Question about Napoleon's army.

[briantk]

I am currently reading about Napoleon's Hundred Day Reign, and question came to me. How well disciplined and organized was the French Army at height of Napoleon's power? Time period I am looking is before Russian invasion and after Austerlitz battle.
In books I read about French army at Napoleonic period suggest that while they may excel in battle, they are poorly disciplined off battle. In one book about Russian invasion, it mentioned that there was army of vagabond soldiers in France who are drifting around, not reporting for duty. In same book, during the retreat from Moscow, retreating units who arrived first at Smolensk (?) depot destroyed any supplies they cannot carry, which denies any relief to following units. Other sources also suggest logistic is nearly non-existant, as army encourage its soldiers to forage without compensation, as opposite of British counterpart do (at higher level of command). Can anyone explain me whether is view is accurate or not?

Thanks in advance,
Brian

[lightfire]

I'd say that the level of discipline during military campaigns was pretty much equal to all armies of those times, but with the situation "at the front" it differs. For instance during the innitial stages of the campaign in Russia Napoleonic army was disciplined enough both in battle and "off battle". Otherwise they wouldn't have achieved such speed and concentrationed punches. However the retreat from Moscow is a very different thing. That was pretty much a collapse of the army (hence the casualties), but by this single retreat hardly it could be called undissciplined force through all period. It was a dissaster of unseen scale, where many armies would have acted in the same manner. maybe it wouldn't be fair to compare this retreat with US army's retreat from North Korea, but discipline during such times staggers in one or other way. If we look at the army of Napoleon and the campaign of 100 days (or even the campaign of 1813-1814) we could see not only veterans of the Old Guard, but also the young recruits, which training was short, morale doubtfull, thus discipline not at highest levels. Many of the most experienced veterans have fallen in Russia or other campaigns. But Even with such force of many poorly trained men Napoleon managed hold for a long time in 1814 and achieve victories. my 2cents.

[Ronguild]

Looting was a common hobby for the soldiers ... In every armies at that time. The worst exemple is the prussian line infantry in 1814 during the campaign of France, a mix of revenge will and poor food logistic.
The case of the "grande armée" is a quite similar : The imperial guard has good supplies whereas the rest of the troops suffers a lot of starvation and lack of supplies. Looting was a survival mean, an awfull one that's sure.

[briantk]

I just finished reading One Hundred Days: Napoleon's Road to Waterloo by Alan Schom.
Impression I have from the book is that Napoleon and his family acted like mafia.
What is your impression of Bonaparte's family?

[SBL]

Looting was a common hobby for the soldiers ... In every armies at that time. The worst exemple is the prussian line infantry in 1814 during the campaign of France, a mix of revenge will and poor food logistic.
The case of the "grande armée" is a quite similar : The imperial guard has good supplies whereas the rest of the troops suffers a lot of starvation and lack of supplies. Looting was a survival mean, an awfull one that's sure.

Agree. While reading John Keegan's The Face of Battle, I was surprised to learn that it was not uncommon for members of one's own army to kill and then loot wounded personnel, including officers, after a battle.

[T3ngu]

Evening all

I spend way too much time travelling for work so i have started listening to a number of podcasts. A while back I started on the Napolean Podcast.

After a while I went from thinking of him being a crazy little man, to being a true leader of his time.

You probably know most of it already, but hey heres the link, and its free.

Cheers

http://napoleon.thepodcastnetwork.com/

[Jaguar]

I just finished reading One Hundred Days: Napoleon's Road to Waterloo by Alan Schom.
Impression I have from the book is that Napoleon and his family acted like mafia.
What is your impression of Bonaparte's family?

As per John R. Elting they were not worst or better than other royal families of the time.

Btw, if one want to know about Napoelon´s army in particular and other armies of that era in general Swords Around a Throne from the same author gives an absurd (784 pages) amount of information. Everything´s there.

