hist2004
10-27-2007, 08:32 AM
Terrorism: Adnkronos interviews expert Brian Jenkins
Rome, 26 Oct. (AKI) - Rome-based daily Il Messaggero on Friday published an an excerpt from the following interview by Adnkronos International (AKI) with one of the worlds' top terrorism authorities, Brian Michael Jenkins. A former US army commander in Vietnam, he is currently an advisor to the US national terrorism committee, special security advisor to the Vatican and a member of the US presidential committee on air safety, as well the author of numerous books.
Q. Traditional terrorism, as practiced by left-wing and right-wing extremists in Europe, tried to change the political structure of a country through violent acts. Jihadist terrorism on the other hand aims to destroy its "infidel enemy". Do you believe that a statement you made in 1975 that "terrorists want to attract public opinion, not kill it" still holds true?
I sometimes try to capture the essence of an idea in a single phrase. In 1975, I wrote that “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” It was in response to those who saw terrorists as bent upon mindless murder.
I argued that since even those we label terrorists did not do what we knew they were technically capable of doing, there must be self-imposed constraints. Wanton violence could threaten consensus and cohesion within the terrorist group itself, exposing it to betrayal.
Indiscriminate violence could alienate the terrorists' perceived constituents - terrorists always imagined themselves to have legions of supporters, but recognised that not all shared their stomach for bloodshed.
Indiscriminate violence could also provoke a public backlash against the terrorists, thereby providing government authorities with support for draconian methods.
These self-imposed constraints were neither universal nor immutable, and over time they eroded as terrorists became brutalised by long struggles and had to escalate to stay in the headlines. The engines of conflict also changed.
Ideological battles were replaced by ethnic antagonisms and religious fanaticism - causes that lend themselves to atrocities. Conviction that one has God’s mandate to destroy heathens, heretics, pagans and infidels removes all worldly constraints. Large-scale indiscriminate violence increased.
That, however, does not mean that practical political calculations have disappeared from terrorist decision-making, even among jihadist terrorists who produce fatwas claiming they have the right to kill millions of infidels.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second-in-command warned Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq that his slaughtering of Shias and other Muslims regarded as heretics or traitors might not easily be understood by Iraq’s Muslim masses and risked isolating al Qaeda from the people.
Zarqawi, a street thug, ignored the warning, pointing out that he, not distant leaders, commanded in Iraq. There were similar differences between the early ideologues and the later bloodier-minded members of Italy’s Red Brigades.
Al-Qaeda’s brutality eventually did alienate many Iraqis. Zarqawi himself was forced into sharing leadership with a Shura council [of tribal elders]. He was then killed, I suspect, the victim of betrayal by al Qaeda itself.
Q. According to a recent survey conducted by Harris Interactive, a growing number of Europeans are losing faith in the Muslim communities that live in Europe. Some, the study results show, believe that integration policies have failed, and that those most likely to commit acts of terrorism are second generation Muslims who have failed to integrate.
Europe has experienced problems integrating Muslim immigrants, who represent a significant and growing portion of the total population. Because of Europe’s proximity to North Africa and the Middle East, many of these recent immigrants are economic refugees who are more difficult to integrate. And the barriers to economic and social advancement are high. Putting aside race, if one doesn’t go to the right school or speaks with a heavy accent, opportunities are extremely limited. And in many European countries, citizenship is almost unattainable. This has created an alienated underclass.
This is one area where America does well, not because of its brilliant policies, but because, as a nation of immigrants, we have low barriers to social integration and economic advancement. And a foreign accent is no barrier at all. Look at former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Can you imagine someone with a strong American accent becoming foreign minister of France?
Q. Why are many well-educated Muslim youths turning their backs on their relatively affluent lifestyles to become suicide bombers as in the cases of the recent attack at Glasgow airport and September 11?
There are not that many. Since 9/11, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan there have been only about 20 suicide attacks directed by al-Qaeda or inspired by its ideology. There are 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. The total number of suicide bombers involved in these attacks is fewer than a hundred.
Recruits are more plentiful in Iraq, Afghanistan, and, of course, Palestine, but these are conflict zones that create their own dynamics of death.
Education never has been a barrier to extreme beliefs or suicide in any form.
Q. In Europe there are those, like Italian prime minister Romano Prodi, who are convinced that to curb terrorism one must talk to the enemy and thus with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah who have a double nature. They participate in society at an institutional and political level while refusing to give up terrorism. Do you believe that dialogue with such groups can help defeat terrorism?
