hist2004
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Conflict Studies Research Centre
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Lesson of Operations in Afghanistan
Conflict Studies Research Centre
ISBNM 1-903584-58-2
1997
Lessons Of Operations In Afghanistan
Colonel Nikolay Spasibo
The history of Afghanistan in the late 20th century was marked by coups d’état, the
first on 17 July 1973 led by Prime Minister Daoud and the second on 27 April 1978
led by the Popular Democratic Party. Changes of power or régime always gives
birth to opposition. The changes that occurred in Afghanistan after 1978 aroused
fierce resistance from the opposition. The miscalculations and mistakes of the new
political leadership helped to spread resistance to the new régime and a highly
unstable situation developed in the country. In these complex circumstances the
Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCSF) was sent into the territory of
neighbouring Afghanistan at the end of December 1979. The Soviet Union’s stated
aim was to assist the new régime, ward off potential incursions from outside and at
the same time safeguard the security of the Soviet Union’s southern borders.
As things turned out, the Contingent of Soviet Forces spent more than nine years
(nine years, one month and 21 days) involved in local combat operations outside the
borders of its country.
While acknowledging the familiar negative political aspects of the commitment of
the LCSF to Afghanistan and the shortcomings in its operations, it must be pointed
out that modes and methods of operation to match the guerrilla tactics of
opposition elements were found while rendering military assistance to the then
régime. This experience, especially on the tactical side, could be used with profit in
training for operations in special conditions.
At a time when - as events in Nagornyy Karabakh, Georgia, Tajikistan and
especially Chechnya bear out - a fairly high probability exists that regular forces
will be employed in armed conflicts of this type, the experience bought at the cost of
13,833 lives takes on particular significance. The aim of this paper is therefore to
identify the factors affecting operational activity by [Soviet] forces and analyse their
tactics in various missions.
The Conditions Governing the Operational Activity of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan
The conditions governing the operational activity of Soviet forces in Afghanistan can
be described as distinctive. The distinctive nature of the situation was shaped by a
whole range of factors, the most important of which were the physical geography
and climate of the country. Three quarters of the territory of Afghanistan is
occupied by mountains with absolute heights of from 2000 m to 4500 m. Southern
and south-western areas are dominated by desert with drifting sand. The rapid
rivers of the mountain areas flow through ravines in country accessible with
difficulty. Seasonal water courses are prevalent in plateau areas, where rivers are
scarce.
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The country has a ****ounced continental climate. The large daily temperature
fluctuations, especially in winter, often caused frostbite. Thus, 57 men of a
battalion from 583 MR (Motor Rifle) Regiment suffered frostbite while on a mission
in the mountains in 1985, and five of them died.
Afghanistan’s road network is extremely ill-developed. Average road density is 2.8
km per 100 km2. Most roads are unmade so that the going becomes poor in the wet
season, while those in desert areas are often affected by sand drifts. These factors
hampered and sometimes prevented manoeuvre.
All in all, the difficult terrain and harsh climate made for difficulties in the use of
equipment, impeded command and control of units and sub-units, and virtually
cancelled out the superiority of regular forces in warfighting assets.
Another major factor was the negative attitude of the bulk of the local population to
the presence of foreign troops, as the following figures show. Insurgency incidents
rose from 35 in 1980 to 355 in 1981 and to 706 in 1987, while the number of
refugees rose from 0.1 m in 1978 to 2.8 m in 1982.
With the commitment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan the main ideological and
political slogan uniting anti-government forces became the call to a jihad or holy
war against the “infidels”. It has to be acknowledged that this call was supported
by a significant proportion of the population. Contributing to this support were the
ethnic and religious peculiarities of the country and the participation of Soviet
troops in putting down rebellions in the initial stage of their presence. The
expansion of combat operations involving Soviet troops also had an impact.
The circumstances surrounding the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan were
determined to a large extent by a third factor – the activities of armed opposition
forces. Thanks to political support and extensive military and economic aid from
Pakistan, Iran and the USA, the Afghan opposition became a powerful militarypolitical
force. It was well-structured, comprising administrative agencies, armed
elements and a well-developed support infrastructure.
The opposition fighting elements were broken down into groups and detachments,
led by men who had received special and military training and were familiar with
local conditions.
The main tactical unit was the group, numbering from 30 to 50 men. When
necessary several groups would unite to form a detachment of from 150 to 200
insurgents.
The second half of the 1980s saw a trend towards the establishment of elements
modelled on conventional military lines. “Islamic regiments” were established,
consisting of from 3 to 5 battalions (detachments) and a number of auxiliary subunits.
The number of insurgents in regiments and sub-units was not rigidly
prescribed. The total strength of a regiment could range from 600 to 900 and
upwards.
The insurgents’ weaponry chiefly comprised small arms (carbines, assault rifles,
MGs (machine guns), anti-tank rocket launchers), recoilless guns, mountain AA
guns, 82 mm and 60 mm mortars, 76 mm mountain guns and 88 mm light
howitzers.
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In addition to DShK MGs and various other types of AA guns, AD assets included
Chinese and Egyptian-made Strela SAM systems, as well as American and British
Red Eye, Stinger and Javelin missiles. The insurgents had large numbers of hand
grenades and anti-tank and anti-personnel mines from various countries, as well as
improvised explosive devices.
The infrastructure established by the opposition, comprising a network of districts,
bases, transhipment points and transhipment bases, together with insurgent
training centres, enabled them to organise the supply of armed detachments with
weapons, ammunition and other stores, establish substantial stocks and continue
active year-round operations. The training centres, of which there were over 120 in
Iran and Pakistan alone, replenished the ranks of the insurgents.
Guerrilla warfare techniques formed the basis of the opposition’s armed struggle.
In all cases they sought to adhere to the following principles: avoiding direct clashes
with superior regular forces, not allowing combat operations to become positional,
refraining from holding captured areas for long periods. There was a particular
emphasis on surprise.
The leading features of the insurgents’ tactics were the bombardment of troops and
built-up areas, attacks on posts and small garrisons, ambushes, diversionary
action and terror, and operations to prevent movements on the country’s main lines
of communication. Sometimes offensive or defensive operations were undertaken,
generally under compulsion, when lines of retreat were cut off and it became
impossible to avoid open battle.
Among the elements of guerrilla warfare referred to above, mine warfare played a
particular role. Mines were laid principally on roads, on the approaches to places
where groups and detachments were stationed, and on the approaches to depots.
This was a very effective technique. For instance, mines accounted for 51% (6102
items) of irreparable losses of weapon systems and equipment by the LCSF in
Afghanistan.
