David Lehmann
06-01-2004, 07:46 PM
In Poland, 1939, and particularly in France, 1940, Blitzkrieg tactics were deployed. In Poland the battle turned into something that greatly resembled the "Kesselschlacht-theory" from World War I, if more motorized. On the other hand, the Blitzkrieg tactic proper was revealed later to the Allies.
Battle of France 1940 (45 days)
The German means and tactics were also not exactly the same in September 1939 and in May 1940. The Polish army suffered 200,000 losses in 35 days (5714 per day) and the French army 330,000+ losses in 45 days (7333+ per day), both have fought bravely against an enemy and its tactics that they weren't really prepared to fight at and Poland was attacked during the same time by the Soviets. The idea that France did not fight is just false, it was defeated in shame because quickly for the country as it was seen in 1939, yes, but the soldiers were courageous and died too for their homeland.
In 1940, in 45 days, the French army lost 92,000 – 120,000 KIA on the battlefield. In the same time the Germans lost 45,218 KIA. Despite lacks of high command the French soldiers did resist to the enemy each time they were well commanded on the front
The Germans engaged 68 divisions against Poland (52 divisions) and they later engaged 135 divisions against France (104 divisions). The ratio of the forces is more or less the same : 1.3.
The German army was also stronger against France :
- Leichten Divisionen had been transformed into Panzer Divisionen*
- Panzer Divisionen created
- many more tanks were armed with good guns superior to 20mm and better armored (16% - 452 tanks - in Poland and 36% - 914 tanks - in France)
- improved mechanization and motorization of the army
- several tanks were improved (the PzIVs for example : more Ausf. A/B in Poland and more Ausf.C/D in France, better armored)
Just to say that if the attacked country is stronger, the attacking country is also very stronger than before.
In the light of these factors, France in 1940 must be seen as the best example of Blitzkrieg carried out, it couldn't work anymore in Russia which was too big. In Poland it was much more a classical Kesselschlacht and the too weak Leichten-Divisionen where after that transformed in Panzer-Divisionen. A large faked attack was undertaken in Belgium and Holland where paratroopers and airborne troops were used to secure important points. France sent its best forces in this area. Later, the main forces attacked in an unexpected place where only second-rate divisions resisted them. Here, Panzers pushed on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the infantry. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacked as support for the Panzers and the infantry.
The French fought very well as companies and battalions but poorly as divisions and horribly as armies ... doctrine (conception and use of tanks), communication issues etc. The French Army didn't lose because of a lack of material (though a high lack of radios, bombers, AA weapons and AA ammunitions) and its armament was as good as the German one, the reasons are both the doctrine at the military level and several political decisions.
* Created in 1936, these Leichten-Divisionen were based on the model of the French DLM. In Germany like in France, the Cavalry wanted its own tanks because it was frightened to loose influence. After Poland the 1., 2., 3. and 4. Leichten-Divisionen became the 6., 7., 3. and 4. Panzer-Divisionen and the 5. PzD has been created.
Engaged by Germany :
135 divisions (10 Pad and several motorized divisions)
~4500 planes
~7500 artillery pieces
~3800 tanks and armored cars
German losses (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) :
- 156,492 losses (27,074 KIA, 111,034 WIA, 18,384 MIA) (+ 6000 Italian losses in the French Alps) -- compared to 40,390 losses in Poland. This first figure established on June 25, 1940 has been corrected later to 45,218 German KIA.
- 1236 planes + 323 damaged (about 650 victories for the French air force fighters alone, not counting here the losses due to AA fire etc. and many gliders and Ju-52 destroyed in the Netherlands) -- compared to 135 planes in Poland (Marek Murawski)
- 839 tanks definitively destroyed (33% of the 2542 tanks engaged) and 157 armored cars destroyed ; most of them against French tanks or AT guns -- compared to 218 tanks (8.5% of the engaged tanks) in Poland (Jentz)
Engaged by France :
104 divisions (with 5 DLC, 3 DLM, 3 DCR : 11 armored /mechanized/motorized divisions but half of them are very weak) : none of these divisions were the real equivalent in power and combined arms that a Panzer Division. Quickly after the first losses and encirclements their were only 63 divisions (counting the one stuck on the Maginot line) to face the whole German army.
~2100 planes
~10000 artillery pieces
~3500 tanks and armored cars but only really about 2000 modern ones engaged
French losses :
- 330,000 losses (92,000-120,000 KIAs and 210,000-240,000 WIA/MIA)
- 1,450,000 prisoners
- 892 aircrafts
- no data for the AFVs ... mostly all (2000+) destroyed or captured except the ones in the colonies.
Allied losses according to Karl-Heinz Frieser (Oberst Bundeswehr, MFGA) in his book "Blitzkrieg Legende" and Gérard Saint-Martin "L'arme blindée française" :
Belgian losses in 19 days : 7500 KIA, 15850 WIA
Luxembourg : no fightings
Dutch losses in 6 days : 2890 KIA, 6889 WIA
British losses in 26 days : 3457 KIA, 13602 WIA, 3267 MIA
French losses in 45 days : 92,000-120,000 KIA (according to different sources),
The Swiss historian Eddy Bauer says also that the Germans lost much more men in the second part of the western campaign, in France the resistance was harder when time advanced.
156,492 German losses (KIA, MIA, WIA) in 45 days, that's 3477 losses per day but in fact the French resistance was all days harder : 2499 losses per day between the 10th May and the 3rd June but 4762 losses per day between the 5th and the 24th June. You can compare that to the 4506 losses/day during operation Barbarossa from June 22 to December 10, 1941.
