In Shah-E-Kot, Apaches Save The Day - updated

[2RHPZ]

Army Times
March 25, 2002

In Shah-E-Kot, Apaches Save The Day - And Their Reputation
By Sean D. Naylor, Times staff writer

The soldier's weather-beaten face was streaked with tears of gratitude.
Just days earlier, separated from his buddies and pinned down by intense
fire from al-Qaida soldiers in the ridgelines around the Shah-e-Kot
valley, he thought he was going to die.
Then, like fire-spitting avenging angels, Apache attack helicopters
sliced through the thin mountain air pouring rocket and chain-gun fire on his would-be killers.
"We came in and took the fire away from him," said Capt. Bill Ryan, the
commander of those Apaches. He said it matter-of-factly, as if there
were nothing remarkable about piloting a helicopter through hails of bullets
and rocket-propelled grenades to save a man's life.
Now safely back at Bagram Air Base, that soldier had come to thank his
deliverers.
As Operation Anaconda wound down, a string of well-wishers stopped by to
pay homage to the dozen or so Apache pilots who had kept the al-Qaida
troops at bay.
Not every visitor broke into tears. But all echoed the sentiments of Lt.
Col. "Chip" Preysler, commander of 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry
Regiment.
Preysler's battalion was one of two that flew into the teeth of
entrenched
al-Qaida positions March 2, the first day of the operation.
Their very lives depended on Ryan's seven Apaches for close air support.
When he came out of the battle nine days later, Preysler immediately
sought out Ryan. With a smile on his face and his hands spread wide, he
said, "You guys have huge balls."
The Apache exploits on the first day of the battle of Shah-e-Kot have
done much to bolster the reputation of an aircraft that saw its battlefield
role called into question after its role in Albania in 1999.
In that bleak period in the helicopter's history, 24 Apaches were sent
to Task Force Hawk for use in the war against Yugoslavia. But the choppers
were held back from combat after two crashed and two pilots died during
mission rehearsals.
The Apache community complained that ignorant journalists and
casualty-averse Pentagon officials had unfairly turned their beloved
killing machine into a scapegoat.
Now, three years later, the contrast could not be starker. The Apache
drivers are being lauded as heroes, and their helicopter is receiving
what to many pilots is praise long overdue.
With al-Qaida fighters so close to U.S. troops that close air support
from "fast mover" jets was often out of the question, the Apaches became the only fire support available to ground commanders.
In the crucial hours of that first day, when the carefully scripted
battle plans had been rendered irrelevant and the outcome hung in the balance, Apaches saved the day.
"The weapon that changed the face of the battle for us was the Apache,"said Col. Frank Wiercinski, commander of the 101st Airborne Division
(Air Assault)'s 3rd Brigade and in charge of all conventional U.S. troops in
the battle. "I was just so impressed by its capability," he said. "I had never seen the Apache in combat before, though I've always trained with it. I am a firm believer right now that a brigade combat team commander needs his Apache battalion in an air assault division - its ability to protect us
en route, its ability to set the conditions on the landing zones and then
its close combat attack capability to take out fires.
"Artillery is a wonderful asset, but you need an observer, you need a sensor, and then you've got the artillery [tube] as the shooter. An
Apache can do all of that, and it's always moving." On station in the valley from dawn on the battle's first day, the
Apaches flew again and again through withering small arms, heavy machine-gun and rocket-propelled grenade fire to provide fire support to the beleaguered infantry troops.
Five Apaches were present at the start of the battle, a sixth arrived
later that morning and a seventh flew up from Kandahar to join the fight
that afternoon. None of the helicopters was shot down, but four were so
badly damaged they were knocked out of the fight. The fire the Apaches braved was so intense that when the day was over, 27 of the 28 rotor blades among the seven helicopters sported bullet holes, said Lt. Col. James M. Marye, the commander of the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment. Marye's aviation task force included the Apaches of Ryan's A Company, 3rd Battalion, 101st Aviation. Beneath the cold numbers are tales of heroism and extraordinary achievement. None are more dramatic than the story of Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jim Hardy.
At about 6:45 a.m., an RPG exploded under the nose of Hardy's Apache,
sending shrapnel slicing through the helicopter's innards. "I looked up and there was a black puff of smoke, like World War II
flak," said Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Hamilton, who was flying nearby.
"There was major damage to that aircraft," Ryan said. "They had lost the
weapons systems and the target-acquisition systems." Despite the fact that Hardy's Apache was now essentially unarmed, he stayed on station. He later told Hamilton that his plan was to fly up the valley and draw fire, allowing the other Apaches to engage enemy gunners once they had revealed themselves.
About 10 minutes after an RPG struck Hardy's aircraft, another hit the
Apache piloted by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Keith Hurley, smashing into
the left Hellfire missile launcher. "The RPG struck me on the left, rocked the aircraft, and a microsecond after that, a bullet came through the cockpit," Hurley said. By the end of the day there were 13 bullet holes in Hurley's aircraft.
Lights immediately started flashing on Hurley's control panel, warning
him that he was hemorrhaging oil. Hardy, one of the company's most
experienced pilots, realized Hurley was in trouble, and got on the radio.
As Hurley recalls it, Hardy told him, "I've got to go back to the [Forward
Arming and Refueling Point], fall in trail and follow me, and we've got
to go quick." The two wounded Apaches headed for the FARP, a way station for the helicopters roughly halfway between the valley and their temporary base in Bagram, north of Kabul. They didn't make it very far.
About a mile west of "the Whale," the humpbacked ridgeline that marked
the western edge of the valley, more lights came on in Hurley's cockpit,
including one that told him he had no fluid left in his transmission.
"I called off the lights to Mr. Hardy and he said, 'You've got to land,
you've got to land now,' " Hurley said. The two landed in a dried-up riverbed, within range of the al-Qaida positions. With bullets flying around him, Hardy, who Hurley described as "the unit maintenance god," shut the helicopters down and went to work on Hurley's aircraft. "He did sort of a triage of the aircraft, examining it like a doctor," Hurley said. Hardy took the three one-quart oil cans that each helicopter carried a spares and poured all six quarts into Hurley's engine. Then he told Hurley they were going to swap helicopters and fly back to the FARP.
"He told me, 'Don't **** around, when I get it started, I'm going,' "
Hurley said. Hardy was drawing on his deep knowledge of the Apache to
take a calculated risk. With Hurley's chopper leaking fluid like a sieve, he knew the six quarts of oil he had just poured in would not last long. But he also knew that the Apache's engine was supposed to last 30 minutes without oil before seizing up. Hardy was gambling that he could nurse Hurley's Apache 50 miles to the FARP in less than half an hour. The alternative was to strap two of the four pilots onto the side of Hardy's helicopter, leaving Hurley's Apache behind as a dead loss. Hardy's gamble paid off. Twenty-six minutes after taking off under fire from the riverbed, the two damaged Apaches landed safely at the FARP. Hardy's colleagues were in awe. "There are not a lot of folks out there who would have taken that aircraft off the ground," Ryan said. "It was an incredible action by Mr. Hardy." Hamilton said: "He's a hero, no doubt about it." Marye recommended Hardy for a Distinguished Flying Cross. He also recommended Ryan, who continued flying despite being nicked on the chin by a bullet, for a Silver Star and several other pilots for the Air Medal with "V" device.

[2RHPZ]

Operation Anaconda: the battle for Shah-i-Kot Valley
Armor, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Ryan Welch

Until a few weeks ago, the battle for Shah-i-Kot Valley, located roughly 60
miles south of the city of Gardez, Afghanistan, was the largest light infantry
battle since Vietnam. It was a textbook example of how the modern military can
mass the effects of overwhelming joint firepower in the most difficult and
hostile environments in the world. The battle, which began on 2 March and
concluded on 14 March 2002, illustrates the need for unity of command and
synchronization to maximize the effects of the coalition forces' technological
superiority and lethality on the battlefield.

Coalition forces, under the command of United States Central Command (CENTCOM),
were led by the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), 10th Mountain
Division. Primary combat forces in the execution of the mission were the 3d
Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, and the 1st Battalion, 87th
Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.

Operation Anaconda also included aviation elements from the 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit, soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment, and special
operations elements from the United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, Denmark,
France, and Norway. Afghan interim authority forces participated in the battle
and were led by a local warlord. It is suspected that overall command of
opposing forces during the battle were the responsibility of Mullah Omar, the
spiritual and political leader of the deposed Taliban regime.

Local Afghan fighters, loyal to the Taliban, were joined by Uzbeks and Chechen
fighters (Muslim extremists) to create a hodgepodge (albeit formidable)
opposition. Primary resources for this battle analysis are briefings and
excerpts from the Infantry Leaders' Conference in July 2002, as well as personal
experience and involvement in the planning process. Secondary resources include
numerous newspaper articles and internet documents to facilitate the accurate
sequencing of events as they occurred. Many resources are not available due to
classification and ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan.

The Strategic Setting Review

The cause of the conflict in Afghanistan is a direct result of the terrorist
attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. President George W. Bush
initiated combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda on 7 October 2001
in response to the Taliban regime's unwillingness to turn over the spiritual
leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. The campaign began with massive coalition
air strikes combined with covert operations.

In December of 2001, coalition air force elements, in conjunction with special
operations forces and anti-Taliban Afghan (Northern Alliance) Forces, began a
massive bombing campaign in the Tora Bora mountain region of Afghanistan. Here,
it was believed that al-Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden, had taken refuge in
Soviet war era cave complexes.

Following the bombing campaign, many Talibs and al-Qaeda members scattered
throughout the Panjshir valley, some crossing over the border into Pakistan,
others seeking places to mass combat power in the Khowst and Gardez provinces.
These forces scattering resulted in a decentralization of command within the
ranks of al-Qaeda. Local leaders, or "Mullahs" quickly took control of small
groups of 50 to 250 fighters, moving them in and amongst the populous to blend
in with civilians, as well as quell any anti-Taliban resistance within the
numerous small villages within these provinces.

Coalition forces under the control of CENTCOM had 5,000 personnel in country and
were supported logistically by air contingents located in the Mediterranean Sea,
and had units operating from Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Units within Afghanistan
operate primarily from airfields located at Kandahar, 300 miles south of the
Shah-i-Kot Valley, and Bagram, located 100 miles west of the Shah-i-Kot Valley.

The non-contiguous nature of this battlefield environment was a logistics
nightmare for coalition forces, due to the extreme environments of the Afghan
desert and mountain regions that could hamper airborne resupply for weeks at a
time. Northern alliance commanders benefited from coalition support with
weaponry, food, and ammunition. Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces enjoyed good
logistics, as the local population could provide much of their sustenance, and
much of their required ammunition and weaponry was scattered throughout the
countryside in arms caches left over from the Soviet-Afghan War.

Coalition forces also benefited from the latest information in waffle equipment
technologies. Real-time transmission of data from assets such as unmanned aerial
vehicles and satellites are the rule, rather than the exception. Extensive
signal and human intelligence were used as well. Opposition forces relied
completely on word-of-mouth and limited phone and radio communications as their
primary means of intelligence.

The morale of coalition forces in the days leading up to Operation Anaconda was
high, mostly due to the perceived success of the bombing campaign in Tora Bora.
Afghan interim authority commanders, in support of the coalition, were riding a
wave of high spirits under the recent string of victories over the Taliban.
Similarly, morale of enemy forces was thought to be high, as evidenced by the
numerous Pakistani, Chechen, and Uzbek fighters that were flooding the region to
join in the coalition expulsion.

Review of the Tactical Situation

Mission. The 3d Brigade Combat Team was to be a blocking force for the local
Afghan commander's force and facilitate his attack. His was to be the main
effort and the coalition forces were the supporting effort.

It is important to note why the task force was a supporting effort. One of the
main goals of the coalition's campaign was to maintain the legitimacy of the
Afghan interim authority and the Afghan military forces. For the coalition to
bear the burden would have undermined these efforts. Furthermore, it was almost
impossible for coalition forces to distinguish al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters from
the indigenous population. Only Afghan forces were capable of this.

Al-Qaeda/Taliban mission. Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters were to defend from
fortified positions and caves, carry out the Mujahideen concept of "death by a
thousand cuts," use guerrilla warfare techniques honed during the Soviet
occupation to demoralize coalition forces, and turn public opinion against the
war.

Equipment. Coalition infantry forces used the latest in small arms (M4 Carbines
instead of AK47s). Al-Qaeda had advantage by using standoff (over 500 meters)
with the larger 7.62x39mm cartridge. Coalition forces had an overall advantage
because they used air superiority to deliver pinpoint air strikes with aerial
munitions and AH-64A helicopters. And because of their technologically superior
night vision systems, coalition forces owned the night.

