The Battle of Long Tan

[hist2004]

The Battle of Long Tan was one in which Australian soldiers demonstrated their courage under fire and adverse conditions.
"Hearty congratulations to the 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment and a Company of the 6th Battalion RAR for their show in Operation SMITHFIEID. Your troops have won a most significant victory over the enemy and one of the most spectacular in Vietnam to date."
Signed W.C. Westmoreland
General, Commander USMACV.

When the Australian Government decided to increase the Australian presence in Vietnam in March 1966, to a full Australian Task Force (ATF), it was based at Nui Dat. From there, the ATF was given the task of securing the province of Phuoc Tuy, south east of Saigon. Two Australian regiments, 5 and 6 RAR, were based at Nui Dat, a piece of high ground surrounded by rubber plantations, and by 14 June, 1966, Nui Dat was nearly fully operational. By establishing this base, the local villages of Long Tan and Long Phuoc were cleared and unavailable to the Viet Cong. During July and up to mid August, the 5 and 6 RAR searched villages north and west of Nui Dat and reopened the main north-south road giving the villagers from the north safe access to the capital of the province, Baria.
Intelligence reports soon began to filter through showing that the Viet Cong were getting ready to attack the base at Nui Dat and at 2.43 am on 17 August, the base was attacked with mortar bombs and recoilless rifle fire. The Viet Cong thought that the Australians would sweep the area around the base in an attempt to stop the attacks, and the Viet Cong would ambush the sweeping forces. 1 Field Regiment returned fire but 22 Australians were wounded, 7 vehicles were damaged and 21 tents were destroyed. To prevent further damage and casualties, 6 RAR were sent out to find the Viet Cong mortar positions.
On the afternoon of 18 August, the 125 men of D Company, began a sweep east of Nui Dat and just before 4pm, moving through a rubber plantation north of Long Tan, the soldiers of 11 Platoon met a small detachment of Viet Cong. They soon found themselves surrounded and pinned down by enemy mortar, machine gun and rifle fire and when the afternoon monsoonal rains came, they were virtually unable to see anything. An artillery barrage from Nui Dat to help the pinned platoon did nothing to relieve their position and they were in danger of being overrun by the enemy. Major Harry Smith, commanding D Company, ordered 10 Platoon forward to assist but heavy fire forced them to ground and they were unable to reach their comrades. Although Smith then ordered 12 Platoon around the side of the action, it, as well as headquarters, was soon under attack.
An air support strike also failed because of the weather and low cloud and ammunition was running low. Smith realised the whole company was now in danger of being wiped out. At Nui Dat, two RAAF helicopters took off with ammunition and flew low over the treetops at Long Tan to push the ammunition boxes, wrapped in blankets, out over D Company.
By 6.15pm, D Company had managed to be reunited with Major Smith and the rest of the men. Major Smith then organised their defence as wave after wave of Viet Cong swooped down on D Company. Artillery support from Nui Dat played a big part at this point, in preventing disaster and to further assist the men, A Company 6 RAR also left Nui Dat in armoured personnel carriers from 3 Troop, 1 APC Squadron. However, 1 kilometre short of Long Tan, they met a large force of Viet Cong and 2 Platoon dismounted to engage them, supported by the machine guns of the armoured personnel carriers.
By 7.10pm, just as it was getting dark, the relief force fought their way through the Viet Cong and reached D Company. 30 members of B Company who were on their way back to Nui Dat, also reached them on foot. Seeing these reinforcements, the Viet Cong, who had been getting ready for one final assault on D Company, withdrew from the battlefield. During the night the Viet Cong cleared many of their wounded and dead from the battle field. A number of wounded Australians lay there all through the long terrifying night, as the Viet Cong moved around them. At first it was thought that the Australians had suffered heavy casualties as they had lost 17 men and 19 wounded, one third of its strength. Total casualties were 17 killed in action from D Company, one dead of wounds from 1st APC Squadron and 24 wounded.
However, as daylight broke, it appeared that the Australians had a achieved a great victory as 245 enemy dead were discovered and many more wounded would have been taken away when the battle ended. A diary of one of the Viet Cong showed their losses to be as high as 500.
At Long Tan, it has been estimated that the Australians faced around 2500 Viet Cong, and D Company became only the second Army unit in military history to receive a United States Presidential Unit Citation. 15 members were given Commonwealth awards for their courage during the battle, including the Military Cross awarded to their commander, Major Harry Smith.
To honour those who died at Long Tan, 6 RAR erected a concrete cross in the rubber plantation where the men took their stand. Today the cross is on display in the Dong Nai province museum at Bein Hoa and a replica marks the site, placed there by the Long Dat District Committee.

