Submarines Versus Aircraft Carriers: Part One

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

Submarines Versus Aircraft Carriers: Part One

by Martin Sieff
Washington DC (UPI) Apr 09, 2008

"The bigger they are the harder they fall" is a principle that doesn't just work in heavyweight boxing; it also applies to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers faced with swarms of attacking diesel-powered submarines.

The myth that gigantic, 80,000 ton nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carriers are unsinkable is not believed by any serious naval officer or analyst, but it has become a deeply ingrained assumption in the American public consciousness, including among most senators, congressmen and their staffs on Capitol Hill.

This is in large part because neither the United States nor Britain has lost a major fleet aircraft carrier in action since the first half of World War II. During World War II, the United States did not lose a single one of its more than 40 fast Essex-class aircraft carriers to enemy action.

This was in part due to the extraordinarily inept and passive combat operations record of the Japanese submarine force, in striking contrast to the magnificent gallantry and operational skill of Japan's aircraft carrier-based striking arm, and the cruisers and destroyers of the Imperial Navy's surface forces.

But the main reason was that Essex-class carriers were fast and Japanese submarines operating in the Pacific Ocean were slow. The USS Yorktown at the Battle of Midway in 1942 and the British aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Eagle operating off the coasts of Europe in 1941 and 1942 were both sunk by torpedoes fired by German U-boats.

The fact that no U.S. aircraft carrier has been seriously threatened in combat in any of the wars the United States has fought since 1945 has added to the mystique of the carrier admirals. They continue to dominate the Navy, greatly influencing its procurement decisions to this day. And arguably, in the 21st century, the political power and prestige of the carrier admirals is greater than ever.

The presumptive Republican nominee for president of the United States this year is Sen. John McCain of Arizona, a heroic carrier combat pilot during the Vietnam War and the son and grandson of U.S. Navy admirals. His grandfather in fact commanded one of the U.S. Navy's main carrier strike forces against Imperial Japan in the closing months of World War II.

However, the real reason none of America's magnificent aircraft carriers has faced serious threat over the past 60 years is for the very good reason that the United States has never fought any war during all that time in which they faced any enemy with significant naval forces.

North Korea and the People's Republic of China did not have them during the Korean War of 1950-53, and North Vietnam did not have them during the Vietnam War, where major U.S. ground forces were committed from 1965 to 1972. In neither of the Gulf wars -- in 1991 and 2003 -- did Iraq have significant naval or anti-ship air launched weapons systems with which it could threaten U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean.

Through the Cold War, the only naval force in the world capable of potentially sinking U.S. aircraft carriers by hostile action was the Soviet navy from the late-1960s on. Even today, that threat is not widely understood, yet it greatly influenced Chinese naval planners who have developed 21st century asymmetrical responses to threaten U.S. carrier battle groups currently operating in the Western Pacific Ocean.

earlier related report
How aircraft carriers became vulnerable

Not a single Essex-class U.S. fleet aircraft carrier was sunk by enemy submarines in World War II. But America's nuclear aircraft carriers have been sitting ducks for fast-attack submarines for the past 40 years. No one in the American or British public realized in 1940 that battleships had become sitting ducks for aircraft-carrier attacks. But in fact that capability had been demonstrated 19 years earlier when U.S. biplanes commanded by the legendary Gen. Billy Mitchell sank the former Imperial German Navy battleship Ostfriesland in a trial attack off Hampton Roads, Va., on July 21, 1921.

One of the eyewitnesses of that event was Capt. Osami Nagano of the Imperial Japanese Navy who went on to command the aircraft carrier strike that sank eight U.S. battleships at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7. 1941.

Similarly, neither U.S. policymakers nor the American public realize the vulnerability of giant aircraft carriers to torpedo attacks from modern fast submarines was demonstrated in 1968 when a fast Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine matched the USS Enterprise at top speed in the Pacific Ocean. That moment, vividly and thoroughly discussed in Patrick Tyler's "Running Critical," was as epochal a moment in the shift of the strategic balance at sea as Billy Mitchell's sinking of Ostfriesland.

Nor was this a freak, or isolated incident. Since 1968, U.S. submarines have routinely scored disabling hits on American carriers in U.S. Navy war games, and the hits, Navy insiders know, are routinely unacknowledged in the official assessments of the maneuvers.

The Russian Navy is now only a shadow of its former self, but China has emerged as the would-be challenger to U.S. naval supremacy in the 21st century. China has experienced repeated problems with building its ambitious and expensive nuclear submarines. These problems probably explain in large part China's reluctance to use its enormous shipbuilding capacity to try and build giant aircraft carriers to match the U.S. leviathans.

Instead, China is investing shrewdly in a "string of pearls" strategy: It is using its great financial clout to buy influence in nations suspicious of the United States and India across around and across the Indian Ocean, in order to be able to construct its own naval and air bases there. These bases have been built, are being built, or are being contemplated in Myanmar, in the Andaman Islands, in Mauritius, in Pakistan and even on the eastern coast of Africa.

Such bases would allow China to maintain or rapidly deploy fleets of combat aircraft and home-base their diesel-powered submarines, based on Russia's excellent Kilo-class at them.

Diesel powered, Kilo-type subs cannot stay at see indefinitely and they lack the range of the nuclear-powered subs of the U.S. British and Russian navies of sailing anywhere in the world without refueling and still having full operational capabilities. But given a base a few hundred or even a thousand miles form their operational areas they are formidable weapons and China has invested big in them. In 2006, China built 14 diesel-powered subs while the United States built only a single nuclear one.

