2RHPZ
05-07-2004, 04:29 AM
Hard-Shelled,SOF-Centered
The Synergy of Might and Mind
By Gordon T. Lee
Gordon Lee is a research communicator at RAND.
The message received by U.S. Navy Captain Robert Harward at Camp Rhino outside
Kandahar in late February was cryptic but urgent: "Mullah K has left the
building. He's on the move."
With that message?sent by the operators of a Predator surveillance drone
circling above the rugged hills of Afghanistan's Paktia province?Harward, the
top-ranking Navy SEAL in Afghanistan and a former RAND Navy Fellow, gave the
green light to a lightning-fast operation that resulted in the capture of a key
Taliban leader, Mullah Khairullah Kahirkhawa.
"We planned, designed, and executed that operation with one hour's notice," said
Harward, who sat down with RAND Review for his first on-the-record interview
since returning to the United States from Operation Enduring Freedom.
"Once we heard he was moving, my guys went off and put together a plan in 30
minutes. And 30 minutes later, it was all over. The whole operation,
coordinating 40 U.S. and Danish special forces, was a great example of how all
the training we've had in combined and joint operations can work and succeed in
the field." The effort involved U.S. Air Force Special Forces, Danish Special
Forces, U.S. Navy SEALs, and U.S. Army conventional air assets.
"It was a real testament to teaming," said Harward.
The Afghanistan campaign convinced him that Special Operations Forces (SOF), if
given appropriate and timely support by conventional forces, will play an
increasingly important role in the war against terrorism. "Afghanistan confirmed
what I studied and was thinking about while I was at RAND," Harward said. "In
the future, the conventional navy's support of and involvement with SOF will be
a growth industry."
From Calm Thought to Quick Action
Harward has spent 18 years as a member of Naval Special Warfare (NSW), the
branch of the U.S. Navy that encompasses elite SEAL commandos and special
warfare combatant crew members (individuals who are specially trained boat
operators). His assignments have included Kuwait and Bosnia. His string of
overseas deployments was interrupted in 19981999, when he accepted an assignment
as a RAND Navy Fellow in Santa Monica, Calif.
U.S. Navy SEALs discover a large munitions cache in one of 70 caves explored
during a search-and-destroy mission in the Zhawar Kili area of eastern
Afghanistan in January. The SEALs subsequently called in air strikes to destroy
the caves and above-ground complexes, which had been used by Al Qaeda and
Taliban forces.
While Harward was at RAND, his research focused on redefining the role of Naval
Special Warfare in the 21st century. He identified a potentially larger role for
SOF in future military engagements and called upon the navy to consider devoting
more of its conventional assets to such unconventional missions.
In August 2001, he was named commander of NSW Group ONE, based in Coronado,
Calif., and was charged with overseeing all NSW personnel and activities on the
West Coast, in the Pacific, and in Southwest Asia. It was from that post that he
was tapped for his command in Afghanistan.
The mission to capture Mullah Khairullah was one of more than 75 missions
performed by U.S. and allied special forces overseen by Harward from the U.S.
base at Camp Rhino and other sites in Afghanistan. From October 2001 through
April 2002, he commanded what was officially known as the Coalition Joint
Special Operations Task ForceSouth. The 2,800-man task force was one of two set
up by the United States to monitor Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, raid their
hideouts, capture commanders, collect intelligence, and engage in a host of
other disruptive activities.
The operations Harward oversaw were some of the most sensitive and dangerous in
Afghanistan. One was a mission in early January to investigate the Al Qaeda
hideout at Zhawar Kili. Expected to last 12 hours, the mission turned into an
eight-day ordeal as U.S. forces scoured the 70-cave complex adjacent to
Pakistan. Another mission involved a days-long surveillance and raid of Ali
Kheyl, a multistoried fortress perched at 14,000 feet, not far from the city of
Khost in eastern Afghanistan. "That place was straight out of an Indiana Jones
movie," Harward said. "We expected to see Steven Spielberg at any minute!"
