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hist2004
05-21-2004, 11:28 PM
Chindits

The Chindits were a British jungle Special Forces unit that served in Burma during the World War Two in 1943-1945. They served especially behind the Japanese lines.

Beginnings
The Chindits were a brainchild of a British brigadier general Charles Orde Wingate when he was serving under the Alexander Wavell in India. He borrowed the name from a Burmese mythical beast Chinthé or Chinthay; Officially their name was 77th Indian Infantry Brigade. Wingate took personal charge of the training of the troops in jungles of central India.

The first Chindit troops were found in 1942 in Jhansi. The majority of the Chindits were British infantry soldiers (King's Liverpool Regiment, 142 Commando Company) but they also included number of Gurkha soldiers and 2nd Burma Rifles. Wingate trained them as Long-Range Penetration units that were to be supplied through air. Usual armament was rifles, Thompson submachine guns, pistols, mortars, grenades and knives. A mule transport company carried their supplies. They were trained to move in small columns and reform into larger groups for a specific objective.


Operation Longcloth
In February 8 1943 in Operation Longcloth, 3000 Chindits, Wingate with them, begun their march into Burma. The original intent had been to use the Chindits as a part of a larger offensive but it was cancelled when the thrust along the Arakan coast faltered.

The chindits crossed the Chindwin River February 13 and faced the first Japanese troops two days later. Two columns marched to the north and received their air supply drops in the broad daylight to create an impression that they were the main attack. They even had a man impersonating a British general along them. RAF mounted air attack to Japanese targets to enforce the deception.

Five other columns, lead by one under the command of brigadier Michael Calvert, proceeded eastward. Three of them later turned north to attack Japanese garrisons but two, of Calvert and Bernard Fergusson, proceeded towards a valley with most railway connections. March 4 Calvert's column reached the valley and demolished the railway from 70 places. Fergusson arrived two days later to do the same.

Many times they could not take their wounded home; some were left with friendly Burmese villagers. Since there were no established paths in the jungle, they had to clear their own with machetes and kukris. A single RAF squadron of 6 planes supplied them by air and not all supply drops found their way to the troops.

When the major force of Chindits crossed Irrawaddy river in March 18, the Japanese already knew about them and had sent three regiments against them. First Japanese sent troops to cut their supply lines before they noticed the air drops; after that, those troops were sent against the Chindits.

On March 24 Wingate received an order to withdraw. By that time the men were exhausted and short of supplies. Back on the Irrawaddy River they abandoned nonessential supplies and either killed their mules for food or set them loose. The columns dispersed and proceeded back with their own routes and methods; one group built an airstrip in the jungle and evacuated their wounded by air, another continued to China. Fergusson's column tried to create a diversion by making false trails and camps. Others crossed the border rivers in one column or in small groups. Many were captured.

By the end of April, after the mission of three months, the rest of the Chindits had crossed the Chindwin river. They had lost a total of 818 men and only 600 of the survivors were regarded fit for further service.


US support
Although British army officers in India criticized the effectiveness of the Chindits - Japanese railway connections had been out of commission for less than a week - Winston Churchill was impressed and took Wingate with him to Quebec Conference. There they were promised support of whole air task force. US Army also began its own plans for group that would later become Merrill's Marauders.

The second Chindit brigade was called Special Force, officially 3rd Indian Division, Long Range Penetration Groups, but the nickname had already stuck. Six brigades were trained in Gwalior and organized into six brigades. In addition to men from previous regiments, new men came also from Black Watch, Queen's Royal, Leicesters, Lancashire Fusiliers and two regiments of Royal Artillery but included also three Nigeria Regiments and more Gurkhas. Men were trained in crossing rivers, demolitions and bivouacking. Brigadiers Calvert and Fergusson took command of two columns.


Operation Thursday
In January 1944 Japanese begun an offensive to India. In February 5 Fergusson's column of Chindits left Ledo for Burma, before the main Chindit operation, Operation Thursday.

