Royal
04-29-2004, 05:05 PM
While I don't agree with alot of what is said in this article, it is interestring more for what it doesn't say, and the way the Blair government makes decisions based on vox-pops rather than operational needs.
All I know is that I'll be out there again for a long tour later in the summer...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3671457.stm
As the US military grapples with the twin challenges of Falluja and Najaf, British politicians and planners look on with anxiety.
Is this the sort of thing British troops can, or should, be involved in?
After several days of speculation that an announcement on further British troop deployments was imminent, defence officials now seem anxious to lower expectations.
"We are not on the verge of a decision," said a well-placed source, adding that it would probably be weeks before any announcements were made.
Why the indecision?
As far as south-eastern Iraq is concerned, the view is that nothing more is yet needed.
Despite a devastating series of suicide bombs in and around Basra on 21 April, planners do not believe there has been any strategic change that requires additional troops.
Logistical problems
But as you look beyond the British-controlled Multinational Division South East (MNDSE), the situation - and the calculations - become much more complex.
Any "out of area" deployment poses a variety of logistical problems (new, extended supply lines to defend) and raises the question of command: how would British forces slot into the existing Polish-led divisional structure?
And then there's the ever-present concern about "overstretch". Can the army spare additional forces?
"If we go to Najaf, 2,000 troops is not enough," says Charles Heyman, editor of Jane's World Armies.
"We need to be able to handle ourselves."
Heyman believes the smallest sensible deployment would be a brigade-sized force of around 5,000 - something that military chiefs would be reluctant to muster.
But there's an even more fundamental problem: just what would they go there for? Would they attempt to recreate the peace-keeping methods they've successfully pursued in the south, or become embroiled in a fight?
"We have to analyse what the problem is," said a defence source. "For Britain, there's a need to improve the strategic game plan."
Sadr's role
The coalition's main problem in the area around Najaf revolves around the young Shia firebrand, Moqtada Sadr, and his loyal followers.
Washington has long regarded Sadr as a threat and is determined to remove him from the scene before the handover of sovereignty at the end of June.
London has, until recently, taken a more ambivalent view of the cleric, hoping that his limited popularity among the wider Shia community would ultimately render him marginal.
This view seems to have stiffened in recent weeks.
"Don't underestimate the resolve of the US and Britain to deal very, very firmly with people who are obstructing the democratic reconstruction of Iraq," said a Whitehall source.
"We're one with the Americans on who are the bad guys."
Bridge-building
But if Moqtada Sadr is a problem, forcibly removing him from the scene is a problem too.
"A US offensive on Najaf would swell the ranks of his followers," warned an official who advised the British military in Iraq until the end of last year.
An attack, the official said, could wreck months of patient bridge-building with local Shia leaders.
"Those we were talking to believed we had the Shia interests at heart."
With their own achievements in the south very much in mind, military chiefs almost certainly want to avoid being sucked into a confrontation with Sadr.
In public, they play down talk of disagreements with their American counterparts, but they have no desire to be seen fighting side by side with troops whose approach to peace keeping is so very different.
"The American interpretation of strength is being belligerent and provocative," says a defence analyst.
And despite years of familiar low-level grumbling about the American military ("all the gear and no idea," being one of the more popular refrains), the past 12 months have been an education.
"This war has come as a total shock to the British," the analyst says.
"British troops would hate to fight alongside the Americans."
All I know is that I'll be out there again for a long tour later in the summer...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3671457.stm
As the US military grapples with the twin challenges of Falluja and Najaf, British politicians and planners look on with anxiety.
Is this the sort of thing British troops can, or should, be involved in?
After several days of speculation that an announcement on further British troop deployments was imminent, defence officials now seem anxious to lower expectations.
"We are not on the verge of a decision," said a well-placed source, adding that it would probably be weeks before any announcements were made.
Why the indecision?
As far as south-eastern Iraq is concerned, the view is that nothing more is yet needed.
Despite a devastating series of suicide bombs in and around Basra on 21 April, planners do not believe there has been any strategic change that requires additional troops.
Logistical problems
But as you look beyond the British-controlled Multinational Division South East (MNDSE), the situation - and the calculations - become much more complex.
Any "out of area" deployment poses a variety of logistical problems (new, extended supply lines to defend) and raises the question of command: how would British forces slot into the existing Polish-led divisional structure?
And then there's the ever-present concern about "overstretch". Can the army spare additional forces?
"If we go to Najaf, 2,000 troops is not enough," says Charles Heyman, editor of Jane's World Armies.
"We need to be able to handle ourselves."
Heyman believes the smallest sensible deployment would be a brigade-sized force of around 5,000 - something that military chiefs would be reluctant to muster.
But there's an even more fundamental problem: just what would they go there for? Would they attempt to recreate the peace-keeping methods they've successfully pursued in the south, or become embroiled in a fight?
"We have to analyse what the problem is," said a defence source. "For Britain, there's a need to improve the strategic game plan."
Sadr's role
The coalition's main problem in the area around Najaf revolves around the young Shia firebrand, Moqtada Sadr, and his loyal followers.
Washington has long regarded Sadr as a threat and is determined to remove him from the scene before the handover of sovereignty at the end of June.
London has, until recently, taken a more ambivalent view of the cleric, hoping that his limited popularity among the wider Shia community would ultimately render him marginal.
This view seems to have stiffened in recent weeks.
"Don't underestimate the resolve of the US and Britain to deal very, very firmly with people who are obstructing the democratic reconstruction of Iraq," said a Whitehall source.
"We're one with the Americans on who are the bad guys."
Bridge-building
But if Moqtada Sadr is a problem, forcibly removing him from the scene is a problem too.
"A US offensive on Najaf would swell the ranks of his followers," warned an official who advised the British military in Iraq until the end of last year.
An attack, the official said, could wreck months of patient bridge-building with local Shia leaders.
"Those we were talking to believed we had the Shia interests at heart."
With their own achievements in the south very much in mind, military chiefs almost certainly want to avoid being sucked into a confrontation with Sadr.
In public, they play down talk of disagreements with their American counterparts, but they have no desire to be seen fighting side by side with troops whose approach to peace keeping is so very different.
"The American interpretation of strength is being belligerent and provocative," says a defence analyst.
And despite years of familiar low-level grumbling about the American military ("all the gear and no idea," being one of the more popular refrains), the past 12 months have been an education.
"This war has come as a total shock to the British," the analyst says.
"British troops would hate to fight alongside the Americans."