About Face: Odyssey of an American Warrior

[Havoc345]

http://i8.photobucket.com/albums/a42/rskoolherc/about.jpg


Anyone read it ? Just got it today and it is a great read so far. He brings up some interesting points about military reform in the US.

[James]

The late Colonel Hackworth has been called his own greatest fan.

[gaijinsamurai]

^ Probably true, but I still liked the book.

[Havoc345]

The late Colonel Hackworth has been called his own greatest fan.



That is mainly due to the fact that higher-ups in the military didn't like what he had to say.

[gaijinsamurai]

James is right, he did have an ego. Perhaps not as bad as someone like Richard Marchinko, but still, I think he probably created a lot of his problems himself. Even so, he had some redeemable traits, and his writings were of value. Most of all, he tended to stand up for the troops.

In my opinion, his worst act was to call for the Marine Corps to be absorbed into the Army.

[Havoc345]

James is right, he did have an ego. Perhaps not as bad as someone like Richard Marchinko, but still, I think he probably created a lot of his problems himself. Even so, he had some redeemable traits, and his writings were of value. Most of all, he tended to stand up for the troops.

In my opinion, his worst act was to call for the Marine Corps to be absorbed into the Army.

Yea I've never understood the let's make the Marines a part of the Army argument.

[gaijinsamurai]

Hackworth wasn't the first. Both Truman and Omar Bradley tried it as well.

[Havoc345]

Hackworth wasn't the first. Both Truman and Omar Bradley tried it as well.

Oh yeah of course I thought it was even worse what Eisenhower had to say about the Marines.

[Lt. James Anderson]

Good book. So is his other book Steel My Soldiers' Hearts ...

http://www.amazon.com/Steel-Soldiers-Hearts-Transformation-Battalion/dp/0743246136

[gaijinsamurai]

What did Ike say about the Marines!?!?!

[Kaplanr]

There was a supposed comment about not wanting any for Overlord; that he could figure out how to integrate Poles, Kiwis, the Dutch as well as the US, Canadian and British Armies, but not the Marines. I can't find a source for the quote though.

I've never heard of any USMC detachments considered for the ETO. The 6th marines were in Iceland for several months, leaving in early 1942 and reforming with the 2nd Marine Div. for service on Guadalcanal in Jan., 1943.

[Havoc345]

What did Ike say about the Marines!?!?!

Well when the Marines were almost absorbed into the Army in '47, the Commandant got help from a few US Senators and Congressman who had served in the Marines in the past to help stop that from happening.

This really pissed Eisenhower off because he was one the main players who wanted to the services to integrate. Their's a quote by him about the event where he said what the Commandant was essentially brown nosing and in his words a "dastardly thing to do". Wish I could find the quote.

[gaijinsamurai]

^ Don't worry about the exact quote. i believe you!
You're right Kaplan. I read that the Army was so worried about the Marines stealing their "glory" that they didn't want the USMC to have anything to do with Operation Overlord. Which is fine, as the Marine Corps had their hands full in the Pacific.

[sct1886]

Good book. So is his other book Steel My Soldiers' Hearts ...

http://www.amazon.com/Steel-Soldiers-Hearts-Transformation-Battalion/dp/0743246136

Outstanding read...

[Havoc345]

After finishing this book I have come up with one conclusion. It is the MOST pretentious book ever written. He opens up every chapter with a quote by one of the soldiers he served with about basically about how great he is. In every situation he tries to paint himself as being the most logical soldier that also has the biggest balls. He makes everyone else seem incompetent but him. He ends the book by saying the United States Military was defeated Militarily in Vietnam and to back up his claim quotes a North Vietnamese Officer. Great source Hack :roll:, I believe that the only reason he spoke out against the Vietnam War was to make a name for himself to satisfy his exaggerated ego. Every one of his Military reforms are ridiculous or are arguments dating back to the inter war years like hey combine the Marine Corps and Army or maybe its better to not buy the latest gear but keep whats efficient and what works. This book does nothing to enlighten the reader about our roles in Vietnam or Korea as through one high ranking soldiers eyes but only shows the extent of Hack's bragging about his big his stones are. A legend in his own mind is the quote that correctly describes this book.

[Lt. James Anderson]

After finishing this book I have come up with one conclusion.

I think you came up with a conclusion even before reading the book and since the book didn't confirm your conclusion - that makes the book bad. If you ever become a 1/100th of a soldier that he was, you'll be good to go ... ;)

I have three combat tours, and I think the book was awesome, his point of view on the military and the Vietnam war were valid too ... But what do I know ...

