Lancero
11-03-2007, 03:33 PM
I'll post a document about the little known (abroad) operation Mar Verde (Green Sea) that took place in Guinea, 1970, during the portuguese African War. It's a 4 part document that I'll try to post in the next days. It's my translation from portuguese Forum Armada - all credits go to them and all errors to my translation.
THE OPERATION GREEN SEA
Part 1 - The context of the war in Guinea
Since 1963 the Portuguese Armed Forces faced a guerrilla war carried out by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Despite having promoted disobedience in 1961, the year in which the attention of Portugal were focused at the beginning of the war in Angola, it was from January that the PAIGC, supported by the Soviet and its bloc undertook what was the most difficult guerrilla that Portugal had to face. The conditions of the theater of operations were the most unfavorable to Portugal. First, the lack of the area (36,125 km2), without strategic depth. Second, the fact that, following the independence of the French and British colonies, Guinea become a small European colonial enclave in a region of new independent states politically adverse to Portugal. This was the case for both neighbors, Guinea-Conakry (pro-Soviet) and Senegal, which allowed the use of their territory as sanctuaries for the PAIGC.
The geography was problematic, and most of the territory a real labyrinth of rivers and canals between small islands and peninsulas. With the full tide, one third of the territory submerged, and when the tide empty it discovered extensive mud areas of difficult acess. Shalow sea lanes largely limited to navigation, placed limits on the size of military vessels, and the efficiency of maritime transport. The road network was precarious outside of the few big cities, the same goes for port infrastructure, exception to the port of Bissau. Outside the savannas and mountainous areas (small) of the interior, the climate is harsh and unhealthy, with high relative humidity throughout the year, and normal temperatures well above 40 °C. The coastal jungles contain all the elements usually harmful to the human presence.
The great ethnic and religious diversity of the indigenous population was not necessarily an obstacle, since there was, at the same time, groups favorable and unfavorable to Portugal. But this context, where coexisted a large number of local languages and dialects, together with cultural habits, social and religious different, forced a proliferation of adaptations of procedure that the Armed Forces had to do, according to the tactical and diplomatic interests, on the relationship with the people. This effort was all too apparent from the moment there were created military units formed exclusively by indigenous, both regular and milicia - in 1974 70% of the total Portuguese Armed Forces, 80% if only the Army account.
In addition to these factors with more direct influence on the conduct of military operations, there were aspects that led to the question of why Portugal invest in the defense of their presence in Guinea. First, the fact that Guinea is a very poor area and delayed, with scarce natural resources. In economic terms, Portugal had no income with Guinea and, by contrast, the revenue of the province was insufficient to support the maintenance of the administrative, educational and medical assistance. The Guinea depended on funds from metropolitan Portugal and this dependence increased with the outbreak of the war of insurrection. The economic and cultural reality also was a reflection of the little population of European origin, the result of climate, and the consequent low public investment in the territory - note that the government was run by Cape Verdeans and most of the business was done by Lebanese and Syrian immigrants. This led the military (Europeans) to ask the reason for the effort of war, with consequences in the motivation and morale of the troops.
http://i205.photobucket.com/albums/bb187/sonias_2007/novembro/1.jpg
PAIGC insurgents
There were three strong arguments to justify the effort in Guinea. First, the majority of the indigenous population was keen to remain Portuguese, for several reasons. In a country with ethnic and religious diversity, in which Portugal acted as a neutral and stabilizing between local rivalries, the Portuguese presence was seen as a guarantor of peace. Also the fact of the PAIGC, be of communist ideology - being in favor of major changes in the organization of social, economic, cultural and religious diversity of the country - earned him the distrust and enmity of a significant part of the population (beginning with Muslims, the second largest religious group, 40% of the population) who did not accept the prospect of radically change its way of life and its institutions. Under Portuguese sovereignty, the population of Guinea was not only free to maintain their way of life as it had the benefits of living under a European quality of administration (for example, the Central Hospital of Bissau was the most well-equipped across West Africa).
In addition to this, with the course of time, were known the bad experiences of other African countries in the post-independence, with economic disasters, civil wars and regimes that made the lives of people a ordeal. Although, in the course of the war and the contact of the PAIGC with the population, a greater percentage shift their loyalty to the independence side, there was a increase of support to Portugal from the remainder population. This would be the source in the plans, by both sides, to find a political solution to Guinea through autonomy instead of independence.
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A typical patrol boat from Portuguese: the LFP Aljezur (of class Alvor), in a river of Guinea
Another argument of weight was the strategic situation of Guinea, providing a point of deployment in West Africa, half way between Europe and Angola, a possible stop in the Cape Route and the sea and air routes of the Portuguese. This has become even more important from the wave of independence in 1960, with the boycott of the new African states to the passage of portuguese ships and aircraft by its territories. Guinea also was an important point of military support (for ships and airplanes) in western Africa, like the Senegal for the French (who kept there important naval, air and land bases after independence).
The third reason - the most important - had to do with the political precedent that would create the granting of independence or autonomy to Guinea that, even with several valid arguments for doing so, could have consequences in the plans that Portugal had in keeping the remaining territories in Africa (for which the government did not consider a similar concession). This was a controversial issue within and outside the political system and of the Armed Forces, so there was never a consensus.
