2RHPZ
06-01-2004, 03:18 PM
GWOT logistics aligning the Navy/SOF team
Navy Supply Corps Newsletter, Jan-Feb, 2004 by Gerry Harms
The Chief of Naval Operations recently convened a CNO Executive Panel (CEP) to
look at Navy Special Operations Forces (SOF). The CEP is an advisory group
composed of distinguished civilian representatives from the scientific,
academic, engineering, and political communities that provides advice and
recommendations on how the Navy can more effectively fulfill its national
security role. The study, which will take the better part of a year to complete,
will review several aspects of Navy SOF, but will focus on determining "what
lessons ... can be applied to the fleet to make the Navy/Marine Corps team more
'SOF-like.'" The Navy is becoming more like Special Forces--how's that for
transformation? To quote the famous Bob Dylan song, "Oh the times, they are a-
changing."
America will be fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) for years to come
and effectiveness in this war will be largely determined by how quickly we can
respond militarily. Actionable intelligence will have a short shelf life and to
be effective, our response (both in mission planning and execution) must be
measured in hours, vice months.
Why is the CNO interested in the fleet becoming more SOF-like Because he
recognizes the uniqueness and critical importance of the Navy/ Special Warfare
team in executing GWOT missions. Across DoD, no other force is positioned to
respond as rapidly because no other force is as ubiquitous, or can leverage the
freedom of movement we enjoy as a Navy operating independently on the world's
oceans.
So there is a compelling need for a better integrated Navy/SOF team and this
need is driving a fundamental and comprehensive shift in the Navy's approach to
platform capabilities. Whether sea, undersea or air, future Navy platform will
place a stronger emphasis on the "SOF-capable" designs aspects. We're seeing it
today in the Jimmy Carter Class SSGN, the first Navy submarine class designed
from the ground up with SOF as a primary mission. We'll see it in the design and
functionality of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), where the Commander Naval
Special Warfare Command sits as a member of the Executive Steering Group
overseeing platform development. On the aviation side, we'll see it in the CV
22, but we're also likely to see an increased emphasis on developing our current
inventory of rotary wing aircraft to become more SOF-capable platforms.
So what does all this mean to us as the Navy's professional logisticians? Our
vision must ensure logistics infrastructure and processes are as integrated and
responsive as the platforms and missions we support.
That seems like a tall order, particularly when you consider these missions (as
CAPT Snyder details in his article on support to SPECWAR during Operation Iraqi
Freedom on page 2 of this issue of the Newsletter) may often execute far ashore,
may be joint, may be conducted with coalition forces or may be combined
operations with other government agencies. Our operational focus as a Navy
Supply Community has always, and for good reason, been support to ships at sea.
It is now clearly in the national interest that we broaden that scope, and
become as capable executing integrated expeditionary logistics ashore, as we are
at supporting a carrier battle group at sea.
The logistics support we provide SEALs and SWCCs (surface warfare combatant
crewmen) is not particularly complex. The "scale of the tail" isn't great, nor
are the resupply demands (we take most of what we need with us).
However, some capital investment is required to better support expeditionary
operations. For example we' re improving ground mobility by obtaining funding
and fielding the vehicles necessary to mechanize SEAL teams so we can move both
operators and required support wherever they need to be. We also need investment
in our information technology (IT). We need to understand unique expeditionary
logistics requirements and ensure we design a logistics IT solution that meets
those needs. Portablity is an issue, remote connectivity is a factor, and the
range of logistics an expeditionary supply officer or a Joint Task Force J4
needs to track goes far beyond any current Log IT system.
I was amazed when I first realized how minimally supported our SEALs were. Up
until recently the approach to logistics support ashore for SPECWAR operators
was jokingly referred to as "go forward and mooch." There was no planned, let
alone dedicated, support for the Navy's premier warfighters ashore. SEALs would
literally figure it out when they got there, cobbling together support for
basics like food and transportation, from wherever they could. In fact,
Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first time in Naval Special Warfare history a
dedicated logistics element deployed with the operational force. In after action
reports of the conflict, SPECWAR leadership cited logistics support as a "force
multiplier" and a key factor in their historic mission success. Logistics
support simply "allowed SPECWAR operators to do things they otherwise could not
have done."
SPECWAR logistics has matured significantly over the past several years and an
essential reason why is the establishment of our Logistics Support Units
(LOGSUs). Before the LOGSUs, each SEAL Team managed its own logistics. For the
most part, teams were largely independent of one another. Good for autonomy, but
bad for economies of scale, standardization of practices, readiness to respond
logistically to large scale contingency operations, or integrating with other
organizations, SPECWAR leadership decided to scale back the SEAL teams to just
the "trigger pullers," and everyone else consolidated into the new LOGSU
commands.