[Stainless Steel Rat]

I've done a fair amount of reading on the Spanish campaigns and Waterloo (outside of *****sburg for US folks, is there any battle that has ever been more disected than Waterloo?) and Napoleon and his marshals, while having a genius at making war, were not very good logisticians. Which, as others have noted, led to great privitations for the common troops and 'requisitioning' by them in the areas they marched through.

How much of this was due to poor organization and how much to financially not being able to pay for supplies I knoweth not, but Wellington's Spanish campaign was markedly more successful in supplying and provisioning the British/Spanish troops and paying the Spanish/Portuguese merchants for the material.

Battlefield genius will get you far, but Logistics will catch up with you sooner or later....

[oldsoak]

What I dont understand is the French apparent weakness in logistics - they had some of the most advanced and scientific thinking in warfare in Europe. Yet it must have been apparent to them that this would be a problem - was it because logistics is unglamorous compared with, say, the cavalry arm that it was neglected ?

[Mordoror]

Sorry to argue but the apparent logistic weakness was slightly less important than many may think

Logistic was poor for every army at that period (as said before, looting and rampaging was the rule for middle and lower grade soldiers in every army and so it was since the fall of the roman military).

in fact there was no true logistic as it is known by our days :
imagine no need for fuel, no need for medical supplies except a scalpel and boiled sheet as band-aid, no need for electricity, informatic components etc

the military life at that time was crude and the only logistic needs were food for horses (but an horse can eat grass), food for the men (but a soldier can loot a farm and will do that to find food if he needs it), water and of course ammo

Of course providing food, water and ammo instead of letting the soldiers wander for it is improving the efficiency of an army as it reduce attrition loses and deserting

Moreover since Valmy the French generals first formed under the revolution and serving under the empire were well aware of the need of a minimum of supplies as they had a lot of example of catastrophic issues for their armies (in Vendée for example) or ennemy armies (Valmy is a good example) that not providing adequate stuff can turn constitued units in mess and an expected victory in defeat. So I do not think that Napoleonian logistic was so bad. If it was so bad, the "marche forcée" from the Pas de Calais to Austerlitz would have let to tremendous attrition. The same for the campagne in Russia (of course, in that case the russians did right by burning the supply depots along the roads, finally conducing to the end of the "Grand armée") and there would not have be the "cantinières" following the Army

here is a link about some logistic stuff (a women function mainly, sorry it is in french : http://www.histoire-empire.org/articles/cantiniere/femmes_aux_armees_de_napoleon.htm)

Moreover, napoleon is known for is capability to make his army manoeuver quickly and on long distance which way of acting is not compatible with a all way out rampaging army (rampaging and looting units obviously slow an entire army)

Off course on several time logistic did not follow, especially in the Spain campaign but it was a special one : guerrilla with asymetric fights and no combat lines leading to many attacks on the supply lines and depots, totaly hostile country (whereas many other countries in europe were forced or accepted from their own will to join the Napoleon project and provide soldiers and stuff) and regular well trained opponent (Anglo-portuguese army) with good manoeuvring capabilities when well commanded (by Wellington) against mainly second hand high ranked french officers.

To add one more element to this discussion remember also that France was under blocus from the Brit Navy which was ruling the seas and has cut the supply roads from the french colonies to the continent.

Finally, if we take the last "100 jours" period, France was economically wasted by 15 years of war, outnumbered by an heavy coalition and forced to fight on several front (which situation of course complicated the logistic problems) with many former allies that turned the back to the Emperor...
All of that make the Waterloo defeat possible (or if it was not at Waterloo it would have be elsewhere, the final coalition being overwhelming in sheer number, somewhat in quality and decided to stop Napoleon)

So I do not think that this defeat is a matter of logistic (anyway, the French fought several battles in the weeks before this one and managed to win or at least have tactical draws several time even against overwhelming odds which means that their army was fully operationnal)

[Toddy]

Let's not forget that Napoleon was actually winning Waterloo until the Prussians arrived on the field of battle.

