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2RHPZ
06-01-2004, 04:53 PM
Posted: April 18 2003,10:27 *
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Massoud: U.S. forgot its 'moral responsibility' in Afghanistan
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(CNN) -- Ahmed Shah Massoud was one of the most well-known Afghan commanders in the 10-year war against the Soviet Union occupation. He became known as the "Lion of Panjshir" for the battles he led against Soviet troops in the Panjshir Valley. *
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When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, he emerged as one of the commanders as the former Afghan mujahedeen split into groups and fought a civil war for control of the country. When the fundamentalist Taliban Islamic militia captured Kabul and gain control of most of the country in 1996, Massoud, an ethnic Tajik, fled to the hills of northern Afghanistan. There, he commanded a coalition of ethnic Uzbek and Tajik forces known as the Northern Alliance that control 5 percent of the country and are fighting against the Taliban. *
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But Massoud is no longer the leader. Two men, posing as journalists, exploded a bomb hidden inside a television camera on September 9, mortally wounding Massoud. The Northern Alliance alleges that attack, which came just two days before the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, was ordered by suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden, who is the main suspect behind the September 11 attacks. *
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Below is the transcript of an interview of Massoud that was done for CNN's Cold War documentary series. The interview was conducted via a translator. *
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CNN: I just wonder if you could ask Commander Massoud what life was like in Afghanistan before the war? *
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MASSOUD: Before the breakout of war in Afghanistan, there was peace and the armed forces controlled the whole country. Life was calm, and the young generation was in favor of transformation: they were not happy with the situation. *
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CNN: Why did things change? Who was responsible for it? *
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MASSOUD: As I mentioned, the majority of the young generation and under-ground parties, undoubtedly ... even the left parties, the Islamic parties and those parties which had liberal ideas, and all the people of Afghanistan, wanted change. But the communists had relations with foreigners, and they also wanted to take part in changes and to change the situation in their favor. And also, in these changes and transformations, the aims and objectives of the former Soviet Union ... and the other main issue was the inner conflict between the royal family. During the period of Zahir Shah (the last king of Afghanistan, deposed in 1973), Zahir had problems with Doud (Zahir's cousin who Zahir had forced to resign prime minister in 1963) ... and he (Doud) wanted to become president after Zahir. And the people of Afghanistan also wanted to bring change in Afghanistan. And just the inner conflict within the royal family caused (problems) ... and also Daud carried out a military coup and he overthrew the king and took power. *
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CNN: Why were you opposed to the PDPA? (the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) *
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MASSOUD: Before the communists took power, everybody knew that they were the puppet of Russia. All the people of Afghanistan knew from Peter's time that the Soviet Union had the objective of reaching warm water; and also, the Soviet Union wanted to occupy the region's countries and they wanted to follow their own objectives. They were atheists, and their ideas and their ideology were not in conformity with our culture. And gradually, the people of Afghanistan got to know their faces and people knew that, except for disaster and tragedy, they could not bring anything for the benefit of the people. And also, the people of Afghanistan had the memory of the former Soviet Union's government in the Central Asian republics, and they had a negative impression of the former Soviet Union. *
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CNN: What was it about the reforms that really he objected to, or people objected to? *
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MASSOUD: Part of these reforms ... it was not in conformity with our culture. For example, when the communists took power, they exerted pressure on the people, on old women, to take part in literacy courses. This was something the people of Afghanistan were not used to. Besides that, they exerted pressure on the people; the communists went to the villages and they wanted to register the people, and they forced them... especially they wanted to ask the men to tell t to give the names of their wives. It's not according to our culture to ask women's names to register them for literacy courses. And also the land reforms, they had their special objectives: they wanted to just use these people who had land to struggle for the communists. And the communists extrajudicially (illegally) captured and arrested the people, and executed them without trial. As a result of these actions of the communists, finally the people of Afghanistan rose up against them and struggled. And another matter that I would like to mention (is that) when the communists took power, they wanted to inculcate their godless, atheist ideas into people. This was their motto, but the people of Afghanistan knew their true faces. *
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CNN: How did the negative impact of all these reforms contribute to the creation of the mujahedeen? *
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MASSOUD: As I already mentioned, the people of the Central Asian republics and Afghanistan did not have a good memory of the former Soviet Union. And secondly, their own actions, their own deeds also resulted in the people of Afghanistan (wanting to get) rid of them and struggling against them. And I myself entered the Panjshir, and I had no effect on the Panjshir people. And when I entered from Nuristan (a province in Northern Afghanistan) to Panjshir, I didn't have money with me, and when I reached the Panjshir, and this was a base where the people knew that they could launch a struggle against the Russians. And I talked with the people, and they prepared and expressed their readiness to struggle against the communists. All the groups came to me at night; and as I mentioned, I had nothing, not even a gun. Young and old got ready - even scholars, the young generation. The peasants and workers gave their support and all of them came to me and they (asked) me that I also organize them and prepare them for an uprising. And all the pressure of the communists on the people resulted in these things. *
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CNN: Could you just explain a bit about how fighting and dying relates to God and the jihad? *
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MASSOUD: As I mentioned before about the communists, they are godless, atheists. And besides this, they were a puppet of foreigners, they were cruel, they oppressed the people, because the people accounted themselves righteously. And from the religious point of view, fighting against the communists ... if someone is dying they (say) they are "in the path of God," and if he is a martyr, then he (has achieved) martyrdom. In both cases, ... we will fulfil our duty in the face of God and in the face of the people of Afghanistan. *
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CNN: Right. What do you remember of December 27, 1979, when the Red Army entered Afghanistan? *
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MASSOUD: On that day, I was with some of my groups in the valley of Panjshir, and I wanted to switch on Radio Afghanistan. And when I switched on and found Radio Afghanistan, suddenly I heard the voice of Karmal (Babrak Karmal was installed as Afghanistan's communist leader when the Soviets invaded) saying something bad about Hafizullah Amin (the Afghan communist leader who was killed when the Soviets invaded) and I was surprised: how had it happened that the situation had changed in Kabul? I switched on to another station, and again Karmal was on the radio, and again we found out from other radio stations that Karmal had taken power with the help of Russia, and I finally knew what was happening. And then I kept in touch with the scholars, with the people of Afghanistan ... and really that day, I tell you I was not disappointed, I was very happy, because the Russians occupied Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan after that knew that they were occupying Afghanistan and they were aggressive troops, and I believed in the people of Afghanistan resisting against this until the last drop of their blood and all the aggressors had been defeated in Afghanistan, and I believed that the Russians would also be defeated. And I told my friends: "I believe from this time that I am successful." *
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CNN: What struck you about the Russians' initial military tactics, the first time that you saw them? *
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MASSOUD: Their first offensive was on Panjshir in spring, and we also came across Russians at that time. I was not at that time in Panjshir. And those groups who were in Panjshir ... the Russians suffered many casualties. And after fighting the Russians, we had a discussion, and when I asked my colleagues "What was the result of this fighting, and how did you fight against the Russians? What did you see?", all of them told us: "We thought that the Russians were very strong and their tactics were very strong." But the colleagues told me "They are not such good fighters -- they just made their column and they launched their offensive, and from behind, we started our firing." And they (entered) the valley, and we could one by one to take under our target (pick them out one by one)." It was propaganda that the Red Army was very strong and terrible, and when our friends came across them they found out that if that's how strong the Russians were, they were very happy. *
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CNN: (The Russian) military tactics changed, and how did he manage to cope with that? *
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MASSOUD: The Russian tactics changed very slowly; they only thought about their mistakes at the end of their fighting, and when they changed their tactics, we also changed our tactics. First their tactic was to bombard, and they launched their offensive with tanks. We were around the mountains at that time, and they started to use helicopters to deliver their troops. We also started to change our tactics at that time and tried to put our arms and ammunition in places where the Russians wouldn't be able to seize them, and we distributed all our troops on mountain tops, and with small mobile groups we moved and started our fighting against the Russians and took the initiative from the Russians and inflicted heavy blows on them in the Panjshir Valley. *