Talking with the enemy is always politically risky. Whether it makes sense in a particular situation varies according to the circumstances. The British, first secretly, then openly, pursued a dialogue with the IRA, despite the latter’s bloody campaign of terror.
Eventually, that conflict was resolved. The Spanish government on several occasions has pursued talks with ETA separatists, but the terrorism campaign continues. And years of dialogue and multiple amnesty offers have not ended the bitter armed conflict in Colombia. On the other hand, Germany defeated the Red Army Factions and Italy prevailed over the Red Brigades without negotiations.
Despite the risks, I favor the deals being struck between American forces in Iraq and former insurgents who now want to drive out al Qaeda. At the same time, I don’t think a dialogue with al Qaeda itself would produce any positive result. In al Qaeda’s view, theirs is a struggle between good and evil and it will continue until evil is destroyed or Judgment Day, whichever comes first.
Hamas and Hezbollah are not just terrorist groups. They are large political organisations. They have won elections. They run or participate in governments. Therefore, it may be possible to engage them politically, but one cannot be naive. Dialogue alone will not defeat terrorism. To reverse Clauswitz, politics are a continuation of war by other means.
Q. Islamic fundamentalism is growing in many Asian nations, from Pakistan to Indonesia, and at the same time there is an increase in anti-Western sentiment in that part of the world. To what extent is the West to blame for the growth of Islamism and how much has the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes contributed to this?
First, we need to distinguish between growing Islamic fundamentalism and the jihadist ideology broadcast by al- Qaeda, which is an aberrant, heretical interpretation of Islam. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism is a complex phenomenon.
There has been a general growth in the more muscular versions of all faiths. Look at Christian Evangelicals, who have made great inroads in the traditionally Catholic countries of Latin America. Or look at the growing voice of the more conservative wings of the Catholic and Anglican Churches.
In part, it is a spiritual response to growing materialism, the erosion of faith, the onslaught of often shocking Western culture in traditional societies, to modernity itself.
Economists see it more in marketing terms. Today’s crusades and Jihads [holy wars] - as spiritual missions, not incitements to violenc - are well-financed, advertise, expand their retail outlets, and compete for market share. Saudi funding of Wahabi mosques is an example. Competition among faiths pushes believers toward fundamentalism.
Q. Jihadist terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists reject modernism, but to fight the West they use the Internet, the most prominent symbol of technological progress in the globalised world. How would you explain this contradiction?
Jihadists reject our so-called modern values. But they are not Amish who insist on horse-drawn carriages and homemade clothes. The jihadist ideology itself, although cloaked in religious faith, is closer to the Western revolutionary doctrines of the 20th century than it is to 7th century Islam. Osama bin Laden talks poetically about steeds and swords, but jihadists have no hesitation in using modern weapons, including the Internet, which has become a key battlefield in this conflict.
Q. In fact, the Internet seems to have become a weapon for the jihadist movement with ever more sites linked to Islamic terrorism springing up and posing a threat to security. Is it possible to deprive terrorists of this weapon?
There is no question that the jihadists have exploited the Internet far more effectively than those countering their terrorist campaign. This is a supreme irony in the United States. We invented the Internet and, in my view, we’re losing the Internet battle.
Some controls of the Internet are possible and legitimate. Even in societies that protect free speech, we prohibit child ****ography, and in some countries, Nazi propaganda is outlawed. We control advertising for alcohol and tobacco. We limit Internet gambling. We try to protect the public against Internet fraud and spam. Why not block terrorist recruiting, incitement to violence, and instruction in its methods?
At the same time, we should not see the Internet war exclusively in terms of walls and moats, which can always be circumvented. When I was a soldier learning jungle warfare, an instructor told us, “The jungle is not your enemy. The jungle is not your friend. The jungle is neutral. Learn how to turn it to your advantage.” The Internet is a new jungle. Just as we had to learn how to fight in the jungle, we now have to learn how to fight on the Internet.
International efforts have diminished al Qaeda’s cash flow, and have made financial transfers more dangerous for the terrorists, but the jihadists are still able to raise money from sympathetic contributors and criminal activities—drug trafficking, petty theft, product counterfeiting, fraud. We may be close to the limits of our ability to squeeze their operational funds. It is easier to block the transfer of millions than it is to prevent terrorists from raising many locally.