For its part, the PAIGC had much in its favor. In addition to all the difficulties that Portugal had (that were advantages for the PAIGC), the PAIGC had no significant rival independence movements (the MLG and FLING, the latter supported by Senegal, had little expression and later lost the support of the Organization of African Unity, OAU), and had a very competent leadership in the person of Amilcar Cabral (which could overcome the internal rivalries between Cape Verde and Guinea - the latter constituting almost all of the guerrillas in the field, and obtain international support), and their fighters had a knowledge of the terrain that the Portuguese purchased only with time.
Crucial in the correlation of forces between Portugal and the PAIGC were the external support to each side. In a conflict that is formed in the context of the Cold War, one side was supported by the leader of your block strategy (PAIGC / USSR) and the other not. Portugal not only was not supported by the US, as the US was openly hostile to the Portuguese presence in Africa during the decade of 60 (having created and sustained the guerrillas of the FNLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, which started the war in these two countries). On the African issue, Portugal was criticised by most of the international community, had against him the Communist bloc, suffered sanctions of the UN, sanctions of all countries of the African continent (although many were neutral in practice, Portugal only had allies in South Africa and Rhodesia), and in Europe counted only with France, Germany and Spain. These last three accepted breaking the 1961 UN embargo on arms sales to Portugal, becoming Germans and French the main suppliers of military equipment (although, in many cases, on "embargo prices").
In contrast, the US (which had decreed an embargo unilaterally to Portugal) and the UK, allies in NATO, accepted only to provide equipment that was not destined to Africa, but still the availability was little. In the beginning of the war, a substantial part of the equipment in service was of US origin, so the situation was "serious". Even what had been acquired under bilateral agreements (in 40's and 50's) and was not subject to limitations on use, suffered equally the penalties for replacement parts and ammunition, which could only be purchased from other sources in the international market, often on the black market.
This caused serious limitations, specialy to the Air Force, since they could not use aircraft they had, in some models, in large quantity. One of these cases was the use, especially in Guinea, of the North American F-86 Saber fighter, between 1961 and 1963, the year, in the face of great pressure from the US, the PoAF was obliged to return the fleet to Portugal. The PoAF had to build its atack power on the North American T-6G, and only returned to dispose of a fighter jet in the territory in 1966, with the arrival of eight Fiat G-91 purchased from Luftwaffe. In that year, the first Alouette III helis arrived to Guinea. Overall, the countries that accepted to sell equipment to Portugal (Germany and especially France; In smaller quantities Spain, South Africa and Israel) produced material in variety and quality, but there was equipment and sub-systems that was only possible get the US and UK (such as land-air missiles), and whose absence was beeing increasingly important. The small Portuguese defense industry was developing itself to achieving self-sufficiency in support of infantry ground troops, and the supply of dozens of coastal and river boat to the Navy (in the case of ocean vessels, it was necessary to import guns). But it was little compared to the needs.
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The small but robust Alouette III was one of the 'horses of battle' in the operations in Africa.
However, like other independence movements, the PAIGC received shipments of small arms in quantity and quality of the Communist bloc (and also training in Algeria and Morocco, and financial of some European countries, including Sweden, Norway and Denmark), in some cases obtaining weapons superior to the Portuguese side (communications, amphibious tanks PT-76, land-air missiles SA-7, among others). The training, especially given by the Cuban military advisers, from 1965, was extremely competent, and made the fighter of the PAIGC one of the most efficient guerrillas in Africa, although the method of attack on Portuguese were more often by use of mines, ambushes and hit and run atacks to barracks (mortars and recoiless cannons). It's best strategy was to wear the portuguese down.
The PAIGC had as its sanctuary in neighbour Guinea-Conakry (former French Guinea), and training camps and its headquarters in it's capital Conakry. It beneficted of the full support of the dictatorial regime of the pro-Soviet Sékou Touré, which consented the use of its territory as a base to infiltrate in the then Portuguese Guinea. No surprises, the main area of war was precisely in the South, where the PAIGC could easily infiltrate and replenish forces by sea and river, just across the border to take advantage of labyrinthine hydrographic conditions.
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The LFP (Small Surveillance Boat) Arcturus, class Bellatrix, in Guinea
On the Portuguese side, the Armed Forces had from the beginning of the war in Angola (in 1961) a mature doctrine of counter-insurgency, based on careful study of the strategy of "Revolutionary War" (especially the thought of Mao Tsé Tung) and the lessons gathered from other experiences in this kind of war - the British in Malaysia and the French in Indochina and Algeria. The Armed Forces adapted itself and rapidly trained for this type of war. But the fact that the war in Angola started so sudden (as a result of the unexpected withdrawal of Belgium of its Congo, in 1960) caught the Armed Forces largely in the "wrong foot" in terms of material. And the start of the international embargo at the same time prevented the planned process of obtaining appropriate weapons and equipment. This forced the use of equipment dating from WWII (which was in majority during the first half of the 60s), and to ad hoc adjustments, such as the use of maritime patrol aircraft Lockheed PV-2 Harpoon in close air support. The Navy was also very aged, and in insufficient number to patrol the waters of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, the shipping routes between the various territories and to make escort to merchant shipping and transport of troops. The situation was not only worse because of the great effort in the "dust shipyard" - the dozens of small patrol and transport boats operating in rivers, built in Portuguese shipyards, wich did not require the import of guns.
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Marines, disembarking from a Zebro III, in Guinea
Portugal was normally mistreated by the internation media and opinion-makers, reaching the point of conotations of Portuguese troops with Nazi ideology. In contrast, the PAIGC enjoyed (as most African independence movements) of sympathy in the "left oriented" press in the West, which helped build an image of romantic guerrillas, and to promote internationally Amilcar Cabral. But not only from the Soviet Bloc, the OAU and the political left arrived support. In the early 70's, most of the transport vehicles used by PAIGC were Volvo trucks offered by Sweden. Finally, the Catholic Church, following the ideas of the Second Vatican Council, emphasizing the 'Theology of Liberation', was in favour of the independence movements. In the case of Guinea, many Catholic missionaries (especially Italians) worked to turn the population against Portugal.
