2RHPZ
05-16-2004, 10:51 AM
Canadians, don´t be angry with this post. I didn´t put it to General Discussion because I belive it is a history now in 2004. But anyway, post opinions, mates.
Poor and Rustic: Canada's Army vs. the Screaming Eagles
The 101st, the Screaming Eagles, is one of America's premiere military units and enjoys a splendid history dating from the Normandy Campaign to the 1991 Gulf War. It is a part of the XVIII Corps, and is available for rapid deployment to any trouble spot. The Division is airmobile and uses helicopters as the basis for manoeuvre and for much of its firepower.
Members of the formation also spend a lot of time overseas on exercises and deployments. They are as experienced in soldiering abroad as any Canadian soldier can expect, and are just as likely to be put into harm's way. Moreover, when they are in harm's way, they are prepared to handle it... much more than would be the case for Canadian troops.
Airmobile troopers are tough. They are also well trained... much better trained than Canadian troops (a distinct turnaround from the 1970s and early '80s). They are also very well equipped. They are not just equipped for modern warfare; they are one of the units that set the standards for how modern operations are conducted. Additionally, the Division's personnel and leaders are, on average, far better educated than their Canadian counterparts.
Dropping in unannounced on the enlisted men's mess-hall for the Division's artillery brigade for lunch was an experience. Seated across from me were three young privates from California. All three were planning on re-enlisting once their 3-year terms were up. All three were high school graduates, and were gathering college credits whenever their duties permitted. (Nearby colleges and universities provide flexible time for troops from the Division.)
The tall corporal from Minnesota was working on a degree in sciences. One of his Master Sergeants occasionally managed his labs while working on a doctorate of his own. The NCOs also often run into their officers in pursuit of post-graduate degrees -- American officers rarely make it to major or beyond without continuing scholarship. The officers, like their men, are solidly professional and impressive in appearance. Some are the children of immigrants who feel they owe something back to America. Others can trace the deeds of their ancestors in the Civil War or beyond.
By contrast, the Canadian Army now seems to be a collection of the uneducated. Too many of our soldiers have not finished high school. Often our officers are not so well educated either. A study, which was part of the "Report to the Prime Minister" prepared for the Minister of Defence in early 1997, found that Canadian officers were badly under-educated in comparison to their US counterparts. For example, 39% of US officers have a Graduate Degree, as opposed to only 6.8% of Canadian ones. Some 39.9% of Canadian officers have less than a BA; this is only true of some 10% of US officers. Moreover, given the necessity of a solid education in the Naval and Air Force environments, Canada's under-educated officers would appear to be much more common in the Army.
The 101st's personnel are bright. They need to be. At the cutting edge, warfare has become very technical indeed. For a start, every vehicle, crew-served weapon or squad in the Division is equipped with a GPS set. For those unfamiliar with the Global Positioning Satellite revolution, it means that you cannot be lost... ever. With a small hand-held receiver, you can always know exactly where you are on the map within seconds. Some Canadian soldiers are familiar with GPS sets too, but hand-receivers are few and far between -- and are often privately purchased anyway. The radios that every Air Assault trooper knows how to use are a marvel as well. The SINCGARS system is light, easy to use, and has a number of features that most of our Army's Vietnam-War era radios don't share. All sets are frequency hoppers, with automatic encryption/decryption, and burst transmitters. Thus, their communications are safe and secure while still being easy to use. These radios can be plugged into a GPS set to automatically report position, and can also be jacked into one of the tough light portable computers that shares data throughout the division. Canada's long delayed modern equivalent system is just starting to creep into service -- years late and without the "plug-in" additions that the Americans enjoy.
With SINCGARs and the computer interface, a squad leader about to run a night patrol can download all the latest information and intelligence for his route and target. His situation and contact reports are also fed into the entire Divisional/Corps net. In this way, anyone in the 101st can find out in real time what is happening in any area. The computer system, a follow-on the highly successful IVIS system found in US mechanized formations, is still being introduced. Besides revolutionizing reporting and planning, it also automates much of the logistics and supply systems. The plodding Canadian command post system with china-markers, plastic covered maps and hand-written logs is definitely passé.
