How were the Australians so effective in Phuoc Tuy province?

[TravelingHomeless]

How were the Australians effective in Phuoc Tuy province? What tactics did they use? How did they compare to the US? Was there more use of smaller patrols and less fire missions? How did the SASR fit into the mission? Any books or movies on the deployment there?

[Rancid]

There are several books, one I recommend is "The Team" all about the Australian Advisors in Vietnam.

"The Odd Angry Shot" is a great film about the SASR in Vietnam.

[baboon6]

Another book is Phantoms of the Jungle by David Horner, the history of the Australian SAS, which of course includes a lot of stuff on their involvement in Vietnam. There was usually one SAS squadron in-country at a time, which was used by 1st Australian Task Force (the brigade-level HQ) for recce and sometimes ambush tasks.

[Mastermind]

I remember working with the Aussies. They were highly impressive. and were no kind of force to be trifeled with. I would as soon go up against a force of US Marines than the Aussies.

The things that most impressed me was, first their absolute cheerfulness. I never saw an Aussie who looked scared...they smiled constantly. I couldn't understand a word they ever said...on the radio I constanly was saying, "Repeat...This is Charlie-two-two...Repeat?" In a fire fight, they almost never asked for our help. they had severe pride in taking care of their own business. We always stood by to take out heavy bunkers or even the little bothersome hidey-spots with our M-2's but, the Aussies took them all in stride. Their reputation was so fierce, the enemy would try to disengage the second they thought they were dealing with the Aussies...and after the Austrailians would move on to another area, our A.O.'s always cooled of for a while. We greatly enjoyed working with them.


Sorry if this did not answer your specific question as to Phuoc Tuy. But, it might shed a bit of light as to how they differed. I would shoulder up with Aussies anytime.

[baboon6]

It must be remembered that the Aussies rotated units and sub-units on year-long tours in Vietnam. Before arriving in Vietnam each infantry unit at least went through jungle and counter-insurgency training at Conungra and Shoalwater. There were of course individual replacements as casualties occurred but by and large the same men worked together for a whole tour. The US Army and Marines, after the initial build-up, mostly rotated men rather than units and for many the first time they had even seen a jungle was when they arrived in Vietnam. A large proportion of Aussie officers and NCOs had previous experience of jungle COIN work in Malaya and/or Borneo.

While they had their own APCs (and later tanks), 105mm artillery and Huey "Slicks", the Aussies relied on the US Army for 155mm artillery support, and until 1969, for helicopter gunship support. A gunship flight, call-sign Bushranger, was formed in 9 Sqn RAAF, with Hueys modified in the field by the Aussies. There was also a RAAF Canberra sqn in Vietnam but the Aussies also used a lot of USAF tactical air support.

[macdaddy78]

There are many, many reasons why we Australians were effective in Viet Nam, not the least being that we had been fighting COIN throughout SE Asia almost constantly since WW11 - in some respects its no different that the US being now well versed in MOUT - you do something long enough you become very good at it.

But anyway click on this link to a slide show in a thread of digRAR's on the Battle of Long Tan in Phuc Tuy province - it highlights how Australians were expert at the coordination of arms and small unit cohesiveness and battle tactics.

There are a number of other very large scale battles fought by Australians particularly the Battles of Coral and Balmoral that are worthwhile researching, in Coral the Australian FSB was actually overrun with the VC/ NVA capturing one of the Australian 105 mm guns - but we won it back very quickly.

Click on the link for the slideshow, I found inspiring:

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=134552&highlight=6RAR

UBIQUE

[winchester_down]

Sorry if this did not answer your specific question as to Phuoc Tuy. But, it might shed a bit of light as to how they differed. I would shoulder up with Aussies anytime.

I dont care if you answered the question or not, I was heartened by your opinion of our diggers, thanks MM.

[ShotOver]

I remember working with the Aussies. They were highly impressive. and were no kind of force to be trifeled with. I would as soon go up against a force of US Marines than the Aussies.

The things that most impressed me was, first their absolute cheerfulness. I never saw an Aussie who looked scared...they smiled constantly. I couldn't understand a word they ever said...on the radio I constanly was saying, "Repeat...This is Charlie-two-two...Repeat?" In a fire fight, they almost never asked for our help. they had severe pride in taking care of their own business. We always stood by to take out heavy bunkers or even the little bothersome hidey-spots with our M-2's but, the Aussies took them all in stride. Their reputation was so fierce, the enemy would try to disengage the second they thought they were dealing with the Aussies...and after the Austrailians would move on to another area, our A.O.'s always cooled of for a while. We greatly enjoyed working with them.