The 9/11 attacks cost al Qaeda an estimated half-million dollars and involved large bank transfers. The four truck bombings in Istanbul in 2003 cost $170,000—only $42,000 each. The 2004 Madrid bombings cost no more than $15,000. The 2005 London bombing cost a mere $2,000.
Q. Jihadist terrorism is backed by an economic empire and it seems that measures to dismantle this empire have failed. What should be done to cut off money supplies to terrorists?
International efforts have diminished al Qaeda’s cash flow, and have made financial transfers more dangerous for the terrorists, but the jihadists are still able to raise money from sympathetic contributors and criminal activitie - drug trafficking, petty theft, product counterfeiting, fraud. We may be close to the limits of our ability to squeeze their operational funds. It is easier to block the transfer of millions than it is to prevent terrorists from raising many locally.
The 9/11 attacks cost al-Qaeda an estimated half-million dollars and involved large bank transfers. The four truck bombings in Istanbul in 2003 cost $170,000 - only $42,000 each. The 2004 Madrid bombings cost no more than $15,000. The 2005 London bombing cost a mere $2,000.
Q. The military fight against terrorism seems to have yielded few results. A survey by Foreign Policy suggests that the world is less safe now than when President Bush announced his "war on terrorism". What can be done to combat terrorism effectively?
Immediately after 9/11, the United States understandably focused its effort on degrading al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities. This involved military operations in Afghanistan and law enforcement operations worldwide.
The toppling of the Taliban, the dispersal of al Qaeda’s training camps, which were an accessible destination point for jihadist volunteers around the world, the capture of some of al Qaeda’s top operational planners - precious talent not easily replaced, all of this had positive result. And international cooperation was unprecedented.
By the end of 2002, I believe that al-Qaeda was in a difficult situation, although I also believed that the campaign to completely destroy the jihadist enterprise would take many, many years.
The invasion of Iraq, from my focused perspective, was a dangerous distraction. And it saved al-Qaeda by arousing anger in the Arab world and Muslim community, energising al-Qaeda’s recruiting drive, enabling it to update and enlarge its cadre of Afghan veterans with Iraqi fighters, diverting precious US resources, and eroding international support. Resilient and adaptive, al-Qaeda exploited the situation to regain its strength.
To combat terrorism effectively now, we need to recognize that the conflict will last a long time. This is a marathon, not a prizefight - there will be no knockout pumches. We, therefore, must conserve resources: our courage, the blood of our soldiers, our national treasure, our will to continue, popular support in the United States and in the world.
Our primary goal must be to prevent al-Qaeda or its successors from being able to mount another 9/11-scale attack or worse. This will require a sustained global effort, not something the United States can do alone.
We may be better off to abandon the term “Global War on Terrorism” as an all-encompassing framework for American policy. The current conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, the turbulent situations in Pakistan and Lebanon, looming confrontation with Iran, the unresolved issues in Palestine, the problems of integrating Muslim populations in Europe, and of religious fundamentalism that threatens fundamental human rights are related, but must be addressed individually within the context of local history and geography.
We need to wage more effective political warfare, not just pound al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities, but blunt its message, discredit its ideology and tactics, reduce the appeal of its narrative to angry young men from Copenhagen to Cairo.
Terrorists groups are seldom entirely eliminated. There are still a few stray 'brigatisti' running around Italy. With guns, they are dangerous, but they are irrelevant. That is the fate of terrorist groups. Locked in their own tiny universe, they become increasingly irrelevant as the world moves on. That may be Osama bin Laden’s biggest fear.
Q.Security measures linked to the "war against terrorism" have deprived people of some of their civil rights. Does the danger exist that many of these rights which were won over years of political battles could be lost if the "war against terrorism" continues?
Every democratic nation - Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom - confronting a serious terrorist threat has been obliged to revise the rules to facilitate the collection of intelligence, broaden police powers, increase security. These countries suppressed terrorism - and remained democracies - by preserving their basic values. The important thing is maintaining the rule of law, not yielding to broad assertions of executive authority in wartime or extrajudicial measures.
Q. The US has recently added Iran's Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards to a list of terrorist organisations. Is it correct to regard a public institution such as the Pasdaran in Iran as a terrorist organisation?
As I wrote in my last book, 'Unconquerable Nation': “Our most effective defense against terrorism will come not from surveillance, concrete barriers, metal detectors or new laws. It will come from our own virtue, our courage, our continued dedication to the ideals of a free society… It will come from our fierce determination, despite the risks, to defend our liberties and protect our values.”