The German army is not in all cases better than the French army and the idea of a total superiority (kind of racial superiority) of the men themselves is a myth still propagated some people. The German soldier is often better trained physically, is better equipped (lighter uniform etc.) and above all he has been better prepared psychologically for years while the French didn't wanted this war. The German soldier fought for Germany, for his Führer, he was well endoctrined. But the idea that the Germans were supermen and the French running cowards is totally wrong.
One point is also when talking about the German army in 1940, too many people still imagine an army only composed of powerful mechanized/motorized units with first class armaments. The French army had 400,000 motorized vehicles (more or less equivalent to the German army, the small US army at the same time for example had 12,000 vehicles). In fact if there are "two" French armies (active and reserve kind of units), there are also "two" German armies : the mechanized one (Panzerdivisionen and motorized units), strongly supported by the Luftwaffe, created and designed to be a strategical and "autonomous" weapon in 1940 ... and the majority of the German army : foot infantry, with horse drawn units, closer to the army of 1918 like the French basic infantry units. The German had also reserve units, not only first class units, concerning the tanks, the PzI and PzII couldn't hurt the majority of the French tanks and there were still MG08/15, not MG34s everywhere etc.
Everyone seems to believe the Germans had the better basic soldier training and tougher soldiers than others. In my opinion this is nonsense. The basic training for a soldier was more or less the same as in all other countries. What can you teach a recruit ? How he handles his weapon, how he follows orders, how he uses his equipment, train his fitness etc. Do you really think other countries didn't do the same or the Germans had a highly secret training method for their recruits to make them super soldiers ?
The myth that the Waffen-SS had a different basic training than the Heer comes also up frequently. The only differences which can be made out from veteran memories is that the treatment in the Waffen-SS was more inhumane and "hard" than in the Heer. And they tried harder to break the will of the recruits with more senseless punishments and drills.
Many veterans also say they never fired more than 10 life rounds during training. Some of them also say they never fired a single one. The real difference in quality and combat effectiveness were factors like combined weapons actions, NCOs and officers corps, experience, flexibility etc. Especially in 1939/1940 when most armies still were stuck in WW1 doctrines and obsolete tactics.
The Germans had always armor superiority because they concentrated it and French did that only in several battles. France, as well as Great Britain, used tank tactics very different from Germany's ones. Where Germany deployed their Panzers in concentration, France and Great Britain deployed their tanks spread out among the infantry or sometimes concentrated but only as a shock element working for the infantry, never as a decisive weapon by itself, they had nothing really comparable to the Panzer Divisionen, the closest was the French DLM which had been in fact copied to give rise to the Leichten Divisionen (transformed in Panzer Divisionen after Poland). The big allied armored units didn't show as good combined arms efficiency and were all weaker in tank numbers. This meant that it was easy for the German forces to take out the few tanks used at a time and the otherwise superior French tanks (armor and armament) were no real threat towards Germany's superior Blitzkrieg tactics. Except for some battles (Hannut/Gembloux, Abbeville ...) the French tanks were never concentrated and as a French general said, the tanks were used in 1000 groups of 3 instead of 3 groups of 1000.
The British did absolutely no better job in France than the French army. They were beaten the same way and led their battles more or less according to the same tactics. The first attack on Abbeville for example was led by the 1st AD (general Evans) and they lost 120 tanks out of 165, the attack failed in only 2 hours. The second attack led by general De Gaulle (4e DCR), according to his views of the use of tanks lasted 3 days and finally the third attack led by the French 2e DCR (Colonel Perré) supported by French infantry and the Scottish 51st HD failed in 6 hours. Hopefully there was the Channel otherwise Great-Britain would have been crushed as easily the same way.
Crude numbers give about the same number of tanks on each side, but remove all the obsolete FT17 tanks from WW1 (1600 tanks still in service) and count only what was really in the front line against the enemy and you will see that the modern French tanks really used at the front are only between 1800 and 2000 grossly. The FCM36, Hotchkiss H35, Renault R35 etc. were equipped with a short 37mm SA18 gun which was exactly the same than the 37mm infantry gun of WW1. Not all the tanks were B1Bis, D2, R40 with a 47mm SA35 gun (and a 75mm gun for the B1bis) or late Hotchkiss H-series with a 37mm SA38 gun.
The French tanks were all better armored than the better German armor, their armament was sometimes better (the 47mm gun is far better than the German 37mm) but they lacked communication and were slower. The German tanks were lighter and were spreading like water, they poured in every breakthrough and attacked the rear lines, disorganizing the whole defense. Thanks to their more numerous radios they were able to quickly change the direction of a movement/attack and they were continuously supported by attack and reconnaissance aircrafts.
On a strategic level the German tanks were superior but if you consider a small tactical engagement from tank to tank it is absolutely not the case. In several occasions the French tanks gave the Germans a bad licking but the mobility and tactics of the Germans almost systematically resulted in concentration of firepower and local superiority in the objective area. During the Hannut/Gembloux gap battle, the French lost 105 tanks and the Germans 165 tanks.
The French B1bis gave the Germans a bad licking resisting 37mm and even 75mm tank gunners with their superior armor. The Pak36 was therefore also called the "door-knocker" by the Germans. Although Guderian and Kleist would mostly dismiss these concerns, the up-and-coming officers in the German army would never forget the impression left of fearing enemy heavy armour and the need to counter them at the infantry level. Ask the German battalion that has been crushed in Huppy for example or the feeling of some German when the B1bis resisted sometimes to more than hundred 20mm, 37mm and 75mm shells.
