sethen
06-06-2004, 12:17 PM
Somalia: Importing the Islamic Revolution
by
Yossef Bodansky
NSCF Senior Fellow
Attacks on U.S. and U.N. forces in Somalia were an integral part of an Iranian and Sudanese plan to transform Mogadishu into a "second Beirut" for Americans. Furthermore, this escalation is the first manifestation of a strategic alliance between Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. In early 1993, Iraq embarked upon a revitalization of its terrorist campaign under an Islamist banner, with active support from Sudan and Sudan's Spiritual Leader, Hassan al-Turabi. Baghdad is using 'Afghans' who have been retrained in Iraqi intelligence camps and who operate in close cooperation with the Iranian-controlled Islamist international terror network. Since late September 1993, these multi-national Islamist forces were able to inflict sizeable casualties on U.S. forces in Mogadishu in a series of urban battles that were popularly attributed to the forces of Somali warlord Muhammad Farah Aidid.
Powder Keg in the Horn of Africa
In the summer of 1991, events throughout the Horn of Africa highlighted an important process rapidly developing all over sub-Saharan Africa: the collapse of the state system and the re-definition of boundaries along ethnic and tribal lines. This process reflects the genuine aspirations of the local populations in their quest for self identity.
In reaction to these events, the West, the self-nominated guardian of the new world order, is suddenly confronted with this dilemma: To support the process in order to reduce the levels of violence and famine and to ensure as smooth a transformation as possible; or to help centralized regimes impose the retention of current state boundaries and political identities, thus further exacerbating turmoil and internal violence.
Although the lengthy revolutionary struggles throughout the Horn of Africa have been against ruthless, dictatorial regimes in both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, it is extremely important to closely examine the ideological motivations of the groups challenging these regimes. By the summer of 1991, these revolutionary forces had endured and prevailed after decades of armed struggle, maintaining the trust and support of the local population through times of unprecedented hardship and famine. This fact alone should have been sufficient in pointing to the genuine popular dedication to the leadership of these revolutionary movements and the ideologies for which they stand.
In Somalia, a clique of military officers loosely identified as the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP) had been in power since the 1969 coup. President Siyad Barre and most of the officers came from Somalia's smaller tribes, the bulk of whose population inhabits north east Kenya and eastern Ethiopia. "Pan-Somalism" -- the unification of all areas inhabited by Somalis -- has become the most distinct ideological character of the SSRP. For Somalia's indigenous population, however, there has emerged a contradiction between Mogadishu's preoccupation with the plight of Somalis across the border and the mounting oppression and impoverishment of the main clans inside Somalia.
The main revolutionary forces are ethnically based. Most important are the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). There are numerous smaller tribes, clans, and families which have allied themselves to these larger revolutionary force movements. By mid 1991, they were divided into two distinct groups: the northern movements -- the SNM and its challengers -- and the central movements -- the USC and its challengers. The natural inhabitation zone of the two groups roughly overlap the ex-British and ex-Italian colonies that had been united by the British in 1960 to form independent Somalia. Thus, the anti-Siyad Barre revolutionary struggle during the late 1980s was in essence a popular struggle against the centralized pan-Somalian identity and for the promotion of self-determination by the main clans.
Self-Determination at any Cost
A closer examination of the revolutionary struggle in the Horn of Africa, not just Somalia, demonstrates that the common denominator of all rebel movements is that of ethnic-, tribal- and/or clan- distinct population groups rising against a central government in a quest for self-identity and self-determination. Their declared objectives range from drastically changing the character of the states to dismemberment and the establishment of new states. Moreover, the movements demanding total independence were the dominant forces in the liberation struggle. In Somalia, for example, the SNM declared the independence of the northern province (recognizing the colonial boundaries of British Somaliland) on 17 May, 1991.
The situation in the Horn of Africa is further complicated by the strategic importance of the region. The Arab and Iranian-declared objective to "transform the Red Sea into a Green Lake" served as the catalyst for explosion. Toward this objective, which has been expressed repeatedly in Middle Eastern documents and in the media, Somalia was originally recognized as part of the Arab league and subsidized by Saudi Arabia. In 1991, the well-financed Somali Islamic Union (SIU) launched a propaganda campaign to unify all Muslim peoples along the Horn of Africa, namely, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. Several conservative Arab regimes led by Saudi Arabia began pouring money into this Islamist unity program. However, it would not be long before the SIU would become a close ally of Iran and Sudan.