During their struggle, especially when defeat loomed, the opposition also resorted to
negotiations with government agencies and the agreement of ceasefires in order to
buy time, conserve their forces and get aid from the state.
Other factors affecting operations by the LCSF were its size and composition and
the way in which units and formations were deployed. The force of 75,000 whose
commitment was completed by mid-January 1980 was too small to stabilize the
situation. By the summer another MR division and two rifle regiments had been
added to the force to bring it up to 81,800 men. In subsequent years the
composition of the force was reviewed and reorganized, with the result that it grew
to 100,000 men, the level at which it remained until withdrawal. Its shape was
then as follows:
- MR troops: three MR divisions, two MR brigades, two independent MR
regiments, eight independent security battalions
- Airborne and assault-storm troops: one AB division, one assault-storm
brigade, one independent parachute regiment
- Missile troops and artillery: one independent army artillery regiment
- Air: one ground attack air regiment, one fighter regiment, one fighter-bomber
regiment, a mixed air regiment, three combat helicopter regiments, six
independent helicopter squadrons
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- Special troops: one combat engineer regiment, one radiotechnical regiment,
two spetsnaz (special forces) brigades, three support brigades (provost traffic
control, pipeline, and logistic support).
Characteristic of the deployment of the Contingent of Soviet Forces was the way in
which they were concentrated in separate garrisons (some 25 main garrisons) at
points over a large territory, mainly in the principal administrative centres and on
the principal lines of communication. This type of deployment helped to support
and bolster the authorities in 21 provincial centres, as well as many district
centres.
Each division and regiment, as well as any battalion deployed as a separate
garrison, was assigned a “zone of responsibility”, i.e. an area in which it tackled
missions with its own forces. The zone of responsibility of the “Kunduz” (201 MR)
Division, “Bagram” (108 MR) Division and “Shindand” (5 Gds MR) Division had
frontages of 400 km, 420 km and 640 km respectively, while the frontage for a
regiment was up to 120 km and for a battalion up to 40 km. The nature of the
situation arising from the factors outlined above produced a number of problems
with respect to combat activity by troops which needed prompt resolution.
One of these problems was organising combat training in an operational
environment. The task was complicated by the continuous replacement of
personnel in the LCSF, occurring every 18 months to two years. A solution was
found by taking a differentiated approach to the training of troops. It began to be
accomplished by training officers, junior specialist personnel and new recruits at
training centres in the USSR, followed by seven or twelve-day advanced training
programmes run as part of scheduled combat training in units and sub-units in
Afghanistan itself.
Another acute problem was the need to optimize force structure in line with the
tasks and local conditions actually encountered. To this end, in order to ensure
more effective use of flame/incendiary assets, in 1985 a flamethrower company was
established in each division and a flamethrower platoon in each brigade and
independent regiment instead of the flamethrower sections in each mountain
battalion.
In order to increase the independence of combat operations by battalions it was
recognized as right for each to have its own organic reconnaissance sub-unit, and
so, from October 1984, they had a reconnaissance platoon. The low effectiveness of
rocket launchers against the insurgents and the need for a large number of snipers
meant that a sniper replaced the rocket launcher operator in the section.
Field water supply platoons were set up and the post of assistant chief engineer
officer established in each regiment and brigade in order to overcome the water
supply problem. In July 1981 ad hoc propaganda detachments were set up in
divisions, brigades and independent regiments for political work with the local
population, and these became organic elements in July 1983.
Devising tactics for LCSF units and sub-units that would be reasonably effective in
fighting the opposition groups and detachments was a problem that had to be
addressed as combat experience was built up in the course of operational activity.
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The range of tactics emerging from practical combat experience suited local
conditions and to a large extent matched the guerrilla tactics of the insurgent
detachments.
The operational environment confronting Soviet units and sub-units in Afghanistan
could thus be characterized as exceptionally complex. This was a consequence not
only of the country’s physical geography and ethnic and religious factors, but also
of the guerrilla tactics of the opposition’s armed groups and detachments and the
mismatch between the size and shape of the force and the missions and local
conditions they actually faced. The problems that arose as a result had to be
tackled in the course of operational activity by the LCSF.
Soviet Tactics in Fighting the Opposition’s Armed Elements
The operational activity of Soviet units and sub-units in Afghanistan comprised
diverse missions: combat operations on various scales, the guarding and defence of
military and economic installations and communications, and the escorting of
convoys carrying freight. These missions, differing in nature, imposed their own
distinctive features on the way in which forces and assets were used to accomplish
them.
In the first half of 1980, when the LCSF had yet to perfect its intelligence system
and intelligence obtained from the Afghan side was inaccurate, the main mode of
action undertaken by Soviet forces to destroy opposition groups and detachments
was sweeps carried out by reinforced battalions in conjunction with Afghan army
sub-units. These essentially involved advancing along a particular route, seeking
enemy detachments in a designated area and destroying them. For march security
temporary outposts were sent out to deploy successively on commanding heights
along the route. The effectiveness of these operations in the first few months largely
depended on the frequent readiness of opposition armed detachments to engage in
a direct clash. As early as summer 1980, however, they stopped doing so because
of heavy casualties and switched to predominantly guerrilla warfare, forcing Soviet
troops to modify their tactics.
Large-scale, usually pre-planned operations were conducted with a view to
smashing the numerous opposition detachments. Soviet forces took part in 416
such operations during their time in Afghanistan.
These large-scale operations basically involved, when possible, simultaneous fire
strikes on the enemy to the entire depth of the objective, followed by the splittingup
and piecemeal destruction of the opposition groups and detachments by ground
forces elements and by air envelopment achieved through the mass use of heliborne
assault forces landed at different times and to different depths in no consistent
pattern.
Some operations were conducted simultaneously in a number of separate areas,
covering a large expanse of ground. In such cases the area of operations was
divided up into regiment and battalion zones in which sub-units operated
independently within the framework of a common plan. Large-scale operations
lasted from five days to several months.
In these operations Soviet forces operated jointly with elements from Afghan
government units. Large numbers of troops were involved – from eight to 40
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battalions, with a total strength of 12,000 to 15,000 men. The Soviet troops had to
put together forces for the operations by drawing on various formations and units
that had sub-units free from other commitments at the relevant time.