Despite the obstacles of all kinds, in 1966, the war in Africa was running in favor of Portugal. In Angola, and against the forecasts in 1961, the armed forces were very close to victory and the total annihilation of the independence movements. In Mozambique, where the war started in 1964, the activity of FRELIMO was intense, but their actions (for now) were confined to the northern border (with the Tanzania) and the coast of Lake Niassa, not affecting the rest of the country. But on the contrary, the situation in Guinea was deteriorating. Sorrounded in a small territory, the armed forces were forced to a defensive war. Given the lack of human and material resources, the pressure of the PAIGC and the need to create a strategic depth, the military focused on the coasts and major cities, where was the majority of the population. This caused the PAIGC to freely move in parts of the territory, even distancing themselves from their sanctuaries and logistical support, and make contact with the population, attracting it to their side. In 1963, they even implemented in the south, on the islands of Como. Only several months later, in January 1964, they were expelled by the largest amphibious operation carried out by Portugal throughout the war, Operation Tridente, a landing force of 1200 men of the Army, Marines and paras, supported by naval and air bombardment against estimated 300 guerrillas of the PAIGC and 15 soldiers of Guinea-Conakry. With that defeat, the guerrillas retained once again the lesson that direct confrontations with Portuguese would always end in disaster and, by contrast, the strategy of attrition was the best. Year after year, the wear was felt increasingly on the Portuguese side, with the decrease in morale of regular troops, while the population of the interior increasingly supporting the PAIGC. In addition, there was the poor performance of the high-command of General Arnaldo Schultz, governor and commander-chief since 1964. In the first months of 1968, when the 25,000 Portuguese troops had to face between 8 and 10,000 guerrillas, and with the PAIGC to establish itself and structure within the territory, the situation deteriorated there significantly, ultimately become precarious. There was a perpective of military defeat.
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The dense vegetation on the banks allowed easy ambushes in rivers
1968 would bring various changes. In May, Salazar made one of his last major decisions after decades ahead of a autocratic government: replace Schultz, who lost credit of soldiers and civilians, by the Brigadier António de Spínola (later promoted to general). At the government and military command of Guinea would be a unusual general, with a style of command that cultivated it's charisma, demonstrations of physical courage in the visits to the fighting zones and an energy that was contagious to the troops, lifting their moral - he assumed the size of a living legend.
Wars are not only won with high morale and the new commander introduced changes. He began to apply new tactics, including greater use of helicopters, and search and destroy operations, in the style made by US in Vietnam. Lisbon agreed to send more 10,000 men, bringing the number to 35,000. Spínola followed a strategy not only military but also political. He created bodies representing the various ethnic groups that were meeting later in the Congress of Peoples of Guinea, in order to win the loyalty of the people, or at least get its neutrality. He intelligently exploit the inter-ethnic rivalries, eroding the base of support for the PAIGC, and did eventually conclude an alliance with Fula ethnic group. To carry out it's plans, replaced several senior officers by a group of young, well-prepared officers of lower patent, experts in counter-subversion operations and psychological war. They were known by the boys of Spínola, and constituted its pretorian guard. Making use of new media and psychological tactics, the psychological impact of Spínola was also duly used in national and international media. The international press began to interest themselves in this general, monocle, dressed in camo and who accompanied the troops under fire, and became an international figure. This has caused the international media to begin to pass another message that not only one that Guinea was a site of Africa where the Portuguese bombarded with napalm.
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General António de Spínola (right) in an area of combat, under fire, in 1969.
1968 was also the year of replacing Salazar, for reasons of health, as President of the Council, by Marcello Caetano. A member of the liberal wing of the regime, Caetano advocated a reform in the relationship with the colonies, through the adoption of a federal model, a project that had the opposition of the Orthodox sectors of the regime and the Armed Forces. Marcello Caetano was also favorable to the increase of military expenditure, unlike Salazar who had imposed financial restrictions too severe, even taking into account that the war was prolonged and it was necessary to manage it in a sustainable way. With a reformer speech in favor of a progressive autonomy and through visits to the territories in Africa, he attempted - with success - to get the support of colonial societies to carry out reforms. In the streets of large cities, he had African crowds to welcome him.
