hist2004
05-07-2004, 10:28 AM
The Federation of Malaysia proposed by The Malayan Federation Prime Minister Abdul Rahman was to compose of Malaya, Singapore, and the northern Borneo colonies of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. These bordered Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan), the president of which was Sukarno, who dreamed of bringing the British colonies along with Malaya and Singapore into a Greater Indonesia. By force if necessary. The only person who opposed the Malaysian idea apart from Sukarno was the Sultan of Brunei who hesitated. Here, in Brunei, Sukarno saw his chance and the North Kalimantan National Army rose in revolt on 8th December 1962, the Sultan requested British help and the British Government quickly sent British and Gurkha troops from their bases in Singapore by air and sea. On 16th December, the British Far Eastern Command issued a statement saying that all major centers in Brunei had been cleared of the rebels. On 19th December, Major-General Walter Walker, who had established a considerable reputation as an expert in jungle warfare during the Malayan Emergency, was appointed Commander British Forces Borneo Territories. The last of the rebels in Brunei were eliminated in May of the following year.
With the last spasms of the Brunei revolt dying, Jakarta radio broadcast a series of inflammatory statements designed to increase tension in Borneo. On 20th January 1963, The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Doctor Sabandrio, announced a policy of confrontation towards Malaya 'because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of neo-colonist and neo-imperialist forces pursuing a policy hostile towards Indonesia'. The war of words dragged on interspersed with various attempts at reaching a political understanding, though how genuine these attempts were on the part of Indonesia is open to doubt as groups of Indonesian 'volunteers' had begun in April to infiltrate across the border into Sarawak and Sabah, where they engaged in raids, sabotage and attempted subversion.
On 27th July President Sukarno stated that 'to crush Malaysia we must launch a confrontation in all fields. We cannot talk sweetly to the imperialists.' On 16th August a Gurkha Rifles units clashed with what a British Army Spokesman at the time called 'a group of about fifty Indonesian-based terrorists'. On 16th September 1963, the Federation of Malaysia formally came into being with only Brunei opting out. Indonesia promptly broke off diplomatic relations with Malaysia. Two days later the British Embassy was burned by a mob of 10,000 in Jakarta. The pieces were in place for Britain's next jungle war.
The Jungle War
General Walter Walker arrived in Borneo in December 1962 to find a country with few motorable roads outside the urban areas and no railways. There was only one deep-sea port at Labuan. Initially there were no stockpiles of military supplies. They would have to be brought over 900 miles from Singapore by sea and air. There were no camps for the troops, no generators, no pumping engines, no workshops and no local military forces from which to obtain advice or assistance. General Walker's first task was therefore to build up the military infrastructure to support enough forces to face the Indonesian forces. In December 1962, Walker had only one infantry brigade of three battalions, six naval coastal minesweepers and some fifteen naval and air force helicopters. At first, the task of defending Malaysia was seemingly insurmountable, as half of the federation was hundreds of miles away, making redeployment and reinforcement more difficult than usual. The 900-mile land border with Indonesian Borneo is covered in dense rain forest. All the Malay Peninsula can be reached by canoe form Sumatra. The island of Borneo is set at the very centre of the Indonesian Archipelago and forms the southern limits of the South China Sea. It is about 7850 miles long and 600 miles across its greatest width. The equator cuts across the centre of the island making the climate inhospitable in the extreme. Vast mountain ranges dominate the island interspersed with valleys and plateaus all of which are covered by tropical rain forest. The jungle is as bad as anything that British troops faced in Malaya or Burma. The 100-foot trees cast a deep green gloom. The streams are infested with leeches, and the hillsides are sometimes vertical. A pair of canvas jungle boots rots after two weeks. In the lowland swamps, the nights are nearly as hot as the days, while elsewhere in the highlands the night air is so cold that men shiver in their jungle-green uniforms even inside a sleeping bag.
The first attack came on 28th September 1963 when about 200 Indonesian raiders crossed the mountains into the jungles of the Third Division and launched an attack on the small outpost at Long Jawai. The garrison consisted of six Ghurkhas, three policemen and twenty-one border scouts, but despite a spirited defence Long Jawai fell. The Indonesians' had penetrated fifty miles into Borneo, and that was their mistake. They had to get back to the border on foot. The Wessex Helicopters of No.845 Squadron Fleet Air Arm flew platoons of the 1/2nd Ghurkha Rifles into ambush positions along the intruders' likely line of retreat. A large proportion of the Indonesian force was destroyed in several actions over the next twelve days including twenty-six Indonesians who were killed instantly when their two longboats were expertly ambushed by a platoon of Ghurkhas in position on the riverbank.
The second attack was in the last three days of 1963, when a large force of raiders attacked the village of Kalabatan, thirty miles west of Tawau. The half-company of the 3rd Royal Malay Regiment there was surprised, and called in the Ghurkhas. Walker deployed the Ghurkhas in a similar manner as he had after Long Jawai and within a month only six of the raiding force had not been killed or captured by the security forces.
In January 1964, Sukarno called a temporary ceasefire to give himself some breathing room, but fighting resumed in March. The Indonesian conflict broadened as the Indonesian Army's regular units began to get involved instead of just supplying advisors to the insurgents. The 2/10th Ghurkhas were the first to clash with a unit of the Indonesian regular army on 7th March. After a sharp fight the Indonesians' withdrew from their positions, and moved into a new position some sixteen miles along the ridge they had originally occupied. They were attacked by anti-tank missiles from two Wessex helicopters, a troop of 105mm light guns and two Saladin Armoured cars, but even with this support the Ghurkhas had a hard fight to dislodge the Indonesians. The same pattern continued until September as Indonesian forces established more bases on the border and the fighting got worse. Walker persuaded the Government to authorize cross -border attacks against Indonesian bases within artillery range, about 18,000 yards that had been shelling locations across the border.
January 1965 saw the British troops in Borneo rearmed, with newer rifles, a more effective mortar and the American Claymore Mine. Seismic detectors completed the rearmament and allowed British bases to monitor a significant length of border. Throughout 1965 the network of platoon and company-sized forts were strengthened and improved as the undeclared war continued. The forts were usually built on high ground and surrounded by a perimeter of barbed wire and 'punjis', sturdy fire-hardened bamboo sticks sharpened at both ends and driven into the ground at the appropriate angle so as to present a would-be attacker with an array of needle-sharp bamboos at thigh height upon which it was hoped he would impale himself. A trench and bunker system allowed the defenders to man the perimeter in comparative safety. The ground was cleared out for about a hundred yards from the perimeter to create effective fields of fire. Each base had fire support units of 81mm mortars or 105mm howitzers with Claymores sited around the perimeter.
Patrols operated on a six-mouth tour, with only several weeks rest and recuperation behind the lines during that tour. Ten to twelve day patrols were the normal, followed by three or four days as guard for the base before the next patrol, enough time to re-equip, shave, clean up and rest before going out again. Letters and parcels were dropped by helicopter or parachute and replies were written lovingly and laboriously into the night.
Patrolling in Borneo was a strain. Encounters with the enemy were always a possibility, though when it happened it was usually unplanned, unexpected and fleeting in nature. Whether the instigator or the victim of an ambush, contact with the enemy was often over in seconds. The ability to shoot quickly and accurately was paramount. The patrol commander always faced the dilemma of walking a trail and perhaps running into an ambush or treading on an anti-personnel mine or hacking his way through nearly impossible secondary jungle at the rate of perhaps 200 yards an hour. It was a game of cat and mouse, of hide and seek and sometimes even of bluff and counter-bluff. At five o'clock it began to get dark, and the patrols broke off the track and established a bivouac area for the night, as movement in the jungle without light being impracticable. A circular perimeter was established, sentries posted, and a cold evening meal quietly eaten. For most of the Borneo campaign it was considered unsafe to cook in the jungle.
When Walker handed over command in March 1965, he left behind a multi-national force in Borneo of some 18,000 men of which over half were British and the remainder were Ghurkha, Malay, Australian and New Zealanders. There were some 1,500 border scouts recruited from the indigenous tribes - Dyak, Sea Dyak, Kenyan, Keyan and half a dozen others. In addition there was a considerable naval presence of coastal minesweepers and fast patrols boats, some eighty helicopters and about forty fixed-wing aircraft which included delta-wing Javelin fighters. Walker's force also included a composite regiment of the Special Air Service regiment, the squadrons being British, Australian and New Zealand, and two regiments each of armoured cars, engineers and artillery.
