The Katyn Forrest Massacre and Aerial Photos

[catdat]

Book Review:
God's Eye: Aerial Photography and the Katyn Forest Massacre
By Frank Fox. West Chester, PA: West Chester University Press, 1999. 136 pages.

A number of police departments in the United States have created ‘cold-case squads’ to investigate unsolved crimes that are years or even decades old. To ‘clear’ old cases, detectives often use new methods such as DNA analysis and other modern forensic techniques to analyze data that was collected but not comprehensible when the crimes were committed. Professor Fox’s intriguing book is about an historical ‘cold case’ that took more than 50 years to clear.



The crime in question was the cold-blooded murder of some 4,500 Polish officers and soldiers whose bodies were discovered in April 1943 in the Katyn Forest, located 12 miles west of the Russian city of Smolensk. The hero of Fox’s book is a self-taught photo-interpreter of professional caliber named Waclaw Godziemba-Maliszewski. The data collected at the time of the crime were aerial reconnaissance photographs taken by the German Luftwaffe, which were seized, classified, and stored in the “evidence room” of the US National Archives until they were declassified in 1979. The methods used to finally solve the crime were modern photo interpretation and photogrammetry.

German occupation forces stumbled onto mass graves at Katyn in April 1943. Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels charged the Soviets with mass murder, hoping to exploit the grisly discovery to shatter the Anglo-American-Soviet wartime alliance. The Germans exhumed many of the corpses and brought in an international team of forensic experts and other observers to substantiate the Soviet atrocity. The plan backfired. All of the forensic experts were from Nazi-occupied countries, with the exception of one pathologist from neutral Switzerland. Stalin blamed the Germans for the massacres, and London and Washington accepted his version of the story as the truth. As time went on, most historians in the West concluded that the Soviets were to blame, since what little evidence there was suggested that the Poles were killed while in Soviet, not German, captivity. Nevertheless, doubts persisted for decades.



God’s Eye is part history and part biography. The historical part tells the story of Katyn and other killing fields where more than 20,000 Polish officers, soldiers, border guards, police, and other officials, as well as ordinary citizens, were executed during World War II. The narrative stretches from 1940 to the present, tracking successive investigations that uncovered the truth bit by bit. The biographical part of Fox’s book focuses on Maliszewski’s indefatigable efforts to identify execution and burial sites, establish Soviet culpability, and pressure Warsaw and Moscow to complete a full official investigation.

http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/graphics/pKatyn.jpg

Caught in the act: A 1944 Luftwaffe photograph captured a Soviet bulldozer excavating mass graves in the Katyn Forest in preparation for moving the corpses to another site.



Maliszewski, who was born in Scotland in 1948, developed an interest in Katyn early in life when he learned that a relative had been among the victims. Interest turned into obsession, however, when he discovered that the solution to the crime might lie in aerial reconnaissance photographs that the Germans themselves had taken of Smolensk and the surrounding area. While doing research at the US National Archives, Maliszewski came across an intriguing article from the CIA’s in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence. The author, a respected CIA photo interpreter, had used the German film footage to analyze the physical characteristics of Katyn, identify burial sites, and draw inferences regarding German versus Soviet culpability.1 Maliszewski had a hunch that additional study of the Luftwaffe imagery would yield further insights.

From 1941 to 1944, the Luftwaffe flew 17 sorties in the Smolensk area, some of which included the Katyn Forest. There, recorded on film, were “snapshots” of the area taken before, during, and after the German occupation. In one series of photographs taken in April 1944, discovered by Poirer and reexamined by Maliszewski, the German cameras caught the Soviets removing bodies from mass graves and bulldozing the ground to cover up evidence of the crime. Maliszewski later found more burial sites using US intelligence satellite imagery and up-to-date maps based on satellite imagery that were provided through the good offices of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Carter, who was sympathetic to the project.

Fox points out that Maliszewski’s research and his struggle to bring his findings to the attention of Polish officials and scholars were crucial to persuading the Polish government to reexamine the World War II tragedies. As a result, Katyn erupted as an issue in Polish-Soviet relations in 1990. In October of that year, Mikhail Gorbachev, under pressure from Warsaw and from his own advisers, revealed part, but not all, of the truth about Katyn. He pinned the blame on Stalin’s chief henchman, Lavrenty Beria, and Soviet military intelligence. It took two more years, the collapse of Soviet power, and a bitter rivalry between Gorbachev and his successor, Boris Yeltsin, for the whole truth to emerge. In 1992, Yeltsin released records from the Communist Party’s “special archive” that revealed that Stalin and five other members of the Politburo had approved the killings on Beria’s recommendation.2

Readers may not be surprised by Soviet and later Russian stonewalling, but they may be shocked to learn that prominent figures in post-communist Poland also impeded Maliszewski’s efforts to locate the final resting places of the murdered Poles and force a full and complete disclosure of the truth. Promises were made but not kept, funding for further investigation was offered but never materialized. Some Polish researchers expropriated Maliszewski’s findings and published them without attribution. When he finally succeeded in publishing his painstaking research in a prestigious Warsaw University scientific journal, the editor censored some of the more damning details.

In God’s Eye, Fox gives due credit to other historians who helped to establish the truth about Katyn. One was Professor Janusz Zawodny, the doyen of Katyn historians, whose 1962 book, Death in the Forest, was the first major exposé of the Polish tragedy. Another was Dr. Simon Schochet, a Polish-Jewish historian whose research revealed that several hundred of the Katyn victims were Jewish. Establishing the presence of Jewish victims illuminates the complexity of the Katyn story. Goebbels reportedly hesitated at first to expose the massacre when he learned that a number of the victims were Polish Jews. And some historians have attempted to portray Katyn as a “Jewish crime” perpetrated by “Jewish-Bolsheviks” against ethnic Poles.



Despite all the “hard” evidence that is now available, the Katyn tragedy continues to reverberate in Russia and Poland and in Russo-Polish relations. In 2000, the Polish government, with Russian and Ukrainian cooperation, dedicated military cemeteries and memorials at Katyn, as well as at Mednoye and Kharkiv, two other sites where Soviet executions occurred. The chairman of the Russian Duma recently said that this had “closed a chapter of a shared past that was a source of conflicts and served as a pretext for many to evoke tension in our relations.”3

Maybe so. But Russia has yet to formally apologize, and the Duma has refused to give the case legal standing so that the families of the victims can claim compensation. The head of the Association of Katyn Families recently charged that Warsaw itself is dragging its feet on demanding a complete investigation of the murders and punishment of the perpetrators who are still alive. Katyn, it seems, is a wound that will take more than one generation to heal.

God’s Eye: Aerial Photography and the Katyn Forest Massacre provides an eminently readable, detailed information base against which to gauge the continuing tensions between Russia and Poland over the Katyn atrocities.


Footnotes:

1 See Robert G. Poirer, “The Katyn Enigma: New Evidence in a 40-year-old Riddle,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 25, Spring 1981, pp. 53-63.

2 Russia’s revelations do not account for all of the probable Polish deaths at Soviet hands; the actual number will never be known. A 5 March 1940 Politburo memorandum signed by Stalin and five other leaders recommended executing 14,700 Polish officers, soldiers, civil servants, landowners, and others being held in Soviet camps and 11,000 more being held in captivity in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland. A KGB report dated 3 March 1959 stated that “21,857 Polish officers, gendarmes, police, settlers, and others” had been killed on official orders in 1940. See Dimitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1998), pp. 148, 220. The latter number does not include some 90,000 Polish officers and soldiers captured in 1939 who have never been accounted for or the estimated 1.5 to 2 million Poles deported to Soviet Central Asia and Siberia, many of whom died in transit or after arriving in the USSR.

3 Yinnadiy Syclzcznyov, Interview, ‘There are no barriers between us.” Przeglad, 9 April 2001, p. 7

[2RHPZ]

Polish officials mark the 65th anniversary of Katyn massacre

WARSAW, Poland: Poland's president and prime minister laid wreaths Saturday to mark the 65th anniversary of the massacre of some 22,000 Polish military officers and intellectuals by the Soviets in the Katyn Forest.