[Havoc345]

No offense but James said the same thing I did and you didn't attack him so you don't have to attack me just because I'm 17 and haven't served in the military yet.

[Lt. James Anderson]

No offense but James said the same thing I did and you didn't attack him so you don't have to attack me just because I'm 17 and haven't served in the military yet.

James didn't comment the book, you did. By your review I can say you wasted time reading it since you didn't get anything out of it. Me, on the other hand, reading Hack's books made me a better soldier ... The man came up with a lot of great stuff, served in three wars, went from private to colonel ... That's something worthy of respect ... His theory about out G-ing the Gs wasn't just a theory ... He put it to work - and most importantly - it worked (so I would say he knew a thing or two about Vietnam ;))!

[LineDoggie]

There was a supposed comment about not wanting any for Overlord; that he could figure out how to integrate Poles, Kiwis, the Dutch as well as the US, Canadian and British Armies, but not the Marines. I can't find a source for the quote though.

I've never heard of any USMC detachments considered for the ETO. The 6th marines were in Iceland for several months, leaving in early 1942 and reforming with the 2nd Marine Div. for service on Guadalcanal in Jan., 1943.

Only USMC at Normandy were the Ships Detachments ie:USS Texas 83 Man Det under under Cpt. Bernard, Lt.Hammerbeck 2IC . Texas's Detachment was alerted to land at Pointe du Hoc to help the Rangers. Most of the Marines alerted to land had no combat experience, and most had only several months time in the Corps.

In the words of one of the Marines: "This is Going to be the biggest Goddamn slaughter since Custer got his at the Little Big Horn". The Marines subsequently were stood down from landing and went on to process German POW's brought aboard

1 Marine went ashore, Col. James E. Kerr of Admiral Moons staff. He landed at Utah Beach @061015JUNE44 to evaluate the Landings.

[Havoc345]

James didn't comment the book, you did. By your review I can say you wasted time reading it since you didn't get anything out of it. Me, on the other hand, reading Hack's books made me a better soldier ... The man came up with a lot of great stuff, served in three wars, went from private to colonel ... That's something worthy of respect ... His theory about out G-ing the Gs wasn't just a theory ... He put it to work - and most importantly - it worked (so I would say he knew a thing or two about Vietnam ;))!


Yes the theory of out G-ing the G was a very good tactic I'll give him that. But his bashing the M1 Abrams and Bradley cmon he was so wrong. He claimed the M1A1 was outgunned by the T80. The myth of vulnerability of the M1 to Warsaw Pact Tanks and doctrine was obliterated during the Gulf War. His other theory of combining the Army and Marines is an age old argument that is dispelled by one simple fact there not as similiar as people believe they perform two very distinct jobs. The Marines are amphibious shock troops and Army soldiers are for garrsion and Iraq style low intensity conflicts. Finally his opinion that a draftee based Army is better than one staffed by volunteers is ridiculous. Draftees are just that drafted citizens who nine times out of ten would prefer not to serve. Don't get me wrong there have been great Draftee soldiers but configuring the US military in that Vietnam Era Conscript fed beast form would only hurt us.

[BadKarma26]

Hackworth wasn't the first. Both Truman and Omar Bradley tried it as well.

"For your information the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what they will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's" -President Harry Truman

some other interesting quotes:

After newspapers criticized the Marines of using unimaginative tactics that led to heavy casualties, General George C. Marshall "vowed that he would never permit another soldier to serve under a Marine command"

During Vietnam General Westmoreland "distrusted Marine operations" when Westmoreland's replacement, General Creighton Adams took command he said about the Marines, "In my judgement no Marine has the full professional military qualifications to satisfactorilly discharge the military responsibilities of the Office...I consider them less professionally qualified in the techniques and tactics of fighting than the US Army...the Marines have been slow to adapt innovations, tactics, techniques and devices which would make their forces more effective against a frequently cunning and clever enemy. They have not been imaginative in developing ways to optimize their strong points against the enemy weak points. Their inertia is to keep on with the pedestrian tactics they thought were right in the beginning. The Marines believe implicitly in giving a man a job and letting him do it. I am satisfi ed that will not work here . . . It is not enough to die for your country. If that is your sacrifice then in the case of the combat man it should be made exacting the greatest price from the enemy . . . This is a hard, tough war, demanding the best in professionalism.
It cannot be prosecuted with mirrors, words or tradition."