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We had very severe fighting with the Russians, and we had a temporary ceasefire with them, and at this time we started our reinforcement in the northern provinces. This was a very good year; and then the Russians again launched a huge offensive and brought very large troops there and also spread mines everywhere and cut off the routes and bombarded different positions. They wanted to bring quite a lot of their troops to the valley, and I knew about their aims and objectives. Then I told my colleagues ... "let them come" But it was not simple duty. And every day at that time, two reconnaissance aircraft flew over the Panjshir Valley, and they followed us step by step. We wanted to deceive the enemy and we resisted against the Russians. Before the start of fighting, we also engaged in some formation fighting, and at that time I had 3,000 guns. Twenty-four days before the fighting, I asked the people of the valley to evacuate the valley, and thousands of people replied positively to our request. And one day before the launching of the Russian offensive, on the excuse that we would like to launch our fighting in the northern provinces, we retreated our forces, and our fighters fought very well in the northern provinces. One day before the Russians started their offensive, we transferred thousands of mujahedeen along the valley, and they descended their troops, and we also spread thousands of miles around. When the troops descended, everywhere they came across anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. From the informational point of view and from the tactical point of view, our troops did very well, and the Russians became like mad. And in Parvan, there also broke out fighting against the Russians. They searched for our groups by helicopter, but we managed to inflict heavy blows on the Russians. At that time, the weather conditions were very good, and we intensified our mobile fighting and activities against Russia. *
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After the first conflict we had with the Russians, when the Russians suffered a reverse, people realized that they could resist against the Red Army. Everybody, every country feared the Red Army at that time, but as a result of our first resistance, the people of Afghanistan knew that we could resist against the Red Army. *
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CNN: Could he just talk us through some of the human suffering that he experienced because of the war, the atrocities? *
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MASSOUD: One of the negative issues (was) their mass killing, and they bombarded villages, residential areas. Old men, women and children were killed by the Russians. Naturally it affected everybody, every human being. When the Red Army suffered reverses and casualties, they killed young and old indiscriminately, even animals, and I myself was an eyewitness of an event. In one place, the people resisted against the Russians, and when I went there I saw the killing of the people: women, men and even animals. In one case, the Russians also poured petrol on people's bodies and burned them. It was very tragic. Another thing that affected the Russians was that when the people realize that the Russians would launch an offensive, and also the Russians bombarded during the day, people wanted to evacuate their villages, and whatever they had, their belongings, they took with them. It was really a very negative action. *
CNN: It's obvious that as the war progressed, the Russians changed their tactics, they became more brutal... what did he think was behind the tactics of destroying these villages completely, what were the Russians trying to do, do you think? *
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MASSOUD: They wanted to defeat the spirit of the people and to defeat the struggle of the people. People again got (together) against the Russians and they strongly resisted them. *
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CNN: How did the mujahedeen treat Soviet prisoners, and how did the Red Army treat captured mujahedeen? *
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MASSOUD: Honestly, our attitude was very humane, and I don't remember even having killed one Russian soldier. When we captured Russian soldiers, we just took them to the prison. *
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CNN: How did you treat Soviet prisoners, and how did the Red Army treat mujahedeen? *
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MASSOUD: The Afghan attitude to the Russian prisoners was very good. We had some Russian prisoners, and we released them and they went back to their homes. On the contrary, the attitude of the opposition was very inhumane, and when they captured our soldiers, they killed them. Some of them were alive, but they were under oppression, under their pressure. *
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When I entered the Panjshir for the first time, there was an uprising. And during two days we managed to surround the enemy forces and we captured their troops. Also, some Afghan armed forces came into the valley. And after a few days, we could manage our fighting against the enemy. *
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From the tactical point of view, it was wrong to fight in front with the enemy. The irregular fighting was not in our favor. The people were new and they were not properly trained. And the second time I wanted to fight, after the first defeat, we collected some other people and we pledged we would fight against our enemy until the last drop of our blood, and we would liberate our country. It was a group of about 15 people, and we swore to God Almighty that we would fight. And I also requested them to observe all the new orders, and that it was necessary to be very good, to receive training. And when I got all these pledges and some training, I set up some other bases in the valley. I started from there, and we started our fighting, using new opportunities, new tactics, and we continued until the collapse of the regime. *
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CNN: How effective was the Stinger really? (The Stinger missile was a U.S. shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapon that allowed the Afghans attack Soviet helicopters and other aircraft.) *
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MASSOUD: Stinger was partly very effective, and also it avoided enemy aircraft bombardment, and it was especially very effective against the helicopters, although generally speaking it didn't change the whole war. From beginning to end, I had eight Stingers, and we just fired two of them. When we fired one of the Stingers, we brought the aircraft down, and the second one did not hit the aircraft. I had six Stingers until recently. *
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CNN: Do you think the Americans' arms made a difference to you? *
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MASSOUD: The first issue was that the people of Afghanistan had their motives against the Russians, and they accepted the casualties, and this was the main reason for our uprising against Russia. And the help rendered to the people of Afghanistan, of course it was not ineffective. *
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CNN: Many of the Pakistanis have told us that the Pakistanis distributed the aid evenly, fairly across the mujahedeen. How does he feel about that? *
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MASSOUD: This is not true: the arms were not distributed fairly. Pakistan just kept in view its future interests. As I already mentioned, they gave us eight Stingers. During two years, Pakistan cut off all financial and military equipment for us. Hekmatyar (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was a fundamentalist Islamic mujahedeen commander) had sincere relations with the Pakistani generals, with ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's intelligence agency), and Hekmatyar could take most of these arms and ammunition. And Pakistan also wanted someone who could just fulfill and implement the Pakistani's interests in Afghanistan. That was Hekmatyar, and Pakistani generals thought that after Afghanistan, the matter of the Central Asian countries would be very important, just to have influence on the Central Asian republics, and also they wanted to bring about and implement their objectives through the Islamic ideology. And Hekmatyar also thought that he was the leader of Islamic countries, and they wanted to use him as a springboard to achieve their goals and objectives. It was one of the main issues of the Pakistani generals that Hekmatyar should remain and should take power. Fortunately, this plan was not fulfilled, and the communist regime collapsed, not by Hekmatyar but by us. And after the victory of the mujahedeen, they started fighting against us. And when they became disappointed with Hekmatyar, they brought the Taliban into existence, and again they wanted to turn Afghanistan into a springboard and (deal with) the other countries through the Taliban and also influence the regional countries. And this assistance was not fairly (distributed) -- all of the ammunition and arms were given to Hekmatyar. *
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CNN: I just wondered if he could talk about a few examples of the favoritism that struck him, how the favoritism showed itself. And what effect does he think this favoritism had on the mujahedeen as a fighting force? *
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MASSOUD: For example, the modern weapons at first were sent to Hekmatyar's commanders, and it was Hekmatyar who was able to use these weapons. Hekmatyar first got the Stinger missiles, and his commanders received modern artillery. It was a unilateral distribution of arms, and Hekmatyar also wanted to exterminate other parties and other people so as to avoid problems in the future. They also wanted to fan the internal fighting, and Hekmatyar thought that he would exterminate all his rivals. They were very optimistic, and they encouraged Hekmatyar by giving him arms and ammunition. Hekmatyar himself announced, after the collapse of the communist regime, that "I have ammunition and arms to fight on for 15 years," and he was able to continue the fighting after the collapse of the regime. *
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One of our problems during the fighting was (the existence of) different parties, and arms and ammunition were supplied to different parties. They also gave arms to different types of people -- for example, to scholars, to old men. They were distributing arms to (anyone who)claimed they were going to resist the communists, and the leaders didn't know who to give arms to. These people from different parties, with different views, with different ideas, (only shared their desire) to struggle against the Russians, and every party wanted to strengthen its position in this part or in that part of the country. And for example, in any one district there should be one commander from one party, but there existed 10 parties and 10 commanders, and every year there was a different commander from each party. For example, one was a scholar, one was young, one was illiterate, and with different views, with different programs. The main problem was how to convince these different parties to be united and to bring a system or order to regularly fight against Russia. On the other hand, Afghans are naturally independent and they want to be independent. When I wanted to bring everybody together and set up an administration and an army, I had problems. This was the main problem: different commanders, different parties. And at that time, the ethnic problem didn't exist as it does now; and gradually, slowly, with difficulties, with problems, we managed to convince the people that their interest was to be united. And this work in those parts was successful. And also, we started this work on those parts where the Russians exerted their pressure. *