Link (http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1478036070): (http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1478036070)
Rome, 26 Oct. (AKI) - Rome-based daily Il Messaggero on Friday published an an excerpt from the following interview by Adnkronos International (AKI) with one of the worlds' top terrorism authorities, Brian Michael Jenkins. A former US army commander in Vietnam, he is currently an advisor to the US national terrorism committee, special security advisor to the Vatican and a member of the US presidential committee on air safety, as well the author of numerous books.
Q. Traditional terrorism, as practiced by left-wing and right-wing extremists in Europe, tried to change the political structure of a country through violent acts. Jihadist terrorism on the other hand aims to destroy its "infidel enemy". Do you believe that a statement you made in 1975 that "terrorists want to attract public opinion, not kill it" still holds true?
I sometimes try to capture the essence of an idea in a single phrase. In 1975, I wrote that “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” It was in response to those who saw terrorists as bent upon mindless murder.
I argued that since even those we label terrorists did not do what we knew they were technically capable of doing, there must be self-imposed constraints. Wanton violence could threaten consensus and cohesion within the terrorist group itself, exposing it to betrayal.
Indiscriminate violence could alienate the terrorists' perceived constituents - terrorists always imagined themselves to have legions of supporters, but recognised that not all shared their stomach for bloodshed.
Indiscriminate violence could also provoke a public backlash against the terrorists, thereby providing government authorities with support for draconian methods.
These self-imposed constraints were neither universal nor immutable, and over time they eroded as terrorists became brutalised by long struggles and had to escalate to stay in the headlines. The engines of conflict also changed.
Ideological battles were replaced by ethnic antagonisms and religious fanaticism - causes that lend themselves to atrocities. Conviction that one has God’s mandate to destroy heathens, heretics, pagans and infidels removes all worldly constraints. Large-scale indiscriminate violence increased.
That, however, does not mean that practical political calculations have disappeared from terrorist decision-making, even among jihadist terrorists who produce fatwas claiming they have the right to kill millions of infidels.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second-in-command warned Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq that his slaughtering of Shias and other Muslims regarded as heretics or traitors might not easily be understood by Iraq’s Muslim masses and risked isolating al Qaeda from the people.
Zarqawi, a street thug, ignored the warning, pointing out that he, not distant leaders, commanded in Iraq. There were similar differences between the early ideologues and the later bloodier-minded members of Italy’s Red Brigades.
Al-Qaeda’s brutality eventually did alienate many Iraqis. Zarqawi himself was forced into sharing leadership with a Shura council [of tribal elders]. He was then killed, I suspect, the victim of betrayal by al Qaeda itself.
Q. According to a recent survey conducted by Harris Interactive, a growing number of Europeans are losing faith in the Muslim communities that live in Europe. Some, the study results show, believe that integration policies have failed, and that those most likely to commit acts of terrorism are second generation Muslims who have failed to integrate.
Europe has experienced problems integrating Muslim immigrants, who represent a significant and growing portion of the total population. Because of Europe’s proximity to North Africa and the Middle East, many of these recent immigrants are economic refugees who are more difficult to integrate. And the barriers to economic and social advancement are high. Putting aside race, if one doesn’t go to the right school or speaks with a heavy accent, opportunities are extremely limited. And in many European countries, citizenship is almost unattainable. This has created an alienated underclass.
This is one area where America does well, not because of its brilliant policies, but because, as a nation of immigrants, we have low barriers to social integration and economic advancement. And a foreign accent is no barrier at all. Look at former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Can you imagine someone with a strong American accent becoming foreign minister of France?
Q. Why are many well-educated Muslim youths turning their backs on their relatively affluent lifestyles to become suicide bombers as in the cases of the recent attack at Glasgow airport and September 11?
There are not that many. Since 9/11, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan there have been only about 20 suicide attacks directed by al-Qaeda or inspired by its ideology. There are 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. The total number of suicide bombers involved in these attacks is fewer than a hundred.
Recruits are more plentiful in Iraq, Afghanistan, and, of course, Palestine, but these are conflict zones that create their own dynamics of death.
Education never has been a barrier to extreme beliefs or suicide in any form.
Q. In Europe there are those, like Italian prime minister Romano Prodi, who are convinced that to curb terrorism one must talk to the enemy and thus with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah who have a double nature. They participate in society at an institutional and political level while refusing to give up terrorism. Do you believe that dialogue with such groups can help defeat terrorism?