The Crisis In Somalia: Playing Off U.S. Interests
By the fall of 1992, the Western World, including the United States, was horrified by the famine in Somalia. However, the crisis in Somalia was more intentionally man-made than the result of any natural disaster. The famine brought about not only massive fatalities among the civilian population, but reduced Somalia to a state of anarchy.
The main reason for this man-made catastrophe was the escalating tribal warfare for independence. By the fall of 1992, the struggle for self-determination was becoming increasingly Islamist, as was the power struggle between rival groups. Furthermore, this convoluted warfare was taking place within the context of an Islamist radical surge throughout the whole Horn of Africa. The key leaders of the Somali struggle for power were using famine as a decisive weapon of choice for determining the character of the civilian population in their fiefdoms. These leaders intentionally denied food to segments of the population they wanted to destroy, and fed only those groups whose allegiance they sought.
In late 1992, on the eve of the U.S. military intervention, the primary fighting in the Mogadishu area and the central coastal area were between extended families and sub-clans who were rallying behind key figures on the basis of personal loyalties. The main protagonists were General Mohammad Farah Aidid, the USC Chairman, who was supported by his own sub-clan and a loose alliance of extended families, and Ali Mahdi Mohammad, the so-called interim president of Somalia, and his sub-clan and a loose alliance of smaller extended familial clans.
The most notorious and cruel fighters of Aidid were the members of the Habar Gidir sub-clan. Historically notorious for its banditry, the Habar Gidir forces were lured into Mogadishu by promises of plunder and rape. Meanwhile, because of the anti-Siyad Barre revolt in the summer and fall of 1991, members of Barre's clans who had provided most of the city's services, including police, escaped in fear of the revenge of advancing Aidid forces. Thus Mogadishu was deprived of any semblance of police resistance. Moreover, the USC won support from an Ethiopian clan by allowing them to profit from selling stolen food in Ethiopia in return for ammunition.
At the same time, Aidid continued to criticize the U.N. and the West for supporting Mahdi Mohammad, and insisted that all the humanitarian aid was being brought into Somalia in order to consolidate Mohammad's power. Therefore, the USC's fierce struggle for the food was presented as a liberation struggle. On the other hand, Mohammad insisted that only he had the right to distribute the food and humanitarian aid. When the U.N. refused Mahdi Mohammad, his forces shelled the Mogadishu harbor and attacked distribution facilities. He attributed the attacks to frustrated "uncontrolled elements" in his force. In fact, Mahdi Mohammad remained resolutely determined to prevent others from eating if he could not control the food.
In the fall, Mohammad insisted that the anticipated deployment of U.S. forces meant recognition of his right to power. Indeed, Aidid threatened any foreign deployment with "unprecedented bloodshed" on 2 November. The U.S.C issued a more moderate communique on 27 November announcing that Aidid "consider[ed] the deployment of armed troops in Somalia damaging for our sovereignty and for our territorial integrity." However, on 1 December, both Aidid and Mohammad welcomed the deployment of U.S. forces on condition that the U.S. recognize each as the legitimate political authority in the country. They considered the role of U.S. forces to "help the transitional government to deliver food supplies," as expressed in a joint communique from Mogadishu. Both leaders also insisted that U.S. forces should fight the "gunmen preventing food from reaching the starving;" thus, in essence, each expected the U.S. to fight their respective rival.
However, in late 1992, it was Aidid who was taking the more credible steps to affect the distribution of aid. In early November, he organized and chaired a major meeting of the "elders and wise men" and other pillars of traditional Somali society in order to gain their support and the loyalty of their various forces. Having accomplished this, Aidid's forces immediately stormed and successfully seized control of fifteen main road junctions and local road blocks from "free lancer" bands.