As the Screaming Eagles always know where they are and what's going on around them, they also know what to do about it. But whatever they do, they will prefer to do it in darkness. As one young sergeant told me, "Any fool can fight in the day, but we own the night." [Original emphasis] Virtually every soldier has a set of AN/PVS-7B night vision goggles. The Canadian army does have the same item of equipment, but it is not issued nearly as widely. Night operations are the exception for Canadians, with the 101st it's the rule.
This applies to all major equipment. The Apache and Black Hawk helicopters fly at night, and the Apache is an evil nocturnal predator. It is fairly quiet, quite agile, and sees everything in the darkness. It also bristles with armament. Yet it is perhaps the helicopter's ability to flawlessly dump whole battalions of troops at night, on time and in the right place, that is an even more profound accomplishment.
Most of the infantry weapons used in the 101st would be entirely familiar to Canadian soldiers. In some cases, the exact same weapons are in use. However, the combination of GPS, SINCGARs and computers means that crew-served weapons are more likely to be used exactly when and where as needed. Laser ranger finders are also very common. Moreover, the wide distribution of "death dot" laser sights for many small arms are a small revolution in themselves. The laser is invisible, save through the night goggles. So a squad leader at night can come upon a road block in Lower Slobovia or Jihadistan, point out to his men who will shoot exactly whom and with what, and the gunmen at the road block will never know what hit them.
Finally, every individual soldier has passed the Air Assault training course, and knows how to load up any item of equipment in the division on any helicopter in its service. In the 101st, the women are expected to meet the same physical qualifications for Air Assault troopers -- and I watched one going over a far more frightening obstacle course than anything I ever did on a Canadian base. For Canadian soldiers, loadmasters are very rare (and as like as not were trained by the US anyway), while a helicopter ride is a rare novelty on training exercises.
The Canadian Army has been rusting out for a while. While the 4th Brigade in Germany in the late 1980s was well trained and completely equipped, this was not true of the rest of the Army. Moreover, by the late 1980s, 4th Brigade's Leopard 1 tanks and M-113s did not place it among the most modern of NATO formations. Things have worsened since. The only partly modern formation that was ready to participate in battle was already under strength in 1988, and has since been brought home anyway.
Since the end of the Cold War, Canadian troops have not been trained in a modern environment, have not trained in realistic large exercises, and have not received anything to speak of in new combat equipment. They have, however, been sent in operation after operation after operation, without adequate training and support. For troops at home, they lack ammunition for training, field rations, uniforms, and everything else that would properly train soldiers for anything more than "peacekeeping" -- peacekeeping as the Federal Cabinet sees it, and not that which was the experience of those who served in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. Whatever success can be attributed to these operations largely exists off the expenditure of human and material capital that remains from earlier days.
The cri de coeur expressed in Jim Davis's excellent book The Sharp End has resonated with many soldiers, and the bill of charges rung up in Scott Taylor's Tested Mettle has yet to be answered. The wasting sickness that plagues the Canadian Army is a long way from being treated, and the patient may die.
In a word, Canada does not adequately train individual soldiers anymore. Therefore, it can not train sections, platoons, companies or battalions. The building blocks of combat ready formations no longer exist. The corporate memory of readiness for the operations of the 1970s and '80s is fast going, and Canada probably could not now assemble a modern battle-ready force without extensive foreign help beyond the provision of equipment.
By contrast, the 101st is in a perpetual training cycle. The Division's three brigades constantly rotate through a standby slot (wherein a brigade 's leading party can be loaded on transport aircraft on four hours notice, and the rest can follow in 18). The other two brigades are either rotating out of a foreign deployment or are involved in extensive collective training. The unit on standby is constantly training as well. Training is tough, imaginative, and concentrates on the basics.
