Was Rommel really a tactical genius, but a strategic idiot?

[matthew.manhorn]

Although Rommel won numerous battles against the British during the early stages of the North African campaign he somehow overstretched his forces and got beaten in El Alamein, Egypt, which caused North Africa to fall into the hands of Allies thus threatening Italy+Southern Germany. If Rommel had defended in North Africa without attacking would he be able to stagnate the Allies from invading Italy!

So is Rommel really a strategical idiot? Or did he just simply lost a gamble?

[hank]

Rommel never had a chance in North Africa from a logistical standpoint. The fact that he did anything shows he was a great filed general. He was constantly undersupplied and under strength and nearly won.

hank

[Jarhead]

Rommel never had a chance in North Africa from a logistical standpoint. The fact that he did anything shows he was a great filed general. He was constantly undersupplied and under strength and nearly won.

hank

Nothing more to add.
The Africa campain was doomed to fail from the beginning.

[matthew.manhorn]

Nothing more to add.
The Africa campain was doomed to fail from the beginning.

so was turtle'ing a better tactic for Rommel rather than attacking

And was Montgomery a bad general overall? He failed to captuire Rommel after the sure-win victory of El Alamein, and conducted a failed operation market garden

[hank]

I used to love to play those computer games with the North African battles when I was younger. The game was called West Front and there was also an East Front. It was almost impossible to equal what Rommel did in the Nort African battles. He had a gift in tactics, strategy, and maybe most importantly in motivating his troops. He got more from less in North Africa than could reasonably have been expected.

hank

[hank]

so was turtle'ing a better tactic for Rommel rather than attacking

And was Montgomery a bad general overall? He failed to captuire Rommel after the sure-win victory of El Alamein, and conducted a failed operation market

Frankly no. Without more divisions and more importantly better supply of the divisions he had there was no chance to win.

Monty was fine.

hank

[Hollis]

Considering what Churchill said in 1942 about Rommel.

"We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general. - Winston Churchill.

Is the purpose of this thread to Insult Generals who are no longer around?

[Morboute]

From the books i have read, he did the best he could do with what he had. The main problem seemed to be that DAK didn't have enough vehicles to get supplies to the front, the trucks they needed were sent to the Eastern front.
They had the supplies needed, just not the means to deliver it to the front lines.

[matthew.manhorn]

thank you for your answers! but can someone give me a general overview of how the north african campaign was doomed to the axis from the beginning? How did the Brits outgun the Germans despite having their mainland bombed / severely damaged by the luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain? Was it the incompetence of the Italian military?

[Shadowstorm]

There's always good generals during the wars who know's what to do, but it's leaders who screw up though.

[KEEPER0311]

so was turtle'ing a better tactic for Rommel rather than attacking


Turtling up will almost never work, especially with very limited supplies of both men and material. Rommel used his greater mobility to hit the Allies where it hurt, fuel, and other supplies. Not only did he manage to hinder the allied effort greatly, but by raiding the allied forces, he managed to gather enough supplies to keep his army moving.

[johanness]

thank you for your answers! but can someone give me a general overview of how the north african campaign was doomed to the axis from the beginning? How did the Brits outgun the Germans despite having their mainland bombed / severely damaged by the luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain? Was it the incompetence of the Italian military?

The Brits were at no time alone against the third Reich .Remember the "Comonwealth"?
Canada,South Africa,Australia,New Zealand,India....

Also England was never planned to be the first target of the Nazis.

[Jarhead]

Was it the incompetence of the Italian military?
Well, the Italian military was stuck in the 1920s. Nothing was up to date.
Furthermore their motivation was like zero.

[perdurabo]

And was Montgomery a bad general overall? He failed to captuire Rommel after the sure-win victory of El Alamein, and conducted a failed operation market garden
i think yes, his timtable of capturing france was idiotic, m-g was total failure that cost so meany lives... but he made a legend out of winning with Rommel so he was good at PR :roll:

[Mordoror]

thank you for your answers! but can someone give me a general overview of how the north african campaign was doomed to the axis from the beginning? How did the Brits outgun the Germans despite having their mainland bombed / severely damaged by the luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain? Was it the incompetence of the Italian military?


the North african campaigna was first a secondary front for the OKH and OKW... The germans just rushed in help of the Italians and did it well with few ressources at the beginning. Then Adolf wasted all with an hypothetic idea of closing the Suez canal and joigning the Japs in central asia. So he ordered to continue the campaign at the very moment the Axis lost the control of the mediterranean sea (remember at that time, the Crete operation was a bloody semi-draw operation for the german paratroopers units, a lot of italian surface battleships were sunk, not german battleships were here to ensure their succession and the brits had an almsot absolute air superiority due to Cyprus/rhodes/malta and some other "unsinkables" CV islands. So the logistic lines of the Afrika korp and the Italian african units was wasted regulary. In spite of that Rommel managed to maintain its gain and win some battles until he find himself overwhelmed by sheer number in Egypt
and afterward by the menace of a second front (the landing in French Algeria and Tunisia of US battle groups)
At that time he was still impered by Hitler to retreat with his soldiers (that secondary front had become a primary front for nothing else than a question of prestige in the germans leader paranoid mind) leading to wasting more men in the nass
that's all the story

and beside the fact that yes the Italian army was badly equiped and badly motivated for some units, some others fought honorably and with courage in desperate odds (when they were very often despited by the german officers and let fall down ....)

[Connaught Ranger]

Rommel was not the big cheese in North Africa, he was answerable to:-

Albert Kesselring (30 November (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_30) 1885 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1885) - 16 July (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_16) 1960 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960)) was a Luftwaffe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luftwaffe) Generalfeldmarschall (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalfeldmarschall) during World War II (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II). Nicknamed "Smiling Albert", he was one of the most skilful generals of Nazi Germany (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_Germany). He commanded air forces in the invasions of Poland (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Poland_%281939%29), France (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France), the Battle of Britain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain) and Operation Barbarossa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa). As Commander-in-Chief South, he was overall German commander in the Mediterranean theatre (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean_theatre_of_World_War_II), which included operations in North Africa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_African_Campaign).

Thus was restricted in what he could and could not do, with regards men, material, and campaign.

Connaught Ranger

[T3ngu]

Rommel never had a chance in North Africa from a logistical standpoint. The fact that he did anything shows he was a great filed general. He was constantly undersupplied and under strength and nearly won.

hank


Considering what Churchill said in 1942 about Rommel.

"We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general. - Winston Churchill.

Is the purpose of this thread to Insult Generals who are no longer around?


thank you for your answers! but can someone give me a general overview of how the north african campaign was doomed to the axis from the beginning? How did the Brits outgun the Germans despite having their mainland bombed / severely damaged by the luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain? Was it the incompetence of the Italian military?

Im currently reading the book "Rommel" published in its 5th or 6th edition in the 1950's, it was written immediately after the war. As what has been said above Rommel was a genius of his time, he invented retreads, fought battles where his ability to get new men, equipment and supplies was limited and at one point, was nearly captured, but when the british paused for a moment, he escaped. He led from the front, and was admired by his men.