Sorry if this did not answer your specific question as to Phuoc Tuy. But, it might shed a bit of light as to how they differed. I would shoulder up with Aussies anytime.

That's great to hear mate, appreciate your input.

[Bushranger]

Many an old NVA/VC interviewed after the war said the Aussie cheated in the tactics we used as we were so quiet & snuck around so stealthly. Made me laugh as they were serious.

[Eztyga]

"The Odd Angry Shot" is a great film about the SASR in Vietnam.

And book...

[SBL]

Click on the link for the slideshow, I found inspiring:

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=134552&highlight=6RAR

UBIQUE

Thanks for the link, and thanks to Digrar for posting it. It was really pretty gripping to read/watch.


Many an old NVA/VC interviewed after the war said the Aussie cheated in the tactics we used as we were so quiet & snuck around so stealthly. Made me laugh as they were serious.

Yeah, that's pretty rich, considering the source.

[Kitsune]

The things that most impressed me was, first their absolute cheerfulness. I never saw an Aussie who looked scared...they smiled constantly.
That's them. How many Aussies do you need to change a lightbulb? Answer: Thirteen. One to actually change the lightbulb and twelve to slap him on the back and to say: "Good on yer, mate!"

[Hollis]

Sorry if this did not answer your specific question as to Phuoc Tuy. But, it might shed a bit of light as to how they differed. I would shoulder up with Aussies anytime.



Been a habit of mine to not go about grading the performance of allies/other services or ranking them. From all I heard about the Aussies, I think I can say as MM said, "I would shoulder up with Aussies anytime".

A very fine group of Soldiers.

[digrar]

How were the Australians effective in Phuoc Tuy province? What tactics did they use? How did they compare to the US? Was there more use of smaller patrols and less fire missions? How did the SASR fit into the mission? Any books or movies on the deployment there?


Most of it has already been said, but it came down to aggressive, skilled patrolling, more often than not initiating the contact, with well co-ordinated use of Armoured, Artillery and air support.
Unit harmony played its part too, the Australian Army has always had mateship to tie its units together, fighting for queen and country is one thing, but when you are fighting for your mates, you're hard to beat.
SASR fit in as long range reconnaissance.

Sleeping with your ears open, Garry McKay.
Phantoms of the jungle/phantoms of war, David Horner.
Combat Battalion The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam, Robert Hall.
In good company, Garry McKay.
The battle of long tan, Lex McAulay.

[Opening Batsman]

I also hear we are pretty good looking.

[T.S.C.Plage]

I guess one of the reasons, if not the most important, is that all Australian soldiers were military-volunteers and not drafted like a huge part of the US soldiers. As mentioned most of the Aussies already had pre War experiences which was a huge advantage in comparison to the huge amount of "newbies" that were shipped to Vietnam by the US military and which sometimes didn't had the right "fighting esprit".


Greetz
Plage

[digrar]

That's incorrect. National service ran from 1964 to 1972, about 63,735 National Servicemen served in the military from 1964-1972. Of that number, 19,450 'Nashos' served in Vietnam, all with the Army.

[T.S.C.Plage]

Oh, than I'm really sorry for the wrong information. I really thought I read that they all were "volunteers".
Thanks for clearing that up!


Greetz
Plage

[baboon6]

The first Australian infantry battalion to do a tour in Vietnam, 1 RAR (in 1965-66), was composed entirely of regulars, but all subsequent battalions (including 1 RAR on its second tour) and most other units had a high proportion of "Nashos", often about 50%. There were even some in the SASR.

[chino65]

Sleeping with your ears open, Garry McKay.
Phantoms of the jungle/phantoms of war, David Horner.
Combat Battalion The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam, Robert Hall.
In good company, Garry McKay.
The battle of long tan, Lex McAulay.

I read "Combat Battalion". One of the best book I ever read. Every infantry man should read this.

[digrar]

One of the Company Commanders from 8RAR is just finishing up as our Governor General.

[Brad01]

My dad was in 8RAR, was in for ten and a half years and loved it p-).

[TravelingHomeless]

Thanks for the references. I'll be sure to check them out.

[marktigger]

Australian doctrine in Veitnam was totally different the US forces. And was developed in the Jungles of New Guinea, Malaya and Borneo.

Another couple of Books

Trackers By Peter Haran
Hit my smoke about Aussie FAC's

[digrar]

Other good ones with Peter Haran and Robert Kearney are Crossfire, Shockwave and Flashback.