Actually, Canadian training is imaginative too. Our soldiers are used to training by making considerable use of pretended resources. Trucks have long been imagined as helicopters, the human voice has been making up for a perpetual shortage of blank ammunition, and Cougar "tank trainers" that were bought as substitutes for real armour have been criminally placed in that role anyway.
The 101st Division is the fulfilment of operational concepts that were only being discussed some 40 years ago. Even today, with the US military as disaffected as it is under the Clinton Administration, new equipment and techniques are constantly being provided to it. In terms of equipment and doctrine, it is already one long revolutionary step of what remains to the Canadian Army, and it is already entering the next revolution.
When the 101st moves in campaign (like it did in Iraq), it takes 150 km strides every day. Behind a curtain of co-ordinated firepower, another wave of helicopters drops a brigade in the enemy's rear. The brigade then provides a lodgement from which Apache helicopters and heliborne artillery can spread mayhem and murder for miles about, while the next day's giant step is prepared.
Each step can take place at night or in foul weather, regardless of such trivial conditions on the ground as swamps, rivers, minefields, traffic jams and other pedestrian concerns. The Division's sensors mean that it can see everything in sight (with thermal imagers on Apaches and so many weapon platforms, there is no way to hide). Its communications system means all discoveries are instantly shared, and the appropriate instrument of firepower is tasked with dealing with a problem.
This combination of mobility, firepower, and co-ordination provides capabilities that have never existed before. The pace of operational manoeuvre afforded by helicopters was only guessed at by the pioneers of Blitzkrieg, and occurred very rarely in WW-II. (Historically such a pace was only achieved in the virtual absence of the enemy). Moreover, the division can fight faster than any conceivable opponent -- thus always retaining the initiative.
When Canada got out of the modern loop, it was still back in a more leisurely concept of operations that would have been quite familiar in the latter years of the Second World War.
By way of a paleontological comparison, the Canadian Army is like Homo Erectus, fussing about with simple hand choppers and fire-hardened sticks compared to Homo Sapiens armed with bows and spear throwers. We have some evolving to do.
The smart fighting that the 101st engages in demands soldiers who are fit enough to do all the jobs of a soldier, and more besides. Equipment such as the SINCGARs, night goggles and GPS receivers are not that complex to use, but the changes they make to the way fighting is conducted are profound. Soldiers need to be smart, fast thinkers, and quick to recognize new situations. While Canadian soldiers have proven their adaptability and resourcefulness time after time throughout this century, this gift does need to be honed -- and higher standards of education for our soldiery (and their officers!) are needed.
The Air Assault Division does have some weaknesses. Its chief of operations feels vulnerable to air defences and must either defeat or avoid them. He feels that is vulnerable to artillery (once landed), and has "significant" fuel and ammunition needs. Fine, but Canadians are in no position to sneer. Our helpless troops are vulnerable to everything in creation -- even wild dogs, and our Army has no strengths to balances against all of its weaknesses.
Canadians might like to imagine that our supposed expertise at peacekeeping makes our soldiers morally superior to belligerent American troopers. In 1996, members of the 101st were busy keeping the world quiet in the Sinai, Panama, Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bosnia. The Screaming Eagles know what the World is like too -- and they are just as willing to be helpful, generous and accommodating. What's more, when they deploy, they can expect the backing of their government. This is a luxury that Canadian soldiers have not experienced for a long time.
Currently, the World seems somewhat peaceful... much as it did a century ago. But any soldier who reads history knows how quickly things can change. The Screaming Eagles are ready to confront whatever comes in the future. The Canadian Army, now a shadow of itself, is still mired in the past. If the time comes to learn how to fight again, we may not even remember how.
Hoping for the lavish equipment and budgets that the 101st enjoys may be vain for now. But we can at least focus on the education and spirit that will provide a basis for a modern force to develop when it is needed. The Canadian Army may be poor, but there is no excuse for remaining ignorant and under-educated.