Communication, more than logistics was the problem in that day and age. Mounted couriers were only good if they didn't get shot before delivering messages. Also the fatal charge and ultimate destruction of the French cavalry happened while Napoleon was off the field of battle.

Thoughts?

[Hessen20]

It escapes me who took charge of directing Napoleon's orders after the death of Berthier, but that was a huge problem of the 1815 campaign. Berthier would send out hundreds of riders per order when his replacement would send one or two and they would get lost or killed. Also it is said that Berthier was one of the only ones that could understand Napoleons handwriting and vision and was able to translate exactly what Napoleon wanted to his subordinates. So the break down of communication in 1815 was due to the lack of Berthier. As to the cavalry charge it is said that it was entirely Ney's doing, and to some it seemed that he lost his marbles or was suffering from what would now be PTSD, he showed up at Lingy, as substantial distance away from his field of battle, to tell Napoleon personally about his victory at Quarter Bras when he should of sent anyone of his many Hussars to do it. He received a sharp reprimand for that action to say the least.

most armies of the continent were extremely well disciplined, but they all had their moments. Badajoz in particular sticks out in my mind for the British, that was a disaster. My field of study has mostly been the Germanic armies of the time period which Napoleon had high praise for and won him many honors on the field. The same goes for the Germans in the service of the English. I would have to say discipline would be high in all armies and more specifically on a unit to unit basis, but also in circumstance, you had units that would run easily or fight to the very last man. At Jena the Saxon grenadiers performed and excellent rearguard duty, forming square and marching to the rear while repeatedly attacked by French Cav and infantry while the Prussians crumbeled around them, and at Elayu you had the 146th line I believe fighting to the last man so their Eagle would not fall into the hands of the Russians, and you have the Polish lancers who in the Bug river I believe shouted "Viva la Emperor" while drowning as well as performed outstanding in every battle, those are just a few of many examples of discipline and duty all in all the armies were composed of very heroic men and the further you read about them the more you hear. If you want to read about the French I recomend you read " La Grande Armee" By George Blond. Also google George Nafziger he writes extensively about all the armies I have allot of his German works. With Eagles to Glory also has remarkable information on the Germans in 1809. Try Greenhill books for all U.K subjects. Osprey has great dissections of campaigns and armies, and browse antique and used book stores they have a wealth of knowledge for relatively cheap.

[T3ngu]

Let's not forget that Napoleon was actually winning Waterloo until the Prussians arrived on the field of battle.

Communication, more than logistics was the problem in that day and age. Mounted couriers were only good if they didn't get shot before delivering messages. Also the fatal charge and ultimate destruction of the French cavalry happened while Napoleon was off the field of battle.

Thoughts?

That and Grouchy didnt march to the sound of the guns.

[Hessen20]

I have read a statement a while ago from his point of view and he had some very compelling arguments. His record up to that point is outstanding.

[T3ngu]

I have read a statement a while ago from his point of view and he had some very compelling arguments. His record up to that point is outstanding.

This is true. However, Grouchy as far as I can tell was simply following Napoleans orders, or at least claimed to be.

It is easy with hindsight to say he should have marched to the sound of the guns, my appologies there, that isn't nessecarily what I meant. I probably should have added some context.

However, there have been suggestions that he deliberately avoided battle, the difference, we shall never know. I was inferring that Napolean could have indeed won waterloo if Grouchy had of marched to Napoleans aid. Hating to quote wiki but...


Napoleon's reaction was to send a message to Grouchy telling him to come towards the battlefield and attack the arriving Prussians.[48] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Waterloo#_note-43) Grouchy, however, had been executing Napoleon's previous orders to follow the Prussians "with your sword against his back" towards Wavre, and was by now too far away to reach Waterloo. Grouchy was advised by his subordinate, Gérard (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89tienne_Maurice_G%C3%A9rard), to "march to the sound of the guns", but stuck to his orders and engaged the Prussian III Corps rear guard under the command of Lieutenant-General (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lieutenant-General) Baron (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baron) Johann von Thielmann (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_von_Thielmann) at the Battle of Wavre (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wavre).