From 13 November to 1 December, Aidid visited Kismayo, a key port, airport, and road juncture in the south and established several alliances with smaller revolutionary forces. Aidid reached agreements with revolutionary leaders in north and central Somalia, thus blocking any resistance from Somaliland and covering USC's central flanks. In this summit, Aidid described to the commanders "their obligations in areas under their control and told them to be wary of elements bent on harming the unity of the Somali people."
At the same time, Mohammad met with representatives of Ethiopia and Eritrea in an effort to establish his own coalition against Aidid forces.
Islamist Influence and Intervention in Somalia
Leaders of the Saudi and Persian Gulf Emirates supported the Islamist World Association and the World Muslim Relief Organization in their declaration that "only Muslim organizations have been doing [true] humane work in Somalia." Shaykh Abd-al-Rahman, a Saudi Islamist, accused the West of distributing humanitarian aid in order to implement "a suspicious plan aimed at partitioning Somalia [among] European countries. . .by fanning the flames of dissension among Somali factions fighting for government control." Dr. Muhammad Khalid Diftirdar, another Saudi Islamist, pointed out that the Muslim charities are committed "to safeguarding Somalia against the pitfalls into which it is being driven by foreign organizations through the aid they make available." This is part of a scheme in which the West "plans the downfall" of Somalia as part of effort "to infiltrate Muslim countries." The crisis, he explained, was part of "the battle that Muslim peoples face" all over the world. Therefore, the Islamist organizations focus on "returning the people to the Holy Koran and Islamist teachings and challenging the concepts fostered in the region by hostile and imperialistic forces."
The position of these Islamist organizations is important in view of the financial and political power behind them. The Islamist World Association and the World Muslim Relief Organization are a part of a wide network of organizations that answer to the Saudi fundamentalist, Islamist proselytization movement. The Saudi Government and the rich supporters of the Saudi fundamentalist movement financed Siyad Barre and his regime after he broke relations with the U.S.S.R in 1978 and until his downfall in mid-1991. The money was then transferred to, and handled by, a Somalian middleman named Mohammad Sheikh Osman. In the summer of 1991, Osman suddenly converted and became a member of Aidid's U.S.C central committee. He brought with him the continued financial and political support of the Saudi fundamentalist movement. (It should be emphasized that there is no known precedent of this Saudi movement, or these organizations, doing anything without the full, albeit tacit, support of, and encouragement from, the highest levels of the Saudi royal family.)
The escalation of fighting and deterioration of order in Somalia in the fall of 1992 was not accidental. It was an integral component in the Iranian-Sudanese struggle to consolidate and expand their strong hold in eastern Africa.
Additional Islamist Front training camps were opened and expanded in Sudan for fighters from Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. In the fall, Turabi, Sudan's Spiritual Leader, ordered the escalation of the campaign to destabilize eastern Africa as part of his desire "to realize his dream of becoming supreme Imam of a fundamentalist Islamist empire." Soon after, new cadres and expert terrorists were sent from Sudan to their countries in east Africa. The training and deployment of these terrorists has expanded since November.
The Somali terrorists were provided with equipment and weapons for the militia that they would train and lead. Some of these militia were operating within the ranks of the main Somali parties, while others remained completely independent, answering only to Khartoum. The Somali terrorists controlled and sponsored by Iran, via Sudan, were to be used against the U.S. forces the same way the HizbAllah had been used by Syria and Iran against the U.S. peacekeepers in Beirut in the early 1980s.
In mid-November 1992, Iran intensified its construction of major facilities in Port Sudan, including radio stations and command, control and communications facilities. Reportedly, Tehran and Khartoum signed a 25-year lease on the port. Iran also built military facilities in Suakin in the east. Both bases constitute the main forward Iranian military posts for regional operations and allow virtually unrestricted access to all of Sudan's airports and sea ports.
The Iranian-Sudanese Surge
In early January 1993, the mission of the U.S. Marines in Somalia had gone peacefully and without any major clash with local forces. However, the Marines had not yet made contact with the country's Islamist forces. For more than a year, Iran and Sudan had been engaged in a fierce campaign to consolidate their control over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. A Sudanese source in Cairo warned that "the Islamists' presence in Somali, Ethiopian, and Kenyan territories" are an integral part of "Sudanese efforts to impose Khartoum's influence in the Horn of Africa and set up an Islamist belt around Sudan."