Perhaps you should read this book as a start. He had a few flaws in terms of normal leadership i.e. actually leading from the front, but as with all humans, they have flaws. He spent 10 years as a captain before the war, then made field marshal over the next 10. His death at the hands of the Nazis was disgraceful. Im too tired to quote from the book.

The book i have is here.... and is written by Brigadier Desmond Young who fought against Rommel

http://www.amazon.com/Rommel-Desert-Fox-Desmond-Young/dp/0688067719

[johanness]

Rommel was not the big cheese in North Africa, he was answerable to:-

Albert Kesselring

Thus was restricted in what he could and could not do, with regards men, material, and campaign.

Connaught Ranger

The qustion was if GF Rommel was a a tactical or strategical General.
And for sure,he was a tactical leader,not a strategical.
That's why Kesselring was his chief,

Te pup,pa.

[Abaddon]

He had a few flaws in terms of normal leadership i.e. actually leading from the front

To be fair, all of Germany's 'great' Generals led from the front. It was SOP and, according to Guderian, 'necessary', for a variety of reasons.

The proper quote is either in Panzer Leader or Achtung Panzer or both, it will take me some time to find it though.

[Roldwin]

Had the germans taken Malta, the african campaign would have been very different, since the island played an important strategic role. By difficulting the supplying and the reinforcement, Rommel always played under disadvantage against the better supplied and reinforced Commonwealth forces.

Refusing in taking Malta probed to be a critical strategic mistake, probably one of the most remarkable mistakes the germans did during the North African campaign.

[Alexandr]

North Africa and Russian campains both was crusial mistakes,no matter how genial can be field commander,goals that was declared by Hilter was no able to achieve non in Africa/ME,non in Russia.
They should at least establish regime in whole Europe (not counting UK),and preparing to battle with UK/Russia.
It could take 10-20 years to build proper Empire in concured European land,BEFORE Reich was able to move further wihout lack of numan,material resorces and logistic problems.
Al that Total Bliztskrieg theory was total madness.

[LineDoggie]

Inadequate supplies
Enigma Compromised(Major cause of above)
Poor quality of Co-Belligerant Armor
Inabiltity to maintain Air Supremecy
"Fuhrer" Orders to not tactically withdraw from untenable lines
Interference from Commando Supremo
But Yeah, Lets put it all on Rommel

[Lokos]

But Yeah, Lets put it all on Rommel

Put what on Rommel? I don't think anyone has questioned his ability to lead on a divisional level. However, he was certainly no Manstein, operationally. Strategically, his ability becomes even more irrelevant. He was a very good tactical leader.

L.

[ronnieraygun]

"Rommel, you stupid son of a bitch, I read your book!"


-Couldn't resist.

[Roldwin]

In my opinion, people here tend to get confused with different military terms...

There are three levels of conductions of the war:


Strategical level --> Is the level in wich the national objectives are fixed, and national resources are developed and used (war effort) in order to reach these strategic objectives.
Operational level --> Is the military level in which campaigns and major military operations, are planned, leaded and maintained in order to reach the strategical targets within the theater of operations. It links the strategical and the tactical levels by establishing a series of operational objectives that are required in order to reach the strategic ones
Tactical level --> Is the level in which combats are planned and executed in order to reach the military objectives assigned to the diffeent tactical elements
I'll give you an example of three differents objectives (Strategical, Operational and Tactival) during the North African Campaign

The control of the mediterranean would be a major Strategical objective.

Controlling the different mediterranean access like Gibraltar strait and the Suez Channel, and the different major ports and cities like Port Said, El Cairo, Gibraltar, Tobruk, Malta, etc... is the meaning of reaching this major Strategical objective. Therefore, those are Operational objectives.

El Adem - Bardia road juction, Alam Halfa ridge, Kasserine pass, etc.. would be tactical objectives, and the reaching of a succesion of different connected and coordined tactical objectives, in a simultaneous or alternative form, will lead to the reaching of the operational objectives.


According to this, Rommel, as an Army Corps leader, and later as an Army leader, could do little in the strategical planning, since this level was an OKH and OKW competence.

So when you ask if Rommel was an strategic idiot, my answer is "No, he wasn't, because he had no authority in the planning at strategic level (with all the elements that it involves, such resources, major logistic planning, war effort, joint and combined warfare, etc...)"

Rommel was an skillful operational leader, maybe the best tactical an operational leader. There are a lot of examples of this, and if it failed in the North African theater, it was not due to his lack of capabilities. Yes, he commited several mistakes, but who didn't ??

Sorry for my english, I know it's not good at all, and I would have liked to be much more clearer explaining the differences betwen the three leves of conduction. I hope you can talk properly next time ;)

[Zoomie]

Is the purpose of this thread to Insult Generals who are no longer around?
No, I think it's for us to write his paper for him.

[filochard]

thank you for your answers! but can someone give me a general overview of how the north african campaign was doomed to the axis from the beginning? How did the Brits outgun the Germans despite having their mainland bombed / severely damaged by the luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain? Was it the incompetence of the Italian military?

One word: Malta. The RAF heroes of Malta used to sink more than half the supplies sent to North Africa and the Germans never mobilized the ressources needed to invade Malta.
One often forget that the Germans lost as many men in Tunisia as in Stalingrad without much resistance I must say but Rommel wasn't there anymore.

[Lokos]

One often forget that the Germans lost as many men in Tunisia as in Stalingrad without much resistance

Well, that's a blatant lie, unless by 'Germans' you mean 'Axis'.

They lost 8,500 KIA in the Tunisian campaign, and ~101,000 as prisoners of war.

The Stalingrad campaign witnessed the destruction of elements of German 4th Pz Armee and the vast majority of the 6th Armee - 147,000 dead and 91,000 prisoners of war. This does not take into account losses accrued by forces attempting to break the encirclement (including 48th Pz Korps and 57th Pz Korps), or the Italian/Romanian/Hungarian forces swept up during the momentous swing of the initial offensive and its aftermath. Which included nearly the entirety of the Italian Eighth Army in the Little Saturn offensive, and nearly saw German 2nd Army encircled. Substantial Hungarian forces (2nd Hun. Army) were also liquidated in the process.

Accounting for losses of combatants at Stalingrad, we usually see half a million permanent Soviet casualties being bandied around. This is correct, insofar as that figure includes both the defensive campaign (July-November) and the offensive campaign (November-February), which encapsulate losses sustained during Operation Blau (including fighting in the city itself), and Saturn, Little Saturn and Uranus. The relevant figure for the Germans, however, only ever seems to count losses sustained inside the Kessel during the fighting (those of the 6th Armee and the present Korps of the 4th Pz Armee, and associated satellite forces).

Please, do not try to equivocate, in this case. In Tunisia the Germans lost two panzer and two light divisions, and a para brigade, if I recall correctly. At Stalingrad, ~20 divisions were removed from the Wehrmacht's order of battle, without taking into account satellite forces.

L.

[TheDesertFox]

In fact Brits outgun the Germans, because they concentrate most of theirs ground forces of this theater of war-some writers note this as mistake of Churchil. They left much lesser number of troops at Singpoure- for example, which is much more vital.
In general this theater of war is not so important for Germany, as it is for GB.
P.S. And Malta is really important here.
P.S.2. The German lost many soldiers there, but not so many as in Stalingrad (In Stalingrad- more than 330 000 troops under Paulus, in Tunisia- between 180 000 and 250 000).
P.S.3. Sorry if my English is not good enough.

