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06-04-2004, 05:29 PM
US CIA Operations in Korea - 1950-1955
Lee Wha Rang
The US CIA - Its Origin
US CIA: The Central Intelligence Agency is a grandson of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) created during WW2. Pres. Truman disbanded the OSS on Oct. 1, 1945 and reassigned the OSS intelligence specialists to the War Dept and the State Dept. On January 22, 1946, Pres. Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) with about 100 employees. CIG's original mission was to coordinate intelligence information and nothing more. Its original function was to digest the cacophony of data collected by military intelligence services and summarize them into a concise digest for the President.
In 1946, Gen. Hoyte Vandenberg, the 2nd CIG director, expanded its operations to data collection in foreign countries. He got most of the old OSS people transferred to the CIG from the War and State Depts and the CIG staff swelled to several thousands.
The National Security Act of July 26, 1947 renamed the CIG to "Central Intelligence Agency" and also established the National Security Council (NSC). On December 19, 1947, the first NSC meeting was held and adopted the 'NSC 4/A', which empowered the CIA to a broad range of covert actions in Italy. Adm. Roscow Hillenkoetter became the director of CIA (DCI) at this time.
The first intervention in foreign affairs by the CIA was in Italy. During WW2, Italian communists played a major role in fighting the Fascists. The post-WW2 Italian government included several communists and Pres. Truman did not like the situation. The CIA was given the task of eliminating the Italian communists.
CIA operatives in Italy planted false stories about the Reds, funded right-wing organizations, highlighted Russian rapes in Eastern Europe, and veiled hints of military retaliation if the Reds remained in the government. American-Italians were marshaled to mount pro-American campaigns in Italy. The Italian Reds were ousted.
On June 18,1948, the NSC 4/A was replaced by the NSC 10/2, which authorized the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) for covert actions worldwide. The OPC director was to be appointed by the Secretary of State and for funding purposes, it was placed under the DCIA. An OSS veteran, Frank Wisner, was appointed the first director of OPC.
The CIA covert mission protocols were spelled out in Section Five of National Security Council Resolution 10/2, namely: 1) Covert political actions, 2) Covert psychological warfare, 3) Covert paramilitary operations (guerrilla warfare), 4) Covert sabotage, 5) Economic warfare, 6) Evasion and escape plans for downed pilots and 7) "Stay-behind" agents in case of enemy take over. The NSC "10/2" authorizes covert operations that are secret and small enough to be deniable by the CIA.
The Director of the CIA served as chairman of the board of the entire US intelligence community, including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA - which deals with electronic intelligence), the intelligence branches of the military services, the State Dept. bureau of intelligence and research, the FBI and the Nuclear Energy agencies.
The CIA was divided into major divisions: Plans (originally, the Office of Policy Coordination and Office of Special Operations), Intelligence, Research, and Support (equipment, logistics, security, and communication). The Plans Division runs spies, guerrillas and other covert operations: for example, it overthrew the government of Iran in 1953, of Guatemala in 1954, obtained and published Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956, ran U-2 spy planes and directed the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.
The US CIA's Early Days in the Far East
The Korean War caught the US CIA and the US Far East Command (FEC) of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In spite of the mounting intelligence for the imminent invasion from north, the CIA and MacArthur saw no imminent invasion in Korea. When the invasion occurred, Pres. Truman sacked the DCIA, Adm. Hillenkeeter and authorized emergency funds for rapid expansion of the CIA in the Korean theater. Truman ignored the fact that MacArthur opposed any major CIA presence in his domain and was the real culprit for the intelligence gap, and the CIA took the blame. When the Korean War broke out, the CIA had only three OSO (Office of Special Operations) operatives in the theatre. George Aurell headed this tiny cell. They had to worked out of their hotel rooms since the General would not permit them to have an office. When the CIA men ventured out, the General had Japanese agents shadow them.
The new DCIA, Gen. Walter Smith whipped the demoralized CIA into shape and dispatched Wisner, the OPC chief, to Tokyo. On June 27, 1950, Wisner appointed his old OSS friend, Hans Tofte to head the CIA OPC operations in the Far East. Hans Tofte turned out to be a shady character of a dubious background and was replaced in 1951. A few years later, Wisner himself was fired, went insane and committed suicide.
Tofte claimed that he was born in Denmark and lived in Manchuria for 8 years and spoke Chinese fluently. During WW2, he emigrated to America and he joined the British intelligence unit working out of New York. He was sent to Burma to organize native labor crews to ferry war supplies to China. He also led guerrillas to fight the Japanese. He returned to US and enlisted in the US Army as a private.
According to Tofte, he was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) because of his background. In 1943, Tofte organized a mini-navy to supply Tito's guerrillas in Yugoslavia. At the end of WW2, the OSS was disbanded, Tofte returned to his native country and worked as manager of an American airline. The airline was used to carry secret documents to the US. He returned to Mason City, Iowa, USA in 1947 and managed a family business until June 1950.
In early days, most of the CIA officers were white men from upper-class economic strata. They were mostly racists and treated the Korean agents with low esteem and deemed their lives expendable. The CIA officers came from Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force - and some non-military. CIA "officers" had dual ranks - a "service" rank (the real one) and a CIA ("agency") rank that could be anything depending on the mission. For example. Hans Tofte was a Lt. Colonel in the US Army but a "Major General" in the CIA.
Tofte was given 'unlimited' funding and began to build a CIA OPC empire in the Far East - code-named "Documents Research Section V". The second in command was Colwell Beers, a former government bureaucrat. Huge new buildings were built at the Atsugi Air Force Base.
The US CIA in Korea
During the early days of the War, the CIA had two quasi-independent operations in Korea: Office of Special Operations (OSO) led by George Aurell and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) led by Hans Tofte. The former engaged in espionage while the latter engaged in cover actions. (On July 2, 1951, these two operations were merged into JACK - Joint Advisory Commission - Korea.) Aurell's OSO team had several cells in north and south Korea. A communication cell in Seoul maintained contacts with the cells in Korea. When the War broke out, the OSO communication cell was expanded because it was the only link between the American officials trapped in South Korea and the US government.
OSO recruited Korean agents for collecting tactical intelligence. The Koreans were trained to cross lines ('line crossers'), to jump off a plane, to stay behind and other espionage activities. The OSO operations were run under the cover name - Department of the Army Liaison Detachment while the OPC operations used the cover - the Far East Air Forces Technical Analysis Group (FEAF/TAG). Both organizations used the Fifth Air Force Special Air Missions Detachment, the 6167th Air Base Group.
The US AF planes were augmented by the CIA's own air force CAT. CAT was originally formed by Gen. Claire Chennault and Whiting Willauer in 1946 to provide air transportation in China. Gen. Chennault commanded the 14th Air Force in 1945. The cargo business was supplemented by covert action missions for the CIA dating back to Oct. 10, 1949, China's national day. CAT was ejected from China in January 1950 and it followed Chiang Kai Sek to Formosa. By early 1950, CAT's commercial and CIA business had dried up and Chennault and Co. faced imminent bankruptcy. On March 24, 1950, CIA purchased CAT outright. In July 1950, the CIA assigned 3 CAT planes to ferry CIA agents between Korea and Japan.
