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2RHPZ
05-17-2004, 12:29 PM
CIA paying millions in Qaeda hunt

Foreign leaders fear impact on own intelligence

By John Donnelly, Globe Staff, 11/24/2002

ASHINGTON - The Central Intelligence Agency, returning to some of its cloak-and-dagger
ways to penetrate hostile territory, has handed out tens of millions of dollars
in unmarked bills in recent months to foreign intelligence contacts in the hunt
for Osama bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders, according to US officials
and former CIA members.

Just as the CIA spent several hundred million dollars in $100 bills on hand-picked
warlords to help motivate and arm ground forces in the war in Afghanistan,
agents have been given stacks of US currency to spend in Yemen, Pakistan,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, among other countries.

Some intelligence specialists applaud the return to the aggressive development
of local spies - called assets by intelligence officials - as a long-overdue
revitalization of a global operation that had become complacent and risk-averse.
But the practice also is creating great tension with some host governments,
which contend the practice could undermine their own efforts as well as cause
dissension in their intelligence ranks.

CIA agents are covertly giving the cash to members of foreign intelligence
services either to pay for information or to be passed on in recruiting other
sources, according to the US officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

''They have received tremendous cooperation from the intel services in those
countries,'' said a former CIA member, speaking on condition of anonymity. ''The
incident in Yemen is a direct result from the cooperation of the Yemeni
intelligence service.''

On Nov. 5, a CIA drone aircraft fired a Hellfire missile and destroyed a vehicle
carrying six suspected Al Qaeda members. The car contained Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi,
one of the two top Al Qaeda leaders in Yemen. That operation also used
electronic intercepts collected by the National Security Agency, which took
sophisticated surveillance equipment into Yemen with the government's quiet
blessing.

The CIA agents are carrying the currency in denominations of $20, $50, and $100
bills, confirmed two intelligence officials, who spoke on condition of
anonymity. The bills are neither crisp nor in sequence so the money can't be
traced to the US government, much less CIA headquarters, and jeopardize the
safety of local CIA contacts, officials say.

Distributing the money is only one of the tactics being used by US intelligence
and the military, which have come under increasing pressure - especially in the
last 10 days, since the latest purported message from bin Laden. The Al Qaeda
leader warned over a scratchy audiotape that the United States and its allies
would be attacked again.

The disclosure that the United States had Abd al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, a top Al
Qaeda commander, in custody was seen as evidence by some analysts that the
intelligence community was tightening the circle around the terror network's top
operators, including bin Laden. Nashiri, described as the head of Al Qaeda's
Arabian Peninsula operations, allegedly played a role in the bombing of the USS
Cole two years ago and in the Oct. 6 attack on a French supertanker off the
coast of Yemen.

Nashiri's arrest not only removes an important Al Qaeda plotter, but it also
could pay dividends through interrogation. US officials say the arrests of Ramzi
Binalshibh and Abu Zubaydah in Pakistan have been extremely helpful even if
Zubaydah's information is dated.

Those three suspects are some of the few senior leaders to be captured in the
US-led war on terrorism. Muhammad Atef, a top Al Qaeda operative, was killed in
Afghanistan in November 2001 by a missile fired from a CIA drone.

Despite those successes, several senior Al Qaeda-linked leaders remain
unaccounted for - about 80 percent of the leadership. In addition to bin Laden,
those still free include Ayman al-Zawahr, bin Laden's top aide; Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed; and Mullah Mohammed Omar, the former head of the Taliban. Intelligence
officials say they believe the freer flow of cash to informers and agents may
help capture these elusive leaders.

But as intelligence officers go after the top leaders, the CIA is facing strains
in its relationships with some foreign governments, US intelligence officials
acknowledge. A Pakistani official told the Globe that the large disbursement of
cash ''is a recipe for disaster. They are trying to run their own parallel
intelligence organization.''

''The CIA and FBI are saying they want to have their own assets,'' said the
Pakistani official, speaking on condition of anonymity. ''Ten thousand dollars
goes a long way, but it's a very temporary way. The general impression is that
Americans use people like condoms and then walk away.

''Everyone knows that once Osama bin Laden is captured, the Americans are going
to bug out of there. That's why Pakistani intelligence is being very careful
with them,'' the official said.

But intelligence specialists counter that Pakistan has not done enough in
rooting out dissidents in its intelligence ranks. Many people contend that
Pakistan intelligence may be hiding bin Laden and his close advisers somewhere
in the nation's vast lawless regions along the Afghan border.

''Someone's protecting'' bin Laden, said Robert Baer, a former CIA agent and
author of ''See No Evil,'' a scathing account of US missteps in running covert
actions in the 1980s and 1990s in the Middle East and elsewhere. ''This guy has
more support that we can ever imagine. You don't just hide out guys like bin
Laden and have them disappear. ''

Some contend that just before the Tora Bora battle in early December last year,
bin Laden sneaked out through the Baluchistan region and crossed the Arabian Sea
to his ancestral home in Yemen. The US military and CIA say they are beginning
to improve their network of sources in that region. The US military, in
particular, has set its aim on deepening its relationship with Djibouti on the
tip of the Horn of Africa. Many of the unmanned US Predator drones are now based
in Djibouti to spy over Yemen.