[filochard]

Well, that's a blatant lie, unless by 'Germans' you mean 'Axis'.

They lost 8,500 KIA in the Tunisian campaign, and ~101,000 as prisoners of war.

The Stalingrad campaign witnessed the destruction of elements of German 4th Pz Armee and the vast majority of the 6th Armee - 147,000 dead and 91,000 prisoners of war. This does not take into account losses accrued by forces attempting to break the encirclement (including 48th Pz Korps and 57th Pz Korps), or the Italian/Romanian/Hungarian forces swept up during the momentous swing of the initial offensive and its aftermath. Which included nearly the entirety of the Italian Eighth Army in the Little Saturn offensive, and nearly saw German 2nd Army encircled. Substantial Hungarian forces (2nd Hun. Army) were also liquidated in the process.

Accounting for losses of combatants at Stalingrad, we usually see half a million permanent Soviet casualties being bandied around. This is correct, insofar as that figure includes both the defensive campaign (July-November) and the offensive campaign (November-February), which encapsulate losses sustained during Operation Blau (including fighting in the city itself), and Saturn, Little Saturn and Uranus. The relevant figure for the Germans, however, only ever seems to count losses sustained inside the Kessel during the fighting (those of the 6th Armee and the present Korps of the 4th Pz Armee, and associated satellite forces).

Please, do not try to equivocate, in this case. In Tunisia the Germans lost two panzer and two light divisions, and a para brigade, if I recall correctly. At Stalingrad, ~20 divisions were removed from the Wehrmacht's order of battle, without taking into account satellite forces.

L.

KIA or POW doesn't make difference military speaking: they are both out of combat.
I was speaking of the last round when the German armies surrendered.
You are right to point out that Stalingrad was in an other league than the Tunisian campaign though.

[Crassus]

Rommel had better strategic understanding when he was depressed. As you can read from von Luck´s memoirs,Rommel understood after defeat at El Alamein and Allied landings in French North Africa that North Africa was a lost cause. He wanted to do a staged withdraw to Sicily and by that saving his troops for another day.
IMO Hitler and Kesselring understood (strategical) situation better, after Africa, Italy would bail out, so in that sense hopeless fight in Tunisia made sense.

Eastern Front was the key to success for Nazi-Germany and that was Rommel´s fatal lapse of judgment during the height of his victories - he forgot the original mission of Afrika-Korps.

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

Morsehead had his number in Tobruk.

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

http://www.awm.gov.au/people/269.asp

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leslie_Morshead

[muck]

Who are we to discuss on that? I for my part have not fought any battle in the role of a commander.
All I have to say is that historians agree to disagree about Rommels skills.

[el borracho]

It was never in Hitler's grand design to hold North Africa for Germany. That was supposed to be the job of the Italians, and to a much lesser extent the Vichy French forces. Once North Africa was secure, theoretically Germany could link up with sympathizers in the Middle East and threaten Russia from the south and possibly invade India to smash the British forces there to open the way for Japan to push further into Asia. Once the invasion of Britain was put on hold Germany turned it's attention to the south and east, but in North Africa's case it was too little, too late to stop the Allied tide that would eventually close in from both sides.

The generals of both sides knew that North Africa was a diversion and Rommel performed fantastically with the resources he was given. For another brilliant display of German generalship in Africa, read up on Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck from the first world war. With a meager amount of forces and supplies, he led the Allies on a goose chase while attacking forces in the Belgian Congo, British East Africa, Rhodesia, and Portuguese Mozambique. His name would be right up there with Rommel's except that he had a falling out with the Nazi party during Hitler's rise to power, and was subsequently erased from the German history books.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Emil_von_Lettow-Vorbeck

[Lokos]

I was speaking of the last round when the German armies surrendered.

So was I. Those are losses in the Kessel, as I explained. 147,000 + 91,000 = 238,000.

101,000 + 8,500 = 109,500.

That's more than twice as many permanent losses, which doesn't go well with the statement that the Germans lost the same number of men in Tunisia as they did in Stalingrad...

L.

[Lokos]

I may have misinterpreted what you were saying. If you meant that you were talking about losses at the moment of surrender, respectively, then you were correct.

L.

[Billy No Mates]

Had the germans taken Malta, the african campaign would have been very different, since the island played an important strategic role. By difficulting the supplying and the reinforcement, Rommel always played under disadvantage against the better supplied and reinforced Commonwealth forces.

Refusing in taking Malta probed to be a critical strategic mistake, probably one of the most remarkable mistakes the germans did during the North African campaign.

The Axis had a chicken and egg situation with Malta,the Germans were inclined to try and render it irrelevant by sucess on the ground in North Africa where victory against the Commonwealth forces seemed tantalisingly close so why divert scant resources against such a tough nut?,especially as on several occasions the Islands appeared to have been neutralized by air and naval attacks .

[Roldwin]

I agree with you. Did you notice that when Malta was strong, the Axis forces in North Africa were weak, and when Malta was weak, the Axis forces were strong ??

I can't find any table showing the Axis monthly total tonnage income to relate it with the monthly raids over malta. Any help, Amigo ??

[hank]

Im currently reading the book "Rommel" published in its 5th or 6th edition in the 1950's, it was written immediately after the war. As what has been said above Rommel was a genius of his time, he invented retreads, fought battles where his ability to get new men, equipment and supplies was limited and at one point, was nearly captured, but when the british paused for a moment, he escaped. He led from the front, and was admired by his men.

Perhaps you should read this book as a start. He had a few flaws in terms of normal leadership i.e. actually leading from the front, but as with all humans, they have flaws. He spent 10 years as a captain before the war, then made field marshal over the next 10. His death at the hands of the Nazis was disgraceful. Im too tired to quote from the book.

The book i have is here.... and is written by Brigadier Desmond Young who fought against Rommel

http://www.amazon.com/Rommel-Desert-Fox-Desmond-Young/dp/0688067719

I saw a program one time about this (I think it was produced by the BBC). They had several junior staff officers who said essentially what you are saying. Late in the campaign (relative to when Rommel left) he was suffering from depression and was very absent. So I don't dispute that. My point was that when he started in NA and largely based on his work in France, his troops thought him to be invincible. When he was leading from the front at those times he greatly inspired those men to do more than they should have. But overall you are right. Later during his time in NA I think its indisputable that he had lost his touch a little bit. So that's a good point.

hank

[AROUETLJ]

Crikey. So Malta basically saved North Africa, which saved the Middle East, which saved India, and therefore it saved the world.

I guess we deserved that George Cross after all.

Why the Italians or the Germans decided not to invade Malta is one of the 20th century's historical mysteries. Had the Italians invaded in 1940, when there was bugger all in terms of defences, they'd have taken it.

I suspect the answer might lie hidden in the political machinations of the time, rather than military strategy. Right up to 1940, Britain was still considering the possibility of going to war against France in the Mediterranean, with Italy on their side.

[Billy No Mates]

I suspect the answer might lie hidden in the political machinations of the time, rather than military strategy. Right up to 1940, Britain was still considering the possibility of going to war against France in the Mediterranean, with Italy on their side.