Several hundred people attended the ceremony at Warsaw's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, where President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Marek Belka both laid wreaths of red and white flowers.

Members of parliament, the Roman Catholic Church and the Katyn Committee, an organization of relatives of those killed, also paid homage to the victims.

"I carry this tragedy in my heart for my entire life since my closest family was murdered in Katyn'' said Jerzy Kluza, 83, whose two uncles were killed in Katyn.

The 21,768 Polish military officers, intellectuals and priests were taken prisoner when the Soviet Union invaded Poland at the start of World War II. They were executed in April and May 1940 by the Soviet secret police in and around the forest near the city of Katyn, in what was then western Soviet Union.

Archive material shows the order for killing the Polish officers was signed March 5, 1940, by Soviet leader Josef Stalin, among others.

Russia admitted in 1990 that Stalin ordered the killings but Russia's top military prosecutor said last month that an investigation had been closed after concluding that the massacre did not constitute genocide, and the criminal case had been dropped.

The memory of the massacre remains a strong irritant in Polish-Russian relations, and Polish lawmakers have called for Moscow to classify the killings as genocide and bring the remaining perpetrators of the so-called Katyn massacre to justice.--AP

Link (http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/4/16/latest/20050416203333&sec=Latest)

RIP to all victims of Stalin dictature ...

[Oddball]

The British Foreign Office and the Katyn Massacre

Introduction (http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1049114090872)
The Butler Memorandum and other documents (http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1049114135104)

http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/BeriaLetter.jpg


First page of Beria's 5 March, 1940 letter to Stalin recommending the liquidation of the Polish officers and other influential Poles (Stalin's signature is underlined).

[WolverineBlue]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54997-2005Apr14.html

Even in this gallery of mega-rogues, Joseph Stalin stands apart. Although second to his imitator Mao Zedong in the absolute numbers of the compatriots killed (shot, tortured to death in prisons, starved in villages, murdered in concentration camps) and to Pol Pot in the proportion of the country's population exterminated, Stalin may be unmatched, at least in modern times, in the number of people his policies affected -- in his impact on the contemporary world.

[perdurabo]

there where other places like Starobielsk, Ostaszkow, Miednoje, we know about 20 000 deaths of Polish officers, goverment guys, science or even railway workers. And Russia still dosent want to reavil their archives. :fork:

[Marmot1]

there where other places like Starobielsk, Ostaszkow, Miednoje, we know about 20 000 deaths of Polish officers, goverment guys, science or even railway workers. And Russia still dosent want to reavil their archives. :fork:


Some 15000 are still missing... one member of my familly is buried somewhere over there in mass grave...

[perdurabo]

there where other places like Starobielsk, Ostaszkow, Miednoje, we know about 20 000 deaths of Polish officers, goverment guys, science or even railway workers. And Russia still dosent want to reavil their archives. :fork:


Some 15000 are still missing... one member of my familly is buried somewhere over there in mass grave...
my grandgrandpa is buried somwhere there too and he was only train director not soldier :(

[BadKarma26]

what a waste...RIP

[2RHPZ]

THE KATYN MASSACRE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE AS
A PUBLIC AND HISTORICAL ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1940-1993

Link (http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/wwii/special.studies/katyn.massacre/katynlrc.txt)

[Kitsune]

One has one thing to give to the Soviets. Unlike the Germans, what they did to the Poles that they did first on to themselves. In the years 1937/1938 the Stalin's Soviet Union led a veritable war against the Red Army. The overall victims of this purge may go into the hundreds of thousands, but most interstingly, the chances to be taken by the NKVD, to be executed or to vanish into the gulag increased the higher the rank of the soldier was. About 50.000 of around 100.000 active officers of the Red Army fell victim to this purge. The casualty rate among generals was nearly 95%. (In early 1938 Hitler purged the Wehrmacht in Germany. During this 16 generals were dismissed, more than 40 transferred to another post. None was imprisoned, executed or killed. Different style of ruling, I guess.)
Anyway, nearly all of the Soviet military leadership of WWII earned their posts and rapid advancements to Stalin's purging (this influenced the Red Army leadership long after the war, even to the Gorbachev era). Most notable exception is Zhukov, who survived. (Stalin tried to get rid of him after WWII, however. Fallen out of favor Zhukov very rapidly became a non-person. Even as early as 1948 Pravda was able to commemorate the "liberation" of Berlin without even mentioning his name).
Psychologically it is interesting how the Red Army itself endured the purges. There was no attempt of an uprising, no criticism. It was accepted as if heaven had done it.

With this backround information in mind it may be more understandable why there has never been an apology from the Soviet Union or Russia. And why there most probably never will be one.

[Lokos]

Probably not one where the Katyn Massacre is termed a 'genocide'. Because, by that criteria, the Soviet Union committed genocide against every nationality within the state. There would be too many implications associated with such an apology.

Lokos

[Drako]

Probably not one where the Katyn Massacre is termed a 'genocide'. Because, by that criteria, the Soviet Union committed genocide against every nationality within the state. There would be too many implications associated with such an apology.

Lokos

We want people responsible for that sentenced nothing more. Forced apology is worthless.

[Kilgor]

Dont hold your breath. The germans have at least come to their senses with their past, Russians never will.

Any mention of the horrid past will bring the usual responses of "russia bashing" or "american or german lies"

Credible people like beevor who speak of the mass rapes, human wave tactics, murderous commisars are made out to be liers and nazi sympthasiers (which is just bull****)

[Lokos]

Kilgor:

Beevor used a single, solitary German General Practitioner from Berlin who took a guess and said '2 million rapes' - and Beevor accepted that as fact, signed, sealed and delivered.

Use a less sensationalist, journalistic source, if you'll please.

And the Soviet Union executed some ~7,500 soldiers for rape and associated crimes in the immediate post-war period.

Just FYI.

Lokos

[Lokos]

As for human wave tactics:

Forbidden by General Order from mid-1942 onwards. In 1941, when they happened, they happened during attempts to break out of encirclements, as the troops had next to no ammunition left.

Anyone who speaks of 'human wave tactics' from late 1942 onwards doesn't know a damned thing about the RKKA.

As for Commissars:

Following the Sevastopol debacle (and the subsequent Mekhlis issue) Commissars took very much a backseat to officers. They no longer had to co-sign orders, and their place in units became that of 'morale officers', there to indoctrinate soldiers, as well as to provide counselling, put together entertainment packages etc.

You need, desperately, to have a look at some material with a smidgeon of Russian sourcing. All you've been reading so far, it seems, is guesswork by people whose main interest is not in propagating truth, but in propagating so called 'pleasant fictions'.

Lokos

[RGRBOX]

Damn... sad, but interesting story...

[Mr.K]

so the most credible picture of the russians in WW2 is a huge wave of guys , pants down with hardons pushed to front by communist/jewish (depends who's telling this "credible" story) commisars who are well fed and have infinite ammo and the need to shoot people in the back because they are murderous.

I'm sure my post will make it into US history books about WW2. rofl

[Drako]

Anyone who speaks of 'human wave tactics' from late 1942 onwards doesn't know a damned thing about the RKKA.

It doesn't change that Russian soldiers were often send for certain death in large numbers.

[Lokos]

So were American/British/German soldiers.

Attrition rates were horrible for every unit of every side participating in frontline combat.

One US division lost ~190% of its strength (that's right, had to basically be replaced twice over) in a few months of fighting.

A typical Soviet division (by 1944 they usually had between two and a half and four thousand men) had to be replaced every two months (if it participated in active combat).

Lokos

[Kilgor]

The US and British soldiers at least didnt have guns pointed to the back of their heads with the threat of execution and the imprisionment of family members.

Argue all you want Lokos, but stalin made it very clear in his one step back order that groups were to be formed behind the first line of attack to execute "cowards". If you cant even accept what is handed down from stalin as evidence then your truely beyond rational thought.