Considering the speed of the French/German tanks, the French tanks had grossly a power of 7-10hp/ton and the German 15-20hp/ton. The figures of max speed (km/h) and autonomy (by road, in km) give that :
GERMAN tanks :
PzI : 40 170
PzII : 40 200
PzIII : 40 165
PzIV : 40 165
Pz38(t) : 42 250
Pz35(t) : 35 190
FRENCH tanks :
FT-17 : 7.5 35
AMC-34 : 40 200
AMC-35 : 42 160
R35 : 20 140
R40 : 20 130
H35 : 35 150
H38 and H39 : 36 120
FCM36 : 24 225
D1 : 18 90
D2 : 23 100
Somua S35 : 45 257
B1 : 28 200
B1bis : 28 180
AMR-33 : 54 200
AMR-35 : 60 200
The 650 Luftwaffe aircrafts shot down by the French air force (+ the ones destroyed by the French AA defenses - some claims say 300 but I have no precisely checked numbers) were later missing above London after the campaign in France, the Germans had to delay the action over Great Britain.
The French ace Marin-la-Meslé collected 21 victories (Mainly Me-109s) in 6 weeks with a Curtiss H-75 despite this plane was totally worse than the Me-109. The German ace Werner Mölder had been shot down over France and made prisoner. Except the too rare Dewoitine D520 all the French fighters were worse than the Me-109. The victory/losses rate of the French air force is positive because most of the German planes were destroyed by French fighters while most of the French planes were destroyed by the dense German Flak.
The French aviation was largely inferior to the German ones, especially the bombers fleet which was really small in comparison. Nevertheless the French Farman 222.2, 223.3 and 223.4 heavy bombers (about 50 only) were really long range bombers and carried 4200 kg bombs. First they dropped leaflets over Germany and Czechoslovakia but they were also the first allied planes to bomb Berlin (Siemens factory) and other cities (Rostock - Heinkel factories -, Hamburg, Münich and Köln) They also bombed rail-road nests in Aix-La-Chappelle, Maastricht, Flessingue and Middelburg in order to delay the Germans. After Italy declared war against France these bombers dropped leaflets over Roma and bombed fuel refinery in Porto Maghera and Livourne. The Lioré & Olivier 451 also bombed Germany and Italy but France had so few bombers and very few attack planes that it didn't change the strategical outcome.
On the French side there was a total lack of coordination between the infantry/tanks/artillery/aviation in comparison to the Germans who trained in that way. But in most occasions the French troops died on their positions instead of surrendering or retreating according to the 92,000 - 120,000 French KIA. The French soldiers fought often very bravely with what they had ... they fought well as companies and battalions but poorly as divisions and horribly as armies almost because of a bad doctrine, the absence of reconnaissance, communication issues etc. It is also wrong to depict the French officers as being not respected, it was not the case in most of the units where these officers were the single reason for the unit not to collapse under the German pressure. If indeed some generals were totally obsolete most of the lieutenants, captains and colonels had the will to fight and were well formed.
The French soldier was not at all prepared psychologically for the war which is an important point generally forgotten. Unlike the German soldier he didn't fought fanatically but simply for his comrades, unit, platoon or company commander etc. Without hate unlike the opposite side. Some tank crews have had their tanks for only one week, most of the infantry never saw a tank or a plane before they had to fight along them (or against them) and several unit really lacked training.
The Germans had light/medium/heavy tanks. In the French army the armored units did not constitute a part of the army by themselves, they were either depending from the infantry (support tanks like the FCM-36 or breakthrough tanks like the B1bis) or from the cavalry (like the Somua S35). They were never created to be an "autonomous" offensive tool, able to pierce and progress deep in ennemy territory. The breakthrough tanks had to give the initial push, to destroy the enemy line of resistance, allowing then the infantry to breakthrough anf take the ground.
The Maginot line :
The choice of building fortifications on the Maginot line had several goals :
- Avoid a surprise attack like in Belgium, Netherlands ... and give alert
- Cover the mobilization period (2-3 weeks)
- Economize forces (France had 39 millions citizens against 70 millions for Germany)
- Protect Alsace/Lorraine and all the industry there
- Be the basis for a counter-attack
- Force the Germans to attack by the flanks (Belgium or Switzerland)
Only after Dunkirk Hitler decided to attack the Maginot Line. The German crossed the Rhine and destroyed several small bunkers (new constructions) but the whole big forts, even attacked by heavy support (420 mm guns, Stuka ...) resisted to all assaults and inflicted heavy losses to the enemy. About 22,000 encircled men in Alsace/Lorraine mobilized 240,000 Germans and in the Alps 85,000 alpine troops defeated 650,000 Italians.
Mussolini assaulted with 650,000 men (20 first echelon divisions) against the Alps. The army of general Olry (France) had only 85,000 men and the country was already deadly hurt by the Wehrmacht who was going to attack this army on its rears. Armistice of June 25, 1940 arrived and no French position was lost in this sector.
The overwhelming numeric superiority of the Italians was limited because of the terrain which limited the use of motorized elements. The French fortifications constructed in the '30s was really efficient in this sector. At the end the Italian had lost 6000 men against less than 300 for the French Army.
Oddly enough, the Maginot line was a success ; it accomplished exactly what it was intended to do. It WASN'T designed to fully protect France from an attack from the east, though the Maginot line mentality fostered the idea that it would.
It was designed to compensate for France's inferiority in troops, vis-à-vis Germany, by reducing the area that the field army had to cover, and by freeing up personnel for that field army's manoeuvre divisions. It did exactly that. It wasn't the Maginot line's fault that the French High Command wasn't able to use the field army effectively.
Concerning the Maginot line in Alsace, the German did attack across the Rhine in June 40 (operation Kleiner Bär) with the VII Army (25th Korps, 27th Korps, 33rd Höh. Kdo, 213rd ID, 6th Gebirgsdivision ; more than 5 artillery regiments and strong air support. The French had to fight 1 vs 10 with second line troops and they had less than 10 field howitzers (a few 75mm and several 155mm) for a front of more or less 200 km.
