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06-02-2004, 05:18 PM
The October war - Cover Story
Armor, May-June, 2003 by William C. Brown
Prelude to the Assault
The October War of 1973 is known by many names. The Arab nations call it the
Ramadan War and the Israelis call it the Yom Kippur War. This conflict was
fought on Muslim and Jewish Holy days--an advantage to the Muslims and a
hindrance to the Israelis.
The October War of 1973 actually began when the Six Day War of 1967 ended. The
results of this conflict could be compared to the Arab nation's "Versailles
Treaty of 1918," as it had with the post-World War I nation of Germany. The
Jordanians lost control of the city of Jerusalem and were dealt a severe blow in
the loss of the West Bank of the Jordan River. As a result of the Six Day War,
the Egyptians lost the entire Sinai Peninsula and strategic use of the Suez
Canal. The Syrians lost two-thirds of its air force by the second day of the
conflict, and at the end of the Six Day War, the Golan Heights was in Israeli
hands. The Six Day War would not be the end of Arab hostilities toward the
Israelis, but a continuation of past hostilities.
During March 1969, former Egyptian President, Gamal Abd al Nasser of Egypt,
would publicly renounce the June 1967 Cease-Fire Agreement between Egypt and
Israel. This would begin the War of Attrition (1967-1971). President Nasser knew
that the Israeli Defense Forces were primarily made up of reservists and could
not sustain a long conflict or afford a large loss of manpower and materiels.
During the War of Attrition, the Egyptians would launch large artillery attacks
against the Israeli fortifications along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, the
Bar-Lev Line. These attacks would be followed by commando raids against the same
fortifications and deep penetration of Israeli territory at crucial road
junctions and communications nodes. In turn, the Israelis would retaliate with
deep air strikes into the interior of Egypt and daring cross-canal raids into
the Egyptian western bank of the Suez Canal. In one such Israeli commando raid,
the Israelis, with the support of CH-53 "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters, stole
an Egyptian P-12 radar system's acquisition and command trailer. The trailers
were sling-loaded beneath a CH-53 and flown to Israeli territory across the
canal. During the 3-year war, both sides would be affected by day-in and day-out
attacks. Finally, in August 1970, another cease-fire agreement would be brokered
by the United States with the support of the Soviet Union, to put an end to the
War of Attrition.
Overall, the Israelis would come out ahead, as far as internal security, by
isolating and destroying terrorist cells in their newly liberated territory from
the 1967 Six Day War. The Bar-Lev Line would be reduced from 31 hardened
positions to 26, but a second line of hardened defenses was established five to
seven miles behind the first. The Egyptians received added Soviet aid in the
form of additional air defense equipment manned by Soviet technicians.
Additionally, Soviet fighter pilots were taking an even bigger part in aerial
duels with the Israeli air force over the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptians were
also able to replenish the losses of arms and munitions from the 1967 Six Day
War and the War of Attrition through the support of the Soviet Union.
On 28 September 1970, President Nasser died from natural causes and his
predecessor would take the reign of Egypt and the Arab League. Anwar Sadat
succeeded Nasser as president of Egypt and assumed responsibilities of leading
the Arab nations once more to war with Israel in October 1973.
The Deception
Prior to the assault launched on 6 October 1973, the Egyptians and their allies
had to deny Israeli intelligence information on the coming attack. A series of
deception programs were emplaced in the Arab media, especially the newspapers.
Egyptian newspapers reported that prior to the attack, the Romanian Defense
Minister would be visiting Cairo on 8 October. One of Egypt's top-ranking
admirals would be participating in sailboat races on the Nile River the same
day. On 7 October, a Royal Air Force Comet commercial airliner was to test
airfields near Cairo and Luxor in anticipation of Her Royal Highness, Princess
Margaret's arrival in Egypt. To mask the Egyptian and Syrian forces massing near
Israeli borders, two Syrian terrorists hijacked a train with Jewish refugees in
Austria.
When the Israelis noted the Egyptian and Syrian forces moving toward the
respected parts of the Israeli borders, the Israelis dismissed it as a
precaution toward possible Israeli retaliation for the hijacking. Egyptian
public radio was quoted as saying it was part of a mobilization drill and that
engineer forces would refurbish the Egyptian portion of the Suez Canal. Egyptian
commanders made certain their soldiers were seen along the bank swimming or
fishing, especially on the Egyptian portion of the Suez Canal bank. Also, 4 days
prior to the attack, the Egyptian commander responsible for Syrian and Egyptians
forces, General Alimad Ismail Ali, war minister and commander in chief, flew to
Damascus, Syria, to discuss the attack timeline. Egyptian and Syrian commanders
both wanted the sun behind them and in front of the enemy, but timing would be
impossible. A compromise was reached and the H-hour was changed from 1800 hours
to 1405 hours on 6 October. The Israelis would soon learn the actual time when
Egyptian and Syrian jets screamed over the Suez Canal and Golan Heights,
dropping bombs and attacking positions.
The Attack
At 1405 hours on 6 October 1973, a combined and coordinated aerial assault by
the air forces of Egypt and Syria struck at crucial points of the Israeli
defenses. The Egyptians attacked the future bridgehead points on the Suez Canal,
to include overwatching defensive positions of the Bar-Lev fortifications. The
Egyptians also carried out air strikes on communications nodes and electronic
warfare sites behind the Israeli defenses positioned deep in the Sinai. The
Syrian air force was conducting strikes all along the Golan Heights, to include
Mount Hermon, which had an important observation post at the 7,000-foot mark,
which was equipped with sensitive electronic sensor devices to monitor against
possible Syrian attacks toward the Golan Plateau.
