2RHPZ
06-02-2004, 08:57 AM
Logistic support is often an underestimated part of war, especially by combat soldiers but withou that you could not win. This article may be boring for someone but it is worth posting, I guess:
Sustaining Northern Iraq: when the 173d Airborne Brigade dropped 1,000
paratroopers into northern Iraq, the provisional 201st Forward Support Battalion
went into the theater with them
Army Logistician, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Jamie L. Krump
On 26 March, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted an airborne assault to secure
the Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq and then prevent the Iraqis from moving
north and the Turks and Kurds from moving too far south. The brigade was
augmented by the 201st Forward Support Battalion (FSB) (Provisional) from the
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), which provided a logistics battalion
headquarters; supported Task Force 1-63, the heavy task force assigned to the
173d; and augmented critical shortages in the 173d's support structure.
Forming an FSB
The 201st FSB's mission began when 21 junior enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned
officers (NCOs), and officers from the 1st Infantry Division Support Command
(DISCOM) departed Vilseck, Germany. After a bus ride to Frankfurt Airport, they
boarded a commercial flight to Vicenza, Italy, with a final destination of
northern Iraq. They had little knowledge of what lay ahead or where specifically
they were going in northern Iraq.
The battalion commander and some of the other key players were pulled out of
Kosovo for the mission, and !he battalion executive officer had been in Turkey
waiting to pass the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) through to northern Iraq.
Still other members of the team had been preparing to go to Turkey for the same
mission.
The 201st FSB was provisional in that it was not an actual FSB, but rather a
conglomeration of soldiers from across the 1st Infantry DISCOM pulled together
to serve as a battalion headquarters that would support the 173d Airborne
Brigade. In addition to the 1st Infantry DISCOM personnel, soldiers from the
250th Forward Surgical Team (FST), the 38th Personnel Services Detachment, the
54th Quartermaster Mortuary Affairs Collection Point Platoon, and the 200th
Materiel Management Center were added to the 173d's organic 501st Forward
Support Company (FSC) to complete the 201st FSB (Provisional).
The 501st FSC consisted of approximately 150 soldiers who traditionally
supported a light infantry brigade of about 2,000 soldiers. An area support
group heavily supplements this support in garrison since the FSC does not have
the capability to support the 173d on its own.
Preparations in Italy
As soon as the plane touched ground in Italy, members of the 201st FSB began to
get to know each other so they could function as a staff and formulate plans,
develop logistics estimates, and try to anticipate problems. The battalion was
notified that it would have to provide a support staff for the 173d Airborne
Brigade during their insertion into and subsequent occupation of an undisclosed
location in northern Iraq. Many questions had to be answered: Would the use of
Turkish airspace be possible? Would the weather be suitable for an airborne
assault? Would ground lines of communication (LOC) from the north be allowed? If
not, how would the FSB provide adequate support for a light infantry brigade,
augmented with a heavy mechanized trait from U.S. Army Europe, using only air
LOC?
This mission would be the first time that a light airborne brigade, augmented
with heavy mechanized assets, would be inserted completely by air. The chosen
location was Bashur Airfield, which was under the operational control of the
Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N). The heavy forces consisted
of a heavy reaction company (HRC) and a medium reaction company (MRC) from the
1st Infantry Division. The HRC and MRC were equal to a 200-man battalion with 5
M1A1 Abrams tanks, 5 M2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 10 M113 armored
personnel carriers, 4 M1064 mortar carriers, 1 M88 recovery vehicle, a scout
platoon, a military police platoon, and a combat service support force
enhancement module. The 201st FSB's job was to go in with the 173d Airborne
Brigade and quickly set up the materiel management support the HRC and the MRC
would need to back up light infantry operations in northern Iraq.
While in Italy, the FSB had refined the support requirements for the brigade,
both with and without the HRC and the MRC. To mitigate a shortfall of scheduled
sustainment flights, the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) established a
warehouse in Miesau, Germany, in which to store, prepare, and rig supplies for
the FSB in northern Iraq. Sustainment flights to Iraq were increased to ensure
that the brigade had enough supplies for all combat operations.
Operations at Bashur Airfield
The 173d conducted an airborne assault on 26 March to capture the Bashur
Airfield. This was 24 hours before most of the logistics troops landed. Over the
following 5 days, the remainder of the task force troops flowed in and began to
develop a logistics hub. The first aircraft carried the personnel and equipment
needed to establish the base camp. Once the initial setup was complete, the
sustainment flights of supplies and equipment began, signaling the start of
real-time logistics. While simply inserting the equipment and personnel was a
challenge, moving the HRC and the MRC quickly and setting up the support they
needed to sustain the 173d Airborne Brigade often required logistics planning
and executing "on the fly." The diverse FSB staff was up to the task.
The first elements of the FSB arrived by air with only two satellite-based
wireless Iridium phones and a couple of laptop computers. They begged for and
borrowed equipment whenever they could to establish a makeshift tactical
operations center (TOC) until more equipment arrived.
