[WDW]Megaraptor
05-25-2008, 11:58 PM
On October 19, 1940, four Italian Savoia Marchetti SM82 transports configured as bombers took off from the island of Rhodes in the Aegean (Rhodes was Italian territory before the war and became Greek after the war). Their target: Oil terminals in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. After attacking these targets the planes landed in Eritrea - a 15 1/2 hour, 4,000km flight.
Saudi Arabia was neutral, and the company which owned the bombed terminals was American, and America was also neutral at this time. No serious damage was done to any of the facilities.
Raid on Manama (http://www.comandosupremo.com/Manama.html)
The English refineries in the Persian Gulf were chosen as the first strategic target at the beginning of summer 1940 when the first models of Savoia-Marchetti were produced by the assembly line. They were transport planes converted into bombers.
The craft belonging to this series were provided with forward/ventral laying devices, a bomb release gear and three Breda-Safat machine-guns. The first SM82 bombers started their activity on July 17, when three aircrafts took off from Rome-Guidonia to raid the English stronghold of Gibraltar (100 and 250 kilogram bombs were dropped during this action). Similar attacks were carried out again on Gibraltar on July 25 (this time the planes took off from the base of Alghero in Sardinia) and on August 20. The results were good (the target was hit, although with a small quantity of explosives and some of the planes were lost or damaged during the mission). At the beginning of October 1940, the command of the Regia Aeronautica decided that five SM82 bombers belonging to the 41st Group led by lieutenant-colonel Ettore Muti should be transferred from Rome-Ciampino to the airport of Gadurrà (Isle of Rhodes).
The passage took place on October 13. The Italian Command intended to employ the special SM82s to bomb the English oil plants of Manama, in the Persian Gulf, in order to show the potential ability of the Italian air force. It was a long and difficult mission involving a 4,000 kilometre flight. Ettore Muti and his comrades spent four days working on a complete revision of the plans and established a complex flight plan.
The Italians decided against the highly dangerous manoeuvre of returning to Rhodes on the same route, as they might have been intercepted by the Royal Air Force based in Cyprus, Palestine and Iraq, and chose another option. After bombing the refineries, the planes would head for the southwest, flying over the immense and scarcely inhabited Arabian desert in order to reach the Red Sea and the Italian colony of Eritrea
On December 18, at 5.10 pm, after filling both the normal and the supplementary tanks, they loaded three out of four SM82s with 1.5 tons of incendiary and explosive bombs weighing 15, 20 or 50 kilograms. Then the four three-engine bombers took off.
In command of the first aircraft, which gained height with difficulty from the Rhodes- Gadurrà runway because it was overloaded with 19,500 kilograms, was Lieutenant Colonel Muti. He was assisted by Major Giovanni Raina and by Captain Paolo Moci, who had previous experience in flying planes overloaded up to 21 tons.
Lieutenant Colonel Fortunato Federici, Captain Aldo Buzzaca and Lieutenant Emanuele Francesco Ruspoli were on the second aircraft, while Captain Giorgio Meyer, Lieutenant Adolf Rebex and Warrant Officer Aldo Carrera were on the third one. The fourth plane was piloted by Captain Antonio Zanetti assisted by Lieutenant Vittorio Cecconi and Warrant Officer Mario Badii.
The SM82s, after gaining height (a manoeuvre which took remarkable efforts because of the enormous weight of the aircrafts) headed east, flying over Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria, bending to the southeast as they went past Jordan and Iraq until they reached the Persian Gulf. During the very long outward flight, the role of Muti's SM82 pathfinder proved its essential function in leading the squadron. Two huge white rhombuses had been painted purposefully on the upper side of its wings and lighted by two lamps so that the pilots of the other planes could easily see them and follow Muti's craft in the dark.
For security reasons, the commander had decided that all radio communications should be cut off. This measure was rather uncomfortable for the crew but allowed the Italians to keep the precious advantage of surprise.
Regarding the role played by the pathfinder plane, we must point out that its duty was to spot the target and release its bombs so that the others could do the same. Thanks to the help of a rudimentary device, the only bombardier (Major Giovanni Raina) was expected to find the difficult target. At 2.20 am, just before reaching the Bahrain Islands, Lieutenant Colonel Federici's aircraft suddenly lost sight contact with Muti's SM82 and had to drop its bombs on different targets in the vicinity of Manama, while the other planes hit the fixed target.