[oldsoak]

Sorry to argue but the apparent logistic weakness was slightly less important than many may think

Logistic was poor for every army at that period (as said before, looting and rampaging was the rule for middle and lower grade soldiers in every army and so it was since the fall of the roman military).

in fact there was no true logistic as it is known by our days :
imagine no need for fuel, no need for medical supplies except a scalpel and boiled sheet as band-aid, no need for electricity, informatic components etc

the military life at that time was crude and the only logistic needs were food for horses (but an horse can eat grass), food for the men (but a soldier can loot a farm and will do that to find food if he needs it), water and of course ammo

Of course providing food, water and ammo instead of letting the soldiers wander for it is improving the efficiency of an army as it reduce attrition loses and deserting

Moreover since Valmy the French generals first formed under the revolution and serving under the empire were well aware of the need of a minimum of supplies as they had a lot of example of catastrophic issues for their armies (in Vendée for example) or ennemy armies (Valmy is a good example) that not providing adequate stuff can turn constitued units in mess and an expected victory in defeat. So I do not think that Napoleonian logistic was so bad. If it was so bad, the "marche forcée" from the Pas de Calais to Austerlitz would have let to tremendous attrition. The same for the campagne in Russia (of course, in that case the russians did right by burning the supply depots along the roads, finally conducing to the end of the "Grand armée") and there would not have be the "cantinières" following the Army

here is a link about some logistic stuff (a women function mainly, sorry it is in french : http://www.histoire-empire.org/articles/cantiniere/femmes_aux_armees_de_napoleon.htm)

Moreover, napoleon is known for is capability to make his army manoeuver quickly and on long distance which way of acting is not compatible with a all way out rampaging army (rampaging and looting units obviously slow an entire army)

Off course on several time logistic did not follow, especially in the Spain campaign but it was a special one : guerrilla with asymetric fights and no combat lines leading to many attacks on the supply lines and depots, totaly hostile country (whereas many other countries in europe were forced or accepted from their own will to join the Napoleon project and provide soldiers and stuff) and regular well trained opponent (Anglo-portuguese army) with good manoeuvring capabilities when well commanded (by Wellington) against mainly second hand high ranked french officers.

To add one more element to this discussion remember also that France was under blocus from the Brit Navy which was ruling the seas and has cut the supply roads from the french colonies to the continent.

Finally, if we take the last "100 jours" period, France was economically wasted by 15 years of war, outnumbered by an heavy coalition and forced to fight on several front (which situation of course complicated the logistic problems) with many former allies that turned the back to the Emperor...
All of that make the Waterloo defeat possible (or if it was not at Waterloo it would have be elsewhere, the final coalition being overwhelming in sheer number, somewhat in quality and decided to stop Napoleon)

So I do not think that this defeat is a matter of logistic (anyway, the French fought several battles in the weeks before this one and managed to win or at least have tactical draws several time even against overwhelming odds which means that their army was fully operationnal)

Its a bit more complex than that - the British had tables which
defined how much bread, cheese, beer etc was needed per man per day etc since before the American War of Independence - and had people whose specific tasks was to purchase food from the locals where possible. Horses , while they can eat grass, need additional hay and oats in the winter which is a major concern for an army who relies on horses and bullocks as the only means of pulling carts and guns. The French would have had at least the equivalent. It may be that Napoleons war of manouevre may have simply been too fast for his logistics train to keep up.

[Mordoror]

yes you are right, it is a little bit more complex that what I wrote
Especially considering hostile countries (by hostile I mean in a topographic and ressource way) and hostile weather (so especially in Winter)

However I persist, logistic was not the state of art that it will become by our days and it was not unusual (in fact it was almost an habit) for any armies to live directly on the land they invade or walk through (via foraging, looting, rampaging or requisitioning)

Your are also right when you say that
the British had tables which
defined how much bread, cheese, beer etc was needed per man per day etc since before the American War of Independence - and had people whose specific tasks was to purchase food from the locals where possible.....
The French would have had at least the equivalent.