"b) Form 3 to 5 well-armed guards (barrage) units (zagradotryads), deploy them in the rear of unstable divisions and oblige them to execute panic-mongers and cowards at site in case of panic and chaotic retreat, thus giving faithful soldiers a chance to do their duty before the Motherland"

It doesnt get more factual than this. Argueing over it is about the same level as neo nazi holocaust denier. Even the germans used to round up and shoot "Cowards" when the war was on their soil and times were desparate. Both iron fisted dictatorships had many things in common.

As for the whole mass rape issue, this was touched on by the excellent world at war series, which was made in the 70's. Well before beevor wrote stalingrad. For many educated ww2 readers, he was just confirming the issue.

[Lokos]

Argue all you want Lokos, but stalin made it very clear in his one step back order that groups were to be formed behind the first line of attack to execute "cowards". If you cant even accept what is handed down from stalin as evidence then your truely beyond rational thought.

"b) Form 3 to 5 well-armed guards (barrage) units (zagradotryads), deploy them in the rear of unstable divisions and oblige them to execute panic-mongers and cowards at site in case of panic and chaotic retreat, thus giving faithful soldiers a chance to do their duty before the Motherland"

It doesnt get more factual than this. Argueing over it is about the same level as neo nazi holocaust denier. Even the germans used to round up and shoot "Cowards" when the war was on their soil and times were desparate. Both iron fisted dictatorships had many things in common.

Do you even know how many executions of Soviet soldiers there were by the NKVD?

Here's a $10 that says you haven't a damned clue.

Did the deep recon units also need 'guns at their backs' to make them inflitrate up to twenty miles into the German rear and come back with valuable intel?

Did those Soviet tank crews have NKVD tanks aiming at their rear hull at all times?

Did Soviet airmen have NKVD fighters to fear if they looked a little 'shaky'?

You don't even have a damned clue about how the RKKA operated, let alone about its military justice system.

Doesn't get more factual than what? Stalin said 'Not one step back!'. Do you think no steps back were taken? Stalin said a lot of things that were pure fantasy. He didn't dictate small unit composition to either the NKVD or the RKKA (as you allege with that '3 to 5 well armed guards' rubbish). He did NOT dictate strategic - let alone operational - conduct after late 1941.

Stalin's rhetoric was just that.

What happened in the field, meanwhile, seems to be something Mr. Beevor doesn't like to discuss. It would confuse his casual readers too much.


As for the whole mass rape issue, this was touched on by the excellent world at war series, which was made in the 70's. Well before beevor wrote stalingrad. For many educated ww2 readers, he was just confirming the issue.

Excuse me, Kilgor. I specialized in the WW2 military history of the Soviet Union at Uni. I'd say that makes me a fairly 'educated WW2 [reader]'. Mr. Beevor is not authorative. Neither is the World At War documentary. Neither Mr. Beevor or the WaW doco engaged with primary source materials - i.e. Soviet administrative reports from post-War occupied territories, or Soviet data from the war itself.

All they have is hearsay, estimation and guesswork. That is the sum of their knowledge on the subject.

Mr. Beevor, furthermore, has an agenda. He wishes to portray the Soviets in a particular light and the Germans in another. He is a journalist at heart, and understands the literary techniques necessary to accomplish this task.

I point you, one last time, to professional historians such as John Erickson, David Glantz and Stephen Wheatcroft. These are acknowledged as the foremost Western authorities on the Soviet Union of WW2. They have done what Mr. Beevor did not; they engaged with primary Soviet materials - and have found them to be quite accurate.

On the other hand, don't bother. Bask in what knowledge you possess and console yourself that it is good and whole. Historiography has moved on from the pleasant fictions you call 'truths'.

Lokos

[Rumsfailed]

Barrier units (zagradotryads) in the red army.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smersh

(see the part "Activity in WW2")

[Lokos]

Smersh was also used to maintain military discipline in the Red Army by means of zagradotryads(заградотряды), or barrier forces, that were supposed to shoot down the Soviet troops in the cases of retreat.

Emphasis is mine.

Whoever wrote the entry on Wikipedia has no data on actual execution rates by SMERSH/NKVD blocking detachments.

Lokos

[Drako]

Smersh was also used to maintain military discipline in the Red Army by means of zagradotryads(заградотряды), or barrier forces, that were supposed to shoot down the Soviet troops in the cases of retreat.

Emphasis is mine.

Whoever wrote the entry on Wikipedia has no data on actual execution rates by SMERSH/NKVD blocking detachments.

Lokos

Ask any soldier fighting in the soviet army if he would come back to his unit after retreating from the battlefield.

[Kilgor]

Ask any soldier fighting in the soviet army if he would come back to his unit after retreating from the battlefield.

Even soviet soldiers liberated from POW camps were sent back to the gulags because of stalins constant mistrust of anyone who had been in contact with german's.

Another one of the lovely policies of the motherland.

Lokos, I know how many people were shot according to my "sources" of course that figure would be alot higher than the post ww2 soviet revisionist history.

[Lokos]

Lokos, I know how many people were shot according to my "sources" of course that figure would be alot higher than the post ww2 soviet revisionist history.

Let's hear them. I'll give you a medal if the source(s) is/are anything but hearsay and ridiculous anti-Soviet fairytales. Meanwhile, the official records of the NKVD were opened last September. Prepare yourself for a new wave of 'revisionism'.


Ask any soldier fighting in the soviet army if he would come back to his unit after retreating from the battlefield.

I have, and the answer is yes. In fact, that's exactly how the RKKA was reformed in August 1941 - shattered units fleeing from the encirclement operations in Belarus and the Ukraine were reassembled and reconstituted - sometimes painstakingly.


Even soviet soldiers liberated from POW camps were sent back to the gulags because of stalins constant mistrust of anyone who had been in contact with german's.

Soviet soldiers liberated from POW camps were processed by the NKVD, that much is true. Unfortunately for you, more than 80% were sent straight back to active duty, most of the rest were given leave and a single digit percentage were placed under investigation, sent to labour battalions or imprisoned.

How many more pleasant fictions would you like to debate?

Lokos

[Igor01]

Ask any soldier fighting in the soviet army if he would come back to his unit after retreating from the battlefield.

Even soviet soldiers liberated from POW camps were sent back to the gulags because of stalins constant mistrust of anyone who had been in contact with german's.

Another one of the lovely policies of the motherland.

Lokos, I know how many people were shot according to my "sources" of course that figure would be alot higher than the post ww2 soviet revisionist history.

К 1 марта 1946 г. было зарегистрировано 4199488 репатриированных советских граждан (2654185 гражданских и 1545303 военнопленных), из них 1846802 поступило из зон действия советских войск за границей и 2352686 принято от англо-американцев и прибыло из других стран. Из этого числа 2427906 человек было направлено к постоянному, избранному или установленному месту жительства. 801152 - призвано в армию, 608095 - зачислено в рабочие батальоны Наркомата обороны, 272867 - передано в распоряжение НКВД (спецконтингент), 89468 - находилось на сборно-пересыльных пунктах и использовалось на работах при советских воинских частях и учреждениях за границей

As of March 1, 1946 there were 4.199.488 Soviet citizens repatriated (2.654.185 civilians and 1.545.303 military personnel). Out of this number 1.846.802 were from the areas liberated by the Red Army, 2.352.686 were handed over by US and UK occupational authorities and arrived from various other countries. From this total number of 4.199.488 2.427.906 were sent to their residence areas, 801.152 drafted into the Red Army, 608.095 joined work batallions under the People's Commissariat of Defence, 272.867 - transferred to NKVD and 89.468 were stationed with various Red Army units and Soviet authorities in European countries.

As you see, only about 6.5% of the total number of repatriated Soviet citizens ended up in NKVD hands and most of them were HiWi's (those who served as "voluntary helpers" with various German units and those who were found guilty of crimes (not necessarily of political nature).

Please stop spewing your anti-Russian nonsense or if you must continue, at least try to validate your ridiculous arguments by something more substantial than your own IMHO's.