As bombardier Raina later told "the operation of spotting the target was easy thanks to the total illumination of the extractive and refinery plants" which were partially damaged by the bombs (half a dozen wells and some oil deposits were set on fire). As soon as they perceived the glares of the first explosions, the Italian planes made off along the escape route landing to the Zula runway (Eritrea) at 8 8:40.
The whole Italian formation had flown 2,400 kilometres in 15.30 hours. At the Eritrean airport, along with a small crowd of Italian aviators, the brave pilots found the fourth SM82 squadron which, in the meantime, had come from Rhodes as a support plane on the way back, should one of the crafts make an emergency landing in the desert.
A few days later, the five SM82s of Colonel Muti took off from Zula and with no further problems, arrived at the Rome-Urbe airport. From a strict military point of view, the raid on the oil refineries of Manama was not able (especially because of the few planes employed) to cause severe damages to the enemy. The enterprise led by Muti had, however, a great importance in the technical and propagandistic side. In fact, after the raid, the RAF was compelled to place a squadron of fighters near the refineries and protect the plants with a couple of battalions and some batteries of antiaircraft guns.
Saudi view of the air raid (http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/197001/discovery.the.story.of.aramco.then-chapter.12.air.raid.htm)
In Dhahran many people had heard those same explosions. "Spike" Spurlock, the lawyer who had drawn up the papers for the incorporation of Casoc in 1933 and who had until recently been in the London office, lay there awhile listening for something more, and then rolled over and went back to sleep. But Spurlock was a philosopher by nature, so unexcitable that his friends swore a self-winding wrist watch would invariably go dead on his wrist. Others, not so calm, ran out in shirttails, pajamas, or less, to discover what went on. Bill Eltiste dashed out of his quarters, and his neighbor, Mrs. Dreyfus, out of hers, and together they talked for a while, before Bill realized he had neglected to dress. He denies indignantly, however, that he was naked. "I had my shoes on," he says, and besides, as if in mitigation of the informality of his attire, "it was dark."
By then the Italian planes which had dropped two or three dozen small 50-pound fragmentation bombs on Arabia and more than 80 on Bahrain were a long way off to the west in the shining metallic sky, headed for Eritrea. They had come, it appeared later, from the Dodecanese Islands. Since no wreckage was ever found, it was presumed that they made their African sanctuary on the fuel they had. W7hy they had bombed the refinery on Bahrain was obvious enough, but why they had dropped bombs on Saudi Arabia, a neutral country whose government they were trying to woo, was a harder one. And when people got out in the morning and began to inspect the damage they had done, everything disintegrated into guess and speculation and incredulity mixed with ribald rumor. If the bombers had been manned by Mark Twain's version of James Fenimore Cooper's Indians they could not have performed more ineptly.
TIME article from Oct. 1940 (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,764881,00.html)
With its own private Drang Nach Osten (Drive to the East) already pushed from Ethiopia through British Somaliland, hammering at the island of Perim in the Red Sea and the port of Haifa on the Mediterranean, Italy took a running jump last week, landed at the far edge of the Middle East. Out across the sands of Arabia to the Persian Gulf it sent a squadron of heavy bombers, driving at the oil depots and refineries of the Bahrein Archipelago.
This was, strictly, no legitimate objective. The Bahrein oil concessions are owned jointly by Texas Corp. and Standard Oil of California. Bahrein's ruler is an independent sheik, its western inhabitants mostly Americans. But Italy quickly pointed out that California Texas Oil Co. is a British corporation, that Bahrein is governed as a British protectorate.
With exultant whoops Rome claimed "enormous fires that could be seen at a great distance." Caustically Cairo replied that there had been no casualties and little damage, that only four planes had appeared. From San Francisco, Standard of California confirmed the British report, said only a water main and an oil pipe had been damaged.
More important to Italy than the actual destruction accomplished was the propaganda value of the raid. Loudly Rome boasted that the bombers had set a new distance record, covering 2,800 miles on the outgoing trip from bases in Libya or Italy. It was a lot more probable that they had taken off from Eritrea, or that the Italian military mission had won the use of an air base from the French in Syria. But Italy stuck to its story, declared the planes had been refueled from submarine tankers. The warning to the U. S. and the Near East was clear.