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Helicopters Alouette III of the Portuguese Air Force
Finally, another change has taken place outside of Portugal. In the United States, Lyndon Johnson was replaced by Richard Nixon as president, representing a shift to the right and a change of policy in relation to Portugal. The antagonism of the United States to the presence of Portugal in Africa dating from the end of World War II, becoming progressively more evident during the Eisenhower administration, both in speech and with the refusal to provide military equipment whose use in Africa was predictable. With Kennedy, and the processes of decolonization by the UK and France (which caused many of the new states became pro-Soviet), the United States sought to achieve its bastions in Africa, and, by opposing to the South Africa and presence of Europeans in Africa, get the sympathy of the Third World, which US felt were fleeing to the Soviet sphere. The sudden granting of independence to the Congo by Belgium established the precedent. Belgium fled hastily in presence of the massacre of its settlers, leaving the way open to the USA and the USSR to fight over the control of those strategic territories. It was hoped that the same happened to Portugal and, under the policy of Kennedy, the United States sponsored the independence movement that started insurgency in Angola (the UPA) and Mozambique (FRELIMO), trying to pre-empt a similar initiative on the part of the USSR . Also made formal its position on the supply of weapons, by the 1961 embargo. The United States sought to overthrow Salazar through one unsuccessful attempt of coup d'etat in Lisbon, also in 1961, sponsoring its replacement by someone favorable. That year, when Portugal tried to deal with the emergency in Angola, the United States had provocative attitudes, with the presence of their vessels and military aircraft in Luanda, on the pretext of watching the operations in the Congo. A ideia que tinham é que Portugal não conseguiria manter um esforço militar em Angola e o regime cairia com a derrota, seguindo a lógica (muito americana) de um pontapé forte na porta e a barraca cai toda de uma vez . They had the idea that Portugal would fail to maintain a military effort in Angola and the regime would fall with the defeat, following the logic of a strong kick in the door and the all house would fall at once. But not only the Portuguese 'survived' in Angola, has they managed to control the uprising past few months, thanks to a tremendous mobilization of forces that no one believed possible. The poor Portuguese-American relations led to the non-renewal of the agreement for the use of the Lajes Base, in the Azores, in 1962. With the frustration of Kennedy's plan, the spotlight is back in Washington for problems that were becoming ever larger: the increase in the power of the Warsaw Pact, Cuba and Vietnam. Vietnam was inherited by his successor Lyndon Johnson, focusing his concerns. The U.S. policy posicion towards Portugal remained the same, but the support for pro-American guerrilla movements, which had the competition of the pro-Soviet were being reduced and eventually US lost the FRELIMO to the influence of China. The Johnson administration become indifferent to Portugal, being too busy to deal with problems left by the successive disastrous foreign policy of Kennedy, starting with Vietnam.
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LDMs (Medium Landing Boats) next to the LFG (Large Landing Boat) Lira, in Guinea.
Nixon would inherited this problem, and had to solve many others. Johnson had passed all the time erasing fires, while others started right beside, and the new president did not want to spend the same ordeal. Unlike Johnson, Nixon was a politician clarified in international affairs and surrounded himself with figures belonging to the right of the American media and the elite university. This led to promotion to relevant positions in the White House of some supporters of Portugal. But that was not the case of the National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Nixon and Kissinger commanded the US foreign policy, assisted by a strict circle, and against the predominantly leftist Department of State. Kissinger had an realistic and pragmatic aproach on foreign policy, seeking to prevent US involvement in secondary matters, in order to concentrate on resolving decisively the involvement in Vietnam and the USSR issue. Therefore, they needed to strengthen regional alliances, and would allow their allies to take care of their own small problems.
Towards Portugal, the pragmatism advised a discreet re-aproach to this ally, to ensure that the United States could have the strategic base in the Azores (which since 1962 used as a political favor but without a commitment on the part of Portugal), and that the Portuguese territories in Africa (including Angola and Mozambique) and South Africa would not only not fall in the Soviet orbit, but also served to stop the Soviet expansion in Africa, the Atlantic and the Indian oceans, otherwise it would create more problems for the U.S. This was the view of the Pentagon and the CIA (which always differed from Kennedy and Johnson in this matter). Portugal has acted behind the scenes in Washington for a change of attitude towards Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, and soon got results. To convince the State Department about the change in policy, Kissinger ordered in 1969 the National Security State Memorandum 39 (NSSM-39) a study by a group of experts from the Departments of State and Defense that serve to support the change in policy. Despite the friction between the two sectors, the findings of this study suggest that the Portuguese were in Africa to stay and that the best option for the United States to obtain an agreement on the use of the Lajes Base was to relax the diplomatic pressure on Portugal - even continuing to pressure for political reforms that were made - and delete the ban non-lethal equipment for dual use, civilian and military, which could be useful to Portuguese Armed Forces, as transport aircraft and trucks. This was well below the desired by Portugal, but was a change of attitude on the part of Washington. The US began to distance itself from the independence movements and refrain from publicly criticizing Portugal, in addition to making promises for the supply of military equipment. Moreover, in contrast to non-supply of arms, training has been given to Portuguese in anti-guerrilla tactics, sharing the experience gained in Vietnam. The use of techniques American opened a phase in the war that was known by the vietnamization. In whole, cooperation given by the U.S. military was not very significant. As for material, the most important sold were two Boeing 707 to the fleet of transport of the PoAF, twelve Bell 212 used in Mozambique and a borrowed hidrographic ship. The much needed fighter planes, the Bell UH-1 in large numbers, and C-130 transport planes, that the US refused to sell to Portugal since the 50's, never came. Even so, the change of political position was important - it increased the Portuguese confidence and gave more freedom of action to its Armed Forces.
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General Spínola, passing review to African comandos, in Guinea.
In Guinea, Spínola had achieved to save the situation but it hadn't become favorable to Portugal. There was a stalemate, with the Portuguese forces to control the towns and the majority of the population, and the PAIGC control the interior. It was clear that, even with the support of the majority of the Guinean population, Portugal could contain the actions of the PAIGC but could not cause it harm sufficient to the point of extinguish it. The PAIGC could always count on the refuge in neighboring countries, especially while in Guinea-Conakry was a regime that it was favorable, and had no problems in obtaining arms for external support. To stike the PAIGC seriously, it would have to address these factors. And it was also clear that the PAIGC, however well trained and armed that was, and even taking part of the population on their side, could never do more than wear the Portuguese forces. It was out of the question to defeat Portugal, and try to take the cities was risky. Attacking Bissau, which had a well prepared defense plan anticipating this possibility, was suicide.