The Chinese strategy in the event of any maritime war with the United States, most especially over Taiwan, in the foreseeable future, would clearly, therefore, be to use swarms of Kilo-type subs to overwhelm the anti-submarine warfare -- ASW -- defenses of U.S. carrier battle groups to torpedo the giant U.S carriers. Alternately, they could choose to surface briefly and even risk destruction in order to fire their formidable Hai Ying -- Sea Eagle -- HY2 anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles, copied with Moscow's approval from the Russian Moskit 3M80 Moskit -- NATO designation SS-N-22 Sunburn. These weapons were expressly designed to kill U.S. aircraft carriers.

Kilo subs would be no match for state-of-the-art, nuclear-powered U.S. undersea attack subs one on one. But they would not be deployed that way. Just as Nazi Kriegsmarine U-Boat -- wolf packs -- operating on the surface -- sought to overwhelm Allied convoys escort ships by their sheer weight of numbers during the long Battle of the Atlantic ion World War II, Chinese diesel subs, remaining underwater, would seek to overwhelm a carrier battle group's defenses by their numbers as well. The much smaller size of China;s diesel submarines -- as they do not have to carry any nuclear propulsion plant -- automatically gives them a great advantage in this regard.

Next: Why carriers need armor

SpaceWar.com Link (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Submarines_Versus_Aircraft_Carriers_Part_One_999.html)

[stonecutter]

German submarine at the Battle of Midway? What?....

[lightfire]

Obviously it meant german submarines vs british aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Eagle, and japanese subs vs USS Jorktown.

[DesktopArmor]

How would armor protect them from supersonic impacts and torpedoes going of below the keel? Unless they're talk MBT thickness, I can't see armor helping all too much.

[TheKiwi]

Sounds like SUBWAR wants more money for submarines. Yes, a carrier (or any other ship) can be sunk by a submarine, but the sub has to pass through several layers of protection to get to the carrier, or sit tight in one spot and hope that a carrier just happens to float past nearby.

Doing that sort of thing during an exercise when you're not likely to be fired upon is one thing. During wartime it's another altogether. During the Falklands, the Brit's agressively prosecuted anything that resembled a sub contact, droping numerous torps and depth charges (I'm sure a whale or two ended up with a torp up the arse).


No one in the American or British public realized in 1940 that battleships had become sitting ducks for aircraft-carrier attacks. But in fact that capability had been demonstrated 19 years earlier when U.S. biplanes commanded by the legendary Gen. Billy Mitchell sank the former Imperial German Navy battleship Ostfriesland in a trial attack off Hampton Roads, Va., on July 21, 1921.

Billy Mitchell sunk stationary battleships without any form of damage control on board, not exactly an advertisement for 'sitting ducks', but a great way of trying to get more money for the army airforce.

[TechPriest]

Obviously it meant german submarines vs british aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Eagle, and japanese subs vs USS Jorktown.
And american submarine vs IJN Shinino?

[Mackie]

How many US submarines are used for coast defense? And how many are planned for offensive strategies?

[Dragonscript]

Another reason Japanese submarines didn't sink American carriers is that they were deployed differently, Japan had a different strategic vision for its sub force than what America had.

By itself, a carrier is a sitting duck but that is why you have the large task force built around it.

[wilhelm]

The US hasn't tangled with any decent navy since the Second World War anyway. I'm sure, as the article states, that the USN is aware of these issues, even if the politicians and general public isn't.

[Beiruty]

Sink a nuclear aircraft carrier, and you will get 1 bad ass nuclear tipped "gift" over your head.

[bd popeye]

Sink a nuclear aircraft carrier, and you will get 1 bad ass nuclear tipped "gift" over your head.6 Hours Ago 07:41 AM

Can I get an amen??:roll:


The fact that no U.S. aircraft carrier has been seriously threatened in combat in any of the wars the United States has fought since 1945 has added to the mystique of the carrier admirals. They continue to dominate the Navy, greatly influencing its procurement decisions to this day. And arguably, in the 21st century, the political power and prestige of the carrier admirals is greater than ever.


True enough...

Ever wonder why the North Vietnamese Air Force never attacked a single USN carrier? Or the Iraqis, or Lybians or the Chinese during the Korean war?

They know that retaliation would be swift and very severe. Also a carrier is always on the move and not easy to find. Carriers are protected by their Air wing & Battle Groups of destroyers & cruisers. Also an LA class submarine always shadows a carrier battle group. The subs job is to ward off other subs.


In 2006, China built 14 diesel-powered subs while the United States built only a single nuclear one.


True enough..but the PLAN(Chinese Navy) does not spend much time at sea training as does the USN. Those subs spend a lot of time in port. Lots. Their nuke subs spend even less time at sea.


Since 1968, U.S. submarines have routinely scored disabling hits on American carriers in U.S. Navy war games, and the hits, Navy insiders know, are routinely unacknowledged in the official assessments of the maneuvers.


War games are just that. Games.:roll: Often times the opposing forces are restricted in the use of certain systems. Once back in '81 while assigned to a VS squadron on board a now retired CV our squadron was not permitted to be used in an ASW excersise during a "war game".


Russian Moskit 3M80 Moskit -- NATO designation SS-N-22 Sunburn. These weapons were expressly designed to kill U.S. aircraft carriers.


