budanski
07-01-2003, 06:26 PM
Commercial Helmet Accessories
July 1, 2003: The troops in Iraq came up with some good suggestions for improving their body armor. While the standard helmet (variously called the K-Pot for the Kevlar it's made of, or the "Fritz", for it's resemblance to the World War II German head gear) was well liked, more troops have seen the new MICH helmet used by Special Forces. The MICH is built to accommodate a radio inside it, but it not as well balanced as the K-Pot, and thus not as comfortable to wear. Special Forces troops have already addressed that problem by using a BLSS™ Kit (from Oregon Aero). This is a commercial product from the manufacturer of aircraft seats and pilot accessories. There is a BLSS Kit for the K-Pot, but the MICH needs it more. The kit provides seven air permeable, reverberation damping pads and a four-point chin strap/harness with an integrated nape pad that replaces the helmet liner. In Iraq, it's also been noted that the Interceptor protective vest could be made a lot cooler if a moisture wicking material, and vents, were added to get some of the heat and sweat out.
The Real Thing is Too Expensive
July 1, 2003: One thing the Iraq operations brought out was the lack of firing ranges where the troops could practice using their weapons they way they did in Iraq. A firing range where vehicles can drive in and fire their .50 caliber machine-guns and TOW missiles are rare. The army has a few, the marines have none. Yet a common tactic was to have hummers out front, equipped with .50 caliber machine-guns and TOW missiles, acting as scouts. Often, the resistance was slight enough so that the scout vehicles could fight their way through and keep going. But you are better at this if you have a chance to practice it a few times with live ammo. Firing ranges like this are expensive, for .50 caliber rounds keep going for nearly ten kilometers, and are heavy enough to injure anyone they hit even at that extreme distance. But the .50 caliber machine-gun proved to be the most effective weapon for these scout units. There will probably be more electronic (video game like) ranges for these troops before there will be more live fire ranges. The electronic ranges are pretty good, but it still means the first time your troops get out there and do it with real weapons, it will take them a day or two to fully move from the electronic world to the real one. This is usually not a problem, mainly because American troops tend to be so much better trained than their opposition.
American Ground Tactics in Iraq
June 30, 2003: Ground combat tactics in Iraq were designed for the special kind of fighting that was expected.. It was mostly meeting engagements (encountering enemy troops while moving in column down a road), and night battles against an enemy who was slow to realize American night fighting capabilities. Troops were organized in columns to keep moving against light opposition. Constant surveillance by aircraft and UAVs ahead of the columns guarded against surprise attacks by enemy tanks, or large units of infantry. But the small groups enemy troops armed with machine-guns and RPGs were to be taken care of by tanks and infantry in armored vehicles (M-2 Bradleys for the Army and AAVs, or armored amphibious vehicles for the Marines.) Mobile artillery was always within range, and fire could be brought down on targets in minutes. Helicopter gunships (Apaches) and A-10 ground attack aircraft were also available from time to time. Most of the time, however, the A-10s operated farther ahead of the columns, as were the Apaches (until the Iraqi irregulars- fighters without uniforms- began to attack supply columns). By the time the American troops approached Baghdad, most Apaches were escorting combat and supply columns, to look out for enemy troops, and add their firepower as needed.*
When columns stopped, often at night (to allow for sleep and because driving at night was slower and more accident ****e), they had to watch out for Iraqi troops trying to sneak up and attack with assault rifles and RPGs. The Iraqis never seemed to catch on to the fact that American troops were plentifully supplied with night vision equipment. American troops would let the Iraqis get close enough so that fire from many M-16s and machine-guns would kill all the attackers. But the major American advantage was not weapons, but training. The U.S. soldiers were better disciplined and skilled at using their weapons. When ambushed, American soldiers were quick to return fire and maneuver their vehicles to avoid RPG, mortar or tank fire. Iraqis were much slower and uncertain when responding to American firepower or U.S. infantry and vehicles advancing towards, or around, them. American squad leaders and vehicle commanders were particularly quick in responding to enemy action, and the Iraqis were rarely able to survive this.*
Most American combat troops received a few weeks of urban warfare (street fighting) training while in Kuwait, and this was used successfully. The urban warfare tactics called for speed and careful observation for where the enemy was, or could be. Most of the "urban warfare" was in villages and small towns on the way to Baghdad. By the time the U.S. troops arrived in the big city, Iraqis were much less willing to fight. The "Thunder Runs" (combat patrols using dozens of tanks and infantry vehicles) intimidated those few Iraqis still willing to fight, and killed most of those that did put up a fight. The Thunder Run was a technique first used in Vietnam by American armored cavalry units, although it was usually seen used outside of cities. By using overhead reconnaissance to look for ambushes and enemy armor or anti-tank weapons, the Baghdad Thunder Runs were able to blast their way through anything else* encountered. The Thunder Run was mainly a psychological warfare tactic, though. After American units had done it a few times, very few Iraqis were willing to resist.*
There was nothing special about the tactics used in Iraq. It was mostly well trained and disciplined troops using their heads and lots of speed to overwhelm a less well prepared enemy.