Somalia, a Muslim country stretching along the all-important littoral of the Horn of Africa, had long attracted the attention of Khartoum and Tehran. The chaos in that country, fractured along tribal lines and immersed in fierce struggles for self-determination and power, made segments of the population and their power-hungry leaders susceptible to close cooperation with, as well as manipulation and exploitation by, Turabi's Khartoum. Indeed, by the time the U.S. forces arrived in Somalia, Islam was spreading among the ranks of the various tribal militia, and the armed Islamist movements in Somalia were growing rapidly.
The success of the Iranian-Sudanese surge in the Horn of Africa is a result of the personalities of the leaders in charge of these activities. Turabi himself was personally close to some of the local Islamist leaders. Indeed, he supervised many of the regional activities. The Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [of Iran] (IRGC), Gen. Rahim Safavi, and Turabi's deputy, Ali Uthman Taha, were directly in charge of the operations in Somalia itself. The training of Somali terrorists and others who would operate in Somalia was conducted under Dr. Ali al-Haj, one of Turabi's close aides and confidants.
Since the summer of 1992, the most experienced terrorist trainees were sent to the Iranian-controlled camps in Sudan. The Sudanese Labor Minister, who defected to Egypt in August 1992, described the situation in these camps at the time of his defection: "They receive tough training in all types of combat, violence, and assassinations -- to be sent, from time to time, to some neighboring countries to explore the situation, carry out limited and swift operations, and await the major plan devised by the Front to send its members to the countries chosen as targets for intensive activity. The list includes, respectively, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, and Chad."
In the fall of 1992, additional Islamist Front training camps were opened and expanded in Sudan for fighters from Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. This expansion was carried out under the personal direction of Dr. Ali al-Haj. New cadres and expert terrorists were sent from Sudan to their countries in east Africa. The training, arming, and deployment of these terrorists expanded in November.
Meanwhile, anticipating the need for a major escalation in the fighting in the region, Khartoum began organizing and training local 'armed forces' capable of engaging U.S. military forces. The main facilities of these semi-organized forces are located in a camp in Somalia's central province under the command of Col. Sulayman Muhammad Sulayman, a member of Sudan's Ruling Council. The militia force allocated for east Africa includes six companies and three battalions manned by 3,000 troops from Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Somalia, and Kenya (500 from Kenya alone). They are trained by IRGC experts from Iran and military officers from Pakistan. During the summer of 1992, a company from this camp fought alongside the forces of General Muhammad Farah Aidid against Ali Mahdi Muhammad's forces in Somalia.
As with all Islamist terrorist and subversive forces, the key to the effectiveness of the center -- Khartoum and Tehran -- to implement their grand designs is their access to, and influence over, the local strongmen. The key regional allies of Khartoum and Tehran clearly demonstrate the extent of Turabi's influence and appeal.
Turabi is very close to the leader of Somaliland, who proclaimed the Sharia [Islamic religious law) as the law of the land, and consequently enjoys Sudanese-Iranian assistance. In central Somalia, the most active and loyal strongman to Turabi is the former chief of police in Mogadishu. In addition, in late 1992, General Muhammad Farah Aidid was already receiving material and logistical aid from al-Turabi's front.
In Ethiopia, the combination of Iranian money and Sudanese pressure and subversion transformed the Oromo Liberation Front into the Islamist Front for the Liberation of Oromo. (As will be discussed below, this transformation has direct impact on the situation in Somalia.) In Djibouti, Turabi's strongest supporter is the uncle of the nation's chief of security.
Several of the local terrorist and irregular forces were under the influence of Sudan and Iran. Since early-1992, Turabi oversaw the emergence of numerous Jihad organizations of highly trusted Islamists from Eritrea and Somalia. The local Islamist organizations were strengthened in the Mogadishu area.