Yep that's what it's designed for. Sure is. The Sunburn packs a tremendous punch. It has,however, a very short range. Only 65nm. That weapon has to be launched from a ship or aircraft. And that aircraft has to get within to 65nm(Natuical miles) launch that bad boy. The USN air defence and ECM will reek havoc on those Sunburns and their delivery systems.. Do you really think the E2-C hovering overhead will let that ship or aircraft carring that missile be unnoticed?? Nope. It will relay that info to the battle groups ships and aircraft and that Sunburn will be toast.

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

I feel I should say at the outset that I don't necessarily agree with the assertions the author is making.
Just a repost that hopefully will appeal to the general forum membership.


Submarines Versus Aircraft Carriers Part Two

by Martin Sieff
Washington, April 10, 2008


More than 40 years ago, there was a British heavyweight boxing champion called Henry Cooper who could do everything -- except take a punch.

Cooper was big, powerful, fast and had a dream punch himself that could and did devastate world champs. But he also had a glass jaw. And whenever he was up against any real world-class powerhouse, they blew him away.

That is the problem facing the gigantic nuclear-powered aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy in any future war against China over Taiwan or if they have to operate dangerously close-in against Iran in any future Persian Gulf conflict. For while Russia and China, as we have previously noted in this series and other columns, have specialized in creating asymmetrical weapon systems designed to disable and destroy U.S. super-carriers, the carriers themselves are far more vulnerable to shell and missile attack than battleships were 65 years ago in World War II.

That is because well-built American, British, German, Italian and Japanese battleships carried thousands of tons of the most low tech but effective defensive naval weapons system ever devised -- steel armor. That didn't make them invincible. The 80,000-ton Yamato and Musashi, the two biggest, most powerful, most heavily armored and armed dreadnoughts ever built, proved helpless against the blizzard of U.S. attacking aircraft and submarines that made funeral pyres of them both in 1944 and 1945. But it still took a lot of punishment to sink, especially from above surface weapons.

However, as respected defense analyst David Crane pointed out in an important article in Defense Review in November 2006, U.S. nuclear-powered super-carriers today don't carry anything lie that armor. They rely on their own speed, the size of their protective support groups and their ability to stay far out in the ocean, launching their aircraft to strike from long distance, to keep them out of harms way.

But that may not always be enough. As Crane noted, in October 2006, a Chinese diesel-powered submarine was able to sneak up on a U.S. carrier task force and surface within torpedo and missile firing range of it before being detected.

Ironically, U.S. super-carriers are now far more vulnerable tot his kind of attack than they were a few years ago because, as Crane also warned, the U.S. Navy no longer uses its trusty old Lockheed Martin S-3B Viking aircraft in their traditional Anti-Submarine Warfare -- ASW -- role to protect the gigantic ships.

Crane therefore concluded, "Frankly it makes one wonder how the U.S. Navy plans to protect our carrier battle groups against modern quiet attack submarines armed with standard torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, and the new breed of supercavitating torpedoes like the Russian Shkval-2. Given the current lack of U.S. ASW/ASuW capability, we don't see how the U.S. Navy can.".

Crane wasn't alone in coming to this conclusion as the outspoken and deliberately outrageous -- but also very knowledgeable -- war blogger Gary Brecher notes in his new book, "The War Nerd," in 2002, U.S. Gen. Paul Van Riper hypothetically sank U.S. super-carriers while playing the role of Iran in war games, using only the coastal vessels and extremely small warships Iran currently has, but recognizing they would be equipped with state-of-the-art Russian and Chinese anti-ship missiles.

However, as was the case when the USS Cole was attacked by al-Qaida in Aden harbor on Oct. 12, 2000, Van Riper also showed that even small boats carrying hundreds or thousands of pounds of explosives can prove deadly. Had the Cole not been in harbor when the attack occurred, it would have been sunk.

As if all that wasn't enough, even the principle of evolution in weapons systems has been working against America's super-carriers:

Next: Why the attack outstrips U.S. aircraft carriers' defense.

SpaceWar.com Link (http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Submarines_Versus_Aircraft_Carriers_Part_Two_999.html)

[TR1]

Yep that's what it's designed for. Sure is. The Sunburn packs a tremendous punch. It has,however, a very short range. Only 65nm. That weapon has to be launched from a ship or aircraft. And that aircraft has to get within to 65nm(Natuical miles) launch that bad boy. The USN air defence and ECM will reek havoc on those Sunburns and their delivery systems.. Do you really think the E2-C hovering overhead will let that ship or aircraft carring that missile be unnoticed?? Nope. It will relay that info to the battle groups ships and aircraft and that Sunburn will be toast.



The initial versions of the Moskit had a range of 120 kilometers. Longer range variants have ranges in excess of 200km.

[SineJustitia]

Is the USN still hunting that single Swedish sub in the Pacific?

Yes, it's war games, but it does show the threat posed by conventional submarines.

And of course, several Dutch submarines "sank" US carriers in exercise, but I think we're not allowed to play anymore, exactly because of that. :)

[Midav]

Is the USN still hunting that single Swedish sub in the Pacific?

Yes, it's war games, but it does show the threat posed by conventional submarines.

And of course, several *insert country name here* submarines "sank" US carriers in exercise, but I think we're not allowed to play anymore, exactly because of that. :)

Just fixed your post. If I could only get a dollar every time I heard that p-)

No doubt subs are a danger and carriers have been sunk in games. We have all heard the stories. But as Big Daddy said, games aren't always realistic.

Have met too many people in the military that got pissed off because they were either restricted or told to be nice hosts/guests and let the other team win.