The CIA OPC Young-do Base
Hans Tofte recruited Han Chul Min to head up the CIA OPC training camp at Young-do, a small island in the Pusan harbor. Han fled North Korea in 1945 and worked for Rhee Synman as an aide. He attended and graduated from the Military Academy - the 8th class - in January 1949. He was assigned to a special operations unit because of his North Korean origin.Captain Han was wounded in the early phase of the Korean War. While recuperating at a hospital in Pusan, he was approached by Yung Chi Young. the former Minister of Interior and told to volunteer for a special mission for the US CIA. In late September 1950, Capt. Han established the first training camp near Pusan and recruited several hundred North Korean refugees for the US CIA OPC in Korea. Fifteen of the agents were sent to Japan for advanced training.
In February 1951, Hans Tofte moved Capt. Han's group to Young-do for security reasons and named it the 'Y' unit. By this time, the Y unit had more than 1,200 members, who were divided into 4 operational groups: Yellow Dragon (North Kangwon and south Hamgyng-namdo), Blue Dragon (central Hamgynong-nam-do), White Tiger (north Hamgyng-namdo and southern Hamgyong-bukdo) and Owl (northern Hamgyong-bukdo).
The Y unit HQ staff were: Han Chul Min (commander-in-chief), Park Sun Man (deputy commander and operations), Kim Sung Ho (personnel), Ma Dong Hun (intelligence) and Han Myung Suk (supplies). Choe Jae Bu was the commander of the regiment made of the Blue Dragon and the White Tiger brigades. Lee Yi Sup commanded the former brigade and Im Bong Ok commanded the latter brigade. Im Yuh Sung commanded the Yellow Dragon brigade and Jung Yung Yun was his deputy.
The White Tiger Brigade
On April 29, 1951, 104 members of the Y unit went ashore in North Korea. The White Tiger brigade, C Company (12 members) led by Kim In Sik went ashore near Chungjin. On May 29, the A Company (15 members) led by Lee Nam Soo and the B Company led by Han Chnag Duk landed safely. On July 1, Choe Che Bu led a landing party of 52 members and linked up with the C Company. Kim In Sik was killed in action while attempting to secure food for his troops. Choe Che Bu managed to collect what remained of his scattered and battered units at one place. On August 25, Choe established contact with the CIA HQ and subsequently, two US planes dropped 31 replacements and much needed supplies. By this time Choe had 60 members and 40 new members recruited locally.
A captured North Korean army captain revealed that the Communists were organizing a major campaign to wipe out the CIA guerrillas and Commander Choe decided to mount a preemptive attack. Choe led a force of 30 and attacked the enemy killing several hundreds of the enemy and capturing 60 rifles.
Choe received the word that the enemy troops regrouped and party cadres were meet at Kapsan to coordinate a major offensive to wipe out the CIA unit. Choe radioed the Youngdo base for air strikes on Kapsan, whereupon 8 US bombers came over and flattened the town killing most of the party cadres.
The enemy mobilized several thousand security troops and mounted a major campaign. Commander Choe was killed trying to cover his unit's retreat. Ji YOng Su replaced Choe as the regimental commander.
On September 17, the CIA OPC dropped 36 replacements in the White Tiger area of operation. In preparation for the oncoming winter, the surviving members split into small bands of about 10 each and attempted to move onto different directions. On November 5, the White Tiger unit was surrounded by an enemy force of over 1,000 regular troops. Those few who managed to escape disappeared in the mountains.
The Blue Dragon Brigade
The 14 men of K Company led by Kim Myong Ryon boarded a US warship on April 29, 1951 from a staging area located at Young-do in the Pusan harbor and landed at Yum-bun-ri, North Korea. They reached the target area without any incident. The 14 men of the C Company led by Kim Young Jung were parachuted on May 24. Kim's chute did not open and was killed. Chu Jong Bin took over the command. The 16 men of the A Company led by Yun Dong Ju were dropped on May 24. On June 16, a team of 14 led by Lee Yi Sum was dropped. On July 6, 52 men of Company A and 48 men of Company C landed at Sin-chang, North Korea. On September 14, Kim Myong Ryon led an attack on an enemy cavalry unit and killed 82 enemy soldiers and 13 horses. But in the process, Kim was captured. Commander Lee Yi Sup was also captured by the enemy.
The brigade ceased to operate effectively. On July 7, 1952, Kim Myong Ryon and a handful of the members managed to escape and returned to the Young-do base.
The Yellow Dradon Brigade
On May 1, 1951, the 12 men of C Company led by Park Hee Bong arrived at the staging area at Yo-do. Kim Jung Wahn's team of 12 men landed at Ahn-byon. In addition, Lee Bong Gyu's team of 57 men landed safely. From June `18 to June 20, Choe Yun Chan's team of 61 men parachuted down safely at Mt. Paik. Since the brigade's area of operation was close to the frontline and also because the members are poorly trained, its performance was not as expected. Only a handful survived to return to the Young-do base.
The Young-do Unit Disbanded
With the Armistice of July 1953, the CIA OPC base at Young-do was close but its operations continued elsewhere. From 1950 to 1953, some 770 CIA-trained Korean partisans were lost in North Korea. In 1955, the US government awarded bronze medals for freedom to Chu Hong Gil, Kim Chi Min, Hwang Bo Hyon, Han Su Sin, Lee Gyong Su, Park Gi Ju, Hong Man Hak, Im Han Young and Hong Sun Su in recognition of their heroism. CIA OPC's Sea Operations
After the armistice, which forbade military operations, the CIA turned to sea operations. The Young-do unit was primarily a partisan unit, whose mission was to operated behind the enemy lines.
The sea operations units were led by Park Young Jo, Kim Sung Man and Kim Gook Yul. The two mother ships were the Sea Horse (Hae-ma) and the Sea Dragon (Hae-ryong). The key agents were: Lee Chun Sung, Lee Chun Won, Choe Bong Man, Gam Hah Baek, Kim Dong Hee, Kim Duk Hung, Yu Dong Wuk (later in the 66th class of the Police Academy)
Major Missions:
1) Operation TP-Stole: Captured a Chinese military ship (junk) and a Chinese officer onboard. It was a supply ship from Dairen and Jin-nam-po 2) Blew up a supply depot at Wang-ga-do. This operation was filmed from the air and confirmed.
3) Cut the undersea cable between Shanghai and Jin-nam-po. The participants were rewarded with a leather jacket made in Japan
4) Ho-yum-do (located at the mouth of the Yalu River) Kim Yong Su, Ahn In Chul, Kim Myong Hak, Bang Kwang Chan, Kim Nam Jun, Kim Jong In, Ma Ha Young.