The German massed heavy AA guns (88 mm) to fire directly at the bunkers at less than 200m and to destroy them while lower calibers (37mm AA and 37mm Pak) had to destroy the weapon slits (MG, mortars) and observation posts of the same bunker. In front of each French bunker there were about 4 to 6 Pak or Flak guns.
Armistice came on June 25, 1940 but only 1 week later did the fortifications surrender. Looking at these facts the Maginot Line did play a good part of its role. It avoided a surprise attack like in Poland, Belgium, Norway etc. It covered the mobilization period and no enemy incursion occurred during this period, it efficiently protected the industries in Alsace/Lorraine and forced Hitler to attack the neutral Belgium where elite troops were send to stop them. Every now knows that they did not manage to stop them and that they were attracted in Belgium.
Defeat was not a fatality and the Maginot line was not the reason of that defeat but became often the scapegoat.
Reasons of the quick fall of France ?
1) Political :
The French government was clearly weak.
From 1931 to 1939 Gamelin modelled a new army and made several errors :
- instead of unifying the command he diluted it in several intermediate command, what complicated the chain of command
- on the eve of war he created two TO : North East and the Alps
- He planned operation Dyle/Breda but against the opinion of the general Georges in charge of it on the field
- he did not understand the role of aviation in a modern war and was opposed to the creation of big armored formations
- in 1939 his collaborators and the army and no trust and no respect for him
- entrenched in the Vincennes castle he communicated only by phone and didn't want to yse modern radio equipment.
2) Strategically / Military :
- The French army was not able to lead a modern movement war
- Bad coordination between the infantry/tanks/artillery/aviation in comparison to the Germans who trained in that way.
- Grossly no reserves
- No serious counter-attack could be launched except operation in the Warndt (Sarre area) in 1939 but this is mainly due to High Command and political reasons.
- Lack in radios, most of the communication means were telephones, flags or men on motorcycles ... very slow when you have to make a quick decision against a quick advancing foe.
- A very important point is the lack in AA artillery compared to the German one (not enough pieces but also not enough AA ammunitions). The Stukas and Hs-123s had it easy while most of the French aircrafts were not destroyed by German fighters but by the very dense Flak the German had.
- The French soldier was also not at all prepared psychologically to the war which is an important point generally forgotten. Unlike the German soldier he didn't fought fanatically for his country or his Führer but simply for his comrades, unit, platoon or company commander.
- The communists often claimed that there were numerous in the resistance but they forgot to mention that it is because they were already well organized since the dissolution of their political movement in September 1939. Because of the German-Soviet agreement they were in favour of the Germans and were responsible for many strikes and sabotages. Farman factory had been damaged by a bomb in June and it is well known that many of the tanks/armament coming out from the Satory factory were sabotaged and that some tanks had mechanical breakdowns due to that. That does not explain at all the total defeat but it puts into light the general atmosphere in the country. Already before WW2 they led a subversive pacifist/internationalist campaign in the country and hindered the French armament program.
3) Psychological :
- France declared war to Germany with a civil population deeply pacifist after the WWI slaughter (France had about 6 millions losses that meant 10% of the active male population of the country - 1,400,000 KIA - and only in the late 50's the French population could reach again the number of before WW1).
- Communists' strikes and sabotages in the armament industries (because of the pact between Germany and Russia).
- The political power was weak.
- The defeat was already there, no real will to fight in the high spheres of decision.
Notes :
(1) After the battle of France, when engaging the Soviets, the German army once again was not the same than in May 1940. In August 1940, Hitler already decided that in further enlargement of the Army, the possibility of a campaign against Soviet Russia had to be considered. By the time this campaign began in June 1941, 84 more divisions were created. Without the extensive booty from the western campaign of 1940, these units would have remained without weapons and vehicles. Motor vehicles in particular played an important role in the motorization of at least some of the divisions. The 18.PzD was equipped with strictly stock French motor vehicles until the end of May 1941. Among the trucks, the 4.5-ton Citroën Type 45 attained a certain significance. The 1-ton Peugeot was also seen often. The same was true for the French halftrack (Somua MCL and MCG, Unic P107 etc.) towing vehicles, which were used as tractors in the Panzerjäger units, infantry gun companies and motorized artillery units.
(2) German vehicles/losses in Poland vs in France (Panzertruppen 1, Thomas Jentz, Schiffer) :
Poland
Total participating
Pz.Kpfw. I: 973
Pz.Kpfw. II: 1127
Pz.Kpfw. III: 87
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 112
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 55
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 198
Pz.Bef.: 219
Total: 2771
Total losses
Pz.Kpfw. I: 89
Pz.Kpfw. II: 83
Pz.Kpfw. III: 26
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 7
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 7
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 19
Pz.Bef.: 5
Total: 236
Losses in % of available
Pz.Kpfw. I: 9.1
Pz.Kpfw. II: 7.4
Pz.Kpfw. III: 29.9
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 6
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 12.7
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 9.6
Pz.Bef.: 2.3
Total: 8.5
France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg
Total participating
Pz.Kpfw. I: 554
Pz.Kpfw. II: 920
Pz.Kpfw. III: 309
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 118
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 207
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 280
Pz.Bef.: 154
Total: 2542
Total losses (for both May and June)
Pz.Kpfw. I: 182
Pz.Kpfw. II: 240
Pz.Kpfw. III: 135
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 62
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 54
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 97
Pz.Bef.: 69
Total: 839 (the majority in France)
Losses in % of available
Pz.Kpfw. I: 32.9
Pz.Kpfw. II: 26.1
Pz.Kpfw. III: 43.7
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 52.5
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 26.1
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 34.6
Pz.Bef.: 44.8
Total: 33
FAMOUS FIERCE BATTLES IN FRANCE :
- Hannut / Gembloux
- Stonne
- Lille
- Abbeville
- Montcornet
- Flavion
- La Horgne
- Defense on the Loire river by the Cavalry school of Saumur
...