If the Göteborg story is 100% accurate (the Swedish sub the USN is exercising against and as was mentioned) then I hope we develop a means to detect and defeat this threat.

[SineJustitia]

Just fixed your post. If I could only get a dollar every time I heard that p-)

Ask for your Euro's; you'll get richer p-)

[NavyTimes]

Van Riper also showed that even small boats carrying hundreds or thousands of pounds of explosives can prove deadly. Had the Cole not been in harbor when the attack occurred, it would have been sunk.

While you can definetly argue that the Cole attack showed a gap in the readiness against such threats, it is also true that if the Cole had not been in harbor when the attack occured the attack would probably have failed.

So the argument is somewhat flawed.

[LETMEIN]

Can I get an amen??:roll:



True enough...

Ever wonder why the North Vietnamese Air Force never attacked a single USN carrier? Or the Iraqis, or Lybians or the Chinese during the Korean war?

They know that retaliation would be swift and very severe. Also a carrier is always on the move and not easy to find. Carriers are protected by their Air wing & Battle Groups of destroyers & cruisers. Also an LA class submarine always shadows a carrier battle group. The subs job is to ward off other subs.



True enough..but the PLAN(Chinese Navy) does not spend much time at sea training as does the USN. Those subs spend a lot of time in port. Lots. Their nuke subs spend even less time at sea.



War games are just that. Games.:roll: Often times the opposing forces are restricted in the use of certain systems. Once back in '81 while assigned to a VS squadron on board a now retired CV our squadron was not permitted to be used in an ASW excersise during a "war game".



Yep that's what it's designed for. Sure is. The Sunburn packs a tremendous punch. It has,however, a very short range. Only 65nm. That weapon has to be launched from a ship or aircraft. And that aircraft has to get within to 65nm(Natuical miles) launch that bad boy. The USN air defence and ECM will reek havoc on those Sunburns and their delivery systems.. Do you really think the E2-C hovering overhead will let that ship or aircraft carring that missile be unnoticed?? Nope. It will relay that info to the battle groups ships and aircraft and that Sunburn will be toast.
I can assure you there is NO defence against Sunburn, as of now (2008)

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

I can assure you there is NO defence against Sunburn, as of now (2008)

Not the SM-2 Standard or the ESSM?

ESSM has been recently enhanced, IIRC.


I wouldn't think the Phalanx would be much protection.
SeaRAM might be.

[OMON]

lets test it out on my cost, ill buy an aircraft carrier and a submarine.

ill pay in zimbabwean dollars

[bd popeye]

The initial versions of the Moskit had a range of 120 kilometers. Longer range variants have ranges in excess of 200km.

You are correct..my bad..


Cruise Speed731 mps (Mach 2.20) -Length9.7 m-Max Range250 km (135 nm) -Max Weight4,000 kg (8,818 lb) -Min Range10,000 m (32,808 ft) -Top Speed996 mps (Mach 3) -Warhead300 kg (661 lb) -Width2.1 m

A very dangerous weapon ..if the "Bad Guys" can get it air borne...


I can assure you there is NO defence against Sunburn, as of now (2008)

Really?? Are you discounting US ablity at ECM?? If the US ECM is working as it should be the Sunburn won't even have a chance to be launched.



Originally Posted by Lt-Col A. Tack http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?p=3172015#post3172015)
Van Riper also showed that even small boats carrying hundreds or thousands of pounds of explosives can prove deadly. Had the Cole not been in harbor when the attack occurred, it would have been sunk.


While there was a lack of readiness at this time,Nov 2000, The USN has drastically changed is security proceedures(called Force Protection) in port. Both while deployed and inport or while transiting.

[angry cow]

Attacking a CVN would be like attacking an SSBN. It it extremely costly and difficult, takes an entire fleets worth of effort that can't be used for any other task, but it is possible. Success would be a Pyhrric Victory at best though, since attacking such a vitally important strategic asset would result in anything and everything up to and possibly including nuclear retaliation.

An Aircraft Carrier also has over 5000 people on it. The American people would be screaming bloody murder, and things would head off towards WWIII real fast.

[Robsto]

Really?? Are you discounting US ablity at ECM?? If the US ECM is working as it should be the Sunburn won't even have a chance to be launched.



How would ECM stop the Sunburn being launched?

Id also like to comment that as far as i know Sunburn is not fitted to Kilo class, the fitted Missile is SSN-27. Sunburn is far to large to be launched vertically.

[TR1]

Sunbrun is indeed not mounted on Kilos. A more typical mount on export subs is the Klub family of missiles.

[bd popeye]

How would ECM stop the Sunburn being launched?

Id also like to comment that as far as i know Sunburn is not fitted to Kilo class, the fitted Missile is SSN-27. Sunburn is far to large to be launched vertically.

ECM, Electronic Counter Measures, can shut down or confuse most electronics. There by causing said electroinics to go hay wire.

Ask the Lybians & Iraqis that tried to fly their aircraft during US attacks how well their aircraft avionics worked.

[Ought Six]

Subs can be very fast underwater, or they can be very quiet underwater. They cannot be both at the same time. For this reason, speed is only really useful to transit quickly to a sub's hunting area, and even then it is revealing itself to system like SOSUS. So a diesel electric sub or nuclear attack sup would have to place itself in the path of the carrier and sit waiting ambush to be effective. It could not persue the group, catch up and attempt to launch an attack without being detected long before it got into range. It would have to be in place before the lead ASW elements of the carrier group reached that location. This means the enemy must be able to predict the movement of the carrier group in order to set up a viable ambush. Of course, German wolfpacks did exactly that with Allied convoys during WWII, but the convoy routes were well established.