Simultaneously, Egyptian and Syrian ground forces stormed toward the Israeli
borders. Eight thousand Egyptian commandos and raft-borne infantry assaulted
across the canal while the Syrians crashed over the purple line of demarcation
with United Nation observers watching as the Syrian juggernaut pushed toward
Golan Heights and the heartland of Judea.
Thirty minutes after the initial assault across the Suez Canal, the Egyptian
flag was flying on the Israeli eastern bank. Within an hour, Egyptian engineers
using pontoon rafts, industrial water pumps, and hoses would tear huge gaps into
the massive sand ramparts in mere hours, unlike the Israeli estimation of more
than 12 hours to breach the high sand wails on their side of the canal. The
Egyptians used the same technique of removing large quantities of sand during
their construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile in the mid-60s. The Egyptians
kept the assault across the canal moving toward establishing crucial
bridgeheads.
At H+2, Egyptian engineers were constructing pontoons, Bailey-type bridges, and
ferries across the Suez to push mechanized forces over to the eastern bank to
support the already established commandos and regular infantry. By 7 October
1973, the Egyptians would span the canal with 10 heavy bridges. Two bridges
would be built for each of the five attacking Egyptian divisions. By 8 October,
the Egyptians would have well over 400 tanks on the eastern portion of the Suez
Canal, preparing for the attack forward to the crucial passes of the Sinai. The
Israelis would not allow the bridgeheads to exist. Israeli General Albert
Mandler's division immediately counterattacked against the Egyptian penetration
of the canal only to be met by a steel storm of antitank guided missiles and
Egyptian infantry antiarmor ambushes firing rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).
Israeli Major General Avraham Adan's armor division suffered heavy losses
answering calls for help, and was repulsed by the Egyptian's use of antiarmor
weapons, especially those known as the "suitcase SAGGER." The calls for help
from the now isolated Bar-Lev Line not only added to the decimation of the
Israeli forward divisions, but also of the Israeli air force. The Egyptians
established an air defense barrier consisting of the surface-to-air missile-2
(SA-2) for higher altitudes and longer ranges over the Suez Canal. They also
incorporated the SA-3, an intermediate missile system to protect the bridgeheads
from the Israeli air force, which had been dubbed the "flying artillery" in the
Six Day War. With the combined air defense barrier and the l-kilometer buffer
zone forward of the Bar-Lev Line established by RPG- and SAGGER-wielding
Egyptian infantry, the Israeli air and ground forces were slowly bleeding
themselves white in the Sinai. Unknown to the Israelis, they were inadvertently
fulfilling one of President Sadat's key tasks for this attack--decimate the
Israeli Defense Force to its breaking point. The Israeli counterattacks may have
been costly but proved fruitful because they stalled the Egyptian momentum, and
with that, the cadence of battle was about to turn in favor of Israeli forces.
However, Israel had to face the threat from the Syrians and the Arab forces
under their command.
The Syrian Front
Syrian's armored forces moved on the Golan Plateau to be met by Israeli armor
and mechanized infantry brigades. These brigades were made up of reservists that
were activated at the beginning of the war and were first to be sent forward.
Israeli's chief of staff, General David Elazar, and its defense minister, Moshe
Dayan, both agreed that Syrian forces posed a great threat to Israel because of
their close proximity. All manpower and materiel were diverted to the Syrian
front to halt the Syrian drive, and all other forces were sent to the west to
delay the Egyptian advance into the Sinai. The Syrian forces were able to drive
deep into Israeli territory and make their way toward the Jordan River bridges,
which would have allowed them free access into the heartland of Israel had it
not been for the heroic actions of two Israeli brigades--the 7th Armor Brigade
and the 188th Armor Brigade.
The 188th would be virtually destroyed while repelling attacks toward the two
crucial bridges over the Jordan River in the southern part of the plateau.
Essentially, two Israeli armored brigades fought and delayed three Syrian
elements in division strength. The Israelis were fighting between 3 to 1 and 6
to1 against Syria in tank-on-tank battles. The tenacious defense of the 188th
Armor Brigade--totaling 57 tanks in strength--along the TransArabian Pipeline
(Tapline) Road, allowed additional Israeli forces to move up to the front. Major
General Dan Laner, commander of the front, literally stood on the Arik Bridge
directing arriving units into battle.
By midnight on 7 October, Syrian forces closed within 5 kilo-meters of the
northern bridge of Bnot Ya'akov just west of Tapline Road, a maintenance road
for a major oil pipe running north to south through the region. The Israelis
were able to hold the Syrian drive for 3 days until they could counterattack
with five mechanized brigades and one elite light infantry brigade (Golani
Brigade). By 10 October, the Israelis had pushed the Syrian forces back to the
original demarcation line, known as the purple line, and continued the attack
through the purple line and into the interior of Syria.
Syrian President Assad asked Egyptian President Sadat to cease-fire, but
President Sadat only promised support, but no cease-fire. The Soviets stepped in
to conduct some saber rattling with the United Nations, the United States, and
Israel. This also stepped up resupply of much needed war materiels to Syrian
airfields that had not yet been destroyed by the Israeli air force.