Regards,
David
Battle of France 1940 (45 days)
The German means and tactics were also not exactly the same in September 1939 and in May 1940. The Polish army suffered 200,000 losses in 35 days (5714 per day) and the French army 330,000+ losses in 45 days (7333+ per day), both have fought bravely against an enemy and its tactics that they weren't really prepared to fight at and Poland was attacked during the same time by the Soviets. The idea that France did not fight is just false, it was defeated in shame because quickly for the country as it was seen in 1939, yes, but the soldiers were courageous and died too for their homeland.
In 1940, in 45 days, the French army lost 92,000 – 120,000 KIA on the battlefield. In the same time the Germans lost 45,218 KIA. Despite lacks of high command the French soldiers did resist to the enemy each time they were well commanded on the front
The Germans engaged 68 divisions against Poland (52 divisions) and they later engaged 135 divisions against France (104 divisions). The ratio of the forces is more or less the same : 1.3.
The German army was also stronger against France :
- Leichten Divisionen had been transformed into Panzer Divisionen*
- Panzer Divisionen created
- many more tanks were armed with good guns superior to 20mm and better armored (16% - 452 tanks - in Poland and 36% - 914 tanks - in France)
- improved mechanization and motorization of the army
- several tanks were improved (the PzIVs for example : more Ausf. A/B in Poland and more Ausf.C/D in France, better armored)
Just to say that if the attacked country is stronger, the attacking country is also very stronger than before.
In the light of these factors, France in 1940 must be seen as the best example of Blitzkrieg carried out, it couldn't work anymore in Russia which was too big. In Poland it was much more a classical Kesselschlacht and the too weak Leichten-Divisionen where after that transformed in Panzer-Divisionen. A large faked attack was undertaken in Belgium and Holland where paratroopers and airborne troops were used to secure important points. France sent its best forces in this area. Later, the main forces attacked in an unexpected place where only second-rate divisions resisted them. Here, Panzers pushed on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the infantry. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacked as support for the Panzers and the infantry.
The French fought very well as companies and battalions but poorly as divisions and horribly as armies ... doctrine (conception and use of tanks), communication issues etc. The French Army didn't lose because of a lack of material (though a high lack of radios, bombers, AA weapons and AA ammunitions) and its armament was as good as the German one, the reasons are both the doctrine at the military level and several political decisions.
* Created in 1936, these Leichten-Divisionen were based on the model of the French DLM. In Germany like in France, the Cavalry wanted its own tanks because it was frightened to loose influence. After Poland the 1., 2., 3. and 4. Leichten-Divisionen became the 6., 7., 3. and 4. Panzer-Divisionen and the 5. PzD has been created.
Engaged by Germany :
135 divisions (10 Pad and several motorized divisions)
~4500 planes
~7500 artillery pieces
~3800 tanks and armored cars
German losses (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) :
- 156,492 losses (27,074 KIA, 111,034 WIA, 18,384 MIA) (+ 6000 Italian losses in the French Alps) -- compared to 40,390 losses in Poland. This first figure established on June 25, 1940 has been corrected later to 45,218 German KIA.
- 1236 planes + 323 damaged (about 650 victories for the French air force fighters alone, not counting here the losses due to AA fire etc. and many gliders and Ju-52 destroyed in the Netherlands) -- compared to 135 planes in Poland (Marek Murawski)
- 839 tanks definitively destroyed (33% of the 2542 tanks engaged) and 157 armored cars destroyed ; most of them against French tanks or AT guns -- compared to 218 tanks (8.5% of the engaged tanks) in Poland (Jentz)
Engaged by France :
104 divisions (with 5 DLC, 3 DLM, 3 DCR : 11 armored /mechanized/motorized divisions but half of them are very weak) : none of these divisions were the real equivalent in power and combined arms that a Panzer Division. Quickly after the first losses and encirclements their were only 63 divisions (counting the one stuck on the Maginot line) to face the whole German army.
~2100 planes
~10000 artillery pieces
~3500 tanks and armored cars but only really about 2000 modern ones engaged
French losses :
- 330,000 losses (92,000-120,000 KIAs and 210,000-240,000 WIA/MIA)
- 1,450,000 prisoners
- 892 aircrafts
- no data for the AFVs ... mostly all (2000+) destroyed or captured except the ones in the colonies.
Allied losses according to Karl-Heinz Frieser (Oberst Bundeswehr, MFGA) in his book "Blitzkrieg Legende" and Gérard Saint-Martin "L'arme blindée française" :
Belgian losses in 19 days : 7500 KIA, 15850 WIA
Luxembourg : no fightings
Dutch losses in 6 days : 2890 KIA, 6889 WIA
British losses in 26 days : 3457 KIA, 13602 WIA, 3267 MIA
French losses in 45 days : 92,000-120,000 KIA (according to different sources),
The Swiss historian Eddy Bauer says also that the Germans lost much more men in the second part of the western campaign, in France the resistance was harder when time advanced.
156,492 German losses (KIA, MIA, WIA) in 45 days, that's 3477 losses per day but in fact the French resistance was all days harder : 2499 losses per day between the 10th May and the 3rd June but 4762 losses per day between the 5th and the 24th June. You can compare that to the 4506 losses/day during operation Barbarossa from June 22 to December 10, 1941.
The German army is not in all cases better than the French army and the idea of a total superiority (kind of racial superiority) of the men themselves is a myth still propagated some people. The German soldier is often better trained physically, is better equipped (lighter uniform etc.) and above all he has been better prepared psychologically for years while the French didn't wanted this war. The German soldier fought for Germany, for his Führer, he was well endoctrined. But the idea that the Germans were supermen and the French running cowards is totally wrong.