Saudi Arabia was neutral, and the company which owned the bombed terminals was American, and America was also neutral at this time. No serious damage was done to any of the facilities.
Raid on Manama (http://www.comandosupremo.com/Manama.html)
The English refineries in the Persian Gulf were chosen as the first strategic target at the beginning of summer 1940 when the first models of Savoia-Marchetti were produced by the assembly line. They were transport planes converted into bombers.
The craft belonging to this series were provided with forward/ventral laying devices, a bomb release gear and three Breda-Safat machine-guns. The first SM82 bombers started their activity on July 17, when three aircrafts took off from Rome-Guidonia to raid the English stronghold of Gibraltar (100 and 250 kilogram bombs were dropped during this action). Similar attacks were carried out again on Gibraltar on July 25 (this time the planes took off from the base of Alghero in Sardinia) and on August 20. The results were good (the target was hit, although with a small quantity of explosives and some of the planes were lost or damaged during the mission). At the beginning of October 1940, the command of the Regia Aeronautica decided that five SM82 bombers belonging to the 41st Group led by lieutenant-colonel Ettore Muti should be transferred from Rome-Ciampino to the airport of Gadurrà (Isle of Rhodes).
The passage took place on October 13. The Italian Command intended to employ the special SM82s to bomb the English oil plants of Manama, in the Persian Gulf, in order to show the potential ability of the Italian air force. It was a long and difficult mission involving a 4,000 kilometre flight. Ettore Muti and his comrades spent four days working on a complete revision of the plans and established a complex flight plan.
The Italians decided against the highly dangerous manoeuvre of returning to Rhodes on the same route, as they might have been intercepted by the Royal Air Force based in Cyprus, Palestine and Iraq, and chose another option. After bombing the refineries, the planes would head for the southwest, flying over the immense and scarcely inhabited Arabian desert in order to reach the Red Sea and the Italian colony of Eritrea
On December 18, at 5.10 pm, after filling both the normal and the supplementary tanks, they loaded three out of four SM82s with 1.5 tons of incendiary and explosive bombs weighing 15, 20 or 50 kilograms. Then the four three-engine bombers took off.
In command of the first aircraft, which gained height with difficulty from the Rhodes- Gadurrà runway because it was overloaded with 19,500 kilograms, was Lieutenant Colonel Muti. He was assisted by Major Giovanni Raina and by Captain Paolo Moci, who had previous experience in flying planes overloaded up to 21 tons.
Lieutenant Colonel Fortunato Federici, Captain Aldo Buzzaca and Lieutenant Emanuele Francesco Ruspoli were on the second aircraft, while Captain Giorgio Meyer, Lieutenant Adolf Rebex and Warrant Officer Aldo Carrera were on the third one. The fourth plane was piloted by Captain Antonio Zanetti assisted by Lieutenant Vittorio Cecconi and Warrant Officer Mario Badii.
The SM82s, after gaining height (a manoeuvre which took remarkable efforts because of the enormous weight of the aircrafts) headed east, flying over Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria, bending to the southeast as they went past Jordan and Iraq until they reached the Persian Gulf. During the very long outward flight, the role of Muti's SM82 pathfinder proved its essential function in leading the squadron. Two huge white rhombuses had been painted purposefully on the upper side of its wings and lighted by two lamps so that the pilots of the other planes could easily see them and follow Muti's craft in the dark.
For security reasons, the commander had decided that all radio communications should be cut off. This measure was rather uncomfortable for the crew but allowed the Italians to keep the precious advantage of surprise.
Regarding the role played by the pathfinder plane, we must point out that its duty was to spot the target and release its bombs so that the others could do the same. Thanks to the help of a rudimentary device, the only bombardier (Major Giovanni Raina) was expected to find the difficult target. At 2.20 am, just before reaching the Bahrain Islands, Lieutenant Colonel Federici's aircraft suddenly lost sight contact with Muti's SM82 and had to drop its bombs on different targets in the vicinity of Manama, while the other planes hit the fixed target.