Joint operations can be illustrated by the operation codenamed Magistral’
[Highway], carried on from 20 November 1987 to 21 January 1988 with the aim of
lifting a blockade on the Gardez-Khost road and facilitating the passage of convoys
carrying stores. A force comprising 14 Soviet and 15 Afghan battalions was set up
for the operation. It resulted in the destruction or capture of some 3000
insurgents, 100 depots and a large quantity of arms, while 18 convoys carried over
22,000 tonnes of freight from Gardez to Khost. Soviet casualties were 20 dead and
68 wounded.
In 1985 Soviet troops switched predominantly to supporting independent combat
operations by Afghan units. This did not mean that they stopped participating in
operations altogether, but the number of large-scale combat operations diminished.
One of the cases in which action by government troops received the heaviest
support was the operation to destroy the Javara (“Wolf Pit”) enemy base area in
March/April 1986. The Javara base was a complex of surface and tunnel-type
underground installations, housing a command post with a communications
centre, training and propaganda centres, barracks, arms and ammunition depots,
repair shops, a hospital, a cartridge-making facility, a prison and other
administrative buildings. The base had its own electricity and water supplies.
The Afghan leadership allocated 41 battalions to the mission. Soviet troops took
no direct part in combat operations, restricting themselves to supporting the
Afghans. In the first stage of the operation support was given by aircraft and two
battalions from 1912 Independent MR Regiment. Later on a further four battalions
were deployed. Soviet casualties in the operation were six dead.
Each large-scale operation generally resulted in a sharp curtailment of opposition
activity in the relevant area. In those cases where operations failed to accomplish
their objectives the main reasons were leakage of the time and place of the
operation, stereotyped action and poorly-organised reconnaissance.
Besides planned large-scale operations, Soviet forces in Afghanistan conducted
impromptu, so-called “unit combat operations". These were based on the most upto-
date intelligence, and in terms of assets employed were limited to a reinforced
battalion at most. The area of operations was generally within the zone of
responsibility of the formation or unit (10 to 15 km from its permanent station).
They did not differ tactically from large-scale operations. In all, over 220 unit
operations were conducted.
Soviet forces employed a fairly extensive range of tactics in their operational
activity. Some of them were as prescribed in manuals and handbooks. Among
these were the capture of commanding heights, action by flanking detachments,
action by a main body operating at the bottom of a ravine with cover from elements
advancing along commanding heights on either side, sweeps, air and artillery
strikes on inaccessible mountain areas, and the mining of enemy lines of approach
and withdrawal.
Non-standard tactics were also used, however, in response to those of the
opposition detachments. One such tactic was for Soviet forces to cordon off a
particular enemy detachment, installation or locality while Afghan units swept the
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area. These operations occurred in two stages. The designated area was cordoned
off in the first stage and swept in the second. For reasons of surprise it was usually
cordoned off at night by units and sub-units advancing in AFVs from several
directions at once, with extensive use of flanking detachments. Troops were
delivered by helicopter to less accessible positions.
The Afghan government elements began their sweep once the designated area was
completely cordoned off. They employed a great diversity of tactics, from a
continuous sweep along one or a number of converging axes, the cordoning-off of
particular targets inside the area, and the laying of ambushes on the insurgents’
lines of withdrawal. Assault groups comprising one MR and one tank platoon, 3 or
4 combat engineers with explosives and mines, a flamethrower crew, an artillery
spotter and medical orderlies were formed to destroy enemy forces in built-up
areas. Individual groups breaking out of the cordoned-off area were destroyed by
pre-prepared artillery fire, helicopters and reserves.
Experience showed that in these operations sudden and secure cordoning-off of the
area was an absolute prerequisite for success. This was clearly illustrated by the
destruction of an insurgent detachment in the village of Azau on 6 September 1985
by elements from 371 MR Regiment landed by helicopter at four sites. Thanks to
the sudden cordoning-off of the built-up area and subsequent decisive joint action
with Afghan police, the insurgents had no chance to withdraw into the mountains
and were completely destroyed.
Reconnaissance-and-search operations by combat groups, for which
reconnaissance elements were most often used, also proved fairly effective. These
basically involved finding small enemy parties or depots in a given area and
destroying them. The combat groups employing this tactic fulfilled two functions,
namely reconnaissance and attack, and this was particularly valuable in an
environment of a shortage of forces and intelligence.
A new experience for Soviet troops was combat operations aimed at destroying the
enemy in the underground irrigation systems known as karezes. These are
underground channels running in shafts driven from water sources to the valleys,
with access to the surface at intervals of 20-30m. On approaching a karez a subunit
would cordon off as many of the exit points as possible and set a watch over
the rest. Preparations were made for artillery fire or demolition. In order to force
the enemy to the surface grenades or slabs of explosive would be thrown down the
access shafts, after which a special check-out team would move into action.
Equipped with respirators and in contact with their sub-unit up above, the team
would advance from one access shaft to another, driving back or killing the
insurgents.
Virtually no large-scale operation in mountains was conducted without heliborne
assault landings. While not a new tactic per se, it had its own distinctive features
in Afghanistan. Firstly, both airborne and motor rifle troops operated as assault
landing forces. Secondly, assault forces were as a rule landed on unprepared
terrain. Thirdly, assault forces were employed en masse, but landed at different
times and to different depths. Thus, 20 assault forces totalling 4,200 men were
landed in the Panjshir operation of 1982 and 17 totalling 11,500 in the Kunar
operation of 1985.
Action by on-call elements in zones of responsibility was quite common. Specially
designated sub-units, comprising a company or battalion, together with artillery
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sub-units, strike aircraft and helicopters, conducted operations with a view to the
prompt exploitation of precise intelligence. Their operations were of a fluid nature.
The insurgent groups and detachments were fairly mobile, so that intelligence was
soon out of date. Combat experience demonstrated the effectiveness of such tactics
in these conditions.
Ambushes were much used. They were employed by Soviet forces to stop fresh
arms and ammunition reaching the insurgent detachments from Pakistan and Iran,
as well as to prevent movement by opposition detachments within Afghanistan.
Ambushes deviated in some respects from the descriptions in manuals. Firstly,
mines of various kinds were used in considerable number when laying ambushes.
Secondly, organic assets were used to set up an armoured group 8-12 km from the
site of the ambush. When combat commenced this advanced rapidly towards the
parent sub-unit, supporting it with fire from on-board armament. Thirdly, from
spring 1984 ambush actions were planned at army level.
Ambush operations were successful only when effective reconnaissance of enemy
forces was carried out, stereotypical patterns avoided in organising and effecting
them, and scrupulous care taken to ensure covert movement by sub-units into the
ambush area. Typical of such operations was an ambush in the vicinity of the
village of Sayat, which resulted in the capture of a caravan carrying arms.