In fact they had the equivalent as every modern armies of that time (When I am talking about modern armies I exclude feudal armies like Ottoman, Mamelouks or in a less way russians) which were by defintion expeditionnary corps which means that stuff for the troups was something vital to them.


It may be that Napoleons war of manouevre may have simply been too fast for his logistics train to keep up.

Really this statement do not convince me. First because Napoleon Grand Armée was on the contrary known to be one of the best equiped of the continental powers. Logistic was poor for the armies of the revolution (some second hand units did not have even shoes) but this was rapidly fixed under the Empire. Secondary, looking on the Emperor's battles, even after tremendous wasting of ammo (Full day fighting of thousands of soldiers, "grand battery"
of dozens of cannons ... etc) there was not reports of ammo shortage as there was no reports of food shortage (except for the well known retreat in Russia ....) or even epidemic spreading of infectious diseases like typhus/dysentery ... which was common on badly equiped and fed troups.

Here come some infos on the Napoleon logistic (sorry some in french)

Au XIXe siècle [modifier (http://fr.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Logistique&action=edit&section=7)]

En 1806, l'empereur Napoléon 1er (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napol%C3%A9on_1er) crée les premiers éléments militaires du personnel d'administration [5] (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistique#_note-4) Selon le ministère de la Défense, dans sa revue Armée de terre, « Il s'agit de compagnies d'ouvriers d'administration rattachées à la garde impériale, constituées de boulangers (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boulanger), bouchers (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boucher_%28m%C3%A9tier%29) et artisans (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artisan) ».
Destinées à assurer le ravitaillement en vivres des armées napoléoniennes puis royales, dotées de statuts et d'uniformes (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniforme) propres (" habit veste en drap gris… "), ces compagnies se sont illustrées au cours de toutes les campagnes napoléoniennes entre 1806 et 1815 (Espagne (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Espagne), Allemagne (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allemagne), Russie (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russie), Saxe (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duch%C3%A9_de_Saxe), France (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/France) et Belgique (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgique)) et des expéditions ultérieures : Espagne 1823, Corée (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cor%C3%A9e) 1828, Algérie (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alg%C3%A9rie) de 1830 à 1839 et Italie (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italie) 1849.


When Napoleon entered Russia in 1812, he set up storage depots and warehouses sufficient for a short campaign ending in a decisive and war-finishing victory against the Russian army. A month after his crossing of the Vistula, having failed to entice the Russian army into battle, Napoleon was trapped in a terrible situation - having to advance on an undamaged foe who retreated from him, with every step along the march bringing his French further from their supplies and the Russians closer to theirs, and the winter coming. The skilled French quartermasters, who had given Napoleon the fastest and most flexible logistics support in Europe for more than a decade, proved unable to sufficiently supply 300 000 French and French allied soldiers as they advanced on Moscow, and when Napoleon retreated he found of the warehouses he had carefully set up along his route looted, not only by Russian irregulars, but often by undisciplined French. Of 300 000 soldiers he led into Russia, Napoleon led out 3 percent - about 10 000 survivors. Both major battles Napoleon fought against the Russians in this campaign - Smolensk and Borodino - were indecisive. The superior logistical environment the Russian army operated in was decisive.

or a link :

http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~dheb/2300/Historical/MA/NapLogistics.pdf

[Toddy]