Talking with the enemy is always politically risky. Whether it makes sense in a particular situation varies according to the circumstances. The British, first secretly, then openly, pursued a dialogue with the IRA, despite the latter’s bloody campaign of terror.
Eventually, that conflict was resolved. The Spanish government on several occasions has pursued talks with ETA separatists, but the terrorism campaign continues. And years of dialogue and multiple amnesty offers have not ended the bitter armed conflict in Colombia. On the other hand, Germany defeated the Red Army Factions and Italy prevailed over the Red Brigades without negotiations.
Despite the risks, I favor the deals being struck between American forces in Iraq and former insurgents who now want to drive out al Qaeda. At the same time, I don’t think a dialogue with al Qaeda itself would produce any positive result. In al Qaeda’s view, theirs is a struggle between good and evil and it will continue until evil is destroyed or Judgment Day, whichever comes first.
Hamas and Hezbollah are not just terrorist groups. They are large political organisations. They have won elections. They run or participate in governments. Therefore, it may be possible to engage them politically, but one cannot be naive. Dialogue alone will not defeat terrorism. To reverse Clauswitz, politics are a continuation of war by other means.
Q. Islamic fundamentalism is growing in many Asian nations, from Pakistan to Indonesia, and at the same time there is an increase in anti-Western sentiment in that part of the world. To what extent is the West to blame for the growth of Islamism and how much has the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes contributed to this?
First, we need to distinguish between growing Islamic fundamentalism and the jihadist ideology broadcast by al- Qaeda, which is an aberrant, heretical interpretation of Islam. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism is a complex phenomenon.
There has been a general growth in the more muscular versions of all faiths. Look at Christian Evangelicals, who have made great inroads in the traditionally Catholic countries of Latin America. Or look at the growing voice of the more conservative wings of the Catholic and Anglican Churches.
In part, it is a spiritual response to growing materialism, the erosion of faith, the onslaught of often shocking Western culture in traditional societies, to modernity itself.
Economists see it more in marketing terms. Today’s crusades and Jihads [holy wars] - as spiritual missions, not incitements to violenc - are well-financed, advertise, expand their retail outlets, and compete for market share. Saudi funding of Wahabi mosques is an example. Competition among faiths pushes believers toward fundamentalism.
Q. Jihadist terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists reject modernism, but to fight the West they use the Internet, the most prominent symbol of technological progress in the globalised world. How would you explain this contradiction?
Jihadists reject our so-called modern values. But they are not Amish who insist on horse-drawn carriages and homemade clothes. The jihadist ideology itself, although cloaked in religious faith, is closer to the Western revolutionary doctrines of the 20th century than it is to 7th century Islam. Osama bin Laden talks poetically about steeds and swords, but jihadists have no hesitation in using modern weapons, including the Internet, which has become a key battlefield in this conflict.
Q. In fact, the Internet seems to have become a weapon for the jihadist movement with ever more sites linked to Islamic terrorism springing up and posing a threat to security. Is it possible to deprive terrorists of this weapon?
There is no question that the jihadists have exploited the Internet far more effectively than those countering their terrorist campaign. This is a supreme irony in the United States. We invented the Internet and, in my view, we’re losing the Internet battle.
Some controls of the Internet are possible and legitimate. Even in societies that protect free speech, we prohibit child ****ography, and in some countries, Nazi propaganda is outlawed. We control advertising for alcohol and tobacco. We limit Internet gambling. We try to protect the public against Internet fraud and spam. Why not block terrorist recruiting, incitement to violence, and instruction in its methods?
At the same time, we should not see the Internet war exclusively in terms of walls and moats, which can always be circumvented. When I was a soldier learning jungle warfare, an instructor told us, “The jungle is not your enemy. The jungle is not your friend. The jungle is neutral. Learn how to turn it to your advantage.” The Internet is a new jungle. Just as we had to learn how to fight in the jungle, we now have to learn how to fight on the Internet.
International efforts have diminished al Qaeda’s cash flow, and have made financial transfers more dangerous for the terrorists, but the jihadists are still able to raise money from sympathetic contributors and criminal activities—drug trafficking, petty theft, product counterfeiting, fraud. We may be close to the limits of our ability to squeeze their operational funds. It is easier to block the transfer of millions than it is to prevent terrorists from raising many locally.