Ambushes were markedly less effective, however, if they were organized in a
stereotyped way or attempted to cover entire axes. Thus, of 24,145 ambushes by
the LCSF only 3,546 or 15% proved effective.
The raid was mainly employed when promptly following up intelligence, as a tactic
for the destruction of small gangs or the ringleaders of counterrevolutionary forces.
MR, assault-storm or parachute sub-units of reinforced platoon or company
strength were employed for raids. They were usually drawn from the on-call forces
detailed for operations in zones of responsibility. Elements assigned as combat
reconnaissance or independent reconnaissance patrols could also be employed.
Raids were carried out at night, at dawn, or, exceptionally, by day.
A snatch group, a fire support group, an armoured group and, in heliborne
operations, an assault support group, were usually formed from the assets assigned
for the raid.
Sub-units could approach the raid objective on foot from several directions, be
carried in by helicopters or drive in using captured vehicles. They captured or
destroyed the objective either on their own or in conjunction with air strikes. An
example of a successful raid was one carried out by a parachute company in July
1986 in Hilmand province to destroy a depot guarded by 20 men. Helicopters
exploited the configuration of the terrain to land the group 100 m from the depot.
At the same time two helicopters attacked a DShK machine gun crew and the
guards’ living quarters. The assault force personnel charged the depot, enveloping
it on three sides. The thunderstruck guards offered no orderly resistance and were
destroyed. The action lasted just 13 minutes.
Generally speaking, a great diversity of tactics were employed even in small-scale
operations, depending on the specific circumstances, the terrain and the available
assets. Combat experience showed the battalion to be the key tactical element that
decided the outcome of combat. Even in large-scale operations involving
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Lessons of Operations in Afghanistan
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substantial forces battalions usually had their own zones of responsibility and
operated independently within them, though in the framework of a common plan.
The opposition detachments’ switch to guerrilla tactics raised in fairly stark terms
the problem of protecting key installations and the delivery of freight, a problem
that was made more difficult to resolve by the stepping up of diversionary action by
the insurgents. Acts of diversion against Soviet troops rose to over 500 per year,
calling for concrete, effective action by the command of the Contingent of Soviet
Forces.
The response was primarily to focus substantial assets from the 40th Army to tackle
the problem. This greatly reduced the forces employed in active combat operations
across the country. Thus, as at 1 June 1986 the Soviet forces comprised 133
battalions, of which 82 or 62% were engaged in the protection or defence of various
installations or lines of communication.
A reasonably well-oiled system for the protection of installations and lines of
communication was set up and became operative in a relatively short space of time.
The system comprised:
- the objects protected (local authorities, airfields, permanent camps, convoys,
aircraft)
- the manpower and assets earmarked for the task (23,000 men, 450 tanks,
1,700 BMDs and BTRs, 900 guns and mortars, 70 MRLs and 20 helicopters)
- the methods by which the task was accomplished (15 km zones in which
special requirements applied, the establishing of control rooms, armed
escorts for freight convoys).
The system did not stop diversionary action by the armed opposition, but did
something to stabilize Soviet casualties from such action. That the system operated
effectively on the whole is borne out by the fact that virtually no guarded fixed
installation was captured or destroyed by enemy diversionary action.
Thus, during their operational activity Soviet forces in Afghanistan had to tackle a
number of missions, for a considerable proportion of which they were not designed.
Commanders at all levels had to devise appropriate tactics in the midst of day-today
operations. In this environment a very significant role was played by junior and
middle-ranking commanders, whose standard of training determined success in the
battle or operation.
Lessons & Conclusions
1. In terms of its composition the Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan was
prepared to repel foreign aggression, but it had to fight armed opposition groups
and detachments, which employed the principles of guerrilla warfare. The
mismatch that became apparent between the size and shape of the Soviet force
and the missions and local conditions it actually encountered had to be
eliminated in the midst of day-to-day operations. This points to the need for a
more differentiated approach to the way in which formations and units are
organised, armed and equipped and for greater specialization in the training of
personnel for operations in specific theatres of military operations.
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2. Combat operations in Afghanistan revealed serious deficiencies in the combat
training of privates, NCOs and officers. Training programmes failed to give due
prominence to the specific nature of action by troops. The personal training of
virtually all categories failed to meet the requirements of combat in special
conditions. The experience acquired thus shows very clearly the need for a
radical review of the training of personnel, including officers, as well as of subunits
at battalion level.
3. Soviet forces had to tackle diverse missions, a considerable proportion of which
were new to commanders at all levels and not envisaged by manuals and
handbooks. The quest for suitable tactics took place while combat experience
was built up, often at the cost of heavy casualties.
The experience of operational activity in Afghanistan thus convincingly
demonstrates that success by regular forces against elements employing guerrilla
tactics depends largely on the extent to which their modes and methods of action
match the methods of warfare adopted by the enemy.
Translated by MOD Linguistic Services.
The chapter translated here is taking from a collection of conference papers entitled
"Russian Military Doctrines and Reforms in the 20th Century" published in Moscow
in 1997 by the "Veterans of the Fatherland" Publishing Centre. It is interesting as a
frank military analysis of a war which Russians have tried to forget rather than
study for the lessons to be learnt. Thus the Russian Army began the First Chechen
War without a counter-insurgency doctrine and even in the Second Chechen War,
some of the lessons described in this chapter have had to be re-learnt.
Although current operations in Afghanistan have, so far, avoided the stalemate and
defeat of the Soviet campaign, principles discussed here, such as the impact of
terrain and climate and the importance of intelligence in counter-insurgency remain
valid.
It is likely that in preparing this chapter, Colonel Spasibo had access to a study of
the war prepared by a group of General Staff officers led by Colonel & Professor
Valentin Runov. This has never been published in Russia but has been translated
into English and is being published by the Kansas University Press. Those who
wish to study the Russian campaign in Afghanistan in more detail will find that this
provides the best military analysis of the campaign available:
The Soviet Afghan War
How a Superpower Fought and Lost
The Russian General Staff
Translated and Edited by Lester W Grau and Michael A Gress
University Press of Kansas 2002
Disclaimer
The views expressed are those of the
Author and not necessarily those of the
UK Ministry of Defence
ISBN 1-903584-58-2
Published By:
The Conflict Studies Research
Centre
Directorate General Development and Doctrine
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Camberley Telephone : (44) 1276 412346
Surrey Or 412375
GU15 4PQ Fax : (44) 1276 686880
England E-mail: csrc@gtnet.gov.uk
http://www.csrc.ac.uk
ISBN 1-903584-58-2
Regards,
Hist2004
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Lesson of Operations in Afghanistan
Conflict Studies Research Centre
ISBNM 1-903584-58-2
1997
Lessons Of Operations In Afghanistan
Colonel Nikolay Spasibo
The history of Afghanistan in the late 20th century was marked by coups d’état, the
first on 17 July 1973 led by Prime Minister Daoud and the second on 27 April 1978
led by the Popular Democratic Party. Changes of power or régime always gives
birth to opposition. The changes that occurred in Afghanistan after 1978 aroused
fierce resistance from the opposition. The miscalculations and mistakes of the new
political leadership helped to spread resistance to the new régime and a highly
unstable situation developed in the country. In these complex circumstances the
Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCSF) was sent into the territory of
neighbouring Afghanistan at the end of December 1979. The Soviet Union’s stated
aim was to assist the new régime, ward off potential incursions from outside and at
the same time safeguard the security of the Soviet Union’s southern borders.