Logistics as defined by the LOGSUs goes far beyond traditional Supply operations
by integrating a comprehensive range of technical and administrative experts
under a single command. As the LOGSU organization chart depicts, everything from
medical, to dive operations, to weapons and combat service support fall under
the LOGSU umbrella. While the organization is still evolving, payoffs on
readiness are clear. As a force, we are better able to respond to large scale
contingencies because we' re far more integrated logistically. SPECWAR
leadership has a single place to turn to understand the spectrum of logistics
related readiness issues. Options to address any deficiency are also
significantly increased and easier to implement because our equipment, our
training and our practices are more standardized and integrated.
As SPECWAR logistics matures internally, we find ourselves in a better position
to work with and leverage other logistics activities. And it's critical we do
that. NAVSUP recognizes the importance of this as well ... not only for the
SPECWAR Community, but for all expeditionary communities of the Navy/Marine
Corps Team. They took action to address this need by establishing the
Expeditionary Support Policy Council (ESPC), a standing body focused on
improving our ability as a maritime force to deliver and sustain logistics
support ashore. The ESPC provides an excellent opportunity for SEABEEs, EOD,
Marines, SPECWAR and other expeditionary elements to focus on the logistics
seams of our individual organizations and determine where we can leverage, where
we can standardize, where we can learn from each other, and the fleet, to
improve our responsiveness and our ability to effectively sustain support
ashore.
Naval Special Warfare logistics has undergone its own transformation during the
last few years but much work remains. While we're all answering the CNO's
question of how the fleet can become more SOF-like, we need to also answer the
question of how SPECWAR can become more like the Navy. Competent answers and
actions will mean a better aligned Navy/SOF team, a more responsive force, and
bottom line ... improved effectiveness executing GWOT missions.
Captain Gerry Harms, SC, USN Assistant Chief of Staff, Director, Logistics at
Headquarters, Naval Special Warfare Command
CAPT Gerry Harms holds an M.S. in Information Management from NPGS and an M.S.
in National Resource Strategy from ICAF. He is a qualified JSO and SWO. His
previous supply related shore tours include the U.S. Special Operations Command,
Tampa, Fla.; Fleet Industrial Supply Center, Yokosuka, Japan; and the Strategic
Systems Program Office, Washington, D.C. His shipboard tours include the USS
Leahy (CG 16), USS Edson (DD 946) and the USS La Moure County (LST 1194). CAPT
Harms' e-mail address is: gerard.harms@navsoc.navy.mil
U.S. Department of the Navy, Supply Systems Command
Navy Supply Corps Newsletter, Jan-Feb, 2004 by Gerry Harms
The Chief of Naval Operations recently convened a CNO Executive Panel (CEP) to
look at Navy Special Operations Forces (SOF). The CEP is an advisory group
composed of distinguished civilian representatives from the scientific,
academic, engineering, and political communities that provides advice and
recommendations on how the Navy can more effectively fulfill its national
security role. The study, which will take the better part of a year to complete,
will review several aspects of Navy SOF, but will focus on determining "what
lessons ... can be applied to the fleet to make the Navy/Marine Corps team more
'SOF-like.'" The Navy is becoming more like Special Forces--how's that for
transformation? To quote the famous Bob Dylan song, "Oh the times, they are a-
changing."
America will be fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) for years to come
and effectiveness in this war will be largely determined by how quickly we can
respond militarily. Actionable intelligence will have a short shelf life and to
be effective, our response (both in mission planning and execution) must be
measured in hours, vice months.
Why is the CNO interested in the fleet becoming more SOF-like Because he
recognizes the uniqueness and critical importance of the Navy/ Special Warfare
team in executing GWOT missions. Across DoD, no other force is positioned to
respond as rapidly because no other force is as ubiquitous, or can leverage the
freedom of movement we enjoy as a Navy operating independently on the world's
oceans.
So there is a compelling need for a better integrated Navy/SOF team and this
need is driving a fundamental and comprehensive shift in the Navy's approach to
platform capabilities. Whether sea, undersea or air, future Navy platform will
place a stronger emphasis on the "SOF-capable" designs aspects. We're seeing it
today in the Jimmy Carter Class SSGN, the first Navy submarine class designed
from the ground up with SOF as a primary mission. We'll see it in the design and
functionality of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), where the Commander Naval
Special Warfare Command sits as a member of the Executive Steering Group
overseeing platform development. On the aviation side, we'll see it in the CV
22, but we're also likely to see an increased emphasis on developing our current
inventory of rotary wing aircraft to become more SOF-capable platforms.
So what does all this mean to us as the Navy's professional logisticians? Our
vision must ensure logistics infrastructure and processes are as integrated and
responsive as the platforms and missions we support.