In the beginning of March 5, when Fergusson had crossed the Chindwin River, two more Chindit brigades were flown onto landing zones in Burma, codenamed Broadway and Piccadilly, at night. Piccadilly, however, could not be used because the locals used it to dry teak logs so Calvert's 77th Brigade had to land on Broadway that had to be hurriedly cleared. The Chindit gliders landed on the third landing zone, Chowringhee, the next day. The next week 600 sorties transferred 9000 men to landing zones.

Chindit groups established heavily defended strongholds with an airstrip in easily defensible positions where they could not be harassed by artillery or armoured troops. They were again supplied and wounded relieved through air, this time mainly by US Air Force No 1 Air Commando. From these strongholds the chindits harassed Japanese communication and supply lines in northern Burma with hit-and-run tactics.

Ferocious jungle fighting ensued. At times, British and Japanese troops were in close combat, bayonets and kukris against katanas. on March 27, after days of aircraft attack, Japanese attacked Broadway for several nights before the attack was repulsed with flown-in artillery and the aid of Kachin guerrillas.

More men - total of 12.000 - were flown in. Still, when columns from Chowrinhee and Broadway met in March 20, it took them a month to establish themselves south of Indaw. Japanese also diverted more troops against them from the attacks against Imphal and Kohima. Fergusson's attempt to take Indaw from him base Aberdeen failed. In India, major part of the air support and the 6th Chindit Brigade, yet to be flown in, was diverted to defend Kohima.

After Wingate's death in an aircraft crash on March 24 1944 the command of the Chindits was handed to brigadier Lentaigne, one of the Chindit Brigade commanders known for his caution. In April he ordered the part of 111 Brigade that was west of the Irrawaddy, now commanded by John Masters, to leave their earlier outposts, move north near Hopin and to build a new stronghold, codenamed Blackpool. Fierce fighting ensued when the Japanese discovered the Chindit's position. Masters' troops had to be evacuated in March because the men were too exhausted after 17 days of continual combat. 19 Allied soldiers, who were so injured as to be beyond hope of recovery, were shot by the medic. When the rest of 111th brigade, under Fergusson, arrived in Blackpool, the Japanese attacked them before they could fortify.

In May 17th general Slim handed the control of the Chindits to US general Joseph Stillwell. Stillwell used them mainly as normal infantry (albeit without tank support), which lead to the larger casualties than before. In June 6-27 77th Brigade took Mogaung and suffered 50% casualties. When they were ordered to advance to Myitkina, commander Calvert shut down his radios and retreated to Kamaing. 111th Brigade in Blackpool had to abandon the stronghold when the Japanese took over the airstrip; they also had to shoot the wounded that could not move. The retreated to Mokso Sakan and were evacuated.

Due to the intervention of Lord Mounbatten, doctors were sent to evaluate the Chindits. At that time, most men were badly exhausted and suffered from malaria and dysentery. One column, containing four and a half battalions (2,200 men) was found to contain only 119 fit men. Mountbatten ordered Stillwell to evacuate all the wounded and the rest of the Chindits retreated. The last Chindit left Burma August 27 1944.


The end
The Chindits had lost 1396 killed and 2434 wounded. Over half had to be hospitalised with a special diet afterwards. The rest began training for the next operation but the unit was disbanded in February 1945.

Military historians disagree on the Chindits' military significance. Many think that the casualties they caused were relatively light. Others have asserted that the idea was a sound one, they were just badly handled and used in operations for which they were not properly equipped or trained, static defence, for example. A third view is that despite the relatively insignificant losses that the Chindits were able to inflict, their propoganda value, at a time when the 14th Army was on the defensive, was a good filip to the people of India and Britain. It has been hard to reach a consensus on this issue due to the partisan nature of the discussions surrounding Wingate himself.

Regards,
Hist2004

AFACadet
05-22-2004, 01:58 PM
Interesting article on the Chindits. Overall pretty good, but it is very inaccurate when dealing with some aspects.