Terrain. Al-Qaeda forces had home-court advantage. The foothills of the
Himalayan Range--the roof of the world with peaks over 14,000 feet high--rival
the Rocky Mountains in altitude and majesty, proved to be an inhospitable
climate for conducting air-assault operations. Limited availability of landing
zones and reduced performance of rotary-wing aircraft at these altitudes greatly
hindered operations. Thin air and subzero temperatures for most of the battle
took a toll on ground combat troops.

Troops available. Though no firm numbers of enemy troops were available, it is
generally accepted that coalition forces enjoyed numerical superiority over al-Qaeda
and Taliban forces in the Shah-iKot Valley. Over 1,500 coalition troops
participated in the battle. It is estimated that there were between 700 and
1,000 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters engaged in the battle.

Time available. Time proved to be an advantage to the defending al-Qaeda and
Taliban forces, as they could fight when they wanted, and for the most part,
where they wanted. Because of the coalition's extended logistics tail and the
difficulty of resupply in the mountain environment, time was critical.

Describing the Action

The plan was a relatively simple hammer-and-anvil approach. Task Force Rakkasan,
occupying their blocking positions on the eastern ridgeline, would provide the
anvil (supporting effort). Special Forces units leading groups of Afghan forces
would form the hammer (main attack), sweeping in from the north and south
entrances to the valley, known as Objective Remington, and clearing the enemy
from the villages.

Coalition special operations forces, in conjunction with Afghan forces, provided
the "outer ring." These units were tasked to stop small bands of al-Qaeda and
Taliban forces from escaping to the north, east, and south of the valley.

The aviation support plan included preparatory attacks on two enemy caves, and
antiaircraft and mortar positions. Strike Eagles (F-15Es) dropped ordnance,
including 2,000-pound bombs, on cave openings near blocking positions Amy and
Ginger. Immediately following these strikes, B- 1Bs dropped a string of bombs on
"The Whale," a mountain that borders the Shah-i-Kot Valley, to suppress known
enemy positions on the ridge. Special reconnaissance units, previously inserted,
destroyed an antiaircraft machine gun (DShK) on the ridgeline in the south,
known later as the Task Force Rakkasan Tactical Command Post (RAK TAK) Ridge.

Following the preparation fires, the first Apache helicopters swept into the
valley to clear the landing zones for the first landing force, 2d Battalion,
187th Infantry (2-187). The battalion immediately came under fire from enemy
positions as soon as the first lift helicopters exfiltrated from the objective.

1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (1-87) of the 10th Mountain Division, was attached
to Task Force Rakkasan for the mission. Their mission was to occupy blocking
positions Eve, Ginger, and Heather. Immediately on landing, they began taking
heavy fire between blocking positions Heather and Ginger. Almost all of the
landing zones were hot. For the next 18 hours, they fought to reach their
objectives, despite al-Qaeda fighters shooting down on them from prepared
positions high on the mountainsides to their east, north, and west. They were
also continuously shelled by 82mm mortars.

Minefields and accurate fire at the northern entrance to the valley had stopped
Afghan forces under General Zia. Taking numerous casualties, he made a hasty
retreat back to Gardez--the supporting attack was now the main attack.

Meanwhile, the brigade tactical air command (TAC) had inserted on the small
ridge south of the valley. From here, the brigade commander had a commanding
view of the entire valley, and was able to get "eyes on" the objective, as well
as a feel for the terrain and the tactical situation. However, the TAC was also
immediately under fire, and fought back repeated al-Qaeda attacks for the rest
of the day.

Company A, 2- 187 was inserted into the battalion's northernmost landing zone.
The 1-87 was unable to take its objectives having been split in two by the
enemy, and the RAK TAC's position was untenable. The 1-87 had to be extracted
and repositioned. The units to the north of Ginger were given orders to move
north to make room for air strikes in the south, and to secure the northern
landing zones for follow-on forces.

During this course of events, the enemy committed a very bad error: the civilian
populous was allowed to move out of the towns, allowing the task force to engage
targets at will. The objective (to include the villages) was now declared a
hostile zone, and heavy firepower was brought to bear. A B-52 strike was called
on a large concentration of enemy fighters in the village of Marzak. In the
following hours, the villages of Marzak, Babulkhel, and Serhankhel would bc
rubbled by continuous bombardment.

When night fell, the brigade combat team's air liaison officer directed an Air
Force AC-130 attack against al-Qaeda targets to provide cover for a medical
evacuation chopper to evacuate wounded from 1-87. The majority had suffered
shrapnel wounds from the enemy's mortars.

The AC-130 attacked again to support the extraction of the brigade TAC. After
the TAC left its ridge, the position was overrun by al-Qaeda fighters. The
brigade combat team's seven AH-64 gun ships made continuous turns in support of
forces in contact, flying through withering small arms and antiaircraft
artillery fire to engage targets--some as close as 200m. By nightfall, five of
the seven aircraft were non-mission capable due to damage; many were merely held
together by 100-mile an-hour tape. Late on D+I, and into the morning hours, 2-187
and the remaining company from Task Force 1-87 moved north to consolidate their
positions. With the responsibility of the battle squarely in coalition hands,
the joint task force commander decided to commit the reserve (1st Battalion,
187th Infantry) to take the objective.

On D+2, bomber boxes were established by the Air Force to facilitate faster
target engagements on "The Whale," and what was now known as Objective Ginger.
Special reconnaissance teams were ordered to use fires to seal off passes being
used by escaping enemy fighters. Early the same day, Task Force 2-187 came under
intense enemy mortar fire coming from prepared positions on "The Whale." The
battalion's terminal air controllers hit moved north to seal off the southern
entrance to the valley.

Two companies from the brigade combat team's quick reaction three were
successfully inserted into the landing zone secured by 2-187. The task force was
ordered to press the attack south toward Objective Ginger. Fire missions
continued on al-Qaeda fighters attempting to resupply from stores hidden in the
valley. The quick reaction force pressed the attack at night, and early on D+7,
they established positions from which they could observe and control Ginger
Pass.

On D+4, all 24 AH-64s assigned to 3d Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault), were now on the ground and in the fight. They
began conducting attacks and air assault escort missions. They conducted round-the-clock
operations, destroying numerous targets of opportunity during Objective
Remington.

A new Afghan force arrived on D+5 to resume the main effort. They prepared to
conduct an attack with the help of Special Forces teams. Task Force Summit was
ordered to attack and seal off the enemy's main escape route through Ginger
Pass.

Task Force 64 moved north and east to block the pass from the south. Isolated
pockets of al-Qaeda fighters were engaged for the next 3 days, but it was clear
that "the back of the enemy had been broken." No more large-scale contact would
be made with al-Qaeda forces for the rest of the battle.

Later on D+13, the 3d Princess patricia's Canadian Light was air assaulted into
the valley to search the caves dotting "The Whale." This was the end of the
battle for Shah-i-Kot and the beginning of "Operation Harpoon."

Significance of Operation Anaconda

The short-term effects of the success of this battle were the destruction of
what was believed to be the last organized units of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces
in Afghanistan. In this battle, U.S. and coalition forces suffered only 40
casualties during the course of engagements over 2 weeks of intense fighting (8
deaths), while it is estimated that al-Qaeda and Taliban lost nearly 500
personnel, as well as an unknown number of wounded. Despite rapid changes in
situation and the relatively hostile environment in which the battle was fought,
U.S. and coalition forces adapted the plan to maximize its effectiveness and
lethality.

Long-term Effects of Anaconda

The most prominent or important long-term effect of the battle is the fact that
since this battle, never again have al-Qaeda and Taliban forces massed in an
organized effort against coalition forces.

Documents and weaponry excavated from the caves in the Shah-i-Kot valley have
led to the engagement and apprehension of numerous al-Qaeda agents. The post-battle
exodus of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters across the border into Pakistan, enabled
coalition intelligence to pinpoint concentrations of fleeing fighters to enable
Pakistani agents to apprehend a number of Al-Qaeda leaders and fighters.

The last long-term benefit of Anaconda is the validation of newly implemented
tactics, techniques, and procedures never before used on the modern battlefield.
Lessons learned during Operation Anaconda have proven critical to the successful
employment of new technological advantages during our recent campaign in Iraq.

Analysis of the Action and Lessons Learned--Tenets of Army Operations

Depth. Due to the extreme distances traveled by coalition forces to Shah-i-Kot,
and the limited ground support structure during this battle, depth was a
difficult component to achieve in the structure of the coalition combat force.
Using the reserve (1-187 Infantry) proved to be a key to the success of this
operation, though leading to the widespread view that depth was adequate during
this battle.

Agility. This battle is a textbook example of how agility plays a key role in
the outcome of battle. Anaconda was the highest altitude battle ever fought by
the U.S. military. Difficult and realistic training at home station, and the
month leading up to this battle in theater, enabled coalition forces to surmount
the severe climactic swings and unforgiving terrain on which Anaconda was
fought.

Versatility. The ability to change a combat order in mid-battle is a hallmark
trait of U.S. forces. Shifting U.S. forces from supporting effort to main effort
took significant measures to perform. Air assault movements are complex actions
that normally require significant amounts of time to plan and execute. In this
case, the air assault component of the brigade combat team was able to adapt the
plan in mid-flight and shifted forces within the Shah-i-Kot Valley, ultimately
assuring the survivability of forces near Objective Ginger, as well as an
overall victory in the battle.

Initiative. Terrain, coupled with the extreme distances in communication with
command and control facilities, severely inhibited the level of initiative that
combat commanders could use on the battlefield. As soon as it was discovered
that enemy positions were many thousands of feet above the landing zones of TF
Rakkasan and TF Summit, the ability to maneuver to attain an advantage was
negated. The initiative shifted rapidly to the enemy as soon as airlift
capability was gone. Over time, initiative was slowly regained through
suppression missions with airlifted mortar assets and close air support provided
by fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

Synchronization. This was perhaps the Achilles' heel of coalition forces during
this battle. Because forces were operating on the timetable of Afghan forces
initially, timing was at best difficult. The extreme distances traveled by
coalition aircraft to reach the engagement area (100 nautical miles (NM) for
rotary wing and 500-plus NM for fixed wing), responsiveness for air assaults and
close air support were basically nonexistent. Continuously rotating or
"stacking" fixed-wing aircraft, such as AC-130s and F-16 sorties, as well as the
arrival of the 3d Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment's remaining attack assets,
solved this problem.

Battlefield Operating Systems

Fire Support. Because of high-density altitudes and the severe climate in
Afghanistan, no towed artillery or self-propelled artillery was shipped into
theater. Initially, indirect fire support was provided by organic 60mm mortars.
Late on D+2, 120mm mortars were air assaulted in and consolidated in a battery
to provide responsive fire support to infantry units in contact. Effects of
indirect fire were limited due to the rocky terrain and many defilade positions
provided by jutting rocks, caves, and gravel embankments.

Intelligence. This was the first infantry battle in which real-time intelligence
feeds were provided directly to the fighting unit's headquarters via unmanned
aerial vehicles and satellite. This was a necessity due to the difficulty of
communications (tactical satellite only), and the limited reconnaissance and
surveillance capability on the ground near Shah-i-Kot. Search and reconnaissance
units assigned to special operations forces identified many targets and threats
prior to actual ground combat. However, during the air assault, many commanders
learned that these teams and photoreconnaissance could only provide a partial
picture of the enemy situation.

Logistics. From D+5 to D+8, TF Rakkasan and TF Summit units learned the
difficulty of logistics in a mountainous environment. Because of the rapidly
changing weather, ceilings dropped to well below rotary-wing minimums for
operations (below 300 feet above-ground level). Para-drop assets were virtually
nonexistent as well, due to the limited airlift capability provided from
Uzbekistan and Turkey. Food and water were rationed until resupply was made on
D+8.

Maneuver. Because of the harsh climate and terrain, maneuver was limited for
survivability purposes. Limited instances occurred in which infantry units
maneuvered to engage isolated enemy positions, but large-scale forms of maneuver
were practically nonexistent, unless done via air assault.

Battle command. On D+1, RAK TAC positioned in the objective area because of
limited over-the-horizon communications in theater. This proved to be an
extraordinarily wise decision, as the brigade combat team commander was on the
ground to make the decision to extract 1-87 and reinsert them to the north. This
also enabled the joint task force commander to make an informed decision to
employ the reserve on D+2.

Air defense. Coalition forces enjoyed air superiority for the duration of this
battle. Al-Qaeda air defenses (small arms and rocket propelled grenades) were
formidable against rotary wing, destroying one CH-47 and causing damage to four
more, as well as seven AH-64 gun ships. No fixed wing aircraft sustained damage
during this battle.

Mobility and survivability. Limited engineer assets were available to the
brigade combat team. Al-Qaeda forces used old, Soviet type antipersonnel and
antitank mines to fix Zia Gulbuddin's forces as they approached the valley,
effectively engaging his forces at standoff with mortars.

