Operational Manoeuvre Groups, and Hi!

[Britboy]

Hi all,
This is my first post here, although I've been reading for awhile, and I'm sure there's a wealth of knowledge on here. A bit of an intro firstly, I'm at uni at the mo, studying International Relations, and have had a bit to do with the Armed Forces (and hopefully much more to come!). Quite a bit of the course deals with Defence-related topics, which beats EU economic policy or whatever anyday, so it's all good. :)

I've read about Combined Arms warfare and 'jointness', and have come across the Red Army concept of the Operational Manoeuvre Group. These were v mobile armoured formations that the Russians would've committed to smash through NATO defensive lines during the Cold War, thereafter they'd run amok in the rear echelons disrupting our frontline forces.

Now was this responsible for the adoption of the 80s US doctrine, 'AirLand Battle'? I.e. emphasis on the Deep Battle to attrite Soviet OMGs before they could get to the area of the Close Battle; emphasis on the Rear Battle to contain any Sov tanks that got through the area of the Close Battle? It also seems that NATO purchases in this period (e.g. Apache, A10, MLRS, Gazelle with TOW/HOT, Tornado GR4, AS90) would be well suited to shooting up enemy armour before it could try and batter its way through the FEBA...

Secondly, the OMG concept seems to be touted as a revolution in operational/campaign-level methods and a stark new threat to NATO forces. But hasn't it always been the role of the Cavalry and Armoured Forces to mass and charge through the line, and to exploit this breach by prowling around the enemy's rear areas? How is this any different really?

So just how revolutionary was the emergence of OMGs; or was it simply a re-branding of the classic Armour mission? And was AirLand Battle a counter to this perceived threat, or did it have another cause?

Cheers
BB

[Lokos]

Start here:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-61/CH42.htm#s5

Move on to Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle by David M. Glantz.


These were v mobile armoured formations that the Russians would've committed to smash through NATO defensive lines during the Cold War, thereafter they'd run amok in the rear echelons disrupting our frontline forces.

OMGs were never to be committed in penetration operations. They were there to disrupt the rear, and remove the Critical Capabilities and Critical Requirements of the strategic center of gravity for a belligerent force, thereby ensuring its speedy collapse. The only time at which a Soviet commander would have allowed the commitment of an OMG during the penetration phase is in the situation wherein a loss of tempo, as a risk, outweighed the reduced combat effectiveness of the OMG resulting from the penetration phase attrition.


I.e. emphasis on the Deep Battle to attrite Soviet OMGs before they could get to the area of the Close Battle;

Ironically enough the Soviets also doctrinally stipulated the necessity of the Deep Battle prior to the Close Battle.


Secondly, the OMG concept seems to be touted as a revolution in operational/campaign-level methods and a stark new threat to NATO forces. But hasn't it always been the role of the Cavalry and Armoured Forces to mass and charge through the line, and to exploit this breach by prowling around the enemy's rear areas? How is this any different really?

The Operational Maneuver Group is the offspring of WW2 experiences. Prior to those experiences, Deep Battle was the closest operational art to what is in place today. Only in the closing years of the war was it utilized correctly. The Germans had a similar system in place, though it relied more on armored breakthroughs. The Soviets preferred to keep their organic armor formations as intact as possible for the exploitation phase.

The differences to the operational art of the Cold War are many, though the concept remains the same. One of the differences is the extreme importance of tempo in modern operational art; the penetration and the deep battle must be conducted relatively quickly so as to synergize a paralysis on the part of the defender. Initiative, tempo, timing, concentration - these were Soviet catchphrases of the Cold War era.

The greater the surprise achieved prior to the penetration phase, the greater the Correlation of Forces available to the Soviets during the penetration phase, and subsequently the more intact their forces for the deep battle.


So just how revolutionary was the emergence of OMGs; or was it simply a re-branding of the classic Armour mission?

It was an evolution of WW2 principles.


And was AirLand Battle a counter to this perceived threat, or did it have another cause?

Both.

Lokos

[Britboy]

Cheers for that link, good reading. It makes sense that you'd want your exploitation force as intact as possible for their next tasking, but with such a force being likely v tank-heavy, I thought they'd be ideal for forcing the breach as well.