The Chindits would not have worked without the support of the 1st Air Commandos (not the No 1 Air Commandos as the article refered to it--there was nothing in the thousands of pages of primary source documents I looked at that ever called it that).

The 1st Air Commandos flew for the Chindits from the start of air operations both flying them in gliders and supporting them on the ground with B-25s, P-51s, Grasshoppers, UC-64s, and the first combat uses of helicopers by allied forces. The Chindits had an important role in the creation of the 1st Air Commandoes, being that if the 1st Air Commandos was never created, the Chindits would not fight again as they were used to behind enemy lines--they were simply taking too many losses when they had to leave only slightly wounded men in the jungle. The Air Commandos allowed these men to be rescued, the survival rate greatly increased, and the missions continued.

Unlike what the article stated, the 1st Air Commandos were instrumental in Operation Thursday. And also unlike the article, no one flew into Piccadilly. It was not because the locals used it to dry teak logs (where in the heck did the person get that?), it was because the Japanese understood it was a good place for aircraft to land. A recon mission a few weeks before showed both Broadway and Piccadilly clear, but no later recon mission were flown to keep from tipping off the Japanese.

Col Allison, one of two leaders and creators of the 1st Air Commandos, had a 'feeling' that he needed to check out the landing sites again. Sure enough, Piccadilly was covered with logs (but they were specifically placed to snag gliders). If the 1st Air Commandos had landed, they would never have seen the logs at night.

I didn't pay much attention to the Chindits after that point, but the 1st Air Commandos preformed one of the most successful ground support campaigns in history. They took very little losses, while at the same time dishing out massive losses to the Japanese while bringing the Chindits to the enemy.

After the war, the Japanese commander of Burma stated that it was the 1st Air Commandos and their gliders that forced his forces to retreat.

hist2004
05-22-2004, 02:15 PM
AFACadet-

Thanks for providing the additional information. This unit was unknown to
me until a few months ago. I've read quit a bit about World War II and the
various units, except for them.

Regards,
Hist2004

AFACadet
05-22-2004, 03:03 PM
I've read most of the articles you've posted here. Where do you get them all?

I'm guessing that by you name, you're either a history major or a history buff.

hist2004
05-22-2004, 03:27 PM
I've read most of the articles you've posted here. Where do you get them all?

I'm guessing that by you name, you're either a history major or a history buff.

A history buff, most of the articles I've posted I've known about for some
time, with the Web it just makes it easier to present to this forum.

Regards,
Hist2004

AFACadet
05-22-2004, 04:35 PM
I knew very little about the 1st Air Commandos either until about a year ago. They were the model for all current USAF Spec Ops groups and had so many firsts that its hard to count them all (one example is they were the first in history to use GFACs in the modern sense--and to extremely good effect).

If you want to learn more about them, I wrote a so-so paper last December looking at the Glider aspect of the operations (I was interested in that since I'm a glider IP here).

You have to copy and paste the link into your address bar though.

http://www.geocities.com/afacadet2000/1stAircommandospaper.doc


Its sad how little is written on them. The Flight Doc of the 1st Air Commandos, Dr. Cortez Enloe, was planning on writing about his experences of the 1st Air Commandos. He got though about 10 chapters (probably about 1/4 of the book or even less--it was going to be a large book), before he died. His 10,000+ pages of manuscripts, research material, interviews, and primary source documents about everything related to the CBI Theatre are all here in the special collections. Going though it, I noticed there were a lot of inaccuracies taught about WWII that those documents would help clearify, but it will probably stay that way unless some historian decides to finish the book.

Ngati Tumatauenga
05-22-2004, 08:29 PM
'The road to Mandalay' by John Masters is an excellent book. I recomend it to any student of command in war.

jamesp
05-22-2004, 10:15 PM
two regiments of Royal Artillery


My Grandad was in one of those regiments.

51st Field Regiment (http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paterson/orgartillery.htm#RA51)