US DHS to search traveler's laptops/cellphones

[Ordie]

Given the history of this source I'm not sure if this is credible.



Exclusive: tougher security checks to enter US as laptops and mobile phones searched



By Jon Clements And Chris Hughes 5/05/2008 (http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2008/05/05/exclusive-tougher-security-checks-to-enter-us-as-laptops-and-mobile-phones-searched-89520-20405885/2008/05/05/)

http://images.mirror.co.uk/upl/sm3/may2008/8/3/B879215F-EC11-6580-5C8B5FFCED38CBFD.jpg US airport checks (Pic:***** Images)



Tourists visiting the US face even tougher security checks now airport officials can search through mobile phones and laptops.
Guards can download any details contained in the items and keep them indefinitely, following a new court ruling.
The latest legislation could mean lengthier queues as security copy photos, emails and phone records. Visitors already face hour-long waits while armed officers take fingerprints and photos.
Travel agents' group Abta stormed: "It's another ratcheting up of Fortress America. It's certainly not a good thing for passengers - it is rather Big Brother."
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There are also fears immigration staff may mistakenly corrupt or erase vital computer details. Abta added: "We'd like to know if they're going to be properly trained to check computers and conduct many spot checks they plan to carry out."
Dr Guy Bunker, of UK-based IT security experts Symantec, said: "Hopefully, they won't search everybody's data - or we may wait in line for weeks. There's also the chance of data being compromised."
He added that some business travellers particularly were now so alarmed they may fly to America with blank laptops.
It comes after a US Appeal Court ruled Los Angeles airport officials acted lawfully when a random search found child **** on a passenger's computer.
Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain said: "Reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices."
But Shami Chakrabarti, of civil rights group Liberty, insisted: "It's one thing to look for drugs and explosives, another to conduct data trawls without suspicion."
Section 38 of the US visa form asks: Do you seek to enter the United States to engage in export control violations, subversive or terrorist activities, or any other unlawful purpose? Are you a member or representative of a terrorist organization as currently designated by the U.S. Secretary of State? Have you ever participated in persecutions directed by the Nazi government of Germany; or have you ever participated in genocide?
(Tick YES or NO)
4,176,211
Number of visits to America from the UK in 2006
Source: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2008/05/05/exclusive-tougher-security-checks-to-enter-us-as-laptops-and-mobile-phones-searched-89520-20405885/

[TallGuy]

This is bull****. I hope this court ruling will be overturned.

[Firetxmi]

It appears it is true.

Here is another source with more verifiable details:
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9081358&intsrc=hm_list

Sickening.

[INAT]

When I travel back home to Srbija like I am getting ready to do in June I have had this already happen three times coming back.The second time I just had to turn it on but the first and third going throug Los Angeles international they had me turn it on and checked the CD drive as well as
log on to XP.This is going too far for them to be able to mine information off the laptop.I bought and external hard drive that has a diffrent OS(Vista and DOS) on it.I think I am going to transfer everything that is important and private on the the external drive and put it in my carry on. This is no longer about terror it is just another law of the new police state.

[Ratamacue]

Any judge that would uphold this law should be subject to having all of their personal files--digital or otherwise--requisitioned, copied, analyzed, and stored by the government. This is absolute bull****. There's no other way to describe it.

[Pille1234]

Just recently when my boss ordered me to clean my notebook before travaling on a business trip to New York I smiled at him thinking to myself what a paranoid guy. Unfortunatly he was just better informed than me. Those "security checks" are getting out of control.

[Laworkerbee]

Mean while our borders are wide open :|

[Snoshi]

I am ussualy conservative when it comes to security checks etc.. But this is going to far..

[Polygon]

Jesus, that is frightening, it's a case where too many people are willing to sacrifice their privacy for supposedly better "safety."

[T3ngu]

Hmmmm v bad. If my laptop goes down, no work for me for at least a week, worse when i am travelling.

Having said that, i have nothing to hide. What about software licenses? Freeware, shareware etc, are they going to check them on business PC's?

[dedbunniez]

Just because you have nothing to hide. Does not mean you should be subject to search.