Lighter Machine-Guns for Commandos
July 1, 2003: A special version of the M249 squad machine-gun has been developed for the Special Forces. It is more compact, with a shorter barrel and improved collapsible buttstock that reduces the overall length of the weapon by some ten inches (from 41 inches to 31 inches). This makes the machine-gun more useful in urban operations, particularly inside buildings. Weight is reduced from 16.5 to 12.6 pounds. A box of 5.56mm ammo, with 200 rounds, will still weighs seven pounds. This "SPW" version also has rails on top to accept sights, laser designators and night vision gear. The Navy SEALs use a different light machine-gun, the Mk46, which weighs a pound less than the SPW version of the M249. Many regular troops want the lighter machine-guns as well, particularly if they may be fighting in urban areas. This is not a major problem, for the M249 can easily be switched, by the user, between the* longer or shorter barrel.*
July 1, 2003: The troops in Iraq came up with some good suggestions for improving their body armor. While the standard helmet (variously called the K-Pot for the Kevlar it's made of, or the "Fritz", for it's resemblance to the World War II German head gear) was well liked, more troops have seen the new MICH helmet used by Special Forces. The MICH is built to accommodate a radio inside it, but it not as well balanced as the K-Pot, and thus not as comfortable to wear. Special Forces troops have already addressed that problem by using a BLSS™ Kit (from Oregon Aero). This is a commercial product from the manufacturer of aircraft seats and pilot accessories. There is a BLSS Kit for the K-Pot, but the MICH needs it more. The kit provides seven air permeable, reverberation damping pads and a four-point chin strap/harness with an integrated nape pad that replaces the helmet liner. In Iraq, it's also been noted that the Interceptor protective vest could be made a lot cooler if a moisture wicking material, and vents, were added to get some of the heat and sweat out.
The Real Thing is Too Expensive
July 1, 2003: One thing the Iraq operations brought out was the lack of firing ranges where the troops could practice using their weapons they way they did in Iraq. A firing range where vehicles can drive in and fire their .50 caliber machine-guns and TOW missiles are rare. The army has a few, the marines have none. Yet a common tactic was to have hummers out front, equipped with .50 caliber machine-guns and TOW missiles, acting as scouts. Often, the resistance was slight enough so that the scout vehicles could fight their way through and keep going. But you are better at this if you have a chance to practice it a few times with live ammo. Firing ranges like this are expensive, for .50 caliber rounds keep going for nearly ten kilometers, and are heavy enough to injure anyone they hit even at that extreme distance. But the .50 caliber machine-gun proved to be the most effective weapon for these scout units. There will probably be more electronic (video game like) ranges for these troops before there will be more live fire ranges. The electronic ranges are pretty good, but it still means the first time your troops get out there and do it with real weapons, it will take them a day or two to fully move from the electronic world to the real one. This is usually not a problem, mainly because American troops tend to be so much better trained than their opposition.