As for the cavitating torpedo, it cannot seek targets while moving at speed, nor is it designed to do so. It is also not designed to directly strike a ship's hull and detonate a large warhead, but instead travels to its preprogrammed location and then releases a light homing torpedo. If that is the case, then it is not much of a threat to a carrier, is it? How much damage could one or two light homing torpedoes do to a Nimitz-class supercarrier? Do supercarriers not have torpedo blisters on the sides of their hulls? And is it not true that nuclear supercarriers are fast enough to outrun many torpedoes?

Please correct me here if any of my statments are incorrect.

[LETMEIN]

Really?? Are you discounting US ablity at ECM?? If the US ECM is working as it should be the Sunburn won't even have a chance to be launched.




Yes I am, please show us how,and even if Sunburns were to be stopped, (Which I don't believe) Yakhont which came out in 04 WILL, and Shkval would defenatly.

[TR1]

Yakhont was developed well before 04....

[Dinges]

We have to make a distinction. Carrier ops are blue water. With the relative legs available on any carrier born flight in a both attack/close support can be taxing on not only the carrier but also carrier group units.

It can expose the Carrier group subs to brown water rules - where there are no thermals to play with. And brown water is the playground of the diesel-electric/AIP sub. And O they are so quiet.

With DE/AIP subs substantially cheaper than nuclear vessels , opens the argument of numbers- ie swarming as in wolfpacks.

[Dinges]

Think of it. In the last ten odd years operations have been close in regional , not continental.

[HappyHeady]

But in fact that capability had been demonstrated 19 years earlier when U.S. biplanes commanded by the legendary Gen. Billy Mitchell sank the former Imperial German Navy battleship Ostfriesland in a trial attack off Hampton Roads, Va., on July 21, 1921.


He should mention, that it took three attacks to damage the Ostfriesland in a way, that it would sink. With damage control on board the ship probably would be saved.

And at least one attack was performed by Army planes. So this event can´t be a prove for the ability of carrier planes.

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

Another series of carrier related articles. I don't necessarily every assertion made by the author.

Defense Focus: Carrier strategy -- Part 1

Published: March 25, 2008 at 7:06 PM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, March 25 (UPI) -- No other navy has anything comparable to the dozen or so aircraft carrier battle groups that the U.S. Navy continuously operates around the world. Almost all of these carriers are powered by nuclear reactors enabling them to stay at sea and operational as long as is necessary. Each one carries a complement of 80 to 90 jet-powered combat aircraft, the best of their kind in the world.

Not a single other navy on Earth has anything comparable to this enormous and technologically magnificent strategic system of projecting U.S. air power around the world. Britain operates a small carrier and is planning to build two more. India is planning also to expand to a three aircraft carrier combat force. But both the British and Indian carriers will be far smaller than the U.S. ones and not remotely capable of carrying anything like the same complement of aircraft.

Russia currently has one aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, but as Russian naval analysts publicly admit, the last time it left port it shipped so much water it nearly sank and had to return to its home port in a hurry.

Russia is also currently virtually rebuilding another of its old Soviet-era aircraft carriers, the Admiral Gorshkov, to be operated by the Indian navy as part of its projected three carrier force, but the conversion work, at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, has been rife with problems, cost overruns and timetable delays. The problems cost the Sevmash managing director his job last year, and this year Russia has been forced to renegotiate the contract with New Delhi.

The Indians have opted to stick with the Admiral Gorshkov rather than, according to some reports, accept a U.S. offer of taking over the old non-nuclear U.S. aircraft carrier the USS Kitty Hawk. Clearly Russia, therefore, does not have the capability to build or reliably operate any kind of large aircraft carrier battle force to project its power around the world according to classic naval dominance theory.

The problems of building, maintaining and operating a significant aircraft carrier force are therefore clearly enormous and only the United States has currently mastered them on the grand strategic scale. France for many years operated the aircraft carrier Clemenceau, but it was beset throughout its life with major engine and other technical problems.

It is fair to say, therefore, that only Britain -- which has been a significant aircraft carrier power for 90 years and indeed invented the very concept at the end of World War I -- has even shown any ability so far to reliably operate far smaller, non-nuclear aircraft carriers on a reliable and ongoing basis.

The woes that the French and the Russians in particular have experienced with their aircraft carriers over the past quarter-century continue to have their impact on the strategic procurement decisions of major powers in the 21st century. Japan has so far shown no interest in building aircraft carriers to safeguard its crucial oil supply routes from the Middle East, even though Japan had one of the most impressive and brilliant records in building and operating aircraft carriers the world has ever seen during World War II. Only the U.S. Navy with a vastly larger force surpassed the operational capabilities of the aircraft carriers of Imperial Japan's Combined Fleet.

Aircraft carriers and their crews and aircraft are enormously expensive to operate. Retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, the former head of the National Security Agency, has famously claimed that the U.S. Army could pay for, equip and operate an entire combat division for the cost of operating a single U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle group.

What does the United States get for the scores of billions of dollars it costs to build, maintain and operate its aircraft carrier battle groups? A very great deal.

--

Next: Projecting power with carrier battle groups

UPI.com Link (http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Industry/Analysis/2008/03/25/defense_focus_carrier_strategy_--_part_1/4610/)

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

Defense Focus: Carrier strategy -- Part 2

Published: March 26, 2008 at 6:31 PM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, March 26 (UPI) -- Throughout the 19th century, whenever British interests were threatened around the world, the British Empire would famously "send a gunboat" and usually the threat, not so much of the little vessel itself as of the enormous naval power that lay behind it, would be enough to bring recalcitrant local leaders to their knees.