[Mr X]

As your first book on the topic I would recommend Albert Palazzo's Australian Military Operations in Vietnam. It is published by the Australian Army's Army History Unit and it was produced so the the lessons of Vietnam would not be lost to todays diggers. It is available free to Members of the Australian Army - The army version comes with an awesome Vietnam version of VBS that is so much fun to play. It is also for sale, though the retail version does not come with the VBS game.

http://www.amazon.com/Australian-Military-Operations-Vietnam-Campaigns/dp/1876439106/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1218286841&sr=1-1

The amazon copy is way too expensive.
You should be able to get it from Hylands for $30.
If they don't have it in stock, email them to get it in for you.

http://www.hylandsbookshop.com.au/

http://i255.photobucket.com/albums/hh145/leighm25a/51k98cE0tZL__SS500_.jpg

[drakegoodman]

I remember working with the Aussies. They were highly impressive. and were no kind of force to be trifeled with. I would as soon go up against a force of US Marines than the Aussies.

The things that most impressed me was, first their absolute cheerfulness. I never saw an Aussie who looked scared...they smiled constantly. I couldn't understand a word they ever said...on the radio I constantly was saying, "Repeat...This is Charlie-two-two...Repeat?" In a fire fight, they almost never asked for our help. they had severe pride in taking care of their own business. We always stood by to take out heavy bunkers or even the little bothersome hidey-spots with our M-2's but, the Aussies took them all in stride. Their reputation was so fierce, the enemy would try to disengage the second they thought they were dealing with the Aussies...and after the Australians would move on to another area, our A.O.'s always cooled of for a while. We greatly enjoyed working with them.

Sorry if this did not answer your specific question as to Phuoc Tuy. But, it might shed a bit of light as to how they differed. I would shoulder up with Aussies anytime.

Winchester summed up my thoughts to a tee. Albeit brief, your anecdotes and first-hand observations were very much welcomed, thanks for the input.

Ashes of Vietnam by Stuart Rintoul is also a very good read.

[marktigger]

Other good ones with Peter Haran and Robert Kearney are Crossfire, Shockwave and Flashback.


Have Read Crossfire and i agree it is excellent. Didn't know about Shockwave and Flashback so will have to look out for those.

Cheers Digrar

Battle of Coral is also a good one

[digrar]

Shockwave is a book about the RAAF helo crews and flashback goes into the PTSD side of things, flashing back between stories from Viet Nam and boys on a veterans retreat run by Robert Kearny.

[Wally1967]

Phantoms of the Jungle is a great book to read you can buy them on internet.

[marktigger]

Shockwave is a book about the RAAF helo crews and flashback goes into the PTSD side of things, flashing back between stories from Viet Nam and boys on a veterans retreat run by Robert Kearny.

MMMM more interesting. Best book i've read about psychological problems post conflicts is "Scars of War" by Hugh McManners who wrote "Falklands Commando" about 148 Bty in 82

[digrar]

Phantoms of the Jungle is a great book to read you can buy them on internet.


Look for the updated copy, it's called Phantoms of War and includes some of the Regiments more recent endevours.

[Wally1967]

Look for the updated copy, it's called Phantoms of War and includes some of the Regiments more recent endevours.

Kool I google it and found this as you can read almost the whole pages. the only thing is every now and then you find a page or every 2nd page is missing but it will make up your mind to buy the book or not.

http://books.google.com.au/books?id=0Qs4sTnGeewC&pg=PR14&lpg=PR14&dq=Phantoms+of+War+book&source=web&ots=U7NFnuAkpr&sig=KHqClzVKgh9dJtuy9cmmYlvEE4w&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPP1,M1

[Eztyga]

A bit off topic to a degree, for those interested in the RAN ops in Vietnam, I recommend this book. Some really great photos from the mundane daily grind, messdeck life and combat (return fire from NVA/VC arty, and NGS, close as we get to getting our hands bloody).

Voyages to Vietnam by Stephen Lewis

This book caught my eye because the ship featured on the front cover was the first ship I served on, and eventually paid off.


Closer to the subject at hand is:

Get the Bloody Job Done: The Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight-Vietnam and the 135th Assault Helicopter Company 1967-1971

Synopsis:The story of a small group of Australian sailors who served with distinction, they were the hardest-fought Australian aviation unit to serve in the Vietnam war.

When I was working in Canberra I met one of the blokes mentioned in this book. He was still serving as a reservist, and had a chest full of tin, including the DSC.

Ezy

[wiking]

I remember working with the Aussies. They were highly impressive. and were no kind of force to be trifeled with. I would as soon go up against a force of US Marines than the Aussies.

