shrek
05-18-2004, 01:50 PM
I POSTED THIS HERE FOR MY BRIT FRIENDS, NOT TO START ANOTHER WAR. THOSE OF YOU WHO KNOW ME ALSO KNOW THAT THIS IS REAL, AND OFFICIAL!
May 2004
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MILITARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT SUMMARY
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT TO ROYAL AIR FORCE TORNADO
GR MK4A ZG710
AIRCRAFT: RAF Tornado GR Mk4A ZG710
DATE: 22 March 2003
LOCATION: Kuwait
PARENT UNIT: RAF Marham
CREW: Two – pilot and navigator
INJURIES: Two fatalities
Issued by: Directorate of Air Staff, Metropole Building, Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5BP
Page 1 of 6
INTRODUCTION
1. Royal Air Force Tornado GR4A ZG710 was returning to Ali Al Salem Air
Base in Kuwait at 2348 hrs on 22 Mar 03 (0248 hrs on 23 Mar 03 local time)
when it was destroyed by a US Army Patriot Surface-to-Air-Missile after being
wrongly identified as an Iraqi Anti-Radiation Missile. The aircraft was the
second of a pair of Tornados, flying as part of a package of Coalition aircraft,
operating during the early part of the war in Iraq. Both members of the crew
were killed instantly when the missile hit their aircraft.
2. The command and control arrangements were based on standard Allied
and UK Joint Doctrine. The Combined Operational Headquarters in Qatar,
with a 4-star US officer and a 3-star UK National Contingent Commander,
had overall command of the war in Iraq. Responsibility for the air campaign
lay with the US-led Combined Air Operations Centre based at Prince Sultan
Air Base in Saudi Arabia; it was commanded by a USAF 3-star General with
an RAF 2-star as part of his team. The Centre had responsibility for air
operations including airspace co-ordination and tactical control of all air
defence. The Land Component Commander, based at Camp Doha in
Page 2 of 6
Kuwait, held operational command of US Army ground based air defence.
There were liaison elements in both Land and Air Component HQs and at the
local USAF Control and Reporting Centre.
EVENTS LEADING TO THE ACCIDENT
3. ZG710 had been operating as part of the RAF Combat Air Wing based
at Ali Al Salem in Kuwait. ZG710’s mission had been tasked and planned in
accordance with appropriate orders. Flight preparation, start up, take off and
the operational phase of the sortie were all completed as planned. Prior to
engine start, ZG710’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system was checked
by the groundcrew and confirmed to be working correctly. Returning to
Kuwait airspace after their mission over Iraq the crew of ZG710 completed
appropriate checks, including noting that the IFF switches were set correctly.
The pilot had just begun a descent towards Ali Al Salem and the aircraft was
at an altitude of 17938 ft when it was struck by the Patriot missile.
4. The Patriot Battery crew were monitoring for Iraqi Tactical Ballistic
Missiles when ZG710 was tracked by their system. The symbol which
appeared on their radar indicated that an Anti-Radiation Missile was coming
directly towards them. The track was interrogated for IFF but there was no
response. Having met all classification criteria, the Patriot crew launched the
missile, and the Tornado, mistaken for an “Anti-Radiation Missile”, was
engaged in self-defence. The Patriot crew had complied with extant selfdefence
Rules of Engagement for dealing with Anti-Radiation Missiles.
SURVIVAL ASPECTS
5. Detailed examination of ejection seat and other equipment proved
conclusively that neither crewman had initiated ejection, and that they had
been killed instantly.
THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
6. The RAF Board of Inquiry was conducted in parallel with US Army
investigations into the incident. The investigations shared information in an
open manner, and the RAF Board had access to the Accident Data Recorder
and wreckage from ZG710, as well as witness statements from both British and
US personnel.
7. The Board noted that without the excellent co-operation and help of the
US Army, it would not have been possible to gain such an accurate picture of
the events that led to the loss of ZG710. However, this Military Aircraft
Accident Summary relates to the UK Board only.
DETERMINATION OF THE CAUSE
8. It became clear early on in the investigation that the immediate cause of
the accident was that a Patriot missile destroyed ZG710. The Board concluded
that the following were contributory factors: Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile
Page 3 of 6
classification criteria; Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of Engagement;
Patriot firing doctrine and crew training; Autonomous Patriot battery operation;
Patriot IFF procedures; ZG710’s IFF serviceability; aircraft routing and airspace
control measures, and Orders and Instructions. A variety of other factors were
considered and discounted once the evidence had been analysed.