Turabi also created the Somali Islamic Union (SIU), as an umbrella for a few Islamist organizations with clan/tribal loyalties. Some of the organizations have been operating underground since 1985, while some of the newer groups act as the main vehicle for Iranian-Sudanese operations. In Somalia, the SIU was mainly "influenced by the guidance of Turabi in Sudan," according to Arab sources. Muhammad Uthman is the SIU's nominal leader, who issues political communiques via London but is not involved in actual activities in Somalia. The first massive military supplies arrived at Bosaso by ship from Sudan in May 1991.
Initial military operations of elements of the SIU took place in late-1991. The first organized operations occurred in June 1992 in an attack in the Bosaso area which proved indecisive. Therefore, on-site activities were consolidated in August 1992 by an Iranian-Sudanese delegation that arrived in Marka, Somalia for a major conference with local SIU commanders on future operations. The two senior officers in charge of Somalia operations personally led the delegation, thus indicating its importance for both Tehran and Khartoum.
Consequently, by the fall of 1992, the armed Islamist movement in Somalia was growing. The centers of Islamist militants were in Mogadishu, Marka, and Bosaso. Operating via Sudan, Iran was the primary source of weapons and funds for these movements. Several additional training camps for Islamists were established in Somalia and across the border in Ethiopia. Weapons and funds were channelled via Djibouti. In addition, since the summer of 1992, local Somali gangs have been reinforced by expert terrorists from Sudan and have been armed by both Sudan and Iran.
In the fall of 1992, once the media campaign in the West for a military-humanitarian intervention in Somalia began having an impact in political circles, Sudanese-Iranian activities escalated markedly. "In Somalia, Turabi's and Iran's horses are running at full speed in a feverish attempt to align a base, disciples, and followers in the atmosphere of the current famine," said Arab sources. The most important preparations were virtually completed on the eve of the arrival of the first U.S. Marines. In Mogadishu, for example, a new Islamist organization emerged and joined the fighting alongside the forces of General Muhammad Farah Aidid and received material and logistical aid from Turabi's Front. However, these Islamist forces disappeared just in time, virtually days and hours before the U.S. Marines hit the beaches.
The initial Islamist reluctance to fight U.S. forces was determined by Iran's and Sudan's overall strategy. The tenets of this strategy are clearly expressed in their reaction to the U.S. intervention. Islamists throughout the Middle East provide indications of the American threat and their desire to act as perceived by Khartoum and Tehran.
The Egyptian Islamist analysis of U.S. intervention, later emphasized by the Muslim Brotherhood, set the tone. They argued that the dispatch of U.S. forces to Somalia was part of a U.S.-Israeli conspiracy to prevent Arab/Muslim control over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Palestinian Islamists were apprehensive that the forces amassed by the U.S. under the excuse of supporting Somalia were essentially a prelude to a U.S. military strike against Sudan. As they stated, the U.S. was "annoyed by Sudan's successes in the Horn of Africa, especially Sudan's increasing influence in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the opposition in Kenya, which is expected to win the next elections." Even official Cairo conceded that "Sudan's turn [may] come after Somalia."
Old Imperialists in a New Game
In early December 1992, Dr. Hatim al-Husayni, a London-based Islamist ideologist, provided the most coherent Islamist analysis of the situation. He concluded that only a drastic, 'all-Islamist' action aimed against both Arab/Muslim regimes and the foreign forces could prevent another catastrophe. "This U.S. military intervention, on the pretext of humanitarian aid for the hungry, will consolidate the U.S. military presence in a new strategic region and strengthen the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. The direct cause of this U.S. military intervention is the Arab and Islamist failure to solve the problems of the Arab and Islamist nations. . .It is the return of Western imperialism against a background of Arab and Islamist differences and backwardness. It is a new Western direct military control of important and sensitive areas in the heart of the Islamist nation. It is a new proof of the Arab and Islamist governments' failure to solve the Islamist nations' problems through joint unified actions."
