sweden was reluctant to let British-French intervention troops to cross Sweden. Soviet agents in Finland told their masters what the masters wanted to hear[15] (http://www.ennenjanyt.net/4-02/rentola.htm#_ftn15#_ftn15)[16] (http://www.ennenjanyt.net/4-02/rentola.htm#_ftn16#_ftn16)[17] (http://www.ennenjanyt.net/4-02/rentola.htm#_ftn17#_ftn17). Dissent may mean death.
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=105444


About comparing to Poland: On Stalins 60th birthday on 21st of December he and Voroshilov sent a communique to the field commanders: "war against Finland is serious and totally different than our autumn excursion [pohod] to Poland" as if field commander would not have noticed that in the battle field[9] (http://www.ennenjanyt.net/4-02/rentola.htm#_ftn9). It took three weeks for Stalin to figure that out.

Why did Voroshilov promise Stalin a victory parade in Helsinki for his birthday if they knew it is not going to be a walk in the park?

[ukasofisosaari]

Yes, and comparing to alien fighting mashines with shields even nuclear bomb is nothing. So what are you trying to tell?


My point was that by the standards of the time, Mannerheim line wasn't a heavy fortification. So were you speaking of Mannerheim line when you were speaking of heavy fortifications or what. And if you were, would you please explain what you think makes Mannerheim line a heavy fortification.
If you weren't, then what heavy fortification were you speaking about that that finns had in the winter war.

[Mamont]

What is incorrect? The numbers?
Of course.


Stalin was under illusion. Either self inflicted or caused by his servants.

Do not repeat ridiculous statements. Stalin ordered a full brief of the state of the Red Army in summer 1939, because of concearns about inevitable coming of a ww2. The first document was dated 22 august 1939. After the german lightning victory over Poland Stalin ordered another, more deep brief, which was assembled at 23 october 1939 by Voroshilov. The brief stated numerous shortages in arms, personnel, automobiles, planes etc. The shortages were so severe, that they needed to be replenished from the emergency reserve, The full text of both briefs. is available in russian. And i'm not mentioning other documents and briefs of that time. So i can safely conclude that only ignorant person would repeat sentence about illusions.

About comparing to Poland: On Stalins 60th birthday on 21st of December he and Voroshilov sent a communique to the field commanders: "war against Finland is serious and totally different than our autumn excursion [pohod] to Poland" as if field commander would not have noticed that in the battle field[9] (http://www.ennenjanyt.net/4-02/rentola.htm#_ftn9). It took three weeks for Stalin to figure that out.
SO what must that mean, other than word of encouragement? And do you really think that before that statement Stalin did not understand nothing about that war? If you think that this is true, than think about why Soviet Union proposed about 5,5k sq.km of their territory for the 2,7k sq.km of finnish soil?
As for the date you provided i found only Voroshilov's letter to Stalin and Molotov about state of the soviet troops, which were lightheaded after the polish voyage. Voroshilov blamed Meretzkkov for his inability to command efficiently due to the same light attitude and lack of knowledge about actual situation on the battleground. Due to this Meretzkov received warning from Stalin that if he continues to fail to bring order he will be relived from command. That is another small fact, that denies claims about inability to understand situation about war.

Why did Voroshilov promise Stalin a victory parade in Helsinki for his birthday if they knew it is not going to be a walk in the park?
That's was a long tradition in former Soviet Union. To dedicate achievements to some date.


what heavy fortification were you speaking about that that finns had in the winter war.
By the word "heavy" i meant "hard to get through", because due to clever use of terrain, masking and other means finns created an effective defensive line. Not to forget the lack of intelligence about newer defensive lines, According to soviet reports long range artillery was ineffective due to inability of precise targeting, so finnish defences usually were knocked off by direct fire and more often than not situation did not allowed the use of any kind of serious protection against finninsh bunkers.

[Teme]

Of course.

If my numbers are incorrect, can you please provide the correct numbers.