Patriot System Anti-Radiation Missile Classification.
9. The Patriot system identifies hostile missiles through their flight profile and
other characteristics, including the lack of an IFF response. The criteria
programmed into the Patriot computer were based on the many different Anti-
Radiation Missiles available worldwide, and were therefore very broad.
ZG710’s flight profile met these criteria as it commenced its descent into Ali Al
Salem. The Board considered that the criteria should have been much tauter,
based on the known threat from Iraq, and concluded that the generic Anti-
Radiation Missile classification criteria programmed into the Patriot computer
were a contributory factor in the accident.
Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of Engagement.
10. The Board concluded that the Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of
Engagement were not robust enough to prevent a friendly aircraft being
classified as an Anti-Radiation Missile and then engaged in self-defence, and
were thus contributory factors in the accident.
Patriot Firing Doctrine and Training.
11. Patriot crews are trained to react quickly, engage early and to trust the
Patriot system. If the crew had delayed firing, ZG710 would probably have
been reclassified as its flight path changed. The crew had about one minute to
decide whether to engage. The crew were fully trained, but their training had
focused on recognising generic threats rather than on those that were specific
to Iraq or on identifying false alarms. The Board concluded that both Patriot
firing doctrine and training were contributory factors in the accident.
Autonomous Patriot Battery Operation.
12. The Patriot crew were operating autonomously, with a primary role of
protecting ground troops from missile attack, but the Rules of Engagement
allowed the Battery to fire in self-defence. Because its communications suite
was still in transit from the US, contact with the Battalion HQ and other units
was through a radio relay with a nearby Battery, which was equipped with
voice and data links to and from the Battalion HQ. The lack of
communications equipment meant that the Patriot crew did not have access
to the widest possible “picture” of the airspace around them to build
situational awareness. The Board considered it likely that a better
understanding of the wider operational picture would have helped the Patriot
crew, who would then have been more likely to identify ZG710 as a friendly
track, albeit one without a working IFF. The Board concluded that the
autonomous operation of the Patriot battery was a contributory factor.
Page 4 of 6
Patriot IFF Procedures.
13. IFF is a system designed to identify automatically whether or not a
particular asset, such as an aircraft, is a “friend or foe”; civilian Air Traffic Control
also use it to identify and track aircraft. A signal is sent from the ground or air to
the aircraft, which then replies. There are five different modes of IFF, which can
work in parallel or alone. These include Mode 1 (an unencrypted code, which
was used in Iraq by all the Coalition aircraft) and Mode 4 (an encrypted form of
IFF).
14. Investigation showed that the Patriot Battery’s IFF interrogator for Mode 4
was working throughout the engagement period, but that Mode 1 codes were
not loaded. The Board believed that autonomous operations without voice and
data connections to and from Battalion HQ might have contributed to the
difficulty the Battery had in receiving the Mode 1 IFF codes. The Board
concluded that the lack of IFF Mode 1 codes increased the probability of the
accident, and was therefore a contributory factor.
ZG710’s IFF system.
15. The Board considered IFF serviceability, potential IFF failures, and aircrew
actions relating to the IFF. The Board was able to discount external damage to
the IFF.
a. Serviceability. The ground engineering check on ZG710’s encrypted
Mode 4 IFF was completed satisfactorily pre-engine start, and an RAF
Regiment Rapier Missile unit that regularly checked the IFF of departing
aircraft did not report the aircraft or log a fault. In line with extant
procedures, only Mode 4 was checked on the ground. However, there is
no firm evidence that ZG710 responded to any IFF interrogations
throughout the entire mission, although there is evidence that the
navigator checked the IFF switches at the appropriate times. The Board
concluded that ZG710’s IFF had a fault and, as an IFF Mode 4 response
would have prevented the Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile classification and
engagement, concluded that the lack of IFF at the time of the accident
was a contributory factor.
b. Failure Modes. Following initial investigation, it became apparent
that certain power failures associated with the IFF may not be displayed to
the crew. The most likely explanation for the absence of an IFF response
was that there had been a power supply failure. The Board recommended
that further work be conducted to research the failure modes, reliability
and serviceability of the Tornado IFF system.
c. Aircrew Actions. The Board considered whether the navigator could
have accidentally or consciously switched off the IFF. The Board
concluded that the navigator did not disable the IFF either accidentally or
consciously.
Page 5 of 6
The Board concluded that ZG710’s IFF had a fault, which was unknown to
the aircrew, and that the lack of IFF at the time of the accident was a
contributory factor.