Initially, the wireless phones were used extensively to make sure the
sustainment flights had the right stuff on board. The 21st TSC's 200th Materiel
Management Center (MMC) from Kaiserslautern, Germany, provided outstanding
support to the FSB and to the brigade during this time. However, prioritizing
supplies and sustainment shipments seemed to require a code that was difficult
to crack. By the time the FSB's requirements were pushed through the logistics
channels to the point of embarkation in Germany, either its needs had changed or
it was discovered that the requirements had been relayed inaccurately. It became
a vicious cycle that was difficult to overcome.
Even though the 200th MMC and the FSB coordinated the FSB's requirements, a
number of mitigating factors often caused low-priority supplies to arrive on
time while critical supplies were delayed. First, the airfield at Ramstein,
Germany, was packed full of pallets for missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
locations. This made it difficult to marry up the right pallets with the right
plane. Second, the FSB initially did not have a liaison at Ramstein to make sure
the right pallets were loaded on the right plane. Third, the planes loaded with
the FSB's supplies sometimes developed problems and had to return to Ramstein or
go to Incirlik, Turkey. At other times, bad weather caused planes to be diverted
to Constanta, Romania.
Eventually, most of these problems were solved. The battalion's communications
equipment improved, as did its reporting system. The improved system captured an
accurate status of what was on hand and where other supplies and equipment were
needed.
The HRC and the MRC needed at least 22,000 gallons of fuel on hand to conduct
sustained combat operations. Initially, the FSB established a 30,000-gallon fuel
system supply point (FSSP) with one 20,000-gallon bag and one 10,000-gallon bag.
Eventually, the FSSP grew to contain 80,000 gallons.
The decision was made to purchase diesel fuel locally. It would be easy to
convert from JP8 to diesel since filter changes are not required. (However,
converting back to JP8 does require all new fuel filters.) Obtaining fuel in
northern Iraq at first would appear to be a simple task. Not so. Northern Iraq
had been cut off from resupply for many years, and the only way to get fuel was
by smuggling it from southern Iraq and Turkey. It became apparent that
purchasing fuel locally was not a workable solution when an initial contract for
40,000 gallons of fuel produced only several hundred gallons delivered in 55-gallon
drums on the bed of a pickup truck.
Delivery of fuel by C-17s and C-130s proved to be impractical. Because of the
limited size of the airfield at Bashur and the threat to the aircraft, the
planes would not spend more than 45 minutes on the ground, which was not long
enough to offload large quantities of fuel. All flights occurred at night, and
unloading fuel from an airplane requires even more time during darkness.
The only workable solution for obtaining fuel was to establish a ground LOC.
Because the FSB was cut off from all forces in the south, it was necessary to
establish a northern ground LOC. Finally, Army Forces (Turkey) negotiated an
agreement with the Turks to let fuel tankers cross their border into northern
Iraq.
To make sure the fuel arrived at the right place and to ensure the safety of the
drivers, the 173d sent escorts to meet the Turkish tankers at the Harbur border
gate between Turkey and Iraq and accompany them to Bashur Airfield. Extensive
coordinating and forecasting were required to prevent the fuel tankers from
sitting too long before being emptied. These convoys ensured that sufficient
fuel assets were available to call forward the HRC and the MRC to support the
173d as it conducted offensive operations to seize Kirkuk, Iraq, and its
airfield.
Expanding Supply Management
Just as the 201st FSB was getting its systems in place to provide solid support
to the 173d Airborne Brigade, the battalion was directed to take over the
forecasting and managing of all supplies in northern Iraq. The supply and
services officer in the 201st support operations office was already providing a
daily logistics status report to the Combined Forces Special Operations
Component Command, so she modified her report to include forecasts for the Air
Force at Bashur Airfield, the JSOTF--N in Irbil, Iraq, and the Marine
Expeditionary Unit in Mosul, Iraq. She quickly established a reporting chain
with these units that allowed her to forecast accurately the needs of all units
in northern Iraq. This was no easy task because there was a constant influx of
units from all services into the region and it was impossible to forecast their
arrival times correctly.
Supporting northern Iraq became an equation of supplies divided by trucks and
soldiers on hand. No matter how many trucks were contracted or how many workers
were hired, there still was a shortage of equipment and manpower to receive,
break down, and distribute the quantity of supplies required. At the culmination
of its mission, the 201st FSB supported over 7,000 personnel at four locations
spread over an area spanning hundreds of miles. This included heavy mechanized
units, aviation assets, special operations groups, Air Force units, Marine Corps
units, and any other units that passed through the northern half of the theater.