Principles of War

Maneuver. All types of maneuver were extremely difficult, as the severe climate
and terrain sapped the strength of ground combat units. The extreme altitudes at
which rotary-wing air assets operated (attack aviation in particular) negated
the ability to hover and engage targets at standoff ranges. The mountainous
terrain severely inhibited mounted maneuver. Numerous chokepoints throughout the
valley would prove deadly for mounted enemy units, as they were easily engaged
by coalition airpower.

Offensive. The initial insertion into Shah-i-Kot was an offensive maneuver,
although it would transition to defensive blocking positions as the plan
unfolded and Afghan forces assumed the retrograde. The offensive tempo of the
operation would ebb and flow for the duration of the battle, changing rapidly
due to the enemy's ability to use terrain to his advantage.

Surprise. It is argued that al-Qaeda forces knew in advance of the coalition's
plans to move through the Shah-i-Kot Valley, a common occurrence when Afghan
forces were involved in a coalition operation. However, introducing two
battalion-sized task forces into the objective area within minutes ultimately
provided the necessary surprise to prevent al-Qaeda from mounting a coherent or
mutually supporting defense.

Security. Using special forces elements to secure the flanks of coalition forces
as they entered the Shah-i-Kot Valley proved deficient on this noncontiguous
battlefield. Ultimately, ground forces were responsible for their own security,
with help from aerial platforms.

Mass. Using ah assault movement would have provided the necessary mass to
overwhelm the enemy, if had he been in the valley below. The enemy's defilade
positions above the initial coalition positions negated the ability of these
forces to mass the effects of their fires to achieve a decisive end.

Objective. The objective of this mission was clearly enemy-oriented, as there
was no intent to occupy the towns within Objective Remington. As the battle
raged on, the objective was shifted to mass the effects of combat power on the
greatest enemy concentrations during Objective Ginger.

Unity of Command. Although ultimate authority for the operation fell under the
joint task force commander, there was a clear disconnect between coalition and
Afghan forces entering the Shah-i-Kot valley. It is easy to see that General Zia
Gulbuddin's desire to complete the mission differed from that of the joint task
force commander. Unity of command proved to be a major contributing factor to
the initial execution of this operation. Simplicity. Simplicity was a key
ingredient in developing this plan. Because of the many international special
forces and Afghan units involved, simplicity was paramount to ensure its overall
success.

Economy of Force. The initial intent for this mission was to seal off escape
routes for fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban forces as Zia's forces moved through
Objective Remington. As such, a large amount of ground forces were needed to
execute the mission to secure numerous exfiltration routes. The economy of using
B-52s and multiple air strikes to subdue an unorganized military force can be
debated as well.

Bibliography

Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, Rakkasan Infantry Leaders" Conference,
Slideshow Presentation. July 2002.

Thomas S. Ricks and Bradley Graham, "Surprises, Adjustments and Milestones for
U.S, Military:' The Washington Post, 10 March 2002.

Dennis Steele. "Operation Anaconda: Taking the Fight to the Enemy in
Afghanistan," Army Magazine, April 2002.

"Afghanistan--Introduction," www.globalsecurity.org.

CPT Ryan K. Welch is currently the assistant $3, 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry
Division. He received a B.A. from Norwich University. His military education
includes the Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox; AH-64A Qualification
Course, Fort Rucker, Alabama; and Aviation Officer Basic Course, Fort Rocker. He
has served in various command and staff positions, to include attack aviation
liaison officer, 3d Battalion, 101st (3-101) Aviation Regiment, 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault), Afghanistan; aviation support platoon leader, 3-101
Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, KY," executive officer, Headquarters and
Headquarters Company, 101st Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Fort
Campbell; and attack platoon leader, A Troop, 3d Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment,
Camp Humphreys, Korea.

[2RHPZ]

Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2 -10 March 20021
Adam Geibel © 2002
*
They just kept sending them into our meat grinder. We've killed several hundred of them, but they just keep coming.
?Major General F.L. Hagenbeck2