THE OPERATION GREEN SEA
Part 1 - The context of the war in Guinea
Since 1963 the Portuguese Armed Forces faced a guerrilla war carried out by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Despite having promoted disobedience in 1961, the year in which the attention of Portugal were focused at the beginning of the war in Angola, it was from January that the PAIGC, supported by the Soviet and its bloc undertook what was the most difficult guerrilla that Portugal had to face. The conditions of the theater of operations were the most unfavorable to Portugal. First, the lack of the area (36,125 km2), without strategic depth. Second, the fact that, following the independence of the French and British colonies, Guinea become a small European colonial enclave in a region of new independent states politically adverse to Portugal. This was the case for both neighbors, Guinea-Conakry (pro-Soviet) and Senegal, which allowed the use of their territory as sanctuaries for the PAIGC.
The geography was problematic, and most of the territory a real labyrinth of rivers and canals between small islands and peninsulas. With the full tide, one third of the territory submerged, and when the tide empty it discovered extensive mud areas of difficult acess. Shalow sea lanes largely limited to navigation, placed limits on the size of military vessels, and the efficiency of maritime transport. The road network was precarious outside of the few big cities, the same goes for port infrastructure, exception to the port of Bissau. Outside the savannas and mountainous areas (small) of the interior, the climate is harsh and unhealthy, with high relative humidity throughout the year, and normal temperatures well above 40 °C. The coastal jungles contain all the elements usually harmful to the human presence.
The great ethnic and religious diversity of the indigenous population was not necessarily an obstacle, since there was, at the same time, groups favorable and unfavorable to Portugal. But this context, where coexisted a large number of local languages and dialects, together with cultural habits, social and religious different, forced a proliferation of adaptations of procedure that the Armed Forces had to do, according to the tactical and diplomatic interests, on the relationship with the people. This effort was all too apparent from the moment there were created military units formed exclusively by indigenous, both regular and milicia - in 1974 70% of the total Portuguese Armed Forces, 80% if only the Army account.
In addition to these factors with more direct influence on the conduct of military operations, there were aspects that led to the question of why Portugal invest in the defense of their presence in Guinea. First, the fact that Guinea is a very poor area and delayed, with scarce natural resources. In economic terms, Portugal had no income with Guinea and, by contrast, the revenue of the province was insufficient to support the maintenance of the administrative, educational and medical assistance. The Guinea depended on funds from metropolitan Portugal and this dependence increased with the outbreak of the war of insurrection. The economic and cultural reality also was a reflection of the little population of European origin, the result of climate, and the consequent low public investment in the territory - note that the government was run by Cape Verdeans and most of the business was done by Lebanese and Syrian immigrants. This led the military (Europeans) to ask the reason for the effort of war, with consequences in the motivation and morale of the troops.
http://i205.photobucket.com/albums/bb187/sonias_2007/novembro/1.jpg
PAIGC insurgents
There were three strong arguments to justify the effort in Guinea. First, the majority of the indigenous population was keen to remain Portuguese, for several reasons. In a country with ethnic and religious diversity, in which Portugal acted as a neutral and stabilizing between local rivalries, the Portuguese presence was seen as a guarantor of peace. Also the fact of the PAIGC, be of communist ideology - being in favor of major changes in the organization of social, economic, cultural and religious diversity of the country - earned him the distrust and enmity of a significant part of the population (beginning with Muslims, the second largest religious group, 40% of the population) who did not accept the prospect of radically change its way of life and its institutions. Under Portuguese sovereignty, the population of Guinea was not only free to maintain their way of life as it had the benefits of living under a European quality of administration (for example, the Central Hospital of Bissau was the most well-equipped across West Africa).
In addition to this, with the course of time, were known the bad experiences of other African countries in the post-independence, with economic disasters, civil wars and regimes that made the lives of people a ordeal. Although, in the course of the war and the contact of the PAIGC with the population, a greater percentage shift their loyalty to the independence side, there was a increase of support to Portugal from the remainder population. This would be the source in the plans, by both sides, to find a political solution to Guinea through autonomy instead of independence.
http://i205.photobucket.com/albums/bb187/sonias_2007/novembro/2.jpg
A typical patrol boat from Portuguese: the LFP Aljezur (of class Alvor), in a river of Guinea
Another argument of weight was the strategic situation of Guinea, providing a point of deployment in West Africa, half way between Europe and Angola, a possible stop in the Cape Route and the sea and air routes of the Portuguese. This has become even more important from the wave of independence in 1960, with the boycott of the new African states to the passage of portuguese ships and aircraft by its territories. Guinea also was an important point of military support (for ships and airplanes) in western Africa, like the Senegal for the French (who kept there important naval, air and land bases after independence).
The third reason - the most important - had to do with the political precedent that would create the granting of independence or autonomy to Guinea that, even with several valid arguments for doing so, could have consequences in the plans that Portugal had in keeping the remaining territories in Africa (for which the government did not consider a similar concession). This was a controversial issue within and outside the political system and of the Armed Forces, so there was never a consensus.
For its part, the PAIGC had much in its favor. In addition to all the difficulties that Portugal had (that were advantages for the PAIGC), the PAIGC had no significant rival independence movements (the MLG and FLING, the latter supported by Senegal, had little expression and later lost the support of the Organization of African Unity, OAU), and had a very competent leadership in the person of Amilcar Cabral (which could overcome the internal rivalries between Cape Verde and Guinea - the latter constituting almost all of the guerrillas in the field, and obtain international support), and their fighters had a knowledge of the terrain that the Portuguese purchased only with time.