As bombardier Raina later told "the operation of spotting the target was easy thanks to the total illumination of the extractive and refinery plants" which were partially damaged by the bombs (half a dozen wells and some oil deposits were set on fire). As soon as they perceived the glares of the first explosions, the Italian planes made off along the escape route landing to the Zula runway (Eritrea) at 8 8:40.
The whole Italian formation had flown 2,400 kilometres in 15.30 hours. At the Eritrean airport, along with a small crowd of Italian aviators, the brave pilots found the fourth SM82 squadron which, in the meantime, had come from Rhodes as a support plane on the way back, should one of the crafts make an emergency landing in the desert.
A few days later, the five SM82s of Colonel Muti took off from Zula and with no further problems, arrived at the Rome-Urbe airport. From a strict military point of view, the raid on the oil refineries of Manama was not able (especially because of the few planes employed) to cause severe damages to the enemy. The enterprise led by Muti had, however, a great importance in the technical and propagandistic side. In fact, after the raid, the RAF was compelled to place a squadron of fighters near the refineries and protect the plants with a couple of battalions and some batteries of antiaircraft guns.
Saudi view of the air raid (http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/197001/discovery.the.story.of.aramco.then-chapter.12.air.raid.htm)
In Dhahran many people had heard those same explosions. "Spike" Spurlock, the lawyer who had drawn up the papers for the incorporation of Casoc in 1933 and who had until recently been in the London office, lay there awhile listening for something more, and then rolled over and went back to sleep. But Spurlock was a philosopher by nature, so unexcitable that his friends swore a self-winding wrist watch would invariably go dead on his wrist. Others, not so calm, ran out in shirttails, pajamas, or less, to discover what went on. Bill Eltiste dashed out of his quarters, and his neighbor, Mrs. Dreyfus, out of hers, and together they talked for a while, before Bill realized he had neglected to dress. He denies indignantly, however, that he was naked. "I had my shoes on," he says, and besides, as if in mitigation of the informality of his attire, "it was dark."
By then the Italian planes which had dropped two or three dozen small 50-pound fragmentation bombs on Arabia and more than 80 on Bahrain were a long way off to the west in the shining metallic sky, headed for Eritrea. They had come, it appeared later, from the Dodecanese Islands. Since no wreckage was ever found, it was presumed that they made their African sanctuary on the fuel they had. W7hy they had bombed the refinery on Bahrain was obvious enough, but why they had dropped bombs on Saudi Arabia, a neutral country whose government they were trying to woo, was a harder one. And when people got out in the morning and began to inspect the damage they had done, everything disintegrated into guess and speculation and incredulity mixed with ribald rumor. If the bombers had been manned by Mark Twain's version of James Fenimore Cooper's Indians they could not have performed more ineptly.
TIME article from Oct. 1940 (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,764881,00.html)
With its own private Drang Nach Osten (Drive to the East) already pushed from Ethiopia through British Somaliland, hammering at the island of Perim in the Red Sea and the port of Haifa on the Mediterranean, Italy took a running jump last week, landed at the far edge of the Middle East. Out across the sands of Arabia to the Persian Gulf it sent a squadron of heavy bombers, driving at the oil depots and refineries of the Bahrein Archipelago.
This was, strictly, no legitimate objective. The Bahrein oil concessions are owned jointly by Texas Corp. and Standard Oil of California. Bahrein's ruler is an independent sheik, its western inhabitants mostly Americans. But Italy quickly pointed out that California Texas Oil Co. is a British corporation, that Bahrein is governed as a British protectorate.
With exultant whoops Rome claimed "enormous fires that could be seen at a great distance." Caustically Cairo replied that there had been no casualties and little damage, that only four planes had appeared. From San Francisco, Standard of California confirmed the British report, said only a water main and an oil pipe had been damaged.
More important to Italy than the actual destruction accomplished was the propaganda value of the raid. Loudly Rome boasted that the bombers had set a new distance record, covering 2,800 miles on the outgoing trip from bases in Libya or Italy. It was a lot more probable that they had taken off from Eritrea, or that the Italian military mission had won the use of an air base from the French in Syria. But Italy stuck to its story, declared the planes had been refueled from submarine tankers. The warning to the U. S. and the Near East was clear.