Military Acquisitions

[Sith]

I have wanted to write up quick paragraph on military acquisitions for some time now, but my pesky Masters thesis kept taking up all my time. Now that that is finished and I have my degree I have a little time to contribute to this board.

I am in the process of converting my work into articles so I am going to be a bit ambiguous about the particular vehicle in question. I would rather be paid for my work than post it for free on the internet. Call me selfish, but I have a family who needs food in front of them. Back to the point being made, the vehicle is not important. What is important is the process.

Anyone who has frequented this forum, or other similar ones, has read posts relating how other vehicles than the one chosen would be more suitable for a given role. Many times people cite four or five features of their favored vehicle or system to prove their point. For example one might argue that the U.S. Army should have adopted the Centauro instead of the Mobile Gun System for reasons W, X, Y, and Z. I use to think along these same lines as well. However, I have found that the vehicle acquisition system goes far deeper when selecting vehicles.

While I only studied one particular vehicle, the system can be applied to all. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to assume that other militaries, while not using the same system, also delve into such detail when deciding how it wants to spend its money.

The selection began by examining vehicles in accordance with how they fit four broadly defined aspects. (Example: Survivability, Transportability, etc.) These four aspects were given an order of importance and then broken down into subcategories. In total the examined vehicles were ranked by how well they met eighteen different subcategories. It was from this ranking that the vehicle was selected. However, once the vehicle was selected it then had to be developed such that it fulfilled ninety-six “desired needs.”

Ninety-six individual characteristics.

When I was in the military we always evaluated vehicles on at most ten or so features. Until I started researching the acquisition system I did not realize the intense detail that went into selecting a vehicle. In that process I realized that that kind of detail makes sense. If you are going to spend billions of dollars on a new vehicle or system you want every aspect of it, down to the nitty gritty, to be exactly what you want. Hence, you minimize the number of Product Improvement Packages (PIP) needed down the line. It also integrates into your logistic better and you are not providing your soldiers with substandard equipment. The bottom line eventually being that you want to spend your money well. Every vehicle or system will eventually need a PIP sometime during its lifetime, as no one can develop a “perfect” vehicle. However, by going into such detail you can make these both small and infrequent.

The next time you question the adoption of a particular vehicle or system, you have to realize that the selection criteria goes far deeper than most of us tend to think. When examining such things I start with two major categories:

Cost: Militaries look for the products which will give them the most bang for the buck. Yes it is true that vehicles and systems are produced by the lowest bidder. However, this does not always translate into cheaper products. Cost is highly effected by using proven technologies, ability to mass produce the product, how many products are to be made, How fast the products are to be delivered, and the primary materials used in its construction.

Logistics: One cannot overemphasize the importance of this. How well does the product fit into the existing logistics system. The parts it needs, the ammo it uses, and the ships or planes it fits on. There is an old military adage that states “amateurs study tactics, experts study logistics.” If you cannot move and keep an Army in the field you do not have an Army.

This is food for thought. I hope you found it interesting.

Thank you,
Sith

[hank]

You also have to remember that every vehicle ever bought will look like the wrong choice right after a government buys it. New systems all have teething problems, that, when ironed out are no longer an issue.

I remember a 60 minutes story when I was younger about UAVs. The gyst of the article was that the Israelis had these cheap model airplanes in Beirut that gave great intel while the US was spending millions developing these uber-complex UAVs that were years away from deployment and which, at the time, were failing miserably. I'm sure the 96 characteristics you mention had a little something to do with our decision to go into long development and not buy the simpler vehicles in the 60 minutes I watched. Those characteristics, however, don't get mentioned in the article.

At the time there was a pretty big movement against US procurement about that. These days it sure looks like our UAVs are doing a pretty good job.

There was a similar report about the F18. The maker of the F5 had upgraded it and was trying to sell it against the F18 and 60 Minutes was railing on the Navy for not buying the F5. That decision in hindsight is a good one, probably for 96 reasons.

Give us a head's up when your stuff comes out, I'd like to read it.

hank

[Sith]

When I stated that no one could develop a perfect vehicle I was talking about “teething problems.” It probably would have been better had I actually used that term.

One thing that you have to keep in mind is that almost always the media is going to be very critical of any military purchase. They love to report stories about how the military is defrauding that American people by purchasing equipment that does not work. The most recent example of this is the Osprey. Another example of this that I used before on this board a while back was the M1 Abrams. The media consistently trashed the vehicle throughout the eighties until Operation Desert Storm. After that they treated the tank like pure gold. Unfortunately that is how the media works more often than not. One of the points of developing a vehicle is to work out the bugs. None the less, the media picks up on these bugs being worked on and reports them as if the military is spending tax dollars on vehicles and equipment that will not work. For example there was one reporter in the early eighties who consistently harped on the M1 for having steering and air filter problems. What he did not bother to mention was that by the time he reported them the problems had already been fixed. Ultimately, they are trying to sell a story. The more controversy they can stir up the better. That being said there are good things that do come of it. It forces the developers to ensure that those particular bugs are in fact worked out. Additionally, it informs military people about the vehicles potential problems. These can then be brought up in the various branch journals such as Armor magazine. They spark debate over the new system as well as push the developers into directly addressing the user community.

However, whether you intended or not, you did bring up a good point about development philosophy and Product Improvement Packages (PIP) that I did not elaborate on.

There are two types of PIPs: one to correct “teething problems,” an unintended PIP so to speak, and the other to improve / update the vehicle. When I was writing about the PIPs above I was thinking more along the lines of preventing unintended PIPs. However, The second type of PIP (improve / update), however, is quite intentional. This is part of the extreme detail or “ninety-six” that I was talking about. What they are doing is intentionally designing the vehicle or system to incorporate anticipated technologies. This philosophy in development emerged in the seventies and has picked up speed in the nineties with digitization.

I do not know when it was that you saw the 60 minutes story on the UAVs but I can only guess that it was in the early eighties. I am guessing that the Israelis were only buying these model airplanes to satisfy an urgent battlefield need as they later acquired purpose built UAVs. The U.S. also does the same thing but when they set out to develop something they do it with the long run in mind.

As it is one of the things that I know a lot about I will again use the M1 Abrams. Prior to its development the Army was working on a technological monstrosity called the MBT-70. This thing was so technologically complex that it incorporated technologies that stretch what is considered reasonable for today’s standards. It was considered a disaster. Thus, when the Main Battle Tank Task Force was stood up in 1972, they asked themselves a fundamental question, “What is a tank and what is it supposed to do?” This spawned a “back to basics” approach to tank design. Whenever a piece of technology was considered they asked if it was really necessary for the tank to function on the modern battlefield, if the answer was no, it was pitched. However, if the answer was no, but the technology was deemed useful; they incorporated into the design the ability to install it later. What resulted was the M1 Abrams, which seamlessly evolved through the M1 PIP, the M1A1, the M1A1 heavy, and the M1A1D. The vehicle’s structure did not have to go through any major redesign until the M1A2, and now we have the M1A2 SEP from that.

I know there are things that I did not touch on but I am going to stop here for now.

Thank you,
Sith