[usa320]

I dont think this is something that should be done randomly. If they plan on doing random checks of people's files and the like, then i think this needs to be overturned in a hurry.

However, if they are doing it in a way that is based on threat assesement and in an intelligence-driven manner, thats a different story.

Theres a big difference between digging through Joe Smith the businessman's laptop when he boards a flight from LA to Seattle and has a return trip booked...and going through the contents of a foreign citizen's computer when they arrive in the US and have passport stamps from all sorts of backwards countries in the middle east, a pile of cash in their pocket and no return flight booked.


Likewise, theres a big difference between searching for records of transactions or literature that would indicate involvement with Narcotics or terrorism, and looking to see who is downloading movies and music without paying.

If there going to do this, they need to abandon the whole "randomness to avoid being accused of profiling" attitude and do it in very specific situations where there are indications and warnings that suggest the data in question may be of valid and viable intelligence interest. That being said.... they are tip toeing a fine line, and the line needs to be clearly defined in the form of standard procedures and regulations surrounding this type of search...

[RallyPointCebu]

Are you a member or representative of a terrorist organization as currently designated by the U.S. Secretary of State? Have you ever participated in persecutions directed by the Nazi government of Germany; or have you ever participated in genocide?
(Tick YES or NO)

If I am a terrorist.. why would I tick YES? duhhh... It is making America safer but its beefing up the scare hype!

[Ratamacue]

If I am a terrorist.. why would I tick YES? duhhh... It is making America safer but its beefing up the scare hype!I don't think it's even making anything safer. It'll take a verifiable army of intelligence analysts to search through all that information and get anything useful out of it.

[dedbunniez]

actually I am sure that there must be some sort of program that would mine the data for questionable references. Child ****, terrorist manifestos. etc.

[Royal]

and going through the contents of a foreign citizen's computer when they arrive in the US and have passport stamps from all sorts of backwards countries in the middle east, a pile of cash in their pocket and no return flight booked.

That sums me up when I come to the States...

[Holycrusader]

That sums me up when I come to the States...

Very, very suspicious ;)

Thats why I need to change my passport to many stamps from "backward countries"

[dacanadianbomb]

Complete and utter BS
There is absolutely no need for this.
What are they expecting to find on there ??

Arent they injuring some sort of right to privacy?

[HR24]

Border Search Authority folks. It's been around for quite some time and been challenged and upheld. Here is a write up I have on it that kinda spells it out a little better. Hope it fits:

U.S. land border search authority
M. Wesley Clark
The need to safeguard U.S. borders has drawn more attention recently than ever before. The law traditionally has recognized that significant public safety interests are at stake when it comes to safeguarding America's borders. This has translated into a unique body of law that permits the government to exercise broad search authority at the border to safeguard the public. This article discusses the contours of land border search law, including a discussion of the role the actual site of the search plays, whether the site is at the actual border, at the functional equivalent of the border, at the extended border, or during the course of roving border patrols.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
ACTUAL BORDER
The state of the law with respect to suspicionless searches conducted at actual, or "true," U.S. borders is the most straightforward and most easily understood. Such searches have been described as either exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements (leaving them subject only to the amendment's reasonableness standard) or as a species of search wholly outside the Fourth Amendment. (1)
A true border search can be made without probable cause, without a warrant, and, indeed, without any articulable suspicion at all. (2) The only limitation on such a search is the Fourth Amendment stricture that it be conducted reasonably. Note that the reasonableness calculus is different at the border (i.e., looser) than it is inland. (3) Of course, the experience and training of law enforcement personnel must be the lens through which all of the facts giving rise to concern on the part of the officer or agent at the border are viewed. (4) The law has developed a sliding scale with regard to border searches--as the degree of intrusiveness increases, so does the requirement for indicia of suspicion.
Routine Border
When crossing the border into the United States, a traveler's luggage, conveyance, outer clothing, purse, wallet, and pockets are subject to suspicionless (i.e., routine) inspection. (5) When inspecting luggage, it is permissible as part of a routine search to scratch the exterior to determine if the luggage shell vibrates (lack of vibration would be abnormal), to flex the luggage exterior (lack of flex would be abnormal), and to heft the luggage to see whether it is equally weighted (unexplained weight might suggest a hidden compartment containing contraband). (6)
Pat Downs and Exposures
Pat downs and requests, for example, to raise a skirt to reveal an undergarment may be considered to fall--depending upon the circuit--somewhere between the suspicionless border search (7) and such nonroutine border examinations as strip and body cavity searches. (8) Therefore, these may require some level of suspicion, albeit minimal.
Nonroutine Border
Drilling/Destructive/Disruptive
Invasive measures designed to reveal the nature of the contents of a container, such as a suitcase or steel drum used for shipping materials, require some level of justification to comply with the Fourth Amendment. For example, drilling into the bottom of a traveler's bag because it had an unusual bottom is not a routine search and, therefore, requires reasonable suspicion. (9) Similarly, once reasonable suspicion arose, drilling into a vessel to reveal cocaine hidden in a secret compartment was a proper reasonable means of effectuating a border search. (10) Drilling into a metal cylinder arriving at an international airport in the United States, not a routine search, must be based upon reasonable suspicion. (11) Inserting a long, thin metal probe in the drain valve of an electrical transformer awaiting customs clearance has been held proper because the search was based upon reasonable suspicion. (12) In summary, at the border, reasonable suspicion justifies a full-scale search that employs reasonable means. (13)
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
However, a nondestructive search taking only 1 to 2 hours at the border that involves only dismantling and reassembly, such as the removal, inspection, and reattachment of a vehicle gas tank (a reversible procedure that does not threaten vehicle safety or operation), requires no suspicion. In United States v. Flores-Montano, (14) an inspector tapped a station wagon gas tank, "noted that the tank sounded solid," and had a mechanic on contract with the U.S. Customs Service remove the tank. Conducting a search involving neither serious damage or destruction, the inspector then "hammered off bondo (a puttylike hardening substance used to seal openings) from the top of the gas tank[,] ... opened an access plate underneath the bondo and found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks." (15) The Supreme Court ruled that under these circumstances, no level of suspicion is needed to justify the search inasmuch as it and others similarly conducted at the border are inherently "reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border." (16) Unfortunately, the Flores-Montano decision deliberately left unaddressed whether more invasive or lengthier searches, such as potentially destructive drilling, also can be conducted without any suspicion whatsoever. (17)
Similar to drilling for purposes of detecting the contents of a container, the relatively low reasonable suspicion standard is the level of proof required for involuntary x-rays, (18) except, perhaps, in the Ninth Circuit. (19) Indeed, it even can be argued that x-rays, particularly at airports, are routine. (20)
Strip
When a search more invasive than a routine inspection is conducted at the border, additional requirements are imposed. The degree of invasiveness visited upon the detainee must be weighed. (21) A strip search, for example, requires '"reasonable' or 'real' suspicion, directed specifically to [the] person[.]" (22) Note, however, that the continuing viability of the real (as opposed to reasonable) suspicion and other tests (discussed below) (23) developed by the Ninth Circuit are in serious doubt given the 1985 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, (24) which "rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that there exists a 'clear indication' standard, intermediate between 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause,' applicable when a seizure of a traveler persists beyond a routine border search." (25)