To lessen the strain on available manpower, the FSB created the mother of all
distribution plans. The plan broke down the loads on every truck by pallets to
be delivered to each location (Mosul, Irbil, and so on). The 200th MMC personnel
in Turkey forwarded to the FSB the bumper number of each truck, the name of its
driver, and, based on data from the FSB's distribution plan, information on the
units that were to receive the items on the truck. The FSB sent up unit
requirements by location, and the 200th MMC folks in Turkey made sure that the
pallets were configured correctly. The FSB escorts met the Kirkuk-bound convoy
at the Iraq border and called out identifying truck and unit information. The
identified trucks dropped out of the convoy and were escorted to the unit
designated to receive the supplies they carried. This distribution system
stopped the drain on resources in the FSB's supply support activity (SSA) and
allowed the FSB to operate more efficiently.
Materiel Management Team Operations
From the beginning, the materiel management team (MMT) was an extremely
important part of the FSB. The team helped the battalion to gain visibility over
what was inbound and to give high priority to critically needed items. The MMT
received a 48-hour crash course in a number of electronic communication,
tracking, and supply support systems just before its departure for Italy.
Using a system called "support requisitions," MMT personnel submitted offline
requisitions to the 200th MMC rear, which filled the requisitions and pushed the
supplies forward on sustainment flights. This was an essential part of
establishing the base camp, because initially there was no connectivity to the
Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS); therefore, there was no way to place
requisitions for deadlined vehicle repair parts, needed equipment, and supplies.
Until SARSS was established, only the MMT had input into what was flown into
Bashur Airfield in support of the 173d's mission.
Standard Army Management Information Systems
After the essential equipment and supplies were on the ground and SARSS was
established, the DISCOM's combat service support automation management officer
(CSSAMO) looked for ways to make the supply system work more efficiently. He
found that several of the Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS)
were not prepped properly before deploying. For example, a listing of forward
unit identification codes had not been loaded into the Standard Army Maintenance
System-1 (SAMS--1). Tweaking the STAMIS was a huge challenge, but eventually all
systems were up and running.
Several other problems resulted from simple oversights. For example, some units
did not come to the area of operations prepared to plug into different voltage
power sources. Therefore, they lost equipment after plugging it into the wrong
voltage. Supporting units were quick to push replacement equipment forward in
order to get the STAMIS operational again for all units on the battlefield.
Maintenance Management in Northern Iraq
Maintenance management in Iraq followed models developed during rotations to the
Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, and the National Training
Center at Fort Irwin, California. Maintenance meetings with all units were
conducted every day at 1000 throughout the operation. The battle rhythm was
always the same. The night before each meeting, the daily not-mission-capable
disk from SAMS-1 was run. The maintenance NCO in charge scrubbed the resulting
026 (deadline report) to make sure the right vehicles were listed. Then two MMT
soldiers recorded the status of all requisitions. In the morning, the support
operations officer compared the scrubbed 026 to his copy with notes from the day
before. After this thorough review, very few parts needed followup at the 1000
maintenance meeting.
The Battle for Kirkuk
Soon after everything had fallen into place at Bashur Airfield and the
battalion's logistics systems were running smoothly, the 173d Airborne Brigade
received a midnight mission to attack and secure the city of Kirkuk by dawn. The
1st Infantry Division HRC and MRC had just arrived at Bashur Airfield when it
was determined that Kirkuk was becoming destabilized. The 173d was ordered to
seize Kirkuk, stabilize it, and secure the airfield that was in the center of
the city.
Inevitably, logistics support would be needed in the forward area. The HRC and
the MRC went forward with only 5 days of supply, which meant that a forward
logistics element would have to be set up quickly. An advance party consisting
of the 201st FSB commander, two drivers, and four staff members went forward the
morning after the 173d and the MRC moved into Kirkuk. The battalion executive
officer remained in charge in Bashur.
As the battalion moved south, the challenges that would be involved in providing
logistics support to a brigade (+) that was spread out over 125 miles became
apparent. In fact, logistics became the ultimate challenge because most of the
logistics personnel remained in Bashur while the majority of the supported units
were forward. Not only did all sustainment received through the air hub in
Bashur have to be transported forward, but supplies from the ground LOC had to
be pushed to multiple locations.
Contracting was critical. The brigade's contracting officer contracted for 50
trucks to transport incoming supplies and to support all movement forward to
Kirkuk. The contract included various types of Iraqi trucks. Most were 20
footers, but there were some 40 footers and lowboys. The truck contract bridged
the logistics gap for the brigade for 30 days.
At Kirkuk, the brigade and the FSB began setting up operations on the airfield.
The SSA and the maintenance platoon for the 501st FSC moved into a military
hangar. This proved to be a great location for the SSA, because the hangar had
lots of room and overhead cover and, most importantly, it was right next to the
airfield.