Border clashes between British and Commonwealth troops and Indonesian units continued throughout 1965. It was on one of General Lea's cross border operations that Lance Corporal Rambahadur Limbu of the 2/10th Ghurkha Rifles won the Victoria Cross, in the border area of the First Division near Bau. 1965 also saw the Indonesian raiders introduce simple wooden 'cigar-box' anti-personnel mines along border tracks. This added a macabre and sickly note into patrolling and a number of legs and feet were lost. In his attempt to gain assistance from China, Sukarno had flirted with the Communist Party and this had seriously undermined his position and he was reduced to the status of a puppet president when General Suharto took over effective leadership of the nation in March 1966. Peace feelers were put out and culminated in a peace agreement signed in Jakarta on 11th August 1966. Fighting had continued in small skirmishes right up until the agreement was signed.
In the fighting, the eight Ghurkha battalions had suffered 43 killed and 87 wounded, the Royal Marine Commandos 16 killed and 20 wounded and the British battalions 16 killed and 51 wounded. Officially Indonesian casualties were put at 600 killed but it is certain that they were considerably greater as a result of the British cross border operations. The campaign was a victory for the British and Malaysian forces, and the Minister of Defence at that time, Mr. Denis Healy declared in the House of Commons that the Borneo Campaign would be recorded 'in the history books ...as one of the most efficient uses of military force in the history of the world.
Claret Operations
Borneo 1964-65
It was decided that infantry attacks could be launched across the border in to Kalimantan territory to pre-empt the Indonesian attacks into Borneo. These operations were given the code name 'Claret' and they were to change the fortunes of war for both the Indonesians and their Commonwealth opponents. No longer could the Indonesians feel secure in their border bases and camps even if they were within Kalimantan territory. Initially these raids were confined to a penetration depth of only 5,000 yards but this was later increased to a depth of 20,000 yards. No longer would the security forces ever feel as frustrated as they had been earlier in the campaign. It was doubtful whether the Indonesians realised that they were seeing the beginnings of a new Commonwealth strategy.
While the Kalimantan border bases were being harassed by British and other Commonwealth troops, the cross border operations exacted a great mental and physical toll on the troops concerned. Courage and skill were required to overcome the tensions and problems of operating behind the enemy lines and the planning of such raids had to ensure that once the troops crossed the border in to Kalimantan that they would be within the limits of fire support from guns located just over on the friendly side of the border, guns that were often flown in by helicopter to a pre-planned LZ for the duration of the operation. The main concern was the problem of getting their casualties back to Sarawak or Sabah without using helicopters. This meant they were faced with the tremendous task of manhandling wounded men through the thick jungle, up mountain slopes, and across fast flowing rivers.
Obviously for the badly wounded soldier, being carried over such hostile terrain, the chances of survival were greatly reduced. Fortunately for the British and Commonwealth forces, the Indonesian forces lacked efficient communications and relied on primitive support that was hampered by long and tenuous supply lines. Nevertheless, the Indonesian build up continued under the command of Gen. Maratan Panggabean. Panggabean was an experienced soldier who had been trained first by the Japanese and had completed his military training in the United States. His immediate subordinate was Col. Supargo who commanded No 4 Combat Command. He too had been trained in America. Dotted along the border were over 20,000 Indonesian troops. To meet these threats, the forces available within Borneo were pathetically small. West Brigade with a front of 600 miles had five battalions. One British, three Ghurkha, and one Malaysian, supported by 25 troop-carrying helicopters. The adjoining Central Brigade, with a front of 300 miles, had two Ghurkha battalions and 12 helicopters. East Brigade, with a front of 80 miles, had one Royal Marine Commando and one infantry battalion forward and no helicopters. At this time the total number of troops under Gen. Walker's Command within the Borneo territories was little more than 10,000 men.
The need for reinforcements was urgent; not only for infantry but engineer squadrons were needed for a multitude of tasks-to build airstrips, roads and bridges. In the end Gen. Walker's protests did produce three more infantry battalions, bringing the total up to 13.
As a result of these reinforcements, by January of 1965 the British and Commonwealth forces in Borneo totalled some 14,000 soldiers supported by 29 guns, two squadrons of armoured cars and four field squadrons of engineers. Gen. Walker was convinced that the only way he could throw the Indonesians off balance was to increase the number of raids into the enemy stronghold of Kalimantan and in addition, the Royal Marine Special Boat Sections were to make small scale amphibious raids round either flank on the coast.
In the 5th Division of Sarawak,'C' Company, 1/2nd Ghurkha Rifles, with its base at Ba Kelan was guarding the approaches that ran across the border. The valley from Ba Kelan stretched over the border to a village called Long Medan, which the Indonesians had converted into a stronghold. The natives of the whole valley belonged to the same tribe, the Murats. They had crossed the border time after time to carry on trading. The Indonesians had forbade any more cross-border trade causing the local community hardship, which eventually led to a petition from the villages to the commanding officer of the 1/2nd Ghurkha rifles to take action. Several reconnaissance patrols had been carried out and official permission for the cross border raid was granted.
The plan was simple: one platoon was to give fire support to the assaulting forces if they came under heavy from any new and previously undetected positions using 3.5-inch rocket launchers, LMGs and M-26 grenade launchers, while the company commander led the other two platoons into the assault against the enemy. Two 3-inch mortars and two general-purpose machine guns were pre-positioned on a nearby hill and were guarded by a platoon from another rifle company. 'C' Company had to move by night approach to cover a distance of eight miles without being detected, which was quite a problem for 150 men when everything had to be carried including rocket launchers and rockets. Each of the Ghurkhas carried two mortar bombs in addition to his own weapon and load. The night of January 29th 1965 was selected for the attack. 'C' Company marched all night and reached the jumping off position in the early hours of the morning of the 30th. Everything went as planned until the attack was sprung by an Indonesian walking towards 11 Platoon's position.
The Platoon did not hesitate and slammed four rockets down on the enemy bunkers, and the company commander gave the order to charge. Under close covering support his party fought through the positions from bunker to bunker, using grenades and rifle fire. From across the river an Indonesian 12.7-mm anti-aircraft gun began firing, joined by a 60-mm mortar and medium machine guns and the situation began to look grim. The precaution of placing the 3-inch mortars and machine guns on the nearby hill saved the crisis. The Mortar Fire Controller (MFC), a corporal who was to win the Military Medal, had to stand up and expose himself to the Indonesian machine gun fire. He was able to pinpoint the hostile 60-mm mortar position and after a ranging round his second bomb blew it up and killed the crew. He then turned his attention to the Indonesian machine guns and knocked them out. Meanwhile, the 12.7-mm gun remained in action pinning the forward section down.
In retaliation, 12 Platoon sent a corporal and two riflemen to silence the gun and after taking a rocket launcher across a paddy field they approached the gun position. The corporal opened fire and the first rocket hit the gun pit killing its occupants. That was to be the end of the battle. It had taken one hour and fifteen minutes. The company commander ordered a withdrawal and by the late afternoon, using a more direct route, the raiding force was back across the border carrying two of its badly wounded men with it as well as the body of a dead Ghurkha rifleman. A few days later it was confirmed that 50% of the Indonesian strength in that area had been killed and that Long Medan was never reoccupied by Indonesian forces in the Ba Kelalan area again.
A few months later, in November 1965, it was decided to send another raiding mission into the area opposite the First Division of Sarawak. This was to be a more ambitious operation. The mission, by another Ghurkha Company, was to ambush the main river supply route at two points near the Indonesian company-sized bases. It would take the raiding party over two days to reach the target area. Each man carried light rations to last 12 days, apart from his personal weapon, ammunition and other vital necessities. Two rivers were met in succession and each time the Assault Pioneers bridged each river with fallen trees. Once the tree was in position, a Ghurkha soldier went across securing hand ropes to enable the company to cross.