The United States
Presidential Unit Citation (Army)
D Company, Sixth Battalion,
Royal Australian Regiment

The President of the United States of America awarded the Citation on 30 May 1968 and Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II gave formal approval for the acceptance and unrestricted wearing of the Distinguished Unit Citation on 13 June 1968.

Citation for D Company, Sixth Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I have today awarded the Presidential Unit Citation (Army) for extraordinary heroism to D Company, Sixth Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, The Australian Army.
D Company distinguished itself by extraordinary heroism while engaged in military operations against an opposing armed force in Vietnam on August 18, 1966. While searching for Viet Cong in a rubber plantation northeast of Ba Ria, Phuoc Tuy Province, Republic of Vietnam, D Company met and immediately became engaged in heavy contact. As the battle developed, it became apparent that the men of D Company were facing a numerically superior force. The platoons of D Company were surrounded and attached on all sides by an estimated reinforced enemy battalion using automatic weapons, small arms and mortars. Fighting courageously against a well-armed and determined foe, the men of D Company maintained their formations in a common perimeter defence and inflicted heavy casualties upon the Viet Cong. The enemy maintained a continuous, intense volume of fire and attacked repeatedly from all directions. Each successive assault was repulsed by the courageous Australians. Heavy rainfall and a low ceiling prevented any friendly close air support during the battle.
After three hours of savage attacks, having failed to penetrate the Australian lines, the enemy withdrew from the battlefield carrying many dead and wounded, and leaving 245 Viet Cong dead forward of the defence position of D Company.
The conspicuous gallantry, intrepidity and indomitable courage of D Company were in the highest tradition of military valour and reflect great credit upon D Company and the Australian Army.

Regards,
Hist2004

[digrar]

I served in 6 RAR for five years, spending time in both Alpha and Delta companies.
I got the following text and images from our unit web site.


http://www.sixthbattalionassociation.com/Battlefield.JPG


OPERATION VENDETTA & SMITHFIELD - THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN

D Company was on a company patrol named "Operation Vendetta" that remained in place until approximately 2300 hours 18 August 1966. The Task Force then commenced "Operation Smithfield".

The Battle of Long Tan occurred in the late afternoon of 18 August 1966 in a rubber plantation some 4500 metres to the east of the Task Force base at Nui Dat. The events of previous days set the scene.

On the 16th of August, 5RAR were patrolling in an area of jungle to the north of the Australian Task Force (1ATF) Base. They were trying to locate enemy identified in the latest intelligence reports. Estimates of enemy strengths operating in the area varied from 300 - 3500. However the most recent patrols had only fleeting contacts with 3 - 6 man groups. There appeared to be little to add any substance to reports of three enemy Regiments operating in the area.

A Coy, 6RAR were also away from the Nui Dat base involved in patrol work, but they were operating to the east and north-east. A Coy had been in three small contacts, killing 2 VC and capturing one. Once again, nothing to indicate a large force.

Back at Nui Dat the remaining soldiers were looking forward to a planned concert by Col Joyce and Little Patti on the 18th of August. The constant poor conditions while in the field were generally little better than in camp as at this stage there was a lot of work required in the base camp area to build up defences.

At 0243 hours (02:43am) on the morning of the 17th of August the 1st Australian Task Force Base (1 ATF Base) came under mortar and recoilless rifle (RCL) attack. Compass bearings were taken by various units as to the direction from which the mortars had been fired, and soon the Artillery at the base camp returned counter bombardment fire. The following morning a further patrol - B Coy, 6RAR - was sent from the base to find the firing location of the enemy mortars, and harass the VC responsible. Earlier intelligence reports had still not ruled out the threat of 274 and 275 NVA Regiments, plus D445 VC Battalion, mounting an attack on the 1 ATF Base. This was considered unlikely, although not impossible, and thus 5RAR were ordered to return to Nui Dat.