As things turned out, the Contingent of Soviet Forces spent more than nine years
(nine years, one month and 21 days) involved in local combat operations outside the
borders of its country.
While acknowledging the familiar negative political aspects of the commitment of
the LCSF to Afghanistan and the shortcomings in its operations, it must be pointed
out that modes and methods of operation to match the guerrilla tactics of
opposition elements were found while rendering military assistance to the then
régime. This experience, especially on the tactical side, could be used with profit in
training for operations in special conditions.
At a time when - as events in Nagornyy Karabakh, Georgia, Tajikistan and
especially Chechnya bear out - a fairly high probability exists that regular forces
will be employed in armed conflicts of this type, the experience bought at the cost of
13,833 lives takes on particular significance. The aim of this paper is therefore to
identify the factors affecting operational activity by [Soviet] forces and analyse their
tactics in various missions.
The Conditions Governing the Operational Activity of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan
The conditions governing the operational activity of Soviet forces in Afghanistan can
be described as distinctive. The distinctive nature of the situation was shaped by a
whole range of factors, the most important of which were the physical geography
and climate of the country. Three quarters of the territory of Afghanistan is
occupied by mountains with absolute heights of from 2000 m to 4500 m. Southern
and south-western areas are dominated by desert with drifting sand. The rapid
rivers of the mountain areas flow through ravines in country accessible with
difficulty. Seasonal water courses are prevalent in plateau areas, where rivers are
scarce.
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The country has a ****ounced continental climate. The large daily temperature
fluctuations, especially in winter, often caused frostbite. Thus, 57 men of a
battalion from 583 MR (Motor Rifle) Regiment suffered frostbite while on a mission
in the mountains in 1985, and five of them died.
Afghanistan’s road network is extremely ill-developed. Average road density is 2.8
km per 100 km2. Most roads are unmade so that the going becomes poor in the wet
season, while those in desert areas are often affected by sand drifts. These factors
hampered and sometimes prevented manoeuvre.
All in all, the difficult terrain and harsh climate made for difficulties in the use of
equipment, impeded command and control of units and sub-units, and virtually
cancelled out the superiority of regular forces in warfighting assets.
Another major factor was the negative attitude of the bulk of the local population to
the presence of foreign troops, as the following figures show. Insurgency incidents
rose from 35 in 1980 to 355 in 1981 and to 706 in 1987, while the number of
refugees rose from 0.1 m in 1978 to 2.8 m in 1982.
With the commitment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan the main ideological and
political slogan uniting anti-government forces became the call to a jihad or holy
war against the “infidels”. It has to be acknowledged that this call was supported
by a significant proportion of the population. Contributing to this support were the
ethnic and religious peculiarities of the country and the participation of Soviet
troops in putting down rebellions in the initial stage of their presence. The
expansion of combat operations involving Soviet troops also had an impact.
The circumstances surrounding the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan were
determined to a large extent by a third factor – the activities of armed opposition
forces. Thanks to political support and extensive military and economic aid from
Pakistan, Iran and the USA, the Afghan opposition became a powerful militarypolitical
force. It was well-structured, comprising administrative agencies, armed
elements and a well-developed support infrastructure.
The opposition fighting elements were broken down into groups and detachments,
led by men who had received special and military training and were familiar with
local conditions.
The main tactical unit was the group, numbering from 30 to 50 men. When
necessary several groups would unite to form a detachment of from 150 to 200
insurgents.
The second half of the 1980s saw a trend towards the establishment of elements
modelled on conventional military lines. “Islamic regiments” were established,
consisting of from 3 to 5 battalions (detachments) and a number of auxiliary subunits.
The number of insurgents in regiments and sub-units was not rigidly
prescribed. The total strength of a regiment could range from 600 to 900 and
upwards.
The insurgents’ weaponry chiefly comprised small arms (carbines, assault rifles,
MGs (machine guns), anti-tank rocket launchers), recoilless guns, mountain AA
guns, 82 mm and 60 mm mortars, 76 mm mountain guns and 88 mm light
howitzers.
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In addition to DShK MGs and various other types of AA guns, AD assets included
Chinese and Egyptian-made Strela SAM systems, as well as American and British
Red Eye, Stinger and Javelin missiles. The insurgents had large numbers of hand
grenades and anti-tank and anti-personnel mines from various countries, as well as
improvised explosive devices.
The infrastructure established by the opposition, comprising a network of districts,
bases, transhipment points and transhipment bases, together with insurgent
training centres, enabled them to organise the supply of armed detachments with
weapons, ammunition and other stores, establish substantial stocks and continue
active year-round operations. The training centres, of which there were over 120 in
Iran and Pakistan alone, replenished the ranks of the insurgents.
Guerrilla warfare techniques formed the basis of the opposition’s armed struggle.
In all cases they sought to adhere to the following principles: avoiding direct clashes
with superior regular forces, not allowing combat operations to become positional,
refraining from holding captured areas for long periods. There was a particular
emphasis on surprise.
The leading features of the insurgents’ tactics were the bombardment of troops and
built-up areas, attacks on posts and small garrisons, ambushes, diversionary
action and terror, and operations to prevent movements on the country’s main lines
of communication. Sometimes offensive or defensive operations were undertaken,
generally under compulsion, when lines of retreat were cut off and it became
impossible to avoid open battle.
Among the elements of guerrilla warfare referred to above, mine warfare played a
particular role. Mines were laid principally on roads, on the approaches to places
where groups and detachments were stationed, and on the approaches to depots.
This was a very effective technique. For instance, mines accounted for 51% (6102
items) of irreparable losses of weapon systems and equipment by the LCSF in
Afghanistan.