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CNN: About these divisions ... I'm just wondering if some time during a battle, there was one particular incident that stands out in his mind as being the most frustrating, where the divisions came out, and he tried his utmost to try and unify them? *
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MASSOUD: The divisions among the mujahedeen were very damaging. When we wanted to fight against the Russians, Hezb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar's Islamic Party) at the same time wanted to disarm our groups. And when fighting broke out at that time, Hezb-i-Islami cut off all our supply routes and they didn't allow food-stuffs or ammunition and arms (through). Whenever the Russians wanted to launch an offensive to capture a place, the Hezb-i-Islami also exerted pressure on the same place, and they just wanted to defeat their rivals. *
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One of the factors which was... we tried to remove this division among the people of Afghanistan. At that time, I announced (a new organization) by the name of Supervisory Council, and I invited all the people of Afghanistan to come around and to cooperate with each other. Fortunately, this supervisory council was very useful, and we managed to prevent fighting in the northern provinces. Most of the commanders and parties came along and joined us, and we organized our forces and we carried out joint operations against the Russians. For example in the northern provinces ... for all these parties I organized commanders, and we launched joint operations when we launched an offensive ... and captured the members of (the Afghan communist army), and there were 13,000 militias, and all of us (operated) jointly. I organized them, and it was a very successful operation. In the whole of Afghanistan, when the matter of Kabul was raised, I also raised the issue of commanders. I invited all the commanders from all over Afghanistan to come along, and all operations should be carried out by coordination between all of these commanders. The different commanders were able to have several meetings and discussions on how to find a solution. *
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CNN: What did you think about the Geneva Peace Accords and the way that the Soviet withdrawal was handled? *
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MASSOUD: From my point of view, it was a historical mistake. It only paved the way for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, it was necessary to bring peace to Afghanistan. But when the Russians left Afghanistan, the communists remained (in power) in Afghanistan and bloodshed and destruction continued, and so this decision was not for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan. Perhaps (it meant) honor for some countries that 'we defeated the Soviet Union' but it was not for the benefit of our nation and the war still continued. This was what emanated from the Geneva Conference and from the Geneva Pact. *
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CNN: What does he think about the idea, or the United Nation's idea, of a coalition government, involving possibly the king? (Note: Former King Zahir is still alive and living in Italy) And does he think that the mujahedeen were actually ready for government at that stage? *
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MASSOUD: In this regard, it was not serious; it was not (intended) that the matter should be solved. My impression is: Pakistan wanted just to bring their puppet into power, like Hekmatyar, and they didn't want to bring peace to Afghanistan. *
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CNN: I'm just trying to get an idea of all the sorts of things that were being talked about at the time with regard to coalitions, how he feels about Najibullah (the last Afghan communist leader who was executed by the Taliban), the king, and how he feels about the mujahedeen's role within that. I'm just trying to get an idea of all the things that were up for grabs at that time. *
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MASSOUD: From my point of view, the main defects of that time was ... just depends on (Pakistan) and on several leaders. Those leaders had already proved that they could not ... especially their relations with those commanders that (were in the field), they were in relation, and it was very successful, but unfortunately it was the case that these efforts didn't come out from (Pakistan), and just from the framework of these leaders. For example, when we kept in touch with (a Pakistani diplomat) who at that time had shuttle diplomacy between Kabul and (Pakistan), I suggested that "I would like to see you in Afghanistan," and his reply was, "I haven't got time at this time. After the matter is finished, I would like to see you." When Najib collapsed, also it remained like that. *
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CNN: I just wondered now... the last question is about the Cold War. Looking back now at the 10 years of the war, how does all the death and destruction make you feel, given that the conflict is going on in Afghanistan today, and the role that the superpowers had in fueling it? What does he think of the Americans, and what does he think of the Cold War being played out in Afghanistan? *
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MASSOUD: From my point of view, it's evident that the Afghan people, by shedding their blood, prevented the communists (from remaining in power) in Afghanistan, and also it resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union and their empire. Western countries, especially the United States of America, forgot Afghanistan, they forgot their moral responsibility before the people of Afghanistan. When they had achieved their goals and objectives, and they had achieved their revenge on Vietnam and their own objectives, they forgot Afghanistan and they left Afghanistan alone (for whatever) ISI, Pakistan wanted to do in Afghanistan. And unfortunately, war is still going on in Afghanistan, and Afghan is killing Afghan. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, we thought that our people would reconstruct the country, but still the suffering of people is going on. And morally, I account this as the responsibility of Western countries, especially the United States of America. *

2RHPZ
06-01-2004, 04:55 PM
Newsweek
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Excerpts from the final interview with the anti-Taliban movement leader Ahmed Shah Massoud
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October 1, 2001 *
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A Rebel's Last Yell
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Ahmed Shah Massoud, the charismatic resistance fighter and head of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, might have played a key role in any U.S. assault on the Taliban regime. But earlier this month two suicidal assassins posing as journalists--and now suspected of working for Osama bin Laden--murdered Massoud with a bomb hidden in a television camera. Only a few days before, NEWSWEEK's Antonia Francis met with Massoud in a large reception room--the same one in which he was killed - at a compound near the town of Khodja Bahauddin. *
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Edition: Atlantic Edition - Section: Interview - Page: 84 *
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FRANCIS: Has there been a change in U.S. policy toward the Northern Alliance, and do you want military aid? *
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MASSOUD: The Taliban are not a force to be considered invincible. They are distanced from the people now. They are weaker than in the past. Only the assistance given by Pakistan, Osama bin Laden and other extremist groups keeps the Taliban on their feet. With a halt to that assistance, it would be extremely difficult [for them] to survive. We hope that the future policy of the United States will exert pressure on Pakistan and also help Afghanistan achieve peace. That would be much more effective than giving [us] weapons or ammunition. *
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FRANCIS: Would you extradite bin Laden? *
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MASSOUD: We do not support any form of terrorism, including [bin Laden's network] Al Qaeda. *
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FRANCIS: How does Pakistan influence the Taliban? *
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MASSOUD: In order to control Afghanistan effectively they do not want to control Afghanistan as a [normal] state or a government. Instead the aim is to reduce Afghanistan to a tribal system in which each ethnic group is dependent upon Pakistan. It is again the old method of divide and rule. A good example: it has been a long time since the emergence of the Taliban but they still lack [a regular] army. Pakistan could indeed establish an army for them. But it hasn't. And they have not established any military school, neither in Kandahar nor in Kabul. *
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FRANCIS: How would you envisage balancing traditional values with your more modern political visions--especially equality for women? *
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MASSOUD: Of course it's not possible to ignore traditional values, but we should take steps to bring change. In the northeastern province of Badakshan, girls go to school and find employment, especially in the health sector and schools. *
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FRANCIS: What have you done to demonstrate your own democratic values? *
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MASSOUD: We have improved our democratic shura, or council system. People gather and decide what to do. These shuras are composed of different sectors of society-- religious people, elders and the educated. [Military] commanders are not part of these shuras. Our shuras start from the village level and expand to province level. Most of the political affairs are run in consultation with these shura structures. *
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FRANCIS: Are there female representatives? *
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MASSOUD: No, there are no women in the shuras. We believe in gradual change. *
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FRANCIS: How does your current military strategy compare with when you fought the Russians? *
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MASSOUD: Against the Russians it was the nature of the fighting--the prolongation, continuation, the costliness for the Russians--which forced them to leave. Wisdom should dictate to Pakistani generals that they will have the same fate as the Soviets. So they should leave. *
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FRANCIS: What could your government have done to stop the rise of the Taliban when you were still in power? *
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MASSOUD: We should have been more united then. The forces that are now united [with us] should have united then. *

2RHPZ
06-04-2004, 08:47 AM
The Encyclopedia of Terror

by Reuel Marc Gerecht

Most journalists and American officials who want to see what Usama bin Ladin is doing make trips that begin in Islamabad, Pakistan, and then go to the gateway city of Peshawar. From there, they try to gain access into southern Afghanistan where they inevitably confront the tight-knit Taliban and Islamist Arab circles which surround America?s most-wanted terrorist. They rarely get very close to him.