B Coy, 6 RAR spent the day of the 17th of August sweeping the area to the east north east and east of Nui Dat, and finding the mortar baseplate position. Meanwhile A Coy had several sightings of small groups of enemy to the north east, but still nothing to suggest a larger force. On 18 August, D Coy, under the command of Major Harry Smith, were ordered to relieve B Coy and follow up tracks leading from the baseplate position used for the earlier attack. For most men in D Coy this was seen as just another patrol. The only difference was this one was going to deprive them of the concert.

At 1035 hrs, just as D Coy were preparing to leave Nui Dat, B Coy reported discovering a dug-in position with weapon pits for about 20 men. They also found signs of the 75mm RCL that had fired at the Base. B Coy then sent patrols to the east and south to follow enemy tracks leading from the position.

At 1100 hrs D Coy left the base and began their patrol eastwards, at that stage, a company with a strength of 108 all ranks (105 Aussies and 3 New Zealanders). Meanwhile A Coy was continuing their patrol back to the 1 ATF Base.

At 1200 hrs the B Coy patrol that had followed the enemy trail to the south found another RCL position with signs of a least 2 wounded VC, presumably as a result of the artillery counter bombardment fire.

The men of D Coy met up with B Coy at 1300 hrs. The two company commanders exchanged the relevant information about the enemy positions and then B Coy set out for Nui Dat. Major Smith decided to follow the trail to the east and D Coy began its search along the track running east into the Long Tan rubber plantation. After a while the track divided into two, and ran about 300 metres apart but roughly parallel. Major Smith adjusted his company patrol formation to suit. He placed 10 Platoon (pl) under Second Lieutenant (2Lt), Geoff Kendall as the forward left, 11 pl under 2lt Gordon Sharp on the high ground to the forward right and 12 pl under 2Lt David Sabben to the centre rear behind Coy Head Quarters (CHQ).

http://www.sixthbattalionassociation.com/kirby1.jpg
OC D coy 6RAR Harry Smith and CSM Jack Kirby

At 1540 hrs a group of six VC literally walked into 11pl. They were fired at and subsequently withdrawn, leaving one dead and taking two wounded with them. 11 pl reported the contact to CHQ and stated that the enemy was dressed in Khaki uniforms. This went basically unnoticed by all concerned but indicated that the enemy may of been Main Force soldiers and not the anticipated village guerrillas. The Platoon Commander of 11 pl, 2Lt Sharp called in artillery fire on the enemy withdrawal route about 500 metres from the original contact. 11 pl then followed up the enemy and chased them to a small hut, where a platoon attack was conducted to ensure the hut was free of enemy. No one was found, despite extensive bloodstains, so they then continued the advance further into the rubber plantation. The soldiers were now fully alert and 11 pl were moving south south east, following a fence on the right flank, towards a small clearing in the rubber.

It was 1608 hrs and 11 pl had reached the near side of the clearing, when heavy fire broke out to their left flank. The platoon went to ground and began to return fire. There was a pause in the fire and 5 section (Sect) was moved to bring fire onto the enemy position. No sooner had 5 Sect begun to carry out this task when the heavy fire commenced again. This time the fire appeared to be more deliberate and intense then on the first occasion. 2Lt Sharp reported a platoon size enemy to his direct front, changing this to a company size enemy in the ensuing minutes. At this time, 60 mm mortars began to fall near the position of CHQ, 10 pl and 12 pl so Major Smith moved these elements to the north of the mortar blasts into an area which was to become the company's final defensive position. 11 pl was ordered to withdraw as the artillery from the Task Force began to fall, with missions of 10 rounds Fire For Effect (FFE) and repeats being called. The Battle of Long Tan had begun.

Meanwhile A Coy had just returned to Nui Dat, and were warned out for movement on 15 minutes notice. The continual thumping of the gun line told the story - somebody was in trouble. B Coy was halted on its return to base and told to move back to the D Coy location. 1 APC Sqn was also placed on 15 minutes notice to move A Coy out to the rubber plantation.

11 pl were being flanked, suffering heavy casualties and unable to withdraw. 2Lt Sharp was killed and Sergeant (Sgt) Bob Buick took over. 10 Pl were ordered to move around from the north to give support to 11 pl and allow them to withdraw. A mass of fire started in the 10 Pl location and all radio communications between 10, 11 and CHQ were lost. The second signaller from CHQ dashed to 10 pl and communications were soon restored. Artillery fire engaged targets to the south and helped to suppress the fire the fire of an enemy mortar position to the east. Casualties were mounting in 10 pl, but they managed to get to within 100 metres of 11 pl before being halted by intense small arms fire. 2Lt Kendall and his platoon were then ordered to withdraw to the CHQ position due to the large numbers of casualties it had received.