Do not repeat ridiculous statements. Stalin ordered a full brief of the state of the Red Army in summer 1939, because of concearns about inevitable coming of a ww2. The first document was dated 22 august 1939. After the german lightning victory over Poland Stalin ordered another, more deep brief, which was assembled at 23 october 1939 by Voroshilov. The brief stated numerous shortages in arms, personnel, automobiles, planes etc. The shortages were so severe, that they needed to be replenished from the emergency reserve, The full text of both briefs. is available in russian. And i'm not mentioning other documents and briefs of that time. So i can safely conclude that only ignorant person would repeat sentence about illusions.

About saying Stalin was under ideological illusion I don't mean he overestimated Red Arm capability. I mean he was under illusion proletariat in Finland would welcome the Red Army as brothers to liberate them from the slavery of capitalists and the Finnish army would not dare to resist the largest military in the world.

If Stalin knew for sure Germany was going to attack, why did he brush numerous warnings aside and was caught pants down?


SO what must that mean, other than word of encouragement? And do you really think that before that statement Stalin did not understand nothing about that war? If you think that this is true, than think about why Soviet Union proposed about 5,5k sq.km of their territory for the 2,7k sq.km of finnish soil?
As for the date you provided i found only Voroshilov's letter to Stalin and Molotov about state of the soviet troops, which were lightheaded after the polish voyage. Voroshilov blamed Meretzkkov for his inability to command efficiently due to the same light attitude and lack of knowledge about actual situation on the battleground. Due to this Meretzkov received warning from Stalin that if he continues to fail to bring order he will be relived from command. That is another small fact, that denies claims about inability to understand situation about war.

My bad. The post about Stalin and Voroshilov sending the communique to commanders of 7., 8., 9., 14., and 23. armies was actually sent 29.12.1939 (thought it was 21.12.1939). This means that the field commanders received the information that Finnish campaign is being different than Polish campaign one week later than I posted earlier.

As the saying goes, you would have got two pounds of dirt for a pound of gold. The Baltic countries gave up to the Stalins demands. And what happened to them.

The most brilliant of the survivors of the old school, Marshal Shaposhnikov, was less sanguine. While Stalin and Voroshilov believed that at worst the war might last a few days, Shaposhnikov—who was absent from Moscow when Stalin and Voroshilov took the decision to launch the campaign against Finland—feared it could go on for months, and was rebuked by Stalin for underestimating the strength of the Red Army and exaggerating that of the Finnish Army.
Commanders at the Kremlin meeting repeatedly refer to the fact that they had not been aware of the strength of Finland's defences, or of much else about Finland's fighting capacity. Many blamed the culture of secretiveness that had kept this information from those to whom it would have been of most value. With breathtaking hypocrisy, their complaints were echoed by Stalin himself, the architect and chief exponent of that culture. Nor had Soviet commanders been given access to Western journals, from which they could have learnt about the latest thinking on modern warfare. And in the wake of the purges the very idea of foreign travel and visits to study the practices of other armies was properly regarded as the kiss of death.
By blaming the allegedly poor performance of military intelligence, Stalin and the campaign commanders engaged in a conspiracy to deflect criticism from themselves and, above all, the political leadership, personified by Stalin and Voroshilov. The General Staff's chief of intelligence himself, Proskurov, was the only participant at the meeting to stand up and attempt to expose the fraud, and would soon pay for his lack of tact with his life. In Session 6, he points out that everything had in fact been known about the disposition and strength of the Finnish defences, and had been circulated to the relevant commands. His assistant, V. Novobranets—in memoirs that were not published until 1990, six years after his death in 1984—claimed (without documentary proof ) that all the facts of Finnish preparations had been compiled in a 'black album', containing detailed photographs, copies of which had been distributed to all Red Army commanders in Karelia. It is therefore clear that Stalin and Voroshilov assumed that, all the contrary evidence not withstanding, the Red Army would succeed as easily against the Finns as it had against the Poles; and also that the Kremlin meeting had the dual purpose of both exposing the shortcomings of the armed forces, and of laying much of the blame for their failure on the intelligence services.
http://sonic.net/~bstone/archives/020210.shtml


That's was a long tradition in former Soviet Union. To dedicate achievements to some date.