A bulk fuels retail point was established in some carports across the street
from the SSA, an ammunition section in the Iraqi ammunition supply point, and a
100,000-gallon FSSP (two 50,000-gallon bags) near the flight line to make it
easy to refuel helicopters. The battalion headquarters was set up in a two-story
building, and the brigade's administrative logistics operations center was
placed next to the brigade's tactical operations center. When half of the
501st's hangar was given to the Air Force, the maintenance platoon moved a mile
down the road into an Iraqi motor park.
In Bashur, the battalion executive officer and the remaining staff assumed
command and control of the brigade elements and worked to clear Bashur Airfield.
This was not easy because flights were still arriving and almost all of the
subsistence and ammunition, along with 80,000 gallons of fuel, was still in
Bashur.
In the week that followed, the 501st Transportation Platoon, augmented with the
50 contract trucks, continued to push supplies, personnel, and equipment to
Kirkuk. Trucks were driven to Kirkuk one day and back to Bashur the next.
However, Bashur still was not being cleared fast enough. Although the distance
between the two points was only 125 miles, the condition of the roads and the
Iraqi trucks caused the trip to take up to 6 hours. To speed up the process, the
convoys began to make complete round trips every day. After about a week, the
executive officer and most of the remaining staff departed Bashur to link up
with the forward logistics element.
Essential supplies, including fuel, were left in Bashur to complete the closeout
of the airfield; the rest were sent on to Kirkuk. The support operations
maintenance officer and a six-man team were left to close out operations in
Bashur. The last big push was moving ammunition from the ammunition holding
area. Thirty pallets of ammunition were transported in one convoy. Air Force
security personnel who needed to get to Kirkuk served as guards for the Iraqi
trucks hauling ammunition. After this push, only the assistant S-2/S-3 and three
others were left in Bashur to clear the FSSP.
It is usually easy to get rid of fuel, but in this instance it was difficult.
About 30,000 gallons were left, and no one wanted it. JSOTF-N volunteered to
send their contracted Turkish tankers up from Irbil to drain the fuel from the
bags. Once this was complete, the team closed the FSSP and prepared it for
shipment to Mosul, which was no easy feat without engineering support. The FSSP
assets and fuel eventually were delivered to the 101st Corps Support Group in
Mosul, which needed all the fuel and storage assets it could get.
Moving Toward a Steady State
When the entire 173d Airborne Brigade closed on Kirkuk, operations seemed to
become more systematic. Providing support became much easier because the entire
FSB was collocated. The battalion established an airfield at Kirkuk, and the Air
Force provided critical support in developing the base. The job was big, and
available supplies and assets were limited, so the Army and the Air Force often
worked together; alone, neither service had enough equipment to build a base
camp.
The 173d Airborne Brigade escorted Air Force fuel from Mosul to Kirkuk until the
task was taken over by the 101st Corps Support Group. Once all of the Air Force
personnel arrived, they slowly picked up all missions and began to support the
173d. The Air Force gradually became the base camp manager, and the Army became
the tenant.
Thanks to the Air Force and the 173d's contracting officer, Kirkuk Airfield
became a comfortable place to live and work. Windows were replaced, air
conditioners were installed, and plumbing was fixed to provide showers. Just
after Memorial Day, the 201st received word that it would be replaced by a team
from the 21st TSC.
The lessons learned in providing sustainment in Iraq were many. The most
refreshing lesson was that everyone could work together in a time of need. Units
separated by tremendous distances pulled together to provide each other with
supplies that normal supply channels could not provide.
It quickly became obvious to the FSB that outside planners could not anticipate
all issues before the operation. The environment was far too fluid for those at
higher echelons to come up with a reliable sustainment plan for providing
constant support. The air LOC was unreliable because planes broke down and
weather conditions were unpredictable. The ground LOC from the north worked well
when the trucks made it across the border and the drivers did not go on strike
before reaching their destinations.
The challenges presented were difficult, changes were slow, and the supply flow
was sluggish. But everyone involved gave all they had to keep other units
functioning. In spite of the sustainment problems it experienced, the 201st FSB
is proud to have served with the 173d Airborne Brigade and proud of its
logistics triumphs while sustaining northern Iraq.
THE AUTHOR THANKS MAJOR JEFFREY VIEIRA, CAPTAIN TRAVIS CARTWRIGHT, CAPTAIN DAVID
WILLIAMS, AND STAFF SERGEANT ADIN AGENBROAD OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT
COMMAND AND CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER (W-2) JOHN RYAN OF THE ALABAMA ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS ARTICLE.
CAPTAIN JAMIE L. KRUMP IS THE S-4 EOR THE 701ST MAIN SUPPORT BATTALION IN
KITZINGEN, GERMANY. SHE SERVED AS THE SUPPORT OPERATIONS SUPPLY AND SERVICES
OFFICER, TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS OFFICER FOR THE 201ST
FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION DURING ITS DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ. SHE HAS A BACHELOR'S
DEGREE IN ENGLISH AND SOCIOLOGY FROM VITERBO UNIVERSITY IN WISCONSIN AND IS A
GRADUATE OF THE QUARTERMASTER OFFICER BASIC COURSE.