That seems like a tall order, particularly when you consider these missions (as
CAPT Snyder details in his article on support to SPECWAR during Operation Iraqi
Freedom on page 2 of this issue of the Newsletter) may often execute far ashore,
may be joint, may be conducted with coalition forces or may be combined
operations with other government agencies. Our operational focus as a Navy
Supply Community has always, and for good reason, been support to ships at sea.
It is now clearly in the national interest that we broaden that scope, and
become as capable executing integrated expeditionary logistics ashore, as we are
at supporting a carrier battle group at sea.
The logistics support we provide SEALs and SWCCs (surface warfare combatant
crewmen) is not particularly complex. The "scale of the tail" isn't great, nor
are the resupply demands (we take most of what we need with us).
However, some capital investment is required to better support expeditionary
operations. For example we' re improving ground mobility by obtaining funding
and fielding the vehicles necessary to mechanize SEAL teams so we can move both
operators and required support wherever they need to be. We also need investment
in our information technology (IT). We need to understand unique expeditionary
logistics requirements and ensure we design a logistics IT solution that meets
those needs. Portablity is an issue, remote connectivity is a factor, and the
range of logistics an expeditionary supply officer or a Joint Task Force J4
needs to track goes far beyond any current Log IT system.
I was amazed when I first realized how minimally supported our SEALs were. Up
until recently the approach to logistics support ashore for SPECWAR operators
was jokingly referred to as "go forward and mooch." There was no planned, let
alone dedicated, support for the Navy's premier warfighters ashore. SEALs would
literally figure it out when they got there, cobbling together support for
basics like food and transportation, from wherever they could. In fact,
Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first time in Naval Special Warfare history a
dedicated logistics element deployed with the operational force. In after action
reports of the conflict, SPECWAR leadership cited logistics support as a "force
multiplier" and a key factor in their historic mission success. Logistics
support simply "allowed SPECWAR operators to do things they otherwise could not
have done."
SPECWAR logistics has matured significantly over the past several years and an
essential reason why is the establishment of our Logistics Support Units
(LOGSUs). Before the LOGSUs, each SEAL Team managed its own logistics. For the
most part, teams were largely independent of one another. Good for autonomy, but
bad for economies of scale, standardization of practices, readiness to respond
logistically to large scale contingency operations, or integrating with other
organizations, SPECWAR leadership decided to scale back the SEAL teams to just
the "trigger pullers," and everyone else consolidated into the new LOGSU
commands.
Logistics as defined by the LOGSUs goes far beyond traditional Supply operations
by integrating a comprehensive range of technical and administrative experts
under a single command. As the LOGSU organization chart depicts, everything from
medical, to dive operations, to weapons and combat service support fall under
the LOGSU umbrella. While the organization is still evolving, payoffs on
readiness are clear. As a force, we are better able to respond to large scale
contingencies because we' re far more integrated logistically. SPECWAR
leadership has a single place to turn to understand the spectrum of logistics
related readiness issues. Options to address any deficiency are also
significantly increased and easier to implement because our equipment, our
training and our practices are more standardized and integrated.
As SPECWAR logistics matures internally, we find ourselves in a better position
to work with and leverage other logistics activities. And it's critical we do
that. NAVSUP recognizes the importance of this as well ... not only for the
SPECWAR Community, but for all expeditionary communities of the Navy/Marine
Corps Team. They took action to address this need by establishing the
Expeditionary Support Policy Council (ESPC), a standing body focused on
improving our ability as a maritime force to deliver and sustain logistics
support ashore. The ESPC provides an excellent opportunity for SEABEEs, EOD,
Marines, SPECWAR and other expeditionary elements to focus on the logistics
seams of our individual organizations and determine where we can leverage, where
we can standardize, where we can learn from each other, and the fleet, to
improve our responsiveness and our ability to effectively sustain support
ashore.
Naval Special Warfare logistics has undergone its own transformation during the
last few years but much work remains. While we're all answering the CNO's
question of how the fleet can become more SOF-like, we need to also answer the
question of how SPECWAR can become more like the Navy. Competent answers and
actions will mean a better aligned Navy/SOF team, a more responsive force, and
bottom line ... improved effectiveness executing GWOT missions.
Captain Gerry Harms, SC, USN Assistant Chief of Staff, Director, Logistics at
Headquarters, Naval Special Warfare Command
CAPT Gerry Harms holds an M.S. in Information Management from NPGS and an M.S.
in National Resource Strategy from ICAF. He is a qualified JSO and SWO. His
previous supply related shore tours include the U.S. Special Operations Command,
Tampa, Fla.; Fleet Industrial Supply Center, Yokosuka, Japan; and the Strategic
Systems Program Office, Washington, D.C. His shipboard tours include the USS
Leahy (CG 16), USS Edson (DD 946) and the USS La Moure County (LST 1194). CAPT
Harms' e-mail address is: gerard.harms@navsoc.navy.mil
U.S. Department of the Navy, Supply Systems Command