Is there any evidence of this?,it sounds incredibly unlikely to me,but im always open to persuasion but i always thought we were rather relying on the French Navy and their excellent fleet to really hold the Med for the Allies .

I would of thought Malta would be quite a hard place to force a large scale amphibious landing the coast is pretty rugged and even a scratch force with a modicum of time to prepare itself could make it extremely difficult for any would be attackers .

The Italians were always keener than the Germans on taking Malta i believe the Folgore division were ear marked for a strike against Malta that fortunately never came .

[Roldwin]

Crikey. So Malta basically saved North Africa, which saved the Middle East, which saved India, and therefore it saved the world.

I guess we deserved that George Cross after all.

Why the Italians or the Germans decided not to invade Malta is one of the 20th century's historical mysteries. Had the Italians invaded in 1940, when there was bugger all in terms of defences, they'd have taken it.

I suspect the answer might lie hidden in the political machinations of the time, rather than military strategy. Right up to 1940, Britain was still considering the possibility of going to war against France in the Mediterranean, with Italy on their side.



I think that it's much more complicated.

Hitler was afraid of an airborne operation over Malta after the Cretan adventure, where the germans sufered heavy losses, and etc, etc etc...

[AROUETLJ]

I think that it's much more complicated.

Hitler was afraid of an airborne operation over Malta after the Cretan adventure, where the germans sufered heavy losses, and etc, etc etc...


Indeed. I've seen the copy of the Italian report where they decided not to invade. However, it's a tiny island compared to Crete (just 316 sq km), and in 1940 there were only about six infantry battalions defending the island.

[Mastermind]

Assessing German Generals of WWII is one of the most difficult things in war history.

When working over the performance of any Divisional and even Battalion commander under Hitler, we have to remember the problems they had on a daily basis dealing with Hitler and High Command orders. Even Submarine commanders were at a loss to perform to their highest levels of performance and duty due to insane and even rediculous interferrences from High command.

As for Rommel, I have done more than a small amount of reading, including Von Mellinthin's works. I can find some faults with Rommel. But, his faults are greatly outstripped by his assets. He led from the front in a modern war. That is almost unheard of. A great deal of his success was due to his first hand intelligence gathering. Also, he had the advantage of a man leading relativly small force sizes on a relatively small field of battle (regarding North Africa). The battlefield, quite often was highly restricted, leaving Rommel choices that on other fields would have been highly fluid and forcing commanders to gamble more or to make movements by diversion and guessing. Rommel was able to move his forces like chess pieces while his opponents were much less able to make decisions. In the end, in my opinion, North Africa was unwinnable by any commander since it ultimately became a material war. Rommels just ran out of supplies and replacement until he was eventually faced with a dire observation before him. He could see the end was predictable....probably after Tobruk and possible even before Tobruk.

Let us not forget that after the US landed in North Africa, things were pretty much in the mop-up phase by the Allies. I know that sounds crass and belittling of the allied effort at that time. But, in reality, the German time was up probalby by 15 june 1942. I cite Rommel's attributed line to von Luck after Hitler had given Rommel his Fieldmarshall status after the capture of Tobruk, "I wish he had given me another division instead."

By the time Alexander and Montgomery had taken over the Allied effort, Rommel knew the jib was up. He was essentially cut off from practical resupply by the Britich success in the Mediterranian especially the British subs and Ac destroying just about every resupply convoy while in the few months leading up to 2nd El Alamein the Allies had received more than 100 thousand tons. Rommels forces were ustterly exhausted, his supplies were non-existant and the end, as I say, was predictable.

Rommel had requested the need to retreat early in October...but by the time Hitler authorized it, it was far too late...by 5 Novemeber when the retreat managed to start...Rommel himself was lucky to escape.

Rommel held on with some daring rear guard actions, but time and space ran out. By March of '43 he was relieved and shipped home.

But, he was hardly welcome. Aside from some limited propaganda parties, he was a general of a defeated army and, in Hitler's eyes, a disgrace to the great plan. Only by slowly rehabilitating Rommel by placing him in command in Greece (a back water at the time) was Kesslering able to bring him to France and the defense of the west wall.

Of course, we all know the result by 7/44 and Romels end.

In the bottom line, Rommel was good...very good. But, not by larger scale combat ala the vast Eastern Front conflicts. I doubt Rommel would have had any better succes than say, for example, Paulus at Stalingrad or Guderian or von Bock in the vicintiy of Moscow....nor would they have had better success than Rommel did in North Africa.

Considring his high commander was really one of the best weapons Rommel's opponents had, I must admire Rommel for his daring, elan, honor, persistence in the face of overwheling odds, and great intelligence. He was not, though, in relation to many other great generals, in a classification of great. Good, yes.

[angry cow]

/\ Good Points

As they say:

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics."
- Gen. Omar Bradley

German industry, for all its might, simply could not support a three continent war effort.

[Winger]

Rommel simply did the most with what he had. IMO, he did more with what he had in North Africa than any other General of the Reich could have.

[Mastermind]

^Possibly...hell, likely you are right. But, for small unit tactics (comparatively speaking, of course) he was hard to beat. Without the massive injection of supplies from the USA, and Brit homeland, and the Allied successes blockading the German resupply efforts, Monte would have never beaten the man. IMHO, naturally.

[OldRecon]

Rommel never had a chance in North Africa from a logistical standpoint. The fact that he did anything shows he was a great filed general. He was constantly undersupplied and under strength and nearly won.

hank

The Axis in fact, despite Royal Navy and RAF on Malta, managed to get more than enough supplies over to Tripolis by sea to be able to win the campaign in North Africa, if only they had the logistical means to transport the supplies from Tripolis to the front.
Fortunately they didn't, being plagued with a deficit in trucks throughout the whole campaign.
Some of the SAS airfield raids must also have hurt quite a bit in that regard too, as I understand many of the aircraft they destroyed during airfield raids were Ju 52's.

[Mastermind]

^I have to respectfully disagree. Supply is what won it and lack of supplies for the losing Germans. Rommel would have put the supplies forward if he had had them...yes, they had a shortage of vehicles, but not an insurmountable problem, since they also had loads of captured equipment.....but in the end, it was lack of fuel to keep them going that ended it. There simply was no way the Axis could hope to compete by late 1942.

[OldRecon]

^I have to respectfully disagree. Supply is what won it and lack of supplies for the losing Germans. Rommel would have put the supplies forward if he had had them...yes, they had a shortage of vehicles, but not an insurmountable problem, since they also had loads of captured equipment.....but in the end, it was lack of fuel to keep them going that ended it. There simply was no way the Axis could hope to compete by late 1942.

It's estimated that Rommel's forces needed 50.000-70.000 tons of supplies per month (including from 15.000-20.000 tons of water) during the period from February 1941 to August 1942, giving a total amount of needed supplies for the whole period of 1.170.000 tons.
If we subtract the needed amount of water from this total, as water could be produced from local sources in North Africa, that means the Axis forces would need 850.000 tons of supplies from sources outside of North Africa.

