Anbar Coming Around

[Dakota435]

The NY Times of all places actually reports progress:

I must confess to being a little pissed that the US military is only now starting to adopt its own counterinsurgency doctrine after 4 years..

Go to NY Times website for complete article

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/world/middleeast/29ramadi.html?ex=1335499200&en=207e6819c8cb9fa5&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

RAMADI, Iraq — Anbar Province, long the lawless heartland of the tenacious Sunni Arab resistance, is undergoing a surprising transformation. Violence is ebbing in many areas, shops and schools are reopening, police forces are growing and the insurgency appears to be in retreat.

ON THE JOB TOGETHER Iraqi policemen and American troops patrol near Ramadi in Anbar. Ramadi’s police force has sharply increased in the past year.

“Many people are challenging the insurgents,” said the governor of Anbar, Maamoon S. Rahid, though he quickly added, “We know we haven’t eliminated the threat 100 percent.”

Many Sunni tribal leaders, once openly hostile to the American presence, have formed a united front with American and Iraqi government forces against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. With the tribal leaders’ encouragement, thousands of local residents have joined the police force. About 10,000 police officers are now in Anbar, up from several thousand a year ago. During the same period, the police force here in Ramadi, the provincial capital, has grown from fewer than 200 to about 4,500, American military officials say.

At the same time, American and Iraqi forces have been conducting sweeps of insurgent strongholds, particularly in and around Ramadi, leaving behind a network of police stations and military garrisons, a strategy that is also being used in Baghdad, Iraq’s capital, as part of its new security plan.

Yet for all the indications of a heartening turnaround in Anbar, the situation, as it appeared during more than a week spent with American troops in Ramadi and Falluja in early April, is at best uneasy and fragile.

Municipal services remain a wreck; local governments, while reviving, are still barely functioning; and years of fighting have damaged much of Ramadi.

The insurgency in Anbar — a mix of Islamic militants, former Baathists and recalcitrant tribesmen — still thrives among the province’s overwhelmingly Sunni population, killing American and Iraqi security forces and civilians alike. [This was underscored by three suicide car-bomb attacks in Ramadi on Monday and Tuesday, in which at least 15 people were killed and 47 were wounded, American officials said. Eight American service members — five marines and three soldiers — were killed in two attacks on Thursday and Friday in Anbar, the American military said.]

Furthermore, some American officials readily acknowledge that they have entered an uncertain marriage of convenience with the tribes, some of whom were themselves involved in the insurgency, to one extent or another. American officials are also negotiating with elements of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, a leading insurgent group in Anbar, to join their fight against Al Qaeda.

These sudden changes have raised questions about the ultimate loyalties of the United States’ new allies. “One day they’re laying I.E.D.’s, the next they’re police collecting a pay check,” said Lt. Thomas R. Mackesy, an adviser to an Iraqi Army unit in Juwayba, east of Ramadi, referring to improvised explosive devices.

And it remains unclear whether any of the gains in Anbar will transfer to other troubled areas of Iraq — like Baghdad, Diyala Province, Mosul and Kirkuk, where violence rages and the ethnic and sectarian landscape is far more complicated.

Still, the progress has inspired an optimism in the American command that, among some officials, borders on giddiness. It comes after years of fruitless efforts to drive a wedge between moderate resistance fighters and those, like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who seem beyond compromise.

“There are some people who would say we’ve won the war out here,” said Col. John. A. Koenig, a planning officer for the Marines who oversees governing and economic development issues in Anbar. “I’m cautiously optimistic as we’re going forward.”

[lider_r]

just like Tal Afar was coming around? i'll believe it when its remained stable for 6 months

the odd good bit of news from iraq can be cherrypicked by people who want to believe things are not as bad as they actually are.

Unfortunatly the bad news is still outweighing the good.

[Con-man]

just like Tal Afar was coming around? i'll believe it when its remained stable for 6 months

the odd good bit of news from iraq can be cherrypicked by people who want to believe things are not as bad as they actually are.

Unfortunatly the bad news is still outweighing the good.

Welcome to MP.net, your optimism will be noted :bash:

[a_very_ex_STAB]

It'll all be over by Christmas!

[WarriorMonk]

It'll all be over by Christmas!

****ing troll.

[lider_r]

Welcome to MP.net, your optimism will be noted :bash:

when it comes to neocons there is a fine line between optimism and complete denial of reality


after all, the mission was "accomplished" 4 years ago remember?

[a_very_ex_STAB]

****ing troll.

Someone's a grouchy little neocon fanboy today :roll:

[usmcprincipal]

when it comes to neocons there is a fine line between optimism and complete denial of reality


after all, the mission was "accomplished" 4 years ago remember?
______________

I think your criticism of the New York Times article is misplaced. The Times has never been a mouthpiece for the administration, nor are there indications there has been a change in their perspective toward Iraq, which has been far from fairy tale positive. In fact there is legitimacy to the idea they lean in the other direction.

