Request: CIA SAS MSP info

[pipaz]

I wonder if anyone has more info on CIA's Special Activities Staff, Military Special Projects, more on there missions and people they take, as far as I know most of them are hand picked from SFDD, SF, DEVGRU. I've only herd of them operate in afganistan I wonder if it was the same unit ?

other than specialoperations.com

[FRO]

I wonder if anyone has more info on CIA's Special Activities Staff, Military Special Projects, more on there missions and people they take, as far as I know most of them are hand picked from SFDD, SF, DEVGRU. I've only herd of them operate in afganistan I wonder if it was the same unit ?

other than specialoperations.com

Hi pipaz

I had a similar question very recently and the thread is here:

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/viewtopic.php?t=15956&sid=1db709729a87464968614109b7ac5681

As for outside of A-Stan, I can't say I've read too much. There were a score of articles in newspapers and I remember 1 article from Jane's Defence Weekly that I have at home that I can post but I don't think I have a link for. A quick search on Google for CIA Special Operations Group OR CIA Special Activities Division should turn up some stuff.

If I come across anything more, I'll let you know.

[squeak]

It wouldn't surprise me if they have operated in Yemen, Pakistan, Iran, Phillipines with those baddies down there plus numerous other places.

While I personally would like to read about them, I realise that what they do is Tip Top Secret and not for no-bodies like us.

[FRO]

Here's some of that article. I honestly don't think posting the whole thing really constitutes fair use for copyright purposes. The rest of the article focuses more on the military special operations forces rather than the CIA SA Div.


JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - MARCH 19, 2003

US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORCES: Covert warriors

Andrew Koch is JDW Bureau Chief
Washington, DC

The little-known activities of the CIA paramilitary forces involve fighting secret battles on behalf of the 'war on terrorism'. Moves are under way to increase this covert military punch, writes Andrew Koch

Qaed Senyan al-Harthi (also known as Abu Ali) never knew what hit him. One minute the suspected Al-Qaeda operative and five accomplices were driving along in the Yemeni desert, the next an AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missile fired from a Predator unmanned air vehicle turned their vehicle into a smouldering ruin.

The operation that caused Abu Ali's demise was part of a new US strategy to strike terrorists around the world. That strategy has sought to deny terrorists safehaven, and, as one senior US official described it, "get them moving" in the hopes that operational security mistakes would be made.

But whether Ali's downfall was due to lax operational security or good intelligence, the strike that killed him was carefully planned and implemented by the secret warriors who form the sword-wielding arm of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Called the Special Activities (SA) Division, these CIA paramilitary forces along with covert special operations force (SOF) units are fighting a clandestine 'war on terrorism', details of which are rarely seen or acknowledged.

The Yemen attack is the exception that demonstrates the rule. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the US has conducted covert SOF and paramilitary missions against suspected terrorists around the world from Afghanistan and Colombia to Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen.

They are also active in Iraq. According to US military sources, CIA and SOF forces have travelled in and out of the country's northern and western areas since at least late last year. Those forces are scouting for ballistic-missile launchers and suspected weapons of mass destruction sites, monitoring oil wells, looking for potential Iraqi defectors and organising Kurdish guerrilla forces for operations if there is an armed conflict.

Some Kurdish politicians are also being organised for their role in post-war reconstruction, mostly by the time-tested CIA tactic of buying loyalty.

But it is in Afghanistan where the SA, part of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, has played its most significant role. They were the first US forces sent to the country, smoothing the way for SOF and other military personnel that would follow. Working in small teams of not more than a dozen people, they organised anti-Taliban efforts, often by bribing local warlords; provided intelligence on targets the military would later strike during the air campaign; and prepared landing zones and safehouses for the follow-on SOF personnel. The CIA gave out "bags of cash" while organising Afghan resistance to the Taliban, one official said, estimating the value of the effort at over $50 million.