Why did Voroshilov provide unrealistic three weeks timetable for having a victory parade in Helsinki if he knew the war is not going to be a cakewalk due to the climate?

[foxtrot023]

So much bitterness, here. Oh, well.



It was a potentiality. He knew that war with Germany was inevitable all the way back in 1939 (John Erickson, 'Road to Stalingrad', p80-85). In 1941, there were numerous half-measures taken to both acknowledge the looming nature of the Soviet-German conflict, and to absorb the impact of an attack the Soviet military theorists believed would come in the form of a two-pronged surprise assault north and south of the Pripyat Marsh. For example, the belated construction of a new defensive line well to the west of the Stalin Line.

He knew war was comming but he tried to avoid it to the very last. Stalin´s fondest wishings were that the western democracies and Germany would bleed themselves, before bringing the USSR into war. The rapid fall of France was worrysome for him, but still he thought that Hitler would not fight a two front war, hence he tended to ignore the intel that pointed out an imminent invasion (of course Hitler did the irrational thing and invaded).

The Red Army, on 22 June 1941, was not tactically surprised in many areas. But on a strategic scale it was caught in the most difficult of post-Purge transition periods.

While I do think some areas were prepared, and senior theatre officers knew something was up, overall there was surprise all over the eastern front. Remember that Satlin prohibited things like recon flights to avoid being seen as confrontational by the germans.

The buffer zone in Finland - forgive the digression - was therefore a logical extension of a policy centred on placing the Red Army in a more easily defensible position in the event of general war with Germany; something that was seen as inevitable by the leadership of the SU.

Indeed, same as Poland, the baltic nations,etc. They were all buffer zones.


To administer conquered territories? To pave the way for future expansion? Who cares? The point of the matter is: what were the immediate reasons for the 1939-1940 invasion? Naked ambition? Sheer malevolence? Or cold calculation? Stalin's particular brand of evil was wholly paranoid, and ruthlessly calculating. Though the answer might be a mixture of the aforementioned elements, you make a mockery of your own case by claiming that there was no 'legitimate' security concern in attacking Finland, on the part of the Soviet Union.

I must say Lokos, that as smart/realistic as it was to the USSR the idea of getting buffer zones, the reality is that there was no legitimacy in invading Finland, it was purely the need to create a buffer zone around Leningrad and to secure Petsamo and the mineral rich area around, Finland be dammed.


Lokos

cheers,

123456789

[Kippari]

Good posts from both sides, but it still keeps amusing me how you Russians try to convince yourselves that the casualties and numbers were exaggerated and Red Army was victorious omnipotent war machine and all that sh*t. I can't blame you for being patriotic, but come on.
I can fully understand why Soviets invaded, in that time it would have been stupid not to have any buffer zone around their second largest city, with large naval base at Kronstadt.

[Lokos]

He knew war was comming but he tried to avoid it to the very last. Stalin´s fondest wishings were that the western democracies and Germany would bleed themselves, before bringing the USSR into war. The rapid fall of France was worrysome for him, but still he thought that Hitler would not fight a two front war, hence he tended to ignore the intel that pointed out an imminent invasion (of course Hitler did the irrational thing and invaded).


Agreed. I don't think we actually diverge in opinion on anything substantive quoted by you in that passage, so I guess I'll just stick with 'agreed'.

While I do think some areas were prepared, and senior theatre officers knew something was up, overall there was surprise all over the eastern front

On a tactical level, nearly everyone knew what was happening. The Navy went to 'Preparedness Level 2' days before the invasion, and the Baltic Fleet was being steamed back to Kronstadt. German recon flights increased exponentially in both volume and cheek. Tank and other vehicles' engines could be heard increasingly closely, as invasion forces got into jump-off positions.