As of 2 March 2002, Operation Anaconda was the largest combat operation in Afghanistan of the War on Terrorism that began after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Major General F.L. Hagenbeck, commander of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, led the major effort to clean out remaining al-Qaeda fighters and their Taliban allies in the Shah-i-Khot Valley. The mission involved about 2,000 coalition troops, including more than 900 Americans, 200 U.S. Special Forces and other troops, and 200 special operations troops from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Norway, New Zealand, and Afghan allies.
Operation Anaconda began before dawn on 2 March 2002. The battle area occupied about 60 square miles. The terrain is rugged, and the peaks have many spurs and ridges. The base of the Shah-i-Khot Valley is approximately 8,500 feet in altitude. The surrounding mountain peaks rise to 11,000 to 12,000 feet. Only small juniper trees grow on the mountain slopes. The actual snow line began about 100 feet above the valley floor. Mountain villages include the hamlets of Sher Khan Khel, Babal Khel, Marzak, Kay Khel, and Noor Khel. On the day battle began, the valley floor was sprinkled with small patches of snow. Temperatures hov-ered near 15 to 20 degrees Fahrenheit.3
The opposition forces were mostly non-Afghan al-Qaeda and Taliban members although the force also included some Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, and Pakistanis. Scattered groups, numbering as many as 20 members, including some family members, holed up in a 3,000-year-old complex of mountain tunnels, caves, and crannies.
The terrorists, who had come to the valley villages six weeks before the battle began, took control; prudently, most of the civilians left. One Afghan villager said the people were told, "If you want to leave or stay it is up to you, but we're staying in those caves because they were ours in the holy war against Russia."4 The terrorists gave 700 sheep to the people of Shah-i-Khot for their troubles; others received bus fare.
Predator drones and other CIA intelligence assets spotted the enemy assembling in groups south of Gardez, but rather than immediately attacking, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) let the terrorists gather to present a larger target. A small U.S. Special Forces detachment accompanied local Afghan commander Zia Lodin as his men entered the valley from the south and headed to Sirkankel to flush out suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban forces.5
To the east and southeast of the combat area, Afghan generals Kamal Khan Zadran and Zakim Khan's units had responsibility for the perimeter. U.S. Special Forces teams were with each Afghan general to help coordinate operations. This noose of allied troops enclosed four specific combat zones. The two most significant zones were code-named Objectives Remington and Ginger. Reconnaissance forces slipped into the mountains a few days before the main attack was scheduled to begin on 27 February, but the operation was postponed 48 hours because of rainy, blustery weather.
When the operation began, Zia ran into trouble. His 450-man unit was caught in a mortar barrage and prevented from entering Sirkankel. Two of Zia's men were killed and 24 were wounded. Retreating under mortar and rocket fire, the Afghan column stumbled into a second ambush to the rear. U.S. Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman was killed. Most of Zia's trucks were destroyed, and his troops retreated to Gardez.6
The hole left by Zia's retreat had to be plugged. U.S. troops, who had been slated to block fleeing terrorists or hopscotch around the battle zone, were immediately dropped into the gap to await Zia's return. Elements of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions were to set up blocking positions to support Afghan allies as they swept through the villages and dislodged al-Qaeda forces. Both units ran into heavy resistance.
Allied special operations troops were tasked to block known routes of escape from the south and southwest, conduct reconnaissance, and call in air strikes. Brigadier General Duncan Lewis, commander of the Australian Army's special operations forces, told the press that about 100 Special Air Service (SAS) commandos had been inserted into remote observation points atop mountains near the towns of Marzak and Sher Khan Khel. The commandos were to pinpoint rebels retreating from the large target area known as Remington.7
The 10th Mountain Division, 2 March
1/87th Infantry Regiment Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Frank Grippe said that the regiment's initial mission was to conduct blocking positions in the southern portion of the valley south of Marzak. Scout sniper teams directly east of Marzak were watching two small canyons that ran out of the village. Just to the north of Marzak, a platoon-size element guarded a larger canyon that ran east out of the valley. In the south, intelligence units estimated that their two positions would possibly have to contain the most terrorist exfiltrators. They also had two blocking positions, one in a canyon running from the southeast of the valley and one running directly south.8
At 0600, 2 March 2002, 125 men from the 1/87th Infantry Regiment and three CH-47 helicopters arrived. One CH-47 went to the northern blocking position, which had a platoon-size element and two scout snipers set up as hunter/killer teams. In the south, 82 men on the other two CH-47s arrived at two landing zones separated by about 400 meters. To the south, troops landed at the base of an al-Qaeda stronghold and literally within a minute of being dro-p-ped off began taking sporadic fire as they moved to cover. A small ridgeline separated the landing zone from the source of fire. Some soldiers maneuvered to a small depression behind the ridge while others moved onto some small ridges to their south.
After the first 10 minutes, al-Qaeda fighters left their caves and well-fortified positions to dump a heavy volume of fire onto the 10th Mountain Division. The al-Qaeda were familiar with the area and had all the low ground in the valley already zeroed in with their mortars, so it did not take long for them to bracket the 10th's mortar and cause the first injuries. After U.S. troops called in close air support, things quieted down. Once troops took cover, organizing and returning fire, they hunkered down for the 18-hour battle of attrition.
Grippe noted that more Afghan forces never arrived.9 Some of Grippe's soldiers took out targets at ranges up to 500 meters with 5.56-millimeter M4 carbines and M249 small arms weapons. Second Lieutenant Christopher Blaha, who inscribed the names of two of his friends lost on 11 September on all his hand grenades, radioed in an air strike while his 1/87th rifle platoon returned fire on the enemy mortar position about 2,500 meters away. Within five minutes, a B-52 dumped its load and scored a direct hit on the mortar position, ending all movement.10
First Lieutenant Charles Thompson and his 10th Mountain troops secured a small al-Qaeda compound before a platoon-size force "hit them by surprise" south of the compound, the direction from which Zia's troops were supposed to have been moving. Thompson's unit repelled the assault with mortar fire and air strikes and apparently inflicted heavy casualties. Later, the much-reduced al-Qaeda force came up the valley in twos or threes, firing some sniping shots but never mounting a serious threat to troops positioned on ridges on the eastern and western sides of the valley.
A mortar ambush injured at least 12 U.S. soldiers when they landed on top of an al-Qaeda command bunker near Marzak. Because they were wearing body armor, the shrapnel struck mostly their arms and legs. Private First Class Jason Ashline was struck by two bullets in the chest but survived because the rounds lodged in his vest. Ashline later told the press, "For a couple of seconds, everything was . . . in slow-motion. I was pretty scared because I didn't feel no pain. I thought, `what's wrong?' I thought maybe I was dead."11 Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ron Corkran later said, "I didn't really expect them to try and duke it out with us. I was just surprised at the intensity of what I saw on the valley floor."12 Sergeant First Class (SFC) Thomas Abbott, whose right arm was injured by shrapnel, added, "I've never been so scared in my life. We thought we were all going to die."13 The wounded were evacuated at around 2000. Near midnight, all elements were extracted from the battle.
The 101 Airborne Division, 2 March
Elsewhere in the valley, 101st Airborne Division brigade commander Colonel Frank Wiercinski landed on a ridge to the south of Sirkankel with an 11-man detachment whose mission was to monitor Charlie Company's progress. As they were moving the command post to higher ground, they began taking fire. Charlie Company was also under fire from an al-Qaeda military compound about 200 meters from where they had landed. Wiercinski described the fight: "We survived three mortar barrages during the day, and at one point we had between 9 to 10 al-Qaeda coming to do [kill] us. But instead, we did [killed] them."14 Five Charlie Company soldiers stayed on the ridge and, while receiving sniper and machine-gun fire, covered those moving away from the mortar impacts.
Platoon leader Lieutenant Shane Owens' unit was forced into a hasty defense position from its original task of blocking the northern end of the valley. Support Platoon Leader Captain David Mayo of the 1/182d Infantry Regiment and his group provided security for the command and control element and conducted reconnaissance of potential resupply landing zones for the operation. As it turned out, the paratroopers' basic load was enough for 24 hours, and resupply was unnecessary.
Captain Kevin Butler watched in frustration as the enemy ducked into caves seconds before supporting jets dropped their bombs. Moments later, the enemy popped back out to wave, throw rocks, then fire their mortars and heavy machine guns at U.S. troops. Some rounds came within 30 meters of Butler's troops. Frustrated and angry, Butler ran 45 meters uphill six times onto the peak and exposed himself to enemy fire to pinpoint the enemy's position so he could call in an air strike. As the F-15s neared the caves, Butler ordered his own men to fire their 60-millimeter mortars. When the enemy reemerged to taunt the U.S. soldiers, the mortar rounds detonated over their heads and sprayed them with shrapnel. Four were killed.15
When allied troops searched the snow-covered mountains for caves and other signs of al-Qaeda fighters, they found several 57-millimeter recoilless rifles, an 82-millimeter mortar, some documents, and night-vision goggles identical to U.S. models.
Units of the 101st Airborne Division moved into the mountains north and east of Sirkankel to block mu-jahideen escape routes and, with Australian and U.S. Special Forces, blocked routes to the south. A new assault south along the high ground east of the valley began on 3 March.
The Special Operations Battle, 3-4 March
During a 24-hour-long battle on 3-4 March 2002, a handful of U.S. soldiers killed "hundreds" of al-Qaeda fighters while repelling waves of heavily armed mujahideen trying to overrun an isolated hilltop position in the Arma Mountains of southeastern Afghanistan.
The hilltop battle developed during a nighttime attempt to establish a new observation post overlooking a major al-Qaeda supply and escape route. Initial wire service reports were vague and confusing since few reporters accompanied the troops into combat. Later, Commander in Chief, CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks explained that many landing zones had been picked for helicopter assaults, and some enemy forces had evaded detection.16
At 0830, an MH-47 Chinook attempting to land a team on a hilltop near Marzak was hit by one or more rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and small arms fire. One grenade bounced off the helicopter and did not explode, but apparently the small arms fire damaged the helicopter's hydraulic system.17 The Chinook managed to fly a short distance before making a forced landing. A head count showed that all but one of the team had managed to escape aboard the heavily damaged helicopter. The lone man not accounted for was U.S. Navy Petty Officer First Class Neil C. Roberts, a door gunner.18
According to Hagenbeck, a second Chinook, flying in tandem with the first and containing a quick reaction force of about 30 special operations troops, flew to the rescue of the downed aircraft.19 The rescuers, who landed under fire later on the night of the 3 March at the hilltop where Roberts was last seen, came under intense fire. A 21-man Special Forces team was dropped off.
At 1200, a third Chinook was hit while inserting more special operations forces near the site of the first incident. According to Joint Staff briefer U.S. Air Force Brigadier General John Rosa, the helicopter was hit by machine-gun and RPG fire and either crash-landed or experienced a hard landing.20 Six soldiers were killed and five wounded in subsequent firefights, since the valley suddenly swarmed with enemy troops. Senior Airman Jason Cun-ningham darted out of the helicopter several times to pull others to safety and was hit by machine-gun fire while treating the wounded.21
Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders must have smelled blood, because the shift in U.S. tactics drew masses of them out of hiding and into combat. From the original estimate of only about 150 to 200 men in the area on 2 March, about 500 fresh fighters were detected moving from southern Afghanistan's Khost area as well as from Waziristan, a Pakistani tribal area where smugglers traditionally found refuge and where many fighters fled after the Taliban government collapsed in November 2001.22 Some estimates of terrorist strength ran as high as 2,000, but in truth, no one knew how many were in the valley.
Two Australian SAS teams, calling air strikes against the ring of attackers, saved the rescue group that was under intense fire from mortars, machine guns, and small arms. Spectre AC-130 gunships dumped 105-millimeter fire into mujahideen positions while Apaches shot up enemy vehicles moving toward the fight along the narrow mountain roads twisting up steep valleys. Hagenbeck told the press that the "hilltop was surrounded, but we were pounding them all night long. We thought when morning came they were going to do a ground assault. They were poised to overrun the [U.S.] position. We gave everything we had to get those guys out."23 A heavily armed infantry force was standing by to fight its way up the hilltop to open an escape route if necessary.24
Shortly after dark, but before the moon rose on 4 March, more helicopters raced in under covering fire from dozens of strike fighters and attack helicopters to extract the Special Forces and their dead comrades. Next to be withdrawn was the 10th Mountain force. As the helicopters re-turned safely to Bagram Air Base, the sprawling hub of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, throngs of soldiers anxiously awaited their return.25
In addition to 7 U.S. dead, there were at least 40 wounded soldiers, of which 18 were treated and returned to duty.26 Another 9 Special Forces sol-diers and 13 others arrived on 6 and 7 March at Germany's Landstuhl Re-gional Medical Center, all in good condition.27 As the smoke figuratively cleared, Franks estimated that U.S. and Afghan forces had killed from 100 to 200 al-Qaeda and Tali-ban fighters during the hilltop battle.28
Continued Operations, 5-10 March
Although the intensity of fighting slacked off on 5 March, allied Afghan commanders sent fresh platoons to the fight while troops in contact kept pressing forward with minesweepers clearing their way. Franks described the fighting as a series of short, often intense clashes with small numbers of fugitives, saying, "We might find five enemy soldiers in one place and then perhaps some distance away from there we may find three and then some distance we may find 15 or 20."29 One Special Forces soldier said the Tali-ban he encountered used "spider holes"?well-camouflaged shallow caves stocked with machine guns?that provided protection from the 500-pound bombs where "a couple of guys can hold up a whole company."30
At a Pentagon briefing that same day, Hagenbeck said, "We caught several hundred [al-Qaeda] with RPGs and mortars heading toward the fight. We body slammed them today and killed hundreds of those guys."31
Zia's forces finally resumed their advance on 6 March. U.S. commanders reported that U.S.-led bombing attacks and ground assaults might have killed as many as 400 fighters of a total of perhaps 800.32 Sergeant Corey Daniel, who commanded an eight-man forward observation unit, told the press on 9 March that al-Qaeda resistance waned over the next few days as they ran out of ammunition and wilted under non-stop bombing.33
Coalition planes continued to hammer the terrorists. Between 2 and 5 March, coalition air forces, using a mix of long-range bombers and tactical aircraft, dropped more than 450 bombs, 350 of which were precision munitions.34 Rosa told reporters that the U.S. offensive was making progress: "I would say we are softening up in certain portions, but there's still a lot of work to be done. We're far from over."35
Afghan commander Abdul Mu-teen said that U.S. and Afghan forces had advanced to within less than 100 meters of the enemy, who were trying to hold off the allies with copious machine gun and RPG fire. According to Muteen, the enemy was "ready for martyrdom and will die to the last man."36
At high altitudes, troop rotation was an important factor in maintaining operational tempo. Another 300 U.S. troops were brought into the battle from a U.S. helicopter base at Kandahar. The helicopters returned one or two hours later to refuel and head out again with fresh troops and supplies.37
More Afghans to the Front, 7 March
On 7 March, wind and sandstorms slowed allied air and ground operations, but near dusk a caravan of 12 to 15 Afghan tanks and armored personnel carriers rumbled down the main road south of Kabul toward Paktia Province and the high-elevation combat. The 1,000 Afghan reinforcements, under Northern Commander Gul Haider, were largely Tajik troops who had fought under their late commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, against the Taliban.38
To western journalists the T-55 tanks and BMP-1 personnel carriers of General Muhammad Nasim's command looked like a moving museum. Eventually, mechanical attrition took its toll on the aging armored vehicles as they made the 60-mile drive from Kabul.
As the armor column reached the battle zone on 9 March, driving winds and snow forced al-Qaeda holdouts to retreat into their caves. The Tajiks were tasked with helping drive hidden Taliban snipers and fighters from the valley villages of Sher Khan Khel, Babal Khel, and Marzak.39
Because the initial grouping of 1,000 Afghan government troops com-mitted to Operation Anaconda were ethnic Pashtuns, cooperation between them and the Tajiks could have been problematic. Apparently, by 10 March, complaints from local commanders prevented Afghan tanks from going any farther than Gardez.
Local ethnic Pashtun commanders warned they would fight national army forces if the Afghan defense ministry, controlled by ethnic Tajik General Mohammed Fahim, did not withdraw troops joining the offensive. Bacha Khan and the other Pashtun commanders insisted that they had enough firepower to defeat the al-Qaeda holdouts without the central government's help or interference.40
An unidentified Special Forces officer noted that the majority of the new forces were Pushtun and that their commanders had dropped old rivalries for the larger goal of eliminating the last of the al-Qaeda and Taliban pockets.41 On 10 March, the officer estimated that between 100 to 200 al-Qaeda forces remained in the valley and that U.S. forces were not approaching the most dangerous part of the war but were in it.
Meanwhile, on 7 March and early on 8 March, U.S. troops came under fire in the southern sector. The clash seemed like a last, defiant gesture. With local terrorist forces severely hurt, U.S. forces repositioned. About 400 U.S. troops returned to Bagram Air Base on 9 March; however, within hours of the withdrawal of one-third of the 1,200 U.S. troops involved in the 8-day-old operation, B-52 bombers had to return to the area.42
(Mis)Perceptions of Afghan Allied Support
Some Afghan commanders in Gardez and Kabul asserted that the United States may have made the mistake of relying on a select few local commanders who gave wrong estimates of enemy troop numbers, then backed out on pledges to assist in the battle. Commander Abdul Mateen Hassankheil, who had 1,500 men fighting in Shah-i-Khot, was one of the critics: "The U.S. does not understand our local politics; it does not know whom to trust, and [it] trusts the wrong people."43
According to Financial Times journalist Charles Clover, in a report from Gardez, Hassankheil claimed that the beginning of the battle was badly planned because the United States relied on intelligence from Padshah Khan, who had told them that the mujahideen at Shah-i-Khot were less numerous than was actually the case.44 Khan, a powerful local commander ousted as province governor weeks before the battle after clashes with militias in Gardez, allegedly had previously provided misleading information to U.S. military leaders. Khan denied that he had misled the United States and insisted that everyone in Gardez making accusations against him were al-Qaeda. Others in Gardez believed that Khan implicated his enemies as members of al-Qaeda so the United States would remove them.45
One unnamed U.S. officer, supposedly familiar with Zia's combat history, said that after Zia's men took heavy fire, Zia probably held them out of the fight with the self-assured knowledge that U.S. forces would have to take up the slack. "This is the way everybody fights over there. Fight and fall back. You don't want to take too many combat losses yourself. You save your resources from attrition to make sure you stay in power when it's all over."46 Hagen-beck and Wiercinski said they did not know Zia's experience or background, but commanders who had worked with Zia before had spoken highly of him.47
Other U.S. officers theorized that someone leaked the plan of attack to the enemy. U.S. troops had trained as many as 500 Afghan allies for a major battle weeks beforehand, and there were hints that Afghans from both sides were talking to one another. This is not surprising given the nation's culture.48
Several U.S. soldiers heaped derision on Zia, painting a picture of a well-prepared opposition that made ample use of advanced weaponry. One soldier told the press that Zia "punked out on us. . . . I don't know how much we paid him, but I'll shoot him myself. He was supposed to roll in. Day 1, he was supposed to attack, and we were supposed to set up blocking positions so they couldn't get out."49 Another soldier said Zia "didn't perform. He took a couple of mortar rounds and took off."50 The soldiers had respect for the enemy: "They're a helluva lot more fancy than people give them credit for. . . . There were lots of weapons, mortar tubes. These guys were good with mortars."51
Noting that Afghan units had an insufficient force ratio but that they recovered from a serious mortar attack to take several key positions, one unnamed Special Forces colonel defended Zia: "The forces [Afghans] put together are different from our American military force. They're not an American military force. We can't expect them to be. It makes them no less noble, no less brave, no less willing to get out and engage our common enemy, and General Zia has, make no mistake about it. I take exception to those folks who complain about what these people have done to get us to this point in the battlefield. You wear his shoes that he has worn for five months in this battlefield."52
An unnamed senior USAF officer, quoted in the Washington Times, criticized U.S. tactics in the battle of Shah-i-Khot.53 He asserted that commanders should have used air strikes for days or weeks, allowing precision-guided bombs and AC-130 howitzers to pummel the caves and compounds. This less-than-discreet officer also attempted to draw a parallel to the 1993 U.S. debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia. He pointed to the mid-December 2001 Tora Bora air campaign as a successful template, but he failed to mention that many al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders had slithered away during that period. Franks simply modified the Tora Bora tactics and sent in U.S.-trained Afghans to block escape routes and do the fighting, only committing relatively large numbers of U.S. ground troops when Afghan allies ran into problems. As another unnamed senior officer rightly observed, "No tactical plan ever survives the first encounter with the enemy. . . , and this plan changed 180 degrees."54
At a 6 March Pentagon press con-ference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that "other than very brave people being involved, this has nothing to do with Mogadishu, and the individual who was killed; his body has been retrieved, and so too have the wounded. And, I don't see any comparison."55
When asked by ABC interviewer Sam Donaldson if the U.S. troops who were attacked and pinned down by al-Qaeda fire on 2 March were surprised by the tenacity of the resistance, Franks pointed out that intelligence is an inexact endeavor. "There will certainly be places . . . where we'll encounter very, very substantial resistance. We will almost never have perfect intelligence information. I would not downplay the possibility that forces that moved into this area got into a heck of a firefight at some point that they did not anticipate. I think that is entirely possible. . . . I think we've seen it in the past. . . . I think we'll see it in the future."56
Perhaps enemy commander Maulvi Saifurrahman Mansoor, who was up in the mountains, inadvertently best described the battle's outcome when he said that al-Qaeda fighters would "continue to wage jihad until our last breath against the Americans for the glory of Islam and for the defense of our country."57 MR