At the same time, 12 pl was sent out to approach 11 pl from its west. As they left CHQ, Major Smith was advised that 10 pl was withdrawing with its casualties, so Smith retained on the 12 pl Sections to reinforce CHQ's strength.

As 10 pl arrived in the company location a Company Aid Post (CAP) was established, and CHQ, 10 pl and the 12 pl Section were placed on the ground to, provide protection for the casualties.

12 pl reached a position about 200 metres behind 11 pl and came under heavy fire: they were subsequently attacked from their north east and south east. With the attacks continuing on 11 pl, CHQ and 10 pl were also now being subjected to attacks from the east by the enemy who were following up 10 platoon's withdrawal. Major Smith called for an air strike at 1702 hrs and would accept napalm to 100 metres. At the same time an ammunition resupply by helicopter was called for.

The time was now 1710 hrs and D Coy reported "Enemy now 200 metres to our direct front, 42 (the radio call sign for 11 pl) being attacked from north, east and south, 43 (the radio call sign for 12 pl) pinned down attempting to reach them." The artillery continued with rounds now falling dangerously close to the friendly locations. The success this had on preventing the enemy from overrunning the position was immeasurable. At 1720 hrs, artillery began firing regimental missions as ordered by the Forward Observer (FO), Captain Stanley. The expenditure of Artillery ammunition became a concern, and additional supplies were ordered from the Logistics Support Base at Vung Tau. Soon, a flight of Chinook helicopters were delivering pallet-loads of shells directly into the Artillery area, despite the near impossible flying conditions.

D Coy reported that all platoons and CHQ were now under constant attack from the east and south. Artillery fire was brought within 100 metres from 11 pl. The strike aircraft requested earlier reported they were unable to give close support to the now desperate D Coy due to the cloud cover and torrential rain. Their visibility was reduced to nil, so the aircraft dropped their ordnance to the north east.

http://www.sixthbattalionassociation.com/Georgechinn_1.JPG
RSM 6 RAR George Chinn

Back at the 1 ATF Base 5 RAR took over the defence of the perimeter. Two "Huey" choppers from 9 Sqn RAAF had been tasked to fly the ammunition resupply out to D Coy. The 6 RAR RSM, WO1 George Chinn, organised the ammunition resupply on to the choppers, and at 1800 hrs the artillery ceased for 15 minutes to allow the helicopter resupply to get to D Coy. Again, the dreadful flying conditions were overcome, and with the aid of a coloured smoke grenade the critical resupply was successful; falling literally into the hands of the CSM WO2 Kirby (who subsequently was killed later in the tour), who quickly organised its distribution.

Meanwhile, 2Lt Sabben's 12 pl had sustained 6 casualties out of its 20 man strength in keeping the 11 pl escape route open. Another coloured smoke grenade thrown by 12 pl allowed the remainder of 11 pl to finally withdraw to the 12 pl position. After fighting off several more assaults, the 11 pl and 12 pl group withdrew the 300 metres to the Company position.

Concurrently, 3Tp 1 APC Sqn with A Coy on board were heading towards the D Coy location. The going in the late afternoon torrential downpour was very slow and the move was not without its problems, the departure from base having been delayed for over an hour and a crossing of the flooded Suoi Da Bang River yet to be negotiated. However none of their problems quite matched the problems of D Coy at that point of time. Light was fading, as was the Coy's ammunition supply. It seemed impossible for D Coy to hold on any longer.

The enemy continued to attack from the east, north east and south east. D Coy were finally regrouped as a Company. At 1820 hrs Major Smith reported that the enemy could be reorganising for another attack and that they had temporarily broken contact. He stated that he had two platoons about 75% effective and one platoon virtually non - effective. The Company had hastily reorganised into all-round defence and the ammunition resupply was distributed, just as the enemy launched another series of massive wave-style attacks on the Coy front. These lasted until it was noticeable that it was approaching last light.