Body cavity searches are the most intrusive and personal types of searches. Accordingly, a higher standard sometimes is imposed on the government to conduct such searches, whether they are conducted visually or by way of a physical examination. A visual examination of body cavities generally needs no more than reasonable suspicion, (26) although more is required in the Ninth Circuit--a clear indication or plain suggestion. (27) A physical body cavity inspection at the border also must be based upon reasonable suspicion (28) or, within the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, upon a clear indication that contraband is being hidden in a body cavity. (29)
Detention at the Border
Detaining someone at the border for a period longer than that necessary for a routine inspection is justified if based on reasonable suspicion that the would-be entrant, for example, is "smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal." (30) Once the decision is made to detain someone, the next issue becomes the length of time the person may be detained. There is no "bright-line" solution as each case is judged by its unique set of facts, and a determination whether continued detention is reasonable is reached in light of all of those facts. (31) Courts recognize that the time for which a suspect is held often is lengthened by the suspect's own behavior, which, in balloon-swallowing cases, can involve refusal to eat, drink, excrete, submit to x-rays, or take laxatives. (32) Many cases begin with detentions that ripen into arrests. When the entire restraint period is considered (periods of detention plus arrest), care must be taken to present the facts to a magistrate judge in a timely fashion. Failing to do so may result in motions for sanctions against the government. In one reported decision, a balloon-swallowing defendant argued that his detention actually had ripened into an arrest, that consequently he had not been provided "with the procedural protections required for warrantless arrests," and, therefore, his incriminating statements made after the "arrest" should be suppressed. (33) Although the appellate panel had no trouble dismissing the defendant's argument, (34) it established a rule applicable in the Fifth Circuit that when balloon swallowers are detained, the government "must seek a judicial determination, within a reasonable period, that reasonable suspicion exists to support the detention." This can be done, the court added, by making an ex parte presentation to a magistrate judge. If this is not done within 48 hours, the judges warned that the "burden" shifts "to the government to demonstrate a bona fide emergency or extraordinary circumstance justifying the lengthier delay." (35)
Mail
All mail arriving from overseas certainly may be opened without a warrant at the postal facility in the United States where it first arrives if there is reasonable cause to suspect its contents are being unlawfully introduced into the country. (36) Indeed, the Fourth Amendment permits the inspection of items crossing the border without any suspicion. (37) The area of the law with regard to mail crossing the border has been overlaid, however, with statutory and regulatory provisions, which seemingly provide additional protection to sealed letter class mail. In such cases, "reasonable cause to suspect the presence of ... contraband" (38) must be established. This standard is not difficult to meet. For example, little more than the recognition that the letter class mail originated from a drug source country establishes reasonable cause. (39) Some courts have bypassed the reasonable cause requirement by using a separate statutory provision that has no threshold proof requirement. (40) As the law in this area is confused, it is best to seek guidance from someone knowledgeable in the applicable circuit case law: "[T]he constitutional necessity of the statutory requirement of reasonable suspicion for a search of international mail is unsettled; many lower courts, however, have upheld spot-checks of international mail conducted without particularized suspicion." (41) Note that both the functional equivalent and extended search doctrines may apply to both incoming and outgoing mail or its substitute (e.g., commercial express mail). (42)
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT
"Under the 'functional equivalent' doctrine, routine border searches are constitutionally permissible at places other than actual borders where travelers frequently enter or exit the country." (43) Examples of functional equivalent borders include airports within the United States where international flights depart or first land (44) and at an "established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border." (45) Of course, this means that those traveling by vehicle "may be stopped at fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop is based largely on ethnicity." (46) Additionally, "boats on inland waters with ready access to the sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion whatever." (47) The first point inside the United States where a ship arriving from outside the country docks is another example of a border functional equivalent. (48) The key feature of a border functional equivalent, then, is that it is "the first point at which an entrant may practically be detained." (49)
EXTENDED BORDER
"The extended border doctrine provides that non-routine border searches that occur near the border are deemed constitutionally permissible if reasonable under the Fourth Amendment," something which is determined by a three-part test, "whether 1) there is a reasonable certainty [or a high degree of probability] that a border crossing has occurred; 2) there is a reasonable certainty that no change in the condition of the luggage [i.e., the item or person to be examined] has occurred since the border crossing; and 3) there is a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred." (50) This three-part test becomes necessary in an extended border search context because it "entails greater intrusion on an entrant's legitimate expectation of privacy than does a search conducted at the border or its functional equivalent[.]" (51) What, however, is reasonable certainty? This is a proof threshold that lies between probable cause and beyond a reasonable doubt. (52) Regarding the second ****g of the test, key to concluding whether or not there has been any change in the luggage, conveyance, or any other item, because it crossed the border are factors including "the time and distance from the original entry and the manner and extent of surveillance." (53) The signal characteristic that differentiates the extended border search from one conducted at the border's functional equivalent is that the first "takes place after the first point in time when the entity might have been stopped within the country." (54) Significantly, a proper extended border like a functional equivalent search may take place without either a warrant or probable cause.