Yet, apart from raising the 'preparedness' level of the military (in theory, only) and moving some armies further West, Stalin and the Military Soviet did nothing to prepare the RKKA to fight off the German invasion. The Germans penetrated into the Soviet rear by slicing through a main line of resistance held only by cadre NKVD rifle regiments (none of which had more than 3 artillery pieces per kilometer).

Soviet divisions were caught with 30-60% effectives. Fuel, ammunition - everything was lacking. Mechanized Corps and tank divisions were strung out for hundreds of miles (generally ranging from 20km-300km). The signals system was largely limited to telephone lines, and once the Luftwaffe paid some special attention to Soviet infrastructural hubs during the first three days of combat, entire Soviet armies lost contact with each other and High Command.

Without air support (the Soviet air force was, more or less, denuded of operational capability by the second week of the war, with thousands of machines and many hundreds of personnel lost) armoured (tank/mechanized) columns on clogged roads were easy pickings for German CAS. At least one tank division in the Baltic was destroyed by air attack.

Soviet ammunition dumps, railheads, major hubs, etc., all were systematically rendered useless.

On top of all this - and there is much that I do not mention - no one issued any orders on a strategic level, no one knew what was happening, or who it was happening to, and no one knew what remained of the Red Army by July.

The level of disorganization and enforced inaction inflicted on the Red Army is nearly unimaginable. The survival of the Red Army, and its eventual triumph, is all the more interesting as a result thereof.

PS. The most prepared of the Soviet general officers was Kirponos, who successfully stalled the Germans in the South-West all the way to Kiev, and launched several partially successful counter-attacks against German flanks.

Remember that Satlin prohibited things like recon flights to avoid being seen as confrontational by the germans.


Worse, he prohibited Red Army AA forces from engaging German recon flights in Soviet air space, for the same reason.

the reality is that there was no legitimacy in invading Finland, it was purely the need to create a buffer zone around Leningrad and to secure Petsamo and the mineral rich area around, Finland be dammed.


One could say that such an end in and of itself has some legitimacy! Many are the means made legitimate by the ends derived. Though I think the debate of legitimacy is purely academic, and not of much interest to military historians.

but it still keeps amusing me how you Russians try to convince yourselves that the casualties and numbers were exaggerated and Red Army was victorious omnipotent war machine and all that sh*t.

Though I am not Russian, I fail to understand your comment. Who is convincing him or herself that casualties were in any way distorted? Krivosheev has compiled accurate casualty reports from the Finnish conflict for the Red Army. There isn't really much room for massive variations to that figure.

As for the 'victorious omnipotence' of the Red Army... I again don't see who, exactly, you're railing against. The Red Army, despite its massive inefficiency and technical deficiencies was in a war winning position in March 1940. This doesn't take anything away from the Finns. But victory was more or less one operation away for the Soviets, whose forces in March 1940 were stronger than they'd ever been previously in the Finnish conflict.

I don't think this bespeaks any sort of omnipotence, but I also don't think it is self-delusional to claim a victory (however limited) in this context.

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Lokos wrote:He knew that war with Germany was inevitable all the way back in 1939 (John Erickson, 'Road to Stalingrad', p80-85). In 1941, there were numerous half-measures taken to both acknowledge the looming nature of the Soviet-German conflict, and to absorb the impact of an attack the Soviet military theorists believed would come in the form of a two-pronged surprise assault north and south of the Pripyat Marsh. For example, the belated construction of a new defensive line well to the west of the Stalin Line.

Whatever Erickson may tell, I would classify such a statement as sheer nonsense. It's classic that wars afterwards are depicted as something unavoidable, that goes for both WWI and WWII, among others, but that is crap. Apart from the (perhaps self evident) fact that there is no such thing as an inevitable war, there is simply no way that Stalin could have known back in 1939 that it would come to a war between Germany and the Sovietunion within the next decade. Unless he himself planned to start one that is.