Sustaining Northern Iraq: when the 173d Airborne Brigade dropped 1,000
paratroopers into northern Iraq, the provisional 201st Forward Support Battalion
went into the theater with them
Army Logistician, Nov-Dec, 2003 by Jamie L. Krump
On 26 March, the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted an airborne assault to secure
the Bashur Airfield in northern Iraq and then prevent the Iraqis from moving
north and the Turks and Kurds from moving too far south. The brigade was
augmented by the 201st Forward Support Battalion (FSB) (Provisional) from the
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), which provided a logistics battalion
headquarters; supported Task Force 1-63, the heavy task force assigned to the
173d; and augmented critical shortages in the 173d's support structure.
Forming an FSB
The 201st FSB's mission began when 21 junior enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned
officers (NCOs), and officers from the 1st Infantry Division Support Command
(DISCOM) departed Vilseck, Germany. After a bus ride to Frankfurt Airport, they
boarded a commercial flight to Vicenza, Italy, with a final destination of
northern Iraq. They had little knowledge of what lay ahead or where specifically
they were going in northern Iraq.
The battalion commander and some of the other key players were pulled out of
Kosovo for the mission, and !he battalion executive officer had been in Turkey
waiting to pass the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) through to northern Iraq.
Still other members of the team had been preparing to go to Turkey for the same
mission.
The 201st FSB was provisional in that it was not an actual FSB, but rather a
conglomeration of soldiers from across the 1st Infantry DISCOM pulled together
to serve as a battalion headquarters that would support the 173d Airborne
Brigade. In addition to the 1st Infantry DISCOM personnel, soldiers from the
250th Forward Surgical Team (FST), the 38th Personnel Services Detachment, the
54th Quartermaster Mortuary Affairs Collection Point Platoon, and the 200th
Materiel Management Center were added to the 173d's organic 501st Forward
Support Company (FSC) to complete the 201st FSB (Provisional).
The 501st FSC consisted of approximately 150 soldiers who traditionally
supported a light infantry brigade of about 2,000 soldiers. An area support
group heavily supplements this support in garrison since the FSC does not have
the capability to support the 173d on its own.
Preparations in Italy
As soon as the plane touched ground in Italy, members of the 201st FSB began to
get to know each other so they could function as a staff and formulate plans,
develop logistics estimates, and try to anticipate problems. The battalion was
notified that it would have to provide a support staff for the 173d Airborne
Brigade during their insertion into and subsequent occupation of an undisclosed
location in northern Iraq. Many questions had to be answered: Would the use of
Turkish airspace be possible? Would the weather be suitable for an airborne
assault? Would ground lines of communication (LOC) from the north be allowed? If
not, how would the FSB provide adequate support for a light infantry brigade,
augmented with a heavy mechanized trait from U.S. Army Europe, using only air
LOC?
This mission would be the first time that a light airborne brigade, augmented
with heavy mechanized assets, would be inserted completely by air. The chosen
location was Bashur Airfield, which was under the operational control of the
Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N). The heavy forces consisted
of a heavy reaction company (HRC) and a medium reaction company (MRC) from the
1st Infantry Division. The HRC and MRC were equal to a 200-man battalion with 5
M1A1 Abrams tanks, 5 M2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 10 M113 armored
personnel carriers, 4 M1064 mortar carriers, 1 M88 recovery vehicle, a scout
platoon, a military police platoon, and a combat service support force
enhancement module. The 201st FSB's job was to go in with the 173d Airborne
Brigade and quickly set up the materiel management support the HRC and the MRC
would need to back up light infantry operations in northern Iraq.
While in Italy, the FSB had refined the support requirements for the brigade,
both with and without the HRC and the MRC. To mitigate a shortfall of scheduled
sustainment flights, the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) established a
warehouse in Miesau, Germany, in which to store, prepare, and rig supplies for
the FSB in northern Iraq. Sustainment flights to Iraq were increased to ensure
that the brigade had enough supplies for all combat operations.
Operations at Bashur Airfield
The 173d conducted an airborne assault on 26 March to capture the Bashur
Airfield. This was 24 hours before most of the logistics troops landed. Over the
following 5 days, the remainder of the task force troops flowed in and began to
develop a logistics hub. The first aircraft carried the personnel and equipment
needed to establish the base camp. Once the initial setup was complete, the
sustainment flights of supplies and equipment began, signaling the start of
real-time logistics. While simply inserting the equipment and personnel was a
challenge, moving the HRC and the MRC quickly and setting up the support they
needed to sustain the 173d Airborne Brigade often required logistics planning
and executing "on the fly." The diverse FSB staff was up to the task.
The first elements of the FSB arrived by air with only two satellite-based
wireless Iridium phones and a couple of laptop computers. They begged for and
borrowed equipment whenever they could to establish a makeshift tactical
operations center (TOC) until more equipment arrived.