A short time ago, the author was a guest of the US government on a visit to the 101st Air Assault Division in Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The trip aroused deep feelings of respect... and envy. Moreover, it served a grim reminder as to just how backward the Canadian Army has become.
http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2000_06_02_Military_Eagles.html
Poor and Rustic: Canada's Army vs. the Screaming Eagles
The 101st, the Screaming Eagles, is one of America's premiere military units and enjoys a splendid history dating from the Normandy Campaign to the 1991 Gulf War. It is a part of the XVIII Corps, and is available for rapid deployment to any trouble spot. The Division is airmobile and uses helicopters as the basis for manoeuvre and for much of its firepower.
Members of the formation also spend a lot of time overseas on exercises and deployments. They are as experienced in soldiering abroad as any Canadian soldier can expect, and are just as likely to be put into harm's way. Moreover, when they are in harm's way, they are prepared to handle it... much more than would be the case for Canadian troops.
Airmobile troopers are tough. They are also well trained... much better trained than Canadian troops (a distinct turnaround from the 1970s and early '80s). They are also very well equipped. They are not just equipped for modern warfare; they are one of the units that set the standards for how modern operations are conducted. Additionally, the Division's personnel and leaders are, on average, far better educated than their Canadian counterparts.
Dropping in unannounced on the enlisted men's mess-hall for the Division's artillery brigade for lunch was an experience. Seated across from me were three young privates from California. All three were planning on re-enlisting once their 3-year terms were up. All three were high school graduates, and were gathering college credits whenever their duties permitted. (Nearby colleges and universities provide flexible time for troops from the Division.)
The tall corporal from Minnesota was working on a degree in sciences. One of his Master Sergeants occasionally managed his labs while working on a doctorate of his own. The NCOs also often run into their officers in pursuit of post-graduate degrees -- American officers rarely make it to major or beyond without continuing scholarship. The officers, like their men, are solidly professional and impressive in appearance. Some are the children of immigrants who feel they owe something back to America. Others can trace the deeds of their ancestors in the Civil War or beyond.
By contrast, the Canadian Army now seems to be a collection of the uneducated. Too many of our soldiers have not finished high school. Often our officers are not so well educated either. A study, which was part of the "Report to the Prime Minister" prepared for the Minister of Defence in early 1997, found that Canadian officers were badly under-educated in comparison to their US counterparts. For example, 39% of US officers have a Graduate Degree, as opposed to only 6.8% of Canadian ones. Some 39.9% of Canadian officers have less than a BA; this is only true of some 10% of US officers. Moreover, given the necessity of a solid education in the Naval and Air Force environments, Canada's under-educated officers would appear to be much more common in the Army.
The 101st's personnel are bright. They need to be. At the cutting edge, warfare has become very technical indeed. For a start, every vehicle, crew-served weapon or squad in the Division is equipped with a GPS set. For those unfamiliar with the Global Positioning Satellite revolution, it means that you cannot be lost... ever. With a small hand-held receiver, you can always know exactly where you are on the map within seconds. Some Canadian soldiers are familiar with GPS sets too, but hand-receivers are few and far between -- and are often privately purchased anyway. The radios that every Air Assault trooper knows how to use are a marvel as well. The SINCGARS system is light, easy to use, and has a number of features that most of our Army's Vietnam-War era radios don't share. All sets are frequency hoppers, with automatic encryption/decryption, and burst transmitters. Thus, their communications are safe and secure while still being easy to use. These radios can be plugged into a GPS set to automatically report position, and can also be jacked into one of the tough light portable computers that shares data throughout the division. Canada's long delayed modern equivalent system is just starting to creep into service -- years late and without the "plug-in" additions that the Americans enjoy.
With SINCGARs and the computer interface, a squad leader about to run a night patrol can download all the latest information and intelligence for his route and target. His situation and contact reports are also fed into the entire Divisional/Corps net. In this way, anyone in the 101st can find out in real time what is happening in any area. The computer system, a follow-on the highly successful IVIS system found in US mechanized formations, is still being introduced. Besides revolutionizing reporting and planning, it also automates much of the logistics and supply systems. The plodding Canadian command post system with china-markers, plastic covered maps and hand-written logs is definitely passé.