On 11 October, the Israelis attacked across the purple line and pushed into the
Syrian interior battling Jordanian, Iraqi, Saudi, and Moroccan forces under the
control of Syrian field commanders. The Israelis keeping the tempo of the attack
in their favor, pushed within 30 kilometers of Damascus. The Israelis held onto
this area well until the final cease-fire that ended the conflict. By the time
the Israeli counterattack against the Syrians occurred, the tactical situation
was set to turn the tide in favor of the Israelis, who faced Egyptian forces
poised to make their drive through the Sinai.
The Turning Point in the West
Due to aggressive Israeli counterattacks against the Egyptian forces on the
eastern portion of the Suez Canal, the Egyptians continued to mass their armored
forces so they could make an adequate drive toward the coastal road near the
town of Romani. The Egyptian 2d Corps was tasked to take the coastal road and
Tasa Road, and seize the town of Bir Gifgafa, while the Egyptian 3d Corps in the
south would drive on toward the two southern passes. The Tasa Road moves through
the central part of the Sinai toward the key town of Bir Gifgafa, and finally
the two southern passes of Giddi and Mitla. This attack would take place on 15
October. Three Israeli divisions waited for the attack--and for the Egyptians to
begin open desert warfare.
Once Egyptian forces had left their protective air defense umbrella over the
Suez Canal, the Israeli flying artillery started to wreck havoc among the
Egyptian armored formations and supply columns moving eastward. The Israeli tank
forces also waited to exploit the Sinai's open expanses to take advantage of
their gunners' long-range accuracy and of unhampered maneuver through the open
terrain. The Sinai was tank country forward of the passes and Bir Gifgafa.
The Egyptian 2d Corps took the brunt of Israeli punishment, but reached the
outskirts of Bir Gifgafa. In essence, the Egyptians controlled the western end
of the Khatmia Pass. The Egyptian 3d Corps seized the southern pass of Mitla,
but was unable to secure the Giddi pass from Israeli Major General Ariel Sharon.
This caused a salient in the Egyptian line, and would be an advantage for Israel
during their countercrossing.
The Israeli Countercrossing
For nearly a week, the tempo of the attack had been in Egyptian hands, but the
course would soon change. With the Egyptian 3d Army's two-pronged attack pushing
as far east as the Milta Pass and being stopped on the western end of the Giddi
Pass, they had overextended the line from their flanking unit in the north, the
2d Egyptian Army. The Israelis planned to take the pressure off of their forces
facing the Egyptians in front of the passes, and turn the tide from reaction on
the Israelis' part to that of the Egyptians. So, Operation Gazelle was
initiated.
The Israeli staff had a plan for crossing the canal that had existed since early
1970, and the plan was modified to suit the Israeli counterattack plans.
Operation Stouthearted Men, the revision of Operation Gazelle, would begin on 15
October 1973. The operation would involve three Israeli armored divisions
crossing the Suez Canal at the town of Deversior on the most northern point of
Great Bitter Lake, which would cause the encirclement of the Egyptian 3d Army on
the eastern side of the Suez Canal. The Israelis expected the Egyptians to cease
their forward attacks and try to throw the Israelis back over the canal, or
destroy them on the western bank of the Suez, resulting in attacking Egyptian
forces going from proactive to reactive maneuvers. Their tempo of attack would
cease through the Sinai as they tried to cut off the Israelis and relieve the
Egyptian 3d Army.
The Israelis, with support of their flying artillery, were able to drag a
pieced-together bridge, made from a pontoon bridge and commercial bridging
equipment, and establish their own bridge head on the western bank of the Suez
Canal. Sharon's division would attack, build, and establish the bridgehead,
while the Adan division moving from the northern part of the Sinai and Major
General Kalman Magen's division from the southern Sinai exploited the bridgehead
on the western bank of the Suez. The two armored divisions would pass through
Sharon's division and would penetrate up to 20 kilometers on the western shore
of the Suez, cutting off all major supply routes to the Egyptian 3d Army, which
numbered some 20,000 men and well over 500 armored vehicles. The Israelis from
that point would fend off many relief operations conducted by the Egyptians to
flee their trapped men. The Israelis would continue their fragile hold on the
western bank until the U.N. cease-fire, which the United States brokered with
the support of the Soviet Union. Both nations would come very close to facing
one another in the Sinai. This was also one of President Sadat's key goals,
bringing the world to light on the Arab-Israeli conflict--not as a regional
conflict but one of global proportions.
Lessons Learned
The October War of 1973 would change how modem armies would fight future battles
with new technologies and tactics associated with technology. It also
demonstrated that a lucky and clever enemy could outfight a technologically
advanced force as the Egyptians had done with the Israelis.
The Egyptians used extensive air defense systems to balance out their inferior
air force when confronting the Israeli air force. Egyptian aircraft, for the
most part, was delegated to a ground-attack role and would not fly far beyond
their air defense barrier established along the Suez Canal. Fratricide was an
issue when pilots did not enter through designated points in the barrier. The
Egyptian's approach to the high sand rampart demonstrated simple ingenuity on
their part. What the Israelis estimated would take Egyptian forces 10-to-12
hours to demolish, only took 2-to-3 hours in some places along the canal.