During a recent OIF joint operation (Fallujah...2nd time around) of Marines and Soldiers here are what several Army commanders had to say about their counterparts:

1LT Chris Boggiano, an scout platoon leader in TF 2-2, probably captured the true essence of the Marine Corps’ equipment problems: My second reconnaissance was my first interaction with the Marines, when we were setting up the staging area and the 76 Marines by that point had cordoned off the city. They were all sitting up on the berm, on the highway, and they’re shooting and shooting and we’re not seeing any tracer rounds coming back at them so Captain Mayfield wanted me to find out what was going on. So I drove up there with the LRAS truck, and I asked them what they were shooting at, and they said they were taking contact from two lights up ahead, and I asked the LRAS guys how far away those lights were. He said 1800 meters and I looked up at the guy doing the shooting and he was using a semi automatic weapon that can shoot about 600 meters and I asked the LRAS guy if he even saw anything there and he didn’t. All these Marines all up and down the line are just shooting at nothing so that was my first interaction with the Marines, and that was a little disheartening. A lot of them didn’t have any night vision equipment at all. They were shooting star clusters to see if anybody was coming up the side of the highway in front of them.

SSG Jimmy Amyett, from TF 2-2, recalled, “When I took my section clearing, I had a tank with me. There were always Bradleys and tanks all along mixed in with us, so if we ran into a problem with a building, we didn’t go running into the building; we ran up to the tank and had them take it out. The way I understood it and when I saw them, the Marines were just operating strictly dismounted . . . and left their armor back in support, and when they ran into trouble they would have to call it up.” Like other soldiers who came in contact with the Marines in Fallujah, Amyett was convinced the Marines “could definitely have used better equipment.”11

The second battle of Fallujah proved a costly endeavor for US forces. Although casualties were light compared to urban combat in the past, 70 Americans were killed and over 600 wounded.12 Not surprisingly, the majority of casualties were Marines. Marine doctrine stresses the importance of using tanks as an infantry support weapon. In the battle of Fallujah, however, it may be argued they lacked enough tanks to support most of their infantry during the fierce house-to-house clearing operations. This concern was voiced by a few Army officers, many of whom felt frustrated as they watched Marines sustain heavy and perhaps avoidable casualties.

“What I don’t understand,” CPT Chris Brooke remarked, “is why you wouldn’t want to use aviation before you entered a building. I know there’s a lot of pride and a lot of bravery, but it’s also tactical to use all the assets you have. I don’t know why they did it that way; I wasn’t in their shoes.”13 MAJ John Reynolds recalled TF 2-2 sending their tanks and 77 Bradleys to assist 1/3 Marines on 16 November. Reynolds stated that the 1/3 operations officer told him “that tanks were a scarce resource with the marines and he appreciated our support.”14

Two of the Marine breaching operations in Fallujah were problematic. The muddled attempts to place a deliberate breach across the railroad berm caused major delays in the operation. The inability of 1/3 Marines to conduct a successful breaching operation completely unhinged RCT-7’s battle plan, forcing TF 2-2 to fight their way to PL Fran with its right flank exposed.

It can also be argued that 1 MAR DIV never fully grasped just how fast a heavy-mechanized force could move through the city. Time after time, the Marines seemed dismayed by the speed of the Army’s advance. Undoubtedly, this was one of the reasons TF 2-2 often found themselves with no Marines on their flank.

[Hollis]

"some other interesting quotes:




I really hope your not intending on starting some interservice pissing contest.

Or

Don't piss in the wind or you will get wet.

[Havoc345]

Man BadKarma that incident with your sister stills seems to be wearing on you.


Could be worse he could have been a sailor.

[Havoc345]