The 9/11 attacks cost al Qaeda an estimated half-million dollars and involved large bank transfers. The four truck bombings in Istanbul in 2003 cost $170,000—only $42,000 each. The 2004 Madrid bombings cost no more than $15,000. The 2005 London bombing cost a mere $2,000.
Q. Jihadist terrorism is backed by an economic empire and it seems that measures to dismantle this empire have failed. What should be done to cut off money supplies to terrorists?
International efforts have diminished al Qaeda’s cash flow, and have made financial transfers more dangerous for the terrorists, but the jihadists are still able to raise money from sympathetic contributors and criminal activitie - drug trafficking, petty theft, product counterfeiting, fraud. We may be close to the limits of our ability to squeeze their operational funds. It is easier to block the transfer of millions than it is to prevent terrorists from raising many locally.
The 9/11 attacks cost al-Qaeda an estimated half-million dollars and involved large bank transfers. The four truck bombings in Istanbul in 2003 cost $170,000 - only $42,000 each. The 2004 Madrid bombings cost no more than $15,000. The 2005 London bombing cost a mere $2,000.
Q. The military fight against terrorism seems to have yielded few results. A survey by Foreign Policy suggests that the world is less safe now than when President Bush announced his "war on terrorism". What can be done to combat terrorism effectively?
Immediately after 9/11, the United States understandably focused its effort on degrading al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities. This involved military operations in Afghanistan and law enforcement operations worldwide.
The toppling of the Taliban, the dispersal of al Qaeda’s training camps, which were an accessible destination point for jihadist volunteers around the world, the capture of some of al Qaeda’s top operational planners - precious talent not easily replaced, all of this had positive result. And international cooperation was unprecedented.
By the end of 2002, I believe that al-Qaeda was in a difficult situation, although I also believed that the campaign to completely destroy the jihadist enterprise would take many, many years.
The invasion of Iraq, from my focused perspective, was a dangerous distraction. And it saved al-Qaeda by arousing anger in the Arab world and Muslim community, energising al-Qaeda’s recruiting drive, enabling it to update and enlarge its cadre of Afghan veterans with Iraqi fighters, diverting precious US resources, and eroding international support. Resilient and adaptive, al-Qaeda exploited the situation to regain its strength.
To combat terrorism effectively now, we need to recognize that the conflict will last a long time. This is a marathon, not a prizefight - there will be no knockout pumches. We, therefore, must conserve resources: our courage, the blood of our soldiers, our national treasure, our will to continue, popular support in the United States and in the world.
Our primary goal must be to prevent al-Qaeda or its successors from being able to mount another 9/11-scale attack or worse. This will require a sustained global effort, not something the United States can do alone.
We may be better off to abandon the term “Global War on Terrorism” as an all-encompassing framework for American policy. The current conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, the turbulent situations in Pakistan and Lebanon, looming confrontation with Iran, the unresolved issues in Palestine, the problems of integrating Muslim populations in Europe, and of religious fundamentalism that threatens fundamental human rights are related, but must be addressed individually within the context of local history and geography.
We need to wage more effective political warfare, not just pound al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities, but blunt its message, discredit its ideology and tactics, reduce the appeal of its narrative to angry young men from Copenhagen to Cairo.
Terrorists groups are seldom entirely eliminated. There are still a few stray 'brigatisti' running around Italy. With guns, they are dangerous, but they are irrelevant. That is the fate of terrorist groups. Locked in their own tiny universe, they become increasingly irrelevant as the world moves on. That may be Osama bin Laden’s biggest fear.
Q.Security measures linked to the "war against terrorism" have deprived people of some of their civil rights. Does the danger exist that many of these rights which were won over years of political battles could be lost if the "war against terrorism" continues?
Every democratic nation - Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom - confronting a serious terrorist threat has been obliged to revise the rules to facilitate the collection of intelligence, broaden police powers, increase security. These countries suppressed terrorism - and remained democracies - by preserving their basic values. The important thing is maintaining the rule of law, not yielding to broad assertions of executive authority in wartime or extrajudicial measures.
Q. The US has recently added Iran's Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards to a list of terrorist organisations. Is it correct to regard a public institution such as the Pasdaran in Iran as a terrorist organisation?
As I wrote in my last book, 'Unconquerable Nation': “Our most effective defense against terrorism will come not from surveillance, concrete barriers, metal detectors or new laws. It will come from our own virtue, our courage, our continued dedication to the ideals of a free society… It will come from our fierce determination, despite the risks, to defend our liberties and protect our values.”
Link (http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1478036070): (http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1478036070)