A day later the company reached an area near the River Separan. Patrols had reported the area as being thick primary jungle with a fast flowing river that was about 25m wide. The company commander, realising he would be ambushing between two large Indonesian camps, crossed the final river with care. The Assault Pioneer Platoon was left behind to cover the rear while the rest of the company crossed unseen and set its ambush on a track that linked the two enemy camps. The company commander placed himself and the Anti-tank Platoon in the ambush area while the Reconnaissance Platoon and the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) remained on the other side of the river in order to protect the rear. The FOO by using his communication link could assist by bringing down diversionary fire on the approaches to the ambush as soon as it was sprung. Then it was just a question of waiting.
All were in position by 0945 hours. At about 1100 hours the company commander received the signal for "enemy" and about five minutes later a small party of Indonesians walked through the ambush zone, followed seconds later by five more, then another six, and then came a continuous line. It was time to spring the ambush. GPMG's opened up from the flank followed by the crash of claymore mines, which had been laid, on the other end of the ambush position. All the waiting ambushers opened fire on the targets in front of them and a minute or two later artillery shells crashed down on either side of the ambush position. The ambush completely stunned the Indonesian soldiers but it was not long before a counter attack swung in from the south covered by a mortar attack from an Indonesian position near by. The support company held firm and the Indonesian counter attack was an abortive one.
After inflicting heavy casualties on the Indonesians, the company commander decided to withdraw across the river, while the FOO directed his guns on to shelling the immediate area of the ambush position. There was no time to waste. The company set off and pressed on hard until dark. Next day, the fifth day after setting out, it recrossed the border. It had been a model operation well planned and expertly executed and as a result the Indonesians in that area took no more offensive action during the confrontation.
The fact that nothing was know about these "Claret" operations until the mid-1980', speaks volumes for the integrity of the soldiers and Marines of the time as these operations were graded top secret. Royal Marine Commandos, with their great experience, took part in several of these operations. The fact that they were concealed from the press and public for twenty years was a remarkable feat and is rather different from today of those that rush into print and describe the most secret of operations. In a media-conscious world, that in itself made the Borneo confrontation unique.
The Air War
Only two years after the end of the Malaya Emergency, a new crisis was brewing in the Far East bringing British Forces back into action. When the British proposed a Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei in May 1961 it was immediately opposed by left-wing nationalist groups and neighbouring Indonesia.
On 8th December 1962, Indonesian backed rebels staged a revolt in the Sultanate of Brunei, where they attacked the Sultans palace and other government establishments, including police and petrol stations in Seria. The British reacted swiftly, despatching 1st battalion the Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron). The Battalion headquarters and A Company were sent ahead by air and B Company sailed aboard HMS Cavalier. At the time 1st battalion the Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron) were part of 17th Gurkha Division.
A company landed at the short Brunei airfield aboard a Blackburn Beverley of 34 Sqn, RAF Seletar, Singapore piloted by the Squadron's Commanding Officer Sgn/Ldr Bennett at about 8pm. The second aircraft arrived about 30 minutes later, carrying Gurkhas and landrovers, the other Beverley's arriving through the night.
The rebels were attempting to capture the police station about a mile from the airfield at this time and were swiftly engaged by the troops. After unloading the Beverley's returned to Labuan and began shuttling troops and supplies to Brunei from RAF Labuan. Where RAF Hastings and RAF Comets were landing them as the runway at Brunei airfield was under repair and too short for those aircraft.
About the 10th December the Anduki Airfield at Seria was noted to have been cleared of obstacles, etc and a Beverley flown by Flt/Lt Fenn was quickly loaded with Seaforth Highlanders and landed at Anduki airfield, the troops leaving the aircraft through its two rear-doors while it was still moving. The aircraft took off as soon as the last man exited the aircraft, receiving a burst of machine gun fire as it passed the control tower.
The troops cleared the airfield and the town after a short skirmish with many Rebels killed and captured.
No.34 Squadron continued to provide detachments at Labuan through out the confrontation air supply dropping to the many army encampments in the jungle, also to SAS units.
However, the Indonesian President had not forgotten that the British had supported the Dutch attempt to regain control of the East Indies in 1945-1947 and began training volunteer guerrilla groups to infiltrate into North Borneo. Raids into Sarawak by the 'Volunteers' began in April 1963 and they increased in frequency following the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in September of that year.
The small Borneo Defence Force, made up of British, Australian, New Zealand and Malay troops commanded by Major General Walker had no easy task and they were almost entirely dependent on helicopter movement in the remote jungle and mountainous terrain of Borneo. By this time four No.20 Squadron Hunters and two Javelin Mk9R of No.60 Squadron, another unit that had spent much of its postwar life operating in Malaya, were sent to Labuan and Kutching, the latter being close to the border with Kalimantan, in Indonesian Borneo.
Again, the dissidents relied on the rural Chinese for support, as did an entirely separate Communist force also operating within Malaysia, the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) that had its origins in the MCP (Malaysian Communist Party). However, by a combination of winning the support of the native population, promoting co-operation between the security forces and local police, plus the quick reaction capability that the helicopter gave him, Major General Walker was able to contain the guerrillas.
A second Javelin squadron, No.64 arrived by the end of the year, and an extra flight expanded No.60 Squadron that was based at Butterworth, providing air defence over western Malaysia. When Indonesia announced that it would use its regular forces against the British, the Hunters and Javelins were tasked with low-level patrols along the Indonesian border, as well as escorting transport aircraft delivering supplies and reinforcements to the security forces. Blackburn Beverly, Handley Page Hastings of 48 Squadron, Far East Air Force and Short Belfast aircraft formed the backbone of the transport force in Borneo, operating from as far away as Singapore. They were joined for a brief period in March 1964 by Sea Vixens from H.M.S. Centaur. No.81 Squadron, with its Canberras, was entailed with a photo survey, the results proved invaluable to those who would follow up on its information.
The Army Air Corps were in Borneo as well as the RAF and Royal Navy. Sgt. Thackeray of the Army Air Corps was flying an Auster with the padre as passenger on Christmas Eve 1963 from Lundu to Kuching. They were hit by cannon fire and the padre was mortally wounded. The Sgt.'s left arm was broken and he was bleeding heavily. However using his knees and right hand he operated the throttle, flaps and control stick until finding a helicopter landing pad he contrived a controlled landing. The prop from this Auster was placed in Kuching Airport reception lounge. On another occasion Sgt. 'Doc' Waghorn a Royal Army Medical Corps pilot was flying a Scout helicopter from the Lundu area back to Kuching. He had with him a Ghurkha and a prisoner. Flying at 3000' feet he must have seen Kuching 20 miles away. They disappeared without a trace and have never been seen again. The following day a Whirlwind helicopter took off to look for them and 5 died when it lost a tail rotor.
When Indonesian naval vessels started to make forays into Malaysian waters, the Shackletons would buzz them at wave-top height, and most turned and ran for home. While the Shackleton's operated during the day, four Fairey Gannet AEW aircraft of No.849 Squadron A flight from HMS Victorious flying out of RAF Seletar were pressed into service to monitor the Straits at night. With full drop tanks and one engine shut down these aircraft could stay on station for long periods of upto 5 hours and sometimes longer. Indonesia launched large-scale incursions in late 1964, with two Hercules transports dropping 100 paratroops and their equipment in Malaysia, 95 miles north of Singapore. The aircraft had flown between Birkit and Penang radar, and the paratroops had been dropped 20 miles apart. A sharp eyed observer on a RAF Shackleton spotted the parachutists canopies tangled in the upper branches of tall trees and alerted the Security forces. The Royal Malay Regiment and the Ghurkhas pursued the invaders into the swamps of Johore, where Hunters attacked them with rockets and cannon-fire. The Hunters flew a total of 14 sorties in support of the ground forces. More than three-quarters of the invaders were killed or captured. One of the Hercules that had dropped the paratroopers was spotted and chased by a Javelin of No.60 Squadron on a routine combat air patrol
In the same month, No.64 Squadron was again sent to reinforce the RAF units and an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) was established over western Malaysia, within which all unidentified aircraft were intercepted and investigated. During October, No.20 Squadron Hunters made strikes against guerrilla infiltrators at Pontian. The following month the Javelins were join by No.32 Squadron Canberras at Tengah, and No.14 Squadron RNZAF with Canberras. A Canberra was lost in the operation 'Birdsong' strikes of 23rd-24th December, whilst landing at Tengah where it was hit by an Indonesian infiltrator.