One point is also when talking about the German army in 1940, too many people still imagine an army only composed of powerful mechanized/motorized units with first class armaments. The French army had 400,000 motorized vehicles (more or less equivalent to the German army, the small US army at the same time for example had 12,000 vehicles). In fact if there are "two" French armies (active and reserve kind of units), there are also "two" German armies : the mechanized one (Panzerdivisionen and motorized units), strongly supported by the Luftwaffe, created and designed to be a strategical and "autonomous" weapon in 1940 ... and the majority of the German army : foot infantry, with horse drawn units, closer to the army of 1918 like the French basic infantry units. The German had also reserve units, not only first class units, concerning the tanks, the PzI and PzII couldn't hurt the majority of the French tanks and there were still MG08/15, not MG34s everywhere etc.
Everyone seems to believe the Germans had the better basic soldier training and tougher soldiers than others. In my opinion this is nonsense. The basic training for a soldier was more or less the same as in all other countries. What can you teach a recruit ? How he handles his weapon, how he follows orders, how he uses his equipment, train his fitness etc. Do you really think other countries didn't do the same or the Germans had a highly secret training method for their recruits to make them super soldiers ?
The myth that the Waffen-SS had a different basic training than the Heer comes also up frequently. The only differences which can be made out from veteran memories is that the treatment in the Waffen-SS was more inhumane and "hard" than in the Heer. And they tried harder to break the will of the recruits with more senseless punishments and drills.
Many veterans also say they never fired more than 10 life rounds during training. Some of them also say they never fired a single one. The real difference in quality and combat effectiveness were factors like combined weapons actions, NCOs and officers corps, experience, flexibility etc. Especially in 1939/1940 when most armies still were stuck in WW1 doctrines and obsolete tactics.
The Germans had always armor superiority because they concentrated it and French did that only in several battles. France, as well as Great Britain, used tank tactics very different from Germany's ones. Where Germany deployed their Panzers in concentration, France and Great Britain deployed their tanks spread out among the infantry or sometimes concentrated but only as a shock element working for the infantry, never as a decisive weapon by itself, they had nothing really comparable to the Panzer Divisionen, the closest was the French DLM which had been in fact copied to give rise to the Leichten Divisionen (transformed in Panzer Divisionen after Poland). The big allied armored units didn't show as good combined arms efficiency and were all weaker in tank numbers. This meant that it was easy for the German forces to take out the few tanks used at a time and the otherwise superior French tanks (armor and armament) were no real threat towards Germany's superior Blitzkrieg tactics. Except for some battles (Hannut/Gembloux, Abbeville ...) the French tanks were never concentrated and as a French general said, the tanks were used in 1000 groups of 3 instead of 3 groups of 1000.
The British did absolutely no better job in France than the French army. They were beaten the same way and led their battles more or less according to the same tactics. The first attack on Abbeville for example was led by the 1st AD (general Evans) and they lost 120 tanks out of 165, the attack failed in only 2 hours. The second attack led by general De Gaulle (4e DCR), according to his views of the use of tanks lasted 3 days and finally the third attack led by the French 2e DCR (Colonel Perré) supported by French infantry and the Scottish 51st HD failed in 6 hours. Hopefully there was the Channel otherwise Great-Britain would have been crushed as easily the same way.
Crude numbers give about the same number of tanks on each side, but remove all the obsolete FT17 tanks from WW1 (1600 tanks still in service) and count only what was really in the front line against the enemy and you will see that the modern French tanks really used at the front are only between 1800 and 2000 grossly. The FCM36, Hotchkiss H35, Renault R35 etc. were equipped with a short 37mm SA18 gun which was exactly the same than the 37mm infantry gun of WW1. Not all the tanks were B1Bis, D2, R40 with a 47mm SA35 gun (and a 75mm gun for the B1bis) or late Hotchkiss H-series with a 37mm SA38 gun.
The French tanks were all better armored than the better German armor, their armament was sometimes better (the 47mm gun is far better than the German 37mm) but they lacked communication and were slower. The German tanks were lighter and were spreading like water, they poured in every breakthrough and attacked the rear lines, disorganizing the whole defense. Thanks to their more numerous radios they were able to quickly change the direction of a movement/attack and they were continuously supported by attack and reconnaissance aircrafts.
On a strategic level the German tanks were superior but if you consider a small tactical engagement from tank to tank it is absolutely not the case. In several occasions the French tanks gave the Germans a bad licking but the mobility and tactics of the Germans almost systematically resulted in concentration of firepower and local superiority in the objective area. During the Hannut/Gembloux gap battle, the French lost 105 tanks and the Germans 165 tanks.
The French B1bis gave the Germans a bad licking resisting 37mm and even 75mm tank gunners with their superior armor. The Pak36 was therefore also called the "door-knocker" by the Germans. Although Guderian and Kleist would mostly dismiss these concerns, the up-and-coming officers in the German army would never forget the impression left of fearing enemy heavy armour and the need to counter them at the infantry level. Ask the German battalion that has been crushed in Huppy for example or the feeling of some German when the B1bis resisted sometimes to more than hundred 20mm, 37mm and 75mm shells.
Considering the speed of the French/German tanks, the French tanks had grossly a power of 7-10hp/ton and the German 15-20hp/ton. The figures of max speed (km/h) and autonomy (by road, in km) give that :
GERMAN tanks :
PzI : 40 170
PzII : 40 200
PzIII : 40 165
PzIV : 40 165
Pz38(t) : 42 250
Pz35(t) : 35 190
FRENCH tanks :
FT-17 : 7.5 35
AMC-34 : 40 200
AMC-35 : 42 160
R35 : 20 140
R40 : 20 130
H35 : 35 150
H38 and H39 : 36 120
FCM36 : 24 225
D1 : 18 90
D2 : 23 100
Somua S35 : 45 257
B1 : 28 200
B1bis : 28 180
AMR-33 : 54 200
AMR-35 : 60 200
The 650 Luftwaffe aircrafts shot down by the French air force (+ the ones destroyed by the French AA defenses - some claims say 300 but I have no precisely checked numbers) were later missing above London after the campaign in France, the Germans had to delay the action over Great Britain.