Given the impasse of going through the south, I tried the somewhat novel idea of approaching Usama bin Ladin?s training camps from the north. My goal was to visit Ahmad Shah Mas?ud, the military commander of northeastern Afghanistan, travel to the front line between him and the Taliban, and if possible, reach the outskirts of the Taliban and Islamist Arab training camps north of Kabul. I wanted to talk to Mas?ud?s front-line soldiers who had fought the Taliban and their Arab auxiliaries, as well as to the prisoners of war Mas?ud had collected.
In a Soviet-made Helicopter
My trip began in the ex-Soviet Republic of Tajikistan. Russian soldiers, who still control that country?s borders, had checked my visas and warmly slapped some of the Afghans on their backs. Less warmly, the Afghans reciprocated. Moscow?s fear of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan had turned enemies into friends. I was on my way to see Ahmad Shah Mas?ud, whom I'd watched from a distance when I was in the Central Intelligence Agency, and his mostly Persian-speaking, ethnically Tajik, Afghan forces. They, alone among Afghanistan?s many ethnicities and tribes, have successfully resisted the Taliban juggernaut that had conquered most of the country by late 1996.
As the Soviet-made MI?8 helicopter lifted off the grass field on the outskirts of Dushanbe below the burnished foothills of the Hindu Kush, I stopped thinking about Usama bin Ladin. The banter of the young Afghan soldiers, cut briefly by a quick prayer, disappeared in the engine?s roar and the squeals of the stressed skin of the thirty-year-old helicopter. Rising higher toward the mountain passes that would take us from Tajikistan into northern Afghanistan, I focused on the bolts holding the chopper together. Two of them across from me were vibrating. This was a mechanically simple machine to maintain, I reassured myself, as I slid down the bench, allowing a bearded, brown-toothed ox of a man to swing his hips and AK-47 assault rifle into my place. I tried to forget the words of an Iranian friend in the United Nations who told me that Mas'ud's helicopters crashed regularly from mechanical difficulties and anti-aircraft fire.
Looking at a dozen men, most dressed in baggy cotton pants and safari vests, sitting and sprawled on ammunition and grenade boxes, foodstuffs, money bags, unmarked white-plastic liquid bottles, and racks of soda-pop cans, I pondered the irony. The helicopter we were riding in?a leftover from the Soviet?Afghan war?was quite possibly once used by the Red Army to kill the older brothers and fathers of my traveling companions. But without this helicopter and others like it, most of my companions would now probably be dead or in exile, victims of the Taliban Islamist religious movement.
The Taliban first rose up in 1994 among the Soviet-Afghan war?s forgotten children ?the poorly-educated young men of the refugee camps and shattered villages of the Pakistani-Afghan border. The Taliban are primarily Pashtuns (known in Rudyard Kipling?s day as the "Pathans"), the dominant tribesman of southern Afghanistan and Pakistan?s northwest frontier. By 1997, they had conquered 90 percent of Afghanistan and all the great resistance commanders of the Soviet-Afghan war. Except one: Mas?ud, whom the writer Robert Kaplan has rightly described as one of the great guerrilla leaders of the twentieth century, perhaps the equal to Giap or Mao.
U.S. intelligence analysts had often anticipated Mas?ud?s defeat by the Red Army, but that did not happen. He survived the Soviets and, in the summer of 1997, this most renowned of the mujahidin?s generals surprised the world once again. In the narrow, white-water sliced opening of the Panjshir valley, a verdant bastion protected by barren mountain walls, Mas?ud?s troops halted the Taliban by blowing the cliffs down upon their Taliban enemies. Within weeks, the "Lion of Panjshir" had driven the Taliban back, nearly to the Afghan capital, Kabul, now a ruined city of rubble. Deterred but not defeated, the Taliban returned to the Shomali plain, which lies between the Panjshir and Kabul in July 1999, a few months before my arrival. Perhaps 700 men under the banner of Usama bin Ladin joined the offensive. Once again American intelligence, and most other observers, thought Mas?ud?s days were numbered. And once again, in retreat, his smaller, well-trained forces counterattacked. Within a few days, they had routed most of the Taliban?s front-line shock troops and taken prisoner an array of Afghan, Pakistani, and Arab holy warriors.
I looked down on the rolling, sometimes conical, brown plains, seeing in them a bit of the Bad Lands of the Dakotas. I searched in vain for the carnage of war: blown out Soviet tanks, personnel carriers, or small Japanese pick-up trucks?the Taliban?s preferred weapon for all-terrain Blitzkrieg attacks. But we were too far from the Panjshir and the western front, where one finds rusting steel carcasses decorating the landscape like shrubbery.
Usama bin Ladin arrived in Afghanistan in May 1996. A scion of one of Arabia?s wealthiest families, the Saudi Islamic militant was, in fact, returning home. He?d first come in the mid-1980s, as the richest of the "Arab Afghans"?the non-Afghan Muslims who volunteered to aid the Mujahidin against the Soviet Union. He linked up with the Palestinian-Jordanian ?Abdullah ?Azzam, the founder of Maktab al-Khidamat (The Office of Services). Headquartered in Peshawar, the Dodge City of the northwest frontier, the Maktab was the logistical hub for the World Muslim League and the Muslim Brethren, the two primary groups that recruited Arabs for the war in Afghanistan (both generously funded by the Saudi government and Saudi princes). It is through the Maktab, which evolved into the slightly more clandestine al-Qa?ida (The Base)?the organization that in August 1998 bombed the U.S. embassies in Africa?that bin Ladin later searched for "Arab Afghans" who saw terrorist violence as a legitimate expression of their faith.
I wanted to see exactly who the holy warriors were in Mas?ud?s prisons. Were they aging leftovers of the Soviet-Afghan war? Were they young men in whom bin Ladin had sparked a new jihad spirit? Had bin Ladin?s hatred of infidel America and its Muslim proxies, in particular the Saudi royal family, become the lingua franca of the Taliban movement, which had received substantial diplomatic and financial support from Saudi Arabia? For the Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghans, and other Muslims who had joined the Taliban, had bin Ladin and Mullah ?Umar, the Taliban?s one-eyed leader, become inseparable heroes in a common holy war against Mas?ud and America?