I suppose the Soviets envisaged Cavalry forces on the FEBA forcing the breach, and then providing security for the OMG passing through. After this they would be free to undertake their own more limited expoitation operations against the enemy in the area of the Deep Battle, whereas the OMG would drive onto the absolute key objectives more likely to be tied to political and grand strategic objectives rather than defeat of enemy formations in the field, or have I misunderstood? It sounds like a form of v optimistic, far-reaching Blitzkreig.

It's interesting that ANY formation could be designated the OMG, I thought that for a task as ambitious as this, permanent forces would be assigned to the role. Although this does have benefit in flexibility and in counter-intelligence, making it harder to tell an OMG from any other formation and so to attrite it or mass your own forces in the area of the penetration effort.

I wonder if later Soviet echelons were to deploy in the wake of the OMG, or if it was accepted that it would become cut-off and surrounded, and that it could hopefully be caught up with, or make it back to friendly lines later.

Initiative may have been essential to this type of operation and for the independent action of groups cut off from normal channels of communication, but do you consider Soviet military atmosphere to promote such initiative and latitude?

Regards
BB

[Lokos]

Initiative may have been essential to this type of operation and for the independent action of groups cut off from normal channels of communication, but do you consider Soviet military atmosphere to promote such initiative and latitude?

Well, have a look at August Storm, or the Kabul operation, and you tell me. The Soviets, in the later years of WW2, never proved to be a predictable opponent. Even in 1941 there is the example of a Soviet cavalry-mechanized group that exploited the German rear for several months with no support from other RKKA formations. Their exploiting tank corps and, in a tactical sense, tank brigades exhibited great initiative and operational latitude in achieving their objectives.


I wonder if later Soviet echelons were to deploy in the wake of the OMG, or if it was accepted that it would become cut-off and surrounded, and that it could hopefully be caught up with, or make it back to friendly lines later.

It would only be cut off and surrounded if the Soviets failed badly in maintaining the tempo of operations and passed the initiative to OPFOR. A force that is reacting is not acting. As long as the Soviets were doing the acting, a reaction would seldom result in encirclement. The OPFOR would be absorbed in the anticipation of the next thrust.


It's interesting that ANY formation could be designated the OMG, I thought that for a task as ambitious as this, permanent forces would be assigned to the role.

This is partly because the designation of OMG is contextual. An OMG, in many cases, would be the best suited available formation. Whether that is a tank division or a moto-rifle division (or any combination thereof scaled up) is perhaps not as relevant as you may think. Both formations had organic tank units, and both were heavily motorized. The mobility required was present in both.


suppose the Soviets envisaged Cavalry forces on the FEBA forcing the breach

Cavalry forces? If by that you mean moto-rifle divisions, then you are correct. I have never seen them referred to as such, though.


whereas the OMG would drive onto the absolute key objectives more likely to be tied to political and grand strategic objectives rather than defeat of enemy formations in the field, or have I misunderstood?

Like I said, the OMG's task was to knock out the struts that propped up the strategic center of gravity of the defending force. Not capturing political or grand strategic objectives, unless those objectives achieved the purpose previously described.


It sounds like a form of v optimistic, far-reaching Blitzkreig.


It was a realistic form of 'Blitzkrieg' (if by Blitzkrieg we are referring to a form of Deep Battle conceived by the Soviets in the mid-1930s), though you should be careful of that term, as it is largely mythical.


but with such a force being likely v tank-heavy, I thought they'd be ideal for forcing the breach as well.

Moto-rifle divisions were also very tank heavy, but the point was to preserve that strength, instead of spending it in a penetration operation. The Soviets, even during WW2, avoided committing their tank strength to the penetration wherever possible. Tank losses during the penetration are extraordinarily heavy, and this is why the Soviets designed several WW2 tanks with enormous quantities of armor and a high-caliber, low-velocity gun; to assist penetrating rifle regiments in destroying fixed defensive positions. These tanks include the SU-100/SU-122/SU-152 series, as well as the IS/IS-2/IS-3 series. They were mostly in independent heavy tank regiments attached to penetrating formations.

Lokos

[Hellfish]

Weren't the Soviet Combined Arms Armies usually considered the default for use as OMGs?

[Lokos]

Weren't the Soviet Combined Arms Armies usually considered the default for use as OMGs?

The size of the OMG is not predetermined. The ones in place were usually combined arms armies. But an OMG is a mission oriented designation.