Water cannons drastically upset the Israeli timetables for defense. The
Egyptians also incorporated a 1-kilometer buffer zone forward of the canal where
they had been infiltrated by infantry and commandos wielding RPG and SAGGER
antitank guided missile (ATGM) systems. As the Israeli armor crashed through the
desert, with little or no infantry support of their own, to rescue forces
trapped in the Bar-Lev Line, they were met with devastating volleys of SAGGER
missiles or antiarmor ambushes where a tank would be struck as many as five
times by RPGs.
The Egyptians had learned from the Six Day War and the War of Attrition that the
Israelis were loyal to trapped or besieged comrades and were also tenacious in
the attack. Leader of the Egyptian army, General Ahmed Ismail used that to his
advantage to initially devastate Israeli forces as they counterattacked in
piece-meal fashion.
The Egyptians and Syrians were solely dependent on the Soviet Union for
technical support, arms, munitions, and transportation on a global scale. The
latter was the Soviet Union instituting the "air-bridge," where a massive amount
of Soviet war materiel was airlifted into Cairo and Damascus. The technicians
manned air defense equipment around Cairo to the Ismailia highway. The air
defense technicians numbered some 500 personnel. However, the support did not
stop there. Since the War of Attrition, Soviet fighter pilots were flying combat
missions in the Sinai against the Israeli air force. Their exact losses for the
October War vary from 23 wounded to six killed.
The United States also alleged that North Korean pilots were also flying combat
missions over Egypt, but the North Korean government denied the accusations
saying that they were deployed only for a training exercise. Another important
asset the Soviet Union provided its Arab allies was strategic intelligence.
During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Soviet Union would launch a total of
two COSMOS spy satellites to gather information on both Arab, but more
importantly, Israeli losses throughout the war. This would enable the Egyptians
to gage their progress against the Israeli forces and help determine strategic
targets to attack with SCUDs. The true lesson to be learned from the war would
be felt by Israeli forces.
Prior to the conflict, Israeli forces were overconfident and underestimated
their Arab enemies, as well as its capabilities, as the Israeli air force
discovered as it broke against the Egyptian air defense barrier over the Suez
Canal. The Israeli's use of ATGM was limited to defensive. They were also the
first generation of ATGM of massive sizes, such as French SS-10 and SS-11, the
European equivalent of the Soviet SNAPPER missile. Initially, the semiautomatic
tracking tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile was offered
prior to the war, but the Israelis declined. This would change, as the Israelis
were in dire straits early on in the conflict. The Israeli government made a
request for the TOW missiles and the United States airlifted the missiles from
Holland. They had literally been removed from the European war stock.
Israeli armored forces learned a terrible lesson from rushing forward without
infantry support. Time and time again, Israeli tanks where picked off by a
SAGGER gunner who had fired less than 150 missiles in training prior to the war.
RPG-equipped infantrymen gnawed away at the Israeli armor as it closed against
the 1-kilometer buffer zone established on the first day of the war to protect
the bridgeheads and allow Egyptian armor forward to the eastern bank of the
Suez. The Israelis learned the importance of electronic countermeasures against
air defense systems.
The Israeli air force took a devastating beating as it attacked the Egyptian
bridgeheads across the Suez. In one day, the Israelis lost a total of 20
aircraft against the air defense barrier. As the war continued, Israeli
commercial airliners were seen landing at U.S. Air Force bases on the east coast
picking up electronic countermeasure pods and other components that were
successful against North Vietnamese air defense systems.
The most valuable lesson learned by the Israelis was that they had
underestimated the abilities of their Arab adversaries. They would not be
fighting the Arab armies of 1956 or 1967, but a new Arab soldier who was
determined to take back what was his and restore his prominence in the Middle
East. The Israelis were relying more and more on sophisticated weaponry to press
their advantage on their Arab enemies; and not relying on simple and proven past
techniques. A large part of Bar-Lev fortifications had lapsed into disrepair--especially
Israel's secret weapon. Pipes leading from the edge of the bank were connected
to oil tanks on Israel's side of the Suez. The pipes would be opened, oil would
float to the surface, and then be ignited.
Egyptian frogmen cemented the nozzles shut, but reported that many of the valves
had been overtightened so it would take more than the turn of a hand to operate.
The original fort had 31 fortified positions, and after the War of Attrition,
five would be sealed with sand, bringing the total number down to 26. The
Israelis had given up maneuver for an initial static defense.
The United States watched as the war progressed and as events unfolded in the
Sinai and Golan Heights. The October War reinforced the idea of the combined
arms fight and the role that advanced technology plays in a conflict, which can
be carded into present day.
Bibliography
Chaim Herzog, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: War and Peace in the Middle East from the
War of Independence through Lebanon, Vintage Books, New York, NY, 1984.
Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Arab-Israeli War 1973, Presidio
Press, Novato, CA, 1978, Reprinted 1997.
Dr. George W. Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War." The Albatros of Decisive
Victory, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1996.
CPT William C. Brown is currently assigned to 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort
Stewart, GA. He received a B.S. from Armstrong Atlantic University, Georgia. He
has served in various command and staff positions, to include squadron
maintenance officer, 3d Squadron, 2d Armor Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA;
executive officer, L Troop, 3/2 ACR, Fort Polk; MOS instructor, 214th Armor
Regiment, East Over, SC; and scout platoon section sergeant, 1/118th infantry,
South Carolina Army National Guard.