The CIA personnel built on the agency's year of experience in Afghanistan and contacts with local leaders. As James Pravitt, CIA Deputy Director of Operations, explained earlier this year: "The first American team on the ground out there was CIA - for a reason. We had people with the right local languages, we had people with the right local contacts, and the right universal skills - the ability both to report conditions and, if need be, to change them for the better." The agency has received much public acclaim for this performance in Afghanistan, but the very survival of its secret SA units was in doubt less than a decade ago. By the end of the Cold War the CIA had largely scrapped its covert-action capabilities, especially its paramilitary forces.

According to an agency document, by 1993 the Special Activities Division, then called the Special Activities Staff, had declined to a staff of 190 personnel overseeing a $70 million budget. That changed, starting in July 1997, when Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet took the agency's helm and the SA and other covert-action units began to grow again. The 'war on terrorism' has accelerated that trend, although the unit is still estimated to have no more than "several hundred" operators in the field - perhaps three times the 1993 total. As Pravitt notes: "You simply cannot create overnight the combination of assets - the talent, the sources, that went into the highest possible gear in defence of America after 11 September."

CIA versus military

The growth of the CIA-SA has left some senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials wondering why they are not military missions. Moreover, they asked, why did the military, with its extensive SOF capabilities, have to rely on the CIA to prepare the ground in Afghanistan for the introduction of US military forces? One senior intelligence official noted the agency's views on such a division of labour, explaining that CIA operators can deploy "in days" rather than the weeks it can take the military.

But, he added, the agency cannot sustain that presence for long periods of time due to their limited number of operational personnel. In many instances the CIA sees its role as going in first to prepare the way for SOF/military units to take over.

This, several DoD sources said, worries Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld because CIA operatives could start a conflict that the Pentagon would have to finish. Rather than have this happen, they said, Rumsfeld is seeking to increase the size and capabilities of SOFs capable of fighting a covert war to disrupt, interdict, capture or kill terrorists around the world (Jane's Defence Weekly 15 January).

The newly reinforced SOFs would report to Rumsfeld not Tenet. The plans are for specialised military units to play a greater role in intelligence-gathering, special reconnaissance, and what is called "direct action", a euphemism for clandestine paramilitary operations such as that which killed Abu Ali.

A number of proposals are being floated in the DoD to increase this covert military punch, although none has been approved yet. One, forwarded by the Defense Science Board (DSB), recommends creating "a new elite Counter-Terrorism Proactive Pre-emptive Operations Group" (JDW 6 November 2002).

Comprising personnel with highly specialised skills including covert action, special operations, information operations, intelligence- gathering and deception, the group would report to a specially designated co-ordinator on the National Security Council. At the same time, the study recommended the DoD and CIA "increase emphasis on counter-terrorism covert action to gain close target access".

Increasing DoD capabilities to conduct covert missions might be feasible in some situations, the CIA argues, but any increased SOF role in secret missions abroad would be complementary to, not competing with, the agency's activities. As the senior intelligence official noted, "there are some countries in the world where the DoD cannot easily go into".

This is due to the visibility military forces have that could carry serious political consequences for host countries with which the US is not at war.

Small-scale civilian CIA teams can better conduct missions in such circumstances, the official argued, because they have a better ability and network to blend in. They also offer political cover due to the absence of uniforms and of public US government recognition that provides a degree of plausible deniability. Still, the official said, "when the military enters in, the agency takes on a support role".

[ChuckThunder]

I wonder if anyone has more info on CIA's Special Activities Staff, Military Special Projects, more on there missions and people they take, as far as I know most of them are hand picked from SFDD, SF, DEVGRU. I've only herd of them operate in afganistan I wonder if it was the same unit ?

other than specialoperations.com

They're everywhere.

[pipaz]

Thanks for the update guys, besides for thouse who have read Inside Delta Force, I bet there is an abvious reson why they would consider SFDD, considering the fact that DF is way more than CTT.