When I caught sight of the Panjshir River snaking through the valley, I started to rethink my plans. I didn?t have to see the camps, I told myself, contemplating behind-the-lines nighttime maneuvers that would be necessary to get close. Mas?ud?s counterattack in August 1999 pushed the front line back toward Kabul but not back far enough for my purposes. Mas?ud?s men could no longer easily go into the foothills north of Kabul and look down on the Taliban and "Arab Afghan" encampments. I recalled the telephone call I?d received from a former professor of Islamic history after the Clinton administration took vengeance for the embassy bombings. Reminiscing about his voyages in the very areas that were struck, he remarked, "I don?t think cruise missiles are the ideal weapon to use against Afghan villages. It may be hard to tell the difference between before and after." Filming rock huts no longer seemed to me like a particularly compelling adventure.
Yet one of Mas?ud?s diplomats had told me that when the wind was up, the Talabani muezzin could be heard. He had seen the camps from a distance and found them eye-catching: the tents? immense green canvasses staked on poles undulating in long waves above the faithful prostrated for prayer. "A green paradise?what every Arab dreams of," he quipped. I wasn?t optimistic as the helicopter, protected from below by anti-aircraft artillery and, per one of Mas'ud's lieutenants, Stinger missiles, dove over the mountain ridge and followed the river south. The video cameras next to my feet probably wouldn?t capture as much as U.S. spy satellites, which no doubt were flying overhead watching me, goat herds, and whatever bin Ladin and the Taliban were doing. But you never know until you put your feet on the ground. I had come in part to do advance work for CBS News; I also have a longstanding interest in Islamic militancy.
Mas?ud?s Headquarters
The helicopter set down on a pebbled riverbed near the Panjshir village of Dadakhil. Barefoot children immediately descended from cornfields and windowless mud-brick houses. Within an hour, a battered Toyota land-cruiser deposited me at Mas?ud?s headquarters where I drank an immense quantity of tea while chatting with an ever-larger array of Afghans who wanted to listen to a Persian-speaking American. The sparsely furnished room, lined with couches, a wooden desk, an armoire, one safe, a framed verse from the Qur?an, and a new computer hidden underneath a plastic drop-cloth, was Mas?ud?s VIP reception area.
I laid out my plans to Mas?ud?s go-between for foreign journalists and diplomats, ?Asim. He nodded quickly, revealing he had already heard from the overseas representatives who had authorized my trip. I could go down to the front lines closest to Kabul and talk to the local commanders and soldiers about photographing the camps. The idea wouldn?t work, however, given the distance from the front line. Somehow, somewhere, ?Asim promised I would see Mas?ud.
If Mas?ud was far away in the Panjshir, it wouldn't be easy to get to him. The Panjshir valley road, which runs 150 kilometers from Anjoman in the north to Jabal Saraj in the south, is a roller-coaster ride. Time and car axles can disappear. Blown off tank treads buried in the earth are the road?s only smooth, sure surface. Bombed and mined by the Soviets, occasionally targeted by Taliban bombers, and neglected for twenty years, the road is the spinal column of what remains of the Panjshir?s civilization. If you don?t fall off it, if an axle doesn?t break, you can drive the distance in nine hours.
At Jabal Saraj, I could discern the ambush that had broken the Taliban?s advance in July 1999. Rust hadn?t yet wiped away the charred steel in demolished personnel carriers and Japanese pick-up trucks. The above-ground rock graves of fallen Taliban?little piles of stone along the road side and river banks?had an angularity that weather and gravity hadn?t collapsed. Flies upon the mounds revealed that Mother Nature had not yet cleansed the place. For a couple of days after the battle, I was told, mothers and sisters who had lost sons and brothers stoned the corpses, cursing them for impoverishing their lives.
Soldiers described the battle. In pick-up trucks mounted with machine-guns, the Taliban had hurled themselves against Mas?ud?s positions. They had more courage than good sense. Arab units fought bravely, often refusing to surrender to encircling forces. When their retreat was cut off, the few left alive put their heads together and set off hand-grenades.
The Pakistanis, Afghans, and Arab prisoners of war I interviewed in Mas'ud's prisons had all believed in jihad against Mas?ud, whom they variously characterized as an "infidel" or a "lackey of Russian infidels." After their capture, some?though by no means all?changed their minds, recognizing Mas?ud as a devout Muslim and a great mujahid, a holy warrior, against the Soviet Union. They told me how Islamist preachers in Pakistan?s northwest frontier and in Kabul had deluded them into believing that the Tajik Afghans weren?t really Muslims.1 But they had heard the muezzin?s call from prison and seen their guards pray. Two Uighur Turks from China, who were tearfully shell-shocked upon the prison?s cement floor, swore that they had been told Russians were still occupying northern Afghanistan. They begged me for mercy and a free trip home to China, or any place else that would accept them.
For many of the prisoners, Mullah ?Umar and Usama bin Ladin had been godheads. More like militant Sufi mystics than fundamentalists who strictly follow the Qur?an, these prisoners had lived to die and to fulfill their masters? words. They wanted to destroy Mas?ud. They wanted to prepare themselves for the larger fight against the West. In the dark, fly-infested, rock-walled prisons, the devotion was fading?but with some, I thought, I could still see the death wish in their eyes.
None of the prisoners with whom I spoke had fought in the jihad against the Soviet Union. Mas?ud?s soldiers mentioned that many of the dead Arabs had seemed young. Bin Ladin?s call had obviously transcended the founding Soviet-Afghan war generation. That was an important step, for forty-year-olds don?t usually make for the best suicide bombers.
Yet, I was not impressed with the captured holy warriors. Most of them were poorly educated peasants. Al-Qa?ida may have chosen the embassies in Tanzania and Kenya because they had weak security; they may have been chosen because the Muslims under bin Ladin?s banner simply could not operate effectively outside the disorganized and listless Third World.
If the majority of the holy-warrior soldiers of al-Qa?ida, or its most lethal ally and cousin, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, spent long stretches inside Afghanistan training, then the United States might actually be lucky. The war-shattered, peasant-dominated, pulverizingly poor and disorganized nature of Afghan society militates against a good work ethic. Terrorist teams successfully attacked in Africa, but they were sloppy in execution and flight. The sloppiness was repeated in Aden, Yemen, where would-be suicide bombers, in January 2000, overloaded a Kamikaze skiff with explosives, sinking it. The USS The Sullivans was saved. By October 2000, the bombing team had found their learning curve in the Arabian *****ula's once-great but now utterly dilapidated port. Using a boat-packed with light-weight, water-resistant plastic explosives, they crippled and nearly sank the USS Cole.
None of the holy warriors I saw could have gone to the West and not drawn attention or immediately gotten lost. Assuming Mas?ud?s intelligence was right?and I?d not found Mas?ud?s best men ****e to outrageous exaggeration?of the 700 or so "Arab Afghans" in Afghanistan, very few were capable of anonymously and securely traveling abroad. However, if bin Ladin?s people were to overcome their religious distaste for Saddam Husayn or the Iranian-trained, Lebanese Shi?ite Hizbullah and receive more sophisticated instruction and aid from either Baghdad or Tehran, then al-Qa?ida and its friends could become truly lethal worldwide.
Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad
But determination can sometimes compensate for competence. And the "Arab Afghans" of the "Offices of Services" and al-Qa?ida were certainly determined. In Mas?ud?s war room, during a conversation with one of his best men, I stumbled on what every intelligence officer dreams of: the component parts?in bin Ladin?s case, the fuses, timing switches, and explosives?that define one?s opponent?s passion and intent. In the lieutenant?s fast-moving, Afghan-accented Persian, I almost missed it.