During their struggle, especially when defeat loomed, the opposition also resorted to
negotiations with government agencies and the agreement of ceasefires in order to
buy time, conserve their forces and get aid from the state.
Other factors affecting operations by the LCSF were its size and composition and
the way in which units and formations were deployed. The force of 75,000 whose
commitment was completed by mid-January 1980 was too small to stabilize the
situation. By the summer another MR division and two rifle regiments had been
added to the force to bring it up to 81,800 men. In subsequent years the
composition of the force was reviewed and reorganized, with the result that it grew
to 100,000 men, the level at which it remained until withdrawal. Its shape was
then as follows:
- MR troops: three MR divisions, two MR brigades, two independent MR
regiments, eight independent security battalions
- Airborne and assault-storm troops: one AB division, one assault-storm
brigade, one independent parachute regiment
- Missile troops and artillery: one independent army artillery regiment
- Air: one ground attack air regiment, one fighter regiment, one fighter-bomber
regiment, a mixed air regiment, three combat helicopter regiments, six
independent helicopter squadrons
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- Special troops: one combat engineer regiment, one radiotechnical regiment,
two spetsnaz (special forces) brigades, three support brigades (provost traffic
control, pipeline, and logistic support).
Characteristic of the deployment of the Contingent of Soviet Forces was the way in
which they were concentrated in separate garrisons (some 25 main garrisons) at
points over a large territory, mainly in the principal administrative centres and on
the principal lines of communication. This type of deployment helped to support
and bolster the authorities in 21 provincial centres, as well as many district
centres.
Each division and regiment, as well as any battalion deployed as a separate
garrison, was assigned a “zone of responsibility”, i.e. an area in which it tackled
missions with its own forces. The zone of responsibility of the “Kunduz” (201 MR)
Division, “Bagram” (108 MR) Division and “Shindand” (5 Gds MR) Division had
frontages of 400 km, 420 km and 640 km respectively, while the frontage for a
regiment was up to 120 km and for a battalion up to 40 km. The nature of the
situation arising from the factors outlined above produced a number of problems
with respect to combat activity by troops which needed prompt resolution.
One of these problems was organising combat training in an operational
environment. The task was complicated by the continuous replacement of
personnel in the LCSF, occurring every 18 months to two years. A solution was
found by taking a differentiated approach to the training of troops. It began to be
accomplished by training officers, junior specialist personnel and new recruits at
training centres in the USSR, followed by seven or twelve-day advanced training
programmes run as part of scheduled combat training in units and sub-units in
Afghanistan itself.
Another acute problem was the need to optimize force structure in line with the
tasks and local conditions actually encountered. To this end, in order to ensure
more effective use of flame/incendiary assets, in 1985 a flamethrower company was
established in each division and a flamethrower platoon in each brigade and
independent regiment instead of the flamethrower sections in each mountain
battalion.
In order to increase the independence of combat operations by battalions it was
recognized as right for each to have its own organic reconnaissance sub-unit, and
so, from October 1984, they had a reconnaissance platoon. The low effectiveness of
rocket launchers against the insurgents and the need for a large number of snipers
meant that a sniper replaced the rocket launcher operator in the section.
Field water supply platoons were set up and the post of assistant chief engineer
officer established in each regiment and brigade in order to overcome the water
supply problem. In July 1981 ad hoc propaganda detachments were set up in
divisions, brigades and independent regiments for political work with the local
population, and these became organic elements in July 1983.
Devising tactics for LCSF units and sub-units that would be reasonably effective in
fighting the opposition groups and detachments was a problem that had to be
addressed as combat experience was built up in the course of operational activity.
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The range of tactics emerging from practical combat experience suited local
conditions and to a large extent matched the guerrilla tactics of the insurgent
detachments.
The operational environment confronting Soviet units and sub-units in Afghanistan
could thus be characterized as exceptionally complex. This was a consequence not
only of the country’s physical geography and ethnic and religious factors, but also
of the guerrilla tactics of the opposition’s armed groups and detachments and the
mismatch between the size and shape of the force and the missions and local
conditions they actually faced. The problems that arose as a result had to be
tackled in the course of operational activity by the LCSF.
Soviet Tactics in Fighting the Opposition’s Armed Elements
The operational activity of Soviet units and sub-units in Afghanistan comprised
diverse missions: combat operations on various scales, the guarding and defence of
military and economic installations and communications, and the escorting of
convoys carrying freight. These missions, differing in nature, imposed their own
distinctive features on the way in which forces and assets were used to accomplish
them.
In the first half of 1980, when the LCSF had yet to perfect its intelligence system
and intelligence obtained from the Afghan side was inaccurate, the main mode of
action undertaken by Soviet forces to destroy opposition groups and detachments
was sweeps carried out by reinforced battalions in conjunction with Afghan army
sub-units. These essentially involved advancing along a particular route, seeking
enemy detachments in a designated area and destroying them. For march security
temporary outposts were sent out to deploy successively on commanding heights
along the route. The effectiveness of these operations in the first few months largely
depended on the frequent readiness of opposition armed detachments to engage in
a direct clash. As early as summer 1980, however, they stopped doing so because
of heavy casualties and switched to predominantly guerrilla warfare, forcing Soviet
troops to modify their tactics.
Large-scale, usually pre-planned operations were conducted with a view to
smashing the numerous opposition detachments. Soviet forces took part in 416
such operations during their time in Afghanistan.
These large-scale operations basically involved, when possible, simultaneous fire
strikes on the enemy to the entire depth of the objective, followed by the splittingup
and piecemeal destruction of the opposition groups and detachments by ground
forces elements and by air envelopment achieved through the mass use of heliborne
assault forces landed at different times and to different depths in no consistent
pattern.
Some operations were conducted simultaneously in a number of separate areas,
covering a large expanse of ground. In such cases the area of operations was
divided up into regiment and battalion zones in which sub-units operated
independently within the framework of a common plan. Large-scale operations
lasted from five days to several months.
In these operations Soviet forces operated jointly with elements from Afghan
government units. Large numbers of troops were involved – from eight to 40
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battalions, with a total strength of 12,000 to 15,000 men. The Soviet troops had to
put together forces for the operations by drawing on various formations and units
that had sub-units free from other commitments at the relevant time.
Joint operations can be illustrated by the operation codenamed Magistral’
[Highway], carried on from 20 November 1987 to 21 January 1988 with the aim of
lifting a blockade on the Gardez-Khost road and facilitating the passage of convoys
carrying stores. A force comprising 14 Soviet and 15 Afghan battalions was set up
for the operation. It resulted in the destruction or capture of some 3000
insurgents, 100 depots and a large quantity of arms, while 18 convoys carried over
22,000 tonnes of freight from Gardez to Khost. Soviet casualties were 20 dead and
68 wounded.