During the same period 1.600.000 tons of supplies left Italy by sea, 220.000 tons of which were lost at sea, which roughly estimated means that 1.380.000 arrived at port of destination.
From this amount one furthermore will have to subtract 173.000 tons destined for the Italian civilian population in Libya, as well as 200.000 of pure military equipment (vehicles, tanks, artillery etc).
Thus Rommel's forces were left with around 1.000.000 tons of supplies of POL, ammo, food etc., which given that he only needed 850.000 tons of supplies means that they should in fact be left with a 20% surplus or so as received in ports under Axis control in North Africa.

At the time the Wermacht OKH estimated that one would need 1.170 standard 2-tonne trucks on a daily basis to move 350 tons of supplies overland over a distance of 45 metrical miles.
The Axis forces in North-Africa from what I understand had on average about 10.000 trucks at their disposal during the given period. Though at one point at the end of 1941 Rommel made a request that was turned down for 8.000 new trucks to compensate for losses.

[jackehammond]

Folks

The failure to launch the campaign to take Malta doomed Rommel. Also, the fact that the British were reading his mail didn't help any also.

Jack E. Hammond

.

[OldRecon]

Folks

The failure to launch the campaign to take Malta doomed Rommel. Also, the fact that the British were reading his mail didn't help any also.

Jack E. Hammond

.

Well, that's the common perception.
But if the Axis managed to get enough supplies into North African ports by sea, despite Malta, yet lacked the means of getting those supplies from those ports to the front in the required ammounts, then the fatal bottleneck must be somewhere else :roll:.
The sealanes to Africa wasn't finaly closed to the Axis until before the endgame in Tunisia in '43.
Thus though the Italians lost most of the "big shows" in the Med, like the battle of Cape Matapan, it still appears to have been able to get enough supplies across the Med.

A good study on 8th army logistics during the advance from El Alamein to Tunisia would be most interesting as a comparison.

[epictetus]

Rommel was a genius. And he lost because he wan't able to supply his army. Hitler did not understand the importance of controling north Afrika, which would have meant the control of the Middle East oil. Malta made sure that the port on Tobruk could not be used for the convoys, which unloaded in Tripoli. And that didn't really helped since the front was east of Tobruk. With 2 panzer div and the 90th light he almost destroyed the 8th army. Had Aunchilek not taken control and ordered the army back, Rommel would have won. It was as close as that. That was the decisive point in North Afrika. Rommel had a vision of attacking Russia in the south, closing off their blood line to the US. Had he been given al those div who were static in Europe, he might have. He was both a tactical genius and a strategic one. To claim otherwise is folly

[Mastermind]

I guess, since Rommel never achieved any strategic successes, we'll never know. He was smart, courageous and well disciplined. Any general with these three attributes will have a success or two on the battlefield. I deeply respect Rommel and his history. But, history has left him short for us. Could he have been a Lee or a Wellington, or a von Manstein or a Cherevichenko or Zhukov ? Possibly. I personally believe it is likely. But, the fact is, histroy did not see fit to shine on rommel that way...so we can deny declaring Rommel his position of such greatness without folly....to place him higher than he earned is just speculative armchairing.

[hank]

The Axis in fact, despite Royal Navy and RAF on Malta, managed to get more than enough supplies over to Tripolis by sea to be able to win the campaign in North Africa, if only they had the logistical means to transport the supplies from Tripolis to the front.
Fortunately they didn't, being plagued with a deficit in trucks throughout the whole campaign.
Some of the SAS airfield raids must also have hurt quite a bit in that regard too, as I understand many of the aircraft they destroyed during airfield raids were Ju 52's.

I just have to disagree as well. Read the history of the AK. There were days when the whole AK had less than 50 tanks operational (often substantially less than that). You can never win in that situation trying to occupy North Africa. For many many reasons, logistical problems doomed Rommel.

I also agree with Mastermind. Rommel was a great tactician for sure. But based purely on length or service, etc. someone like Manstein or Zhukov is definitely a better general in almost all respects. Rommel's career was too short-lived to make him an all-time great. Certainly a great general but not one of the all-time greats.

hank

[Hollis]

I just have to disagree as well. Read the history of the AK. There were days when the whole AK had less than 50 tanks operational (often substantially less than that). You can never win in that situation trying to occupy North Africa. For many many reasons, logistical problems doomed Rommel.
.

hank


That is what I always read, logistics killed his NA campaign.

[Ravage]

That is what I always read, logistics killed his NA campaign.

Thats why Rommel had to relly on controling the battle field after the battle. Nothing new to see Germans using captured British AT guns and other equipment.

[epictetus]

I guess, since Rommel never achieved any strategic successes, we'll never know. He was smart, courageous and well disciplined. Any general with these three attributes will have a success or two on the battlefield. I deeply respect Rommel and his history. But, history has left him short for us. Could he have been a Lee or a Wellington, or a von Manstein or a Cherevichenko or Zhukov ? Possibly. I personally believe it is likely. But, the fact is, histroy did not see fit to shine on rommel that way...so we can deny declaring Rommel his position of such greatness without folly....to place him higher than he earned is just speculative armchairing.

I agree, but the evidence is based on his success with the limited resources he had. His 7th panzer did good in france. In Russia, I don't know sometimes I wish he could have been there. On par equipment and logistics, the brits would have never had a chance. But who knows how history could have changed if he would have been able to reach the Black Sea. All in all he was a great general. If Hitler had taken all his advices, the war would have been different. Not the outcome of the war, just the way you got to the end. But you need a diff thread for that

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

I agree, but the evidence is based on his success with the limited resources he had. His 7th panzer did good in france. In Russia, I don't know sometimes I wish he could have been there. On par equipment and logistics, the brits would have never had a chance. But who knows how history could have changed if he would have been able to reach the Black Sea. All in all he was a great general. If Hitler had taken all his advices, the war would have been different. Not the outcome of the war, just the way you got to the end. But you need a diff thread for that

As I said in the previous page. General Morsehead defeated Rommel time and time again. The Australian 9th Division and 18th Brigade of the 7th Division were under siege, had even bigger supply problems then Rommel and had to rely on captured Afrika Corps equipment.

[T3ngu]

As I said in the previous page. General Morsehead defeated Rommel time and time again. The Australian 9th Division and 18th Brigade of the 7th Division were under siege, had even bigger supply problems then Rommel and had to rely on captured Afrika Corps equipment.

To a certain extent yes, but as a general statement, rommel if he had supplies, and manpower, i suspect he would have trumped the brits.

The italians didn't really match up to the german or allied troops.

[ColinP]

I suspect Rommel realized from the start that he had a short window period in which to succeed, the Brits were overstretched everywhere and could not reinforce quickly, so he gambled on a knockout punch, had he been able to capture one side of the canal, the Brits would have been screwed, not being able to take Torbruk screwed him and cost him the advantage he breifly held.

[T3ngu]

I suspect Rommel realized from the start that he had a short window period in which to succeed, the Brits were overstretched everywhere and could not reinforce quickly, so he gambled on a knockout punch, had he been able to capture one side of the canal, the Brits would have been screwed, not being able to take Torbruk screwed him and cost him the advantage he breifly held.

Indeed, he did aim for the knockout punches, but unfortunately on many occasions was unable to follow through.

[ren0312]

In order to reach the Suez, Guderian calculated that the Germans needed to have at least 4 Panzer divisions, Rommel did not have anywhere close to that number.