1.This article is based on open-source media reports as of 11 March 2002.
2.MG F.L. Hagenbeck, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) News Conference, Tampa, FL, 4 March 2002.
3.Interview with U.S. Army soldiers who participated in Operation Anaconda, DOD News Transcript, 7 March 2002. Hereafter referred to as DOD News Transcript.
4.Barry Bearak, "Taliban and War Deliver a Double Blow to Villagers," New York Times (NYT), 11 March 2001.
5.Jonathan Ewing, "Stiff Resistance: Coalition Forces Face Hardened Al Qaeda, Taliban Fighters," Associated Press (AP), 5 March 2002.
6.Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Forces Gain Edge in Afghan Attack," Washington Post, 6 March 2002.
7."Diggers in heavy Afghan fighting," Australian Associated Press (AAP) via Daily Telegraph, 8 March 2002.
8.DOD News Transcript.
9.CSM (Unknown) Frank quoted in John F. Burns, "Saying Battle is Reaching End, U.S. Sends Troops Back to Base," NYT, 11 March 2002.
10.Ibid.
11.Kathy Gannon, "Hundreds of Fighters Mass at Front Line for Final Push on Al-Qaida Caves," AP, 11 March 2002.
12."US-led troops locked in fierce fight with al-Qaeda remnants," Agence France-Presse (AFP), 7 March 2002.
13.Gerry J. Gilmore, "U.S. Troops Describe All-Day Shah-i-Khot Battle," American Forces Information Service (AFIS), 7 March 2002.
14.Ewing.
15."Army Capt. Zaps Al Qaeda Guides U.S. firepower at jeering enemy," New York Daily News, 7 March 2002; Butler was nominated for a Bronze Star; Ewing, "Al-Qaida Taunt US Forces at a Price, AP, 7 March 2002.
16.Rowan Scarborough, "Military officers criticize rush to use ground troops," Washington Times, 7 March 2002.
17.Pamela Hess, "U.S. chopper shot down in Afghan battle," United Press International (UPI), 4 March 2002.
18."Unexpectedly Stiff Resistance Meets Coalition Forces Mount in Attack on Al-Qaida and Taliban," AP, 5 March 2002. U.S. Marine Corps Major Ralph Mills said Roberts died of a bullet wound after surviving a fall from the helicopter. However, whether Roberts was alive when he fell, was left on the ground, or was shot out of the helicopter is still unknown.
19.Ibid.; David Wood, "Outnumbered U.S. force rakes al-Qaida forces," Newhouse News Service, 5 March 2002; Andrew Buncombe, "Entering its sixth bloody day, the Afghan battle that would be over in 24 hours," United Kingdom Independent, 07 March 2002.
20.Jim Garamone, "Allies Aggressive in Fight Against Al Qaeda, Taliban," American Forces Press Service (AFPS), 5 March 2002.
21.Elliott Minor, "Air Force Airman Killed in Afghanistan Remembered for Devoting His Life to Helping Others," AP, 7 March 2002.
22.John F. Burns, "U.S. Adds Troops and Helicopters in Afghan Battle," NYT, 7 March 2002.
23.Wood.
24."Diggers"; Wood.
25.Wood.
26.Garamone.
27.Stephen Graham, "Wounded U.S. Troops Recount Battle," AP, 8 March 2002.
28."Warplanes in action after US suffers worst losses of Afghan campaign," AFP, 5 March 2002.
29."Kathy Gannon, "New troops moving into front-line areas near Gardez, Afghanistan," Canadian Press, 5 March 2002.
30.Ibid.
31.Graham and Loeb.
32.Burns, "U.S. Adds Troops."
33.Christine Hauser and Stuart Grudgings, "U.S. Pulls Troops From Battle: Afghan Force Divided," *******, 10 March 2002.
34.Garamone; "French air force deploys fighters in east Afghanistan," AFP, 4 March 2002. French fighter planes carried out "two duty missions in the zone" on 2 and 3 March in support of Operation Anaconda. These aircraft had not previously participated in the bombings in the Arma Mountains and were on their first operational missions.
35.Robert Burns, "Marine Attack Helicopters Ordered Into Battle in Afghanistan: Pentagon Cites Progress," AP, 5 March 2002.
36.Christine Hauser and Peter Millership, "Mountain battle rages in Afghanistan," *******, 6 March 2002.
37.John F. Burns, "U.S. Adds Troops and Helicopters in Afghan Battle," NYT, 7 March 2002.
38.Kathy Gannon, "U.S. forces step up attacks on al-Qaida fighters," AP, 8 March 2002.
39.Barry Bearak, "Old Arms Now Joining the Newest Near Gardez," NYT, 9 March 2002.
40.Kathy Gannon, "Coalition's Afghan Allies Feud," AP, 9 March 2002.
41.Geoffrey Mohan and Esther Schrader, "Back at Base U.S. Troops Say Afghans Failed Them," Los Angeles Times, 11 March 2002.
42.Gannon, "U.S. forces step up attacks"; Paul Haven, "Army: Major Anaconda Fighting Over," AP, 10 March 2002; Hauser and Grudgings.
43.Abdul Mateen Hassankheil quoted in Charles Clover, "Afghan rivalries blamed for US defeat," Financial Times, 5 March 2002.
44.Ibid.
45.Ibid.
46.Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "Retreat of Afghan Allies Forced G.I.'s to Take Lead in Fighting," NYT, 10 March 2002.
47.Jonathan Ewing, "Mud, Cold and Shells: A Trench-Level View of the War in Afghanistan," AP, 7 March 2002.
48.Schmitt and Shanker.
49.Mohan and Schrader, "Back at Base."
50.Ibid.
51.Ibid.
52.Ibid.
53.Scarborough.
54.Schmitt and Shanker.
55.Scarborough.
56.Gerry J. Gilmore, "Anaconda Battle Plan Sound, Franks Says," AFPS, 10 March 2002.
57.Hauser and Millership, "Mountain battle ranges."

[mattnwnc03]

wow , them theres some big posts

[DLodge]

In a similar vein, for all those who think that the days of the attack helicopter are numbered following the disaster at Karbala...

Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight

"Americans define war as being waged against a uniformed, disciplined, opposing state's armed forces, the sort who will fight fairly, the way the Americans do." -Daniel P. Bolger1

THE FACT THAT I am writing this article at an Iraqi airfield north of Tikrit testifies to the success of the United States and its coalition partners in their endeavor to remove Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime and to liberate the Iraqi people. Although this second Persian Gulf war witnessed conventional and symmetrical battles in its opening phases, some Iraqi forces employed asymmetric techniques to undermine U.S. campaign plans and to test America's resolve.

Subsequent to the capture of Baghdad, Task Force (TF) Iron Horse, comprising the 4th Infantry Division (ID) and attached units, was charged with clearing the area north of Baghdad (centered on Tikrit, the former hub of Saddam's political support) of noncompliant forces (NCF) and interdicting the proliferation of the many remaining weapons systems in that area. Both the employment of asymmetric techniques against U.S. forces moving against Baghdad and the subsequent intransigence of NCF in northern Iraq, employing hit-and-run, guerrilla-style tactics to acquire weapons and disrupt U.S. lines of communications (LOC), were anathema to the U.S. definition of war.

During the first Persian Gulf war in 1991, Iraqi forces confronted the United States and its coalition partners according to the dominant Western (conventional and symmetric) paradigm of war. It is hardly surprising that the Iraqi forces were defeated. It is also not surprising that in 2003, some Iraqi forces adopted asymmetric approaches to try to mitigate U.S. overmatch in technology and conventional military prowess. The most glaring and disquieting Iraqi employment of asymmetric techniques occurred during the approach to Baghdad on 23 March 2003. Highly dispersed small Iraqi units set ambushes, using a cell phone and observer network in the cities south of Baghdad. These ambushes damaged a number of AH-64s that were conducting a corps-level, deep-shaping attack against Republican Guard divisions surrounding Baghdad.

The Iraqi enemy never presented a massed target for AH-64 attacks and quickly dispersed into the cities rather than remain in conventional and predictable defensive battle positions. During this Iraqi ambush, small-arms and antiaircraft fire damaged more than 90 percent of a U.S. regiment's helicopters, and one helicopter crew was captured. The damage to one attack helicopter battalion's aircraft was so severe that the battalion did not see any major action for the rest of the war.2

Not long after the fall of Baghdad, and before coalition forces had finished subduing a host of NCF in northern Iraq, the media began to report that the days of the Apache Longbow were numbered. These negative media comments echoed the death knell of deep-attack shaping operations and postulated that the Apache was obsolescent. This opinion seemed to be based on one highly visible but unsuccessful large-scale deep attack. Actually, the Apache had proven its worth and effectiveness during the first Persian Gulf war and the war in Afghanistan. Hoping to gain an advantage in the zero-sum defense appropriations game, self-proclaimed attack helicopter and air-power experts said it was time to eliminate the Apache and supplant its ground support role with the U.S. Air Force's A-10 Warthog. Others argued that the Apache was designed for a deep-attack role in the context of a conventional war between organized, combined-arms formations. Therefore, adversaries who embraced asymmetric approaches saw the Apache as a dinosaur, just another Cold War relic.

The armchair experts were wrong. After 23 March 2003, Army attack aviation adapted tactics to counter the asymmetric threat. With close air support (CAS) A-10 attacks, Apache helicopters conducted effective armed reconnaissance and close shaping missions that were integrated with ground maneuver to defeat Republican Guard divisions surrounding Baghdad. After Iraq's organized formations dissolved, Iraqi Ba'ath party guerrillas confronted effective and lethal small AH-64 armed weapons teams integrated with ground scouts and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sensors. This phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom was characterized by decentralized, combined arms, small units operating in nonlinear, noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs). U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, provides a perceptive description and codification of this operational milieu where combat and stability operations intersect.3

The Apache Longbow remains an effective instrument in armed reconnaissance operations throughout a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlespace against an enemy that uses symmetric and asymmetric tactics. After Baghdad was seized, the attack helicopter integrated with ground maneuver in a close fires role. Coalition forces were operating against paramilitary and noncompliant forces in nonlinear AOs that were highly distributed in time and space.

Asymmetric Warfare, Quo Vadis?

The enemy, employing his small forces against a vast country, can only occupy some big cities and main lines of communication and part of the plains. Thus, there are extensive areas in the territory under his occupation that he has had to leave ungarrisoned and that provide a vast arena for our guerrilla warfare.-Mao Tse-tung4 Mao Tse-tung is one of the most widely studied practitioners of the asymmetric approach. In the quote above, he explains how guerrilla bands can harness time and space to their advantage. A host of definitions of asymmetric warfare and asymmetric strategy exists. In fact, there are so many definitions that asymmetry has become the strategic term de jour since the mid-1990s and now means many things to different people.

The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia characterizes asymmetry as attacks "posing threats from a variety of directions with a broad range of weapons systems to stress the enemy's defenses."5 However, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes asymmetric action as actions in which "forces, technologies, and weapons are different," or actions in which terrorism and a rejection of the conventional approach is the norm.6 The 1999 Joint Strategy Review defines asymmetry even more broadly as "attempts to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths while exploiting U.S. weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the U.S. method of operations."7

U.S. Army War College professor Steven Metz offers another definition for strategic asymmetry: "In military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths, exploit opponents' weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, militarystrategic, operational, or a combination, and entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, or time perspectives. It can be shortterm, long-term, or by default. It can also be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches and have both psychological and physical dimensions."8

Counterinsurgency expert Max Manwaring limited the scope of asymmetric warfare to insurgencies and small internal wars. Manwaring explicitly refers to the U.S. experience of fighting guerrillas in Vietnam as an asymmetric war.9 The first reference to his notion of asymmetric conflict is in an article on the U.S. experience in Vietnam.10 Asymmetric warfare is not a new concept; it dates as far back as the Roman occupation of Spain and the Levant. Asymmetry's scope and definition limit the use of hit-and-run, small-unit tactics by irregular and paramilitary elements to harass, ambush, bomb, and disrupt the outposts, checkpoints, or LOC of conventional formations. Practitioners of the asymmetric approach concentrate limited attacks against regular military forces' critical vulnerabilities by using treachery to undermine the overmatch of technology and aggregate forces of their adversaries.11

The subject of asymmetric warfare is relevant because the U.S. military will continue to confront enemies that use asymmetric techniques. Four facts point to this likelihood:

-Western powers have the most advanced militaries (technology and firepower) in the world.

-Economic and political homogenization among these nations essentially precludes a war among them.

-Most rational adversaries in the non-Western world have learned from the two wars against Iraq not to confront the West on its terms.