Sorry if this did not answer your specific question as to Phuoc Tuy. But, it might shed a bit of light as to how they differed. I would shoulder up with Aussies anytime.

Nothing is more valuable to us who can only read about it, than people who were there telling us their own experiences. I think we all agree that the people who were there have the full and complete right to side-track or OT a bit to relate their own personal experiences.

[Augustus08]

Lex Macauley's books on the Australian forces in Vietnam have always been pretty popular. This is evidently the current title (previously SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle) of David Horner's book on the SASR: SAS: Phantoms of War - A History of the Australian Special Air Service. My personal opinion as to the effectiveness of the Australians in Phuoc Tuy has been already mentioned in a previous post: aggressive patrolling and a high degree of all-arms co-ordination. Aggressive patrolling has been a cornerstone of Australian infantry doctrine for generations. And a very high degree of proficiency in minor tactics such as contact drills and other tactical drills has always been demanded at section and platoon level with section and platoon leaders demanding and getting the most of their soldiers in training and in battle.

[TravelingHomeless]

Thanks again for the recommendations. ive been checking online for several books. Any ideas as to how many Aussies served in the Vietnam war? Must have been a high ratio compared to the population at the time. All SASR members must have served a tour or 2.

[T.S.C.Plage]

National service ran from 1964 to 1972, about 63,735 National Servicemen served in the military from 1964-1972.

Like digrar already wrote. ;)


Greetz
Plage

[macdaddy78]

Thats just National Servicemen, it doesnt count regular soldiers.

[digrar]

Not all of those National Servicemen served in SVN. We sent about 50000 troops over, 520 were KIA, almost 2400 wounded. 19,450 conscripted national servicemen served from 1965 to 1972, 202 KIA and 1,279 wounded.

[Wally1967]

The only thing that wasn't so effective was the 14kms of minefield it the biggest stuff up in Australian Army during Viet Nam war.

cant remember if that was in Phuoc Tuy province?

[Eztyga]

The only thing that wasn't so effective was the 14kms of minefield it the biggest stuff up in Australian Army during Viet Nam war.

cant remember if that was in Phuoc Tuy province?

Yeah, the VC would dig them up and use them against us. Then we went back 30 odd years after the war and dug them up for them as an overseas aid program.

It was an 11-kilometre minefield of 23,000 M16 mines Australian soldiers set in South Vietnam's Phuoc Tuy province in 1967, under Brigadier Stuart Graham's orders. US M16 Jumping Jack mines caused more than 57 per cent of Australian casualties in Vietnam, about 250 wounded and 60 killed.

There is a doco called Vietnam Minefield by Graham Pearson on the subject. Should be available on DVD. It aired on SBS some time ago.


Ezy

[Wally1967]

Didn't the Australian army destroy the minefields during Viet Nam war with M113 with wheels on side or was it after the war?

I read it in one of the Australian Defender mags now I have to look for it ;)

[baboon6]

Yeah, the VC would dig them up and use them against us. Then we went back 30 odd years after the war and dug them up for them as an overseas aid program.

It was an 11-kilometre minefield of 23,000 M16 mines Australian soldiers set in South Vietnam's Phuoc Tuy province in 1967, under Brigadier Stuart Graham's orders. US M16 Jumping Jack mines caused more than 57 per cent of Australian casualties in Vietnam, about 250 wounded and 60 killed.

There is a doco called Vietnam Minefield by Graham Pearson on the subject. Should be available on DVD. It aired on SBS some time ago.


Ezy

Since Australian operational casualties in Vietnam were 402 killed and 2069 wounded, that figure is nowhere near 57%. Or did you mean 57% of land-mine casualties?
http://www.anzacday.org.au/history/vietnam/casualties.html

[Calanen]

A minefield of mistakes

August 18, 2005

Page Tools



US M16 Jumping Jack mines caused more than 57 per cent of Australian casualties in Vietnam.

Photo: Supplied



A new documentary reveals a wartime decision that became a disaster for Australian troops. Nicole Brady reports.

Walter Pearson was being evacuated from Vietnam with serious wounds in June 1969 when another injured soldier looked over from his bed and explained the circumstances of the mine injuries both had sustained.

"We were coming back on the plane and this corporal says to me, 'Oh, it was that f minefield that f Graham put in.' And I didn't know anything about this minefield, some of us had heard something about it, and when he said it went right across the province to stop the VC (Vietcong) moving back and forth, I was just astounded," Pearson says.

The corporal was referring to an 11-kilometre minefield of 23,000 M16 mines Australian soldiers set in South Vietnam's Phuoc Tuy province in 1967, under Brigadier Stuart Graham's orders.