[ColinP]

As I recall Guderian and Rommel did not see eye to eye on many things. Guderian was more structured in his plans and attacks. Rommel was more like Patton, a rough plan and a close attention to the enemy and battlefield to decide the next move.

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

To a certain extent yes, but as a general statement, rommel if he had supplies, and manpower, i suspect he would have trumped the brits.

The italians didn't really match up to the german or allied troops.

The Commonwealth had nothing until the US production came into play and the USN could help during the Battle of the Atlantic. Especially from the period between the surrender of France and the direct entry of the USA.

For a considerable period the Italian Navy which was the 4th most powerful navy in the world controlled the Med. At the time of Rommels greatest successes. Fact that the Commonwealth defended at any rate is truly remarkable.

Rommel should have defeated the Commonwealth. He had the supplies he had the men, and he was being regularly supplied through the Italian Navy.

As for the Italians being weak troops. Thats not really the case. Far from it. Italians were more often then not just as good as the Allies and German troops. They simply lacked quality leadership. When units fell under the command of German Leadership they battled just as hard as anyone.

The legend of Rommel is largely due to his and for that matter the Commonwealths conduct during the fighting in Africa then for astute tactical prowess.

How Morsehead is largely forgotten for his role compared to Rommel when Rommel had everything he needed to take Tobruk makes you wonder. Especially considering when the roles were reversed and Morsehead smashed Rommel at El Alamain (sp)

[ColinP]

Rommel was also aided (unknowingly) by a US miltary Attache in Cario transmitting the 8th Army order of battle in a code that the Germans had broken, combined with the British poor radio discipline early in the war. I believe one of Monty’s first acts was to tighten up the radio discipline, although I could be wrong on this?

[jackehammond]

Rommel was also aided (unknowingly) by a US miltary Attache in Cario transmitting the 8th Army order of battle in a code that the Germans had broken, combined with the British poor radio discipline early in the war. I believe one of Monty’s first acts was to tighten up the radio discipline, although I could be wrong on this?

Dear Member,

It was the Italians who broke the code by sneaking someone in the embassy in Italy. The rest is a true fact few are aware of. Unfortunately the German's made the same mistake by using their wireless code system to broadcast the information the Italians gave them and the British had broke the German code and new something was up!

Jack E. Hammond

.

[OldRecon]

I just have to disagree as well. Read the history of the AK. There were days when the whole AK had less than 50 tanks operational (often substantially less than that). You can never win in that situation trying to occupy North Africa. For many many reasons, logistical problems doomed Rommel.

I also agree with Mastermind. Rommel was a great tactician for sure. But based purely on length or service, etc. someone like Manstein or Zhukov is definitely a better general in almost all respects. Rommel's career was too short-lived to make him an all-time great. Certainly a great general but not one of the all-time greats.

hank

Well can't quite see what you disagree about.
The transport of supplies by ship from Italy to North Africa was only one part of the logistical chain. Transport of the landed supplies from the North African harbours to the front was another part of that same chain.
The Axis did not have enough trucks or a rail network of appropriate capacity to bring forward supplies from the North African ports to the front in the required amounts! Period! :-|
No wonder Rommel had logistical problems.
At the outset it was newer the intention of Hitler and OKW that Rommel should conquer Egypt, when they sent him and the Afrika corps to Libya to shore up the Italians. Rather all that was hoped of him and the Africa corps was to conduct a dynamic defence on the Libyan soil, using superior mobility and integration of arms to give any British attempts at offensive forays a bloody nose.
Thus they equipped Romel with enough logistical resources so as to be just able conduct that dynamic defence and not to conquer Egypt.
Rommel on the other hand against advice given him acted on his own initiative and fell for the temptation to "swallow his prey whole" once he sensed how tactically superior his forces were compared to their British opponents in the area.
Thus he outrun his supplies in his attempt to swallow the prey.
No doubt a good craftsman he was at the tactical side of the job, but his awareness of the logistical implications of traversing over great distances may perhaps have been not as sharp as his tactical skills.
German officers and soldiers of both ww-1 and ww-2 for some reason or another often appear obsessed with the skill of the individual at the front end. Expressions, of feeling snubbed for loosing these wars, because "as man for man they were better soldiers than their opponents, and thus they should have won the war if not for the "Jewish/communist backstabbers" in ww-1 and the dilletante leadership of "the little corporal" in ww-2", are rather common among German war veterans of the ww's.
The Brits and the Americans however are and can be justifiably proud of their logistical approach to the ww's.

[OldRecon]

In order to reach the Suez, Guderian calculated that the Germans needed to have at least 4 Panzer divisions, Rommel did not have anywhere close to that number.

Well, numercial superiority isn't allways required. The British forces that gave the Italians in North Africa such a beasting before the entry of Rommel, were numercialy inferior to their Italian opponents, yet carried the day largerly through superior mobility and ability to concentrate firepower against immobile opponents landlocked in garrisons like Bardia and Tobruk.
The main point of Rommel's ability to cause a lot of trouble to the British Commonwealth forces opposing him, was again the ability of his forces to gain local superiority through superior mobility and arms integration / concentration of firepower, and not numercial superiority.
True if you combine the numbers of Germans with the numbers of Italian soldiers on North African soil it may not look that bad for the Axis on paper, but as most of the Italians were immobile garrison troops... at the front end the Axis must at no time after the intervention of Rommel have been "that much" nummercialy superior.
If he had been given a logistical tail, able to support the forces he allready had all the way to Egypt, I guess he could well have carried the day without the addition of more combat divisions to his rooster.

[hank]

OldRecon, your saying all the necessary supplies were getting to NA but not to the front. That was certainly true. But the lack of replacement tanks and related materials was not related to a lack of transport lorries. So to that extent I guess we are not in agreement. Rommel never had what he needed to win in NA. Its just that simple.

It sounds like you are saying that the divisions Rommel had were sufficient and supplied and that just doesn't fit with what I've read. The 2 panzer divisions he had (7 and 15th light IIRC) were never fully outfitted even from the outset. To make it worse they never got resupplied with replacements for their losses. It was such a problem that in the worst cases they were combat ineffective. Which it seems to me is distinct from supply-chain problems which were also serious as you've done such a good job of explaining.

hank

[Mastermind]

I am of the same mind on this as Hank. I re-scanned some of my books last night and found nothing regarding the supply situation mentioned above. The fact is, tankers were being sunk faster than the Italians could get them out of port. If there was a shortage of trucks, it was casued by a lack of gasoline to run them. The dynamic of time/supplies would have to be graphed to see the supply-tankers-truk numbers available etc. I came across one picture of the Germans in retreat and it shows hundreds of trucks and other vehicles hell bent across the desert. So, they had some trucks and some gas even in retreat...So, it is a guessing game.

I won't deny the Germans had vehicle shortage and they certainly had fuel shortages. They were very short on operational tanks and used quite a bit of captured allied equipment.

It is remarkable that Rommel did as much as he did with what little he had. But, there comes a time in studying the campaing when you see he loses his sharpness. He was probably exhausted. You can not go on day after day, in those conditions the way he did and not suffer some sort of physical penalty.

I think the best histroy can judge is, he was greatly respected by his troops, his leaders and his enemies for his command of his craft. He was a fantastic tactician.