Over the past 60 years the United States has often enjoyed the same result from sending not a lowly gunboat, but a gigantic nuclear-powered aircraft carrier as a show of strength.

It is not often recognized how often the sending of an aircraft carrier in a timely manner has defused international crises or led to them being resolved along lines satisfactory to the United States and its allies.

In 1990 the first Bush administration overlooked clear warning signs from Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein that he was planning to conquer Kuwait, which successive Iraqi governments had coveted for generations as their so-called long-lost 19th province.

In fact, Kuwait was an effectively independent emirate for more than 150 year before Iraq was created. A sitting Kuwaiti premier even issued congratulations to the 13 American colonies when they issued their Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776.

When Saddam conquered Kuwait in July 1990, it took the assembling of a gigantic 700,000-strong, U.S.-led and dominated land army to push him out of it again in the 1991 Gulf War. However, 29 years earlier, the British Royal Navy successfully deterred an earlier Iraqi dictator, Abd al-Karim Qassem, from attacking Kuwait by simply sending a light fleet aircraft carrier, HMS Bulwark, carrying a small British Commando force, to protect the emirate.

In 1995 and 1996 the Clinton administration sent U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups into the Strait of Taiwan between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland as a warning to the People's Republic of China that it was prepared to defend Taiwan.

However, U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups are not just about deterrence or bluff. Their deterrent effect is great because they have repeatedly displayed their real military power as well.

Carrier-based U.S. air power played a major force in assuring U.S. strategic air supremacy throughout the 1950-53 Korean War and the period of major U.S. direct participation in the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1972. Whenever U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups are directed to recurring trouble spots around the world, whether they occur around the Middle East, off North Korea or in the Taiwan Strait, governments, diplomats and military leaders sit up and take notice. They know that, to paraphrase U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, one of the great visionaries and architects of U.S. global sea power, a very large and formidable stick is being waved at them.

In terms of confirming American military credibility and influence around the world, and as a boost for U.S. diplomatic efforts, aircraft carrier battle groups, for all their great cost, have prevented wars and helped contain wars that were being fought. They have also played a huge role in guaranteeing the U.S. government's freedom of action, especially in considering the use of military force and air power around the world.

For unlike land-based air force assets, carrier-based air power is not dependent on the continuing good will of the governments of host countries, and therefore it is not at the whim of short-term fluctuations of fortune in the political process that can lead local governments to refuse to allow the U.S. Air Force to use air bases in their countries for politically controversial or sensitive operations.

This most famously happened when several major NATO allies refused to allow U.S. C-5A Galaxy heavy transports to land for refueling on their territories when the aircraft were rushing urgently needed weapons and ammunition to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or war of Ramadan.

However, for all their great and continuing value in projecting U.S. power around the world, in deterring some wars and helping win others, aircraft carriers are far from invulnerable. Major fields of naval war technology have been devoted over the past 40 years to developing asymmetrical ways to destroy them.

--

Next: The vulnerabilities of modern aircraft carriers

UPI.com Link (http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Industry/Analysis/2008/03/26/defense_focus_carrier_strategy_--_part_2/8999/)

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

Defense Focus: Carrier strategy -- Part 3

Published: March 28, 2008 at 12:04 PM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, March 28 (UPI) -- Modern U.S. aircraft carriers resemble old British battlecruisers in their combination of far-reaching lethal hitting power and surprising physical vulnerability.

As we noted in previous parts of this series, America's dozen or a nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and their supporting battle groups have successfully projected U.S. power around the world for more than 40 years. They have successfully deterred wars and provided massive striking power during conflicts that had to be fought. The very threat that they are being sent to a particular theater has often produced remarkable diplomatic responses from governments in the region in question that would not otherwise have been forthcoming.

The enormous size of U.S. nuclear super-carriers -- at least three times the length of a football field with a tonnage about double that of the Titanic -- also makes them ideal containers to move ground forces and their heavy equipment, if required, across the oceans. And they are also overlooked but invaluable and unique tools for building American goodwill around the world and furthering the goals of "soft" diplomacy by their capabilities to bring medical supplies, rescue facilities and general relief to regions afflicted by natural disasters like the coasts devastated by the Indian Ocean tsunami tragedy.

The very size of U.S. carriers adds to their impressive and deterrent effect. In this, they strikingly parallel the huge British battlecruisers that were built at Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher's order before World War I and that became the main potent symbols of continuing British naval sea power and global supremacy in the two decades between the world wars.

Those battlecruisers were tactically the aircraft carriers of their day. They were technological marvels that could sail as fast as cruisers while being as large and powerful as battleships. They carried heavy guns ranging from 12-inch -- 305-mm -- to 15-inch -- 381-mm -- in caliber. They were designed to be "big bullies" on the ocean that could hunt down and destroy German raiders and cruiser squadrons. They proved their ability to do this at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914 when two of them -- HMS Inflexible and HMS Invincible -- blew four out of five cruisers of German Admiral Graf Maximilian Von Spee's light cruisers out of the water, avenging the previous sinking of two old British heavy cruisers at the hands of Von Spee's ships at the Battle of Coronel.