5) Uh Hwa-do; American advisor Smith and later replaced by Welsh (heavily bearded) Hong Sun Il (team leader), Yang Yong Bum, Na Jun Hee (interpreter),
6) Naek-ah-do: Park Young Jo (team leader), Lee Chol Hee (operations chief)
7) Soon-wi-do:
Team #1: Shin Soo Jae (team leader); the team ship (the Whale) had an 8-horse-power gasoline engine made in Japan.
Team #2: Park Sun Dong (team leader); the team ship (the Shark); members were Kang Yong Je, Hwang Hyong Yup, Lee Duk Yun, Ahn Joong Ho, Ahn Byong Nam, Ji Jung Sik, Lee Wan Young and Cho Dong Baek.
Team #3: Kim Myong Hak (leader); the team ship Jung Uh Ri; members were Lee Sun Oh, Kim Sang Chun, Jung Hyng Gun, Park Bong Il, Kim Soon Sik, Lee Won Hyong, Goh Seh Wha and Choe Young Sik
Team #4: Ahn In Chul (leader).
Radio contacts were initiated by the code word - 'Tiger, come in' followed by numeric codes set in a code book.
The Korean Agents - Who Were They?
Spies came in various ranks. At the bottom of the ladder was the 'footers' (line-crossers) - the most expendable spies. Footers were placed a few miles behind lines and they walked back to the front to be captured. Footers were normally soldiers or women. They observe enemy positions. formations, equipment, etc. and got debriefed when they were recovered. Less than one out of hundred made it back. They were also used for spreading dysinformation. The quality of intelligence a footer brought back was useful in verifying information obtained from prisoners or recon units. The more qualified an agent, the deeper his injection point. It did not take much to train a footer; and loss of a footer was no disaster. All footers were trained in the basics of sabotage and encouraged to sabotage something if possible.
At the top of the ladder were N Korean army officers. They were injected so that they were allowed to return to their former units. They were placed on a mountain path used by N Korean guerrillas or stragglers returning home. These agents required much longer training. The main value of these was in their ability to mole into communist hierarchy. The moles were activated only when they were needed and left alone - all unnecessary contacts were avoided.
The "6006" (a CIA affiliate - aliases NICK and 6004 AISS) ran the Korean Labor Organization - KLO. The main function of the KLO was to provide physical labor for the American troops - such as carrying ammo's and other supplies on their back, taking care of the dead bodies, unloading cargo ships in Pusan and so on. The KLO was largely manned by N Korean refugees - a gold mine for spy recruiter. The "6006" recruits spies among captured N Korean soldiers and civilians. Late 1950 and early 1951, CIA agents interviewed refugees from N Korea and POWs on Koejedo. Those who were anti-Communists were enticed or pressed to join the operation.
The existence of KLO is secret, although it was well-known among the refugees. During the war years 1951 to 1953, KLO was off limit to S Korean military or police - or for that matter the US military. KLO had its own kangaroo courts which tried, convicted and executed people suspected of being communists. KLO was run by N Korean refugees under the direction of US spy-masters. In 1954, S Korean newspapers published stories of the abuses going on at KLO camps and the police began criminal investigations. By this time, KLO was not of much value to the UN war operations and the US spy-masters let it die.
The Clark Missions
The first major OPC operation, code named Trudy Jackson, was by a US commando team led by Lt. Eugene Clark of the US Navy working for the CIA. On Sept. 9, Lt. Clark, a US Army captain, 3 GI's and 2 Korean agents landed at Yonghong-do in preparation for the Inchon (14 miles from Yonghong) landing. Clark pressed some 50 islanders into scouting missions in Inchon. Informants called in the N Korean troops; the commandos escape to a nearby island of Palmi-do leaving behind the islanders. Those who helped the Americans were shot by the communists. On October 15, 1950, Lt. Clark led a 150-men guerrilla unit from a "6006" base near Inchon. The guerrilla vanguards landed at Paengnyong and did propaganda in the open to draw in the N Korean security forces. A few hours later, the main body of the guerrillas slipped ashore through the gaps left open by the communists rushing to the town. Within a few days, the guerrilla unit was trapped and wiped out. This is true of all guerrilla and agent operations in N Korea - very few would survive.
Operation TROPIC
Flights over N Korean, Chinese and Russian territories are performed by CAT pilots who volunteer for the missions ($10 per hour bonus). Some 25% of the CAT pilots refuse to participate in covert actions. The US Air Force intelligence teams brief O PC mission crews on AAA sites, penetration landmarks, radio control points, major cities (to avoid), drop zone avenues, return paths and so on. EE (escape and evasion) kits included gold bars to be used to bribe local friendlies in the event of bail-out or crash landing behind enemy lines. Potassium cyanides pills are included in the EE kits. All missions are flown in DC-4's or B-17's during moon-lit nights - more for the benefit of the agents being dropped or picked up. From 1951 to 1955, over one thousands poorly trained agents were dropped or boated into "virgin" areas to establish a guerrilla base from scratch - with zero success. TROPIC was the code name given to the CIA covert operations with CAT.
TROPIC crews and planes operated out of Atsugi Naval Air Station and the "600" near Kimpo (K-16), Korea. In 1952, retired Col. John H. Mason replaced Colwell Beers as chief of JTAG - the cover for the CIA operations in Korea and Manchuria. The aircraft (mostly C-47) would load up its cargo of agents or supplies at Atsugi or Kimpo and fly due east (for Chinese and northeast Korean missions) or west (northwest Korean missions) into international airspace and out of US radar range.
Once out of the radar range, the C-47 would turn north and climb to a high altitude (normally 10,000 ft). Drop zones are identified by landmarks or pre-arranged ground signals. Over the drop zone, its cargo of agents or supplies are p ushed out by the CIA handlers. Recovery of agents is normally done by ship. The CIA mother ship would anchor over the horizon and speed boats or rubber dinghies sneak in to fetch the waiting agents. Or some agents leave the shore in commandeered fishing boats or rubber dinghies to meet the recovery team halfway.
The CIA has devised a crude (and unsafe) air recovery method - used for picking up downed airmen and home-bound agents. A loop of strong rope or metal cable is strung between two tall trees. If no trees are found in an open area, two wooden poles are used instead. The loop is attached to a piece of rope which is wrapped around a person or a bag of documents or equipment. The aircraft would snatch the loop with a hook and reel it in as it speeds into high altitude. The "rescuee" risks decapitation, whiplash, sudden drop or spearing by the aircraft's hook.
The first operational use of the "hook" technique was attempted on Nov. 29, 1952 at Kirin, Manchuria. In July of the same year, TROPIC dropped a 4-men Chinese guerrilla team (Wen Team for its leader Chang Tsai-wen) into the Kirin area. In October, an additional agent, Li Chun-ying, was dropped in the same area to keep an eye on the Wen Team. On Nov. 29, 1952, a TROPIC crew left the "6006" base to recover Li using the "hook" technique. The crew found the poles and started to hook the loop when the Chinese communists opened fire and shot the plane.