Some info:
"NAPOLEON FAMOUSLY said an army marches on its stomach. Clearly military personnel need to eat well to perform well. But what Napoleon was really getting at with this maxim was the importance of the supply line. Logistics - getting food, clothes, and spare parts to the front - is often what makes or breaks a conflict. The truth of this was illustrated by Napoleon himself when, in June 1812, he tried (and failed) to invade Russia with a force of 500,000 men. Because the Russians removed most of the food and crops in advance, Napoleon's army couldn't live off the land as they had in previous campaigns.
Despite this, his forces made it to Moscow by September, but they were too emaciated to hold their position and in October went into retreat. Napoleon failed to live up to his own dictum about supply and, as a result, his bid for continental domination was thwarted." Source: DCLnews Special Report

"Napoleon had two different yet supportive divisions in his various wars. One division did the fighting while the other did the provisioning. Traditionally the provisioning division moved before the fighting forces to secure food and lodging. When the fighting division caught up, they were assured of provisions. An army has always ‘marched on its stomach’ and it remains the same today. If the provisioning division got captured, the fighting soldiers went hungry that night. Napoleon decided to remedy this situation, as hungry soldiers were not often victorious.

To ensure that the fighting army was under a common General to provisioning, Napoleon created a Marchal (Marshall) General de Logis (now logistics) to coordinate and control both provisioning and fighting......" Source: ferret.com.au

[stonecutter]

Last time I was in France I was shown some family letters dating to the Napoleonic wars, written by my acquaintance's distant relative, who was a Hussard serving under I forget which of Napoleon's marshals... Anyway I remember in one letter, he was writing about how tired they were, barely being able to stay in the saddle, 30 hours with no food, etc. The entire letter was one of suffering and hardship -- a true "grognard" perhaps but still an indication of what these hard men went through sometimes. I can't remember the date on the letter, if it was near the end of the Napoleonic wars when things may have been a bit hectic, or not. I'm trying to convince this guy in France to put the letters into a book and publish them, it was fascinating reading these first-hand accounts of life in such a momentous period of history. What made it even better was having the Hussard's sabre right beside us as we were reading!
http://i24.photobucket.com/albums/c16/yamagatafan/IMG_1703.jpg

[oldsoak]

It may be that Napoleons war of manouevre may have simply been too fast for his logistics train to keep up.
Really this statement do not convince me. First because Napoleon Grand Armée was on the contrary known to be one of the best equiped of the continental powers. Logistic was poor for the armies of the revolution (some second hand units did not have even shoes) but this was rapidly fixed under the Empire. Secondary, looking on the Emperor's battles, even after tremendous wasting of ammo (Full day fighting of thousands of soldiers, "grand battery"
of dozens of cannons ... etc) there was not reports of ammo shortage as there was no reports of food shortage (except for the well known retreat in Russia ....) or even epidemic spreading of infectious diseases like typhus/dysentery ... which was common on badly equiped and fed troups.


- firstly, logistics was across very poor roads and infrastructure largely by bullock carts - they dont move with any speed. If you consider the speed that characterised Napoleon, I would argue that he ran the risk of leaving them behind in order to better exploit his victories in the field, and this was a calculated risk on his part. Secondly, the fact that in Russia he outdistanced his ability to supply himself proves that point. He could not have been uniformed or unaware of the risks he took - assuming of course that he was kept informed of what was going on.
It was difficult enough for WWII Nazi Germany, nevermind 18th century France !
Most 18th century European armies relied on stealing/purchasing food from the local populace because they simply could not supply the level of food , munitions and clothing over the distances involved for any length of time. The British were reasonably good at at it simply because we never moved fast enough ! :lol:

[Hessen20]

Was that Hussar in the service for a while after the wars...that model looks like the type that came into service during the beginning of the 2nd Empire.

similar to yours 1845:
http://www.lehussard.com/frameGenerale.asp?CodeCat=SYS_ANCIEN


1st Empire:

http://www.lehussard.com/frameGenerale.asp?CodeCat=SYS_ANCIEN

[Jaguar]

Napoleon´s Grande Armee outmarched every army. Supply trains were slow (so french soldiers were foraging experts, they lived off the land and stores captured from the enemy (Austrians were frequently providers) . It didn´t use tents too, one of the reasons being they took space in already overloaded and slow moving supply trains.