Initially, the wireless phones were used extensively to make sure the
sustainment flights had the right stuff on board. The 21st TSC's 200th Materiel
Management Center (MMC) from Kaiserslautern, Germany, provided outstanding
support to the FSB and to the brigade during this time. However, prioritizing
supplies and sustainment shipments seemed to require a code that was difficult
to crack. By the time the FSB's requirements were pushed through the logistics
channels to the point of embarkation in Germany, either its needs had changed or
it was discovered that the requirements had been relayed inaccurately. It became
a vicious cycle that was difficult to overcome.
Even though the 200th MMC and the FSB coordinated the FSB's requirements, a
number of mitigating factors often caused low-priority supplies to arrive on
time while critical supplies were delayed. First, the airfield at Ramstein,
Germany, was packed full of pallets for missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
locations. This made it difficult to marry up the right pallets with the right
plane. Second, the FSB initially did not have a liaison at Ramstein to make sure
the right pallets were loaded on the right plane. Third, the planes loaded with
the FSB's supplies sometimes developed problems and had to return to Ramstein or
go to Incirlik, Turkey. At other times, bad weather caused planes to be diverted
to Constanta, Romania.
Eventually, most of these problems were solved. The battalion's communications
equipment improved, as did its reporting system. The improved system captured an
accurate status of what was on hand and where other supplies and equipment were
needed.
The HRC and the MRC needed at least 22,000 gallons of fuel on hand to conduct
sustained combat operations. Initially, the FSB established a 30,000-gallon fuel
system supply point (FSSP) with one 20,000-gallon bag and one 10,000-gallon bag.
Eventually, the FSSP grew to contain 80,000 gallons.
The decision was made to purchase diesel fuel locally. It would be easy to
convert from JP8 to diesel since filter changes are not required. (However,
converting back to JP8 does require all new fuel filters.) Obtaining fuel in
northern Iraq at first would appear to be a simple task. Not so. Northern Iraq
had been cut off from resupply for many years, and the only way to get fuel was
by smuggling it from southern Iraq and Turkey. It became apparent that
purchasing fuel locally was not a workable solution when an initial contract for
40,000 gallons of fuel produced only several hundred gallons delivered in 55-gallon
drums on the bed of a pickup truck.
Delivery of fuel by C-17s and C-130s proved to be impractical. Because of the
limited size of the airfield at Bashur and the threat to the aircraft, the
planes would not spend more than 45 minutes on the ground, which was not long
enough to offload large quantities of fuel. All flights occurred at night, and
unloading fuel from an airplane requires even more time during darkness.
The only workable solution for obtaining fuel was to establish a ground LOC.
Because the FSB was cut off from all forces in the south, it was necessary to
establish a northern ground LOC. Finally, Army Forces (Turkey) negotiated an
agreement with the Turks to let fuel tankers cross their border into northern
Iraq.
To make sure the fuel arrived at the right place and to ensure the safety of the
drivers, the 173d sent escorts to meet the Turkish tankers at the Harbur border
gate between Turkey and Iraq and accompany them to Bashur Airfield. Extensive
coordinating and forecasting were required to prevent the fuel tankers from
sitting too long before being emptied. These convoys ensured that sufficient
fuel assets were available to call forward the HRC and the MRC to support the
173d as it conducted offensive operations to seize Kirkuk, Iraq, and its
airfield.
Expanding Supply Management
Just as the 201st FSB was getting its systems in place to provide solid support
to the 173d Airborne Brigade, the battalion was directed to take over the
forecasting and managing of all supplies in northern Iraq. The supply and
services officer in the 201st support operations office was already providing a
daily logistics status report to the Combined Forces Special Operations
Component Command, so she modified her report to include forecasts for the Air
Force at Bashur Airfield, the JSOTF--N in Irbil, Iraq, and the Marine
Expeditionary Unit in Mosul, Iraq. She quickly established a reporting chain
with these units that allowed her to forecast accurately the needs of all units
in northern Iraq. This was no easy task because there was a constant influx of
units from all services into the region and it was impossible to forecast their
arrival times correctly.
Supporting northern Iraq became an equation of supplies divided by trucks and
soldiers on hand. No matter how many trucks were contracted or how many workers
were hired, there still was a shortage of equipment and manpower to receive,
break down, and distribute the quantity of supplies required. At the culmination
of its mission, the 201st FSB supported over 7,000 personnel at four locations
spread over an area spanning hundreds of miles. This included heavy mechanized
units, aviation assets, special operations groups, Air Force units, Marine Corps
units, and any other units that passed through the northern half of the theater.