In 1985 Soviet troops switched predominantly to supporting independent combat
operations by Afghan units. This did not mean that they stopped participating in
operations altogether, but the number of large-scale combat operations diminished.
One of the cases in which action by government troops received the heaviest
support was the operation to destroy the Javara (“Wolf Pit”) enemy base area in
March/April 1986. The Javara base was a complex of surface and tunnel-type
underground installations, housing a command post with a communications
centre, training and propaganda centres, barracks, arms and ammunition depots,
repair shops, a hospital, a cartridge-making facility, a prison and other
administrative buildings. The base had its own electricity and water supplies.
The Afghan leadership allocated 41 battalions to the mission. Soviet troops took
no direct part in combat operations, restricting themselves to supporting the
Afghans. In the first stage of the operation support was given by aircraft and two
battalions from 1912 Independent MR Regiment. Later on a further four battalions
were deployed. Soviet casualties in the operation were six dead.
Each large-scale operation generally resulted in a sharp curtailment of opposition
activity in the relevant area. In those cases where operations failed to accomplish
their objectives the main reasons were leakage of the time and place of the
operation, stereotyped action and poorly-organised reconnaissance.
Besides planned large-scale operations, Soviet forces in Afghanistan conducted
impromptu, so-called “unit combat operations". These were based on the most upto-
date intelligence, and in terms of assets employed were limited to a reinforced
battalion at most. The area of operations was generally within the zone of
responsibility of the formation or unit (10 to 15 km from its permanent station).
They did not differ tactically from large-scale operations. In all, over 220 unit
operations were conducted.
Soviet forces employed a fairly extensive range of tactics in their operational
activity. Some of them were as prescribed in manuals and handbooks. Among
these were the capture of commanding heights, action by flanking detachments,
action by a main body operating at the bottom of a ravine with cover from elements
advancing along commanding heights on either side, sweeps, air and artillery
strikes on inaccessible mountain areas, and the mining of enemy lines of approach
and withdrawal.
Non-standard tactics were also used, however, in response to those of the
opposition detachments. One such tactic was for Soviet forces to cordon off a
particular enemy detachment, installation or locality while Afghan units swept the
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area. These operations occurred in two stages. The designated area was cordoned
off in the first stage and swept in the second. For reasons of surprise it was usually
cordoned off at night by units and sub-units advancing in AFVs from several
directions at once, with extensive use of flanking detachments. Troops were
delivered by helicopter to less accessible positions.
The Afghan government elements began their sweep once the designated area was
completely cordoned off. They employed a great diversity of tactics, from a
continuous sweep along one or a number of converging axes, the cordoning-off of
particular targets inside the area, and the laying of ambushes on the insurgents’
lines of withdrawal. Assault groups comprising one MR and one tank platoon, 3 or
4 combat engineers with explosives and mines, a flamethrower crew, an artillery
spotter and medical orderlies were formed to destroy enemy forces in built-up
areas. Individual groups breaking out of the cordoned-off area were destroyed by
pre-prepared artillery fire, helicopters and reserves.
Experience showed that in these operations sudden and secure cordoning-off of the
area was an absolute prerequisite for success. This was clearly illustrated by the
destruction of an insurgent detachment in the village of Azau on 6 September 1985
by elements from 371 MR Regiment landed by helicopter at four sites. Thanks to
the sudden cordoning-off of the built-up area and subsequent decisive joint action
with Afghan police, the insurgents had no chance to withdraw into the mountains
and were completely destroyed.
Reconnaissance-and-search operations by combat groups, for which
reconnaissance elements were most often used, also proved fairly effective. These
basically involved finding small enemy parties or depots in a given area and
destroying them. The combat groups employing this tactic fulfilled two functions,
namely reconnaissance and attack, and this was particularly valuable in an
environment of a shortage of forces and intelligence.
A new experience for Soviet troops was combat operations aimed at destroying the
enemy in the underground irrigation systems known as karezes. These are
underground channels running in shafts driven from water sources to the valleys,
with access to the surface at intervals of 20-30m. On approaching a karez a subunit
would cordon off as many of the exit points as possible and set a watch over
the rest. Preparations were made for artillery fire or demolition. In order to force
the enemy to the surface grenades or slabs of explosive would be thrown down the
access shafts, after which a special check-out team would move into action.
Equipped with respirators and in contact with their sub-unit up above, the team
would advance from one access shaft to another, driving back or killing the
insurgents.
Virtually no large-scale operation in mountains was conducted without heliborne
assault landings. While not a new tactic per se, it had its own distinctive features
in Afghanistan. Firstly, both airborne and motor rifle troops operated as assault
landing forces. Secondly, assault forces were as a rule landed on unprepared
terrain. Thirdly, assault forces were employed en masse, but landed at different
times and to different depths. Thus, 20 assault forces totalling 4,200 men were
landed in the Panjshir operation of 1982 and 17 totalling 11,500 in the Kunar
operation of 1985.
Action by on-call elements in zones of responsibility was quite common. Specially
designated sub-units, comprising a company or battalion, together with artillery
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sub-units, strike aircraft and helicopters, conducted operations with a view to the
prompt exploitation of precise intelligence. Their operations were of a fluid nature.
The insurgent groups and detachments were fairly mobile, so that intelligence was
soon out of date. Combat experience demonstrated the effectiveness of such tactics
in these conditions.
Ambushes were much used. They were employed by Soviet forces to stop fresh
arms and ammunition reaching the insurgent detachments from Pakistan and Iran,
as well as to prevent movement by opposition detachments within Afghanistan.
Ambushes deviated in some respects from the descriptions in manuals. Firstly,
mines of various kinds were used in considerable number when laying ambushes.
Secondly, organic assets were used to set up an armoured group 8-12 km from the
site of the ambush. When combat commenced this advanced rapidly towards the
parent sub-unit, supporting it with fire from on-board armament. Thirdly, from
spring 1984 ambush actions were planned at army level.
Ambush operations were successful only when effective reconnaissance of enemy
forces was carried out, stereotypical patterns avoided in organising and effecting
them, and scrupulous care taken to ensure covert movement by sub-units into the
ambush area. Typical of such operations was an ambush in the vicinity of the
village of Sayat, which resulted in the capture of a caravan carrying arms.