While the Indonesian Air Force did pose a threat, most of their aircraft retreated before they could be intercepted, and they relied on ageing World War 2-era bombers for low-level attacks. By mid-year, the security forces had been strengthened and now included a battalion of SAS that was permitted to cross into Indonesia and smash the infiltrator camps. Hunters attacked a group of 25 Indonesian regulars who had landed from boats on the south coast of Johore near Tanjong-Pen Gelik, some seven miles east of Changi at the end of May.
RAF and Naval forces constantly located and identified landing forces, and the Indonesian bombers attacked villages close to the Indonesian border, inflicting little serious damage. The last Indonesian attacks took place across the Sarawak border by Indonesian regulars in August 1966. By this time the Allied security forces were in total control of most of the disputed areas, and all Indonesian operations ceased following a coup in Jakarta on 30th September. After a series of mopping-up operations, the security forces began to withdraw from Malaysia and on 11th August, following the Indonesia Presidents' overthrow in the previous March, Malaysia and Indonesia signed a peace agreement.
During this conflict, two Victor B Mk 1A bombers flew a single offensive operation which was the first, and only offensive operation undertaken by this type in RAF service.
The Helicopter War
A large scale revolt in Brunei in December 1962 led the Sultan of Brunei to appeal for British Assistance. No.42 Royal Marine Commando were flown in from their base in Singapore and backed up by Bristol Belvedere helicopters of No 66 Squadron RAF, and HMS Albion which had been exercising in the area at the time. The Commando's landed by the carriers' Westland Whirlwind helicopters were No 40 and No 3 Royal Marine Commando brigade. Albion was later joined by the HMS Bulwark. The insurgents were dispersed in one month, but another crisis soon arose as brunei was not included in the newly formed Federation of Malaya and Indonesia threatened confrontation, including a continuation of the effort started by the north brunei Liberation Army. By February 1964, RAF and Royal Navy Helicopters including some Westland Wessex operating from bases in Sarawak and Sabah to assist Army and Marine detachments fighting guerilla forces infiltrated by Indonesia over its one thousand mile frontier with Malaysia.
In Borneo, the helicopter played a major role in fortifying the frontier and maintaining the frontier strong points by airlifting supplies in. They also airlifted troops into interception points against retreating Indonesian and guerilla forces. Armed with wire-guided anti-tank missiles they engaged hill-top positions held by the Indonesian forces, their armour and vehicles. Using these ambush techniques the Gurkhas were able to ambush the retreating Guerillas and usually inflict heavy casualties with little loss. The helicopters saw also very effective use as CASEVAC aircraft and in the vast tracts of jungle was an invaluable tool for the British forces.
The Limbang Raid
Shortly after the start of the Brunei rebellion began in December 1962 in the town of Bangar a number of government officials had been held hostage and then murdered. Following this the up-river town of Limbang was also seized by the rebel forces led by Salleh bin Sambas. He ordered his men to arrest a British resident and his wife who lived in Limbang as well as other hostages. All the hostages were all soon to be hanged. The task of rescuing the hostages was given to Captain Jeremy Moore's L company Royal Marines. Moore would later command the British forces in the 1982 Falklands War. Brigadier Patterson gave Moore some simple orders " Release the hostages" Moore was informed there were about 150 rebels at Limbang and was given a map of the area and a 10 year photo of the town which did not show all the buildings. He realized that a cautious approach to the target would be useless because the rebels would be informed of the approach of the Marines and the hostages would be shot. Instead he decided on a direct assault on the town from the river at dawn using 2 commandeered cargo lighters operated by Royal Navy crews. The Navy Commander of these lights was Captain Black who would also serve later in the Falklands war as Captain of H.M.S. Invincible.
At dawn the next day the 2 lighters rounded the river bend below Limbang. All surprise was lost due to the noise made by the boats engines. The whole town erupted with gun fire aimed at the boats. As soon as the fire fight started the leading lighter beached near the Limbang police station where most of the heavy machine gun fire was coming from. The other lighter held back giving support fire with a Vickers machine gun. A RN officer aboard her , when asked by QMS Cyril Scoins if he could pull the craft out of line to give the Vickers a better fire position, replied: " Sergeant Major, Nelson would have loved you ". Two sections of Marines disembarked from the first lighter and immediately Marines started to drop, hit by rebel fire. Marines were also hit in the support boat. The Marines, once ashore faced a 30 yard dash under heavy fire. Two were killed in the leading craft and the coxswain wounded. Lt. Davis was also wounded as he jumped ashore leading No5 troop.
The leading assault party had already sustained serious casualties from a single, very accurate machine gun and a great number of shot guns which proved lethal at close range. It was decided to land a second assault party to help the first 2 sections. As the second lighter neared the shore line they took more casualties from enemy fire coming from the police station. Once more marines had been landed, the battle swung in the Marines' favor and the machine gun in the police station was finally taken out. The Marines now moved though the town house clearing and hunting the rebels who had not much fight left in them. The race was now on to find the hostages before they were executed.
Moore, who was in the lead assault boat was delayed getting ashore when the boats Royal Navy helms man was hit and the boat started to drift back into the river. When Moore finally did get ashore he headed straight for the town hospital were he thought the hostages might be held. On arriving outside the hospital they heard a very loud nervous voice singing " They'll be coming round the mountain when they come " This was the British resident singing at the top of his voice to make sure the Marines did not shoot him, thinking that the rebels were in the hospital. Moore found all the hostages alive and well, their captors had run off.
A small fire fight had occurred outside the hospital in which 2 Marines and Sergeant MacFarlane were killed. Moore had to give command to 2 new troop commanders to carry on clearing the town of rebels. The Marines started house to house clearing, killing or capturing any rebels still left in Limbang. By the end of the battle 5 Marines lay dead and another 8 were wounded. L company later became known as the Limbang Company with the anniversary being celebrated annually by 42 Commando as " Limbang Day ". Captain Moore received a Bar to his Military cross ( won during the Malayan Emergency ). Clps Lester and Rawlinson were awarded Military Medals and the RN personnel who manned the lights were also decorated for their bravery on this day.
"The Last Raid"
(Operation Claret 1966 Indonesian Borneo)
March 1966, L Company and M Company of 42 Commando Royal Marines took part in an ambitious Claret Operation, to raid an Indonesian camp at Sedjingan across the border into Indonesian Kalimantan, the Indonesian camp was garrisoned by members of the Siliwang Division one of the crack formations of their army.
After marching from their respective Company bases at Biawak and Samatan in western Sarawak, L and M companies rendezvoused the day before the raid two miles away from their target. A successful close reconnaissance had been carried out by Lt Clark of L company. And at one stage Cpl Pearce got to within five yards of Indonesian sentries without being spotted. That close to the sentries that one of them urinated on the bush behind which Cpl Pearce was crouching; again escaping detection.
As a result of Lt Clark’s report, it was decided that L Company would attack the camp at first light, while M Company ambushed the likely enemy withdrawal routes. This necessitated M Company moving into position in full daylight the evening before, which they managed without detection.
The next day the attack went in as planned, both parts of the operation being succesful, and the Indonesian army sustaining considerable casualties.
During L Company’s withdrawal, Lt Clark’was hit by a stray round and Killed; his body was evacuated by helicopter. Also during the withdrawal L/cpl T.J.Collins who manned the LMG was found to be missing, L/cpl Collins was posted missing in action presumed killed. He just disappeared during the withdrawal action, Later on seaches were made, but to no avail, and after the confrontation enquiries were made but also proved negative due to the Indonesian authorities lack of co-operation.