Napoleon main strategy when engaging superior numbers was fighting one wing at time. Superior mobility was paramount. Forced marches and foraging exerted a heavy toll on the infatry but it was a price Napoleon paid willingly.

However it´s an oversimplification, this pdf (http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~dheb/2300/Historical/MA/NapLogistics.pdf) gives more details on the subject.

[oregongrunt]

Looting was a common hobby for the soldiers ... In every armies at that time. The worst exemple is the prussian line infantry in 1814 during the campaign of France, a mix of revenge will and poor food logistic.
The case of the "grande armée" is a quite similar : The imperial guard has good supplies whereas the rest of the troops suffers a lot of starvation and lack of supplies. Looting was a survival mean, an awfull one that's sure.
The supply system was bad, grabbing a villager's chickens or vegetables was expected and tolorated.

[stonecutter]

Hessen20, the links just bring you to the main site; I searched around it but couldn't find the cavalry sabres. Interesting what you say though , I don't know whether the letter-writer continued his military career after the Napoleonic wars.

[LordTyphus]

Its a bit more complex than that - the British had tables which
defined how much bread, cheese, beer etc was needed per man per day etc since before the American War of Independence - and had people whose specific tasks was to purchase food from the locals where possible. Horses , while they can eat grass, need additional hay and oats in the winter which is a major concern for an army who relies on horses and bullocks as the only means of pulling carts and guns. The French would have had at least the equivalent. It may be that Napoleons war of manouevre may have simply been too fast for his logistics train to keep up.


There's no comparison between the two. How can you compare the puny British army, which for instance was a minority at Waterloo, to a French juggernaut, numbering in the few hundreds of thousands? Of course, the size of French Napoleonic or Revolutionary army adds to the logistical constraint. shouldn't that be clear to anyone with a modicum of wit? But which of europe's army was capable of this kind of organization. Just look at a plan of Paris from a God's eye view and compare it to London, and tell us which of the two races is more capable of organizing massive armies. The larger the army, the more likely you'll find rogue units, crims etc within it. Case close.

[Toddy]

Napoleon´s Grande Armee outmarched every army.

Not exactly true mate, the Zulus, were the most mobile force in history.

[LordTyphus]

Last time I was in France I was shown some family letters dating to the Napoleonic wars, written by my acquaintance's distant relative, who was a Hussard serving under I forget which of Napoleon's marshals... Anyway I remember in one letter, he was writing about how tired they were, barely being able to stay in the saddle, 30 hours with no food, etc. The entire letter was one of suffering and hardship -- a true "grognard" perhaps but still an indication of what these hard men went through sometimes. I can't remember the date on the letter, if it was near the end of the Napoleonic wars when things may have been a bit hectic, or not. I'm trying to convince this guy in France to put the letters into a book and publish them, it was fascinating reading these first-hand accounts of life in such a momentous period of history. What made it even better was having the Hussard's sabre right beside us as we were reading!


Nice. French Hussards were badass. There's a case of 800 French Hussards hounding some Prussians, who then took refuge in a town fortress which was manned by 3000 men and had 120 cannons to bear. Believe it or not, the Hussards commander, LaSalle I think, boldly asked the Prussian to surrender or else face the consequence. The Prussians surrendered! I don't blame then; it would suck to be woman in a town about to be pillaged by Hussards.

They had no equal when it came to sword fight as well. In Russia, they cut down the Cossacks in drove. I think only the French Cuirassier were better than the French Hussards, all armies considered.

[LordTyphus]

Not exactly true mate, the Zulus, were the most mobile force in history.

And what is the Zulus' business in Napoleonic Europe? How about you learn to read within context! Further, the Mongols were the most mobile army in history.

[Jaguar]

Not exactly true mate, the Zulus, were the most mobile force in history.

But in Europe at that time...