US sends 'cowboy' general back to Iraq


By Toby Harnden in Washington
Last Updated: 12:10am BST 06/08/2006


An American general blamed for aggressive and brutal tactics that helped fuel the insurgency in Iraq is to return to the country as second in command of coalition forces there.
As a Major Gen, Raymond Odierno led the US Army's 4th Infantry Division for a year from mid-2003. Based in Saddam Hussein's former home town of Tikrit, he was responsible for much of the Sunni triangle, now the heartland of Iraq's entrenched insurgency.
Senior American officials now concede that the Iraq project could be doomed and admit that the war may have been lost in the immediate aftermath of the invasion - when Gen Odierno is accused of adopting a flawed approach to counter-insurgency operations.
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Having since been promoted to three-star rank, the now Lt Gen Odierno will return to Iraq later this year as the day-to-day commander of all coalition forces, including British troops in the south.
According to Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas Ricks, published this month to acclaim as a definitive account of military operations, Gen Odierno had a disastrous operational philosophy that valued short-term subjugation of the population more than the long-term goal of winning hearts and minds.
"These guys were looking for a fight," one American intelligence officer told Ricks, the Washington Post's defence correspondent. "I saw so many instances of abuses of civilians, intimidating civilians, our jaws dropped. They were cowboys."
Two colonels who served in Iraq at the time, one attached to the 4th Infantry Division, accused Gen Odierno of ordering his men to arrest and detain all military-age males without discrimination. "And when they got out, they were supporters of the insurgency," said Col Alan King.
The US army inspector general's office concluded that the 4th Infantry Division was reduced to "grabbing whole villages, because combat soldiers [were] unable to figure out who was of value and who was not".
Ricks quoted from an official US Marine Corps report that stated that 4th Infantry Division officers refused to meet tribal leaders, used their weapons indiscriminately and took a "very aggressive posture" despite the relative peace at the time.
"A budding co-operative environment between the citizens and American forces was quickly snuffed out," the report stated. "The new adversarial relationship would become a major source of trouble in the coming months."
Gen Odierno has strenuously defended his division's performance, telling Ricks that the implication that "all we did was kill people wantonly and abuse prisoners - in my opinion, that's totally false".
In an army meeting two years ago, Gen Odierno argued that being too gentle created risks and while his division had "probably made some mistakes" his men "adapted quickly" and its tough tactics were adopted from bitter experience.

[Havoc345]

nsurgency, Counterinsurgency, And The Marines In Vietnam

AUTHOR Major Frank D. Pelli, USMC

CSC 1990

SUBJECT AREA Leadership


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND THE MARINES IN VIETNAM

The war in Vietnam continues to be hotly debated. Why
the United States lost the war has been a key question
surrounding the debate over its involvement. One of the most
important points to recognize is that it was an insurgency.
My purpose is to evaluate what an insurgency is, what is
required to defeat it, and what the Marine Corps' concepts
and actions were to counter the insurgency in Vietnam. The
Marine strategy for Vietnam contained many of the important
elements necessary to effectively conduct a counterinsurgency
war.
Mao is considered to be the primary influence in
guerrilla warfare. He recognizes the importance of the
people in the success of the war. Well organized guerrilla
units are encouraged by him to take the initiative, applying
hit-and-run tactics, fighting in the enemy rear and
establishing bases for popular support and for spreading
their influence. He warned that guerrilla warfare is
protracted and becomes conventional only as it approaches
success.
General Giap parrots much of Mao's philosophy. His war
with the Japanese and French was an ideal test for the
precepts of Mao and as result Giap reinforces much of what
Mao offers in terms of guerrilla tactics. Giap's sound
defeat of the French provides a clear illustration of an
efficacious insurgency.
Not every insurgency has been a success, however. The
counterinsurgency conducted by the Malayans and the British
in Malaya is an excellent example from which to draw lessons
for success. The security of the people is essential. Once
this is provided the police, who provide the intelligence on
the enemy, and the military, who engage the guerrillas in
small-unit combat, can join with the government to develop a
strategy and oprational plan to defeat the guerrillas and
their infrastructure (the link to the people).
Throughout its history the Marine Corps has learned to
defeat guerrillas. They applied their knowledge in Vietnam
with a strategy and tactics that parallel the Malaya
counterinsurgency. They focused on the people and the link
between the peasant and the guerrilla. Several effective
programs, i.e. Combined Action Platoons, COUNTY FAIR
operations and GOLDEN FLEECE operations, were conducted in I
Corps in Vietnam. I believe that the Marines had the right
formula to defeat the Viet Cong but for victory all of
Vietnam needed to its application.




INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND THE MARINES IN VIETNAM



OUTLINE


THESIS STATEMENT. The Marine strategy for Vietnam contained
many of the important elements necessary to effectively
conduct a counterinsurgency war.