As the Screaming Eagles always know where they are and what's going on around them, they also know what to do about it. But whatever they do, they will prefer to do it in darkness. As one young sergeant told me, "Any fool can fight in the day, but we own the night." [Original emphasis] Virtually every soldier has a set of AN/PVS-7B night vision goggles. The Canadian army does have the same item of equipment, but it is not issued nearly as widely. Night operations are the exception for Canadians, with the 101st it's the rule.
This applies to all major equipment. The Apache and Black Hawk helicopters fly at night, and the Apache is an evil nocturnal predator. It is fairly quiet, quite agile, and sees everything in the darkness. It also bristles with armament. Yet it is perhaps the helicopter's ability to flawlessly dump whole battalions of troops at night, on time and in the right place, that is an even more profound accomplishment.
Most of the infantry weapons used in the 101st would be entirely familiar to Canadian soldiers. In some cases, the exact same weapons are in use. However, the combination of GPS, SINCGARs and computers means that crew-served weapons are more likely to be used exactly when and where as needed. Laser ranger finders are also very common. Moreover, the wide distribution of "death dot" laser sights for many small arms are a small revolution in themselves. The laser is invisible, save through the night goggles. So a squad leader at night can come upon a road block in Lower Slobovia or Jihadistan, point out to his men who will shoot exactly whom and with what, and the gunmen at the road block will never know what hit them.
Finally, every individual soldier has passed the Air Assault training course, and knows how to load up any item of equipment in the division on any helicopter in its service. In the 101st, the women are expected to meet the same physical qualifications for Air Assault troopers -- and I watched one going over a far more frightening obstacle course than anything I ever did on a Canadian base. For Canadian soldiers, loadmasters are very rare (and as like as not were trained by the US anyway), while a helicopter ride is a rare novelty on training exercises.
The Canadian Army has been rusting out for a while. While the 4th Brigade in Germany in the late 1980s was well trained and completely equipped, this was not true of the rest of the Army. Moreover, by the late 1980s, 4th Brigade's Leopard 1 tanks and M-113s did not place it among the most modern of NATO formations. Things have worsened since. The only partly modern formation that was ready to participate in battle was already under strength in 1988, and has since been brought home anyway.
Since the end of the Cold War, Canadian troops have not been trained in a modern environment, have not trained in realistic large exercises, and have not received anything to speak of in new combat equipment. They have, however, been sent in operation after operation after operation, without adequate training and support. For troops at home, they lack ammunition for training, field rations, uniforms, and everything else that would properly train soldiers for anything more than "peacekeeping" -- peacekeeping as the Federal Cabinet sees it, and not that which was the experience of those who served in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. Whatever success can be attributed to these operations largely exists off the expenditure of human and material capital that remains from earlier days.
The cri de coeur expressed in Jim Davis's excellent book The Sharp End has resonated with many soldiers, and the bill of charges rung up in Scott Taylor's Tested Mettle has yet to be answered. The wasting sickness that plagues the Canadian Army is a long way from being treated, and the patient may die.
In a word, Canada does not adequately train individual soldiers anymore. Therefore, it can not train sections, platoons, companies or battalions. The building blocks of combat ready formations no longer exist. The corporate memory of readiness for the operations of the 1970s and '80s is fast going, and Canada probably could not now assemble a modern battle-ready force without extensive foreign help beyond the provision of equipment.
By contrast, the 101st is in a perpetual training cycle. The Division's three brigades constantly rotate through a standby slot (wherein a brigade 's leading party can be loaded on transport aircraft on four hours notice, and the rest can follow in 18). The other two brigades are either rotating out of a foreign deployment or are involved in extensive collective training. The unit on standby is constantly training as well. Training is tough, imaginative, and concentrates on the basics.
Actually, Canadian training is imaginative too. Our soldiers are used to training by making considerable use of pretended resources. Trucks have long been imagined as helicopters, the human voice has been making up for a perpetual shortage of blank ammunition, and Cougar "tank trainers" that were bought as substitutes for real armour have been criminally placed in that role anyway.