"An encyclopedia?" I asked, caught between hurried note-taking and a daydream of my own work on Afghanistan a decade earlier.
"An encyclopedia written by the Arabs," he repeated.
In the CIA, I?d handled hundreds of "walk-ins," volunteers who came to U.S. embassies and consulates to say something to the American government. Good stuff rarely came blatantly labeled. Rather, it would quietly leap at you in a digression.
"It?s about explosives," he said. "It?s called, The Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad. I think bin Ladin?s people wrote it."
I took one look at it, the Mawsu?at al-Jihad al-Afghani in Arabic, and realized I just might have a key, perhaps the key, for understanding the evolution and intent of bin Ladin?s organization.
"Has anyone else seen this?" I asked, wondering whether Mas?ud?s people fully understood what they?d found. For the Tajik Afghans, who?d been fighting for twenty years, Usama bin Ladin and the "Arab Afghans" were a footnote to their strife. They tended to downplay the Saudi militant because his importance in American eyes?his ability to steal the world?s headlines?diminished that of their own suffering and struggle, which ought to be, they thought, the main story.
"No," he answered.
Amazing, I quietly said to myself, as I gazed through the bomb diagrams of Explosives, the title of volume one of the Encyclopedia. Throughout the 200-page manual, diagrams were paired with Arabic instructions. Anti-personnel ****y-traps, how-to instructions for letter bombs, exploding books, chairs, sofas, beds, irons, teapots, cigarette packs and lighters, whiskey bottles, stethoscopes, women?s hairbrushes, pipes, radios, whistles?a cornucopia of maiming devices?gave way to bigger bombs for cars, trucks, houses, and buildings. The volume also detailed fuses, timing switches, and brewing instructions in both Arabic and English, for the terrorist who could not get his hands on Libyan-stockpiled, plastic Semtex explosives.
The publishing house was the "Office of Services," the mother of al-Qa?ida. No date and location were given. The Encyclopedia only listed, "Headquarters, of All the Camps of All the Fronts." It was likely that the Maktab had written the work in Peshawar, the Maktab?s main base of operations throughout the Soviet?Afghan war. I started reading the dedications that prefaced the book. Number one was to ?Abdullah ?Azzam, the founder of the Maktab al?Khidamat. It read:
A word of truth with a tear of allegiance
To our beloved brother and revered Sheikh ?Abdullah ?Azzam
Who revived the spirit of jihad in the souls of the youth with the word of God....
Who suffered harm from most people except from the faithful....
This work is dedicated to Allah, then to you.
The second dedication was to Usama bin Ladin.
To the beloved brother Abu Abdallah?Usama bin Ladin?who was the faithful helper of Sheikh ?Abdullah ?Azzam in his jihad and in the creation of the "Office of Services"
Who waged jihad in Afghanistan with his person and with everything he owned.
Who did not cease to wage jihad and incite jihad to the present day
Who has been wronged in his jihad by most of those who cling to Islam...
Let Allah strengthen you and reward you for what you have done.
For the sake of Islam, to you, from all Muslims and [especially] those who wage the jihad, with all the best.
I skipped over the third dedication, which was to the unnamed mujahidin leaders of the Soviet-Afghan war who had helped educate the "Arab Afghans" and thereby allowed them to offer the Encyclopedia, "one of the sources of energy for the faithful," to Muslim holy warriors everywhere.
A fourth dedication caught my eye.
To the brothers who participated in the publishing of this Encyclopedia?No one knows [them] except Allah.
We ask Him to put this effort into the balance of the Day of Judgment and reward with all the best all those who translated, designed, printed, wrote, collected material, or those who took pictures, sent computers?or anything else that we may have forgotten.
Let Allah weigh these things with all your other good deeds on the Day of Judgment.
The fifth dedication underscored the importance of Pakistan to the authors of the Encyclopedia.
Allah, be he exalted, says...
He who doesn?t thank others, is not thanked....
We thank the state of Pakistan, the government and the people
For the presence of the Arab brothers on its land (despite the many problems it has endured) from the enemies of Allah?and the victory it has given to its brothers, the Mujahidin of Afghanistan.
And we ask Allah to weigh this good deed with their other good deeds for the sake of Islam and the Muslims.
When did the Maktab begin the Encyclopedia? How many volumes were there and on what subjects? I couldn?t tell. The dedications clearly indicated that the work wasn?t completed until after Usama bin Ladin began his peregrinations. He had left Afghanistan in 1990 for Saudi Arabia, where his radical views got him into trouble as soon as Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait. He was outraged that the Saudi royal family allowed U.S. soldiers to defend the kingdom. The stationing of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, which bin Ladin viewed as holy, infuriated him and drove him into exile in Sudan by January 1992. In 1994, the Saudi government reportedly stripped him of his citizenship.
The dedication to bin Ladin in the Encyclopedia clearly shows that at the time he was being attacked and abandoned by brother Muslims, which would mean a publication date no earlier than 1991. It?s possible that it was published later, after international pressure started to build on him in Sudan and the Sudanese leader, Hasan at-Turabi, the outstanding Islamist leader of the Arabic-speaking peoples, distanced himself from bin Ladin. This would mean a publication date circa 1994 and certainly no later than 1996. Otherwise the dedication would have underscored bin Ladin?s return to Afghanistan. The Taliban also aren?t mentioned. According to Arab and Pakistani sources in Peshawar, the Encyclopedia was first published in Pakistan in late 1992 or early 1993.
It was clear from the diagrams and discussions in Explosives that the Encyclopedia?s focus was Western, not Soviet. In other words, a work that had originally been provoked by the Soviet Union?s occupation of Afghanistan became, sometime in the late 1980s or early 1990s, a holy-warrior?s guide against the West.
Examining the recipe pages for bombs, I strongly suspected that volume one of the Encyclopedia was the training manual for the teams who took down the U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998. It wasn?t an advanced work?the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Hizbullah could have done better?but it was a good, basic primer for blowing up buildings and cars. It would have provided a good stepping stone for those in Yemen who employed several hundred pounds of C-4 plastic explosive to build the suicide boat-bomb that killed seventeen sailors aboard the USS Cole on October 12, 2000.
I read Explosives through the night in the guest house where I was staying, asking others about it. Rashid ad-Din, a bald-headed bear of a man, who was Mas?ud?s brother-in-law, sparkled with a sense of discovery. He brought me an immense manual of nearly 1,000 pages. I didn?t have to read the title, Weapons, to know that I had another volume of the Encyclopedia. He, too, had picked up his copy at the front lines, a leftover from one of Mas?ud?s numerous little victories in 1997. A lover of Arabic and guns, he?d kept volume five for the diagrams of Western and Soviet-bloc weaponry. He particularly admired the detailed instructions on how to use the famous CIA-delivered Stinger, shoulder-fired, ground-to-air missiles?the U.S. weapon that helped turn the tide against the Red Army. (Hundreds of missing, "unreturned" Stingers left over from the Soviet-Afghan war remain in Afghan hands; apparently, Mas'ud hasn't many Stingers?most of my conversations with Mas'ud's lieutenants and friends converged on a dozen. The rest belong to the Taliban and their allies.)
Whatever doubts I had about the general quality of the Islamists who had rallied around bin Ladin, I was impressed by this literary endeavor. The cell that created the Encyclopedia?a series that likely encompasses thousands of pages?had produced one of the most detailed and easily the largest terrorist guide ever written. It would have taken years to put such a collection together, even if most of the work was only compilation and translation. The people who put together the Encyclopedia were truly dedicated. They weren?t kidding about the harm they intended to inflict upon their enemies.