Surveillance is another key tool. The most obvious targets are the frequently
chosen messengers of Al Qaeda: reporters working for the Al-Jazeera TV network.
One US official said a reporter of particular interest to US intelligence
officers is Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan, the bureau chief in Islamabad, Pakistan, who
has received several of bin Laden's communiques, including an audio recording on
Nov. 12 in Islamabad in which bin Laden applauds the recent terrorist attacks in
Bali and Yemen.

The release of the audiotape should spark an intensified effort to catch bin
Laden, said Michael E. O'Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings
Institution, a centrist Washington think tank. ''The best way to make the
argument is to look around the world at top terrorist leaders and what happens
to the organizations under them once the leaders are caught. You see a
remarkable drop-off with their capture.''

In recent weeks, US intelligence has reported a substantial increase in phone
calls and messages made by those linked to Al Qaeda. Jay C. Farrar, a military
analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a centrist
Washington think tank, said the US intelligence community should be responding
to that increase in activity in equal measure.

''The reality is you've got to step back and take a look at all the
possibilities,'' Farrar said. ''It is like a police investigation of a murder.
You eliminate things that don't bear fruit, you keep working on those that give
you an opening.

''The feeling is that inevitably someone is going to make a mistake, and the
more you stay on it, the more you concentrate, the better able you'll be to see
that first stumble.''

Offering multimillion-dollar public rewards for bin Laden hasn't worked. Now,
the CIA hopes, furtive payments of a few hundred dollars to the right local
agents will.

John Donnelly can be reached at donnelly@globe.com.

This story ran on page A1 of the Boston Globe on 11/24/2002.
© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.





Bribes, not bombs, defeated Taleban

by elaine monaghan

CIA spent ?45 million buying off hostile leaders, according to a new book on the
war

THE United States won the war in Afghanistan not so much through its
overwhelming military might as through the simple, age-old technique of bribery,
according to a book published in the US today.

Bob Woodward, the Washington Post journalist, claims that CIA agents, led by a
team called ?Jawbreaker?, bought off a number of Taleban commanders and other
hostile factions with a mere $70 million (?45 million).

In Bush at War, Mr Woodward tells how, as US aircraft rained bombs on
Afghanistan, 110 CIA officers and 316 special forces personnel were causing just
as much damage on the ground with their cash handouts.

That´s one bargain, President Bush told Mr Woodward as he wondered aloud what
the Soviet Union had spent during the nine years in which it tried in vain to
suppress the Afghans in the 1980s.

The CIA?s pay-offs were a drop in the ocean compared with the estimated $10
billion overall cost of the war in Afghanistan, but experts agree that they did
much to shorten the campaign by buying off Taleban forces and giving money up
front to their only organised opponent, the Northern Alliance.

According to Mr Woodward´s account, a ten-man paramilitary team code-named
"Jawbreaker" set the tone after landing in Afghanistan on September 26, 15 days
after the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Centre. They carried $3
million in a single attaché case.

The team leader, Gary, dumped half a million dollars in ten stacks of $100
bills in front of the head of the Alliance?s intelligence and security service
and told him to do with it as he wished. The next day, he delivered $1 million
to the commander of the Alliance forces, who is now Afghanistan?s Foreign
Minister, Mr Woodward wrote.

?Hank?, the head of the CIA?s counter-terrorism special operations, knew the
value of cash to Afghanistan?s impoverished fighters, whose commanders had
themselves been bought off by the Taleban some years before.

?Warlords or sub-commanders with dozens or hundreds of fighters could be bought
off for as little as $50,000 in cash,? he told Mr Woodward. ?If we do this
right, we can buy off a lot more of the Taleban than we have to kill.?

One commander, offered $50,000 to defect, asked for time to reflect. US special
forces then dropped a precision bomb right outside his headquarters and called
him back, this time offering only $40,000. He accepted.

?It?s the way things work there. Ever since the Soviet War, there have been no
governing structures. It?s really a question of who has got the cash and who has
got the weapons,? P. W. King, the co-ordinator of a project on US policy towards
the Islamic world at the Brookings Institution, said.

Julie Sirrs, a former Defence Intelligence Agency analyst and expert on
Afghanistan, agreed. ?If they would have done this a few years ago, maybe we
wouldn?t have had this problem,? she said. ?The Northern Alliance was so cash-strapped,
it needed money to feed its horses.?

The one thing that American money could not buy, however, was information
leading to the capture of either Osama bin Laden or Mullah Mohammed Omar,
supreme leader of the Taleban.

The White House said yesterday that intelligence experts had concluded that the
voice on an audiotape received by the al-Jazeera television station last week
was that of bin Laden, proving that the al-Qaeda leader was alive.

Mr Woodward recounts the parting instructions given to ?Gary? by the head of the
CIA?s counter-terrorism centre before he left for Afghanistan. ?You have one
mission,? he was told. ?Go find the al-Qaeda and eliminate them . . . Get bin
Laden, find him. I want his head in a box . . . I want to take it down and show
the President.?