-The United States and its European allies will employ firepower and technology in the less-developed world against ostensibly inferior adversaries employing asymmetric approaches.

Asymmetric conflict will therefore be the norm, not the exception. The asymmetric nature of the war in Afghanistan underscores the salience of asymmetric conflicts.12

Time and Space: The Dispersion/ Concentration Conundrum

"Strategy is the art of making use of time and space".
-Napoleon Bonaparte13

In the vast expanses of China, Mao Tse-tung masterfully manipulated time and space to cause Japanese forces to disperse. By inducing the dispersal of the Kwantung Army, Chinese guerrillas could attack isolated outposts and reduce Japanese forces piecemeal. Essentially, the weaker opponent can use time and space factors to shape the concentration/ dispersion chimera to his advantage. The asymmetric warrior uses space to draw his enemy out to the countryside, making it difficult for the big power to concentrate its numerical superiority. The conventional force, then, must use more and more troops to secure its LOCs, resulting in the need for a host of isolated outposts. The weaker adversary is thereby able to locally concentrate his inferior numbers against overextended detachments.

Military historian B.H. Liddell-Hart refers to this form of warfare as an inversion of the orthodox principle of concentration: "Dispersion is an essential condition of survival and success on the guerrilla side, which must never present a target and thus can only operate in minute particles, though these may momentarily coagulate like globules of quick-silver to overwhelm some weakly guarded objective."14 In other words, a prudent, asymmetric-thinking enemy manipulates time and space to disperse the greater power's military forces, protracting the conflict and wearing down the will of the orthodox opponent. Mao Tse-tung and North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap repeatedly emphasized that forces dispersed to control territory become spread so thinly that they are vulnerable to attack. Thus, if the conventional formation concentrates its forces to overcome this vulnerability, then other areas are left insecure. A massive increase in forces could help resolve this operational contradiction, but it also immediately increases the domestic costs of the war. Conversely, if the conventional army aims to placate domestic opposition to the war by withdrawing some forces, the contradiction at the operational level becomes more acute.

Mao Tse-tung explained that the guerrilla could prolong his struggle and make it a protracted war by employing manpower in proper concentrations and dispersions and by concentrating against dispersed enemy detachments that are relatively weaker. For every territorial space, there is an inevitable mathematical logic that dictates how many troops are required to exert control. For example, British soldier and writer T.E. Lawrence claimed that it would have required 20 Turkish soldiers for every square mile (600,000 total-a prohibitive number) to control the Arab revolt in 1916.15

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, after the fall of Baghdad, TF Ironhorse's nonlinear AO north of Baghdad ran from Taji to Bayji along the Tigris River in the west, to Kirkuk in the north, and east to Iraq's border with Iran. On any given day, TF Ironhorse comprised about 24,400 combat and combat support troops operating in an AO of approximately 51,180 square (sq) kilometers (km). To put the potential for paramilitary dispersion and concentration into Lawrence's mathematical logic, in this highly dispersed environment, coalition forces had approximately one soldier for every 2 sq km.

Adaptation After the Abyss

"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into the abyss, the abyss also looks into you." -Friederich Nietzsche16

The Apache crews who conducted the deepshaping attack on the night of 23 March 2003 must have thought they were staring into the abyss when they flew into curtains of small arms and antiaircraft artillery fire thrown up by Iraqi regular and irregular elements. After the regiment's attack against the Republican Guard Medina Division, the helicopters, with battered rotors and airframes full of holes, withdrew. The Apaches flew into a classic asymmetric helicopter ambush similar to those guerrilla and paramilitary fighters created in Vietnam and Somalia.

According to an Army report, the enemy was able to set ambushes using a cell phone and a visual observer network in the cities south of Baghdad. Supposedly, an Iraqi two-star general in Al Najaf alerted the Iraqi air defense network by phone about the Apache assembly area locations and when the helicopters had been launched. Army V Corps Commander Lieutenant General William S. Wallace remarked that the enemy general used a cell phone to speed-dial a number of Iraqi air defenders.17

The Iraqi pre-planned air defense network allowed paramilitary forces to respond quickly throughout the area with well-aimed, random fire. As a result, many Apaches took hits in the tail rotor and cockpit areas. U.S. aviators reported that they had encountered a hornet's nest of enemy antiaircraft fire delivered by small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and antiaircraft iron-sight guns. As the aircraft approached their attack-by-fire positions, the entire power grid system below them went black, which was a signal for Iraqi air defenders to begin the antiaircraft ambush. The long wall of concentrated fire damaged 34 Apaches. When describing this deep attack to the media, Wallace said that the attack helicopters "did not meet the objectives that I had set for the attack."18 However, this was only one mission during the war, and the Army and the attack helicopter community adapted techniques to defeat an enemy more resolute and treacherous than originally estimated.19 Wallace said, "[W]e learned from our mistakes. We adjusted and adapted based on what we learned, and we still used the Apache helicopter in a significant role during the course of the fight."20

After 23 March, the Army V Corps continued the offensive with a series of limited objective attacks. On 28 March, V Corps assigned the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to conduct a deep attack against the 14th Brigade of the Medina Republican Guard Division. However, learning from the lessons of 23 March, the 101st's attack helicopters altered tactics, essentially conducting an in-depth zone reconnaissance, clearing the zone while attacking northward. When they encountered organized smallarms fire similar to the type used during the night of 23 March, they pulled back and directed Air Force CAS to eliminate enemy resistance.

For the remainder of the war, Apache helicopters adopted a close shaping role instead of conducting deep attacks and provided aviation close fires in support of ground maneuver forces. Commenting on the shift from the deep-attack role to the close combat attack, close support role, the V Corps commander stated, "When the 3d Infantry Division attacked through the Karbala Gap and subsequently into Baghdad, in addition to its own attack helicopter battalion, it had 21 Apaches from the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment under its operational control (OPCON), amounting to a total of 39 Apaches for continuous 24-hour operations to provide close combat attack or close support of ground forces."21

The 101st's helicopter attacks after 23 March destroyed 866 targets, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, air defense artillery (ADA), and missile launchers. In addition, the 3d ID's attack helicopter battalion destroyed 25 tanks, 27 infantry fighting vehicles, 6 artillery pieces, and 52 ADA pieces as it provided aviation close fires during the march to Baghdad.

To adapt to an enemy employing asymmetric tactics from urban-centric dispositions, the 3d ID's attack battalion mission profile transformed from battalion-massed or phased attacks against armor and artillery to continuous close combat attacks in support of the division's main effort brigade combat team (BCT). The Apache's close support role during the war's principally orthodox, formation-against-formation phase signaled the rebirth of aviation in a close fires role and represented a paradigm shift from a decade-long infatuation with deep attacks. After U.S. forces seized Baghdad, the Apache continued to perform in a close support role, but in an expanded battlespace and against a more dispersed and unorthodox paramilitary foe employing Maoist hit-and-run techniques.22

The Close Fire Role Against Irregulars

"We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of [enemy] forces and dissipation of his strength." -Mao Tse-tung23

After the fall of Baghdad, TF Ironhorse cleared and expanded the large, nonlinear AO in northern Iraq. Instead of fighting Republican Guard divisions, the task force cleared the AO of elusive, intransigent NCFs. In this milieu, attack helicopters, working in teams of two, performed cordon and search, armed aerial reconnaissance, airborne reaction force, and patrol operations. These roles were similar to the successful, responsive attack helicopter tactics employed during the Vietnam war.

While TF Ironhorse's aviation brigade's civil affairs element was trying to restore water and electricity to local villages, its attack helicopter crews, operating with the 1st BCT, were attacking the various elements opposing the new order: hard-core members of Saddam Hussein's government, criminal bands, Iranian agents, suicide bombers, and power-hungry Iraqi factions determined to seize control. This period represented an overlap between war and stability operations.

Stability operations, the current Army lexicon for what used to be operations other than war and low-intensity conflict, encompass a wide range of tasks, including countering insurgencies. Intensity is relative and contextual; however, when the term "low-intensity conflict" was in vogue, an aphorism offered, "It is not low intensity to the platoon engaged in a firefight with insurgents."

In today's vernacular, Somalia would be categorized within the realm of stability operations. However, anyone who has read the book or seen the movie Black Hawk Down realizes the acute intensity of the Battle of Mogadishu on 3-4 October 1993.24 V Corps chief of staff Brigadier General Daniel Hahn described this environment when he said, "It will look at times like we are still at war," and "stability operations are characterized by momentary flare-ups of violence."25

At the beginning of the war with Iraq, the United States and coalition forces aimed to destroy Republican Guard divisions so as to remove Saddam Hussein's regime. After the regime's collapse, the new mission statement required TF Ironhorse to clear the AO of NCF; to interdict the acquisition and proliferation of weapons; and to establish a secure, stable environment in northern Iraq. In this landscape, the Apache proved to be an effective weapons platform for reconnaissance, detection, and interdiction of NCF

During the evening of 1 May 2003, scouts and a UAV working under the 1st BCT observed and engaged paramilitary elements stealing crates of ammunition from an arms cache west of Tikrit. An aerial weapons team of Apaches arrived at the objective shortly thereafter, vectored to the target by 1st BCT command post staff officers who were watching live UAV-feed. The Apaches sealed off the NCF's avenue of escape, opened fire with 30 millimeter cannon, and turned the paramilitary's vehicle into a "hunk of twisted metal," leaving 14 dead.26

Attack helicopters were effective in blocking and interdicting fleeing paramilitaries during cordon and search operations, working within the ground BCT's concept of operation. On several occasions, aerial weapons teams proved instrumental in filling holes in the cordon along inaccessible exfiltration routes. To preempt and unhinge any NCF effort to attack the aviation brigade's base camp, AH-64s, integrated into combined-action teams comprising military police, tactical human intelligence teams, and Bradley ADA Linebackers, conducted raids, ruses, and feints in the 5-km area beyond the wire. In some instances, Apaches destroyed unmanned remnant air defense systems just outside the main operating base fence line to exhibit dissuasive and credible force. As a result, the enemy conducted no successful attacks against the Camp Speicher base cluster. A final but salient component of the rebirth of aviation close fires was a continuous relationship between attack helicopter companies and the ground BCT.

For the duration of the counter-NCF phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, one attack helicopter company remained under each ground brigade's OPCON. An aviation liaison officer (LNO) also remained in the command post of each brigade to plan and integrate close support. One LNO was a seasoned senior warrant officer, two were career course captains, and all were Apache-qualified aviators.

The LNOs were key players in anticipating missions and in integrating air and ground operations. Also, allocating one platoon per 12-hour mission cycle allowed the attack battalion to respond to contingencies 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in the three AOs. The relationship, training, and techniques that developed between the aviation brigade and the ground combat teams were essential preconditions for success and bore exponential improvements in air and ground integration. The only disadvantage of having three attack companies under an OPCON relationship with the brigades was that this left no Apaches for a tactical combat force (TCF) or reaction-force role. A potential remedy for this was to either embed a TCF team in each company or to rely on the corps attack regiment for the TCF. In such an expansive AO, maintaining one central and principal operating base was necessary for sustaining a high tempo.27

The Importance of Concentration

"Every lost battle is a principle of weakness and disorganization; and the first and immediate desideratum is to concentrate, and in concentration, to recover order, courage, and confidence." -Carl von Clausewitz28

"And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my strength to attack a fraction of his. There, I will be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike few at a selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straits." -Sun Tzu29

These quotes by two of the most renowned philosophers of war show the importance of concentration. The words of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu also contrast the distinctly Western and Eastern ways of war. Modern military history shows that the West and its military forces have generally dominated and monopolized the conventional paradigm of war, usually winning when the East or the South decided to fight according to this paradigm. The philosophies of military strategists Henri de Jomini, Clausewitz, and Russian general Alexandr A. Svechin are embedded in the cultures of these militaries. As a result, the West has embraced the direct use of military force, combining maneuver and firepower to mass combat power at a decisive point, which usually equates to the destruction or annihilation of an enemy force or army.

The problem is that the enemy U.S. forces are most likely to fight is one who has for centuries embraced a different philosophy of war. Potential adversaries are from Asia and the Near East--cultures that generally embrace an Eastern tradition of war. Moreover, the Eastern way of war, which usually stems from the philosophies of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung, is distinguished from the Western way of war by its reliance on indirectness, attrition, and perfidy. In other words, the Eastern way of war is inherently more asymmetric.

Employing attack helicopters in a close combat role where intransigent adversaries adopt asymmetric techniques is particularly germane for the U.S. military in its war against al-Qaeda. Since the 19th century, the United States has embraced the conventional paradigm and marginalized the unconventional one. After victories against Iraq in two conventional Persian Gulf wars, it is unlikely that another second-tier power will fight the United States according to its paradigm.

