2RHPZ
06-02-2004, 05:21 PM
THE EVENTS OF 11 September 2001 and the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have resulted
in a significant expansion of U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) and special operations
forces (SOF) roles and missions. At the direction of
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Army
has also placed SOCOM in the new and unfamiliar
role of a supported combatant command.1 The combination
of expanded roles and missions with a higher
demand for SOF assets and capabilities and increased
command responsibilities poses a daunting
challenge.
SOCOM?s expanded roles and missions increase
manpower requirements for SOF personnel who can
plan at the strategic level.2 As more SOF operators
begin performing strategic planning duties, SOF units
risk losing capabilities.3 Given SOF truths (people are
more important than hardware, competent SOF cannot
be created or mass-produced in an emergency,
and quality over quantity), the expanded requirement
for operators and planners presents a dilemma.4
How does SOCOM educate enough SOF planners
for its expanded mission without compromising
its capabilities or disregarding SOF truths?
SOCOM cannot simply strip tactical SOF units, already
critically short of experienced manpower, to
meet the demand for educated strategic planners
who can function effectively on a combatant
commander?s staff or on a joint special operations
task force (JSOTF).
Ful article in .pdf format at:
http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun04/schrieber.pdf
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have resulted
in a significant expansion of U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) and special operations
forces (SOF) roles and missions. At the direction of
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Army
has also placed SOCOM in the new and unfamiliar
role of a supported combatant command.1 The combination
of expanded roles and missions with a higher
demand for SOF assets and capabilities and increased
command responsibilities poses a daunting
challenge.
SOCOM?s expanded roles and missions increase
manpower requirements for SOF personnel who can
plan at the strategic level.2 As more SOF operators
begin performing strategic planning duties, SOF units
risk losing capabilities.3 Given SOF truths (people are
more important than hardware, competent SOF cannot
be created or mass-produced in an emergency,
and quality over quantity), the expanded requirement
for operators and planners presents a dilemma.4
How does SOCOM educate enough SOF planners
for its expanded mission without compromising
its capabilities or disregarding SOF truths?
SOCOM cannot simply strip tactical SOF units, already
critically short of experienced manpower, to
meet the demand for educated strategic planners
who can function effectively on a combatant
commander?s staff or on a joint special operations
task force (JSOTF).
Ful article in .pdf format at:
http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun04/schrieber.pdf