Aircraft Routing and Airspace Control Measures.
16. ZG710 followed the published speed and height procedures for a return
to Ali Al Salem. If the position of the Patriot batteries and the likely “arcs” of
their missiles had been taken into account in writing the procedures, ZG710
might have taken a different route. In addition, procedures were in place to
deal with a situation where an aircraft’s IFF had failed, but the crew would
have needed to know that the IFF was inoperative to employ them. The
Board concluded that airspace routing, airspace control measures and a
breakdown in planning and communication were contributory factors in the
accident.
Instructions.
17. The Board considered that the instructions available to aircrew
regarding aircraft operating without IFF were misleading and that this was a
contributory factor.
RECOMMENDATIONS
18. The Board made 12 recommendations including the following:
a. Further work is conducted to research the failure modes, reliability
and serviceability of the Tornado IFF system.
b. Closer co-ordination is implemented between planning and
operations organisations regarding airspace usage.
c. The US Board of Officers and US Safety Board receive a full copy
of the RAF Board of Inquiry.
d. UK liaison officers at US Central Command (CENTCOM) should
follow up on US actions fo llowing issue of their Report.
e. The RAF Board of Inquiry report is used to inform the process of
Lessons Identified from the War in Iraq.
19. The Commander-In-Chief RAF Strike Command, who reviewed the
Board, agreed with the Board’s recommendations, and made the
following additional recommendations:
a. A positive challenge and response IFF check be completed after
take-off between every aircraft and an appropriate control authority.
b. The Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit
warning is triggered in all failure modes.
Page 6 of 6
c. Operational doctrine is examined to enhance inter-component
Combined Air Operations Centre liaison and air space co-ordination.
The recommendations are currently being implemented.
CONCLUSION
20. The war in Iraq was completed in a highly efficient and effective manner,
for which all those involved must take great credit. As part of that campaign,
the crew of ZG710 conducted a dangerous and demanding combat mission in
an exemplary manner yet did not return safely. Overall, the losses suffered
by the Coalition were remarkably low, particularly in the air, and ZG710 was
the only Royal Air Force aircraft lost during the war. The Board of Inquiry has
established the causes of this tragic accident and has highlighted the various
factors that contributed to it. As is often the case, these factors were
complex, many and various; the Board’s recommendations are now being
implemented.
May 2004
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MILITARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT SUMMARY
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT TO ROYAL AIR FORCE TORNADO
GR MK4A ZG710
AIRCRAFT: RAF Tornado GR Mk4A ZG710
DATE: 22 March 2003
LOCATION: Kuwait
PARENT UNIT: RAF Marham
CREW: Two – pilot and navigator
INJURIES: Two fatalities
Issued by: Directorate of Air Staff, Metropole Building, Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5BP
Page 1 of 6
INTRODUCTION
1. Royal Air Force Tornado GR4A ZG710 was returning to Ali Al Salem Air
Base in Kuwait at 2348 hrs on 22 Mar 03 (0248 hrs on 23 Mar 03 local time)
when it was destroyed by a US Army Patriot Surface-to-Air-Missile after being
wrongly identified as an Iraqi Anti-Radiation Missile. The aircraft was the
second of a pair of Tornados, flying as part of a package of Coalition aircraft,
operating during the early part of the war in Iraq. Both members of the crew
were killed instantly when the missile hit their aircraft.
2. The command and control arrangements were based on standard Allied
and UK Joint Doctrine. The Combined Operational Headquarters in Qatar,
with a 4-star US officer and a 3-star UK National Contingent Commander,
had overall command of the war in Iraq. Responsibility for the air campaign
lay with the US-led Combined Air Operations Centre based at Prince Sultan
Air Base in Saudi Arabia; it was commanded by a USAF 3-star General with
an RAF 2-star as part of his team. The Centre had responsibility for air
operations including airspace co-ordination and tactical control of all air
defence. The Land Component Commander, based at Camp Doha in
Page 2 of 6
Kuwait, held operational command of US Army ground based air defence.
There were liaison elements in both Land and Air Component HQs and at the
local USAF Control and Reporting Centre.
EVENTS LEADING TO THE ACCIDENT
3. ZG710 had been operating as part of the RAF Combat Air Wing based
at Ali Al Salem in Kuwait. ZG710’s mission had been tasked and planned in
accordance with appropriate orders. Flight preparation, start up, take off and
the operational phase of the sortie were all completed as planned. Prior to
engine start, ZG710’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system was checked
by the groundcrew and confirmed to be working correctly. Returning to
Kuwait airspace after their mission over Iraq the crew of ZG710 completed
appropriate checks, including noting that the IFF switches were set correctly.