The article's point of reference seemed to be more Ramadi than Al Anbar province. The guarded optimism evident in the article was echoed several weeks earlier by General Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, after his recent visit to the province. General Conway's reputation is not that of a a politician offering faux optimistic appraisals of untenable situations; however, I find it interesting how rapidly intelligence estimates can change in a six month to a year's time.

It was not long ago sections of a report issued by the chief Marine Corps intelligence officer in Al Anbar were released and the content appeared to be pessimistic about the military/political situation in Al Anbar. Of course, it's possible the published report was taken out of context, but I find it compelling how rapidly the situation in Al Anbar can appear to change.

Semper Fi

[lider_r]

it can just as easily change from calm to chaos

if the US can't guarentee security in the green zone then i can't see how it can guarentee security in a sunni neighbourhood for a sustained period

Thats not to say its the fault of the troops, its the fault of an adminstration which keeps insisting that soldiers do things they were never trained nor supposed to do- regardless of how many get maimed and killed.

Troops are still being killed all because of two peoples (cheney/bush) refusal to swallow their pride. Why should they care? its not like its either of their relatives or friends getting their hands dirty and coming back in caskets. For them its just another name in the paper, but of course the odd photo op with a wounded vet is enough to prove that they 'care'.

[WarriorMonk]

Someone's a grouchy little neocon fanboy today :roll:

who said I was a neocon? I'm the moderate who likes to mess up the right and left's fun all the time. Get your facts straight. Instead of being so arrogant, why don't you try being nicer for a change if you want more people to like you?

[joedirt]

people do need to realize that there are many insurgent groups in iraq. alqaeda in mesopotamia is just one group you have tons of other groups some are big like alqaeda others are small. also regardless of what the propaganda wants us to think the majority of people doing the attacks and blowing themselves up are iraqi's.

[Firetxmi]

RIP to the Marine killed yesterday in Anbar.


A Marine also was killed Sunday in Anbar province, a Sunni insurgent stronghold west of the capital, the military said.

An al-Qaida-linked group vowed Monday to pursue a "long-term war of attrition" in Anbar against U.S. forces and an alliance of Sunni tribal leaders who have turned against the terror network.

Underscoring the threat, a tanker truck exploded near a restaurant just west of the Anbar provincial capital of Ramadi, killing four people and wounding six, police said.


Link:http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/world/4761964.html

[Dakota435]

just like Tal Afar was coming around? i'll believe it when its remained stable for 6 months

the odd good bit of news from iraq can be cherrypicked by people who want to believe things are not as bad as they actually are.

Unfortunatly the bad news is still outweighing the good.

Anbar only a little while ago was completely hopeless. The difference is this is the first time the locals have actually come on side. The fish are no longer able to swim as Mao would say. If this can be repeated in other locales, they may be on to something.

Man what would you have done when things were going badly in Korea? If in 3 years Iraq has settled down finally your lot will be going around crying "But they still have crime! It's not perfect! It's a failure!"

Whatever... optimistic people enjoy life more than pessimists so I'm glad to look on the bright side of things. The bad news is only outweighing the good because you probably depend on CNN or the nets for your news.

[usmcprincipal]

Thats not to say its the fault of the troops, its the fault of an adminstration which keeps insisting that soldiers do things they were never trained nor supposed to do- regardless of how many get maimed and killed.
__________________

I'm curious how you reached the conclusion the troops in Al Anbar Province are inadequately trained and ill prepared to meet their mission objectives.

While I'm not familiar with the training requirements for Army units assigned to Al Anbar Province, I have more than a passing knowledge of the training criteria for Marines assigned to the fleet, particularly infantry Marines. Since the Corps provides the bulk of the combat and support formations in Al Anbar Province, I would be interested in reading what evidence you can provide that would support your statement.

Semper Fidelis

[a_very_ex_STAB]

who said I was a neocon? I'm the moderate who likes to mess up the right and left's fun all the time. Get your facts straight. Instead of being so arrogant, why don't you try being nicer for a change if you want more people to like you?

Whatever
I'm not interested in popularity contests.:roll:

[lider_r]

I'm curious how you reached the conclusion the troops in Al Anbar Province are inadequately trained and ill prepared to meet their mission objectives.

While I'm not familiar with the training requirements for Army units assigned to Al Anbar Province, I have more than a passing knowledge of the training criteria for Marines assigned to the fleet, particularly infantry Marines. Since the Corps provides the bulk of the combat and support formations in Al Anbar Province, I would be interested in reading what evidence you can provide that would support your statement.