The Chinese were waiting for the spy plane. Two crew members survived the crash and told their story in bloody detail. Late 1953, the Chinese published details of the CIA OPC operations in China from 1950 to 1953: 101 agents killed and 111 captured - i.e., every agent dropped was killed or captured on arrival. To support their claim, the Chinese showed off: six mortars, 998 rifles, 179,000 rounds of ammunition, 96 radios, code books, invisible ink, fake passes and ID's and several hundred pounds of gold.
The Ettinger Incident
On Feb. 7, 1951, a CIA captain in charge of an off-shore island came aboard the USS Rochester and requested a helicopter to pick up a wounded Navy flier, Lt. Ettinger. Ettinger was shot down in N Korea but supposedly was rescued by the CIA agents operating in N Korea. Normally, downed pilots were picked up by speed boats, but Ettinger was injured requiring an airlift instead. A CIA officer, Lt. Naylor-Foote, accompanied the rescue team. Navy Chief Petty Officer Duane Thorin was to pilot the rescue helicopter. Lt. Naylor-Foote told Thorin that he knew the Korean agents well and also, that he had done espionage jobs in China, which turned out to be false. Thorin managed to find the pre-arranged signals from the agents (three torches) and landed his craft. They found Lt. Ettinger standing in an open field, shoeless, waiting for his rescue. Unfortunately, Thorin hit an embankment and the craft crashed.
Lt. Naylor-Foote got out of the craft and went looking for his agents, shouting the radio call codes. Three men in N Korean uniforms appeared from a nearby woods. Thorin assumed that they were the agents the CIA men had talked about - although Lt. Ettinger had never seen them before. The Koreans disarmed and led the three bewildered Americans to a building. They were met by a general and his English interpreter. Ettinger recognized the general as the man who arranged his rescue. Thorin was impressed by the CIA - they had a North Korean general working for them! The general was genuinely sorry for the mishap and promised the Americans that he would find another way home. In fact, the Americans were sent to a POW camp.
The Shark Incident
Until the Armistice, the CIA boats operated from several islands of North Korea. The Armistice returned most of the islands to North Korea and so the CIA boats were moved to Sochon-do in the West Sea. The primary mission of the CIA boats after the Armistice was recovery of the CIA agents from North Korea. At about midnight of December 13, 1953, the Shark, one of the CIA boats, braved a heavy snow storm and picked up two CIA agents and headed back to the waiting mother ship. Unfortunately, it was discovered by the enemy coastal defense, which began to shell.
The boat was hit and shell fragments flew all over. The ship was set on fire. The two agents were wounded and jumped into the freezing water. The mother ship came to their rescue but the agents, including Kang Yong Je, could not be found and presumed dead. One of the crew Lee Wan Young was rescued. The crippled boat was loaded onto the mother ship and brought to Pier 21 of the Inchon Harbor.
Lee Wan Young was originally with the Wolf Pack partisan group. He was later assigned to man the Shark. Lee also went on several missions ashore to spy on the enemy air activities and troop movements.
The Shark had an 8 HP engine made in Japan. It was built specifically for spy missions. Its mufflers were located on the side so they they could easily muffled with cloth covers. The Shark saw action about once a month, usually during moonless nights. Her primary mission was to inject and retrieve agents in North Korea. The agents stayed at safe houses for 15-30 days and then retrieved. Mission orders were radioed in from the base
Kang was born in Gyuk-sung-gun, Whang-hae-do (North Korea), the birthplace of Kim Gu, the nationalist hero of Korea. He was married at age 15 to a 16-year old bride. Kang graduated from an agricultural school in 1945, the year of Liberation and military occupation of North Korea by the Soviets.
Kang joined an anti-Communist youth group in 1945 and escaped to South Korea in August 1948 just prior the North Korean government was established in Pyongyang. He and his friend Lee Jong Yul joined the Northwest Youth Corps and worked as line-crossers for the 18th Regiment (White Skull Unit) stationed at Unjin.
On December 21, 1949, Kang and Lee crossed the 38th Parallel and walked into Haeju on a secret mission. Two days later they escorted Hwang Jin Yup and Sin Um Won safely back to South Korea. The Regiment moved to another location in March 1949 but Kang stayed on until the Korean War started.
In September 1950, Kang returned to his home town now in the UN control and formed an anti-Communist youth group. Kang was in charge of security and commanded the local self-police unit. When the Chinese intervened, Kang and his friends became guerrillas. Kang's unit fought the Communist troops but suffered from shortage of supplies. Luckily Kang's unit got connected with the Students Volunteers Army unit led by Lee Jong Hak. The latter unit, which later became the Donkey partisan unit, received supplies from the UN Command and shared them with Kang's unit.
Kang's friend Lee Jong Yul and many others were killed in action and the survivors dispersed. Kang managed to escape to a small island, Soon-wi-do, where he linked up with the CIA Ho-yum unit. This unit was named after Ho-yum-do, a small uninhabited island near Pyongyang-do.
Hans Tofte's Demise
Hans Tofte's little spy empire crashed in 1951. A CIA internal investigation found numerous "irregularities" in Hans Tofte's glowing reports of his success stories and in the CIA funds (millions of dollars were missing.) In one of his reports to the CIA, Tofte enclosed a movie footage of an "actual" guerrilla operation in North Korea.. Unfortunately for Tofte, the CIA used the film in its guerrilla training classes and also, it was show-cased to the Pentagon brass. One day, a student asked - "How come all operations in the film are done in daylight?". Sure enough, even the covert landing of guerrillas in rubber boats in the film was in broad daylight. The instructor could not explain and indeed the CIA bosses could not explain either. After months of evasion, Col. Tofte finally admitted that the whole affair was a hoax. Tofte was relieved of his job in Korea.
A few years later, Tofte was given an assignment in Columbia. Tofte was sent to train Columbian security officers in the use of helicopters in the Columbian civil war - la vilencia. A major operational fiasco occurred and Tofte was called back.
On July 23, 1966, Tofte (then 59 years old) placed an ad in the Washington Post for a $150-a-month basement apartment for rent. A new CIA employee (Kenneth R. Slocum) responded to Tofte's ad and was shown the basement by Tofte's 86-year old mother-in-law, Charlotte Leister. Tofte and his wife, Marlys, were working on their new house at the time.
Slocum happened to open a closet on the third floor, and to his surprise, the closet was full of CIA documents stamped "SECRET". Next day, Slocum returned with a CIA security officer (Charles Speake) and gained entry by telling Mrs. Leister that Speake was interested in buying the house. Speake took possession of the documents and Tofte was suspended from his $25,000-a-year job, pending further investigation.
Tofte was fired on Sept. 15, 1966 and he filed a lawsuit against the CIA and its then director Helms, accusing them of stealing $30,000 in jewels belonging to his wife. Tofte died in 1987 under a mysterious circumstance - but by that time he had divulged many secrets to numerous newsmen, authors. The CIA would neither confirm nor deny the "facts" as bared by Tofte) and to presumably foreign agents. It turned out that Hans Tofte had many CIA secret documents hidden at several locations and the CIA security were unable to regain them.