ROVING PATROLS
By statute, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the United States Customs Service (USCS) (55) has the power to search any vehicle located "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States" without a warrant. A reasonable distance is defined as "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States." However, such a yardstick is not necessarily determinative. "It is clear, of course, that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution." (56) Despite the statute and regulation, the Supreme Court refused to condone a suspicionless Border Patrol vehicle search 25 air miles north of the border with Mexico that resulted from a roving patrol. Note that a roving patrol does not keep the suspect or suspect conveyance under nearly continuous surveillance from the point where the actual border was crossed. "In the absence of probable cause or consent, the search violated the ... Fourth Amendment right to be free of 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" (57) The Court continued, quoting from one of its earlier opinions, that "those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." (58)
Not only may searches away from the border or its functional/extended equivalent not be conducted absent probable cause or consent, neither may brief stops (59) be effected absent reasonable suspicion. In 1973, the Border Patrol stopped a car below San Clemente, California, and away from the U.S.-Mexican border solely because all three of its occupants "appeared" to be of "Mexican descent." (60) The government relied on the INS statutory and regulatory to support its position that it had the authority to stop vehicles in the border area solely for the purpose of determining whether the occupants were legally in the United States. As before, the Border Patrol was disappointed before the Supreme Court. Al-though recognizing the serious illegal immigrant problem along the southwest border, the Court nevertheless concluded that "[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." (61) The Court went on to expand its remarks, noting
[e]xcept at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on
roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those
facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain
aliens who may be illegally in the country. (62)
In sum, away from the actual, functional equivalent, or extended border, traditional Fourth Amendment concepts apply to both searches and seizures. Put differently, so-called roving patrols enjoy no special Fourth Amendment treatment, nor do they fall under any special exception to the reasonableness requirement.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
BORDER SEARCH AUTHORITY
As a general rule, only those federal officers with customs or immigration enforcement authority, (63) or those acting under their supervision, may conduct border searches. Drug evidence uncovered by an FBI agent who was searching vehicles entering the United States from Mexico to determine if they were stolen was suppressed because he was not cloaked with statutory border search authority. Indeed, the government could not even make a
claim that the FBI agent is a person 'authorized to board or search
vessels' within Section 482 (64) or that customs authority has been
delegated to him. The FBI agent surpassed his authority.... He acted
for general law enforcement purposes, not for enforcement of customs
laws[.] ... Congress and the courts have specifically narrowed the
border searches to searches conducted by customs officials in
enforcement of customs laws. (65)
Additionally, the FBI agent had not been acting in concert with customs officials (66) nor had the agent been cloaked with customs authority as, for example, by a cross-designation of customs powers. The Ninth Circuit has said statutes, such as the one granting customs officials their powers, "represent special designations of authority to them to conduct border searches. That authority also has been extended to immigration authorities and Coast Guard officials" (67) and, conspicuously by omission, to no other federal law enforcement personnel. The court added that
Congress has given the authority to conduct border searches only
to this limited group of officials and has charged them with the
exclusive responsibility for inspecting goods and persons crossing
the borders and for interdicting illegal entries. Searches conducted
by other law enforcement agents are not considered border searches
and must therefore meet the traditional demands of the Fourth
Amendment. (68) If there is to be a delegation or cross-designation
of, for example, customs authority, it will not be valid unless
clearly made, such as by written agreement (69) or, if in the heat of
an enforcement operation, verbally. (70) Delegations of federal
customs authority may be made by designation to other than federal
personnel, such as to state or local law enforcement personnel. (71)
Personnel assisting and under the supervision of customs officials at
the border, such as National Guard soldiers (72) or even
nongovernment individuals, (73) may conduct border searches.
CONCLUSION
Border search authority is an important weapon in the law enforcement arsenal. However, to lawfully exercise such powers, a law enforcement officer must be acting under a clear delegation of authority or acting under the direction and supervision of federal agents who have such authority. Of course, benefits from this authority also may arise through close coordination of investigations and the sharing of information.