The French ace Marin-la-Meslé collected 21 victories (Mainly Me-109s) in 6 weeks with a Curtiss H-75 despite this plane was totally worse than the Me-109. The German ace Werner Mölder had been shot down over France and made prisoner. Except the too rare Dewoitine D520 all the French fighters were worse than the Me-109. The victory/losses rate of the French air force is positive because most of the German planes were destroyed by French fighters while most of the French planes were destroyed by the dense German Flak.
The French aviation was largely inferior to the German ones, especially the bombers fleet which was really small in comparison. Nevertheless the French Farman 222.2, 223.3 and 223.4 heavy bombers (about 50 only) were really long range bombers and carried 4200 kg bombs. First they dropped leaflets over Germany and Czechoslovakia but they were also the first allied planes to bomb Berlin (Siemens factory) and other cities (Rostock - Heinkel factories -, Hamburg, Münich and Köln) They also bombed rail-road nests in Aix-La-Chappelle, Maastricht, Flessingue and Middelburg in order to delay the Germans. After Italy declared war against France these bombers dropped leaflets over Roma and bombed fuel refinery in Porto Maghera and Livourne. The Lioré & Olivier 451 also bombed Germany and Italy but France had so few bombers and very few attack planes that it didn't change the strategical outcome.
On the French side there was a total lack of coordination between the infantry/tanks/artillery/aviation in comparison to the Germans who trained in that way. But in most occasions the French troops died on their positions instead of surrendering or retreating according to the 92,000 - 120,000 French KIA. The French soldiers fought often very bravely with what they had ... they fought well as companies and battalions but poorly as divisions and horribly as armies almost because of a bad doctrine, the absence of reconnaissance, communication issues etc. It is also wrong to depict the French officers as being not respected, it was not the case in most of the units where these officers were the single reason for the unit not to collapse under the German pressure. If indeed some generals were totally obsolete most of the lieutenants, captains and colonels had the will to fight and were well formed.
The French soldier was not at all prepared psychologically for the war which is an important point generally forgotten. Unlike the German soldier he didn't fought fanatically but simply for his comrades, unit, platoon or company commander etc. Without hate unlike the opposite side. Some tank crews have had their tanks for only one week, most of the infantry never saw a tank or a plane before they had to fight along them (or against them) and several unit really lacked training.
The Germans had light/medium/heavy tanks. In the French army the armored units did not constitute a part of the army by themselves, they were either depending from the infantry (support tanks like the FCM-36 or breakthrough tanks like the B1bis) or from the cavalry (like the Somua S35). They were never created to be an "autonomous" offensive tool, able to pierce and progress deep in ennemy territory. The breakthrough tanks had to give the initial push, to destroy the enemy line of resistance, allowing then the infantry to breakthrough anf take the ground.
The Maginot line :
The choice of building fortifications on the Maginot line had several goals :
- Avoid a surprise attack like in Belgium, Netherlands ... and give alert
- Cover the mobilization period (2-3 weeks)
- Economize forces (France had 39 millions citizens against 70 millions for Germany)
- Protect Alsace/Lorraine and all the industry there
- Be the basis for a counter-attack
- Force the Germans to attack by the flanks (Belgium or Switzerland)
Only after Dunkirk Hitler decided to attack the Maginot Line. The German crossed the Rhine and destroyed several small bunkers (new constructions) but the whole big forts, even attacked by heavy support (420 mm guns, Stuka ...) resisted to all assaults and inflicted heavy losses to the enemy. About 22,000 encircled men in Alsace/Lorraine mobilized 240,000 Germans and in the Alps 85,000 alpine troops defeated 650,000 Italians.
Mussolini assaulted with 650,000 men (20 first echelon divisions) against the Alps. The army of general Olry (France) had only 85,000 men and the country was already deadly hurt by the Wehrmacht who was going to attack this army on its rears. Armistice of June 25, 1940 arrived and no French position was lost in this sector.
The overwhelming numeric superiority of the Italians was limited because of the terrain which limited the use of motorized elements. The French fortifications constructed in the '30s was really efficient in this sector. At the end the Italian had lost 6000 men against less than 300 for the French Army.
Oddly enough, the Maginot line was a success ; it accomplished exactly what it was intended to do. It WASN'T designed to fully protect France from an attack from the east, though the Maginot line mentality fostered the idea that it would.
It was designed to compensate for France's inferiority in troops, vis-à-vis Germany, by reducing the area that the field army had to cover, and by freeing up personnel for that field army's manoeuvre divisions. It did exactly that. It wasn't the Maginot line's fault that the French High Command wasn't able to use the field army effectively.
Concerning the Maginot line in Alsace, the German did attack across the Rhine in June 40 (operation Kleiner Bär) with the VII Army (25th Korps, 27th Korps, 33rd Höh. Kdo, 213rd ID, 6th Gebirgsdivision ; more than 5 artillery regiments and strong air support. The French had to fight 1 vs 10 with second line troops and they had less than 10 field howitzers (a few 75mm and several 155mm) for a front of more or less 200 km.
The German massed heavy AA guns (88 mm) to fire directly at the bunkers at less than 200m and to destroy them while lower calibers (37mm AA and 37mm Pak) had to destroy the weapon slits (MG, mortars) and observation posts of the same bunker. In front of each French bunker there were about 4 to 6 Pak or Flak guns.