Lee Wha Rang
The US CIA - Its Origin
US CIA: The Central Intelligence Agency is a grandson of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) created during WW2. Pres. Truman disbanded the OSS on Oct. 1, 1945 and reassigned the OSS intelligence specialists to the War Dept and the State Dept. On January 22, 1946, Pres. Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) with about 100 employees. CIG's original mission was to coordinate intelligence information and nothing more. Its original function was to digest the cacophony of data collected by military intelligence services and summarize them into a concise digest for the President.
In 1946, Gen. Hoyte Vandenberg, the 2nd CIG director, expanded its operations to data collection in foreign countries. He got most of the old OSS people transferred to the CIG from the War and State Depts and the CIG staff swelled to several thousands.
The National Security Act of July 26, 1947 renamed the CIG to "Central Intelligence Agency" and also established the National Security Council (NSC). On December 19, 1947, the first NSC meeting was held and adopted the 'NSC 4/A', which empowered the CIA to a broad range of covert actions in Italy. Adm. Roscow Hillenkoetter became the director of CIA (DCI) at this time.
The first intervention in foreign affairs by the CIA was in Italy. During WW2, Italian communists played a major role in fighting the Fascists. The post-WW2 Italian government included several communists and Pres. Truman did not like the situation. The CIA was given the task of eliminating the Italian communists.
CIA operatives in Italy planted false stories about the Reds, funded right-wing organizations, highlighted Russian rapes in Eastern Europe, and veiled hints of military retaliation if the Reds remained in the government. American-Italians were marshaled to mount pro-American campaigns in Italy. The Italian Reds were ousted.
On June 18,1948, the NSC 4/A was replaced by the NSC 10/2, which authorized the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) for covert actions worldwide. The OPC director was to be appointed by the Secretary of State and for funding purposes, it was placed under the DCIA. An OSS veteran, Frank Wisner, was appointed the first director of OPC.
The CIA covert mission protocols were spelled out in Section Five of National Security Council Resolution 10/2, namely: 1) Covert political actions, 2) Covert psychological warfare, 3) Covert paramilitary operations (guerrilla warfare), 4) Covert sabotage, 5) Economic warfare, 6) Evasion and escape plans for downed pilots and 7) "Stay-behind" agents in case of enemy take over. The NSC "10/2" authorizes covert operations that are secret and small enough to be deniable by the CIA.
The Director of the CIA served as chairman of the board of the entire US intelligence community, including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA - which deals with electronic intelligence), the intelligence branches of the military services, the State Dept. bureau of intelligence and research, the FBI and the Nuclear Energy agencies.
The CIA was divided into major divisions: Plans (originally, the Office of Policy Coordination and Office of Special Operations), Intelligence, Research, and Support (equipment, logistics, security, and communication). The Plans Division runs spies, guerrillas and other covert operations: for example, it overthrew the government of Iran in 1953, of Guatemala in 1954, obtained and published Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956, ran U-2 spy planes and directed the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.
The US CIA's Early Days in the Far East
The Korean War caught the US CIA and the US Far East Command (FEC) of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In spite of the mounting intelligence for the imminent invasion from north, the CIA and MacArthur saw no imminent invasion in Korea. When the invasion occurred, Pres. Truman sacked the DCIA, Adm. Hillenkeeter and authorized emergency funds for rapid expansion of the CIA in the Korean theater. Truman ignored the fact that MacArthur opposed any major CIA presence in his domain and was the real culprit for the intelligence gap, and the CIA took the blame. When the Korean War broke out, the CIA had only three OSO (Office of Special Operations) operatives in the theatre. George Aurell headed this tiny cell. They had to worked out of their hotel rooms since the General would not permit them to have an office. When the CIA men ventured out, the General had Japanese agents shadow them.
The new DCIA, Gen. Walter Smith whipped the demoralized CIA into shape and dispatched Wisner, the OPC chief, to Tokyo. On June 27, 1950, Wisner appointed his old OSS friend, Hans Tofte to head the CIA OPC operations in the Far East. Hans Tofte turned out to be a shady character of a dubious background and was replaced in 1951. A few years later, Wisner himself was fired, went insane and committed suicide.
Tofte claimed that he was born in Denmark and lived in Manchuria for 8 years and spoke Chinese fluently. During WW2, he emigrated to America and he joined the British intelligence unit working out of New York. He was sent to Burma to organize native labor crews to ferry war supplies to China. He also led guerrillas to fight the Japanese. He returned to US and enlisted in the US Army as a private.
According to Tofte, he was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) because of his background. In 1943, Tofte organized a mini-navy to supply Tito's guerrillas in Yugoslavia. At the end of WW2, the OSS was disbanded, Tofte returned to his native country and worked as manager of an American airline. The airline was used to carry secret documents to the US. He returned to Mason City, Iowa, USA in 1947 and managed a family business until June 1950.
In early days, most of the CIA officers were white men from upper-class economic strata. They were mostly racists and treated the Korean agents with low esteem and deemed their lives expendable. The CIA officers came from Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force - and some non-military. CIA "officers" had dual ranks - a "service" rank (the real one) and a CIA ("agency") rank that could be anything depending on the mission. For example. Hans Tofte was a Lt. Colonel in the US Army but a "Major General" in the CIA.
Tofte was given 'unlimited' funding and began to build a CIA OPC empire in the Far East - code-named "Documents Research Section V". The second in command was Colwell Beers, a former government bureaucrat. Huge new buildings were built at the Atsugi Air Force Base.
The US CIA in Korea
During the early days of the War, the CIA had two quasi-independent operations in Korea: Office of Special Operations (OSO) led by George Aurell and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) led by Hans Tofte. The former engaged in espionage while the latter engaged in cover actions. (On July 2, 1951, these two operations were merged into JACK - Joint Advisory Commission - Korea.) Aurell's OSO team had several cells in north and south Korea. A communication cell in Seoul maintained contacts with the cells in Korea. When the War broke out, the OSO communication cell was expanded because it was the only link between the American officials trapped in South Korea and the US government.
OSO recruited Korean agents for collecting tactical intelligence. The Koreans were trained to cross lines ('line crossers'), to jump off a plane, to stay behind and other espionage activities. The OSO operations were run under the cover name - Department of the Army Liaison Detachment while the OPC operations used the cover - the Far East Air Forces Technical Analysis Group (FEAF/TAG). Both organizations used the Fifth Air Force Special Air Missions Detachment, the 6167th Air Base Group.
The US AF planes were augmented by the CIA's own air force CAT. CAT was originally formed by Gen. Claire Chennault and Whiting Willauer in 1946 to provide air transportation in China. Gen. Chennault commanded the 14th Air Force in 1945. The cargo business was supplemented by covert action missions for the CIA dating back to Oct. 10, 1949, China's national day. CAT was ejected from China in January 1950 and it followed Chiang Kai Sek to Formosa. By early 1950, CAT's commercial and CIA business had dried up and Chennault and Co. faced imminent bankruptcy. On March 24, 1950, CIA purchased CAT outright. In July 1950, the CIA assigned 3 CAT planes to ferry CIA agents between Korea and Japan.