[Kitsune]

And about the idea that Stalin "who wanted to prevent the war to the very last", needed Finland as a "bufferzone"...well, that does not quite fit to the entirely offensive doctrine the Red Army had (because of Stalin's orders) since the late thirties. Which was: any attack of another nation (in the world of Soviet PR, the Sovietunion would never attack at first, of course) is instantly stopped and then turned into a massive counteroffensive which carries the war into the country of the attacker. With such a doctrine in mind...why does a country need a large bufferzone? Especially a country like the Sovietunion which has already more land (and therefore buffer) than anyone else on the planet?
Instead of ascribing harmless motives to someone who was everything but that - what about another theory? Could it be that Stalin did just attack Finland because he wanted to expand his influence? Or, considering that Finland had once been part of the Tsarist Empire, that he wanted to get back what had once been Russian? Without stopping there, of course?

[foxtrot023]

And about the idea that Stalin "who wanted to prevent the war to the very last", needed Finland as a "bufferzone"...well, that does not quite fit to the entirely offensive doctrine the Red Army had (because of Stalin's orders) since the late thirties. Which was: any attack of another nation (in the world of Soviet PR, the Sovietunion would never attack at first, of course) is instantly stopped and then turned into a massive counteroffensive which carries the war into the country of the attacker. With such a doctrine in mind...why does a country need a large bufferzone? Especially a country like the Sovietunion which has already more land (and therefore buffer) than anyone else on the planet?
Instead of ascribing harmless motives to someone who was everything but that - what about another theory? Could it be that Stalin did just attack Finland because he wanted to expand his influence? Or, considering that Finland had once been part of the Tsarist Empire, that he wanted to get back what had once been Russian? Without stopping there, of course?

Kitsune,

Stalin did indeed thought that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. His main priority was to secure his borders till he felt that the USSR would be ready for that war. He certainly did not expected Germany to attack in 1941, specially since that would create a 2 front war for Germany. He did saw the eastern europe, Balts and Finland as the USSR natural sphere of influence, but by and large, the land grab between 1939 to 1941 done by the USSR, besides having new territory was to create a buffer between the USSR and Germany, as simple as that. Remember that in 1941 the Red army was in the process of effecting changes, both in materiel as in leadership, etc.

[Kilgor]

Kitsune,

Stalin did indeed thought that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. His main priority was to secure his borders till he felt that the USSR would be ready for that war. He certainly did not expected Germany to attack in 1941, specially since that would create a 2 front war for Germany.

This is the central issue. Everyone knew that there would be a inevitable clash between Europe's two great antagonists, but the question was would it be in 41 or later. Stalin was absolutely convinced that German "provocations" were just that, blackmail for greater concessions. He was also absolutely convinced that any intelligence of a german attack was all a British ruse, especially after Hess decided to go on his one way trip to the UK.

[J4ckRy4n]

The Red Army, despite its massive inefficiency and technical deficiencies was in a war winning position in March 1940. This doesn't take anything away from the Finns. But victory was more or less one operation away for the Soviets, whose forces in March 1940 were stronger than they'd ever been previously in the Finnish conflict

Agreed. You sure know about Winter War..

[Teme]

As for the 'victorious omnipotence' of the Red Army... I again don't see who, exactly, you're railing against. The Red Army, despite its massive inefficiency and technical deficiencies was in a war winning position in March 1940. This doesn't take anything away from the Finns. But victory was more or less one operation away for the Soviets, whose forces in March 1940 were stronger than they'd ever been previously in the Finnish conflict.

Lokos

Stalin received reports about imminent British-French excursion to Finland and had to pull out of the game in fear of ending up in war with France and England. Some of these reports were overstated and could not detect the rift between British and French plans and difficulties there were to get even modest number of troops on Finnish soil. If Stalin would have continued the war, Finnish defenses would have collapsed. After the Winter War Stalin lectured his intelligence officers about some delusional reports he received, like imminent French-British bombing raids to Baku oil fields and about tens of thousands of British, French and refugee Polish troops being already shipped to Finland.

[Lokos]

It's classic that wars afterwards are depicted as something unavoidable, that goes for both WWI and WWII, among others, but that is crap.

