Project Nike & the 22 May 1958 incident

[drakegoodman]

Origins of the Nike System

Nike, named for the mythical Greek goddess of victory, was the name given to a program which ultimately produced the world's first successful, widely-deployed, guided surface-to-air missile system. Planning for Nike was begun during the last months of the Second World War when the U.S. Army realized that conventional anti-aircraft artillery would not be able to provide an adequate defence against the fast, high-flying and manoeuvrable jet aircraft which were being introduced into service, particularly by the Germans.

During 1945, Bell Telephone Laboratories produced the "AAGM (Anti Aircraft Guided Missile) Report" in which the concept of the Nike system were first outlined. The Report envisioned a two-stage, supersonic missile which could be guided to its target by means of ground-based radar and computer systems. This type of system is known as a "command" guidance system. The main advantage over conventional anti-aircraft artillery was that the Nike missile could be continuously guided to intercept an aircraft, in spite of any evasive actions taken by its pilot. By contrast, the projectiles fired by conventional anti-aircraft artillery (such as 90mm and 120mm guns) followed a predetermined, ballistic trajectory which could not be altered after firing.

New Jersey

Due to its strategic location, New Jersey played a significant role in the Cold War defence of the North American continent. Within the Garden State, air defence radar sites, bases for interceptor aircraft, anti-aircraft gun batteries, surface to air missile sites, and command and control facilities were constructed in order to defend against the threat of attack by long range, nuclear-armed aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. Throughout the Cold War, these sites were manned on a 24 hour per day basis on constant alert, ready to defend the region, the nation and the North American continent.

For two decades, spanning some of the most troubled years of the Cold War era, New Jersey was the location of more than one dozen U.S. Army Nike missile installations. Named for the mythical Greek goddess of victory, Nike missiles were designed to shoot down attacking aircraft. The Nikes were deployed at missile sites which completely encircled major metropolitan areas with overlapping fields of fire, providing a vital last line of defence against an attack by air.

Nike Ajax: The First Nike Missile

The first successful test firing of a Nike missile occurred during 1951. This first Nike missile was later given the name Nike "Ajax". Nike Ajax was a slender, two-stage guided missile powered by a liquid-fuelled motor utilizing a combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA), unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) and JP-4 jet petroleum. The Ajax was blasted off of its launcher by means of a jettisonable solid fuel rocket booster which fired for about 3 seconds, accelerating the missile with a power of 25 times the force of gravity.

The Ajax missile was capable of maximum speeds of over 1,600-mph and could reach targets at altitudes of up to 70,000 feet. Its range was only about 25 miles, which was too short to make it a truly effective air defence weapon in the eyes of its many detractors. Its supporters countered that the new missile was markedly superior to conventional anti-aircraft artillery, and that it was, significantly, the only air defence missile actually deployed and operational at that time.

Nike Ajax was armed with three individual high-explosive, fragmentation-type warheads located at the front, centre and rear of the missile body. Although consideration was given to arming the Ajax with a nuclear (atomic) warhead, this project was cancelled in favour of developing a totally new, much-improved Nike missile. Even as the first Nike Ajax missiles were being deployed across the nation, work on its successor, first known as "Nike-B" and later as Nike "Hercules" had already begun.

Disaster

Located in the Chapel Hill section of Middletown Township, Nike Battery NY-53 inadvertently became the subject of worldwide media attention during 1958. On May 22nd of that year, the accidental explosion of several Nike Ajax missiles at the site claimed the lives of ten Army and civilian ordnance personnel, caused considerable damage to the site and even greater damage to the Army's reputation. The incident was one of the worst missile related disasters of the Cold War era.

The following are photographs taken a day after the incident.