More Than a Movie
The operations that took place during the first six months of the Afghan
campaign were unique, Harward said, first of all because they were led and
driven by special forces. "Up until March, this was a SOF campaign, supported by
conventional forces. All our operations were SOF-specific. That didn't change
until Operation Anaconda, when SOF shifted focus and began to support the
conventional forces."
The unique SOF nature of the campaign led to a novel command structure and a
completely new role for the navy. It was unusual for Naval Special Warfare to
command a joint task force. "Normally, we would be the navy component [of a task
force]. In this case, we were the lead commanding element."
In that capacity, Harward commanded not just navy SEALs but all SOF personnel
assigned to the task force from the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, Australia,
Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Turkey. His authority extended beyond SOF
personnel to include U.S. Marine Corps helicopters and ground forces.
"This allowed us to do things we'd never done before," Harward said. "You saw
SEALs operating 500 miles inland, using army and Marine Corps helicopters."
The new arrangement, with its integration of joint forces in the field, also
allowed Harward and his team to make quicker decisions and operate with shorter
planning cycles. The U.S. Special Operations Command strives to have its special
forces use a 96-hour planning process; ideally, SOF personnel should identify a
target four days in advance of hitting it. However, in the hunt for fleeing Al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters, U.S. commanders had to dramatically compress the
cycle to as short as an hour or two, said Harward. "This altered how we planned
for flight crew rest hours, how we used intelligence assets, and how we utilized
air assets."
An unfortunate result of the shorter planning cycle was that it intensified the
challenge of identifying, sorting, and verifying targets?a process that has
never been easy. Many organizations?other military services, other government
agencies, Afghan allies?were involved in vetting and approving targets.
Sometimes they worked through the process quickly and accurately; other times,
not. "Targeting is never perfect and can always be improved," Harward said. "It
always needs to be worked on."
The Afghan campaign, its SOF leadership, its joint and coalition nature, its
operational agility, and the premium it placed on accurate information?all of
these qualities epitomize the type of warfare that will be needed to subdue
global terrorism, said Harward.
"Afghanistan was SOF-centric, and more and more warfare likely will be SOF-specific."
The Synergy of Might and Mind
By Gordon T. Lee
Gordon Lee is a research communicator at RAND.
The message received by U.S. Navy Captain Robert Harward at Camp Rhino outside
Kandahar in late February was cryptic but urgent: "Mullah K has left the
building. He's on the move."
With that message?sent by the operators of a Predator surveillance drone
circling above the rugged hills of Afghanistan's Paktia province?Harward, the
top-ranking Navy SEAL in Afghanistan and a former RAND Navy Fellow, gave the
green light to a lightning-fast operation that resulted in the capture of a key
Taliban leader, Mullah Khairullah Kahirkhawa.
"We planned, designed, and executed that operation with one hour's notice," said
Harward, who sat down with RAND Review for his first on-the-record interview
since returning to the United States from Operation Enduring Freedom.
"Once we heard he was moving, my guys went off and put together a plan in 30
minutes. And 30 minutes later, it was all over. The whole operation,
coordinating 40 U.S. and Danish special forces, was a great example of how all
the training we've had in combined and joint operations can work and succeed in
the field." The effort involved U.S. Air Force Special Forces, Danish Special
Forces, U.S. Navy SEALs, and U.S. Army conventional air assets.
"It was a real testament to teaming," said Harward.
The Afghanistan campaign convinced him that Special Operations Forces (SOF), if
given appropriate and timely support by conventional forces, will play an
increasingly important role in the war against terrorism. "Afghanistan confirmed
what I studied and was thinking about while I was at RAND," Harward said. "In
the future, the conventional navy's support of and involvement with SOF will be
a growth industry."
From Calm Thought to Quick Action
Harward has spent 18 years as a member of Naval Special Warfare (NSW), the
branch of the U.S. Navy that encompasses elite SEAL commandos and special
warfare combatant crew members (individuals who are specially trained boat
operators). His assignments have included Kuwait and Bosnia. His string of
overseas deployments was interrupted in 19981999, when he accepted an assignment
as a RAND Navy Fellow in Santa Monica, Calif.