The numbers above are from Zemskov's "The Birth of the Second Emigration, 1944 - 1952). I'd like to point out that Zemskov had full and unrestricted access to Soviet archives, unlike Solzhenitsyn who nevertheless firmly planted the idea of unimaginable numbers of GULag's political prisoners while not having a slightest clue himself.

[foxtrot023]

Kilgor:

Beevor used a single, solitary German General Practitioner from Berlin who took a guess and said '2 million rapes' - and Beevor accepted that as fact, signed, sealed and delivered.

Use a less sensationalist, journalistic source, if you'll please.

And the Soviet Union executed some ~7,500 soldiers for rape and associated crimes in the immediate post-war period.

Just FYI.

Lokos

Lokos,

try these-

documents on the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Central Europe, vol. 1, pp. 12-3 and 48-68

Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, p.82

Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, p.635

Jahn, Pommersche Passion, p.113

OKH Gen St d H Op Abt IV, Fremde Heere Ost, Jan 20 1945

[Lokos]

foxtrot:

Djilas' comment was in regards to the ~150 Soviet rapes in Yugoslavia - and has nothing to do with Germany.


OKH Gen St d H Op Abt IV, Fremde Heere Ost, Jan 20 1945

What does a document from January 20 1945 have to do with the number of rapes in Berlin? Berlin was not in Soviet hands on January 20 1945.

I am not familiar with the other sources, but I have trouble believing they are more pertinent than those above.

The issue is: how many German women were raped in Berlin - and is Beevor's estimate in regards to this correct?

Lokos

[foxtrot023]

foxtrot:

Djilas' comment was in regards to the ~150 Soviet rapes in Yugoslavia - and has nothing to do with Germany.


OKH Gen St d H Op Abt IV, Fremde Heere Ost, Jan 20 1945

What does a document from January 20 1945 have to do with the number of rapes in Berlin? Berlin was not in Soviet hands on January 20 1945.

I am not familiar with the other sources, but I have trouble believing they are more pertinent than those above.

The issue is: how many German women were raped in Berlin - and is Beevor's estimate in regards to this correct?

Lokos

My bad, you are correct in regards to Djilas, however it does give a Modus Operandi for soviet troops outside the SU during WW2. Think that this happened in a portion of Yugoslavia were there was no fighting (and this considering that Yugoslavia was an allied country that had largely liberated itself with its partisans).

The OKH document details attacks on civilian population plus raped occurred in East Prussia in late 1944 and early 1945.

The other documents cover intentions and actual cases of civilian abuse and rape in Germany committed by soviet troops. Mind you, the soviets were not the only ones engaged in this (German and Western allied troops did that as well) but it does give documentary by the civilians that faced the attacks and rapes (specially the documents on the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Central Europe and Pommersche Passion) and paints a picture of these attacks being committed with permission. This of course varies from unit to unit, as some soviet units behaves quite well with the population, but in other cases even the polish prison camp inmates protected german civilians. Per example Konigsberg, were 25,000 civilians had been killed/abused/raped by soviet troops source: documents on the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Central Europe p.32, or Breslau were 40,000 civilians were killed/abused/raped. Even a soviet source Istoriya quotes "Not all Soviet soldiers knew how to conduct themselves towards the inhabitants but 2 bielorussian front took firm measures to deal with this" vol. 5 p.113

Now, I know that this pales compared to what the nazis did both in the concentration camps and in the Soviet Union, specially in cities like Leningrad or Kiev, but it did happen.

[Lokos]

I'm well aware that many Soviets behaved atrociously in occupied areas. The specific issue, though, is the 'Rape of Berlin', as alleged by Mr. Beevor. I do not believe, given the facts, that his allegations are founded on sound source material and a solid factual basis.

Also, it should be noted that, while such behaviour certainly was perpetrated by Soviet soldiers against German (and other) civilians, measures were taken to restore order in the most stringent sense (sometimes these measures were downright draconian).

Lokos

[CPL Trevoga]

The US and British soldiers at least didnt have guns pointed to the back of their heads with the threat of execution and the imprisionment of family members.

Argue all you want Lokos, but stalin made it very clear in his one step back order that groups were to be formed behind the first line of attack to execute "cowards". If you cant even accept what is handed down from stalin as evidence then your truely beyond rational thought.

"b) Form 3 to 5 well-armed guards (barrage) units (zagradotryads), deploy them in the rear of unstable divisions and oblige them to execute panic-mongers and cowards at site in case of panic and chaotic retreat, thus giving faithful soldiers a chance to do their duty before the Motherland"

It doesnt get more factual than this. Argueing over it is about the same level as neo nazi holocaust denier. Even the germans used to round up and shoot "Cowards" when the war was on their soil and times were desparate. Both iron fisted dictatorships had many things in common.

As for the whole mass rape issue, this was touched on by the excellent world at war series, which was made in the 70's. Well before beevor wrote stalingrad. For many educated ww2 readers, he was just confirming the issue.

You have been watching "Enemy at the Gates", didn't you? NKVD troops had a role of MP's, they did not shoot in the back of their comrades. Many
NKVD units where used as reserves.

"Wave attacks" are nothing more than frontal assaults without arty support
and yes people who let those charges were mainly gone by late 41. No frontal assualt can defeat a few MG-34, that's just how it is.

Red Army was fighting best army in the world, they did not defeat it with stupid tactics. Russia is populous, but not that populous. Red Army won
due to tenacity, ingenuity and proffesionalism of Soviet soldiers.

[Lokos]

Russia is populous, but not that populous.

If you look at it objectively, the Axis forces arrayed against the Soviets, in September 1941, actually outnumbered the Soviets in both troops in the field and potential mobilization.

Interesting, that.

Lokos

[Mitch Rapp]

Russia is populous, but not that populous.

If you look at it objectively, the Axis forces arrayed against the Soviets, in September 1941, actually outnumbered the Soviets in both troops in the field and potential mobilization.

Interesting, that.

Lokos

Actually the Axis countries were not so united. And the key to the victory was how many tanks, planes and guns you have, not how large is your population. Russia succeeded in producing tons of these weapons for a short period of time

[Kilgor]

Please stop spewing your anti-Russian nonsense or if you must continue, at least try to validate your ridiculous arguments by something more substantial than your own IMHO's.

.

Anti russia... try anti stalinist anti totalitiarian despot bull****.

Sorry If i dont believe the some of the figures produced by a a state ruled by a exceptionally cruel and brutal man and leadership.

[Igor01]

Please stop spewing your anti-Russian nonsense or if you must continue, at least try to validate your ridiculous arguments by something more substantial than your own IMHO's.

.

Anti russia... try anti stalinist anti totalitiarian despot bull****.

Sorry If i dont believe the some of the figures produced by a a state ruled by a exceptionally cruel and brutal man and leadership.

Excellent argument you are using Killgor: "I will make ridiculous and completely unsubsanciated claimes myself but if you try to expose out my utter ignorance in the matter and back up your view by thorough historical research I'll dismiss it simply because the source is Russian and therefore is "stalinist and despot bull****"." Way to go!

[Lokos]

Anti russia... try anti stalinist anti totalitiarian despot bull****.

Sorry If i dont believe the some of the figures produced by a a state ruled by a exceptionally cruel and brutal man and leadership.

I have more respect for Russians than to dismiss their experiences as a people and as a nation, as well as their achievements (which were epic), because they were ruled by a madman.

Seperate the people from the ruler, please. The SU was more than a figurehead for Stalin's madness. And, I do not see how you can call it a totalitarian, evil regime from the mid 50's onwards, even looking at it subjectively.

Lokos

[foxtrot023]

I'm well aware that many Soviets behaved atrociously in occupied areas. The specific issue, though, is the 'Rape of Berlin', as alleged by Mr. Beevor. I do not believe, given the facts, that his allegations are founded on sound source material and a solid factual basis.

Also, it should be noted that, while such behaviour certainly was perpetrated by Soviet soldiers against German (and other) civilians, measures were taken to restore order in the most stringent sense (sometimes these measures were downright draconian).