The 101st Division is the fulfilment of operational concepts that were only being discussed some 40 years ago. Even today, with the US military as disaffected as it is under the Clinton Administration, new equipment and techniques are constantly being provided to it. In terms of equipment and doctrine, it is already one long revolutionary step of what remains to the Canadian Army, and it is already entering the next revolution.
When the 101st moves in campaign (like it did in Iraq), it takes 150 km strides every day. Behind a curtain of co-ordinated firepower, another wave of helicopters drops a brigade in the enemy's rear. The brigade then provides a lodgement from which Apache helicopters and heliborne artillery can spread mayhem and murder for miles about, while the next day's giant step is prepared.
Each step can take place at night or in foul weather, regardless of such trivial conditions on the ground as swamps, rivers, minefields, traffic jams and other pedestrian concerns. The Division's sensors mean that it can see everything in sight (with thermal imagers on Apaches and so many weapon platforms, there is no way to hide). Its communications system means all discoveries are instantly shared, and the appropriate instrument of firepower is tasked with dealing with a problem.
This combination of mobility, firepower, and co-ordination provides capabilities that have never existed before. The pace of operational manoeuvre afforded by helicopters was only guessed at by the pioneers of Blitzkrieg, and occurred very rarely in WW-II. (Historically such a pace was only achieved in the virtual absence of the enemy). Moreover, the division can fight faster than any conceivable opponent -- thus always retaining the initiative.
When Canada got out of the modern loop, it was still back in a more leisurely concept of operations that would have been quite familiar in the latter years of the Second World War.
By way of a paleontological comparison, the Canadian Army is like Homo Erectus, fussing about with simple hand choppers and fire-hardened sticks compared to Homo Sapiens armed with bows and spear throwers. We have some evolving to do.
The smart fighting that the 101st engages in demands soldiers who are fit enough to do all the jobs of a soldier, and more besides. Equipment such as the SINCGARs, night goggles and GPS receivers are not that complex to use, but the changes they make to the way fighting is conducted are profound. Soldiers need to be smart, fast thinkers, and quick to recognize new situations. While Canadian soldiers have proven their adaptability and resourcefulness time after time throughout this century, this gift does need to be honed -- and higher standards of education for our soldiery (and their officers!) are needed.
The Air Assault Division does have some weaknesses. Its chief of operations feels vulnerable to air defences and must either defeat or avoid them. He feels that is vulnerable to artillery (once landed), and has "significant" fuel and ammunition needs. Fine, but Canadians are in no position to sneer. Our helpless troops are vulnerable to everything in creation -- even wild dogs, and our Army has no strengths to balances against all of its weaknesses.
Canadians might like to imagine that our supposed expertise at peacekeeping makes our soldiers morally superior to belligerent American troopers. In 1996, members of the 101st were busy keeping the world quiet in the Sinai, Panama, Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bosnia. The Screaming Eagles know what the World is like too -- and they are just as willing to be helpful, generous and accommodating. What's more, when they deploy, they can expect the backing of their government. This is a luxury that Canadian soldiers have not experienced for a long time.
Currently, the World seems somewhat peaceful... much as it did a century ago. But any soldier who reads history knows how quickly things can change. The Screaming Eagles are ready to confront whatever comes in the future. The Canadian Army, now a shadow of itself, is still mired in the past. If the time comes to learn how to fight again, we may not even remember how.
Hoping for the lavish equipment and budgets that the 101st enjoys may be vain for now. But we can at least focus on the education and spirit that will provide a basis for a modern force to develop when it is needed. The Canadian Army may be poor, but there is no excuse for remaining ignorant and under-educated.
A short time ago, the author was a guest of the US government on a visit to the 101st Air Assault Division in Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The trip aroused deep feelings of respect... and envy. Moreover, it served a grim reminder as to just how backward the Canadian Army has become.
http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2000_06_02_Military_Eagles.html