Armor, May-June, 2003 by William C. Brown
Prelude to the Assault
The October War of 1973 is known by many names. The Arab nations call it the
Ramadan War and the Israelis call it the Yom Kippur War. This conflict was
fought on Muslim and Jewish Holy days--an advantage to the Muslims and a
hindrance to the Israelis.
The October War of 1973 actually began when the Six Day War of 1967 ended. The
results of this conflict could be compared to the Arab nation's "Versailles
Treaty of 1918," as it had with the post-World War I nation of Germany. The
Jordanians lost control of the city of Jerusalem and were dealt a severe blow in
the loss of the West Bank of the Jordan River. As a result of the Six Day War,
the Egyptians lost the entire Sinai Peninsula and strategic use of the Suez
Canal. The Syrians lost two-thirds of its air force by the second day of the
conflict, and at the end of the Six Day War, the Golan Heights was in Israeli
hands. The Six Day War would not be the end of Arab hostilities toward the
Israelis, but a continuation of past hostilities.
During March 1969, former Egyptian President, Gamal Abd al Nasser of Egypt,
would publicly renounce the June 1967 Cease-Fire Agreement between Egypt and
Israel. This would begin the War of Attrition (1967-1971). President Nasser knew
that the Israeli Defense Forces were primarily made up of reservists and could
not sustain a long conflict or afford a large loss of manpower and materiels.
During the War of Attrition, the Egyptians would launch large artillery attacks
against the Israeli fortifications along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, the
Bar-Lev Line. These attacks would be followed by commando raids against the same
fortifications and deep penetration of Israeli territory at crucial road
junctions and communications nodes. In turn, the Israelis would retaliate with
deep air strikes into the interior of Egypt and daring cross-canal raids into
the Egyptian western bank of the Suez Canal. In one such Israeli commando raid,
the Israelis, with the support of CH-53 "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters, stole
an Egyptian P-12 radar system's acquisition and command trailer. The trailers
were sling-loaded beneath a CH-53 and flown to Israeli territory across the
canal. During the 3-year war, both sides would be affected by day-in and day-out
attacks. Finally, in August 1970, another cease-fire agreement would be brokered
by the United States with the support of the Soviet Union, to put an end to the
War of Attrition.
Overall, the Israelis would come out ahead, as far as internal security, by
isolating and destroying terrorist cells in their newly liberated territory from
the 1967 Six Day War. The Bar-Lev Line would be reduced from 31 hardened
positions to 26, but a second line of hardened defenses was established five to
seven miles behind the first. The Egyptians received added Soviet aid in the
form of additional air defense equipment manned by Soviet technicians.
Additionally, Soviet fighter pilots were taking an even bigger part in aerial
duels with the Israeli air force over the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptians were
also able to replenish the losses of arms and munitions from the 1967 Six Day
War and the War of Attrition through the support of the Soviet Union.
On 28 September 1970, President Nasser died from natural causes and his
predecessor would take the reign of Egypt and the Arab League. Anwar Sadat
succeeded Nasser as president of Egypt and assumed responsibilities of leading
the Arab nations once more to war with Israel in October 1973.
The Deception
Prior to the assault launched on 6 October 1973, the Egyptians and their allies
had to deny Israeli intelligence information on the coming attack. A series of
deception programs were emplaced in the Arab media, especially the newspapers.
Egyptian newspapers reported that prior to the attack, the Romanian Defense
Minister would be visiting Cairo on 8 October. One of Egypt's top-ranking
admirals would be participating in sailboat races on the Nile River the same
day. On 7 October, a Royal Air Force Comet commercial airliner was to test
airfields near Cairo and Luxor in anticipation of Her Royal Highness, Princess
Margaret's arrival in Egypt. To mask the Egyptian and Syrian forces massing near
Israeli borders, two Syrian terrorists hijacked a train with Jewish refugees in
Austria.
When the Israelis noted the Egyptian and Syrian forces moving toward the
respected parts of the Israeli borders, the Israelis dismissed it as a
precaution toward possible Israeli retaliation for the hijacking. Egyptian
public radio was quoted as saying it was part of a mobilization drill and that
engineer forces would refurbish the Egyptian portion of the Suez Canal. Egyptian
commanders made certain their soldiers were seen along the bank swimming or
fishing, especially on the Egyptian portion of the Suez Canal bank. Also, 4 days
prior to the attack, the Egyptian commander responsible for Syrian and Egyptians
forces, General Alimad Ismail Ali, war minister and commander in chief, flew to
Damascus, Syria, to discuss the attack timeline. Egyptian and Syrian commanders
both wanted the sun behind them and in front of the enemy, but timing would be
impossible. A compromise was reached and the H-hour was changed from 1800 hours
to 1405 hours on 6 October. The Israelis would soon learn the actual time when
Egyptian and Syrian jets screamed over the Suez Canal and Golan Heights,
dropping bombs and attacking positions.
The Attack
At 1405 hours on 6 October 1973, a combined and coordinated aerial assault by
the air forces of Egypt and Syria struck at crucial points of the Israeli
defenses. The Egyptians attacked the future bridgehead points on the Suez Canal,
to include overwatching defensive positions of the Bar-Lev fortifications. The
Egyptians also carried out air strikes on communications nodes and electronic
warfare sites behind the Israeli defenses positioned deep in the Sinai. The
Syrian air force was conducting strikes all along the Golan Heights, to include
Mount Hermon, which had an important observation post at the 7,000-foot mark,
which was equipped with sensitive electronic sensor devices to monitor against
possible Syrian attacks toward the Golan Plateau.