In March 1966 General Suharto replaced Sukarno in a coup, and secret peace feelers were sent to Kuala Lumpur. Although Claret operations were halted, the British continued to reconnoitre across the Border into Indonesian Borneo to give warnings of incursions. On 28th of May 1966, cross-border activity ceased, and on the 11th of August the end of confrontation was ratified. A peace that brought an end to the strange undeclared war in Borneo, a war that rarely hit the headlines. The stamina and health of the British, Gurkha and Commonwealth soldiers had withstood the stress and rigours of operating for long periods in some of the toughest terrain in the world.
The Borneo Campaign stands out as being a notable example of how highly trained professional infantrymen, with full support from the other arms and services, can achieve a decisive victory against a well-armed and aggressive foe.
Regards,
Hist2004
With the last spasms of the Brunei revolt dying, Jakarta radio broadcast a series of inflammatory statements designed to increase tension in Borneo. On 20th January 1963, The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Doctor Sabandrio, announced a policy of confrontation towards Malaya 'because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of neo-colonist and neo-imperialist forces pursuing a policy hostile towards Indonesia'. The war of words dragged on interspersed with various attempts at reaching a political understanding, though how genuine these attempts were on the part of Indonesia is open to doubt as groups of Indonesian 'volunteers' had begun in April to infiltrate across the border into Sarawak and Sabah, where they engaged in raids, sabotage and attempted subversion.
On 27th July President Sukarno stated that 'to crush Malaysia we must launch a confrontation in all fields. We cannot talk sweetly to the imperialists.' On 16th August a Gurkha Rifles units clashed with what a British Army Spokesman at the time called 'a group of about fifty Indonesian-based terrorists'. On 16th September 1963, the Federation of Malaysia formally came into being with only Brunei opting out. Indonesia promptly broke off diplomatic relations with Malaysia. Two days later the British Embassy was burned by a mob of 10,000 in Jakarta. The pieces were in place for Britain's next jungle war.
The Jungle War
General Walter Walker arrived in Borneo in December 1962 to find a country with few motorable roads outside the urban areas and no railways. There was only one deep-sea port at Labuan. Initially there were no stockpiles of military supplies. They would have to be brought over 900 miles from Singapore by sea and air. There were no camps for the troops, no generators, no pumping engines, no workshops and no local military forces from which to obtain advice or assistance. General Walker's first task was therefore to build up the military infrastructure to support enough forces to face the Indonesian forces. In December 1962, Walker had only one infantry brigade of three battalions, six naval coastal minesweepers and some fifteen naval and air force helicopters. At first, the task of defending Malaysia was seemingly insurmountable, as half of the federation was hundreds of miles away, making redeployment and reinforcement more difficult than usual. The 900-mile land border with Indonesian Borneo is covered in dense rain forest. All the Malay Peninsula can be reached by canoe form Sumatra. The island of Borneo is set at the very centre of the Indonesian Archipelago and forms the southern limits of the South China Sea. It is about 7850 miles long and 600 miles across its greatest width. The equator cuts across the centre of the island making the climate inhospitable in the extreme. Vast mountain ranges dominate the island interspersed with valleys and plateaus all of which are covered by tropical rain forest. The jungle is as bad as anything that British troops faced in Malaya or Burma. The 100-foot trees cast a deep green gloom. The streams are infested with leeches, and the hillsides are sometimes vertical. A pair of canvas jungle boots rots after two weeks. In the lowland swamps, the nights are nearly as hot as the days, while elsewhere in the highlands the night air is so cold that men shiver in their jungle-green uniforms even inside a sleeping bag.
The first attack came on 28th September 1963 when about 200 Indonesian raiders crossed the mountains into the jungles of the Third Division and launched an attack on the small outpost at Long Jawai. The garrison consisted of six Ghurkhas, three policemen and twenty-one border scouts, but despite a spirited defence Long Jawai fell. The Indonesians' had penetrated fifty miles into Borneo, and that was their mistake. They had to get back to the border on foot. The Wessex Helicopters of No.845 Squadron Fleet Air Arm flew platoons of the 1/2nd Ghurkha Rifles into ambush positions along the intruders' likely line of retreat. A large proportion of the Indonesian force was destroyed in several actions over the next twelve days including twenty-six Indonesians who were killed instantly when their two longboats were expertly ambushed by a platoon of Ghurkhas in position on the riverbank.
The second attack was in the last three days of 1963, when a large force of raiders attacked the village of Kalabatan, thirty miles west of Tawau. The half-company of the 3rd Royal Malay Regiment there was surprised, and called in the Ghurkhas. Walker deployed the Ghurkhas in a similar manner as he had after Long Jawai and within a month only six of the raiding force had not been killed or captured by the security forces.
In January 1964, Sukarno called a temporary ceasefire to give himself some breathing room, but fighting resumed in March. The Indonesian conflict broadened as the Indonesian Army's regular units began to get involved instead of just supplying advisors to the insurgents. The 2/10th Ghurkhas were the first to clash with a unit of the Indonesian regular army on 7th March. After a sharp fight the Indonesians' withdrew from their positions, and moved into a new position some sixteen miles along the ridge they had originally occupied. They were attacked by anti-tank missiles from two Wessex helicopters, a troop of 105mm light guns and two Saladin Armoured cars, but even with this support the Ghurkhas had a hard fight to dislodge the Indonesians. The same pattern continued until September as Indonesian forces established more bases on the border and the fighting got worse. Walker persuaded the Government to authorize cross -border attacks against Indonesian bases within artillery range, about 18,000 yards that had been shelling locations across the border.
January 1965 saw the British troops in Borneo rearmed, with newer rifles, a more effective mortar and the American Claymore Mine. Seismic detectors completed the rearmament and allowed British bases to monitor a significant length of border. Throughout 1965 the network of platoon and company-sized forts were strengthened and improved as the undeclared war continued. The forts were usually built on high ground and surrounded by a perimeter of barbed wire and 'punjis', sturdy fire-hardened bamboo sticks sharpened at both ends and driven into the ground at the appropriate angle so as to present a would-be attacker with an array of needle-sharp bamboos at thigh height upon which it was hoped he would impale himself. A trench and bunker system allowed the defenders to man the perimeter in comparative safety. The ground was cleared out for about a hundred yards from the perimeter to create effective fields of fire. Each base had fire support units of 81mm mortars or 105mm howitzers with Claymores sited around the perimeter.
Patrols operated on a six-mouth tour, with only several weeks rest and recuperation behind the lines during that tour. Ten to twelve day patrols were the normal, followed by three or four days as guard for the base before the next patrol, enough time to re-equip, shave, clean up and rest before going out again. Letters and parcels were dropped by helicopter or parachute and replies were written lovingly and laboriously into the night.
Patrolling in Borneo was a strain. Encounters with the enemy were always a possibility, though when it happened it was usually unplanned, unexpected and fleeting in nature. Whether the instigator or the victim of an ambush, contact with the enemy was often over in seconds. The ability to shoot quickly and accurately was paramount. The patrol commander always faced the dilemma of walking a trail and perhaps running into an ambush or treading on an anti-personnel mine or hacking his way through nearly impossible secondary jungle at the rate of perhaps 200 yards an hour. It was a game of cat and mouse, of hide and seek and sometimes even of bluff and counter-bluff. At five o'clock it began to get dark, and the patrols broke off the track and established a bivouac area for the night, as movement in the jungle without light being impracticable. A circular perimeter was established, sentries posted, and a cold evening meal quietly eaten. For most of the Borneo campaign it was considered unsafe to cook in the jungle.
When Walker handed over command in March 1965, he left behind a multi-national force in Borneo of some 18,000 men of which over half were British and the remainder were Ghurkha, Malay, Australian and New Zealanders. There were some 1,500 border scouts recruited from the indigenous tribes - Dyak, Sea Dyak, Kenyan, Keyan and half a dozen others. In addition there was a considerable naval presence of coastal minesweepers and fast patrols boats, some eighty helicopters and about forty fixed-wing aircraft which included delta-wing Javelin fighters. Walker's force also included a composite regiment of the Special Air Service regiment, the squadrons being British, Australian and New Zealand, and two regiments each of armoured cars, engineers and artillery.