In his first cable back, ?Gary? rather optimistically requested some heavy-duty
cardboard boxes, dry ice and some pikes.

Marmot1
05-17-2004, 01:05 PM
My price is 35.000$ :-) Somone want tu buy me??? I can provide you secret locations of most wanted and most sexy babes in Poland. rofl

2RHPZ
09-27-2004, 02:14 AM
The inside story of the CIA's proxy war

November 20 2002

With the help of bags of money, the US was determined to avoid Moscow's mistakes in Afghanistan, writes Bob Woodward in Washington.

At 12.30pm on September 26, 2001, a husky, 59-year-old man with a round, cheerful face and glasses was huddled in the back of a Russian-made, CIA-owned Mi-17 helicopter that was going to have to strain to climb to 4500 metres to clear the pass into the Panjshir Valley of north-eastern Afghanistan.

Gary, an undercover CIA officer whose last name is not being used, was leading the first critical wave of President Bush's war against terrorism. With him was a team of CIA covert paramilitary officers with communications gear that would allow them to set up direct, classified links with headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Between his legs was a large metal suitcase that contained $US3 million ($A5.3 million) in non-sequential $US100 bills. He always laughed when he saw a television show or movie in which someone passed $1 million in a small attache case. It just wouldn't fit.

Several times in his career, Gary had stuffed $1 million into his backpack so he could move around and pass it to people on other operations. He had signed for the $US3 million as usual. What was different this time was that he could dole it out pretty much at his discretion.

Gary had been an officer in the Directorate of Operations of the CIA for 32 years, the type of CIA clandestine operative who many thought no longer existed. In the 1970s, he had been an undercover case officer in Teheran, then Islamabad. He had recruited, developed, paid and run agents who reported from within the host governments.

On September 11, Gary had been almost out the door, weeks from retirement. Four days later, he received a call from Cofer Black, the head of the agency's counter-terrorism centre, asking him to come to headquarters. "I know you're ready to retire," Mr Black told him. "But we want to send a team in right away. You're the logical person to go in." Not only did Gary have the experience, but he spoke Pashto and Dari, Afghanistan's two main languages.

When he was Islamabad station chief, he made several covert trips into Afghanistan, meeting leaders of the Northern Alliance and bringing in cash, normally $US200,000 - a bag of money on the table.

Go in, Mr Black said, persuade the Northern Alliance to work with us and prepare the ground in Afghanistan to receive US forces.

Six days later, Gary's 10-man team, codenamed "Jawbreaker", left the US. Jawbreaker now had another assignment. The president had signed a new intelligence order; the gloves were off. "You have one mission," Mr Black instructed. "Go find al Qaeda and kill them. We're going to eliminate them. Get bin Laden, find him. I want his head in a box... I want to take it down and show the President."

On September 27 in the Panjshir Valley, Gary sat down with General Mohammed Fahim, commander of the Northern Alliance forces, and Mr Abdullah, the Alliance foreign minister. He put $US1 million on the table, explaining that they could use it as they saw fit. Mr Fahim said he had about 10,000 fighters, though many were poorly equipped.

"The President is interested in our mission," Gary said. "He wants you to know the US forces are coming and we want your cooperation, and he's taking a personal interest in this." "We welcome you guys," Mr Fahim said. "We'll do whatever we can." But he had questions. "When does the war start? When do you guys come? When is the US really going to start to attack?"

"I don't know," Gary said. "But it will be soon. We have to be ready. Forces have to be deployed. We have to get things together. You're going to be impressed. You have never seen anything like what we're going to deliver on to the enemy."

On Wednesday, October 3, Gary went to look for an airfield to bring supplies into Northern Alliance territory. The team found one in Golbahar that had been used by the British in 1919. He asked Muhammed Arif, the Alliance's intelligence chief, to grade an area and turn it into an airstrip, and he handed out another $US200,000. He bought three Jeeps for $US19,000 and paid $US22,000 for a tanker truck and helicopter fuel - which never arrived.

In a scenario presented to General Tommy Franks, head of US Central Command, the opposition forces, chiefly the Northern Alliance, would do most of the ground fighting. If the US repeated the mistakes of the Soviet Union by invading with a large land force, they would be doomed.

On November 9, Mazar-e Sharif fell. Three days later Kabul had been abandoned. And on December 7, the Taliban's southern stronghold of Kandahar fell, effectively leaving the Northern Alliance, its Pashtun allies and the US in charge of the country.

George Tenet, the CIA director, was extremely proud of what the agency had accomplished. The money it had been able to distribute without traditional cost controls had mobilised the "tribals". In some cases, performance standards had been set: Move from point A to point B, and you get several hundred thousand dollars. A stack of money on the table was still the universal language. His paramilitary and case officers in the region had made it possible - a giant return on years of investment in human intelligence.

The CIA calculated that it had spent only $US70 million in direct cash outlays on the ground in Afghanistan, and some of that had been to pay for field hospitals. In an interview, Mr Bush said: "That's one bargain," and he wondered aloud what the Soviets had spent in their disastrous war in Afghanistan that had contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Washington Post (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/11/19/1037682017146.html?oneclick=true)