Simultaneously, Egyptian and Syrian ground forces stormed toward the Israeli
borders. Eight thousand Egyptian commandos and raft-borne infantry assaulted
across the canal while the Syrians crashed over the purple line of demarcation
with United Nation observers watching as the Syrian juggernaut pushed toward
Golan Heights and the heartland of Judea.
Thirty minutes after the initial assault across the Suez Canal, the Egyptian
flag was flying on the Israeli eastern bank. Within an hour, Egyptian engineers
using pontoon rafts, industrial water pumps, and hoses would tear huge gaps into
the massive sand ramparts in mere hours, unlike the Israeli estimation of more
than 12 hours to breach the high sand wails on their side of the canal. The
Egyptians used the same technique of removing large quantities of sand during
their construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile in the mid-60s. The Egyptians
kept the assault across the canal moving toward establishing crucial
bridgeheads.
At H+2, Egyptian engineers were constructing pontoons, Bailey-type bridges, and
ferries across the Suez to push mechanized forces over to the eastern bank to
support the already established commandos and regular infantry. By 7 October
1973, the Egyptians would span the canal with 10 heavy bridges. Two bridges
would be built for each of the five attacking Egyptian divisions. By 8 October,
the Egyptians would have well over 400 tanks on the eastern portion of the Suez
Canal, preparing for the attack forward to the crucial passes of the Sinai. The
Israelis would not allow the bridgeheads to exist. Israeli General Albert
Mandler's division immediately counterattacked against the Egyptian penetration
of the canal only to be met by a steel storm of antitank guided missiles and
Egyptian infantry antiarmor ambushes firing rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).
Israeli Major General Avraham Adan's armor division suffered heavy losses
answering calls for help, and was repulsed by the Egyptian's use of antiarmor
weapons, especially those known as the "suitcase SAGGER." The calls for help
from the now isolated Bar-Lev Line not only added to the decimation of the
Israeli forward divisions, but also of the Israeli air force. The Egyptians
established an air defense barrier consisting of the surface-to-air missile-2
(SA-2) for higher altitudes and longer ranges over the Suez Canal. They also
incorporated the SA-3, an intermediate missile system to protect the bridgeheads
from the Israeli air force, which had been dubbed the "flying artillery" in the
Six Day War. With the combined air defense barrier and the l-kilometer buffer
zone forward of the Bar-Lev Line established by RPG- and SAGGER-wielding
Egyptian infantry, the Israeli air and ground forces were slowly bleeding
themselves white in the Sinai. Unknown to the Israelis, they were inadvertently
fulfilling one of President Sadat's key tasks for this attack--decimate the
Israeli Defense Force to its breaking point. The Israeli counterattacks may have
been costly but proved fruitful because they stalled the Egyptian momentum, and
with that, the cadence of battle was about to turn in favor of Israeli forces.
However, Israel had to face the threat from the Syrians and the Arab forces
under their command.
The Syrian Front
Syrian's armored forces moved on the Golan Plateau to be met by Israeli armor
and mechanized infantry brigades. These brigades were made up of reservists that
were activated at the beginning of the war and were first to be sent forward.
Israeli's chief of staff, General David Elazar, and its defense minister, Moshe
Dayan, both agreed that Syrian forces posed a great threat to Israel because of
their close proximity. All manpower and materiel were diverted to the Syrian
front to halt the Syrian drive, and all other forces were sent to the west to
delay the Egyptian advance into the Sinai. The Syrian forces were able to drive
deep into Israeli territory and make their way toward the Jordan River bridges,
which would have allowed them free access into the heartland of Israel had it
not been for the heroic actions of two Israeli brigades--the 7th Armor Brigade
and the 188th Armor Brigade.
The 188th would be virtually destroyed while repelling attacks toward the two
crucial bridges over the Jordan River in the southern part of the plateau.
Essentially, two Israeli armored brigades fought and delayed three Syrian
elements in division strength. The Israelis were fighting between 3 to 1 and 6
to1 against Syria in tank-on-tank battles. The tenacious defense of the 188th
Armor Brigade--totaling 57 tanks in strength--along the TransArabian Pipeline
(Tapline) Road, allowed additional Israeli forces to move up to the front. Major
General Dan Laner, commander of the front, literally stood on the Arik Bridge
directing arriving units into battle.
By midnight on 7 October, Syrian forces closed within 5 kilo-meters of the
northern bridge of Bnot Ya'akov just west of Tapline Road, a maintenance road
for a major oil pipe running north to south through the region. The Israelis
were able to hold the Syrian drive for 3 days until they could counterattack
with five mechanized brigades and one elite light infantry brigade (Golani
Brigade). By 10 October, the Israelis had pushed the Syrian forces back to the
original demarcation line, known as the purple line, and continued the attack
through the purple line and into the interior of Syria.
Syrian President Assad asked Egyptian President Sadat to cease-fire, but
President Sadat only promised support, but no cease-fire. The Soviets stepped in
to conduct some saber rattling with the United Nations, the United States, and
Israel. This also stepped up resupply of much needed war materiels to Syrian
airfields that had not yet been destroyed by the Israeli air force.