Lokos

You are correct to note that specifically in Berlin there is no way to have an acurate assestment of the number of rapings.

In regards to other occurrences of soviet soldiers behaviour towards civilians, as you are aware there is a period of time between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 were no measures were taken. Afterwards, as you mention, stern measures were taken, but that was poor consolation to the victims, but as always, the behaviour towards german civilians did vary from unit to unit.

[foxtrot023]

Anti russia... try anti stalinist anti totalitiarian despot bull****.

Sorry If i dont believe the some of the figures produced by a a state ruled by a exceptionally cruel and brutal man and leadership.

I have more respect for Russians than to dismiss their experiences as a people and as a nation, as well as their achievements (which were epic), because they were ruled by a madman.

Seperate the people from the ruler, please. The SU was more than a figurehead for Stalin's madness. And, I do not see how you can call it a totalitarian, evil regime from the mid 50's onwards, even looking at it subjectively.

Lokos

Stalin was not mad, he was evil. I think Stalin was quite a rational man, however his policies were inhumane.

Anyways, Stalin at least had enough presence of mind to avoid mendling into military planning after the disasters of 1941 and early 1942, unlike Hitler, which kept going further and further into planning often with disastrous results for the german army

[Lokos]

I prefer to think Stalin was a madman - because I'm uncomfortable with the notion that there are people out there who might be as brutal as he was while remaining rational (therefore evil) human beings.

Re:everything else, I agree with you, by and large.

Lokos

[Rumsfailed]

I prefer to think Stalin was a madman - because I'm uncomfortable with the notion that there are people out there who might be as brutal as he was while remaining rational (therefore evil) human beings.

Re:everything else, I agree with you, by and large.

Lokos

I used to believe Stalin was insane too, until I read a biography by Edvard Radzinski. Now, I don't know how accurate that was, but his version of Georgia's most famous son was a chillingly cynical political operator who himself HATED russians. Known as "The Great Humorist" by Radzinski (I am not sure if that was one of the official Comrade Stalin Petnames ala Father Sun), whose analysis paints a picture of a brilliantly calculating SOB whose single biggest mistake was in letting Hitler attack first. Radzinski also hints at terrors that might have been after the war when Stalin was heating up a new purge, with jews as targets. Luckily he died before setting the new Witch Hunt into motion.

[Lokos]

I have to agree with you both; he was quite sane. All the more chilling and disturbing...

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Lokos wrote:
If you look at it objectively, the Axis forces arrayed against the Soviets, in September 1941, actually outnumbered the Soviets in both troops in the field and potential mobilization.

Interesting, that.

Lokos

Just as a clarification:

When Barbarossa started (June 1941), the Soviet Army outnumbered the attacking (mostly German) armed forces by 1.2 to 1 in men, 7 to 1 in tanks, 4 to one in artillery and 4 to one in aircraft.
The usual story that the Soviet material was obsolete crap is nonsense, Soviet tanks were not leftovers from WWI (Russia hadn't any back then) but were nearly all build after 1935. The German tanks were smaller, had weaker armor and were at disadvantage in bad weather, mud and snow. The only areas in which they were superior were communication (all had radio) and superior targetting optics (German optics were the easily the best worldwide). And with some soviet tank types the Germans had special problems: tanks of the KV types were nearly impervious to German fire and the T 34 (first encountered one and a half month after the invasion had started) impressed them thoroughly (it was the main reason why Panther and Tiger tanks would be developed). Guderian called it the "best tank worldwide until 1943". Only PzKpfw IV could kill it at all, and only from behind.
Barbarossa was simply unique. Never before, never after, has an invader been so completely outnumbered by the defender in "stuff". Never. The Germans relied entirely on their superior grasp of tactics. And it nearly worked. Until winter 1941/1942 the Soiets had lost about 18.000 tanks (the invading Germans had 3300 at their disposal). Soviet losses (POW, KIA, MIA) are close to 5 million.
Main Russian myth about this year seems to be that their own soldiers in this year were cowards and let themselves taken prisoner easily. This is not true. Germans losses were about 700.000 until winterfall (KIA, MIA and very few POW), that is more than all campaigns to this time in Poland, Norway, France, Greece, Africa...taken together. (And this difference in losses was the reason why the Germans "outnumbered" the Soviets after September, Lokos)
Germans may have accused Soviets of a lot, but never ever of being cowards. When the Wehrmacht reached Moscow it was a spend force. Men, tanks, guns, other equipment had seen action for more than half a year constantly and were worn down. The winter, for which the Germans were hardly equipped made it worse. But Moscow was held by only a few tattetered Soviet units, which the Germans broke slowly through, defenseline by defenseline. Then Zhukov arrived with fresh units from the East and routed the Germans. But the Soviet counterattack had no true force behind it, the Germans hedgehoged themselves in west of Moscow, repelled any attempts to disloged them, and both sides licked their wounds to fight on in spring 1942.
Soviet defeat until winter 1941 were solely because of bad tactics of their side and brillant one on the side of the enemy. The Germans had sucessfully sowed confusion and had achieved complete surprise. Their operations were conducted with precision and high fighting power. The Soviets wasted their soldiers in senseless point defense. Stalin had his hand it in it. But they neither lacked weapons, the men or the bravery.

[Lokos]

When Barbarossa started (June 1941), the Soviet Army outnumbered the attacking (mostly German) armed forces by 1.2 to 1 in men, 7 to 1 in tanks, 4 to one in artillery and 4 to one in aircraft.

Axis armored forces, artillery, air power and attacking infantry were concentrated at jump off points in Poland. The Red Army's Western Military District had tanks dispersed over thousands of miles of terrain (back into the Ukraine and Belarus), cadre formations in garrison etc. The Wehrmacht was able to utilize its resources to achieve absolutely overwhelming numerical advantages wherever they saw fit.


The usual story that the Soviet material was obsolete crap is nonsense, Soviet tanks were not leftovers from WWI (Russia hadn't any back then) but were nearly all build after 1935.

Actually, the usual story is that 80% of the tanks were not combat worthy due to lack of maintenance, lack of trained technical personnel, lack of fuel, lack of ammunition and many other 'lacks' in terms of armored fighting capability. Obsolescence has nothing to do with that.


The only areas in which they were superior were communication (all had radio) and superior targetting optics (German optics were the easily the best worldwide).

A tank is not a warfighting machine without a crew to man it and a logistical infrastructure to support it. The Soviets were lacking in both, having been caught in the midst of sweeping reformations of the RKKA.


And with some soviet tank types the Germans had special problems: tanks of the KV types were nearly impervious to German fire and the T 34 (first encountered one and a half month after the invasion had started) impressed them thoroughly (it was the main reason why Panther and Tiger tanks would be developed). Guderian called it the "best tank worldwide until 1943". Only PzKpfw IV could kill it at all, and only from behind.

This is misguiding. Most tanks on both sides were killed by anti-tank guns (such as the German 88), not by other tanks. The Germans did initially have troubles with the KV1/2 and the T34. However, these were tactical troubles, and were not consequential strategically or even operationally.


Barbarossa was simply unique. Never before, never after, has an invader been so completely outnumbered by the defender in "stuff". Never. The Germans relied entirely on their superior grasp of tactics. And it nearly worked. Until winter 1941/1942 the Soiets had lost about 18.000 tanks (the invading Germans had 3300 at their disposal). Soviet losses (POW, KIA, MIA) are close to 5 million.

Never before had an invader picked such a perfect time to invade, and had an enemy so willing to oblige in terms of force disposition? It is not a wonder that Barbarossa was so successful initially. It is a wonder the Germans were not able to win decisively by the end of '41. Had the Wehrmacht been instructed to begin Operation Barbarossa in June 1942, it would have found itself in a world of trouble - Soviet military reforms were proceeding apace.

As for Soviet tank losses, it should be noted that less than a 1/3rd were combat losses. For the vast majority of the time, Soviet tanks simply ran out of fuel in transit and were abandoned, or were slightly damaged, could not be repaired and were abandoned, or ran out of ammo and were abandoned.