The implication for using attack helicopters in the future is evident; the U.S. military needs to cultivate the mindset, doctrine, and techniques that combine attack helicopters with small, ground-maneuver elements operating in a dispersed AO. Attack helicopters also should be able to concentrate small teams rapidly at the critical time and place to provide lethal fires.

Learning these lessons and techniques is important because asymmetric warfare is not ephemeral. The Army has historically viewed irregular warfare as a temporary anomaly. As a result, it has not done a stellar job of retaining asymmetric warfare techniques in its institutional memory. One expert on the history of the Army and guerrilla warfare feels guerrilla warfare is so incongruous to the natural methods and habits of a well-to-do society that the Army has tended to regard it as abnormal and to forget about it when possible. Each new experience with irregular warfare has required that the Army learn appropriate techniques all over again.30

NOTES

1. Daniel P. Bolger, Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 69.

2. U.S. Army, V Corps, "Attack Aviation Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom," unpublished and unclassified report, 2003, Camp Virginia, Kuwait, 1.

3. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2001).

4. Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted Warfare (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 65.

5. Joint Publication (JP), Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), 59.

6. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), III-9.

7. Joint Strategy Review (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), 2

8. Steven Metz, "Strategic Asymmetry," Military Review (July-August 2001): 24.

9. Max G. Manwaring, Internal War: Rethinking Problem and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), vii-viii.

10. The term "asymmetric conflict" first appears in 1974 in Andrew Mack, The Concept of Power and its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict (London: Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, 1974).

11. Metz, 25.

12. Once again, "inferior" connotes a weakness in conventional measures of military might, not necessarily in strategy, tactics, and warrior skills. Asymmetric conflict was also the norm during the Cold War and for most of U.S. history. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear escalation precluded a symmetric conflict between the two superpowers.

13. Napoleon Bonaparte, in Michael Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), 99.

14. B.H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), 365.

15. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Powers Lose Small Wars: the Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," in Power, Strategy, and Security: a World Politics Reader, ed., Klaus Knorr NOTES (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 138-39; Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans., Samual B. Griffith II (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 98; Liddell-Hart, 366.

16. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, book IV, trans., Helen Zimmern (1886) in Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (New Jersey: Franklin Electronic Bookman, 1998), 146.

17. Scott Canon, "Time to Study the Lessons Learned in War," Kansas City Star, 2 May 2003, 1; V Corps, 1; Neil Baumgardner, "V Corps Commander: Army 'Altered Use' of Apaches Following Failed Attacks," Defense Daily, 8 May 2003, 3.

18. V Corps, 2.

19. Baumgardner, 3; Rowan Scarborough, "General Tells How Cell Phone Foiled U.S. Attack in Iraq," The Washington Times, 8 May 2003, 13.

20. Scarborough, 13.

21. V Corps, 2; Baumgardner, 3.

22. Baumgardner, 3; Baumgardner, "Apache Longbow Battalion Destroyed Two Republican Guard Battalions During OIF," Defense Daily, 4; V Corps, 2.

23. Mao Tse-tung, 68.

24. Michael R. Gordon, "Between War and Peace," New York Times, 2 May 2003, 1.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Major John Novalis, 4th ID attack helicopter battalion Executive Officer, interview by author, 13 May 2003 Camp Speicher, Iraq; "Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Review," unpublished and unclassified report, 2003 Camp Speicher, Iraq, 5.

28. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed., Anatol Rapoport (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 361.

29. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans., Samual B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 98.

30. Russell F. Weigley, The History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1967), 161.
http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume1/september_2003/9_03_8.html

[WolverineBlue]

And friggin' ay right -- Task Force Ironhorse

Hooah!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

GO 4ID

[2RHPZ]

Anaconda: A war story

US soldiers recount 18 hours in one of the fiercest firefights of the Afghan war

By Ann Scott Tyson

A pale blue dawn broke over the snow-covered Shah-e Kot peaks as Sgt. 1st Class Thomas Abbott and his battalion from the 10th Mountain Division rode packed in Chinook helicopters to the battle zone. Many of the US troops, fresh-faced young recruits who'd never before seen combat, were, as some put it, "pumped."

For Sergeant Abbott, a 32-year-old father of four, former Army Ranger, and a veteran of conflicts such as the bloody Mogadishu firefight of 1993, the adrenaline rush felt all too familiar.

It was March 2, and what was about to unfold was the biggest US ground battle in the Afghanistan war, in which American infantrymen took on the foot soldiers of terrorism directly for the first time.

The operation, code-named Anaconda, aimed to seal off and destroy pockets of Al Qaeda and Taliban regrouped inside a 70-square-mile stretch of rugged mountain ridges and valleys. Friendly Afghan forces accompanied by US Green Berets were to attack from the north, driving the estimated 200 to 400 enemy fighters toward several US blocking positions in the south, manned by Army assault troops.

But within minutes after Abbott's chopper touched down in the valley, his unit's mission changed drastically. Dug into the surrounding ridges on the east and west was a heavily armed, fortified enemy force of well over 100 men that US military planners had not known was there. These fighters were later joined by Al Qaeda from the north, who repelled the Afghan forces and then moved south to fight the Americans.

This is the story of how Abbott and 85 other light infantrymen – aided by the US air arsenal – survived and, to a degree, succeeded in an 18-hour firefight that was as brutal as it was unexpected. Under attack at times from 360 degrees, running out of ammunition, with a third of its men wounded, the US force held its ground until most of the enemy were defeated. Through skill, stamina, and a small dip in terrain known as the "bowl," miraculously every US soldier lived.

Yet the lessons of the battle, based on interviews with more than 20 soldiers and officers who took part, are sobering. For the American fight that cold March day offers stark revelations about war planning and strategy: about troubling shortfalls of intelligence, and the cost – however necessary – of US military efforts to spare civilians. It underscores the importance of "boots on the ground" and the limits of antiseptic, push-button warfare from above – especially against an elusive terrorist force.

The struggle in the valley tells, too, of deeper things: of how a 21-year-old private feels getting shot at for the first time, and of the inner resolve of commanders who stave off panic. It's a story of the frustration of a young medic with too many wounded to care for when help is hours away. It's about fear overwhelmed by revenge, and good men learning to kill without regrets. It's about the elation of staying alive, and the uncommon beauty of helicopter blades spinning silver in the full moon light.

* * *

Moments after Abbott jogged out the back of the Chinook into the rocky, snow-patched valley at about 6 a.m., the yell burst out: "Incoming!"

Enemy rifle fire – sporadic at first, but rapidly building – shot down on the US troops from a fortified ridgeline partway up the mountainside on the east. Rounds also flew in from two dozen black-uniformed Al Qaeda, who appeared to the men like ants, climbing the ridge to the west.

Abbott and the rest of the 10th Mountain Division's Charlie Company took cover in shallow ditches and rises and began returning fire in both directions. To move faster, many dropped their 85-pound rucksacks stuffed with food, cold-weather gear, and extra ammunition – a decision they would later regret.

Battalion commander Lt. Col. Paul LaCamera, the 10th Mountain Division's senior officer on the ground and his top enlisted man, Command Sgt. Maj. Frank Grippe, took up position in the "bowl." The dip in the valley was so fortuitous that Sergeant Major Grippe later joked that Mother Nature must have put it there "because sometime young Americans were going to need it."

Still, Grippe realized his men were "in a very precarious position." Originally assigned to block major southern and eastern exit routes from the valley – code-named Heather and Ginger – they now faced a "nose-to-nose" battle with a large enemy contingent. Worse, the enemy manned well-concealed mountainside positions, while Grippe's men occupied the exposed low ground.

The consolation prize: They had found one of the biggest concentrations of Al Qaeda and Taliban in the Shah-e Kot Valley.

A few feet from Grippe, Capt. Scott Taylor, the battalion fire-support officer, began urgently radioing for Apache attack helicopters. The bespectacled young officer from Long Valley, N.J., was a 1996 Rutgers graduate in international environmental studies. Now he dealt with the landscape of war, directing artillery and close airstrikes.

Captain Taylor passed grid coordinates for targets to two Apache pilots, who within 20 minutes swooped in firing cannons on the ridge. They circled and were launching rockets at the hilltop when enemy bullets strafed the aircraft, forcing them to leave. An hour later, two more Apaches flew in. Taylor again directed them to targets, but before they fired a single shot, they, too, were repelled by ground-to-air missiles and small arms.

"Summit 4-0. This is Killer Spade 6," the pilot radioed, using Taylor's call sign. "We've taken small-arms fire and have to return to the FARP [Forward Area Refueling Point, known as 'Texaco'] to deal with it."

Taylor immediately radioed his higher-ups at the brigade command for guidance. The news was bad: Five out of six Apaches available that morning had been torn up by enemy groundfire. The choppers also lacked maneuverability in the high, thin air. There would be no Apache support the rest of the day.

Meanwhile, in the open valley floor, Pvt. 1st Class Chad Ryan and his crew were hoisting 40-pound, high-explosive rounds into the muzzle of a 120-mm mortar tube and firing at the eastern ridgeline.

The young gunner was new to combat but managed to stay focused, even as one buddy temporarily panicked and others looked wide-eyed.

"It didn't hit me as, 'Hey, I'm gonna die.' It was, 'Hey, I've been here before,' " he said.

Back in the small Mississippi River town of Sterling, Ill., Private Ryan's football coach had taught him to "practice how you play." When he joined the Army in 2000, he trained as if it were for real, too. "I took it as, 'It's my life. It's gonna save me one day,' and it did."

Ryan's crew shot off 16 rounds before AK-47 fire began tossing up dirt at their feet. When enemy mortar strikes started closing in, Abbott and others rushed out under direct fire and helped pull the big gun back. They had reached a small drainage ditch near a group of Abbott's men when, suddenly, the world disappeared in a flash and cloud of black.

Grippe looked over to where Abbott had been, and saw more than a dozen bodies motionless on the ground. An enemy mortar with a 60-yard burst radius had landed almost on top of them. "I figured we had four or five guys dead," Grippe said. But then a shadow staggered out of the smoke and debris.

Abbott, his right arm deeply lacerated, screamed at his men to get up and move before another mortar round struck. "If you don't get up, you are going to die!" he yelled. One soldier stared back blankly, slipping into shock. "Snap out of it!" Abbott shouted. He radioed for cover, and led the band of wounded as they hobbled and dashed 40 yards to the bowl.

As he lay in the dirt, unable to shoulder a weapon, Abbott felt defenseless. Worse, more than half of his platoon was wounded, and he blamed himself. His mind drifted to thoughts of his children, and his wife's parting plea: "Don't be a hero. Come back to us."

It was still morning.

* * *

As Abbott's unit dug in, word of its predicament began ricocheting around the US military headquarters at Bagram airfield 80 miles to the north. Inside a packed, noisy tent bristling with communications gear, US commanders and staff tracked the unfolding campaign.

"There's a hot LZ [landing zone]!" one of the US battle planners, Maj. Francesca Ziemba, rushed over to tell intelligence officers tracking the unfolding campaign.

Major Ziemba felt a twinge of horror as she and scores of other officers watched live video of the battlefield taken by unmanned Predator drones. What they saw on the 5-foot-wide screens and heard crackling over radio waves was in many ways shocking: The enemy was proving more numerous, determined, and entrenched in the craggy mountains of Shah-e Kot than expected.

For the headquarters staff of the 10th Mountain Division, including Ziemba and Gen. Frank "Buster" Hagenbeck, commander of Operation Anaconda, news of the men caught in enemy crossfire hit doubly hard.

"Those were our guys. It was personal," says Ziemba, a West Point graduate and veteran intelligence officer nicknamed "Ox." "I wanted to pick up a rifle and get on a helo and go out there. I think everyone felt that way."

The frustration was acute because Ziemba and other intelligence officers had been sleuthing out the enemy for weeks. Now, 86 American infantrymen were fighting for their lives, largely because US reconnaissance had failed to detect the enemy in the mountain ridges.

"There was nothing to tell us that they were there," says Ziemba, whose job was to anticipate enemy moves. US intelligence photos, listening devices, and spying had turned up no sign of Al Qaeda presence in the high ground. Analysts also believed the mountain hide-outs would be too cold for the enemy, given that even local shepherds waited out the winter in the villages below.

"Unfortunately, these guys were very good at hiding," says Chief Warrant Officer Jocelyn Baker, who was tracking the battle that day.

As she scanned three Predator screens, Officer Baker was also surprised by the sizable Al Qaeda and Taliban contingents, initially believed to be only small pockets located in and around civilian villages. "We are assuming they are civilians, but it turns out they are a whole lot of bad guys," says Baker.

In fact, the Americans may have been too cautious. Concerned about risking civilian lives, US commanders did not launch their usual heavy aerial bombardments to "soften up" the enemy before sending in ground troops. When friendly Afghan forces launched an assault from the north on the morning of March 2, they encountered no civilians. "Zero," says Col. John Mulholland, a Green Beret commander who helped lead the Afghans.