Armistice came on June 25, 1940 but only 1 week later did the fortifications surrender. Looking at these facts the Maginot Line did play a good part of its role. It avoided a surprise attack like in Poland, Belgium, Norway etc. It covered the mobilization period and no enemy incursion occurred during this period, it efficiently protected the industries in Alsace/Lorraine and forced Hitler to attack the neutral Belgium where elite troops were send to stop them. Every now knows that they did not manage to stop them and that they were attracted in Belgium.
Defeat was not a fatality and the Maginot line was not the reason of that defeat but became often the scapegoat.
Reasons of the quick fall of France ?
1) Political :
The French government was clearly weak.
From 1931 to 1939 Gamelin modelled a new army and made several errors :
- instead of unifying the command he diluted it in several intermediate command, what complicated the chain of command
- on the eve of war he created two TO : North East and the Alps
- He planned operation Dyle/Breda but against the opinion of the general Georges in charge of it on the field
- he did not understand the role of aviation in a modern war and was opposed to the creation of big armored formations
- in 1939 his collaborators and the army and no trust and no respect for him
- entrenched in the Vincennes castle he communicated only by phone and didn't want to yse modern radio equipment.
2) Strategically / Military :
- The French army was not able to lead a modern movement war
- Bad coordination between the infantry/tanks/artillery/aviation in comparison to the Germans who trained in that way.
- Grossly no reserves
- No serious counter-attack could be launched except operation in the Warndt (Sarre area) in 1939 but this is mainly due to High Command and political reasons.
- Lack in radios, most of the communication means were telephones, flags or men on motorcycles ... very slow when you have to make a quick decision against a quick advancing foe.
- A very important point is the lack in AA artillery compared to the German one (not enough pieces but also not enough AA ammunitions). The Stukas and Hs-123s had it easy while most of the French aircrafts were not destroyed by German fighters but by the very dense Flak the German had.
- The French soldier was also not at all prepared psychologically to the war which is an important point generally forgotten. Unlike the German soldier he didn't fought fanatically for his country or his Führer but simply for his comrades, unit, platoon or company commander.
- The communists often claimed that there were numerous in the resistance but they forgot to mention that it is because they were already well organized since the dissolution of their political movement in September 1939. Because of the German-Soviet agreement they were in favour of the Germans and were responsible for many strikes and sabotages. Farman factory had been damaged by a bomb in June and it is well known that many of the tanks/armament coming out from the Satory factory were sabotaged and that some tanks had mechanical breakdowns due to that. That does not explain at all the total defeat but it puts into light the general atmosphere in the country. Already before WW2 they led a subversive pacifist/internationalist campaign in the country and hindered the French armament program.
3) Psychological :
- France declared war to Germany with a civil population deeply pacifist after the WWI slaughter (France had about 6 millions losses that meant 10% of the active male population of the country - 1,400,000 KIA - and only in the late 50's the French population could reach again the number of before WW1).
- Communists' strikes and sabotages in the armament industries (because of the pact between Germany and Russia).
- The political power was weak.
- The defeat was already there, no real will to fight in the high spheres of decision.
Notes :
(1) After the battle of France, when engaging the Soviets, the German army once again was not the same than in May 1940. In August 1940, Hitler already decided that in further enlargement of the Army, the possibility of a campaign against Soviet Russia had to be considered. By the time this campaign began in June 1941, 84 more divisions were created. Without the extensive booty from the western campaign of 1940, these units would have remained without weapons and vehicles. Motor vehicles in particular played an important role in the motorization of at least some of the divisions. The 18.PzD was equipped with strictly stock French motor vehicles until the end of May 1941. Among the trucks, the 4.5-ton Citroën Type 45 attained a certain significance. The 1-ton Peugeot was also seen often. The same was true for the French halftrack (Somua MCL and MCG, Unic P107 etc.) towing vehicles, which were used as tractors in the Panzerjäger units, infantry gun companies and motorized artillery units.
(2) German vehicles/losses in Poland vs in France (Panzertruppen 1, Thomas Jentz, Schiffer) :
Poland
Total participating
Pz.Kpfw. I: 973
Pz.Kpfw. II: 1127
Pz.Kpfw. III: 87
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 112
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 55
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 198
Pz.Bef.: 219
Total: 2771
Total losses
Pz.Kpfw. I: 89
Pz.Kpfw. II: 83
Pz.Kpfw. III: 26
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 7
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 7
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 19
Pz.Bef.: 5
Total: 236
Losses in % of available
Pz.Kpfw. I: 9.1
Pz.Kpfw. II: 7.4
Pz.Kpfw. III: 29.9
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 6
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 12.7
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 9.6
Pz.Bef.: 2.3
Total: 8.5
France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg
Total participating
Pz.Kpfw. I: 554
Pz.Kpfw. II: 920
Pz.Kpfw. III: 309
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 118
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 207
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 280
Pz.Bef.: 154
Total: 2542
Total losses (for both May and June)
Pz.Kpfw. I: 182
Pz.Kpfw. II: 240
Pz.Kpfw. III: 135
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 62
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 54
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 97
Pz.Bef.: 69
Total: 839 (the majority in France)
Losses in % of available
Pz.Kpfw. I: 32.9
Pz.Kpfw. II: 26.1
Pz.Kpfw. III: 43.7
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 52.5
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 26.1
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 34.6
Pz.Bef.: 44.8
Total: 33
FAMOUS FIERCE BATTLES IN FRANCE :
- Hannut / Gembloux
- Stonne
- Lille
- Abbeville
- Montcornet
- Flavion
- La Horgne
- Defense on the Loire river by the Cavalry school of Saumur
...
Regards,
David