Main Russian myth about this year seems to be that their own soldiers in this year were cowards and let themselves taken prisoner easily. This is not true. Germans losses were about 700.000 until winterfall (KIA, MIA and very few POW), that is more than all campaigns to this time in Poland, Norway, France, Greece, Africa...taken together. (And this difference in losses was the reason why the Germans "outnumbered" the Soviets after September, Lokos)

Well over a million and a half Soviets became POWs as a result of the large encirclement operations alone. For all intents and purposes, the Red Army was destroyed by August 1941, and had to be completely reconstituted from strategic reserves.

By the end of 1941 Axis territories were home to well over two hundred million people (including USSR occupied territories). The Soviet Union had less than one hundred and twenty million to draw upon for manpower - even less if you discount the Muslim republics in which the Soviets never had major recruiting successes.

The Axis had more forces in the field and a vaster mobilization potential - subsequently squandered advantages.


Germans may have accused Soviets of a lot, but never ever of being cowards. When the Wehrmacht reached Moscow it was a spend force.

The Soviets were routed by a force superior in manoeuvre. This should not be equated with cowardice or the perception of cowardice. The border campaign broke the RKKA, and it remained broken until well after 1941.


But the Soviet counterattack had no true force behind it, the Germans hedgehoged themselves in west of Moscow, repelled any attempts to disloged them, and both sides licked their wounds to fight on in spring 1942.

Had Stalin called for a localized offensive, AGC could very well have collapsed under Soviet pressure. Instead, he opted for a general offensive all along the front, and cost the Soviet Union nearly its entire strategic reserve - one of the many horrific mistakes by Stalin.


But they neither lacked weapons, the men or the bravery.

They lacked the weapons, early on (after the border battles and the fighting in the Ukraine), if not bodies.

The concept of a tank division had to be abandoned, because by September 1941 tank stocks were nearly non-existent. The Soviets had to revert to independent tank brigades as the highest grade armored formations.

Artillery ammo was nearly depleted, rifle ammo stocks were down... It was a generally bad situation until the Winter of '41.

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Lokos wrote:
By the end of 1941 Axis territories were home to well over two hundred million people (including USSR occupied territories). The Soviet Union had less than one hundred and twenty million to draw upon for manpower - even less if you discount the Muslim republics in which the Soviets never had major recruiting successes.


This is misleading. One cannot simply regard the inhabiting population of an occupied territory as "recruiting material". For example the British Commonwealth had a population that outnumbered the one of "Greater Germany" by factor four to five. So technically the British were sorry loosers for not winning the war alone. Less technically seen, most of the mentioned inhabitants of the Commonwelath were Indians, and the British control over them was shaky at best during WWII (Ghandhi etc). So the British could not really rely on the Indians as they could on the English, Scottish, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders. And these groups did not outnumber the Germans or at least not by much.
So it is with the Germans. They could not rely on Poles, Czechs or the inhabitants of the overrun Soviet Union to a large degree. On the contrary, to control these regions they needed troops that were missing at the front.

[Lokos]

This is misleading. One cannot simply regard the inhabiting population of an occupied territory as "recruiting material". For example the British Commonwealth had a population that outnumbered the one of "Greater Germany" by factor four to five. So technically the British were sorry loosers for not winning the war alone. Less technically seen, most of the mentioned inhabitants of the Commonwelath were Indians, and the British control over them was shaky at best during WWII (Ghandhi etc). So the British could not really rely on the Indians as they could on the English, Scottish, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders. And these groups did not outnumber the Germans or at least not by much.
So it is with the Germans. They could not rely on Poles, Czechs or the inhabitants of the overrun Soviet Union to a large degree. On the contrary, to control these regions they needed troops that were missing at the front.

Fair enough. Subtracting the 'unreliable nationalities' (ie Poles, Ukrainians, Belarussians) we are still left with some eighty million Germans (in the GGR), and well over thirty million 'reliable' nationalities that sent fighting formations to the Eastern Front (including Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, Slovakians, Croatians, Italians - albeit I'm not counting their entire population here at all - and the Spanish to a far more limited degree).

In real terms the Soviets were able to create a 1.5-2 manpower advantage when neccessary after mid 1942 - I am not disputing this. But I attribute this mainly to an overall younger population and superior force generation, rather than any serious lack of potential on the Axis side.

There is one more reason for Soviet manpower superiority in the fighting arms; the lack of support personnel. Your basic German or US division had great numbers of support personnel - logistics, specialist branches of service etc. A typical Soviet division was very bare in this regard, and was not well supported in terms of logistics personnel.

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Lokos wrote:

In real terms the Soviets were able to create a 1.5-2 manpower advantage when neccessary after mid 1942 - I am not disputing this. But I attribute this mainly to an overall younger population and superior force generation, rather than any serious lack of potential on the Axis side.


And that was what the German leadership did not realize. Their assessment in winter 1941 was that the Soviet army was nearly completely destroyed and that Stalins Empire was all but finished. Only a coup de grace was needed for 1942. Germany had not re-structured its industry for war production, even in 1942 the production of cosumer goods did outweigh the one of war goods. Actually the ressources given to the army were reduced at the end of 1941. One of Hitlers greatest mistakes (the other one being to believe that France and Britain would let him got away with conquering Poland).
In 1942 the Germans had to realize that the Soviets weren't finished. And from winter 1942/43 the Soviets even turned the tide. Only then, in 1943, German economy was set on footing for total war. Too late.


Lokos wrote:
In real terms the Soviets were able to create a 1.5-2 manpower advantage when neccessary after mid 1942 - I am not disputing this. But I attribute this mainly to an overall younger population and superior force generation, rather than any serious lack of potential on the Axis side.
I don't disagree.



Lokos wrote:
There is one more reason for Soviet manpower superiority in the fighting arms; the lack of support personnel. Your basic German or US division had great numbers of support personnel - logistics, specialist branches of service etc. A typical Soviet division was very bare in this regard, and was not well supported in terms of logistics personnel.
Well, could be. Germans are pampered Westerners after all. ;)

[Lokos]

And that was what the German leadership did not realize. Their assessment in winter 1941 was that the Soviet army was nearly completely destroyed and that Stalins Empire was all but finished. Only a coup de grace was needed for 1942. Germany had not re-structured its industry for war production, even in 1942 the production of cosumer goods did outweigh the one of war goods. Actually the ressources given to the army were reduced at the end of 1941. One of Hitlers greatest mistakes (the other one being to believe that France and Britain would let him got away with conquering Poland).
In 1942 the Germans had to realize that the Soviets weren't finished. And from winter 1942/43 the Soviets even turned the tide. Only then, in 1943, German economy was set on footing for total war. Too late.

I agree with this in whole.


Well, could be. Germans are pampered Westerners after all.

Compared to the Soviets, your typical German soldier was, indeed, pampered. p-)

Lokos

[foxtrot023]

This is misleading. One cannot simply regard the inhabiting population of an occupied territory as "recruiting material". For example the British Commonwealth had a population that outnumbered the one of "Greater Germany" by factor four to five. So technically the British were sorry loosers for not winning the war alone. Less technically seen, most of the mentioned inhabitants of the Commonwelath were Indians, and the British control over them was shaky at best during WWII (Ghandhi etc). So the British could not really rely on the Indians as they could on the English, Scottish, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders. And these groups did not outnumber the Germans or at least not by much.
So it is with the Germans. They could not rely on Poles, Czechs or the inhabitants of the overrun Soviet Union to a large degree. On the contrary, to control these regions they needed troops that were missing at the front.

Fair enough. Subtracting the 'unreliable nationalities' (ie Poles, Ukrainians, Belarussians) we are still left with some eighty million Germans (in the GGR), and well over thirty million 'reliable' nationalities that sent fighting formations to the Eastern Front (including Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, Slovakians, Croatians, Italians - albeit I'm not counting their entire population here at all - and the Spanish to a far more limited degree).