Volume five, in particular, emphasized the preferences of the Encyclopedia. Weapons should have been volume one if the Encyclopedia had originally been intended as a guide against the Red Army in Afghanistan. Knowing how to use assault rifles, machine-guns, and Stingers ought to have been more important than explosive devices for "urban warfare." All the volumes could have been published at once. But that isn?t usually how encyclopedias are handled, especially not if you?re engaged in a jihad where you want to provide the faithful as quickly as possible with the necessary knowledge.
When I returned to the United States I ran my copy of the Encyclopedia, which I?d photographed in part on 35mm film, past a friend who?d lived and breathed bombs for thirty years. He was highly impressed by the simplicity and accuracy of the diagrams. The Maktab al-Khidamat had obviously got its hands on, among other things, U.S. special-forces manuals, "CIA black books"?paramilitary training guides that the agency produced in the late 1950s and early 1960s?and other explosives literature available from Paladin Press, the militiaman?s favorite guide to weaponry and guerrilla tactics.
The authors of the Encyclopedia didn?t just copy material; they often simplified it, ensuring that relatively uneducated true-believers might have a chance of building a working bomb. My expert did not want to be in the kitchen when someone tried to make homemade nitroglycerin per the Explosives instructions. But if the process didn?t kill its maker, the resulting ingredients would certainly explode with great force, he assured me.
The Encyclopedia was attempting to diminish, if not eliminate, the master-pupil tutelage that forced terrorists and would-be terrorists to gather together in one spot for prolonged study. The volumes were a portable university for the common militant. Its ultimate aim was to democratize terrorism.
Numerous versions and condensations of the Encyclopedia have appeared in France, England, Italy, Belgium, Croatia, Jordan, Egypt, the Philippines, Canada, and the United States. The 200-page terrorist manual that U.S. authorities have submitted in the court case in New York City against the bombers of the U.S. embassies in Africa is in all probability derived in spirit and material from the Encyclopedia. According to the New York Times, the manual was seized in Manchester, England, in 2000.2 The original, full-length Encyclopedia was probably in circulation in Europe no later than 1995. That year the Belgian police arrested a group of Muslim militants (in the so-called "Zaoui affair") who had in their possession on a diskette what appears to have been a complete copy of the Encyclopedia; total pages: 8,000. According to a Belgian security source, the Belgians didn't know what to do with the work and didn't have the resources to translate it; so it was given to the Israelis. The French also obtained a copy from the Belgians. It also isn't clear whether a copy was passed to the Americans, and, if so, whether the CIA analyzed and translated the document. By 1999, the CIA definitely received an abridged version?approximately 1,000 pages?of the Encyclopedia from the Jordanians.
Meeting Mas?ud
?Asim?s promise held true: before leaving Afghanistan, I met Ahmad Shah Mas?ud. I found he had changed little from the photos taken during the war against the Soviets. I noticed his hands; they shook mine softly, in the manner of a devout Muslim. His very average height was camouflaged by a well-pressed, clean khaki uniform and multi-pocketed vest. In a nation of wrinkles and stains, this alone gave him a high status. His forty-eight years gently creased his slender forehead, eyes, and neck. Flecked with gray, his curly black hair and short-cropped beard gave him the air of a beatnik. His dark, warm eyes moved precisely?not at all the flat, motionless pools of the shell-shocked Iranian soldiers I?d known.
Mas?ud had entered Afghan legend as a warrior-poet. Physically, I could see why. His voice and diction were also efficient. I contrasted the man before me with the one I had seen from a distance in the street a few days before. There, Mas?ud had personally knocked an absent-minded peasant off his feet with a blow of his hand for blocking the river road. Twenty years of war aside, this oscillation between hard and soft no doubt made his men love and fear him.
We wandered in conversation for hours. Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Europe, the KGB, the CIA, Christians, Muslims, and Jews, the strengths and weaknesses of America?s press and the Republican and Democratic parties?Mas?ud has a highly curious mind trapped in the Panjshir valley.
Like every other Tajik Afghan I had met, he didn?t really want to talk about Usama bin Ladin. But unlike most, he saw the humor in the situation. He had been trying for years to get Washington to pay attention to the Islamist radicalism in his homeland. The pleas of his representatives in the West had always been dismissed as disingenuous ethnic maneuvering?Tajiks trying to get the better of the majority Pashtuns. Only with the bombings by bin Ladin had Washington again come calling a little more seriously.
Mas?ud asked me whether the Americans would ever intercept his satellite telephone conversations and give the tape to the Pakistanis. I replied, "No," and explained that intercepts are the crown jewel of U.S. intelligence and recorded conversations would never be shared with Islamabad. I am not sure Mas?ud believed me. Intercept and cooperation with foreign security services are America?s only real trumps against Usama bin Ladin and the Islamic militants around him. Which is why, in part, Washington has a problem. Intercept can do only so much when people know you?re listening. Nowadays, there are ways around such surveillance. With a satellite telephone, it is not hard to connect to the Internet from anywhere in the world, even from the remote caves of Afghanistan. The speed isn?t much, but it allows the sending of encrypted e-mail that America?s eavesdroppers probably cannot decipher. Telephone encryption systems available to al-Qa'ida are also exceptionally difficult if not impossible to decipher. Depending on the system used, live-time decryption?essential for counterterrorist work?would require a near miracle. And bin Ladin's messengers, once they reach Pakistan, can become invisible in the telephone cacophony of that country's big cities. Unless we have a good idea to whom bin Ladin's men are talking outside of Pakistan, our efforts at intercept are unlikely to be of any significant operational use. Luck on our side and stupidity on bin Ladin's have usually been the critical factors in our intelligence successes against al-Qa'ida and its militant allies.
As for cooperation with Pakistan: U.S. officials have to seek help from Pakistan?s government and its Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, both of which are so riddled with Islamists that they may well contain more enemies than friends of the United States. And even among the many Pakistanis who are our friends, why would they want to stir a hornet's nest by actively working with the United States against bin Ladin? Anyone who has traveled in Pakistan knows that in Peshawar or Quetta or even in Westernized Lahore, bin Ladin is a popular fellow, if not a hero. These factors have, for all practical purposes, paralyzed any serious U.S. counterterrorist policy against the Saudi terrorist.
I left Dadakhil with Mas?ud on a helicopter the next morning. The western front was active and over the mountains two Taliban jet fighters attacked. We rolled into evasive maneuvers that catapulted my stomach into my mouth. The rickety door to the helicopter slid open, and I found myself looking down at herds of fleeing billy-goats. Hanging onto the bench and tape-wrapped tubing, with its red Russian Cyrillic lettering saying, "Don?t Touch!" I remembered a television journalist asking about the nationality of the pilots and helicopters that would transport his television crew through the Pamir mountains and the Hindu Kush.
Suddenly, a soldier hanging onto the flip-flopping pilot?s door screamed into the cockpit.
"What is it?!" I yelled, hoping the Afghan at the rear of the helicopter had mistaken large birds for fighter aircraft.
"They intercepted the planes? radio!" he shouted directly into my ear.
"AND?!" I screamed.
"Shoot it down!" he yelled back. I immediately glued my face to one of the filthy, oval windows.
Hitting the ground hard, we landed in an irrigated rice field not far from Taloqan, where two French aid workers had been wounded a few weeks before. We spent the afternoon eating rice and chicken and waiting for the skies to clear. Mas?ud returned to asking me more questions about whether the United States would ever give the Pakistanis intercepts of his communications, particularly between his small, life-sustaining fleet of aged Soviet helicopters and his forces on the ground. I said "No," and I thought this time Mas'ud believed me. He then went to pray in a bullet-riddled mosque, and for a few minutes the immense stress etched into his forehead, eyes, and stiff back disappeared as he shut his eyes and contemplated God.