British battlecruisers, like modern American aircraft carriers, performed superbly in doing what they were originally designed to do. But they were quickly elevated to more ambitious roles where they failed disastrously. The huge, imposing size of the British battlecruisers and their imposing guns tempted British admirals to put them in the main line of battle of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow in order to use them against the German High Seas Fleet.

But when the two great navies finally clashed at Jutland in 1916, three British battlecruisers were destroyed by long-range plunging shells from German battleships in only a few minutes. All three of them blew up, killing virtually all their crews instantaneously --3,000 men in all. These catastrophes spurred Admiral David Beatty, the commander of the British battlecruiser squadron, and not usually the sharpest wit on the planet, to utter the memorable words, "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today."

What made the British battlecruisers so vulnerable was the same reason they could sail so fast and carry such big guns at the same time: They carried very little steel armor protection. That was why the heavy shellfire from the German battleships was able to penetrate their powder magazines and blow them up so quickly. Heavily armored, if slower, battleships in both world wars proved capable of taking far more punishment while staying afloat, completing their missions and protecting the lives of most of their crews.

The key to survival for British battlecruisers, therefore, in both world wars, was to stay out of range of the big guns of enemy warships. The British at first failed to learn this lesson in World War II, which is why HMS Hood, the largest warship in the world for decades and the pride of the Royal Navy, was sunk in only a few minutes of gunfire from the German battleship Bismarck in the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland in May 1941. By contrast, the Bismarck endured vastly greater punishment a few days later from the British battleships Rodney and King George V before finally sinking.

The same lessons about vulnerabilities and how to avoid them that the British learned at such great cost in both world wars apply in the 21st century to U.S. nuclear-powered super-carriers, as their commanders and top U.S. admirals are well aware.

--

Next: How to protect a super-carrier

UPI.com Link (http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Industry/Analysis/2008/03/28/defense_focus_carrier_strategy_--_part_3/1814/)

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

Defense Focus: Carrier strategy -- Part 4

Published: March 31, 2008 at 12:22 PM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, March 31 (UPI) -- Watching the PBS documentary about life on the USS Nimitz, it is easy to imagine that America's nuclear-powered super aircraft carriers are unsinkable. But no ship is unsinkable, and when it comes to aircraft carriers, a lot of the best naval warfare submarine, torpedo and ballistic missile designers in the world have worked long and hard for decades to come up with new ways to sink them.

The first problem that modern super aircraft carriers face is that they are big -- exceptionally, extraordinarily big. If a single Nimitz-class carrier was stood on its end it would be a 90-floor building, more than 900 feet high. What that means is that aircraft carriers make dream targets. Anything that big can be hit, and in terms of combat firepower, anything that can be hit can be killed.

There is a widely held popular assumption that even if you could pump one or two torpedoes or two or three sea-launched missiles into a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier they are so huge, so tough and have so many fail-safe systems built into them that they would keep on operating regardless.

That may even prove to be the case, but the simple fact is that no one has ever fired a few torpedoes into a nuclear aircraft carrier-size hull or blasted it with a few missiles to be sure. And all the computer simulations in the world are based on assumptions -- usually comfortable ones -- that cannot begin to approximate the far more complex variables of real-world field testing.

Second, aircraft carriers are volatile, dangerous environments filled with high-octane gasoline, devastating conventional ordnance and -- at their heart -- nuclear reactors.

Nor does an aircraft carrier's nuclear reactor have to be directly hit in order to destroy it or cause a catastrophic meltdown. Any damage that shredded enough coolant pipes or, worse, pumps in the reactors coolant circulating system could set such a dangerous sequence of events in motion.

The Russian-built and designed Sunburn -- known by the Chinese as the Hai Ying or Sea Eagle HY2 -- in particular is designed to be a U.S. carrier killer. It can fly at Mach 2.5, or two and half times the speed of sound -- around 1,700 miles per hour carrying an almost 500-pound warhead. And it can deliver a tactical nuclear weapon.

Writing in Defense Review on Nov. 20, 2006, respected defense analyst David Crane also noted a report in Aviation Week that China was also "developing a new high-speed cruise missile called Anjian -- 'Dark Sword.'"

"From the picture we've seen of it, Anjian also looks very stealthy, i.e., it looks like it utilizes stealth technology. If China's already perfected this item, it would be another weapon that our Navy can't combat," Crane warned.

Crane's warnings appear justified. U.S. nuclear aircraft carriers, for all their size, resemble battlecruisers more than battleships in their high speed, great offensive armaments and most of all lack of armor plate protection.

Armor plate went out of fashion after World War II among naval designers around the world, and it has never come back into fashion. However, the nuclear reactors that power U.S. super carriers would be the modern equivalent of the Hood's inadequately protected ammunition, or powder magazines. And the new Russian-designed supersonic anti-ship missiles would be the equivalent of the Bismarck's 15-inch naval guns.

--

Next: Next-generation anti-aircraft carrier missiles

UPI.com Link (http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Industry/Analysis/2008/03/31/defense_focus_carrier_strategy_--_part_4/1413/)

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

Defense Focus: Carrier strategy -- Part 5

Published: April 1, 2008 at 11:08 AM

By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, April 1 (UPI) -- Russian and Chinese naval weapons designers know they lack the resources and the technology to match the awesome power of U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups ship for ship and plane for plane. So instead, for decades, they have opted for asymmetrical solutions to the problem of killing U.S. super carriers. And they have come up with some lethal weapons.