American Ground Tactics in Iraq
June 30, 2003: Ground combat tactics in Iraq were designed for the special kind of fighting that was expected.. It was mostly meeting engagements (encountering enemy troops while moving in column down a road), and night battles against an enemy who was slow to realize American night fighting capabilities. Troops were organized in columns to keep moving against light opposition. Constant surveillance by aircraft and UAVs ahead of the columns guarded against surprise attacks by enemy tanks, or large units of infantry. But the small groups enemy troops armed with machine-guns and RPGs were to be taken care of by tanks and infantry in armored vehicles (M-2 Bradleys for the Army and AAVs, or armored amphibious vehicles for the Marines.) Mobile artillery was always within range, and fire could be brought down on targets in minutes. Helicopter gunships (Apaches) and A-10 ground attack aircraft were also available from time to time. Most of the time, however, the A-10s operated farther ahead of the columns, as were the Apaches (until the Iraqi irregulars- fighters without uniforms- began to attack supply columns). By the time the American troops approached Baghdad, most Apaches were escorting combat and supply columns, to look out for enemy troops, and add their firepower as needed.*
When columns stopped, often at night (to allow for sleep and because driving at night was slower and more accident ****e), they had to watch out for Iraqi troops trying to sneak up and attack with assault rifles and RPGs. The Iraqis never seemed to catch on to the fact that American troops were plentifully supplied with night vision equipment. American troops would let the Iraqis get close enough so that fire from many M-16s and machine-guns would kill all the attackers. But the major American advantage was not weapons, but training. The U.S. soldiers were better disciplined and skilled at using their weapons. When ambushed, American soldiers were quick to return fire and maneuver their vehicles to avoid RPG, mortar or tank fire. Iraqis were much slower and uncertain when responding to American firepower or U.S. infantry and vehicles advancing towards, or around, them. American squad leaders and vehicle commanders were particularly quick in responding to enemy action, and the Iraqis were rarely able to survive this.*
Most American combat troops received a few weeks of urban warfare (street fighting) training while in Kuwait, and this was used successfully. The urban warfare tactics called for speed and careful observation for where the enemy was, or could be. Most of the "urban warfare" was in villages and small towns on the way to Baghdad. By the time the U.S. troops arrived in the big city, Iraqis were much less willing to fight. The "Thunder Runs" (combat patrols using dozens of tanks and infantry vehicles) intimidated those few Iraqis still willing to fight, and killed most of those that did put up a fight. The Thunder Run was a technique first used in Vietnam by American armored cavalry units, although it was usually seen used outside of cities. By using overhead reconnaissance to look for ambushes and enemy armor or anti-tank weapons, the Baghdad Thunder Runs were able to blast their way through anything else* encountered. The Thunder Run was mainly a psychological warfare tactic, though. After American units had done it a few times, very few Iraqis were willing to resist.*
There was nothing special about the tactics used in Iraq. It was mostly well trained and disciplined troops using their heads and lots of speed to overwhelm a less well prepared enemy.
Lighter Machine-Guns for Commandos
July 1, 2003: A special version of the M249 squad machine-gun has been developed for the Special Forces. It is more compact, with a shorter barrel and improved collapsible buttstock that reduces the overall length of the weapon by some ten inches (from 41 inches to 31 inches). This makes the machine-gun more useful in urban operations, particularly inside buildings. Weight is reduced from 16.5 to 12.6 pounds. A box of 5.56mm ammo, with 200 rounds, will still weighs seven pounds. This "SPW" version also has rails on top to accept sights, laser designators and night vision gear. The Navy SEALs use a different light machine-gun, the Mk46, which weighs a pound less than the SPW version of the M249. Many regular troops want the lighter machine-guns as well, particularly if they may be fighting in urban areas. This is not a major problem, for the M249 can easily be switched, by the user, between the* longer or shorter barrel.*