Border clashes between British and Commonwealth troops and Indonesian units continued throughout 1965. It was on one of General Lea's cross border operations that Lance Corporal Rambahadur Limbu of the 2/10th Ghurkha Rifles won the Victoria Cross, in the border area of the First Division near Bau. 1965 also saw the Indonesian raiders introduce simple wooden 'cigar-box' anti-personnel mines along border tracks. This added a macabre and sickly note into patrolling and a number of legs and feet were lost. In his attempt to gain assistance from China, Sukarno had flirted with the Communist Party and this had seriously undermined his position and he was reduced to the status of a puppet president when General Suharto took over effective leadership of the nation in March 1966. Peace feelers were put out and culminated in a peace agreement signed in Jakarta on 11th August 1966. Fighting had continued in small skirmishes right up until the agreement was signed.
In the fighting, the eight Ghurkha battalions had suffered 43 killed and 87 wounded, the Royal Marine Commandos 16 killed and 20 wounded and the British battalions 16 killed and 51 wounded. Officially Indonesian casualties were put at 600 killed but it is certain that they were considerably greater as a result of the British cross border operations. The campaign was a victory for the British and Malaysian forces, and the Minister of Defence at that time, Mr. Denis Healy declared in the House of Commons that the Borneo Campaign would be recorded 'in the history books ...as one of the most efficient uses of military force in the history of the world.
Claret Operations
Borneo 1964-65
It was decided that infantry attacks could be launched across the border in to Kalimantan territory to pre-empt the Indonesian attacks into Borneo. These operations were given the code name 'Claret' and they were to change the fortunes of war for both the Indonesians and their Commonwealth opponents. No longer could the Indonesians feel secure in their border bases and camps even if they were within Kalimantan territory. Initially these raids were confined to a penetration depth of only 5,000 yards but this was later increased to a depth of 20,000 yards. No longer would the security forces ever feel as frustrated as they had been earlier in the campaign. It was doubtful whether the Indonesians realised that they were seeing the beginnings of a new Commonwealth strategy.
While the Kalimantan border bases were being harassed by British and other Commonwealth troops, the cross border operations exacted a great mental and physical toll on the troops concerned. Courage and skill were required to overcome the tensions and problems of operating behind the enemy lines and the planning of such raids had to ensure that once the troops crossed the border in to Kalimantan that they would be within the limits of fire support from guns located just over on the friendly side of the border, guns that were often flown in by helicopter to a pre-planned LZ for the duration of the operation. The main concern was the problem of getting their casualties back to Sarawak or Sabah without using helicopters. This meant they were faced with the tremendous task of manhandling wounded men through the thick jungle, up mountain slopes, and across fast flowing rivers.
Obviously for the badly wounded soldier, being carried over such hostile terrain, the chances of survival were greatly reduced. Fortunately for the British and Commonwealth forces, the Indonesian forces lacked efficient communications and relied on primitive support that was hampered by long and tenuous supply lines. Nevertheless, the Indonesian build up continued under the command of Gen. Maratan Panggabean. Panggabean was an experienced soldier who had been trained first by the Japanese and had completed his military training in the United States. His immediate subordinate was Col. Supargo who commanded No 4 Combat Command. He too had been trained in America. Dotted along the border were over 20,000 Indonesian troops. To meet these threats, the forces available within Borneo were pathetically small. West Brigade with a front of 600 miles had five battalions. One British, three Ghurkha, and one Malaysian, supported by 25 troop-carrying helicopters. The adjoining Central Brigade, with a front of 300 miles, had two Ghurkha battalions and 12 helicopters. East Brigade, with a front of 80 miles, had one Royal Marine Commando and one infantry battalion forward and no helicopters. At this time the total number of troops under Gen. Walker's Command within the Borneo territories was little more than 10,000 men.
The need for reinforcements was urgent; not only for infantry but engineer squadrons were needed for a multitude of tasks-to build airstrips, roads and bridges. In the end Gen. Walker's protests did produce three more infantry battalions, bringing the total up to 13.
As a result of these reinforcements, by January of 1965 the British and Commonwealth forces in Borneo totalled some 14,000 soldiers supported by 29 guns, two squadrons of armoured cars and four field squadrons of engineers. Gen. Walker was convinced that the only way he could throw the Indonesians off balance was to increase the number of raids into the enemy stronghold of Kalimantan and in addition, the Royal Marine Special Boat Sections were to make small scale amphibious raids round either flank on the coast.
In the 5th Division of Sarawak,'C' Company, 1/2nd Ghurkha Rifles, with its base at Ba Kelan was guarding the approaches that ran across the border. The valley from Ba Kelan stretched over the border to a village called Long Medan, which the Indonesians had converted into a stronghold. The natives of the whole valley belonged to the same tribe, the Murats. They had crossed the border time after time to carry on trading. The Indonesians had forbade any more cross-border trade causing the local community hardship, which eventually led to a petition from the villages to the commanding officer of the 1/2nd Ghurkha rifles to take action. Several reconnaissance patrols had been carried out and official permission for the cross border raid was granted.
The plan was simple: one platoon was to give fire support to the assaulting forces if they came under heavy from any new and previously undetected positions using 3.5-inch rocket launchers, LMGs and M-26 grenade launchers, while the company commander led the other two platoons into the assault against the enemy. Two 3-inch mortars and two general-purpose machine guns were pre-positioned on a nearby hill and were guarded by a platoon from another rifle company. 'C' Company had to move by night approach to cover a distance of eight miles without being detected, which was quite a problem for 150 men when everything had to be carried including rocket launchers and rockets. Each of the Ghurkhas carried two mortar bombs in addition to his own weapon and load. The night of January 29th 1965 was selected for the attack. 'C' Company marched all night and reached the jumping off position in the early hours of the morning of the 30th. Everything went as planned until the attack was sprung by an Indonesian walking towards 11 Platoon's position.
The Platoon did not hesitate and slammed four rockets down on the enemy bunkers, and the company commander gave the order to charge. Under close covering support his party fought through the positions from bunker to bunker, using grenades and rifle fire. From across the river an Indonesian 12.7-mm anti-aircraft gun began firing, joined by a 60-mm mortar and medium machine guns and the situation began to look grim. The precaution of placing the 3-inch mortars and machine guns on the nearby hill saved the crisis. The Mortar Fire Controller (MFC), a corporal who was to win the Military Medal, had to stand up and expose himself to the Indonesian machine gun fire. He was able to pinpoint the hostile 60-mm mortar position and after a ranging round his second bomb blew it up and killed the crew. He then turned his attention to the Indonesian machine guns and knocked them out. Meanwhile, the 12.7-mm gun remained in action pinning the forward section down.
In retaliation, 12 Platoon sent a corporal and two riflemen to silence the gun and after taking a rocket launcher across a paddy field they approached the gun position. The corporal opened fire and the first rocket hit the gun pit killing its occupants. That was to be the end of the battle. It had taken one hour and fifteen minutes. The company commander ordered a withdrawal and by the late afternoon, using a more direct route, the raiding force was back across the border carrying two of its badly wounded men with it as well as the body of a dead Ghurkha rifleman. A few days later it was confirmed that 50% of the Indonesian strength in that area had been killed and that Long Medan was never reoccupied by Indonesian forces in the Ba Kelalan area again.
A few months later, in November 1965, it was decided to send another raiding mission into the area opposite the First Division of Sarawak. This was to be a more ambitious operation. The mission, by another Ghurkha Company, was to ambush the main river supply route at two points near the Indonesian company-sized bases. It would take the raiding party over two days to reach the target area. Each man carried light rations to last 12 days, apart from his personal weapon, ammunition and other vital necessities. Two rivers were met in succession and each time the Assault Pioneers bridged each river with fallen trees. Once the tree was in position, a Ghurkha soldier went across securing hand ropes to enable the company to cross.
A day later the company reached an area near the River Separan. Patrols had reported the area as being thick primary jungle with a fast flowing river that was about 25m wide. The company commander, realising he would be ambushing between two large Indonesian camps, crossed the final river with care. The Assault Pioneer Platoon was left behind to cover the rear while the rest of the company crossed unseen and set its ambush on a track that linked the two enemy camps. The company commander placed himself and the Anti-tank Platoon in the ambush area while the Reconnaissance Platoon and the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) remained on the other side of the river in order to protect the rear. The FOO by using his communication link could assist by bringing down diversionary fire on the approaches to the ambush as soon as it was sprung. Then it was just a question of waiting.