Lokos

Even then, the romanian, hungarian and italian formations were of poor combat value, but not due to cowardice and/or poor soldiering skills of those nationalities, but because they were ill equipped and sometimes poorly led. When properly led and equipped, those soldiers were good soldiers. If you think about it, only the finnish and the spanish had a similar or superior fighting value to their german counterparts. And consider than from 1943 onwards, the majority of those axis formations were removed from the Eastern front, leaving the gap in manpower even more inclined to the SU.

[Kilgor]

Stalin was probably the most paranoid and suspicious dictator the world has ever seen. Worse than hitler. He was mad from paranoia.

[Kilgor]

Seperate the people from the ruler, please. The SU was more than a figurehead for Stalin's madness. And, I do not see how you can call it a totalitarian, evil regime from the mid 50's onwards, even looking at it subjectively.

Lokos

Whilst there was some reforms and some camps opened up. SU society was hardly free under the later rulers. Given it was not a evil totalitarian society, but it still was a one party state with no freedom of speech,vote and minimal human rights.

[Lokos]

Even then, the romanian, hungarian and italian formations were of poor combat value, but not due to cowardice and/or poor soldiering skills of those nationalities, but because they were ill equipped and sometimes poorly led. When properly led and equipped, those soldiers were good soldiers. If you think about it, only the finnish and the spanish had a similar or superior fighting value to their german counterparts. And consider than from 1943 onwards, the majority of those axis formations were removed from the Eastern front, leaving the gap in manpower even more inclined to the SU.

The Italians acquitted themselves pretty well early on in the war. The Romanians and the Hungarians were never that enthusiastic about the war, but they were used very often as flank support troops, garrison forces and skeleton formations for quiet sections of the front - which freed up higher quality German formations for action against the Soviets.

But, that aside, the Soviet Union also had to deal with the fact that only the Russians were truly caught in the nationalistic fervor. And they made up no more than one hundred and twenty million of the USSR's total population.

If the Axis had done as good a job at force generation and mobilization, the Soviet Union would have had great and terrible difficulties triumphing in that war.


but it still was a one party state with no freedom of speech,vote and minimal human rights.

Well, yes, but that's hardly demonic evil right there. It was an oppressive society because it saw itself as constantly being at threat from the rest of the world. Very highly militarized and subjected to military discipline. It was forced to spend up to 30% of its GDP on the military, year-on-year. This was the single greatest reason for the economic decline and eventual collapse of the SU.

Lokos

[Kilgor]

Well, yes, but that's hardly demonic evil right there. It was an oppressive society because it saw itself as constantly being at threat from the rest of the world. Very highly militarized and subjected to military discipline. It was forced to spend up to 30% of its GDP on the military, year-on-year. This was the single greatest reason for the economic decline and eventual collapse of the SU.

Lokos

Thats quite absurd.

It was a oppessive society because the leaders ruled it that way, not because of any western threat. Thats pure soviet retoric at its finest. The communist party wanted to cling to power no matter what and that was from internal and external threats. Western and European leaders even before ww2 knew that communism was a perverted idealology and were suspicious and cold to the USSR. And it didnt help that the SU had a worldwide network of spies and the comintern to try and gain footholds in other countries.

There is no one to blame for the USSR's collapse other than itself.

[Lokos]

It was a oppessive society because the leaders ruled it that way, not because of any western threat.

Are you saying that the Cold War was all in the imagination of the leaders of the SU?


The communist party wanted to cling to power no matter what and that was from internal and external threats.

I would hardly say it was 'clinging' to power. It had the power. That power was consolidated and could not be wrested away without civil war.


Western and European leaders even before ww2 knew that communism was a perverted idealology and were suspicious and cold to the USSR.

Do you think this helped ease the Soviet Union's fears of the threat from the West, or made them worse? Remember; the Soviet experience from 1917-1945 equates to two invasions from the West concerned with destroying the Communist regime - the Western intervention in 1918-1922 and the German invasion of '41.

Are you surprised they set up a series of buffer states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic states etc) in the aftermath of WW2?


And it didnt help that the SU had a worldwide network of spies and the comintern to try and gain footholds in other countries.

The SU's official policy was 'Communism in One Country' - not worldwide revolution. You're thinking Lenin, and he died long before the Cold War. As for spies... Are you saying the West didn't use spies, and didn't infiltrate Soviet society?


There is no one to blame for the USSR's collapse other than itself.

A Soviet militarist attitude didn't spring up from a vacuum. It was a direct result of specific perceived actions on the part of the monolithically perceived West. Spending 30% of the national GDP on defence isn't something a country does because it feels like it, instead it is something a country does when it feels threatened.

And, IMHO, the West and the SU were threats to each other. Fact is; the SU collapsed because it couldn't keep up with the West while spending a third of its total GDP on the military. It decayed and died. But do not try to tell me it didn't get a helping hand from the West in that regard.

Lokos

[Lokos]

Also, do note, I'm trying to tell you how the Soviet Union perceived the situation, not how I perceive the situation - or how the situation was. Keep that in mind.

Lokos

[Turhapuro]

but it still was a one party state with no freedom of speech,vote and minimal human rights.
Well, yes, but that's hardly demonic evil right there. It was an oppressive society because it saw itself as constantly being at threat from the rest of the world.
Lame excuse.

Why western world did not evolve to one party oppressive society because they obviously saw itself as constantly being at threat from USSR and communists inside those nations?

The idea behinf communism is dictaturship of the proletariat. Communist party is vital part to that so no other parties are allowed. That was 100% clear from the beginning, way before cold war or WW2 started, it was clear even revolution at Russia started.

[Igor01]

The idea behinf communism is dictaturship of the proletariat. Communist party is vital part to that so no other parties are allowed. That was 100% clear from the beginning, way before cold war or WW2 started, it was clear even revolution at Russia started.

Dictatorship of the proletariat was not the idea but the method to quel resistance by bourgeoisie and capitalists and that only on the early stages of Soviet history. Soviet Communism of 1919 was completely different from that of 1926 which was very different from 1949 which bore no resemblense to 1963. Don't forget that in the end the USSR was dismantled by Communists themselves (think Gorbatchev, Yakovlev, Eltsin). If you disregard the evolution that the official Soviet ideology has gone through you will never truly understand the Soviet history.

[Lokos]

Lame excuse.

I am not excusing anything. I am discouraging dogmatic perceptions of a complex issue.


The idea behinf communism is dictaturship of the proletariat.

Could you source that for me? Was it Marx, Engels or Lenin who advocated a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'? And could you relate your source to the fundamental tenets of Communism that, to me, seem diametrically opposed to any sort of dictatorship?


That was 100% clear from the beginning, way before cold war or WW2 started, it was clear even revolution at Russia started.

That is surprising, considering that Russia's proletariat was not the originator, the propagator or the consolidator of the socialist movement. In fact, Russia's proletariat never had much say in the workings of the Soviet Union. Ironically, Soviet Communism was simply urban-centric, and entirely driven by the bourgeois.


Why western world did not evolve to one party oppressive society because they obviously saw itself as constantly being at threat from USSR and communists inside those nations?

Several reasons.

1) Russia did not have a liberal, individualistic socio-economic tradition as a determinant of acceptability.

2) The Western world, as a whole, was far superior to the Soviet Union in manpower, economic potential and survivability. The Soviets were the underdog in that power relationship. They had more to fear - and subsequently took greater steps to keep up and pose a credible threat to the West. Please note; 'to keep up'. This quest for a balance of power eventually destroyed the Soviet Union, which was never economically capable of both sustaining civil society and a military that could rival the collective potential of the West.

Lokos

[foxtrot023]

Even then, the romanian, hungarian and italian formations were of poor combat value, but not due to cowardice and/or poor soldiering skills of those nationalities, but because they were ill equipped and sometimes poorly led. When properly led and equipped, those soldiers were good soldiers. If you think about it, only the finnish and the spanish had a similar or superior fighting value to their german counterparts. And consider than from 1943 onwards, the majority of those axis formations were removed from the Eastern front, leaving the gap in manpower even more inclined to the SU.