To lessen the strain on available manpower, the FSB created the mother of all
distribution plans. The plan broke down the loads on every truck by pallets to
be delivered to each location (Mosul, Irbil, and so on). The 200th MMC personnel
in Turkey forwarded to the FSB the bumper number of each truck, the name of its
driver, and, based on data from the FSB's distribution plan, information on the
units that were to receive the items on the truck. The FSB sent up unit
requirements by location, and the 200th MMC folks in Turkey made sure that the
pallets were configured correctly. The FSB escorts met the Kirkuk-bound convoy
at the Iraq border and called out identifying truck and unit information. The
identified trucks dropped out of the convoy and were escorted to the unit
designated to receive the supplies they carried. This distribution system
stopped the drain on resources in the FSB's supply support activity (SSA) and
allowed the FSB to operate more efficiently.
Materiel Management Team Operations
From the beginning, the materiel management team (MMT) was an extremely
important part of the FSB. The team helped the battalion to gain visibility over
what was inbound and to give high priority to critically needed items. The MMT
received a 48-hour crash course in a number of electronic communication,
tracking, and supply support systems just before its departure for Italy.
Using a system called "support requisitions," MMT personnel submitted offline
requisitions to the 200th MMC rear, which filled the requisitions and pushed the
supplies forward on sustainment flights. This was an essential part of
establishing the base camp, because initially there was no connectivity to the
Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS); therefore, there was no way to place
requisitions for deadlined vehicle repair parts, needed equipment, and supplies.
Until SARSS was established, only the MMT had input into what was flown into
Bashur Airfield in support of the 173d's mission.
Standard Army Management Information Systems
After the essential equipment and supplies were on the ground and SARSS was
established, the DISCOM's combat service support automation management officer
(CSSAMO) looked for ways to make the supply system work more efficiently. He
found that several of the Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS)
were not prepped properly before deploying. For example, a listing of forward
unit identification codes had not been loaded into the Standard Army Maintenance
System-1 (SAMS--1). Tweaking the STAMIS was a huge challenge, but eventually all
systems were up and running.
Several other problems resulted from simple oversights. For example, some units
did not come to the area of operations prepared to plug into different voltage
power sources. Therefore, they lost equipment after plugging it into the wrong
voltage. Supporting units were quick to push replacement equipment forward in
order to get the STAMIS operational again for all units on the battlefield.
Maintenance Management in Northern Iraq
Maintenance management in Iraq followed models developed during rotations to the
Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, and the National Training
Center at Fort Irwin, California. Maintenance meetings with all units were
conducted every day at 1000 throughout the operation. The battle rhythm was
always the same. The night before each meeting, the daily not-mission-capable
disk from SAMS-1 was run. The maintenance NCO in charge scrubbed the resulting
026 (deadline report) to make sure the right vehicles were listed. Then two MMT
soldiers recorded the status of all requisitions. In the morning, the support
operations officer compared the scrubbed 026 to his copy with notes from the day
before. After this thorough review, very few parts needed followup at the 1000
maintenance meeting.
The Battle for Kirkuk
Soon after everything had fallen into place at Bashur Airfield and the
battalion's logistics systems were running smoothly, the 173d Airborne Brigade
received a midnight mission to attack and secure the city of Kirkuk by dawn. The
1st Infantry Division HRC and MRC had just arrived at Bashur Airfield when it
was determined that Kirkuk was becoming destabilized. The 173d was ordered to
seize Kirkuk, stabilize it, and secure the airfield that was in the center of
the city.
Inevitably, logistics support would be needed in the forward area. The HRC and
the MRC went forward with only 5 days of supply, which meant that a forward
logistics element would have to be set up quickly. An advance party consisting
of the 201st FSB commander, two drivers, and four staff members went forward the
morning after the 173d and the MRC moved into Kirkuk. The battalion executive
officer remained in charge in Bashur.
As the battalion moved south, the challenges that would be involved in providing
logistics support to a brigade (+) that was spread out over 125 miles became
apparent. In fact, logistics became the ultimate challenge because most of the
logistics personnel remained in Bashur while the majority of the supported units
were forward. Not only did all sustainment received through the air hub in
Bashur have to be transported forward, but supplies from the ground LOC had to
be pushed to multiple locations.
Contracting was critical. The brigade's contracting officer contracted for 50
trucks to transport incoming supplies and to support all movement forward to
Kirkuk. The contract included various types of Iraqi trucks. Most were 20
footers, but there were some 40 footers and lowboys. The truck contract bridged
the logistics gap for the brigade for 30 days.
At Kirkuk, the brigade and the FSB began setting up operations on the airfield.
The SSA and the maintenance platoon for the 501st FSC moved into a military
hangar. This proved to be a great location for the SSA, because the hangar had
lots of room and overhead cover and, most importantly, it was right next to the
airfield.
A bulk fuels retail point was established in some carports across the street
from the SSA, an ammunition section in the Iraqi ammunition supply point, and a
100,000-gallon FSSP (two 50,000-gallon bags) near the flight line to make it
easy to refuel helicopters. The battalion headquarters was set up in a two-story
building, and the brigade's administrative logistics operations center was
placed next to the brigade's tactical operations center. When half of the
501st's hangar was given to the Air Force, the maintenance platoon moved a mile
down the road into an Iraqi motor park.