Instead, a large enemy force repulsed the Afghans and then turned south to face US troops, including Abbott's unit. Only later was it determined that the enemy had used cash and threats to drive civilians from the villages before the fighting.

Even worse, as Baker tracked enemy movements from inside the windowless intelligence tent, she was beginning to realize what Abbott and his men were already finding out on the ground: "They knew we were coming."

* * *

High on a snowy ridge, an Al Qaeda sniper was harassing the Americans. Through binoculars they spotted him, jeering and making obscene gestures. But every time they tried to shoot him, he slipped behind the rocks.

Until now, the men of the 10th Mountain Division – the first US conventional force in Afghanistan – had had few close encounters with the enemy. The Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners they came across at detention centers at Bagram and Mazar-e Sharif looked peaked and thin.

"They had bodies like little girls," recalls Charlie Company medic Eddie "Doc" Rivera, who took DNA samples from the detainees. Seeing their frail figures, he felt a mixture of anger and incredulity: "What were you even thinking, to challenge us?"

That day in the valley, though, the enemy stirred no pity. Wearing black tunics and black head wraps, they appeared to the American soldiers as "Ninjas." "These weren't the total third world country bums who were forced to fight," says Abbott. "They were probably the trainers."

The terrorist fighters had the advantage of a mountain stronghold riddled with caves and tunnels dug over decades. In the 1980s, Afghan mujahideen leader Nassrullah Mansour killed many Soviet troops who sought to capture the base that lies at the southern end of the Shah-e Kot Valley and intersects a major supply and escape route east to Pakistan. In a nearby valley, a Soviet commando battalion of 400 men was wiped out in one day in April 1986 after making a similar assault below fortified ridgelines.

This time, it was Mr. Mansour's son, Saif, who led the die-hard collection of Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants in making a stand against the Americans. After the fall of the Taliban regime last winter, hundreds of Arabs, Afghans, Chechens, and Uzbeks regrouped at the base, occupying the reinforced bunkers, mud-brick compounds, and caves complete with air vents and back exits.

Inside, they lived in rustic comfort in hideouts that appeared surreal to US troops who later searched the area. Entire skinned, smoked goats hung in kitchens, with bags of rice and cast-iron stoves for cooking and heat. They had punching bags, gym shoes, and exercise equipment. Copies of the Koran were common, as were Russian weapons manuals. Medical supplies, drugs, and even makeshift IVs stood ready for use. They had radios, cellphones, foreign passports, alarm clocks, and, of course, vast caches of weapons and ammunition.

Outside, some of the bunkers had 3-foot-thick stone walls, so strong that US antitank rockets bounced off, according to Staff Sgt. Del Rodriguez, who led a direct assault on one such enemy-held position.

Even US bombs and precision-guided missiles had limited effectiveness, as the fighting March 2 showed.

As the day wore on, Air Force controllers attached to Colonel LaCamera's battalion radioed for close airstrikes by B-52 bombers as well as "fast movers" such as F-16 fighter jets. The noise of the aircraft sent the enemy scurrying into their caves, giving the Americans an opportunity to reposition.

Still, pilots thousands of feet overhead had trouble landing bombs on cave openings hidden by the crags and shadows of the mountains. Once the aircraft left, enemy fire resumed.

Then, around 3 p.m., the airstrikes halted completely until nightfall. Seizing the opportunity, the well-stocked enemy began to pound the US troops with the most intense barrage of fire yet.

LaCamera's men were left to fight back with small arms: M4 rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers. For a time, they were aided by a small group of US and Australian Special Operations Forces on the western ridge above. Those forces ambushed a group of Al Qaeda there and also radioed warnings when the enemy on the east ridge pulled out its mortars. US mortars lay quiet. They were considered too vulnerable to enemy targeting after the attack on Ryan's tube wounded Abbott and his men.

Yet pinpointing the well-concealed enemy positions with small arms also proved hard. A natural camouflage of shrubs, rocks, and juniper trees blended together in the snow, obscuring enemy muzzle flashes and the backblast from rocket-propelled grenades. "They knew the nooks and crannies and where to hide," LaCamera says.

The thin mountain air grew colder. American casualties mounted. Some of the men used their bare hands to scrape 3-foot-deep troughs for the wounded out of the ocher soil, laying two or three injured men in each one. They had little food, water, or winter clothing and only one of four medical supply bags – the other three had been dropped in the valley.

Worse, ammunition was low. The US troops exhausted their supply of machine-gun rounds. Within hours, they risked running out completely.

The Al Qaeda had the fight they wanted, their chance to kill Americans, LaCamera thought. He and his men were determined to see them fail.

* * *

One young US private was knocked down by a round in the chest, but scrambled back up and returned fire, saved by his Kevlar body armor. Two others lay without cover in the valley floor, guarding the perimeter. For hours, Sgt. Jeffrey Grothause and his nine-man squad maneuvered in and around the 50-yard-wide bowl, holding off Al Qaeda and Taliban who came from the village of Marzak in the north and crept to within 30 yards of US forces.

Shrapnel later tore into his arm, but Sergeant Grothause still picked up his M4 rifle and shot off a dozen rounds to cover his men. "It's just your will. You see your guys out there, and you say, 'I'm not going to let those guys go solo,' " he says. "We kept going."

As American troops like Grothause rallied that day, no one was prouder of his "boys" than Grippe. With dark eyes and black hair shaved halfway up his head, the ex-paratrooper had spent most of his career in Army Ranger units that had to be ready to deploy within 18 hours. He had seen action in the Middle East, Panama, and Haiti. In the eyes of his men, the burly sergeant of Sicilian descent embodied the heart and soul of the moment.

"Hooyah! Let's get some fire over there!" Grippe yelled, grabbing an M203 grenade-launcher to get his men on target.

"Hooyah, this is what it's about, man!"

Nearby was Grippe's longtime Ranger comrade and commanding officer. The blond, barrel-chested LaCamera seemed Grippe's perfect complement. Tracking the battle and communicating with higher-ups, the cool, soft-spoken West Point graduate made the day's toughest decisions.

Yet while Grippe, LaCamera, and other veterans exuded resolve, combat novices like Grothause and medic "Doc" Rivera pulled through with sweat, grit, and a refusal to let one another down.

Again and again as the day wore on, Rivera heard the telltale "thwump" of a mortar blasting from the mountains and lunged to shield the wounded. Cradling their heads in his blood-spattered hands, he heard their quiet prayers and moans. Then, the 160-pound specialist from Ellenville, N.Y., breathing hard at the 8,500-foot elevation, used all his strength to try to move his hurting buddies to safety.

"They are all torn up from shrapnel, but they are digging their legs and fingers into the dirt trying to move," Rivera recalls. "I want to pick them up, but I can't. So I drag them."

Then another casualty would come in, and another. "Doc, it hurts so bad," one told him. "Doc, what's gonna happen to me?"

"We gotta get these casualties out!" the medic yelled. But hour after hour, the answer came back the same: "The LZ's [landing zone's] too hot!"

Rivera was scared, but he knew he had to be strong for his guys. When he needed comfort, he thought of his friend Steve, the short, balding New York City paramedic he'd worked with last summer as part of his Army training. While stationed at an airfield in Uzbekistan in November, Rivera learned that Steve had been killed at the World Trade Center.

"I thought about him. I said, 'Hey, this is for you, man. This is for everybody who didn't make it.' It boosted me. It opened a window."

As the cold deepened and dusk spread across the valley, the men anticipated the advantage nightfall would bring. "We own the night," Sgt. Maj. Robert Healy, a former Ranger instructor who handled battalion operations, told them. "We can see them. They can't see us."

Then about 6:30 p.m., from high above, came the faint whir of propellers from the slow and low-flying but lethal AC-130 "Spectre" gunship, a plane the military restricts to flying at night. An instant later, a blaze of 105-mm cannon fire strafed the mountain, eliciting cheers from the US troops. Using infrared sensors and radar, the gunship crew spotted and picked off groups of the enemy caught unawares, unloading most of its ammunition. "Papa Spectre took care of business," said Sergeant Healy.

The gunship's detailed thermal-imaging cameras also offered evidence of the size of the enemy contingent the Americans faced: Upon arrival, its crew detected 60 enemy dead already on the eastern ridgeline, and then killed 28 more, said Taylor, the fire-support officer on the ground. US commanders later estimated the enemy force in the 18-hour battle at 150 to 200.

Warned by the gunship of more enemy closing in, LaCamera knew he had to get his men out. He called for a massive bombardment of the ridgelines to the east and west of his troops' position. US headquarters also ordered the bombing of Marzak village, which had been declared a hostile area. "I want Marzak and those ridges to disappear," LaCamera said. In the US air barrage that followed, B-52 bombers dropped a string of 2,000-pound missiles that rocked the ground and lit the sky like a gigantic fireworks display.

Yet when a Black Hawk medivac helicopter approached at 8 p.m., it still met sporadic fire. It was nearly hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, but managed to land and evacuate the 12 most seriously wounded.

At 10:45 p.m., a second gunship circled in to provide cover, and finally, near midnight, two Chinooks flew in for the rest of the troops, huddled in the freezing darkness. The sight of the wide-bodied birds, silver in the moonlight, was to Rivera "like the gates of heaven opening."

With gear and rucksacks recovered from the valley jostling on their backs, the soldiers scrambled up a 10-foot embankment to the choppers and piled in.

Still, for Abbott and others sitting confined and immobile before liftoff, it was one of the most nerve-wracking moments of the day. A hit now, they knew, would mean carnage. After all they'd been through, they "didn't want to die sitting on a helicopter," Taylor said.

"Lay down some suppressive fire!" Grippe yelled to the Chinook gunner, who seemed unfazed by the danger. For the first time that day, the ridgeline above remained silent.

As the chopper rose, Abbott's whole body tensed as he gauged the rise in elevation. "100 feet, OK, nothing yet ... 200 feet...."

They cleared the valley. Healy, who had been holding his breath, burst out a sigh of relief.

Rivera looked at his buddies' dazed faces. "Yeah, we made it," he thought. "That was my lottery, right there," he said. "I won the lottery."

Epilogue

A cool spring breeze blows down through the hardwood forest of the Adirondack Mountains and across the grassy hills surrounding Fort Drum, N.Y. There, inside a packed sports arena festooned with US and state flags, LaCamera, Grippe, and dozens of their men stand at attention in the center of a basketball court as a military band plays the national anthem.

One by one, as their names are called, the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division step forward.

"Lt. Col. Paul LaCamera ... the Silver Star ... for gallantry in action."

For his tough, clearheaded decisions on March 2, LaCamera earns the highest medal awarded to US soldiers so far in the antiterror war. Grippe and Healy receive the Bronze Star With Valor for "heroic achievement." Taylor and two dozen others are decorated with Bronze Stars, and Ryan with an Army Commendation Medal. Purple Hearts are awarded to Abbott and other wounded.

"Welcome home," booms Army Brig. Gen. Thomas Goedkoop from the podium. "And from a grateful nation, thank you."

The standing-room-only crowd erupts with applause from hundreds of comrades in fatigues, shouts from children, and tears from wives cradling infants. Many of the babies were born during the six-month Afghanistan deployment and are seeing their fathers for the first time. "I thought I'd never get to be a father," says Sgt. Randel Perez, who earned a Bronze Star With Valor for his bravery March 2. His son, Ramiro, was born Dec. 23.

Indeed, for the soldiers who hastily shipped out in October – unable to tell their families where they were going or when they'd return – it's a euphoric homecoming. A time, at last, to let their guard down.

"I said a couple of 'Our Fathers' and 'Hail Marys,' " LaCamera says, reflecting on the spiritual side of soldiering. "There's no atheist in a foxhole."

Grippe jokes about how the shrapnel lodged in his right hamstring will set off metal detectors for the rest of his life. He shrugs off his Bronze Star, saying, "It's really no big deal."

Maybe not to him. But at Shah-e Kot, the 10th Mountain Division was tested in the first battle of a campaign with huge stakes.

Amid fierce resistance, what was originally planned as a 72-hour operation stretched out for two weeks. An additional 200 to 300 US troops were flown in, as were Marine Cobra helicopters. In the end, US-led forces swept through the base and killed hundreds of enemy fighters, although an unknown number escaped, according to US military officials.

Grippe and his men were vital to bringing down an enemy stronghold, but the slightest loss of will, slip in judgment, or adverse turn could have cost scores of lives. Indeed, on March 4, just north of where Grippe and his men fought, seven US commandos on a reconnaissance mission died in mountain ambushes.

"What message would we send to the rest of the world on the seriousness of our war on terrorism if we lost against a terrorist organization?" Grippe asks. "An 18-hour battle can affect a whole country."

[penna]

great post