Russian military systems designers look to be able to produce large numbers of weapons based on relatively simple designs that are cost-effective and robust on the battlefield. And when confronted with U.S. weapons systems that they cannot match directly like stealth bombers or nuclear-powered super aircraft carriers, they look for asymmetrical solutions that enable them to use their own areas of expertise.

Therefore, although Russia has still to demonstrate it can successfully build and operate a modern, 21st century-era large aircraft carrier, it leads the world in designing and producing relatively cheap missile systems designed to "kill" such carriers at scores, and even hundreds of miles distance. The U.S. arsenal has no weapons to compare with the Russian-built Moskit 3M80 -- NATO designation SS-N-22 Sunburn -- ramjet-powered cruise missile or the new, even more advanced SS-N-27 Sizzler.

These weapons fly two and a half times faster than U.S. ones. American cruise missiles are subsonic, but Russian-made ones can fly at well over Mach 2, or more than twice the speed of sound -- with speeds estimated at 1,500 mph to 1,700 mph at close to ground level.

Russia has sold the technology to build the Moskit to China, which manufactures it as the Hai Ying or Sea Eagle HY2. It can carry an almost 500-pound warhead, and it can deliver a tactical nuclear weapon. The threat of the Hai Ying is so great that it has effectively barred operational access to the Taiwan Strait to U.S. aircraft carriers in time of high tension. China has also supplied the Hai Ying to Iran.

It is striking that four-star Adm. William Fox Fallon, who has just resigned as head of U.S. Central Command, has expressed his caution and reluctance about going to war with Iran. Fallon is the U.S. Navy's leading expert, and therefore probably the top authority in the world, about using aircraft carrier-based air power to strike land-based targets. His previous position was running Pacific Command with great distinction, and that theater includes China and Taiwan.

Fallon's caution is clearly based in part on the fact that U.S. carrier battle groups would have to be operated with great discretion and skill to protect them from the threat of Iran's Sunburns.

The threat that the Moskit SS-N-22 Sunburn -- and now its younger more advanced sister, the SS-N-27 Sizzler -- pose to U.S. aircraft carriers is very similar to the one that German battleships' 15-inch, or 381mm, plunging shell-fire fired from long range posed to British battlecruisers in World War II. The Bismarck, as previously noted in this series, sank the legendary and enormous, but only lightly armored, HMS Hood with a single long-range shell that detonated its powder magazine.

Respected analyst David Crane, writing in Defense Review in November 2006, concluded bleakly, "Bottom line, our aircraft carriers are vulnerable against the latest Russian and Chinese torpedo and missile tech, and with the current U.S. naval defense philosophy, that situation isn't likely to change anytime soon."

It is difficult to disagree with this prognosis.

UPI.com Link (http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Industry/Analysis/2008/04/01/defense_focus_carrier_strategy_--_part_5/9757/)

[TR1]

I would worry more about Yakhont (for carrier-busting)...

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

I would worry more about Yakhont (for carrier-busting)...

Why so, sir?

(My AShM knowledge is woefully inadequate)

Actually, I thought the author spent quite a lot of time drawing historic parallels, and not enough on technology and procedures.

Could have been shortened to a couple of articles.

[TR1]

Well The advantage of the Klub over the Yakhont/BrahMos is its versitility, as it can be employed by both surace ships and submarines against land, surface, and submarine targets. The ones that are relevant for anti-carrier use are the anti-ship versions, one with a supersnic final stage, the other without. The supersonic-stage missile has a range of 200 km, the entirely subsonic one 300 km.

Compare to the Yakhont/BrahMos, which has supersonic speeds throughout the entire 300km+ range. Warheads are about similar, but Yakhont is about 1.5 times heavier= hits harder. It is also reportedly armored. It is being actively marketed right now, so while more potent anti-carrier missiles do exist (Granit) BrahMos is most likely to be encountered.

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

Well The advantage of the Klub over the Yakhont/BrahMos is its versitility, as it can be employed by both surace ships and submarines against land, surface, and submarine targets. The ones that are relevant for anti-carrier use are the anti-ship versions, one with a supersnic final stage, the other without. The supersonic-stage missile has a range of 200 km, the entirely subsonic one 300 km.

Compare to the Yakhont/BrahMos, which has supersonic speeds throughout the entire 300km+ range. Warheads are about similar, but Yakhont is about 1.5 times heavier= hits harder. It is also reportedly armored. It is being actively marketed right now, so while more potent anti-carrier missiles do exist (Granit) BrahMos is most likely to be encountered.

Thank you, sir! Probably won't help my sleep :)

Hopefully we're never on the receiving end!

[TR1]

hehe, well BarhMos will most likely not make it into Chinese service, so no worries there. Klub is rumored to be in Chinese use, with their Kilo submarines, but no info on what versions etc. The Chinese of course also have Moskit on their new Sovermmeny destoyers.

[Lt-Col A. Tack]

hehe, well BarhMos will most likely not make it into Chinese service, so no worries there. Klub is rumored to be in Chinese use, with their Kilo submarines, but no info on what versions etc. The Chinese of course also have Moskit on their new Sovermmeny destoyers.

Diesel subs...also not comforting.

More ASW drills for everyone :)

[starman]

Another reason Japanese submarines didn't sink American carriers

They got the Wasp, and twice torpedoed Saratoga. I think on both occasions the Japanese submariners could've sunk it but goofed and only damaged it. Btw they also got CVE Liscome Bay in '43.




is that they were deployed differently, Japan had a different strategic vision for its sub force than what America had.

In fact the IJN subs were designed to assist the battle fleet, which should, in theory, have increased carrier sinkings.