Pearson's documentary Vietnam Minefield condemns the field as Australia's biggest post-Word War II military blunder.

Graham's plan aimed to stop Vietcong soldiers moving in and out of the local villages they relied on for supplies and support.

Undermanned and, says Pearson, underestimating the number and ingenuity of the enemy, Graham ordered troops to lay the mines.

The plan had disastrous and immediate consequences: seven Australians died and 10 were wounded during the minefield's construction.

But worse was to come. The Australian forces were moved to another area, leaving the minefield unguarded and open to plunder.

The Vietcong quickly devised a way to safely remove the mines, giving them an enormous and deadly arsenal.

The Vietcong used them to lethal effect, placing them across the local territory. The mines eventually killed 60 Australians.

Pearson and the corporal were just two of the 250 Australians the mines wounded.
But it has taken years for the full picture of the consequences of Graham's blunder to emerge.

Pearson returned home, convalesced, studied Vietnamese intensively for a year at a defence force language school and then, as the war was ending, returned to Vietnam to work as an interpreter.

He forgot the conversation with the corporal as time passed and resumed civilian life.
It was not until a few years ago, when he saw an advertisement placed by historian Greg Lockhart in a Vietnam veterans' magazine, that he came to understand the extent of damage the decision to establish the minefield inflicted.

Lockhart was researching a book about the field and calling for those with first-hand accounts of it to contact him.

"The thing was, I knew about this minefield and I knew they'd been stealing mines from it but I didn't know the extent of it," Pearson says.

"When Greg told me what happened . . . I said, 'Gee, this is a top yarn, we ought to get this on air as a documentary.' That's how this started."

Former soldiers with experience of the minefield and the injuries the mines caused are interviewed, as are former Vietcong soldiers. There is a sense of respect in the film for the infantrymen and women on both sides of the conflict.

Moral judgements are reserved, one feels, for the military brass and the politicians who directed Australia's involvement in Vietnam.

He passionately believes that Graham - who died in 1997 - was guilty of a terrible error of judgement, but Pearson seems remarkably forgiving.

"Soldiers, whether you're a corporal or a brigadier . . . you make decisions in war that lead to people's deaths . . . It's all a matter of judgement," Pearson says.

"And the further up the chain you are, the judgements you have to make put more and more people in jeopardy.

"What's happened here is this guy's made a judgement that's ended up killing a whole pile of us. It might have worked, but the chances of it were pretty slim.

"It was just one of those things. He didn't have enough troops. You can blame him, but you can't blame him."

There has never been an apology to the Australians injured or to the families of those killed.

Pearson laughs when the question is put to him. Armies do not apologise, it is not in the military mind to go back on a decision, he says.

Also, Graham went to his grave defending his decision to lay the mines, Pearson says.
Although the film is about exposing the Australian military's terrible error - as Pearson points out, Graham's call was known of by his superiors before the mines were laid - it also seeks to show how pointless the entire Vietnam expedition was.

"The futility of the minefield is the futility of the war as a whole," Pearson says.
"The minefield was a waste of time and effort that ended up killing a lot of people.

And it had no positive impact on operations and had no positive impact on the outcome of the war.

"The same thing with the war itself - our commitment there had no positive impact on the outcome of the Vietnamese struggle for their own independence and freedom. It was absolutely futile."

Storyline Australia: Vietnam Minefield screens at 8.30 tonight on SBS

http://www.theage.com.au/news/tv--radio/a-minefield-of-mistakes/2005/08/16/1123958066783.html

[Eztyga]

Or did you mean 57% of land-mine casualties?

Casualties from landmines/****y traps.

[Augustus08]

I have never understood the reasons behind Brig. Stuart Graham's decision to lay this 11-km-long minefield in 1967 without having the troops to cover & guard it. Leaving a laid minefield by itself, unmanned & unguarded, particularly one of this size laid for the purpose of large-scale interdiction, goes against one of the most basic tenets of land warfare. Graham must have known that.

[digrar]

He had the troops, the ARVN were going to look after it, he just overestimated their enthusiasm, will, motivation and ability.

[Cobber15-08]

I think this was quaintly called "The Great Barrier Mine Field".

[Augustus08]

He had the troops, the ARVN were going to look after it, he just overestimated their enthusiasm, will, motivation and ability.

This fact at least makes Graham's decision rational. Was this fact about the ARVN manning, guarding, etc. the minefield ever given in the aforementioned documentary? From my memory of seeing this doco last year (or was it the year before?), the ARVN was not mentioned in this capacity, though I could well be wrong.