On 11 October, the Israelis attacked across the purple line and pushed into the
Syrian interior battling Jordanian, Iraqi, Saudi, and Moroccan forces under the
control of Syrian field commanders. The Israelis keeping the tempo of the attack
in their favor, pushed within 30 kilometers of Damascus. The Israelis held onto
this area well until the final cease-fire that ended the conflict. By the time
the Israeli counterattack against the Syrians occurred, the tactical situation
was set to turn the tide in favor of the Israelis, who faced Egyptian forces
poised to make their drive through the Sinai.
The Turning Point in the West
Due to aggressive Israeli counterattacks against the Egyptian forces on the
eastern portion of the Suez Canal, the Egyptians continued to mass their armored
forces so they could make an adequate drive toward the coastal road near the
town of Romani. The Egyptian 2d Corps was tasked to take the coastal road and
Tasa Road, and seize the town of Bir Gifgafa, while the Egyptian 3d Corps in the
south would drive on toward the two southern passes. The Tasa Road moves through
the central part of the Sinai toward the key town of Bir Gifgafa, and finally
the two southern passes of Giddi and Mitla. This attack would take place on 15
October. Three Israeli divisions waited for the attack--and for the Egyptians to
begin open desert warfare.
Once Egyptian forces had left their protective air defense umbrella over the
Suez Canal, the Israeli flying artillery started to wreck havoc among the
Egyptian armored formations and supply columns moving eastward. The Israeli tank
forces also waited to exploit the Sinai's open expanses to take advantage of
their gunners' long-range accuracy and of unhampered maneuver through the open
terrain. The Sinai was tank country forward of the passes and Bir Gifgafa.
The Egyptian 2d Corps took the brunt of Israeli punishment, but reached the
outskirts of Bir Gifgafa. In essence, the Egyptians controlled the western end
of the Khatmia Pass. The Egyptian 3d Corps seized the southern pass of Mitla,
but was unable to secure the Giddi pass from Israeli Major General Ariel Sharon.
This caused a salient in the Egyptian line, and would be an advantage for Israel
during their countercrossing.
The Israeli Countercrossing
For nearly a week, the tempo of the attack had been in Egyptian hands, but the
course would soon change. With the Egyptian 3d Army's two-pronged attack pushing
as far east as the Milta Pass and being stopped on the western end of the Giddi
Pass, they had overextended the line from their flanking unit in the north, the
2d Egyptian Army. The Israelis planned to take the pressure off of their forces
facing the Egyptians in front of the passes, and turn the tide from reaction on
the Israelis' part to that of the Egyptians. So, Operation Gazelle was
initiated.
The Israeli staff had a plan for crossing the canal that had existed since early
1970, and the plan was modified to suit the Israeli counterattack plans.
Operation Stouthearted Men, the revision of Operation Gazelle, would begin on 15
October 1973. The operation would involve three Israeli armored divisions
crossing the Suez Canal at the town of Deversior on the most northern point of
Great Bitter Lake, which would cause the encirclement of the Egyptian 3d Army on
the eastern side of the Suez Canal. The Israelis expected the Egyptians to cease
their forward attacks and try to throw the Israelis back over the canal, or
destroy them on the western bank of the Suez, resulting in attacking Egyptian
forces going from proactive to reactive maneuvers. Their tempo of attack would
cease through the Sinai as they tried to cut off the Israelis and relieve the
Egyptian 3d Army.
The Israelis, with support of their flying artillery, were able to drag a
pieced-together bridge, made from a pontoon bridge and commercial bridging
equipment, and establish their own bridge head on the western bank of the Suez
Canal. Sharon's division would attack, build, and establish the bridgehead,
while the Adan division moving from the northern part of the Sinai and Major
General Kalman Magen's division from the southern Sinai exploited the bridgehead
on the western bank of the Suez. The two armored divisions would pass through
Sharon's division and would penetrate up to 20 kilometers on the western shore
of the Suez, cutting off all major supply routes to the Egyptian 3d Army, which
numbered some 20,000 men and well over 500 armored vehicles. The Israelis from
that point would fend off many relief operations conducted by the Egyptians to
flee their trapped men. The Israelis would continue their fragile hold on the
western bank until the U.N. cease-fire, which the United States brokered with
the support of the Soviet Union. Both nations would come very close to facing
one another in the Sinai. This was also one of President Sadat's key goals,
bringing the world to light on the Arab-Israeli conflict--not as a regional
conflict but one of global proportions.
Lessons Learned
The October War of 1973 would change how modem armies would fight future battles
with new technologies and tactics associated with technology. It also
demonstrated that a lucky and clever enemy could outfight a technologically
advanced force as the Egyptians had done with the Israelis.
The Egyptians used extensive air defense systems to balance out their inferior
air force when confronting the Israeli air force. Egyptian aircraft, for the
most part, was delegated to a ground-attack role and would not fly far beyond
their air defense barrier established along the Suez Canal. Fratricide was an
issue when pilots did not enter through designated points in the barrier. The
Egyptian's approach to the high sand rampart demonstrated simple ingenuity on
their part. What the Israelis estimated would take Egyptian forces 10-to-12
hours to demolish, only took 2-to-3 hours in some places along the canal.