The CIA OPC Young-do Base
Hans Tofte recruited Han Chul Min to head up the CIA OPC training camp at Young-do, a small island in the Pusan harbor. Han fled North Korea in 1945 and worked for Rhee Synman as an aide. He attended and graduated from the Military Academy - the 8th class - in January 1949. He was assigned to a special operations unit because of his North Korean origin.Captain Han was wounded in the early phase of the Korean War. While recuperating at a hospital in Pusan, he was approached by Yung Chi Young. the former Minister of Interior and told to volunteer for a special mission for the US CIA. In late September 1950, Capt. Han established the first training camp near Pusan and recruited several hundred North Korean refugees for the US CIA OPC in Korea. Fifteen of the agents were sent to Japan for advanced training.
In February 1951, Hans Tofte moved Capt. Han's group to Young-do for security reasons and named it the 'Y' unit. By this time, the Y unit had more than 1,200 members, who were divided into 4 operational groups: Yellow Dragon (North Kangwon and south Hamgyng-namdo), Blue Dragon (central Hamgynong-nam-do), White Tiger (north Hamgyng-namdo and southern Hamgyong-bukdo) and Owl (northern Hamgyong-bukdo).
The Y unit HQ staff were: Han Chul Min (commander-in-chief), Park Sun Man (deputy commander and operations), Kim Sung Ho (personnel), Ma Dong Hun (intelligence) and Han Myung Suk (supplies). Choe Jae Bu was the commander of the regiment made of the Blue Dragon and the White Tiger brigades. Lee Yi Sup commanded the former brigade and Im Bong Ok commanded the latter brigade. Im Yuh Sung commanded the Yellow Dragon brigade and Jung Yung Yun was his deputy.
The White Tiger Brigade
On April 29, 1951, 104 members of the Y unit went ashore in North Korea. The White Tiger brigade, C Company (12 members) led by Kim In Sik went ashore near Chungjin. On May 29, the A Company (15 members) led by Lee Nam Soo and the B Company led by Han Chnag Duk landed safely. On July 1, Choe Che Bu led a landing party of 52 members and linked up with the C Company. Kim In Sik was killed in action while attempting to secure food for his troops. Choe Che Bu managed to collect what remained of his scattered and battered units at one place. On August 25, Choe established contact with the CIA HQ and subsequently, two US planes dropped 31 replacements and much needed supplies. By this time Choe had 60 members and 40 new members recruited locally.
A captured North Korean army captain revealed that the Communists were organizing a major campaign to wipe out the CIA guerrillas and Commander Choe decided to mount a preemptive attack. Choe led a force of 30 and attacked the enemy killing several hundreds of the enemy and capturing 60 rifles.
Choe received the word that the enemy troops regrouped and party cadres were meet at Kapsan to coordinate a major offensive to wipe out the CIA unit. Choe radioed the Youngdo base for air strikes on Kapsan, whereupon 8 US bombers came over and flattened the town killing most of the party cadres.
The enemy mobilized several thousand security troops and mounted a major campaign. Commander Choe was killed trying to cover his unit's retreat. Ji YOng Su replaced Choe as the regimental commander.
On September 17, the CIA OPC dropped 36 replacements in the White Tiger area of operation. In preparation for the oncoming winter, the surviving members split into small bands of about 10 each and attempted to move onto different directions. On November 5, the White Tiger unit was surrounded by an enemy force of over 1,000 regular troops. Those few who managed to escape disappeared in the mountains.
The Blue Dragon Brigade
The 14 men of K Company led by Kim Myong Ryon boarded a US warship on April 29, 1951 from a staging area located at Young-do in the Pusan harbor and landed at Yum-bun-ri, North Korea. They reached the target area without any incident. The 14 men of the C Company led by Kim Young Jung were parachuted on May 24. Kim's chute did not open and was killed. Chu Jong Bin took over the command. The 16 men of the A Company led by Yun Dong Ju were dropped on May 24. On June 16, a team of 14 led by Lee Yi Sum was dropped. On July 6, 52 men of Company A and 48 men of Company C landed at Sin-chang, North Korea. On September 14, Kim Myong Ryon led an attack on an enemy cavalry unit and killed 82 enemy soldiers and 13 horses. But in the process, Kim was captured. Commander Lee Yi Sup was also captured by the enemy.
The brigade ceased to operate effectively. On July 7, 1952, Kim Myong Ryon and a handful of the members managed to escape and returned to the Young-do base.
The Yellow Dradon Brigade
On May 1, 1951, the 12 men of C Company led by Park Hee Bong arrived at the staging area at Yo-do. Kim Jung Wahn's team of 12 men landed at Ahn-byon. In addition, Lee Bong Gyu's team of 57 men landed safely. From June `18 to June 20, Choe Yun Chan's team of 61 men parachuted down safely at Mt. Paik. Since the brigade's area of operation was close to the frontline and also because the members are poorly trained, its performance was not as expected. Only a handful survived to return to the Young-do base.
The Young-do Unit Disbanded
With the Armistice of July 1953, the CIA OPC base at Young-do was close but its operations continued elsewhere. From 1950 to 1953, some 770 CIA-trained Korean partisans were lost in North Korea. In 1955, the US government awarded bronze medals for freedom to Chu Hong Gil, Kim Chi Min, Hwang Bo Hyon, Han Su Sin, Lee Gyong Su, Park Gi Ju, Hong Man Hak, Im Han Young and Hong Sun Su in recognition of their heroism. CIA OPC's Sea Operations
After the armistice, which forbade military operations, the CIA turned to sea operations. The Young-do unit was primarily a partisan unit, whose mission was to operated behind the enemy lines.
The sea operations units were led by Park Young Jo, Kim Sung Man and Kim Gook Yul. The two mother ships were the Sea Horse (Hae-ma) and the Sea Dragon (Hae-ryong). The key agents were: Lee Chun Sung, Lee Chun Won, Choe Bong Man, Gam Hah Baek, Kim Dong Hee, Kim Duk Hung, Yu Dong Wuk (later in the 66th class of the Police Academy)
Major Missions:
1) Operation TP-Stole: Captured a Chinese military ship (junk) and a Chinese officer onboard. It was a supply ship from Dairen and Jin-nam-po 2) Blew up a supply depot at Wang-ga-do. This operation was filmed from the air and confirmed.
3) Cut the undersea cable between Shanghai and Jin-nam-po. The participants were rewarded with a leather jacket made in Japan
4) Ho-yum-do (located at the mouth of the Yalu River) Kim Yong Su, Ahn In Chul, Kim Myong Hak, Bang Kwang Chan, Kim Nam Jun, Kim Jong In, Ma Ha Young.
