A closer look at the Khe Sanh body count

[2RHPZ]

Battle of Khe Sanh: Recounting the Battle's Casualties

A Marine veteran of the war's longest battle searches for the truth beyond the official numbers.

By Peter Brush




......

The American military presence at Khe Sanh consisted not only of the Marine Corps Khe Sanh Combat Base, but also Forward Operating Base 3, U.S. Army (FOB-3). Many American casualties were caused by the 10,908 rounds of rockets, artillery and mortars the North Vietnamese fired into the base and hill positions. Army deaths at FOB-3, however, were not included in the official statistics either.

....



Historynet.com (http://www.historynet.com/magazines/vietnam/8189002.html)

[KB]

A little local color from a friend...

The “hill fights” around Khe Sanh took place in early 1967. I moved my platoon (2nd Platoon, Bravo Recon Company, 3rd Recon Battalion) into Khe Sanh after the hill fights and before the siege which really began in late1967. We immediately began regular patrolling upon our arrival with six to eight man squads and experienced frequent and increasingly intense contact with multiple units of NVA regulars throughout the summer and fall.

In October of 1967 I ran what I believe was the last “standard” recon patrol out of the khe Sanh combat base. Cobra’s mission on that day was to explore the area around the summit of hill 1015 which was several clicks north of the combat base with a commanding view of the entire area. We inserted, after being shot out of the first zone west of the hill , into a second zone on the edge of the canopy perhaps two clicks east on a finger on the southeast side of 1015. The second insert was uneventful and we moved without contact, but with a lot of enemy sign into the canopy and toward 1015; which was perhaps a click and a half to the northwest. Late in the afternoon I made the decision to stop for the day and established our harborsite perhaps 500 meters from the hilltop and 50 meters down off of the west side of the finger. It was very steep, very difficult terrain chosen because I was fairly sure no one would walk directly into us during the night.

My choice of a harborsite was a good one because during the night there was a lot of noise and unseen movement toward the hilltop on the finger just above us. We reported the movement but did not call for fires on it because we were uncertain of our precise position and we could not adjust fire in any case. The next morning it was finally quiet on the finger, but we ate a cold breakfast because I didn’t want any cooking noises / smells to compromise our position. We then resumed our careful approach to the hilltop staying west of and below the finger running southeast to northwest toward the top of 1015. We hadn’t moved more than a few hundred meters when we walked into the most neatly prepared heavy mortar positions with beautifully carved out pits on the edges of openings in the canopy. No soldiers, no tubes, no ammo, but perfectly carved pits plus bunkers plus storage areas for ammo and paths out to aiming stakes. Far more neatly constructed and camouflaged than Marines would ever have done. They were absolutely textbook examples! I was scared to death because the work looked brand spanking new and I was amazed that no one was there because the location was obviously the work of a large group of men. We reported our findings and were told to continue the mission.

We then continued our very careful approach to the hilltop and hadn’t gone another 200 meters when my point team called me up. There, not 25 meters to our front, was a large group of tents and decently built wooden shelters for a company or perhaps a battalion of NVA soldiers. It was still early, perhaps 0800, and as we were standing there dumbfounded a single unarmed NVA soldier without a shirt walked up to a washstand, constructed from neatly cut branches with a pan for water and a mirror, on the edge of their camp. He looked at us, we looked at him, and at the same time we could see many men in the camp stirring behind him. This “encounter” probably lasted only a few seconds, but it seemed like forever; I can still see so many details. At any rate, we decided not to shoot him and he decided not to call out for help. An unspoken bargain that absolutely saved his life and, ultimately, ours. We turned and retreated back to the rest of team Cobra. I quickly briefed the team, telling them we had to haul ass out of there without regard to stealth and why. We then took off due south toward the valley with me calling for all kinds of fire support on the radio and an extraction when we were out of the canopy.

The good news was that we never saw another NVA that day. We hauled ass into the valley while, believe it or not, the Air Wing had two F4’s and two A4’s in the area and within minutes they had dropped both 500 pounders and napalm onto the top of 1015. That was followed by the fire base putting more than 400 rounds of 105’s onto the same hilltop over the next few hours. The great news was that Cobra made the valley in less than an hour and two 46’s were there to bring us home; flying under the 105’s which were still sending their greetings onto the hill.

The best news is that I didn’t lose a man that day, but we knew, and the Corps knew, that the NVA was going to make a big deal out of Khe Sanh and we didn’t need Recon to tell us they were out there. They were definitely out there. I left Khe Sanh and Recon a few days later to have the grunt experience with 2/4 at Con Thien that my Battalion commander wanted me to have. My Bravo Recon platoon and a new Lieutenant, except for a few local patrols, hunkered down inside the Khe Sanh fire base during the siege and acted as a reserve unit to reinforce the line when and where the grunts needed them.

[Midn./Patriot]

Thank you for sharing the tale KB. The way you wrote it reminds me of the book Battlelines and 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. Very easy to visualize the situation.

[Breakfast in Vegas]

Interesting story. Thanks for posting!

[PaulClift]

Great post, for me one of the most memorable images of the war is transport planes sharing the airstrip with incoming rocket fire (I think its rockets).

[LillaMy]

Semper Fi!

[zonk]

good read right there, i try to read a lot of vietnam history, for some reason it is the most fascinating to me

[Hollis]

And they tied up two divisions of NVA....


BTW Charlie sure was placing a lot that it would be a nother Dien Bien Phu

[2RHPZ]

Another one on Khe Sanh from The History Net.com (October 2007 Issue):

Air Power in the Siege of Khe Sanh (http://www.historynet.com/magazines/vietnam/8854322.html?featured=y&c=y)

Tactical airlift and aerial fire support during the 77-day siege were key to averting an American Dien Bien Phu and defeating the NVA at Khe Sanh.

By William A. Barry