The pilot had just begun a descent towards Ali Al Salem and the aircraft was
at an altitude of 17938 ft when it was struck by the Patriot missile.
4. The Patriot Battery crew were monitoring for Iraqi Tactical Ballistic
Missiles when ZG710 was tracked by their system. The symbol which
appeared on their radar indicated that an Anti-Radiation Missile was coming
directly towards them. The track was interrogated for IFF but there was no
response. Having met all classification criteria, the Patriot crew launched the
missile, and the Tornado, mistaken for an “Anti-Radiation Missile”, was
engaged in self-defence. The Patriot crew had complied with extant selfdefence
Rules of Engagement for dealing with Anti-Radiation Missiles.
SURVIVAL ASPECTS
5. Detailed examination of ejection seat and other equipment proved
conclusively that neither crewman had initiated ejection, and that they had
been killed instantly.
THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
6. The RAF Board of Inquiry was conducted in parallel with US Army
investigations into the incident. The investigations shared information in an
open manner, and the RAF Board had access to the Accident Data Recorder
and wreckage from ZG710, as well as witness statements from both British and
US personnel.
7. The Board noted that without the excellent co-operation and help of the
US Army, it would not have been possible to gain such an accurate picture of
the events that led to the loss of ZG710. However, this Military Aircraft
Accident Summary relates to the UK Board only.
DETERMINATION OF THE CAUSE
8. It became clear early on in the investigation that the immediate cause of
the accident was that a Patriot missile destroyed ZG710. The Board concluded
that the following were contributory factors: Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile
Page 3 of 6
classification criteria; Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of Engagement;
Patriot firing doctrine and crew training; Autonomous Patriot battery operation;
Patriot IFF procedures; ZG710’s IFF serviceability; aircraft routing and airspace
control measures, and Orders and Instructions. A variety of other factors were
considered and discounted once the evidence had been analysed.
Patriot System Anti-Radiation Missile Classification.
9. The Patriot system identifies hostile missiles through their flight profile and
other characteristics, including the lack of an IFF response. The criteria
programmed into the Patriot computer were based on the many different Anti-
Radiation Missiles available worldwide, and were therefore very broad.
ZG710’s flight profile met these criteria as it commenced its descent into Ali Al
Salem. The Board considered that the criteria should have been much tauter,
based on the known threat from Iraq, and concluded that the generic Anti-
Radiation Missile classification criteria programmed into the Patriot computer
were a contributory factor in the accident.
Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of Engagement.
10. The Board concluded that the Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of
Engagement were not robust enough to prevent a friendly aircraft being
classified as an Anti-Radiation Missile and then engaged in self-defence, and
were thus contributory factors in the accident.
Patriot Firing Doctrine and Training.
11. Patriot crews are trained to react quickly, engage early and to trust the
Patriot system. If the crew had delayed firing, ZG710 would probably have
been reclassified as its flight path changed. The crew had about one minute to
decide whether to engage. The crew were fully trained, but their training had
focused on recognising generic threats rather than on those that were specific
to Iraq or on identifying false alarms. The Board concluded that both Patriot
firing doctrine and training were contributory factors in the accident.
Autonomous Patriot Battery Operation.
12. The Patriot crew were operating autonomously, with a primary role of
protecting ground troops from missile attack, but the Rules of Engagement
allowed the Battery to fire in self-defence. Because its communications suite
was still in transit from the US, contact with the Battalion HQ and other units
was through a radio relay with a nearby Battery, which was equipped with
voice and data links to and from the Battalion HQ. The lack of
communications equipment meant that the Patriot crew did not have access
to the widest possible “picture” of the airspace around them to build
situational awareness. The Board considered it likely that a better
understanding of the wider operational picture would have helped the Patriot
crew, who would then have been more likely to identify ZG710 as a friendly
track, albeit one without a working IFF. The Board concluded that the
autonomous operation of the Patriot battery was a contributory factor.
Page 4 of 6
Patriot IFF Procedures.
13. IFF is a system designed to identify automatically whether or not a
particular asset, such as an aircraft, is a “friend or foe”; civilian Air Traffic Control
also use it to identify and track aircraft. A signal is sent from the ground or air to
the aircraft, which then replies. There are five different modes of IFF, which can
work in parallel or alone. These include Mode 1 (an unencrypted code, which
was used in Iraq by all the Coalition aircraft) and Mode 4 (an encrypted form of
IFF).