Crucial in the correlation of forces between Portugal and the PAIGC were the external support to each side. In a conflict that is formed in the context of the Cold War, one side was supported by the leader of your block strategy (PAIGC / USSR) and the other not. Portugal not only was not supported by the US, as the US was openly hostile to the Portuguese presence in Africa during the decade of 60 (having created and sustained the guerrillas of the FNLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, which started the war in these two countries). On the African issue, Portugal was criticised by most of the international community, had against him the Communist bloc, suffered sanctions of the UN, sanctions of all countries of the African continent (although many were neutral in practice, Portugal only had allies in South Africa and Rhodesia), and in Europe counted only with France, Germany and Spain. These last three accepted breaking the 1961 UN embargo on arms sales to Portugal, becoming Germans and French the main suppliers of military equipment (although, in many cases, on "embargo prices").
In contrast, the US (which had decreed an embargo unilaterally to Portugal) and the UK, allies in NATO, accepted only to provide equipment that was not destined to Africa, but still the availability was little. In the beginning of the war, a substantial part of the equipment in service was of US origin, so the situation was "serious". Even what had been acquired under bilateral agreements (in 40's and 50's) and was not subject to limitations on use, suffered equally the penalties for replacement parts and ammunition, which could only be purchased from other sources in the international market, often on the black market.
This caused serious limitations, specialy to the Air Force, since they could not use aircraft they had, in some models, in large quantity. One of these cases was the use, especially in Guinea, of the North American F-86 Saber fighter, between 1961 and 1963, the year, in the face of great pressure from the US, the PoAF was obliged to return the fleet to Portugal. The PoAF had to build its atack power on the North American T-6G, and only returned to dispose of a fighter jet in the territory in 1966, with the arrival of eight Fiat G-91 purchased from Luftwaffe. In that year, the first Alouette III helis arrived to Guinea. Overall, the countries that accepted to sell equipment to Portugal (Germany and especially France; In smaller quantities Spain, South Africa and Israel) produced material in variety and quality, but there was equipment and sub-systems that was only possible get the US and UK (such as land-air missiles), and whose absence was beeing increasingly important. The small Portuguese defense industry was developing itself to achieving self-sufficiency in support of infantry ground troops, and the supply of dozens of coastal and river boat to the Navy (in the case of ocean vessels, it was necessary to import guns). But it was little compared to the needs.
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The small but robust Alouette III was one of the 'horses of battle' in the operations in Africa.
However, like other independence movements, the PAIGC received shipments of small arms in quantity and quality of the Communist bloc (and also training in Algeria and Morocco, and financial of some European countries, including Sweden, Norway and Denmark), in some cases obtaining weapons superior to the Portuguese side (communications, amphibious tanks PT-76, land-air missiles SA-7, among others). The training, especially given by the Cuban military advisers, from 1965, was extremely competent, and made the fighter of the PAIGC one of the most efficient guerrillas in Africa, although the method of attack on Portuguese were more often by use of mines, ambushes and hit and run atacks to barracks (mortars and recoiless cannons). It's best strategy was to wear the portuguese down.
The PAIGC had as its sanctuary in neighbour Guinea-Conakry (former French Guinea), and training camps and its headquarters in it's capital Conakry. It beneficted of the full support of the dictatorial regime of the pro-Soviet Sékou Touré, which consented the use of its territory as a base to infiltrate in the then Portuguese Guinea. No surprises, the main area of war was precisely in the South, where the PAIGC could easily infiltrate and replenish forces by sea and river, just across the border to take advantage of labyrinthine hydrographic conditions.
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The LFP (Small Surveillance Boat) Arcturus, class Bellatrix, in Guinea
On the Portuguese side, the Armed Forces had from the beginning of the war in Angola (in 1961) a mature doctrine of counter-insurgency, based on careful study of the strategy of "Revolutionary War" (especially the thought of Mao Tsé Tung) and the lessons gathered from other experiences in this kind of war - the British in Malaysia and the French in Indochina and Algeria. The Armed Forces adapted itself and rapidly trained for this type of war. But the fact that the war in Angola started so sudden (as a result of the unexpected withdrawal of Belgium of its Congo, in 1960) caught the Armed Forces largely in the "wrong foot" in terms of material. And the start of the international embargo at the same time prevented the planned process of obtaining appropriate weapons and equipment. This forced the use of equipment dating from WWII (which was in majority during the first half of the 60s), and to ad hoc adjustments, such as the use of maritime patrol aircraft Lockheed PV-2 Harpoon in close air support. The Navy was also very aged, and in insufficient number to patrol the waters of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, the shipping routes between the various territories and to make escort to merchant shipping and transport of troops. The situation was not only worse because of the great effort in the "dust shipyard" - the dozens of small patrol and transport boats operating in rivers, built in Portuguese shipyards, wich did not require the import of guns.
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Marines, disembarking from a Zebro III, in Guinea
Portugal was normally mistreated by the internation media and opinion-makers, reaching the point of conotations of Portuguese troops with Nazi ideology. In contrast, the PAIGC enjoyed (as most African independence movements) of sympathy in the "left oriented" press in the West, which helped build an image of romantic guerrillas, and to promote internationally Amilcar Cabral. But not only from the Soviet Bloc, the OAU and the political left arrived support. In the early 70's, most of the transport vehicles used by PAIGC were Volvo trucks offered by Sweden. Finally, the Catholic Church, following the ideas of the Second Vatican Council, emphasizing the 'Theology of Liberation', was in favour of the independence movements. In the case of Guinea, many Catholic missionaries (especially Italians) worked to turn the population against Portugal.