Lokos

[Britboy]

Ah, I envisaged the OMG being cut off in the enemy's rear area, in a similar way to how LRRP and reconnaissance units often end up cut off for the duration of their mission - or how Partisan units on the Eastern Front during WWII operated independently. It makes sense that the Soviets may have hoped their actions would force an enemy to reel so heavily that they would withdraw, but just because a C2 or logistics site was knocked out doesn't preclude surviving frontline forces from attempting to sever the OMGs lines of communication, does it?

And if you intend to operate non-cut-off, that implies that the LOCs must be guarded in some way, at least until the remainder of your troops catch up. This guarding diverts forces from contributing to the combat power of the OMG.

By Cavalry forces I meant tank units organic to the formations on the FEBA for forcing the breach (here in UK the Royal Armoured Corps is made up of (largely) the old Cavalry regiments (and the RTR) so the terms are maybe a bit more interchangable; but I understand that the US created a new Armour branch rather than convert horse regiments).

It's interesting that the Soviets envisaged Motor Rifle units forcing the penetration, surely the shock action of tanks are ideal for overrunning a defensive position. I agree that tanks are more valuable for exploitation and should be saved for such if possible, but wouldn't this already be achieved by having a separate OMG, thereby allowing the frontline formations to suffer some losses without undue harm to the exploitation.

Regards
BB

[Lokos]

but just because a C2 or logistics site was knocked out doesn't preclude surviving frontline forces from attempting to sever the OMGs lines of communication, does it?

Those forces would be faced with the shallow envelopments of the second echelon of penetration. The Soviets were not planning to halt when the OMG was inserted into the rear. This is why they were in pursuit of a 'deep battle' that would preclude effective response to the very rapid exploitation of an OMG. Also, you are assuming that the defending forces would aim to cut off a relatively self-sufficient (remember the timescale involved) formation, as opposed to preventing the fall of the Critical Requirements of their Strategic Center of Gravity.


And if you intend to operate non-cut-off, that implies that the LOCs must be guarded in some way, at least until the remainder of your troops catch up. This guarding diverts forces from contributing to the combat power of the OMG.

The OMGs preserved their combat power so as to be able to fight off such attempts...


By Cavalry forces I meant tank units organic to the formations on the FEBA for forcing the breach (here in UK the Royal Armoured Corps is made up of (largely) the old Cavalry regiments (and the RTR) so the terms are maybe a bit more interchangable; but I understand that the US created a new Armour branch rather than convert horse regiments).

It's interesting that the Soviets envisaged Motor Rifle units forcing the penetration, surely the shock action of tanks are ideal for overrunning a defensive position.

As I already said, Soviet Moto-Rifle formations had a strong organic tank element - but tanks are NOT a useful tool in and of themselves for breaching strongly held lines; especially in an ATGM laden Cold War environment. Artillery, air-support, tactical nuclear weapons and infantry remain the penetration utilities of choice. Tanks can offer support. Realistically, it would have been a combined arms offensive. Anything less, and you're talking disaster.


I agree that tanks are more valuable for exploitation and should be saved for such if possible, but wouldn't this already be achieved by having a separate OMG, thereby allowing the frontline formations to suffer some losses without undue harm to the exploitation.

The Soviets did have separate OMGs and they did expect their frontline tank forces to suffer significant loss. On the order of 50% during the penetration phase for the leading regiments. Divisions were expected to be rendered hors de combat in three days of fighting. The exploitation phase was to be performed by forces designated to exploit. Penetration forces would generally be too weakened for this task.

Lokos

[Britboy]

Cheers Lokos, that's certainly opening my eyes to Armoured Warfare...

[Lokos]

I like the way you've opened your account here on MilPhotos. Good discussion.

Regards,
Lokos

[People's General]

Great thread,
Britboy, I bet U must have read the <collapse of soviet union military> written by Odom. but I was confused by his point, that the Air land battle is the new doctrine adopted by NATO to deal with the "OMG".
the concept of OMG first appear at the military excercise in 1981, (I forget the english or russian name of that excercise!:roll:) while the Air land battle concept was the development of the NATO doctrine in 1970s. So, I dont think Mr Odom is right as he give too less information to support his point.
well, It's amazing that both two military group foucs on maneuver warfare and " what to do in the enemies' rear area ", the major difference is, OMG is a huge unit, and the NATO emphasis on small units , with full air support to maneuve behind the enemy line, to delay the Warsaw pact's advance. OMG is larger than a tank division, while smaller than a combined army, many people believe it is equal to the a Crops, it might be built before the war, (the 1UC and 2 UC in BRMD and CMD) and it could be form up as a TASK FORCE by elements from different units under the command of cheif commander in western front, and, alot of people who study the cold war and concept of soviet armed force in my country believe the 20th Guard Army is an OMG( could any friend from russia prove this?p-))
OMG's mission is to waiting the first line army to break though the enemies's defence line, OMG will get though the defence line and rush into the rear. OMG is controlled by the commander of Front, it might not conduct the operational mission like surround the enemy and eliminate the enemy by a flank attack,
with the support of direct air support and airborne units, OMG's primary targets are, Command centre, airport, traffic centre, air defence, long range artillery , missle luncher and if lucky enough, get rid of those damn Pershing II. well, OMG is assigned to Shock enemy defence by destroy the command system or cut off communication between the higher level and front line units, to make the enemy suffer chaos and panic, than the 2nd echelons could drive them run for life.