5) Uh Hwa-do; American advisor Smith and later replaced by Welsh (heavily bearded) Hong Sun Il (team leader), Yang Yong Bum, Na Jun Hee (interpreter),
6) Naek-ah-do: Park Young Jo (team leader), Lee Chol Hee (operations chief)
7) Soon-wi-do:
Team #1: Shin Soo Jae (team leader); the team ship (the Whale) had an 8-horse-power gasoline engine made in Japan.
Team #2: Park Sun Dong (team leader); the team ship (the Shark); members were Kang Yong Je, Hwang Hyong Yup, Lee Duk Yun, Ahn Joong Ho, Ahn Byong Nam, Ji Jung Sik, Lee Wan Young and Cho Dong Baek.
Team #3: Kim Myong Hak (leader); the team ship Jung Uh Ri; members were Lee Sun Oh, Kim Sang Chun, Jung Hyng Gun, Park Bong Il, Kim Soon Sik, Lee Won Hyong, Goh Seh Wha and Choe Young Sik
Team #4: Ahn In Chul (leader).
Radio contacts were initiated by the code word - 'Tiger, come in' followed by numeric codes set in a code book.
The Korean Agents - Who Were They?
Spies came in various ranks. At the bottom of the ladder was the 'footers' (line-crossers) - the most expendable spies. Footers were placed a few miles behind lines and they walked back to the front to be captured. Footers were normally soldiers or women. They observe enemy positions. formations, equipment, etc. and got debriefed when they were recovered. Less than one out of hundred made it back. They were also used for spreading dysinformation. The quality of intelligence a footer brought back was useful in verifying information obtained from prisoners or recon units. The more qualified an agent, the deeper his injection point. It did not take much to train a footer; and loss of a footer was no disaster. All footers were trained in the basics of sabotage and encouraged to sabotage something if possible.
At the top of the ladder were N Korean army officers. They were injected so that they were allowed to return to their former units. They were placed on a mountain path used by N Korean guerrillas or stragglers returning home. These agents required much longer training. The main value of these was in their ability to mole into communist hierarchy. The moles were activated only when they were needed and left alone - all unnecessary contacts were avoided.
The "6006" (a CIA affiliate - aliases NICK and 6004 AISS) ran the Korean Labor Organization - KLO. The main function of the KLO was to provide physical labor for the American troops - such as carrying ammo's and other supplies on their back, taking care of the dead bodies, unloading cargo ships in Pusan and so on. The KLO was largely manned by N Korean refugees - a gold mine for spy recruiter. The "6006" recruits spies among captured N Korean soldiers and civilians. Late 1950 and early 1951, CIA agents interviewed refugees from N Korea and POWs on Koejedo. Those who were anti-Communists were enticed or pressed to join the operation.
The existence of KLO is secret, although it was well-known among the refugees. During the war years 1951 to 1953, KLO was off limit to S Korean military or police - or for that matter the US military. KLO had its own kangaroo courts which tried, convicted and executed people suspected of being communists. KLO was run by N Korean refugees under the direction of US spy-masters. In 1954, S Korean newspapers published stories of the abuses going on at KLO camps and the police began criminal investigations. By this time, KLO was not of much value to the UN war operations and the US spy-masters let it die.
The Clark Missions
The first major OPC operation, code named Trudy Jackson, was by a US commando team led by Lt. Eugene Clark of the US Navy working for the CIA. On Sept. 9, Lt. Clark, a US Army captain, 3 GI's and 2 Korean agents landed at Yonghong-do in preparation for the Inchon (14 miles from Yonghong) landing. Clark pressed some 50 islanders into scouting missions in Inchon. Informants called in the N Korean troops; the commandos escape to a nearby island of Palmi-do leaving behind the islanders. Those who helped the Americans were shot by the communists. On October 15, 1950, Lt. Clark led a 150-men guerrilla unit from a "6006" base near Inchon. The guerrilla vanguards landed at Paengnyong and did propaganda in the open to draw in the N Korean security forces. A few hours later, the main body of the guerrillas slipped ashore through the gaps left open by the communists rushing to the town. Within a few days, the guerrilla unit was trapped and wiped out. This is true of all guerrilla and agent operations in N Korea - very few would survive.
Operation TROPIC
Flights over N Korean, Chinese and Russian territories are performed by CAT pilots who volunteer for the missions ($10 per hour bonus). Some 25% of the CAT pilots refuse to participate in covert actions. The US Air Force intelligence teams brief O PC mission crews on AAA sites, penetration landmarks, radio control points, major cities (to avoid), drop zone avenues, return paths and so on. EE (escape and evasion) kits included gold bars to be used to bribe local friendlies in the event of bail-out or crash landing behind enemy lines. Potassium cyanides pills are included in the EE kits. All missions are flown in DC-4's or B-17's during moon-lit nights - more for the benefit of the agents being dropped or picked up. From 1951 to 1955, over one thousands poorly trained agents were dropped or boated into "virgin" areas to establish a guerrilla base from scratch - with zero success. TROPIC was the code name given to the CIA covert operations with CAT.
TROPIC crews and planes operated out of Atsugi Naval Air Station and the "600" near Kimpo (K-16), Korea. In 1952, retired Col. John H. Mason replaced Colwell Beers as chief of JTAG - the cover for the CIA operations in Korea and Manchuria. The aircraft (mostly C-47) would load up its cargo of agents or supplies at Atsugi or Kimpo and fly due east (for Chinese and northeast Korean missions) or west (northwest Korean missions) into international airspace and out of US radar range.
Once out of the radar range, the C-47 would turn north and climb to a high altitude (normally 10,000 ft). Drop zones are identified by landmarks or pre-arranged ground signals. Over the drop zone, its cargo of agents or supplies are p ushed out by the CIA handlers. Recovery of agents is normally done by ship. The CIA mother ship would anchor over the horizon and speed boats or rubber dinghies sneak in to fetch the waiting agents. Or some agents leave the shore in commandeered fishing boats or rubber dinghies to meet the recovery team halfway.
The CIA has devised a crude (and unsafe) air recovery method - used for picking up downed airmen and home-bound agents. A loop of strong rope or metal cable is strung between two tall trees. If no trees are found in an open area, two wooden poles are used instead. The loop is attached to a piece of rope which is wrapped around a person or a bag of documents or equipment. The aircraft would snatch the loop with a hook and reel it in as it speeds into high altitude. The "rescuee" risks decapitation, whiplash, sudden drop or spearing by the aircraft's hook.
The first operational use of the "hook" technique was attempted on Nov. 29, 1952 at Kirin, Manchuria. In July of the same year, TROPIC dropped a 4-men Chinese guerrilla team (Wen Team for its leader Chang Tsai-wen) into the Kirin area. In October, an additional agent, Li Chun-ying, was dropped in the same area to keep an eye on the Wen Team. On Nov. 29, 1952, a TROPIC crew left the "6006" base to recover Li using the "hook" technique. The crew found the poles and started to hook the loop when the Chinese communists opened fire and shot the plane.