Ambushes were markedly less effective, however, if they were organized in a
stereotyped way or attempted to cover entire axes. Thus, of 24,145 ambushes by
the LCSF only 3,546 or 15% proved effective.
The raid was mainly employed when promptly following up intelligence, as a tactic
for the destruction of small gangs or the ringleaders of counterrevolutionary forces.
MR, assault-storm or parachute sub-units of reinforced platoon or company
strength were employed for raids. They were usually drawn from the on-call forces
detailed for operations in zones of responsibility. Elements assigned as combat
reconnaissance or independent reconnaissance patrols could also be employed.
Raids were carried out at night, at dawn, or, exceptionally, by day.
A snatch group, a fire support group, an armoured group and, in heliborne
operations, an assault support group, were usually formed from the assets assigned
for the raid.
Sub-units could approach the raid objective on foot from several directions, be
carried in by helicopters or drive in using captured vehicles. They captured or
destroyed the objective either on their own or in conjunction with air strikes. An
example of a successful raid was one carried out by a parachute company in July
1986 in Hilmand province to destroy a depot guarded by 20 men. Helicopters
exploited the configuration of the terrain to land the group 100 m from the depot.
At the same time two helicopters attacked a DShK machine gun crew and the
guards’ living quarters. The assault force personnel charged the depot, enveloping
it on three sides. The thunderstruck guards offered no orderly resistance and were
destroyed. The action lasted just 13 minutes.
Generally speaking, a great diversity of tactics were employed even in small-scale
operations, depending on the specific circumstances, the terrain and the available
assets. Combat experience showed the battalion to be the key tactical element that
decided the outcome of combat. Even in large-scale operations involving
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Lessons of Operations in Afghanistan
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substantial forces battalions usually had their own zones of responsibility and
operated independently within them, though in the framework of a common plan.
The opposition detachments’ switch to guerrilla tactics raised in fairly stark terms
the problem of protecting key installations and the delivery of freight, a problem
that was made more difficult to resolve by the stepping up of diversionary action by
the insurgents. Acts of diversion against Soviet troops rose to over 500 per year,
calling for concrete, effective action by the command of the Contingent of Soviet
Forces.
The response was primarily to focus substantial assets from the 40th Army to tackle
the problem. This greatly reduced the forces employed in active combat operations
across the country. Thus, as at 1 June 1986 the Soviet forces comprised 133
battalions, of which 82 or 62% were engaged in the protection or defence of various
installations or lines of communication.
A reasonably well-oiled system for the protection of installations and lines of
communication was set up and became operative in a relatively short space of time.
The system comprised:
- the objects protected (local authorities, airfields, permanent camps, convoys,
aircraft)
- the manpower and assets earmarked for the task (23,000 men, 450 tanks,
1,700 BMDs and BTRs, 900 guns and mortars, 70 MRLs and 20 helicopters)
- the methods by which the task was accomplished (15 km zones in which
special requirements applied, the establishing of control rooms, armed
escorts for freight convoys).
The system did not stop diversionary action by the armed opposition, but did
something to stabilize Soviet casualties from such action. That the system operated
effectively on the whole is borne out by the fact that virtually no guarded fixed
installation was captured or destroyed by enemy diversionary action.
Thus, during their operational activity Soviet forces in Afghanistan had to tackle a
number of missions, for a considerable proportion of which they were not designed.
Commanders at all levels had to devise appropriate tactics in the midst of day-today
operations. In this environment a very significant role was played by junior and
middle-ranking commanders, whose standard of training determined success in the
battle or operation.
Lessons & Conclusions
1. In terms of its composition the Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan was
prepared to repel foreign aggression, but it had to fight armed opposition groups
and detachments, which employed the principles of guerrilla warfare. The
mismatch that became apparent between the size and shape of the Soviet force
and the missions and local conditions it actually encountered had to be
eliminated in the midst of day-to-day operations. This points to the need for a
more differentiated approach to the way in which formations and units are
organised, armed and equipped and for greater specialization in the training of
personnel for operations in specific theatres of military operations.
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2. Combat operations in Afghanistan revealed serious deficiencies in the combat
training of privates, NCOs and officers. Training programmes failed to give due
prominence to the specific nature of action by troops. The personal training of
virtually all categories failed to meet the requirements of combat in special
conditions. The experience acquired thus shows very clearly the need for a
radical review of the training of personnel, including officers, as well as of subunits
at battalion level.
3. Soviet forces had to tackle diverse missions, a considerable proportion of which
were new to commanders at all levels and not envisaged by manuals and
handbooks. The quest for suitable tactics took place while combat experience
was built up, often at the cost of heavy casualties.
The experience of operational activity in Afghanistan thus convincingly
demonstrates that success by regular forces against elements employing guerrilla
tactics depends largely on the extent to which their modes and methods of action
match the methods of warfare adopted by the enemy.
Translated by MOD Linguistic Services.
The chapter translated here is taking from a collection of conference papers entitled
"Russian Military Doctrines and Reforms in the 20th Century" published in Moscow
in 1997 by the "Veterans of the Fatherland" Publishing Centre. It is interesting as a
frank military analysis of a war which Russians have tried to forget rather than
study for the lessons to be learnt. Thus the Russian Army began the First Chechen
War without a counter-insurgency doctrine and even in the Second Chechen War,
some of the lessons described in this chapter have had to be re-learnt.
Although current operations in Afghanistan have, so far, avoided the stalemate and
defeat of the Soviet campaign, principles discussed here, such as the impact of
terrain and climate and the importance of intelligence in counter-insurgency remain
valid.
It is likely that in preparing this chapter, Colonel Spasibo had access to a study of
the war prepared by a group of General Staff officers led by Colonel & Professor
Valentin Runov. This has never been published in Russia but has been translated
into English and is being published by the Kansas University Press. Those who
wish to study the Russian campaign in Afghanistan in more detail will find that this
provides the best military analysis of the campaign available:
The Soviet Afghan War
How a Superpower Fought and Lost
The Russian General Staff
Translated and Edited by Lester W Grau and Michael A Gress
University Press of Kansas 2002
Disclaimer
The views expressed are those of the
Author and not necessarily those of the
UK Ministry of Defence
ISBN 1-903584-58-2
Published By:
The Conflict Studies Research
Centre
Directorate General Development and Doctrine
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Camberley Telephone : (44) 1276 412346
Surrey Or 412375
GU15 4PQ Fax : (44) 1276 686880
England E-mail: csrc@gtnet.gov.uk
http://www.csrc.ac.uk
ISBN 1-903584-58-2
Regards,
Hist2004