[hank]

MM is right. Its well-documented that late in his involvement in NA he was severely depressed and was not the ultimate decision-maker on a great many issues.

hank

[OldRecon]

Rommel was a genius. And he lost because he wan't able to supply his army. Hitler did not understand the importance of controling north Afrika, which would have meant the control of the Middle East oil. Malta made sure that the port on Tobruk could not be used for the convoys, which unloaded in Tripoli. And that didn't really helped since the front was east of Tobruk. With 2 panzer div and the 90th light he almost destroyed the 8th army. Had Aunchilek not taken control and ordered the army back, Rommel would have won. It was as close as that. That was the decisive point in North Afrika. Rommel had a vision of attacking Russia in the south, closing off their blood line to the US. Had he been given al those div who were static in Europe, he might have. He was both a tactical genius and a strategic one. To claim otherwise is folly

Well if you take a look at the map you'll observe that RAF bases in Egypt lies closer to Tobruk than RAF bases in Malta, and that in fact Tripolis lies closer to Malta than Tobruk :).

[OldRecon]

OldRecon, your saying all the necessary supplies were getting to NA but not to the front. That was certainly true. But the lack of replacement tanks and related materials was not related to a lack of transport lorries. So to that extent I guess we are not in agreement. Rommel never had what he needed to win in NA. Its just that simple.

It sounds like you are saying that the divisions Rommel had were sufficient and supplied and that just doesn't fit with what I've read. The 2 panzer divisions he had (7 and 15th light IIRC) were never fully outfitted even from the outset. To make it worse they never got resupplied with replacements for their losses. It was such a problem that in the worst cases they were combat ineffective. Which it seems to me is distinct from supply-chain problems which were also serious as you've done such a good job of explaining.

hank

Up to El Alamein, when sufficiently supplied with ammo and POL to conduct manouvre battle, Rommel consistently gave the British a bloody nose with what forces he had.
In large part I guess thanks to superior training/tactical doctrine and arms integration of the German forces, in combination with slightly superior tanks, artillery (the 88 mm AA/AT gun in particular) and fighter aircraft (ME-109 and Macchi 202 vs. Hawker Hurricanes and Curtis Kittyhawks/Warhawks).
With supplies of 6 pounder A/T guns, American Grant and Sherman tanks, 5.5 inch howitzers, and Spitfire fighters arriving during 1942, evening out the British weaponry quality deficit of 1941 vs. the German forces, along with increased British/Commonwealth troop levels, I'll guess the assumption that Rommel's forces were too small is a correct one.
But with a proper logistical tail in place during 1941, when the Germans enjoyed both a tactical and technological advantage, I guess he could well have beaten the British in a conclusive fashion.
That the British for instance didn't get a worse beasting during their Battleaxe and Crusader offensives, in large part stemmed from Axis logistical problems that impaired the mobility of their forces.
Also At Alamein the British were able to anchor their defence on a "secure" flank inland, in the form of the Quattara depression (though according to the estimates of some LRDG men advances of large military formations through the depression was a quite possible undertaking).
Again the worst deficit for the Germans during the Alamein battles were lack of POL hampering their ability to manouvre and counterattack and not the lack of weaponry.
Paradoxialy when Axis forces were plagued with critical supply shortages at El Alamein the stores in Tripolis were quite full (and why should that be so?).
And yes the Italian navy suffered from POL shortages during the war, yet the Axis were still able to ensure the shipment of 2 Italian infantry divisions and 3 German divisions (10th panzer included) to Tunisia as late as November of 1942 in answer to the Allied Torch landings.

[ColinP]

An interesting article I read somewhere, is that the British lost 20% of the fuel sent to N/A due to spillage. Which means 1 in 5 tankers making it through was wasted. I have used the standard Brit fuelcan (my friend owned a Daimler scout car) it truly was a useless item compared to the jerrican. The brits also issued a collapsible funnel to reduce spillage.

[OldRecon]

An interesting article I read somewhere, is that the British lost 20% of the fuel sent to N/A due to spillage. Which means 1 in 5 tankers making it through was wasted. I have used the standard Brit fuelcan (my friend owned a Daimler scout car) it truly was a useless item compared to the jerrican. The brits also issued a collapsible funnel to reduce spillage.

That one I'll fully agree with.
From when I was a little kid in the very early 1970 I remember they used to sell turpentine or white spirit in paint shops in tins similar to the pre jerrycan British petrol cans.
Flimsy things!
It wouldn surprise me if some of the jerrycans we used when I was in the army during the 1980's were of WW-2 wintage, as at least some of the cans had the german pattern of "stiffening grooves" on each flat side (i.e. a square shaped inward groowe in the middle, with four straigth lined inward grooves radiating diagonaly outwards from each corner of the central square groove), rather than the X-shaped grooves on Allied jerrycans.
And yet they still stood up to some quite rought threatment.
That the jerrycan shape is still mimicked in cans completely made of plastic, I guess says something of the status/quality of the original metal outer shell plastic liner jerry can.

[epictetus]

Well if you take a look at the map you'll observe that RAF bases in Egypt lies closer to Tobruk than RAF bases in Malta, and that in fact Tripolis lies closer to Malta than Tobruk :).

The trip from Italy to tripoli is wayyyyy shorter!
That's not what I meant. Most transports were sunk on route. Without Malta, a night unload would have made it diff for those RAF planes in Egypt do do any great damage.
In related news, the italians were not bad soldiers. They just had bad leaders and ****ty equipment. Even so, Ariete performed quite well throughout the war. German panzers in the beginning were not as good as people thought. PzrIII with the 37mm and Pzr IV with low velocity 75mm sucked against the Matilda II. PIII with 50mm and PIV with long barrel 75mm were good, but by that time the brits had the Grant, so it was a wash really. Malta was the key to Rommels defeat. Although you can argue that after Tobruk he should have allowed for the occupation of Malta rather than charge ahead after the 8th army. Being an armchair general is really hard!!!:-(

[7SAI Bn]

Pity for Rommel that he and others had a mad meglomaniac interfering in operations and planning.I believe not his fault.Monty was dumber by far comparred to Rommel

[ColinP]

Monty was methodical to a fault sometimes. He also didn't allow himself to be bullied into acting before he was ready.

[Eoin666]

Monty was methodical to a fault sometimes. He also didn't allow himself to be bullied into acting before he was ready.

Indeed, surely securing your logistics, building up your forces and attempting to minimise your own casualties is as much "good generalship" as Rommel's flair and "leading from the front" how that makes someone "dumber" I don't quite know. Montgomery didn't take any of Churchill's constant demands to attack, attack, attack....until he himself was ready, Mongomery was the right commander at the right time in N.Africa. He was also a great admirer of Rommel hanging his portrait in his own mobile HQ, in fact wasn't it he who coined the term Desert Fox??

[Roldwin]

Well, actually, was Auchinleck who stopped Rommel in El-Alamein during the first El-Alamein battle. (the right commander in the right time...)