I. INSURGENCY ACCORDING TO MAO TSE-TUNG
A. PHASES OF INSURGENCY
B. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
C. INITIATIVE AND SMALL-UNIT ACTION
D. TACTICS
E. BASES
II. GIAP'S GUERRILLA WARFARE
A. PHASES OF WARFARE
B. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
C. BASES
D. TACTICS
E. FRENCH DILEMMA
III. LESSONS FROM MALAYA
A. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
B. POLICE
C. INTELLIGENCE
D. TACTICS
IV. SIR ROBERT THOMPSON'S COUNTERINSURGENCY CONCEPTS
A. PRINCIPLES
B. TACTICS
V. MARINES AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN VIETNAM
A. EMPHASIS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY
B. MARINE CORPS PLAN
C. CIVIC ACTION




INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND THE MARINES IN VIETNAM


The war in Vietnam has been debated and discussed in
scores of books and articles from the 1960's until today.
Questions about the morality of the United States presence
there, whether it could have ever succeeded, and if the
strategy was right will probably continue to be answered in a
number of ways for many years to come. Probably the most
basic question is why did the U.S. lose? Was it a loss of
national will, a failure to enter the war with the intent of
winning, or did the Nation just fail to recognize the type of
war it was and apply its might accordingly?
Andrew F. Krepinivich, Jr. in The Army and Vietnam
writes a scathing indictment of the U.S. Army for failing to
fight the Vietnam war as the situation dictated. Throughout
his book he accuses Army leaders of failing to properly apply
the stategy and tactics of counterinsurgency. "Deeply
imbedded in the service's psyche, conventional operations
held sway over the Army... "(5:164) He maintains that the
Army intended to fight an attrition war and "...gambled that
it could attrite insurgent forces faster than the enemy could
replace them..."(5:177) The Marine Corps on the other hand,
conducted a war based upon its previous experience in
fighting insurgents.(5:172)
Two of the key Marine Corps leaders, Major General Lewis
W. Walt and Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, did have a
clear view of how to conduct a counterinsurgency war.
Krulak, as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific,
wrote several letters to senior administration officials

outlining Marine programs and emphasizing the necessity of
conducting counetrinsurgency operations. He also was a
staunch supporter of Gen Walt, then Commanding General Of the
Third Marine Division and III Marine Amphibious Force (III
MAF) in Vietnam, when he was conducting a number of programs
to defeat the Viet Cong (VC) in I Corps in northern South
Vietnam. It is impossible to determine if the strategy of
the Marines could have won the war. Certainly , without
similar efforts by the Army in the rest of Vietnam, I Corps
would have been an oasis of counterinsurgency in a desert of
attrition warfare. This does not negate the Marine strategy.
The Marine strategy for Vietnam contained many of the
important elements necessary to effectively conduct a
counterinsurgency war.

INSURGENCY ACCORDING TO MAO


Mao Tse-tung is often viewed as the father of modern
insurgency. His treatise, Guerrilla Warfare, provides
detailed philosophy and principles for the conduct of war by
the people for reasons of nationalism and ideology. To come
to an understanding of guerrilla warfare in general and the
war in Vietnam specifically, it is important to review the
principles that Mao advocates. These principles are the key
to guerrilla strategy and can serve as a basis for
highlighting the strategy of counterinsurgency.
Guerrilla Warfare was written in 1937 as a guide for the
communists in China to wage a war against the Japanese. Mao
considers this to be a war of national liberation from the
oppression of the Japanese and generally avoids the usual
communist rhetoric. He does , however ,emphasize that a
guerrilla war cannot be prosecuted separately from politics.

Everyone must understand that the goal is political-freedom
for the Chinese people. This is important because the
guerrillas come from the people and are supported by the
poeple. To gain their support and active participation they
must see and accept the political goal for which they are
fighting.
In his introduction to Mao Tse-tunq on Guerrilla
Warfare, S.B. Griffith provides some of his own insights into
Mao's guerrilla philosophy. Griffith says that there are
three phases in a guerrilla war, phases which are which are
fairly indistinct, flowing and intermingling among one
another. Phase one is a period of establishing the movement
and developing its viability. It seeks to develop the
support of the people who can provide it with men,
intelligence and logistical support. Phase two is more
military oriented, with guerrillas seeking to covertly
eliminate opposition, spread the movement's influence and
attack government outposts for arms, ammunition, and other
military necessities. Local militia units are also organized
to eliminate resistors at the local level. In phase three
the guerrillas begin to band into more conventional military
units to attack and destroy the enemy and achieve victory for
the movement. (13:20-23)

[James]

Ok, this has evolved from comments about King Hackworth's book to what the USMC did "wrong" in Vietnam 40 years ago, to how the Army is a vastly superior force today.

Enough.