Despite the obstacles of all kinds, in 1966, the war in Africa was running in favor of Portugal. In Angola, and against the forecasts in 1961, the armed forces were very close to victory and the total annihilation of the independence movements. In Mozambique, where the war started in 1964, the activity of FRELIMO was intense, but their actions (for now) were confined to the northern border (with the Tanzania) and the coast of Lake Niassa, not affecting the rest of the country. But on the contrary, the situation in Guinea was deteriorating. Sorrounded in a small territory, the armed forces were forced to a defensive war. Given the lack of human and material resources, the pressure of the PAIGC and the need to create a strategic depth, the military focused on the coasts and major cities, where was the majority of the population. This caused the PAIGC to freely move in parts of the territory, even distancing themselves from their sanctuaries and logistical support, and make contact with the population, attracting it to their side. In 1963, they even implemented in the south, on the islands of Como. Only several months later, in January 1964, they were expelled by the largest amphibious operation carried out by Portugal throughout the war, Operation Tridente, a landing force of 1200 men of the Army, Marines and paras, supported by naval and air bombardment against estimated 300 guerrillas of the PAIGC and 15 soldiers of Guinea-Conakry. With that defeat, the guerrillas retained once again the lesson that direct confrontations with Portuguese would always end in disaster and, by contrast, the strategy of attrition was the best. Year after year, the wear was felt increasingly on the Portuguese side, with the decrease in morale of regular troops, while the population of the interior increasingly supporting the PAIGC. In addition, there was the poor performance of the high-command of General Arnaldo Schultz, governor and commander-chief since 1964. In the first months of 1968, when the 25,000 Portuguese troops had to face between 8 and 10,000 guerrillas, and with the PAIGC to establish itself and structure within the territory, the situation deteriorated there significantly, ultimately become precarious. There was a perpective of military defeat.
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The dense vegetation on the banks allowed easy ambushes in rivers
1968 would bring various changes. In May, Salazar made one of his last major decisions after decades ahead of a autocratic government: replace Schultz, who lost credit of soldiers and civilians, by the Brigadier António de Spínola (later promoted to general). At the government and military command of Guinea would be a unusual general, with a style of command that cultivated it's charisma, demonstrations of physical courage in the visits to the fighting zones and an energy that was contagious to the troops, lifting their moral - he assumed the size of a living legend.
Wars are not only won with high morale and the new commander introduced changes. He began to apply new tactics, including greater use of helicopters, and search and destroy operations, in the style made by US in Vietnam. Lisbon agreed to send more 10,000 men, bringing the number to 35,000. Spínola followed a strategy not only military but also political. He created bodies representing the various ethnic groups that were meeting later in the Congress of Peoples of Guinea, in order to win the loyalty of the people, or at least get its neutrality. He intelligently exploit the inter-ethnic rivalries, eroding the base of support for the PAIGC, and did eventually conclude an alliance with Fula ethnic group. To carry out it's plans, replaced several senior officers by a group of young, well-prepared officers of lower patent, experts in counter-subversion operations and psychological war. They were known by the boys of Spínola, and constituted its pretorian guard. Making use of new media and psychological tactics, the psychological impact of Spínola was also duly used in national and international media. The international press began to interest themselves in this general, monocle, dressed in camo and who accompanied the troops under fire, and became an international figure. This has caused the international media to begin to pass another message that not only one that Guinea was a site of Africa where the Portuguese bombarded with napalm.
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General António de Spínola (right) in an area of combat, under fire, in 1969.
1968 was also the year of replacing Salazar, for reasons of health, as President of the Council, by Marcello Caetano. A member of the liberal wing of the regime, Caetano advocated a reform in the relationship with the colonies, through the adoption of a federal model, a project that had the opposition of the Orthodox sectors of the regime and the Armed Forces. Marcello Caetano was also favorable to the increase of military expenditure, unlike Salazar who had imposed financial restrictions too severe, even taking into account that the war was prolonged and it was necessary to manage it in a sustainable way. With a reformer speech in favor of a progressive autonomy and through visits to the territories in Africa, he attempted - with success - to get the support of colonial societies to carry out reforms. In the streets of large cities, he had African crowds to welcome him.