All were in position by 0945 hours. At about 1100 hours the company commander received the signal for "enemy" and about five minutes later a small party of Indonesians walked through the ambush zone, followed seconds later by five more, then another six, and then came a continuous line. It was time to spring the ambush. GPMG's opened up from the flank followed by the crash of claymore mines, which had been laid, on the other end of the ambush position. All the waiting ambushers opened fire on the targets in front of them and a minute or two later artillery shells crashed down on either side of the ambush position. The ambush completely stunned the Indonesian soldiers but it was not long before a counter attack swung in from the south covered by a mortar attack from an Indonesian position near by. The support company held firm and the Indonesian counter attack was an abortive one.
After inflicting heavy casualties on the Indonesians, the company commander decided to withdraw across the river, while the FOO directed his guns on to shelling the immediate area of the ambush position. There was no time to waste. The company set off and pressed on hard until dark. Next day, the fifth day after setting out, it recrossed the border. It had been a model operation well planned and expertly executed and as a result the Indonesians in that area took no more offensive action during the confrontation.
The fact that nothing was know about these "Claret" operations until the mid-1980', speaks volumes for the integrity of the soldiers and Marines of the time as these operations were graded top secret. Royal Marine Commandos, with their great experience, took part in several of these operations. The fact that they were concealed from the press and public for twenty years was a remarkable feat and is rather different from today of those that rush into print and describe the most secret of operations. In a media-conscious world, that in itself made the Borneo confrontation unique.
The Air War
Only two years after the end of the Malaya Emergency, a new crisis was brewing in the Far East bringing British Forces back into action. When the British proposed a Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei in May 1961 it was immediately opposed by left-wing nationalist groups and neighbouring Indonesia.
On 8th December 1962, Indonesian backed rebels staged a revolt in the Sultanate of Brunei, where they attacked the Sultans palace and other government establishments, including police and petrol stations in Seria. The British reacted swiftly, despatching 1st battalion the Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron). The Battalion headquarters and A Company were sent ahead by air and B Company sailed aboard HMS Cavalier. At the time 1st battalion the Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron) were part of 17th Gurkha Division.
A company landed at the short Brunei airfield aboard a Blackburn Beverley of 34 Sqn, RAF Seletar, Singapore piloted by the Squadron's Commanding Officer Sgn/Ldr Bennett at about 8pm. The second aircraft arrived about 30 minutes later, carrying Gurkhas and landrovers, the other Beverley's arriving through the night.
The rebels were attempting to capture the police station about a mile from the airfield at this time and were swiftly engaged by the troops. After unloading the Beverley's returned to Labuan and began shuttling troops and supplies to Brunei from RAF Labuan. Where RAF Hastings and RAF Comets were landing them as the runway at Brunei airfield was under repair and too short for those aircraft.
About the 10th December the Anduki Airfield at Seria was noted to have been cleared of obstacles, etc and a Beverley flown by Flt/Lt Fenn was quickly loaded with Seaforth Highlanders and landed at Anduki airfield, the troops leaving the aircraft through its two rear-doors while it was still moving. The aircraft took off as soon as the last man exited the aircraft, receiving a burst of machine gun fire as it passed the control tower.
The troops cleared the airfield and the town after a short skirmish with many Rebels killed and captured.
No.34 Squadron continued to provide detachments at Labuan through out the confrontation air supply dropping to the many army encampments in the jungle, also to SAS units.
However, the Indonesian President had not forgotten that the British had supported the Dutch attempt to regain control of the East Indies in 1945-1947 and began training volunteer guerrilla groups to infiltrate into North Borneo. Raids into Sarawak by the 'Volunteers' began in April 1963 and they increased in frequency following the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in September of that year.
The small Borneo Defence Force, made up of British, Australian, New Zealand and Malay troops commanded by Major General Walker had no easy task and they were almost entirely dependent on helicopter movement in the remote jungle and mountainous terrain of Borneo. By this time four No.20 Squadron Hunters and two Javelin Mk9R of No.60 Squadron, another unit that had spent much of its postwar life operating in Malaya, were sent to Labuan and Kutching, the latter being close to the border with Kalimantan, in Indonesian Borneo.
Again, the dissidents relied on the rural Chinese for support, as did an entirely separate Communist force also operating within Malaysia, the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) that had its origins in the MCP (Malaysian Communist Party). However, by a combination of winning the support of the native population, promoting co-operation between the security forces and local police, plus the quick reaction capability that the helicopter gave him, Major General Walker was able to contain the guerrillas.
A second Javelin squadron, No.64 arrived by the end of the year, and an extra flight expanded No.60 Squadron that was based at Butterworth, providing air defence over western Malaysia. When Indonesia announced that it would use its regular forces against the British, the Hunters and Javelins were tasked with low-level patrols along the Indonesian border, as well as escorting transport aircraft delivering supplies and reinforcements to the security forces. Blackburn Beverly, Handley Page Hastings of 48 Squadron, Far East Air Force and Short Belfast aircraft formed the backbone of the transport force in Borneo, operating from as far away as Singapore. They were joined for a brief period in March 1964 by Sea Vixens from H.M.S. Centaur. No.81 Squadron, with its Canberras, was entailed with a photo survey, the results proved invaluable to those who would follow up on its information.
The Army Air Corps were in Borneo as well as the RAF and Royal Navy. Sgt. Thackeray of the Army Air Corps was flying an Auster with the padre as passenger on Christmas Eve 1963 from Lundu to Kuching. They were hit by cannon fire and the padre was mortally wounded. The Sgt.'s left arm was broken and he was bleeding heavily. However using his knees and right hand he operated the throttle, flaps and control stick until finding a helicopter landing pad he contrived a controlled landing. The prop from this Auster was placed in Kuching Airport reception lounge. On another occasion Sgt. 'Doc' Waghorn a Royal Army Medical Corps pilot was flying a Scout helicopter from the Lundu area back to Kuching. He had with him a Ghurkha and a prisoner. Flying at 3000' feet he must have seen Kuching 20 miles away. They disappeared without a trace and have never been seen again. The following day a Whirlwind helicopter took off to look for them and 5 died when it lost a tail rotor.
When Indonesian naval vessels started to make forays into Malaysian waters, the Shackletons would buzz them at wave-top height, and most turned and ran for home. While the Shackleton's operated during the day, four Fairey Gannet AEW aircraft of No.849 Squadron A flight from HMS Victorious flying out of RAF Seletar were pressed into service to monitor the Straits at night. With full drop tanks and one engine shut down these aircraft could stay on station for long periods of upto 5 hours and sometimes longer. Indonesia launched large-scale incursions in late 1964, with two Hercules transports dropping 100 paratroops and their equipment in Malaysia, 95 miles north of Singapore. The aircraft had flown between Birkit and Penang radar, and the paratroops had been dropped 20 miles apart. A sharp eyed observer on a RAF Shackleton spotted the parachutists canopies tangled in the upper branches of tall trees and alerted the Security forces. The Royal Malay Regiment and the Ghurkhas pursued the invaders into the swamps of Johore, where Hunters attacked them with rockets and cannon-fire. The Hunters flew a total of 14 sorties in support of the ground forces. More than three-quarters of the invaders were killed or captured. One of the Hercules that had dropped the paratroopers was spotted and chased by a Javelin of No.60 Squadron on a routine combat air patrol
In the same month, No.64 Squadron was again sent to reinforce the RAF units and an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) was established over western Malaysia, within which all unidentified aircraft were intercepted and investigated. During October, No.20 Squadron Hunters made strikes against guerrilla infiltrators at Pontian. The following month the Javelins were join by No.32 Squadron Canberras at Tengah, and No.14 Squadron RNZAF with Canberras. A Canberra was lost in the operation 'Birdsong' strikes of 23rd-24th December, whilst landing at Tengah where it was hit by an Indonesian infiltrator.