When a helicopter finally returned me to Tajikistan, an old, white-haired Afghan who?d seen me off asked whether I?d taken some good pictures. "Better than I?d hoped," I answered, handing my passport to a beautiful, blond Russian female officer, who was encircled by Afghans demanding their turn. She failed to notice that my Tajik visa had expired. In a few days, I was back in Moscow being spoiled by Russian friends who didn?t at all share my curiosity about Afghanistan.
While walking in Moscow's streets, stopping at every bar I could find, I realized how easy it was for the United States to forget about Afghanistan after the Cold War. Afghanistan is a brutal country where time slows down as your bowels speed up. There is a consensus among world-weary travelers that no place on earth will wear you down quicker and more completely than Afghanistan. It is the extreme opposite of the United States. Half a world away from Washington, inaccessible and blown to bits, the country is simply beyond the scope of most American officials. They need to be able to see long-term not to flee such a mess. Americans need to feel a debt of honor to the Afghans who fought the Soviets and who now desperately need them patiently, constantly, and generously to intrude into their affairs. For very understandable reasons, we didn't do what was required.
The Central Intelligence Agency?s Role
Nonetheless, the CIA should have definitely done better. The institution exists to look into the future; the clandestine service is supposed to do those things which are hard, physically and morally, for the rest of the country. And yet the CIA's record in Afghanistan and against Islamic radicalism shows few moments of operational foresight. The CIA made a decent quartermaster during the Soviet?Afghan war, delivering a large quantity of military material to the Pakistanis with very few officers involved. As an intelligence service, however, it failed then and is failing now.
Islamic militancy was the sub-text of much of my work as a case officer in the Near East division of the Central Intelligence Agency?s directorate of operations. Though Iranian operations were my preferred bailiwick, and I?d inherited the anti-Afghan biases of my Persian instructors and friends, I?d occasionally tracked Afghan affairs. Yet, I never went into the country. In fact, no case officer during the Soviet-Afghan war ever went inside. Though popular imagination had the CIA and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) recruiting "Arab Afghans" for a jihad against the Red Army, the truth was otherwise. Case officers had relatively little contact with the mujahidin in Pakistan, let alone inside Afghanistan. They had no contact whatsoever with "Arab Afghans" like Usama bin Ladin and ?Abdullah ?Azzam. The first agency officer who had even a minimal command of an Afghan language didn't arrive in Pakistan until 1987, only a year and half before the war's end. Languages weren't necessary, so the theory went, since the Pakistanis were really doing all the "field" work.
When the war ended, America?s interests waned almost overnight. "We ran down the fire-escape as quickly as we could," remarked a CIA officer who served in Pakistan in 1989. The American government, the CIA specifically, had minimal intelligence interest in the Afghan civil war that followed the collapse of the Soviet-installed Afghan communist regime in 1992. The people who had bled more than any other to wound the Soviet Union had fallen into ethnic civil strife. The official U.S. view was clear: the United States "had no dog" in the civil wars in Afghanistan. Even when an American energy company, UNOCAL, started eyeing Afghanistan for a possible pipeline to move central Asian oil and gas to Western and Asian markets while avoiding Iran, the U.S. intelligence community only marginally increased its interest in collecting information.
A case officer who served in Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union repeatedly asked headquarters for permission to try to collect intelligence inside Afghanistan, exploiting the physical access offered by Mas?ud's northern alliance, which then controlled a wide swath of the country. Sensitive to Islamic radicalism from years of working on Lebanese and Palestinian militancy, he thought Afghanistan warranted our attention. C.I.A. headquarters refused every request. The agency was not fond of Mas?ud, for the Pakistanis loathed him and no one wanted to irritate the Pakistanis. A Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, Julie Sirrs, had actually been fired in 1999 for traveling to see Mas?ud and northern Afghanistan?even though she had received permission?because her visit disquieted senior U.S. officials, who feared sending the wrong signals. (Interestingly, a trip she?d made a year earlier to Taliban-controlled southern Afghanistan had no adverse professional repercussions and had been admired within the Pentagon for its pluck.)3
Even after the return of bin Ladin to Afghanistan and the bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, the CIA?s disposition hardly changed. Only a handful of case officers have spent even a few days inside Afghanistan. No meaningful networks have been developed there. One doesn't need to know the CIA from the inside out to see that the U.S. Navy had no advance warning about the attack on the Cole even though bin Ladin's men had been lying in wait in Aden for over a year. Given the loquacious nature of Middle Eastern societies, in-house complaints about the clumsiness of the botched attack on the USS The Sullivans probably circulated throughout the outer circles of bin Ladin's network. If U.S. intelligence had had valuable agents within bin Ladin's apparatus, we would have known something about The Sullivans, and the Cole would never have entered Aden's mountain-ringed harbor.
And despite the close association between the Taliban and bin Ladin, the American bias against Mas?ud remains. On rare occasions, according to U.S. officials and Mas'ud himself, senior American officials have met him in quick rendezvous, usually to encourage him to try harder to find some modus vivendi with Mullah ?Umar.4 Having settled the war with Mas?ud, the thinking goes, the Taliban might calm down and then turn over, or at least stifle, bin Ladin. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence and the State Department have mirrored each other in not wanting to do anything that might seriously roil the status quo with their Pakistani counterparts.
This attitude may finally be changing as the U.S. government has realized the intractability of the Taliban position toward bin Ladin and the deafness of the Pakistanis to Washington?s pleas to do something about the Saudi's terrorist camps and cells. A more regular relationship with Mas?ud is no doubt now in the offing, as the CIA and the State Department search for ways of making up for lost time in their pursuit of bin Ladin. But this has so far not translated into the down-and-dirty, essential intelligence work: thorough, ongoing debriefings of Mas?ud's prisoners-of-war and the regular, in-country questioning of Mas?ud 's front-line soldiers and supporters who battle and trade with the Taliban and their allies. And State Department officials, who much more so than American intelligence officers carry the authority and approval of the U.S. government, have continued to keep a polite distance from Mas?ud. No senior State Department official has yet to fly into Dadakhil and shake hands with the "Lion of the Panjshir." Uncle Sam remains wary of, if not hostile to, a Realpolitik approach pressuring the Pakistanis and the Taliban through direct aid to Mas?ud. Like its predecessor, the Bush administration has so far shown no desire to engage the United States in an activist, tough diplomacy in south-central Asia, even if bin Ladin is Public Enemy Number One. So Washington continues with the same policies even though it knows they haven't worked.
U. S. government spending on counterterrorism, a response in large part to al-Qa?ida?s bombing successes, is approaching $10 billion per year.5 According to CIA director George Tenet, al?Qa?ida is America's most immediate national-security threat.6 And yet the CIA?bureaucratically the cutting-edge of America?s defense against terrorism overseas?had not as of October 2000 sent a single operative or analyst to search on the ground for the clues to bin Ladin's strengths and weaknesses. In other words, what ought to be elementary stuff in both the intelligence and the news businesses. Curiosity aside, that's what brought me to northern Afghanistan.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, director of the Middle East Initiative at The Project for The New American Century, was a Middle East specialist in the CIA, 1985 to 1994. Under the pseudonym Edward Shirley, he is the author of Know Thine Enemy, A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997)

1 A point confirmed in Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Education of a Holy Warrior," The New York Times Magazine, June 25, 2000.
2 The New York Times, Apr. 5, 2001.
3 See also this issue.
4 Discussions with Mas'ud, Sept. 1999.
5 Center for Nonproliferation Studies at cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/terfund.htm.
6 George Tenet, "Usama bin Ladin as America?s ?Most Serious? Threat," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2001, p. 83.