U.S. Navy SEALs discover a large munitions cache in one of 70 caves explored
during a search-and-destroy mission in the Zhawar Kili area of eastern
Afghanistan in January. The SEALs subsequently called in air strikes to destroy
the caves and above-ground complexes, which had been used by Al Qaeda and
Taliban forces.
While Harward was at RAND, his research focused on redefining the role of Naval
Special Warfare in the 21st century. He identified a potentially larger role for
SOF in future military engagements and called upon the navy to consider devoting
more of its conventional assets to such unconventional missions.
In August 2001, he was named commander of NSW Group ONE, based in Coronado,
Calif., and was charged with overseeing all NSW personnel and activities on the
West Coast, in the Pacific, and in Southwest Asia. It was from that post that he
was tapped for his command in Afghanistan.
The mission to capture Mullah Khairullah was one of more than 75 missions
performed by U.S. and allied special forces overseen by Harward from the U.S.
base at Camp Rhino and other sites in Afghanistan. From October 2001 through
April 2002, he commanded what was officially known as the Coalition Joint
Special Operations Task ForceSouth. The 2,800-man task force was one of two set
up by the United States to monitor Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, raid their
hideouts, capture commanders, collect intelligence, and engage in a host of
other disruptive activities.
The operations Harward oversaw were some of the most sensitive and dangerous in
Afghanistan. One was a mission in early January to investigate the Al Qaeda
hideout at Zhawar Kili. Expected to last 12 hours, the mission turned into an
eight-day ordeal as U.S. forces scoured the 70-cave complex adjacent to
Pakistan. Another mission involved a days-long surveillance and raid of Ali
Kheyl, a multistoried fortress perched at 14,000 feet, not far from the city of
Khost in eastern Afghanistan. "That place was straight out of an Indiana Jones
movie," Harward said. "We expected to see Steven Spielberg at any minute!"
More Than a Movie
The operations that took place during the first six months of the Afghan
campaign were unique, Harward said, first of all because they were led and
driven by special forces. "Up until March, this was a SOF campaign, supported by
conventional forces. All our operations were SOF-specific. That didn't change
until Operation Anaconda, when SOF shifted focus and began to support the
conventional forces."
The unique SOF nature of the campaign led to a novel command structure and a
completely new role for the navy. It was unusual for Naval Special Warfare to
command a joint task force. "Normally, we would be the navy component [of a task
force]. In this case, we were the lead commanding element."
In that capacity, Harward commanded not just navy SEALs but all SOF personnel
assigned to the task force from the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, Australia,
Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Turkey. His authority extended beyond SOF
personnel to include U.S. Marine Corps helicopters and ground forces.
"This allowed us to do things we'd never done before," Harward said. "You saw
SEALs operating 500 miles inland, using army and Marine Corps helicopters."
The new arrangement, with its integration of joint forces in the field, also
allowed Harward and his team to make quicker decisions and operate with shorter
planning cycles. The U.S. Special Operations Command strives to have its special
forces use a 96-hour planning process; ideally, SOF personnel should identify a
target four days in advance of hitting it. However, in the hunt for fleeing Al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters, U.S. commanders had to dramatically compress the
cycle to as short as an hour or two, said Harward. "This altered how we planned
for flight crew rest hours, how we used intelligence assets, and how we utilized
air assets."
An unfortunate result of the shorter planning cycle was that it intensified the
challenge of identifying, sorting, and verifying targets?a process that has
never been easy. Many organizations?other military services, other government
agencies, Afghan allies?were involved in vetting and approving targets.
Sometimes they worked through the process quickly and accurately; other times,
not. "Targeting is never perfect and can always be improved," Harward said. "It
always needs to be worked on."
The Afghan campaign, its SOF leadership, its joint and coalition nature, its
operational agility, and the premium it placed on accurate information?all of
these qualities epitomize the type of warfare that will be needed to subdue
global terrorism, said Harward.
"Afghanistan was SOF-centric, and more and more warfare likely will be SOF-specific."