A Coy and 3 Tp were about 800 metres away and they were struggling to get to D Coy. As they got closer they began to take fire, and reported that they had contacted possibly three enemy Companies who withdrew after being fired upon by the APCs. B Coy, moving on foot, were also closing up behind D Coy and the Commanding Officer (CO) of 6 RAR, Lt Colonel (LtCol) Townsend aboard another APC joined A Coy as the force relieved D Coy.

http://www.sixthbattalionassociation.com/COTownsend.JPG
LTCOL Townsend CO 6RAR

As the last of the massive enemy assaults faded, B Coy arrived in Delta's position and were used to cover the approach from the west. It was just on dark. The Artillery was stopped to allow APCs to approach the Company position, and in the silence, the D Coy survivors could hear the APCs approaching. The battle was over.

On their arrival, 3 Tp and A Coy moved across D Coy's front, firing the 50 cals of the APCs as a precaution. The 6 RAR CO, who had arrived with A Coy, then took control of the aftermath. A Coy formed a screen to the east while D Coy took care of their dead and wounded. A casualty evacuation was organised in a clearing some 750 metres to the west, with the APCs forming a hollow square using their internal lights with top hatches open to guide the incoming choppers. The following morning, after a sleepless night with constant threat of further attacks, battlefield clearance commenced. D Coy again were up front for this task.

This was "The Battle of Long Tan".



THE ENEMY

The enemy was found to be the 275 NVA Regt and D445 VC Provincial Battalion plus one other NVA battalion in support. The original contact was believed to with a standing patrol or screening force. The enemy constantly tried to envelope the Australians, from the northern and southern flanks. The dispersion and movement of D Coy and all three Platoons probably deceived the enemy as to the size of the force they had contacted. The large amount of fire support would have aided in this deception.

The enemy were well equipped and were almost certainly prepared for a major assault on the base rather than a contact out in the field. Most of the enemy soldiers carried ammunition for crew-served weapons which were not in evidence on the battlefield in addition to their personal AK or SKS rifle with up to 250 rounds of ammunition. Furthermore, most were found to have 2 or 3 grenades on them, with some Grenadiers carrying satchels of 15 to 20 grenades. These were not used during the battle. The individual soldier was not camouflaged, yet had netting or fames on which to hang camouflage. His drills and discipline were of a high standard. He was apparently well fed and his clothing and equipment were in good order. Most Australians were surprised at the personal proficiency and battle discipline of their counterpart.

Enemy Casualties

245 KIA (Body Count)

3 Captured

150 KIA (Subsequent Intelligence estimate)

500 WIA (Subsequent Intelligence estimate)

Friendly Casualties

D Coy: 17 KIA 21 WIA

Other: 1 KIA from 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn

6 RAR: 3 WIA

Finds

Documents; large quantities of enemy webbing and clothing; 33 assault rifles; 5 SKS rifles; 8 light machine guns; 3 carbines; 1 heavy machine gun on wheels; 2 recoilless rifles; 4 rocket launchers; 1 60mm mortar; ammunition (12,000 rounds of various small arms, 300 grenades of different types, 100 rounds of mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket launcher ammunition).



Aerial View: Long Tan Battlefield 18th August 1966

FROM ARMY CANBERRA
TO 1 ATF

" The Prime Minister's Press Secretary has asked that the following message be passed to you. QUOTE. Our forces in their latest engagement have acquitted themselves with skill effectiveness and high courage in the best Australian tradition. Please tell them that Australia is proud of them. I have publicly expressed my sympathy to the bereaved. My sympathy also goes to the wounded. I send them best wishes for a speedy recovery."

SIGNED HAROLD HOLT,

PRIME MINISTER.

"Hearty congratulations to the 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment and a company of the 5th Battalion RAR for their fine show in Operation SMITHFIELD. Your troops have won a most significant victory over the enemy and one of the most spectacular in Vietnam to date."

SIGNED W. C. WESTMORELAND,

General, Commander USMACV.

"Please pass on to the 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment. My heartiest congratulations for the outstanding results attained during Operation SMITHFIELD. The large number of enemy killed as compare to the light casualties of the Australians is indicative of the professionalism of your Task Force. I especially want to congratulate D Company for its outstanding performance."

SIGNED MAJ GENERAL SEAMAN,

Commanding General II Field Force Victor.


http://www.sixthbattalionassociation.com/Battlefieldlongtan.JPG
Aerial image of Long Tan August 1966

[garoco]

Xa Long Tan, one of our Armys' most significant victories.

Duty First.