While the Indonesian Air Force did pose a threat, most of their aircraft retreated before they could be intercepted, and they relied on ageing World War 2-era bombers for low-level attacks. By mid-year, the security forces had been strengthened and now included a battalion of SAS that was permitted to cross into Indonesia and smash the infiltrator camps. Hunters attacked a group of 25 Indonesian regulars who had landed from boats on the south coast of Johore near Tanjong-Pen Gelik, some seven miles east of Changi at the end of May.
RAF and Naval forces constantly located and identified landing forces, and the Indonesian bombers attacked villages close to the Indonesian border, inflicting little serious damage. The last Indonesian attacks took place across the Sarawak border by Indonesian regulars in August 1966. By this time the Allied security forces were in total control of most of the disputed areas, and all Indonesian operations ceased following a coup in Jakarta on 30th September. After a series of mopping-up operations, the security forces began to withdraw from Malaysia and on 11th August, following the Indonesia Presidents' overthrow in the previous March, Malaysia and Indonesia signed a peace agreement.
During this conflict, two Victor B Mk 1A bombers flew a single offensive operation which was the first, and only offensive operation undertaken by this type in RAF service.
The Helicopter War
A large scale revolt in Brunei in December 1962 led the Sultan of Brunei to appeal for British Assistance. No.42 Royal Marine Commando were flown in from their base in Singapore and backed up by Bristol Belvedere helicopters of No 66 Squadron RAF, and HMS Albion which had been exercising in the area at the time. The Commando's landed by the carriers' Westland Whirlwind helicopters were No 40 and No 3 Royal Marine Commando brigade. Albion was later joined by the HMS Bulwark. The insurgents were dispersed in one month, but another crisis soon arose as brunei was not included in the newly formed Federation of Malaya and Indonesia threatened confrontation, including a continuation of the effort started by the north brunei Liberation Army. By February 1964, RAF and Royal Navy Helicopters including some Westland Wessex operating from bases in Sarawak and Sabah to assist Army and Marine detachments fighting guerilla forces infiltrated by Indonesia over its one thousand mile frontier with Malaysia.
In Borneo, the helicopter played a major role in fortifying the frontier and maintaining the frontier strong points by airlifting supplies in. They also airlifted troops into interception points against retreating Indonesian and guerilla forces. Armed with wire-guided anti-tank missiles they engaged hill-top positions held by the Indonesian forces, their armour and vehicles. Using these ambush techniques the Gurkhas were able to ambush the retreating Guerillas and usually inflict heavy casualties with little loss. The helicopters saw also very effective use as CASEVAC aircraft and in the vast tracts of jungle was an invaluable tool for the British forces.
The Limbang Raid
Shortly after the start of the Brunei rebellion began in December 1962 in the town of Bangar a number of government officials had been held hostage and then murdered. Following this the up-river town of Limbang was also seized by the rebel forces led by Salleh bin Sambas. He ordered his men to arrest a British resident and his wife who lived in Limbang as well as other hostages. All the hostages were all soon to be hanged. The task of rescuing the hostages was given to Captain Jeremy Moore's L company Royal Marines. Moore would later command the British forces in the 1982 Falklands War. Brigadier Patterson gave Moore some simple orders " Release the hostages" Moore was informed there were about 150 rebels at Limbang and was given a map of the area and a 10 year photo of the town which did not show all the buildings. He realized that a cautious approach to the target would be useless because the rebels would be informed of the approach of the Marines and the hostages would be shot. Instead he decided on a direct assault on the town from the river at dawn using 2 commandeered cargo lighters operated by Royal Navy crews. The Navy Commander of these lights was Captain Black who would also serve later in the Falklands war as Captain of H.M.S. Invincible.
At dawn the next day the 2 lighters rounded the river bend below Limbang. All surprise was lost due to the noise made by the boats engines. The whole town erupted with gun fire aimed at the boats. As soon as the fire fight started the leading lighter beached near the Limbang police station where most of the heavy machine gun fire was coming from. The other lighter held back giving support fire with a Vickers machine gun. A RN officer aboard her , when asked by QMS Cyril Scoins if he could pull the craft out of line to give the Vickers a better fire position, replied: " Sergeant Major, Nelson would have loved you ". Two sections of Marines disembarked from the first lighter and immediately Marines started to drop, hit by rebel fire. Marines were also hit in the support boat. The Marines, once ashore faced a 30 yard dash under heavy fire. Two were killed in the leading craft and the coxswain wounded. Lt. Davis was also wounded as he jumped ashore leading No5 troop.
The leading assault party had already sustained serious casualties from a single, very accurate machine gun and a great number of shot guns which proved lethal at close range. It was decided to land a second assault party to help the first 2 sections. As the second lighter neared the shore line they took more casualties from enemy fire coming from the police station. Once more marines had been landed, the battle swung in the Marines' favor and the machine gun in the police station was finally taken out. The Marines now moved though the town house clearing and hunting the rebels who had not much fight left in them. The race was now on to find the hostages before they were executed.
Moore, who was in the lead assault boat was delayed getting ashore when the boats Royal Navy helms man was hit and the boat started to drift back into the river. When Moore finally did get ashore he headed straight for the town hospital were he thought the hostages might be held. On arriving outside the hospital they heard a very loud nervous voice singing " They'll be coming round the mountain when they come " This was the British resident singing at the top of his voice to make sure the Marines did not shoot him, thinking that the rebels were in the hospital. Moore found all the hostages alive and well, their captors had run off.
A small fire fight had occurred outside the hospital in which 2 Marines and Sergeant MacFarlane were killed. Moore had to give command to 2 new troop commanders to carry on clearing the town of rebels. The Marines started house to house clearing, killing or capturing any rebels still left in Limbang. By the end of the battle 5 Marines lay dead and another 8 were wounded. L company later became known as the Limbang Company with the anniversary being celebrated annually by 42 Commando as " Limbang Day ". Captain Moore received a Bar to his Military cross ( won during the Malayan Emergency ). Clps Lester and Rawlinson were awarded Military Medals and the RN personnel who manned the lights were also decorated for their bravery on this day.
"The Last Raid"
(Operation Claret 1966 Indonesian Borneo)
March 1966, L Company and M Company of 42 Commando Royal Marines took part in an ambitious Claret Operation, to raid an Indonesian camp at Sedjingan across the border into Indonesian Kalimantan, the Indonesian camp was garrisoned by members of the Siliwang Division one of the crack formations of their army.
After marching from their respective Company bases at Biawak and Samatan in western Sarawak, L and M companies rendezvoused the day before the raid two miles away from their target. A successful close reconnaissance had been carried out by Lt Clark of L company. And at one stage Cpl Pearce got to within five yards of Indonesian sentries without being spotted. That close to the sentries that one of them urinated on the bush behind which Cpl Pearce was crouching; again escaping detection.
As a result of Lt Clark’s report, it was decided that L Company would attack the camp at first light, while M Company ambushed the likely enemy withdrawal routes. This necessitated M Company moving into position in full daylight the evening before, which they managed without detection.
The next day the attack went in as planned, both parts of the operation being succesful, and the Indonesian army sustaining considerable casualties.
During L Company’s withdrawal, Lt Clark’was hit by a stray round and Killed; his body was evacuated by helicopter. Also during the withdrawal L/cpl T.J.Collins who manned the LMG was found to be missing, L/cpl Collins was posted missing in action presumed killed. He just disappeared during the withdrawal action, Later on seaches were made, but to no avail, and after the confrontation enquiries were made but also proved negative due to the Indonesian authorities lack of co-operation.
In March 1966 General Suharto replaced Sukarno in a coup, and secret peace feelers were sent to Kuala Lumpur. Although Claret operations were halted, the British continued to reconnoitre across the Border into Indonesian Borneo to give warnings of incursions. On 28th of May 1966, cross-border activity ceased, and on the 11th of August the end of confrontation was ratified. A peace that brought an end to the strange undeclared war in Borneo, a war that rarely hit the headlines. The stamina and health of the British, Gurkha and Commonwealth soldiers had withstood the stress and rigours of operating for long periods in some of the toughest terrain in the world.
The Borneo Campaign stands out as being a notable example of how highly trained professional infantrymen, with full support from the other arms and services, can achieve a decisive victory against a well-armed and aggressive foe.
Regards,
Hist2004