Stalin believed that conflict with Germany was unavoidable. Fact. He said so, himself, in many instances. This does not mean that the conflict was unavoidable. Just that he believed it was. And he was directing Soviet policy.

there is simply no way that Stalin could have known back in 1939 that it would come to a war between Germany and the Sovietunion within the next decade

He didn't know dates or any other exact details. But he knew war was coming by late 1938, after the partition of Czechoslovakia. He didn't speed up the re-organization of the Red Army in 1940 for nothing. German and Soviet interets in Europe were at such diametrically opposite ends that conflict between the two - especially with a shared border - was inevitable.

Unless he himself planned to start one that is.

He did, actually, in 1942-1943.

"...well, that does not quite fit to the entirely offensive doctrine the Red Army had (because of Stalin's orders) since the late thirties

This will be hard for you to believe: the Red Army high command and Military Soviet actually believed that the next war would be fought, firstly, as a short defensive action in the border zones - before the annihilation of enemy forces in strength. All Soviet war planning envisaged a short, defensive period before the assumption of the offensive.

The assumption of the offensive - much like the rest of glubokii boi (deep battle) - was a lesson learnt in the Russian Civil War, wherein taking the offensive with highly mobile forces achieved extensive and meaningful victories for the Red Army. The entire doctrine was, in effect, based on the experiences of the last great war, and was, as such, centred on mobility and concentration of forces at the point of decision. Advanced stuff for its time. But it was always presupposed that the enemy would act first. Even in the wargames.

With such a doctrine in mind...why does a country need a large bufferzone?

You said it, yourself. The Red Army had no wish to fight a war on properly Soviet territory.

Especially a country like the Sovietunion which has already more land (and therefore buffer) than anyone else on the planet?

You may find this hard to believe, but no Soviet commander saw his country as something expendible to be traded for time. That was necessitated by a dire strategic situation. But Soviet doctrine always emphasised immediate counter-attack to push operations back into enemy territory.

Instead of ascribing harmless motives to someone who was everything but that

Harmless? What was harmless about the motives I prescribed? This 'buffer zone' was at the clear expense of an otherwise innocent 'bystander'. Nothing innocent about it.

Or, considering that Finland had once been part of the Tsarist Empire, that he wanted to get back what had once been Russian?

Is this why he did it with such urgency, after the onset of WW2 proper (post September)? Is this why he chose what was, essentially, the worst campaigning weather of them all to pursue that conflict?

Stalin received reports about imminent British-French excursion to Finland and had to pull out of the game in fear of ending up in war with France and England.

I've made that point many times in previous debates, and agree with it, obviously.

Lokos

[AZRON]

I just bought an interesting book on the subject of the Red Army.

IVAN'S WAR by Catherine Merridale ISBN 13:978-0-312-42652-1 .

It was interveiws with the folks both civilian and military and delves into the Official Archives of many of the former Soviet Republics.

Finally after 60 years of the German point of view we get one from the SU point of view.

I'm just into 1938 so no info on Rus.-Fin. War but comments about the Finns that they were the most feared and even the Germans feared them.

Plus Stalin was using the Sov. movie industry to inform the people that war with Germany was coming but that it would be fought in the West not on Soviet turf.

[shocker1]

http://www.veoh.com/videodetails.swf?permalinkId=v319505xq8wd3MD&id=1235393&player=videodetails&videoAutoPlay=0"
Pretty good documentry. I learned a bit.
http://www.veoh.com/videos/v319505xq8wd3MD?searchId=5305754910663010245&rank=0

[Mamont]

Pretty good documentry. I learned a bit.


Well, it's just an overview, for documentary this film contains mistakes and preatty one-sided view without any meaningfull analysis.

[shocker1]

Well, it's just an overview, for documentary this film contains mistakes and preatty one-sided view without any meaningfull analysis.
I figured that much. I am very interested in this conflict as not much has been out there. I know pretty much nothing about the conflict and as a history buff I take all Docus with a grain of salt but I still enjoy them. I did not post the vid for some biased reason. just thought it was interesting and has a good quailty picture.