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Helicopters Alouette III of the Portuguese Air Force
Finally, another change has taken place outside of Portugal. In the United States, Lyndon Johnson was replaced by Richard Nixon as president, representing a shift to the right and a change of policy in relation to Portugal. The antagonism of the United States to the presence of Portugal in Africa dating from the end of World War II, becoming progressively more evident during the Eisenhower administration, both in speech and with the refusal to provide military equipment whose use in Africa was predictable. With Kennedy, and the processes of decolonization by the UK and France (which caused many of the new states became pro-Soviet), the United States sought to achieve its bastions in Africa, and, by opposing to the South Africa and presence of Europeans in Africa, get the sympathy of the Third World, which US felt were fleeing to the Soviet sphere. The sudden granting of independence to the Congo by Belgium established the precedent. Belgium fled hastily in presence of the massacre of its settlers, leaving the way open to the USA and the USSR to fight over the control of those strategic territories. It was hoped that the same happened to Portugal and, under the policy of Kennedy, the United States sponsored the independence movement that started insurgency in Angola (the UPA) and Mozambique (FRELIMO), trying to pre-empt a similar initiative on the part of the USSR . Also made formal its position on the supply of weapons, by the 1961 embargo. The United States sought to overthrow Salazar through one unsuccessful attempt of coup d'etat in Lisbon, also in 1961, sponsoring its replacement by someone favorable. That year, when Portugal tried to deal with the emergency in Angola, the United States had provocative attitudes, with the presence of their vessels and military aircraft in Luanda, on the pretext of watching the operations in the Congo. A ideia que tinham é que Portugal não conseguiria manter um esforço militar em Angola e o regime cairia com a derrota, seguindo a lógica (muito americana) de um pontapé forte na porta e a barraca cai toda de uma vez . They had the idea that Portugal would fail to maintain a military effort in Angola and the regime would fall with the defeat, following the logic of a strong kick in the door and the all house would fall at once. But not only the Portuguese 'survived' in Angola, has they managed to control the uprising past few months, thanks to a tremendous mobilization of forces that no one believed possible. The poor Portuguese-American relations led to the non-renewal of the agreement for the use of the Lajes Base, in the Azores, in 1962. With the frustration of Kennedy's plan, the spotlight is back in Washington for problems that were becoming ever larger: the increase in the power of the Warsaw Pact, Cuba and Vietnam. Vietnam was inherited by his successor Lyndon Johnson, focusing his concerns. The U.S. policy posicion towards Portugal remained the same, but the support for pro-American guerrilla movements, which had the competition of the pro-Soviet were being reduced and eventually US lost the FRELIMO to the influence of China. The Johnson administration become indifferent to Portugal, being too busy to deal with problems left by the successive disastrous foreign policy of Kennedy, starting with Vietnam.
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LDMs (Medium Landing Boats) next to the LFG (Large Landing Boat) Lira, in Guinea.
Nixon would inherited this problem, and had to solve many others. Johnson had passed all the time erasing fires, while others started right beside, and the new president did not want to spend the same ordeal. Unlike Johnson, Nixon was a politician clarified in international affairs and surrounded himself with figures belonging to the right of the American media and the elite university. This led to promotion to relevant positions in the White House of some supporters of Portugal. But that was not the case of the National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Nixon and Kissinger commanded the US foreign policy, assisted by a strict circle, and against the predominantly leftist Department of State. Kissinger had an realistic and pragmatic aproach on foreign policy, seeking to prevent US involvement in secondary matters, in order to concentrate on resolving decisively the involvement in Vietnam and the USSR issue. Therefore, they needed to strengthen regional alliances, and would allow their allies to take care of their own small problems.
Towards Portugal, the pragmatism advised a discreet re-aproach to this ally, to ensure that the United States could have the strategic base in the Azores (which since 1962 used as a political favor but without a commitment on the part of Portugal), and that the Portuguese territories in Africa (including Angola and Mozambique) and South Africa would not only not fall in the Soviet orbit, but also served to stop the Soviet expansion in Africa, the Atlantic and the Indian oceans, otherwise it would create more problems for the U.S. This was the view of the Pentagon and the CIA (which always differed from Kennedy and Johnson in this matter). Portugal has acted behind the scenes in Washington for a change of attitude towards Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, and soon got results. To convince the State Department about the change in policy, Kissinger ordered in 1969 the National Security State Memorandum 39 (NSSM-39) a study by a group of experts from the Departments of State and Defense that serve to support the change in policy. Despite the friction between the two sectors, the findings of this study suggest that the Portuguese were in Africa to stay and that the best option for the United States to obtain an agreement on the use of the Lajes Base was to relax the diplomatic pressure on Portugal - even continuing to pressure for political reforms that were made - and delete the ban non-lethal equipment for dual use, civilian and military, which could be useful to Portuguese Armed Forces, as transport aircraft and trucks. This was well below the desired by Portugal, but was a change of attitude on the part of Washington. The US began to distance itself from the independence movements and refrain from publicly criticizing Portugal, in addition to making promises for the supply of military equipment. Moreover, in contrast to non-supply of arms, training has been given to Portuguese in anti-guerrilla tactics, sharing the experience gained in Vietnam. The use of techniques American opened a phase in the war that was known by the vietnamization. In whole, cooperation given by the U.S. military was not very significant. As for material, the most important sold were two Boeing 707 to the fleet of transport of the PoAF, twelve Bell 212 used in Mozambique and a borrowed hidrographic ship. The much needed fighter planes, the Bell UH-1 in large numbers, and C-130 transport planes, that the US refused to sell to Portugal since the 50's, never came. Even so, the change of political position was important - it increased the Portuguese confidence and gave more freedom of action to its Armed Forces.
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General Spínola, passing review to African comandos, in Guinea.
In Guinea, Spínola had achieved to save the situation but it hadn't become favorable to Portugal. There was a stalemate, with the Portuguese forces to control the towns and the majority of the population, and the PAIGC control the interior. It was clear that, even with the support of the majority of the Guinean population, Portugal could contain the actions of the PAIGC but could not cause it harm sufficient to the point of extinguish it. The PAIGC could always count on the refuge in neighboring countries, especially while in Guinea-Conakry was a regime that it was favorable, and had no problems in obtaining arms for external support. To stike the PAIGC seriously, it would have to address these factors. And it was also clear that the PAIGC, however well trained and armed that was, and even taking part of the population on their side, could never do more than wear the Portuguese forces. It was out of the question to defeat Portugal, and try to take the cities was risky. Attacking Bissau, which had a well prepared defense plan anticipating this possibility, was suicide.