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General view of the Launching Area of Battery B, 526 AAA Missile Battalion, Leonardo, NJ. 22 May 1958

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Launcher Nr 1, A Section, on elevator. 22 May 1958

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Remains of launcher Nr 1 after explosion. 22 May 1958

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Remains of a booster. 22 May 1958

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Booster debris. 22 May 1958

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Missile debris in front of launcher Nr 2. 22 May 1958

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Missile debris. 22 May 1958

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Missile debris. 22 May 1958

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Damage to transport handling rail. 22 May 1958

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Converter. 22 May 1958

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Generator Building. 22 May 1958

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Missile Assembly and Service Building. 22 May 1958

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Remains of Government truck and civilian vehicle (Studebaker) .22 May 1958

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Close up of damage to Government vehicle. 22 May 1958

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Close up of damage to Government vehicle. 22 May 1958

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A pit caused by explosion in front and to the right of A Section. 22 May 1958

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Another pit caused by the explosion. 22 May 1958

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Inspection team officers. 22 May 1958

For reference: A typical Nike Ajax and its launcher assembly

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[onefast93z28]

When I lived in NJ, you could find those missile sites everywhere. We used to paintball in some of them...

I grew up near Middletown, but never knew of that site.

[bearfirefighter]

Is it listed anywhere what the cause of the fire was? It looks as though the berms surrounding the launch site protected most of the surrounding area....I would be interested to know. Thanks for the info and the great post.

bearfirefighter

[drakegoodman]

Is it listed anywhere what the cause of the fire was? It looks as though the berms surrounding the launch site protected most of the surrounding area....I would be interested to know. Thanks for the info and the great post.

bearfirefighter

At the time of the disaster, 14 missiles were located aboveground: 7 in "A" Section, 4 in "B" Section, and 3 in "C" Section. The explosion apparently originated with a missile undergoing modification in "A" Section. Here, an ordnance team were replacing two M27 (T93) Safety & Arming Mechanisms with two improved models, M30 or M30A1, in accordance with Modification Work Order (MWO) Y2-W20.

Aside from installation instructions, the MWO kit consisted of two brackets, two place assemblies, the necessary attaching hardware for the M30 devices, and two nameplates for the missile. To replace the arming mechanism, two of the three warheads in the missile (nose and centre warheads weighing 12 and 179 lbs., respectively) had to be removed. A crater in front of the missile position suggested that these warheads were lying on the ground at the time of the explosion.

Somewhere in the process of removing the old devices and brackets and replacing them with the new ones, the missile was accidentally detonated. All seven missiles of "A" Section exploded. The nearest adjoining missile In "B" Section apparently did not explode but its booster was ignited by a flying red-hot pellet and it blasted into the side of a nearby hill. Failure of this missile to explode may have saved the remaining six missiles.

[drakegoodman]

Continued...

A Board of Enquiry was immediately convened by the 1st Region, U. S. Army Air Defense Command, Fort Totten, New York, to investigate the accident.

The findings of the board indicated that the "point of initiation of the explosion was probably a PGPN relay cap" but just which relay cap could not be determined. The "most likely causes of the detonation of the PETN relay cap which initiated the disaster" were listed as follows:

(1) Excessive tightening of a detonating cord coupling more than finger tight.

(2) Use of unauthorized materials such as string, solder wire, or aluminium wire around the detonating cord, next to the cellar, in order to mate the PGI1J relay cap fit more snugly.

(3) 'Cross-threading' the detonating cord coupling nut while screwing it into the five-way connector or into the warhead adapter .

(4) Scraping, crushing, pinching, or otherwise damaging the PETN relay cap in some manner.

As a direct result of this accident and the investigation that followed, it was determined that an unauthorized "field fix" relating to MWO Y2-W20 had been applied to an undetermined number of AJAX missiles on site, thus creating a hazardous condition which was general throughout the CONUS.

The new arming device was considered a vast improvement for AJAX missiles, both in reliability and safety of operation; however, the unauthorized fix eliminated the safety tolerance desired between the warhead initiator and the PETN relay cap on the detonating cord harness assembly. The elimination of this tolerance by application of the "field fix" created a serious safety hazard in the form of possible order detonation.

Accordingly, the Commanding General of the Army Air Defence Command (ARADCOM) notified all commands and installations concerned that on-site missiles with an unauthorized fix applied "...are potential safety hazards and further unnecessary movement, assembly, or disassembly of loaded missiles must not occur until inspection and necessary removal by qualified Ord personnel...".

It was also directed that immediate and positive action be taken to stop application of the unauthorized fix and to thoroughly indoctrinate personnel in the necessity of refraining from the application of changes or modifications to material without proper technical service approval.