and other details, I think Lokos have give more better explaination and links than me.

Last, sorry for my poor english, I hope you guys could understand what I want to express.:)

[Britboy]

Right, so we have:

First Echelon effecting breakthrough predominantly with mech inf and arty

OMG surging through breach to attack the key nodes of the enemy force

Second Echelon expoiting the breakthrough closer to enemy frontline forces, i.e. attacking them from the flank or rear

I know that the USSR needed a force capable of removing the enemy's key capabilities in a wholly-conventional war (i.e. the OMG) but as any war would likely involve at least tactical nuclear weapons, could the same effect be achieved by use of these? Or even massed air or arty?

I see how the USSR needed to be able to perform this mission without escalating to tactical nuclear (if the war was still at conventional level of escalation and they did not wish to escalate to/had inferiority at the tac nuc level) hence the OMG, but once the war goes to the tactical nuclear stage isn't there a more efficient and dependable method of removing the enemy's key capabilities? Does the OMG become somewhat redundant? Or are tac nuc weapons used to 'clear the way' and soften enemy defences before the OMG arrives, like a nuclear artillery preparation?

Also, I'm now interested in what NATOs methodology for stopping the Soviet doctrine would be. How were operations to be conducted within the Rear Battle?

I know during the Second War the US had a doctrine of anti tank defence concentrating on the location of any breakthrough attempt. Tank destroyers and AT guns would wait behind their own defensive lines essentially acting as a mobile reserve; when a location was identified that the enemy would seek to use armour they would concentrate at that section of the line to negate any breakthrough. (Actual use of tank destroyers didnt parallel this as commanders frequently used them to make up tank shortages and as Assault Guns for infantry support I believe, but this was the doctrine anyway).

Would NATO have seeked to counter any possible penetration and likely thrust by an OMG/2nd Ech forces by deploying such an ATk reserve just behind contested areas of the line? Although I imagine it to be a lot more likely to feature ATGM-armed AFVs, infantry and helicopters than actual tanks.

Or perhaps the idea was to let them 'exploit' short of the critical sites, whilst attempting to close frontline forces behind them, bottling them up in a kessel and hopefully sealing them off from their air support?

[People's General]

I can't see there is any disadvantage of soviet at tactical nuclear weapons level, every division have 4 Frog or SS-21, 36-54 2S3 or 2A26 that could bomb enemy with nuclear shell, at the army level, there are 12-18 SS-23 or SCUD 72 2s5 , on the other hand, the US army, 72 m109A at divison, at crops level, dozens of M109 and M110, several short range lancer luncher, other NATO country have less or none nuclear deliver on ground. american have strong air force, but russia have more reliable, direct control nuclear weapons, they don't have to worry the airman complain the heavy AA fire, or bad weather, or a short sight dude from air make a friendly fire, all the russian ground commander have to do is press the red button, seeing the missle flying higher and higher, then, booooom...
warsaw pacts emphasis on conventional warfare is because of some political consideration. and they believe the war might escalation, so they should get ready for tactical nuclear warfare.
nuc is efficiency on static target and uncoverd/spotted target
so in nuclear warfare, OMG is still a powerful card, it could be a good " Artillery spotter" , it provides best recon method, contact with enemy, but when nuclear weapon is out of storage or it is inefficiency to use Nuc ( enemy formation is too loose ) it could also knock down foes by itself. at the same time it could defeat a armor brigade's defence, and itself have great NBC protection from enemy's nuclear attack.

and why not air, errr, soviet tactical air force strength increased rapdily since mid 70's , their payload , combat radius, bombing accurate, ECM got great improvement, but they are still away from conducting "air campagin", so they should rely on their advantage, Armor force.