[Connaught Ranger]

"Big Brother Is Watching You!"

cant wait to see if they will slap a charge / tax on for searching a persons own laptop!!

Connaught Ranger.:roll:

[Invisigoth]

Just encrypt anything important and hide it. I bet you some 10$ security doughnut won't find it. Or even better, use Linux.

[HR24]

Just encrypt anything important and hide it. I bet you some 10$ security doughnut won't find it. Or even better, use Linux.

The forensics agents in my office break encryptions daily. Most everything can be broken or recovered off of hard drives.

[SuperCavitator]

Just encrypt anything important and hide it. I bet you some 10$ security doughnut won't find it. Or even better, use Linux.

It will be very, very interesting to observe what happens if an inspection identifies encrypted files and the owner refuses to give the password.

To HR24 - Aren't there significant exceptions to "can be broken or recovered," at least where this means less than a few years of brute force attack?

[little icebear]

It will be very, very interesting to observe what happens if an inspection identifies encrypted files and the owner refuses to give the password.


Maybe they´ll put you on a plane and bring you to Egypt or Afghanistan or any other country where some experts can resort to tort... uh, I meant to say: tough interrogation methods on you. :p

[xav]

What about secured work laptops?

I have many friends from college who now work at Harris and Northrop Gruman and travel almost every month.

Guess what... Their work laptops are not only password protected, but they also need to plug in a special USB stick to make it boot. Most of the data on these laptops is encrypted too.

I will have to ask them what their company policy is regarding these new rules in airports.
But somehow I doubt Northrop or Harris will let their employees let some random ghetto security guy (as far as Altanta airport is concerned) access their confidential "secret" or "top secret" rated files... :cantbeli:

[SuperCavitator]

Maybe they´ll put you on a plane and bring you to Egypt or Afghanistan or any other country where some experts can resort to tort... uh, I meant to say: tough interrogation methods on you. :p

You mean someone takes depositions in Egypt and Afghanistan?

[eskachig]

It's absolutely insane that the government would want to look through my private email without reasonable suspicion or a warrant.

[Invisigoth]

The forensics agents in my office break encryptions daily. Most everything can be broken or recovered off of hard drives.

I wanna see some airport goon break a regular 128/256-bit encryption in his office, no way Jose. What's he gonna do, brute-force it with his Pentium-233? :D
Nothing is impenetrable but I doubt the casual checker will find the hidden & encrypted partition on my laptop and manage to break it open without calling in the big guns (gotta protect si ****!) :)

[Andrew Chalmers]

Opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6D5D931898D8168188257432005AC9B8/$file/0650581.pdf?openelement

[HR24]

To HR24 - Aren't there significant exceptions to "can be broken or recovered," at least where this means less than a few years of brute force attack?

There is one exception that I have seen done. A nail right through the hard drive :). Then, tossed in the apartment watering hole. County SO divers found it after a full days search.

[HR24]

I wanna see some airport goon break a regular 128/256-bit encryption in his office, no way Jose. What's he gonna do, brute-force it with his Pentium-233? :D
Nothing is impenetrable but I doubt the casual checker will find the hidden & encrypted partition on my laptop and manage to break it open without calling in the big guns (gotta protect si ****!) :)

You're counting on this, how you say, airport "goon", who may have been run through one of the ICE/Secret Service/IRS computer forensics training programs, not having the best and latest forensic equipment money can buy. If they are serious about it, you can bet they will harden it up.

Some of you folks just don't understand Border Search Authority. I've seen Inspectors turn cars inside out, tear out all of the panelling, rip up the carpet, toss the car up on a lift, crack the transmission, etc. and come away with only a few ounces of cocaine. How? They could articulate that they had reasonable suspicion that there were narcotics somewhere within the vehicle, whether it be by subject indicators, K-9 hit, or X-Ray scan.