14. Investigation showed that the Patriot Battery’s IFF interrogator for Mode 4
was working throughout the engagement period, but that Mode 1 codes were
not loaded. The Board believed that autonomous operations without voice and
data connections to and from Battalion HQ might have contributed to the
difficulty the Battery had in receiving the Mode 1 IFF codes. The Board
concluded that the lack of IFF Mode 1 codes increased the probability of the
accident, and was therefore a contributory factor.
ZG710’s IFF system.
15. The Board considered IFF serviceability, potential IFF failures, and aircrew
actions relating to the IFF. The Board was able to discount external damage to
the IFF.
a. Serviceability. The ground engineering check on ZG710’s encrypted
Mode 4 IFF was completed satisfactorily pre-engine start, and an RAF
Regiment Rapier Missile unit that regularly checked the IFF of departing
aircraft did not report the aircraft or log a fault. In line with extant
procedures, only Mode 4 was checked on the ground. However, there is
no firm evidence that ZG710 responded to any IFF interrogations
throughout the entire mission, although there is evidence that the
navigator checked the IFF switches at the appropriate times. The Board
concluded that ZG710’s IFF had a fault and, as an IFF Mode 4 response
would have prevented the Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile classification and
engagement, concluded that the lack of IFF at the time of the accident
was a contributory factor.
b. Failure Modes. Following initial investigation, it became apparent
that certain power failures associated with the IFF may not be displayed to
the crew. The most likely explanation for the absence of an IFF response
was that there had been a power supply failure. The Board recommended
that further work be conducted to research the failure modes, reliability
and serviceability of the Tornado IFF system.
c. Aircrew Actions. The Board considered whether the navigator could
have accidentally or consciously switched off the IFF. The Board
concluded that the navigator did not disable the IFF either accidentally or
consciously.
Page 5 of 6
The Board concluded that ZG710’s IFF had a fault, which was unknown to
the aircrew, and that the lack of IFF at the time of the accident was a
contributory factor.
Aircraft Routing and Airspace Control Measures.
16. ZG710 followed the published speed and height procedures for a return
to Ali Al Salem. If the position of the Patriot batteries and the likely “arcs” of
their missiles had been taken into account in writing the procedures, ZG710
might have taken a different route. In addition, procedures were in place to
deal with a situation where an aircraft’s IFF had failed, but the crew would
have needed to know that the IFF was inoperative to employ them. The
Board concluded that airspace routing, airspace control measures and a
breakdown in planning and communication were contributory factors in the
accident.
Instructions.
17. The Board considered that the instructions available to aircrew
regarding aircraft operating without IFF were misleading and that this was a
contributory factor.
RECOMMENDATIONS
18. The Board made 12 recommendations including the following:
a. Further work is conducted to research the failure modes, reliability
and serviceability of the Tornado IFF system.
b. Closer co-ordination is implemented between planning and
operations organisations regarding airspace usage.
c. The US Board of Officers and US Safety Board receive a full copy
of the RAF Board of Inquiry.
d. UK liaison officers at US Central Command (CENTCOM) should
follow up on US actions fo llowing issue of their Report.
e. The RAF Board of Inquiry report is used to inform the process of
Lessons Identified from the War in Iraq.
19. The Commander-In-Chief RAF Strike Command, who reviewed the
Board, agreed with the Board’s recommendations, and made the
following additional recommendations:
a. A positive challenge and response IFF check be completed after
take-off between every aircraft and an appropriate control authority.
b. The Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit
warning is triggered in all failure modes.
Page 6 of 6
c. Operational doctrine is examined to enhance inter-component
Combined Air Operations Centre liaison and air space co-ordination.
The recommendations are currently being implemented.
CONCLUSION
20. The war in Iraq was completed in a highly efficient and effective manner,
for which all those involved must take great credit. As part of that campaign,
the crew of ZG710 conducted a dangerous and demanding combat mission in
an exemplary manner yet did not return safely. Overall, the losses suffered
by the Coalition were remarkably low, particularly in the air, and ZG710 was
the only Royal Air Force aircraft lost during the war. The Board of Inquiry has
established the causes of this tragic accident and has highlighted the various
factors that contributed to it. As is often the case, these factors were
complex, many and various; the Board’s recommendations are now being
implemented.