In Bashur, the battalion executive officer and the remaining staff assumed
command and control of the brigade elements and worked to clear Bashur Airfield.
This was not easy because flights were still arriving and almost all of the
subsistence and ammunition, along with 80,000 gallons of fuel, was still in
Bashur.
In the week that followed, the 501st Transportation Platoon, augmented with the
50 contract trucks, continued to push supplies, personnel, and equipment to
Kirkuk. Trucks were driven to Kirkuk one day and back to Bashur the next.
However, Bashur still was not being cleared fast enough. Although the distance
between the two points was only 125 miles, the condition of the roads and the
Iraqi trucks caused the trip to take up to 6 hours. To speed up the process, the
convoys began to make complete round trips every day. After about a week, the
executive officer and most of the remaining staff departed Bashur to link up
with the forward logistics element.
Essential supplies, including fuel, were left in Bashur to complete the closeout
of the airfield; the rest were sent on to Kirkuk. The support operations
maintenance officer and a six-man team were left to close out operations in
Bashur. The last big push was moving ammunition from the ammunition holding
area. Thirty pallets of ammunition were transported in one convoy. Air Force
security personnel who needed to get to Kirkuk served as guards for the Iraqi
trucks hauling ammunition. After this push, only the assistant S-2/S-3 and three
others were left in Bashur to clear the FSSP.
It is usually easy to get rid of fuel, but in this instance it was difficult.
About 30,000 gallons were left, and no one wanted it. JSOTF-N volunteered to
send their contracted Turkish tankers up from Irbil to drain the fuel from the
bags. Once this was complete, the team closed the FSSP and prepared it for
shipment to Mosul, which was no easy feat without engineering support. The FSSP
assets and fuel eventually were delivered to the 101st Corps Support Group in
Mosul, which needed all the fuel and storage assets it could get.
Moving Toward a Steady State
When the entire 173d Airborne Brigade closed on Kirkuk, operations seemed to
become more systematic. Providing support became much easier because the entire
FSB was collocated. The battalion established an airfield at Kirkuk, and the Air
Force provided critical support in developing the base. The job was big, and
available supplies and assets were limited, so the Army and the Air Force often
worked together; alone, neither service had enough equipment to build a base
camp.
The 173d Airborne Brigade escorted Air Force fuel from Mosul to Kirkuk until the
task was taken over by the 101st Corps Support Group. Once all of the Air Force
personnel arrived, they slowly picked up all missions and began to support the
173d. The Air Force gradually became the base camp manager, and the Army became
the tenant.
Thanks to the Air Force and the 173d's contracting officer, Kirkuk Airfield
became a comfortable place to live and work. Windows were replaced, air
conditioners were installed, and plumbing was fixed to provide showers. Just
after Memorial Day, the 201st received word that it would be replaced by a team
from the 21st TSC.
The lessons learned in providing sustainment in Iraq were many. The most
refreshing lesson was that everyone could work together in a time of need. Units
separated by tremendous distances pulled together to provide each other with
supplies that normal supply channels could not provide.
It quickly became obvious to the FSB that outside planners could not anticipate
all issues before the operation. The environment was far too fluid for those at
higher echelons to come up with a reliable sustainment plan for providing
constant support. The air LOC was unreliable because planes broke down and
weather conditions were unpredictable. The ground LOC from the north worked well
when the trucks made it across the border and the drivers did not go on strike
before reaching their destinations.
The challenges presented were difficult, changes were slow, and the supply flow
was sluggish. But everyone involved gave all they had to keep other units
functioning. In spite of the sustainment problems it experienced, the 201st FSB
is proud to have served with the 173d Airborne Brigade and proud of its
logistics triumphs while sustaining northern Iraq.
THE AUTHOR THANKS MAJOR JEFFREY VIEIRA, CAPTAIN TRAVIS CARTWRIGHT, CAPTAIN DAVID
WILLIAMS, AND STAFF SERGEANT ADIN AGENBROAD OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT
COMMAND AND CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER (W-2) JOHN RYAN OF THE ALABAMA ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS ARTICLE.
CAPTAIN JAMIE L. KRUMP IS THE S-4 EOR THE 701ST MAIN SUPPORT BATTALION IN
KITZINGEN, GERMANY. SHE SERVED AS THE SUPPORT OPERATIONS SUPPLY AND SERVICES
OFFICER, TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS OFFICER FOR THE 201ST
FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION DURING ITS DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ. SHE HAS A BACHELOR'S
DEGREE IN ENGLISH AND SOCIOLOGY FROM VITERBO UNIVERSITY IN WISCONSIN AND IS A
GRADUATE OF THE QUARTERMASTER OFFICER BASIC COURSE.