and to NATO, the best situation is stop enemy breakthough attemps at begining, if not, make the first Ech main force pass, then send small units to conduct maneuver warfare in the rear, destroy those "soft target", try to delay the 2nd Ech's advance in defence position, make the 2nd Ech Force to transfer formation from March to fully deployed combat formation, then they can run back home. If situation allows, NATO might throw a whole division into rear 40-100 KM. all what they do are to prevent the Warsaw pacts focus on attack and advance but divide more force and resource on security and defence, slow down enemy's advance. I read from books of my language, that tell me NATO would not try to eliminate any large column. Delay enemy as long as they can, and 30 days later, USA could reinforce more airplane and manpower than soviet.
NATO could conduct large scale air campagin, they do the same dirty job as OMG from the air

[Lokos]

but as any war would likely involve at least tactical nuclear weapons, could the same effect be achieved by use of these? Or even massed air or arty?

Soviet operational planning included the release of at least 320 tactical nuclear weapons on the first day of the Cold War turning hot since the mid 60s. Contingency, non-nuclear planning, however, also saw the intention to use combined arms conventional forces (including massed air and/or artillery) to force a breach in the MLR.


but once the war goes to the tactical nuclear stage isn't there a more efficient and dependable method of removing the enemy's key capabilities? Does the OMG become somewhat redundant? Or are tac nuc weapons used to 'clear the way' and soften enemy defences before the OMG arrives, like a nuclear artillery preparation?

The Soviets planned for most eventualities. The conventional forces present were deemed sufficient to force a breach large enough to insert an OMG into NATO's operational rear. That is not to say, however, that they would not have first turned to, as you say, more efficient and dependable means of removing obstacles and breaking lines.


Also, I'm now interested in what NATOs methodology for stopping the Soviet doctrine would be. How were operations to be conducted within the Rear Battle?

Well, if you trust in Clancy, we are to believe that NATO's highly mechanized formations would conduct a fighting withdrawal, never allowing a breach because the lines would be too flexible and simple to reform as they pulled back. IMO, that's rubbish. A prepared defensive Main Line of Resistance is exactly what the term implies. Even with all the mobility in the world, conducting a withdrawal under constant pursuit - with the expectation that you'll be able to form a coherent line with other retreating formations at some point - is disingenuous. It would require insane co-ordination and luck. Seeing as NATO C3 centers would be receiving a high degree of attention from Soviet assets, it is not (again, in my view) a plausible option.

Sadly, neither is a fight to the death at the Fulda Gap.

The best option would be a gradual knocking out of the struts supporting the Soviet momentum forward. Ammo depots, rail lines and roads, transport hubs, C3 centers, fuel depots etc. Damage their forces as much as possible in the first instance of the offensive, preserve your own forces, and slow them down. The Third World War would have exhausted ammunition reserves within weeks. All NATO needs to win is to preserve its army in the field and to slow down the Soviets in Germany for long enough.


I know during the Second War the US had a doctrine of anti tank defence concentrating on the location of any breakthrough attempt.

It is the advantage of the attacker that, in most instances, they are the ones who know where the breakthrough will occur - not the defender.


Tank destroyers and AT guns would wait behind their own defensive lines essentially acting as a mobile reserve; when a location was identified that the enemy would seek to use armour they would concentrate at that section of the line to negate any breakthrough. (Actual use of tank destroyers didnt parallel this as commanders frequently used them to make up tank shortages and as Assault Guns for infantry support I believe, but this was the doctrine anyway).

The tactical reserve you describe was fairly standard fare for all the major belligerents of WW2.


Would NATO have seeked to counter any possible penetration and likely thrust by an OMG/2nd Ech forces by deploying such an ATk reserve just behind contested areas of the line? Although I imagine it to be a lot more likely to feature ATGM-armed AFVs, infantry and helicopters than actual tanks.

Of course. This is exactly the reason why the OMGs and Second Echelon forces had to be as fresh as possible for the exploitation. To combat the tactical reserves greeting them in the immediate vicinity of the MLR.


Or perhaps the idea was to let them 'exploit' short of the critical sites, whilst attempting to close frontline forces behind them, bottling them up in a kessel and hopefully sealing them off from their air support?

Close the frontline forces behind them? The ones being enveloped by the 2nd echelon? The timescale involved is not conducive to such maneuvers.

Lokos