The Italians acquitted themselves pretty well early on in the war. The Romanians and the Hungarians were never that enthusiastic about the war, but they were used very often as flank support troops, garrison forces and skeleton formations for quiet sections of the front - which freed up higher quality German formations for action against the Soviets.

But, that aside, the Soviet Union also had to deal with the fact that only the Russians were truly caught in the nationalistic fervor. And they made up no more than one hundred and twenty million of the USSR's total population.

If the Axis had done as good a job at force generation and mobilization, the Soviet Union would have had great and terrible difficulties triumphing in that war.

Lokos

Lokos,

Those ¨quiet¨ sectors of the front were the ones through which the soviets launched their enveloping offensive against 6th army in Stalingrad. It is no mistery that soviet planning specifically targeted those divisions from other nationalities other than the germans.

You are quite correct that Germany did not truly mobilized till 1944, however let me point out, and in reference to one of your postings ago were you compared population levels between Greater Germany and allies and the Soviet Union, that Germany was also at war with the western allies, themselves with a superior population base to Germany. So when you consider the consolidated populations of the UK and commonwealth, the US and the USSR (even if you include only russians), and you compare that to Germany and allies, and you see the disparity.

[Lokos]

Those ¨quiet¨ sectors of the front were the ones through which the soviets launched their enveloping offensive against 6th army in Stalingrad.

The fact that Romanian troops were there was exactly what gave the Germans the ability to concentrate their own forces. Perhaps it was a mistake in Stalingrad, but consider how much more poorly the Germans would have fared had they had to disperse their own forces to cover their flanks.

And Stalingrad is but one example. For most of '41 and '42 second echelon and foreign formations were comfortably used by the Germans to retain force concentration abilities.


So when you consider the consolidated populations of the UK and commonwealth, the US and the USSR (even if you include only russians), and you compare that to Germany and allies, and you see the disparity.

That is all well and good. However, during 1941, 1942 and most of 1943 the vast majority of German (and Axis) resources, manpower and effort went into singlemindedly combating the Soviet Union. For this same reason, when I cite German force superiority in September 1941, I do not add the resources deployed in Africa, in Norway, in France and in the Balkans as part of the Wehrmacht total - in the same way that I do not add in the Far East garrison for the Soviets.

This period being, relatively speaking, a single combat between two belligerents, I think it is fitting to compare mobilization potential and show just how much of an advantage the Axis had, in truth.

For example, not many people understand this, but in September 1941 the Soviet Union's economy was roughly the size of Portugal's (at the time). It was faced by an Axis that had Germany, France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Norway and Italy to draw upon for resources and industrial might.

Lokos

[foxtrot023]

Those ¨quiet¨ sectors of the front were the ones through which the soviets launched their enveloping offensive against 6th army in Stalingrad.

The fact that Romanian troops were there was exactly what gave the Germans the ability to concentrate their own forces. Perhaps it was a mistake in Stalingrad, but consider how much more poorly the Germans would have fared had they had to disperse their own forces to cover their flanks.

And Stalingrad is but one example. For most of '41 and '42 second echelon and foreign formations were comfortably used by the Germans to retain force concentration abilities.


So when you consider the consolidated populations of the UK and commonwealth, the US and the USSR (even if you include only russians), and you compare that to Germany and allies, and you see the disparity.

That is all well and good. However, during 1941, 1942 and most of 1943 the vast majority of German (and Axis) resources, manpower and effort went into singlemindedly combating the Soviet Union. For this same reason, when I cite German force superiority in September 1941, I do not add the resources deployed in Africa, in Norway, in France and in the Balkans as part of the Wehrmacht total - in the same way that I do not add in the Far East garrison for the Soviets.

This period being, relatively speaking, a single combat between two belligerents, I think it is fitting to compare mobilization potential and show just how much of an advantage the Axis had, in truth.

For example, not many people understand this, but in September 1941 the Soviet Union's economy was roughly the size of Portugal's (at the time). It was faced by an Axis that had Germany, France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Norway and Italy to draw upon for resources and industrial might.

Lokos

However let me point out that Germany did not mobilized completely on a war footing till 1944, and by that time it was already too late as it had to face both the Eastern and Western fronts. By that time the Werhmacht was 60% deployed in the East and 40% in the West.

BTW Lokos, in no way was the economy/industrial might of the Soviet Union similar to that of Portugal. If that had been the case, by 1942 there would have been no arms to which to fight the germans.

[Lokos]

However let me point out that Germany did not mobilized completely on a war footing till 1944, and by that time it was already too late as it had to face both the Eastern and Western fronts.

Indeed, which is why I only talk of 'mobilization potential', rather than actual mobilization - a task at which the Soviets were superior.


By that time the Werhmacht was 60% deployed in the East and 40% in the West.

70/30, if you consider it in 'real' terms (i.e. actual combat capability of forces, disposition of war materiel, strategic consideration etc).

Also, in 1945, roughly 85% of Wehrmacht casualties were sustained fighting the Soviets.


BTW Lokos, in no way was the economy/industrial might of the Soviet Union similar to that of Portugal. If that had been the case, by 1942 there would have been no arms to which to fight the germans.

I am talking in terms of GDP, of course. Which is why I said that the Soviet Union's economy was the size of Portugal's at the time, rather than its arms industry ;) . And, during the time period I speak of, thousands of Soviet factories were still in transit and were being redeployed further East, and were thus not producing anything, so I discounted them.

Lokos

[foxtrot023]

However let me point out that Germany did not mobilized completely on a war footing till 1944, and by that time it was already too late as it had to face both the Eastern and Western fronts.

Indeed, which is why I only talk of 'mobilization potential', rather than actual mobilization - a task at which the Soviets were superior.


By that time the Werhmacht was 60% deployed in the East and 40% in the West.

70/30, if you consider it in 'real' terms (i.e. actual combat capability of forces, disposition of war materiel, strategic consideration etc).

Also, in 1945, roughly 85% of Wehrmacht casualties were sustained fighting the Soviets.

Lokos

Since Jan. 1944 new weapons/arms and priority were given to western front formations. At the time, the menace of a second front, potentially only a 100km away from the Rurh area was seemed as being more dangerous strategically that the eastern front.

[Lokos]

The vast majority of war materiel continued flowing East.

But you're right, the balance did shift in '44.

It wasn't 90/10 anymore.

Lokos

[RGRBOX]

but it still was a one party state with no freedom of speech,vote and minimal human rights.
Well, yes, but that's hardly demonic evil right there. It was an oppressive society because it saw itself as constantly being at threat from the rest of the world.
Lame excuse.

Why western world did not evolve to one party oppressive society because they obviously saw itself as constantly being at threat from USSR and communists inside those nations?

The idea behinf communism is dictaturship of the proletariat. Communist party is vital part to that so no other parties are allowed. That was 100% clear from the beginning, way before cold war or WW2 started, it was clear even revolution at Russia started.

I though I read about a good example to this fear / threat this morning in the paper... some central provences in China was having problems with gangs of thugs being hired or ordered by party leaders to go out and put phyical presure on AIDS organizations who were there to help and to promote AIDS awarness... there is a fear by local party officials of there being a underlying shadow to some secret operation by these officials that my be working against the party line or something to that effect... sorry, if my recolition isn't exact but this was the point made to my understanding..

[Kitsune]

Russia did not have a liberal, individualistic socio-economic tradition as a determinant of acceptability.

Wow. Lokos, I really must say that sentence is pure art. Great. Especially your usage of the word "determinant". That is one of my favorite words. Really a shame that one has so rarely the opportunity to use it in a meaningful sentence. I really have to print that one out in even greater letters, frame it and hang it over my writing desk. Beautiful.
Thanks.

p-)

[Lokos]

Is there something wrong with the sentence?

:|

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Not at all. I just could not resist to voice my truly felt admiration (and slight envy, to be honest) for an especially fine crafted sentence featuring brillantly chosen and extremely well placed foreign words.
I mean it.

:D

[Lokos]

Uhh, thanks.

Foreign words?

Lokos