Water cannons drastically upset the Israeli timetables for defense. The
Egyptians also incorporated a 1-kilometer buffer zone forward of the canal where
they had been infiltrated by infantry and commandos wielding RPG and SAGGER
antitank guided missile (ATGM) systems. As the Israeli armor crashed through the
desert, with little or no infantry support of their own, to rescue forces
trapped in the Bar-Lev Line, they were met with devastating volleys of SAGGER
missiles or antiarmor ambushes where a tank would be struck as many as five
times by RPGs.
The Egyptians had learned from the Six Day War and the War of Attrition that the
Israelis were loyal to trapped or besieged comrades and were also tenacious in
the attack. Leader of the Egyptian army, General Ahmed Ismail used that to his
advantage to initially devastate Israeli forces as they counterattacked in
piece-meal fashion.
The Egyptians and Syrians were solely dependent on the Soviet Union for
technical support, arms, munitions, and transportation on a global scale. The
latter was the Soviet Union instituting the "air-bridge," where a massive amount
of Soviet war materiel was airlifted into Cairo and Damascus. The technicians
manned air defense equipment around Cairo to the Ismailia highway. The air
defense technicians numbered some 500 personnel. However, the support did not
stop there. Since the War of Attrition, Soviet fighter pilots were flying combat
missions in the Sinai against the Israeli air force. Their exact losses for the
October War vary from 23 wounded to six killed.
The United States also alleged that North Korean pilots were also flying combat
missions over Egypt, but the North Korean government denied the accusations
saying that they were deployed only for a training exercise. Another important
asset the Soviet Union provided its Arab allies was strategic intelligence.
During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Soviet Union would launch a total of
two COSMOS spy satellites to gather information on both Arab, but more
importantly, Israeli losses throughout the war. This would enable the Egyptians
to gage their progress against the Israeli forces and help determine strategic
targets to attack with SCUDs. The true lesson to be learned from the war would
be felt by Israeli forces.
Prior to the conflict, Israeli forces were overconfident and underestimated
their Arab enemies, as well as its capabilities, as the Israeli air force
discovered as it broke against the Egyptian air defense barrier over the Suez
Canal. The Israeli's use of ATGM was limited to defensive. They were also the
first generation of ATGM of massive sizes, such as French SS-10 and SS-11, the
European equivalent of the Soviet SNAPPER missile. Initially, the semiautomatic
tracking tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile was offered
prior to the war, but the Israelis declined. This would change, as the Israelis
were in dire straits early on in the conflict. The Israeli government made a
request for the TOW missiles and the United States airlifted the missiles from
Holland. They had literally been removed from the European war stock.
Israeli armored forces learned a terrible lesson from rushing forward without
infantry support. Time and time again, Israeli tanks where picked off by a
SAGGER gunner who had fired less than 150 missiles in training prior to the war.
RPG-equipped infantrymen gnawed away at the Israeli armor as it closed against
the 1-kilometer buffer zone established on the first day of the war to protect
the bridgeheads and allow Egyptian armor forward to the eastern bank of the
Suez. The Israelis learned the importance of electronic countermeasures against
air defense systems.
The Israeli air force took a devastating beating as it attacked the Egyptian
bridgeheads across the Suez. In one day, the Israelis lost a total of 20
aircraft against the air defense barrier. As the war continued, Israeli
commercial airliners were seen landing at U.S. Air Force bases on the east coast
picking up electronic countermeasure pods and other components that were
successful against North Vietnamese air defense systems.
The most valuable lesson learned by the Israelis was that they had
underestimated the abilities of their Arab adversaries. They would not be
fighting the Arab armies of 1956 or 1967, but a new Arab soldier who was
determined to take back what was his and restore his prominence in the Middle
East. The Israelis were relying more and more on sophisticated weaponry to press
their advantage on their Arab enemies; and not relying on simple and proven past
techniques. A large part of Bar-Lev fortifications had lapsed into disrepair--especially
Israel's secret weapon. Pipes leading from the edge of the bank were connected
to oil tanks on Israel's side of the Suez. The pipes would be opened, oil would
float to the surface, and then be ignited.
Egyptian frogmen cemented the nozzles shut, but reported that many of the valves
had been overtightened so it would take more than the turn of a hand to operate.
The original fort had 31 fortified positions, and after the War of Attrition,
five would be sealed with sand, bringing the total number down to 26. The
Israelis had given up maneuver for an initial static defense.
The United States watched as the war progressed and as events unfolded in the
Sinai and Golan Heights. The October War reinforced the idea of the combined
arms fight and the role that advanced technology plays in a conflict, which can
be carded into present day.
Bibliography
Chaim Herzog, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: War and Peace in the Middle East from the
War of Independence through Lebanon, Vintage Books, New York, NY, 1984.
Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Arab-Israeli War 1973, Presidio
Press, Novato, CA, 1978, Reprinted 1997.
Dr. George W. Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War." The Albatros of Decisive
Victory, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1996.
CPT William C. Brown is currently assigned to 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort
Stewart, GA. He received a B.S. from Armstrong Atlantic University, Georgia. He
has served in various command and staff positions, to include squadron
maintenance officer, 3d Squadron, 2d Armor Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA;
executive officer, L Troop, 3/2 ACR, Fort Polk; MOS instructor, 214th Armor
Regiment, East Over, SC; and scout platoon section sergeant, 1/118th infantry,
South Carolina Army National Guard.