The second battle began on October the 23rd, and it was just attrition battle, where Montgomery succeed in concentrating and launching a superior army against a less numerous and poorly equipped army, but failed in achieving a major victory, allowing Rommel to retreat from his possitions on November the 4th

[Roldwin]

Oh, and this Montgomery's excess of caution was a constant he showed during the rest of the war, like in Sicilia and the subsequent lauching in Reggio Calabria, where there were almost no opposition from the german army, and the link up with Clarck's Vth Army was of an exasperating slowness

[Eoin666]

Oh, and this Montgomery's excess of caution was a constant he showed during the rest of the war, like in Sicilia and the subsequent lauching in Reggio Calabria, where there were almost no opposition from the german army, and the link up with Clarck's Vth Army was of an exasperating slowness


Well, actually, was Auchinleck who stopped Rommel in El-Alamein during the first El-Alamein battle. (the right commander in the right time...)

The second battle began on October the 23rd, and it was just attrition battle, where Montgomery succeed in concentrating and launching a superior army against a less numerous and poorly equipped army, but failed in achieving a major victory, allowing Rommel to retreat from his possitions on November the 4th

Wasn't it Montgomery who stopped Rommel at Alam Halfa after the 1st El Alamein, when Rommel had to attack prepared defences just as Mongomery would a few months later? It was surely a bit hard to avoid an attritional battle at Alamein with no room for flanking manoeuvres reslting in a head on clash through extensive minefields and defences.

The war in N.Africa had gone back and forwards for years with no decisive victory, one side chasing the other until their logistics ran out, he stabilised his situation and reorganised his forces.

The less said about Clarke the better, with his glory-seeking march into Rome but that's another topic :)

[ColinP]

I have read that British commanders still felt the weight of causalities from WWI and had no desire to repeat them and this was a factor in Monty’s caution, any thoughts on this?

[TheDesertFox]

I have read that British commanders still felt the weight of causalities from WWI and had no desire to repeat them and this was a factor in Monty’s caution, any thoughts on this?

Yep. And Market Garden is just a myth?
P.S. Rommel fought not only in North Africa, but in France as commander of the Ghost Division- one of the best. He also fought in Italy in WWI- he have Pour le Mérite from there. If someone have more info- it will be great to share it with us.

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

I have read that British commanders still felt the weight of causalities from WWI and had no desire to repeat them and this was a factor in Monty’s caution, any thoughts on this?

Well of course that would have been a factor. You don't lose however many men it was in a day and not kicked in the nuts .

[Roldwin]

Wasn't it Montgomery who stopped Rommel at Alam Halfa after the 1st El Alamein, when Rommel had to attack prepared defences just as Mongomery would a few months later? It was surely a bit hard to avoid an attritional battle at Alamein with no room for flanking manoeuvres reslting in a head on clash through extensive minefields and defences.

The war in N.Africa had gone back and forwards for years with no decisive victory, one side chasing the other until their logistics ran out, he stabilised his situation and reorganised his forces.

The less said about Clarke the better, with his glory-seeking march into Rome but that's another topic :)

maybe Monty got all the credit, while, in fact, he just implementated the defence plan designed by Auchinleck, who decided where the battle was to be fought.

[Billy No Mates]

maybe Monty got all the credit, while, in fact, he just implementated the defence plan designed by Auchinleck, who decided where the battle was to be fought.

Monty wasn't a bad general he was however lucky (itself a useful attribute i suppose) lucky to have got the job at all due to 'Strafer' Gott's death who was due to get the post and lucky to have got it when the material available to the Allies was improving both in quantity and quality .
He was the best British commander in the desert since the unsung Wavell who if he hadnt of been mucked about was probably about to remove the Axis from North Africa altogether so we might not have heard to much about Rommel .

[Dercius]

Had the germans taken Malta, the african campaign would have been very different, since the island played an important strategic role. By difficulting the supplying and the reinforcement, Rommel always played under disadvantage against the better supplied and reinforced Commonwealth forces.

Refusing in taking Malta probed to be a critical strategic mistake, probably one of the most remarkable mistakes the germans did during the North African campaign.

X2

Malta was always the key issue during the north african campaign, and should have been key objective number 1 for both Italian and German Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. It was a knife pointing to the neck of axis forces in africa, and at the end it did its job.

Rommel did a great job, I dont know if a different approach could have been done, something like the sort of campaign Kesselring carried in Italy. For sure not in Libya nor Egypt, as far as I know there were just two good bottle necks were deffensive actions could work out El Alamein-Qattara area, and Halfaya pass( but this last one could be bypassed). Tunisia was a different bussiness, plenty of bottlenecks and perfect terrain for defensive and delay actions. But when fighting took place in Tunis, the experienced forces of the german DAK and the italian crack units Littorio, Ariete, Folgore,etc.... were already gone wasted in the attacks at the british lines at El Alamein and on the retreat after the defeat of El Alamein.

Dont know if Rommel´s was the best approach to the situation there, but using his own words "A plan with a chance of success, a try on", well, at least he tried, and in my opinion he tried his best.

[Dercius]

Yep. And Market Garden is just a myth?
P.S. Rommel fought not only in North Africa, but in France as commander of the Ghost Division- one of the best. He also fought in Italy in WWI- he have Pour le Mérite from there. If someone have more info- it will be great to share it with us.

Yes, thats true. Rommel was awarded the Pour le Merite during WWI. He was a daring and extremely brilliant captain in a german gebirgsjager division operating in the Italian front. With 250 gebirgsjager he occupied a key possition allowing other troops to complete the capture of 9000 italian soldiers during the initial stages of the battle of Capporetto and the Tagliamento river crossing. An operation that was almost the obliteration of Italian armed forces (more than 275000 italian soldiers were captured, more than 2500 artillery guns and tons of supplies were captured while german and austrians suffered 20000 casualties. The front line was pushed more than 120 km and at the end of the offensive, german and austrian troops were on the river piave, at the gates of treviso and venice, and british and french troops aswell as any italian unit available were rushed to stop the tide and hold the line.) So yes, he proved himself as a very able infantry commenader during WWI.

[ghostdog]

Yes, thats true. Rommel was awarded the Pour le Merite during WWI. He was a daring and extremely brilliant captain in a german gebirgsjager division operating in the Italian front. With 250 gebirgsjager he occupied a key possition allowing other troops to complete the capture of 9000 italian soldiers during the initial stages of the battle of Capporetto and the Tagliamento river crossing. An operation that was almost the obliteration of Italian armed forces (more than 275000 italian soldiers were captured, more than 2500 artillery guns and tons of supplies were captured while german and austrians suffered 20000 casualties. The front line was pushed more than 120 km and at the end of the offensive, german and austrian troops were on the river piave, at the gates of treviso and venice, and british and french troops aswell as any italian unit available were rushed to stop the tide and hold the line.) So yes, he proved himself as a very able infantry commenader during WWI.

Where did you studied history ?
I bet on history channel !
Nobody crossed the river Piave , the Italians were on the defensive after defeats but knew the time of the Austrian attack and bombarded their crowded trenches with artillery. The Austrians were finished by the time of Vittorio Veneto a bit later.

Do you ever heard the song "il Piave mormorò : non passa lo straniero ! " = "The Piave murmured :the stranger won't pass !"

[Semperfidjm]

Im working on my masters and I must say that you people make my head hurt!!!!!!!!! Now I have at least three more books to read and a whole host digging to do. With two kids and two jobs I'll never get to the hunny do's. But thank you all for more of the work I love!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Semperfi to all.