Semper Fidelis


In terms of combat effectiveness i don't doubt their capability, but without knowing the culture, language, customs or history of the country they are working in im not sure i see how they can be expected to win the support of a population that neither welcomes they're presence or condemns attacks against them.

An example of this is a report i heard recently of bacon and other pork products being served within the green zone. Something like this may seem trivial to many US soldiers but its enough to give a muslim even more reason to shoot at foreign troops on its soil.

[usmcprincipal]

As I suspected you have little knowledge of which you speak. I would encourage you not to offer opinion as fact without evidence. An anecdotal example culled from an undocumented report does not support a sweeping generalization.
__________________

"In terms of combat effectiveness i don't doubt their capability, but without knowing the culture, language, customs or history of the country they are working in..."

Where did you come up with this? How did you determine these features are not part of Marine Corps training doctrine? How is a combat formation effective in asymmetric warfare without a civil affairs capability?

My rationale for such a contentious response to your posts has nothing to do with your political leaning, but rather your use of the military to support it without having a working knowledge of the subject.

[lider_r]

As I suspected you have little knowledge of which you speak. I would encourage you not to offer opinion as fact without evidence. An anecdotal example culled from an undocumented report does not support a sweeping generalization.


"But I write about the really wacky world inside there. You know, this is a place -- Iraq is a Muslim country, and what did they serve in the dining hall, the Halliburton food contractors, what did they serve? They served pork bacon for breakfast, hot dogs for lunch, porkchops for dinner. There were many Iraqi Muslims that also ate there. They worked as translators and as janitors in the palace and other parts of the Green Zone, and they were subjected to eating food from the same buffet, even though they found the pork products also served there to be incredibly offensive. When they complained, Halliburton sort of brushed aside their concerns. Cultural sensitivity, well, you know, so what? It was more important to meet American needs, to serve them high-fat comfort food"

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN
Author of: Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone

http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/09/29/151212



Where did you come up with this? How did you determine these features are not part of Marine Corps training doctrine? How is a combat formation effective in asymmetric warfare without a civil affairs capability?

So all the troops are well versed in the local dialect and have understanding of local culture and sentiment towards the occupation there? There are plenty of indicators to show that this is not the case with other troops in iraq and afghanistan.


My rationale for such a contentious response to your posts has nothing to do with your political leaning, but rather your use of the military to support it without having a working knowledge of the subject.

There is quite an omniscient tone to your reply- as if nobody could possibly make an observation about the conflict unless they actually serve in the Marines.

[usmcprincipal]

"There is quite an omniscient tone to your reply- as if nobody could possibly make an observation about the conflict unless they actually serve in the Marines."

Either you're shifting the point of emphasis or I was not clear in my point of contention. I thought my criticisms of your posts have been fairly concise and narrowly defined. They have less to do with your observations made about the conflict, of which I have little interest, and more to do with statements made about the quality of training offered to Fleet Marines in preparation for service in Iraq or Afghanistan and how it compromises their mission success. Your initial post offers more than inference that the training doctrine is inadequate to meet current needs. However, you did not offer details that would substantiate the statement, nor do I believe you have the necessary knowledge of Marine Corps training doctrine and structure to effectively offer a substantive critique with a corresponding plan to improve training effectiveness.

While certainly not omniscient in all things related to the Marine Corps, after twenty years service in the Corps I'm a damn sight closer to all knowing than a civilian, who never placed his feet on the yellow footprints.
_________________________

"So all the troops are well versed in the local dialect and have understanding of local culture and sentiment towards the occupation there? There are plenty of indicators to show that this is not the case with other troops in iraq and afghanistan."

All Marines are not fluent in Arabic, Farsi, Pashtu, or Dari; however, there is no historical precedent indicating an occupying force must be fluent in a native tongue to wage an effective counterinsurgency. As you may know organic Marine combat formations are highly complex, but flexible with a wide variety of specialties tailored to meet the tactical needs of the commanders in the field. These specialties would include intelligence and civil affairs capabilities with linguistics components.

Marines scheduled to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan do attend appropriate classes to learn rudimentary language skills, as well as receive training on local customs and culture. They also avail themselves of the large percentage of Marines, who have prior experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these experienced Marines are in positions of command from the battalion level down to the squad and fire team level.
__________________________

I'm not sure what you may have meant by "plenty of indicators to show...." I'm wary of broad statements lacking substance, but the statement suggests systemic organizational problems, rather than aberrant incidents out of character with standard operating procedures. Reaching a conclusion of systemic failure in theory and practice is a strong assertion and requires expertise and in depth research. If you have evidence of such, I would certainly read it.

As for the initial paragraph of your last post, I have no interest in responding, since it has nothing to do with the training received by Marines and Sailors operating in Al Anbar Province.

Semper Fi