The Chinese were waiting for the spy plane. Two crew members survived the crash and told their story in bloody detail. Late 1953, the Chinese published details of the CIA OPC operations in China from 1950 to 1953: 101 agents killed and 111 captured - i.e., every agent dropped was killed or captured on arrival. To support their claim, the Chinese showed off: six mortars, 998 rifles, 179,000 rounds of ammunition, 96 radios, code books, invisible ink, fake passes and ID's and several hundred pounds of gold.
The Ettinger Incident
On Feb. 7, 1951, a CIA captain in charge of an off-shore island came aboard the USS Rochester and requested a helicopter to pick up a wounded Navy flier, Lt. Ettinger. Ettinger was shot down in N Korea but supposedly was rescued by the CIA agents operating in N Korea. Normally, downed pilots were picked up by speed boats, but Ettinger was injured requiring an airlift instead. A CIA officer, Lt. Naylor-Foote, accompanied the rescue team. Navy Chief Petty Officer Duane Thorin was to pilot the rescue helicopter. Lt. Naylor-Foote told Thorin that he knew the Korean agents well and also, that he had done espionage jobs in China, which turned out to be false. Thorin managed to find the pre-arranged signals from the agents (three torches) and landed his craft. They found Lt. Ettinger standing in an open field, shoeless, waiting for his rescue. Unfortunately, Thorin hit an embankment and the craft crashed.
Lt. Naylor-Foote got out of the craft and went looking for his agents, shouting the radio call codes. Three men in N Korean uniforms appeared from a nearby woods. Thorin assumed that they were the agents the CIA men had talked about - although Lt. Ettinger had never seen them before. The Koreans disarmed and led the three bewildered Americans to a building. They were met by a general and his English interpreter. Ettinger recognized the general as the man who arranged his rescue. Thorin was impressed by the CIA - they had a North Korean general working for them! The general was genuinely sorry for the mishap and promised the Americans that he would find another way home. In fact, the Americans were sent to a POW camp.
The Shark Incident
Until the Armistice, the CIA boats operated from several islands of North Korea. The Armistice returned most of the islands to North Korea and so the CIA boats were moved to Sochon-do in the West Sea. The primary mission of the CIA boats after the Armistice was recovery of the CIA agents from North Korea. At about midnight of December 13, 1953, the Shark, one of the CIA boats, braved a heavy snow storm and picked up two CIA agents and headed back to the waiting mother ship. Unfortunately, it was discovered by the enemy coastal defense, which began to shell.
The boat was hit and shell fragments flew all over. The ship was set on fire. The two agents were wounded and jumped into the freezing water. The mother ship came to their rescue but the agents, including Kang Yong Je, could not be found and presumed dead. One of the crew Lee Wan Young was rescued. The crippled boat was loaded onto the mother ship and brought to Pier 21 of the Inchon Harbor.
Lee Wan Young was originally with the Wolf Pack partisan group. He was later assigned to man the Shark. Lee also went on several missions ashore to spy on the enemy air activities and troop movements.
The Shark had an 8 HP engine made in Japan. It was built specifically for spy missions. Its mufflers were located on the side so they they could easily muffled with cloth covers. The Shark saw action about once a month, usually during moonless nights. Her primary mission was to inject and retrieve agents in North Korea. The agents stayed at safe houses for 15-30 days and then retrieved. Mission orders were radioed in from the base
Kang was born in Gyuk-sung-gun, Whang-hae-do (North Korea), the birthplace of Kim Gu, the nationalist hero of Korea. He was married at age 15 to a 16-year old bride. Kang graduated from an agricultural school in 1945, the year of Liberation and military occupation of North Korea by the Soviets.
Kang joined an anti-Communist youth group in 1945 and escaped to South Korea in August 1948 just prior the North Korean government was established in Pyongyang. He and his friend Lee Jong Yul joined the Northwest Youth Corps and worked as line-crossers for the 18th Regiment (White Skull Unit) stationed at Unjin.
On December 21, 1949, Kang and Lee crossed the 38th Parallel and walked into Haeju on a secret mission. Two days later they escorted Hwang Jin Yup and Sin Um Won safely back to South Korea. The Regiment moved to another location in March 1949 but Kang stayed on until the Korean War started.
In September 1950, Kang returned to his home town now in the UN control and formed an anti-Communist youth group. Kang was in charge of security and commanded the local self-police unit. When the Chinese intervened, Kang and his friends became guerrillas. Kang's unit fought the Communist troops but suffered from shortage of supplies. Luckily Kang's unit got connected with the Students Volunteers Army unit led by Lee Jong Hak. The latter unit, which later became the Donkey partisan unit, received supplies from the UN Command and shared them with Kang's unit.
Kang's friend Lee Jong Yul and many others were killed in action and the survivors dispersed. Kang managed to escape to a small island, Soon-wi-do, where he linked up with the CIA Ho-yum unit. This unit was named after Ho-yum-do, a small uninhabited island near Pyongyang-do.
Hans Tofte's Demise
Hans Tofte's little spy empire crashed in 1951. A CIA internal investigation found numerous "irregularities" in Hans Tofte's glowing reports of his success stories and in the CIA funds (millions of dollars were missing.) In one of his reports to the CIA, Tofte enclosed a movie footage of an "actual" guerrilla operation in North Korea.. Unfortunately for Tofte, the CIA used the film in its guerrilla training classes and also, it was show-cased to the Pentagon brass. One day, a student asked - "How come all operations in the film are done in daylight?". Sure enough, even the covert landing of guerrillas in rubber boats in the film was in broad daylight. The instructor could not explain and indeed the CIA bosses could not explain either. After months of evasion, Col. Tofte finally admitted that the whole affair was a hoax. Tofte was relieved of his job in Korea.
A few years later, Tofte was given an assignment in Columbia. Tofte was sent to train Columbian security officers in the use of helicopters in the Columbian civil war - la vilencia. A major operational fiasco occurred and Tofte was called back.
On July 23, 1966, Tofte (then 59 years old) placed an ad in the Washington Post for a $150-a-month basement apartment for rent. A new CIA employee (Kenneth R. Slocum) responded to Tofte's ad and was shown the basement by Tofte's 86-year old mother-in-law, Charlotte Leister. Tofte and his wife, Marlys, were working on their new house at the time.
Slocum happened to open a closet on the third floor, and to his surprise, the closet was full of CIA documents stamped "SECRET". Next day, Slocum returned with a CIA security officer (Charles Speake) and gained entry by telling Mrs. Leister that Speake was interested in buying the house. Speake took possession of the documents and Tofte was suspended from his $25,000-a-year job, pending further investigation.
Tofte was fired on Sept. 15, 1966 and he filed a lawsuit against the CIA and its then director Helms, accusing them of stealing $30,000 in jewels belonging to his wife. Tofte died in 1987 under a mysterious circumstance - but by that time he had divulged many secrets to numerous newsmen, authors. The CIA would neither confirm nor deny the "facts" as bared by Tofte) and to presumably foreign agents. It turned out that Hans Tofte had many CIA secret documents hidden at several locations and the CIA security were unable to regain them.