Expressing Tehran's view of the situation, the HizbAllah warned that the real objective of the U.S. intervention in Somalia is Sudan. The U.S. cannot tolerate the existence of Sudanese policy based on the Sharia that challenges and confronts U.S. interests. According to an official statement read on HizbAllah radio and extensively published in the media, "the [U.S.] return to the Horn of Africa is intended to confront the Islamist revival that shines from the Horn of Africa. This is not the first intervention and will not be the last. Washington must throw its weight and military strength against every Islamist or national awakening in any area that seeks to achieve independence and end subservient policies. This will be a common phenomenon by the end of this century and into the next." Therefore, only a resolute action could reverse this dire trend and ensure the progress of the Islamist revolution in the entire region.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1992, the military and organizational capabilities of the Islamists, especially the SIU, were not yet tested because their leaders had avoided exposure. This inaction, according to Arab sources in Beirut, "must be viewed as part of Turabi's strategy aimed at building an Islamist belt around Sudan. Turabi believes that such a belt would protect the experiment of making the country Islamist and turning it into a base for the Islamist movement in the Arab and African regions. The SIU has counterparts in Kenya, Djibouti, and other African countries. The common denominator is that they are almost wholly guided by Turabi's instructions."
At the same time, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Chad and Kenya were areas of major escalation of the Islamist drive. In these countries, Sudan and Iran were already engaged in a silent war with the local regimes over the future of the region, and not just the countries themselves. As Arab sources asserted, "Turabi's front is making penetration attempts as part of a plan coordinated with Tehran to export the Islamist Revolution." Indeed, some of the regional operations were already having a direct impact on the U.S. presence in Somalia. For example, in Kenya, the Islamist Party controls Mombasa, the main port of entry for West/U.S. cargoes, including supplies for Somalia. The SIU was maintaining "an almost daily relationship" with the Islamist Republic Organization in Mombasa. Moreover, Tehran controls the local economic elite made of the Oromo tribe of Ethiopian-origin that facilitates multi-faceted support for the Islamist subversive forces. As indicated above, the Iranian-Sudanese control over the Islamist Front for the Liberation of Oromo in Ethiopia enables them to penetrate, subvert, and strongly influence the Kenyan community through family and clan loyalties.
Another Beirut: An Islamist Strategy to Counter The Great Satan
Both Sudan and Iran were not only explicitly opposed to U.S. intervention in Somalia, but were apprehensive about the strategic ramifications of the presence of U.S. forces in the Horn of Africa. Thus, on November 28, 1992, the moment the U.S. declared its intention to deploy to Somalia, a large Iranian delegation, as well as some thirty members of "the intelligence, security and military services, economic experts and diplomats" rushed to Khartoum for an urgent meeting. As a result of the visit, a new "protocol for security cooperation" between Iran and Sudan was signed in Tehran by the two intelligence services. The primary objective of the new agreement is to expedite Tehran's support for the Sudanese security agencies in sponsoring terrorism against, and subversion of, both domestic opposition and "other Arab regimes," according to Egyptian sources.
Meanwhile, Tehran and Khartoum decided on activating several existing contingency plans and some new drastic measures. A special committee including Sudanese and Iranian senior officials would be in charge of Somali operations. Egyptian sources stated the "purpose" of the committee is "to turn Somalia into a trap and quagmire for the U.S. forces through a guerrilla war against them." It was decided not to do anything before the situation in Somalia was closely studied. "The committee will follow developments in the American military intervention in Somalia and draft plans to resist it" through local organizations and the SIU.
Indeed, the committee's decisions were immediately reflected in the passivity of the SIU forces, as well as other Islamist forces, and their reluctance to confront or resist U.S. forces. According to a very knowledgeable Arab in Beirut, "It is no secret that in its monitoring of the American action in Somalia, SIU will not proceed out of Somalia's interests alone, but also from what the party considers to be the interest of Islamist internationalism, which Turabi seeks to establish through several frameworks he derived to attract Islamist trends worldwide. The SIU military action against the American presence in Somalia will be linked with developments in regional sensitivities connected with the international forces' scope of action in the region."
In late December 1992, Tehran and Khartoum were already anticipating a major escalation against U.S./Western forces. It was decided that a three-man team be established to oversee the crisis management. A Sudanese-Iranian joint command was also established including the head of Sudan's Military Intelligence, the head of Intelligence, a senior Iranian intelligence official in Khartoum, and the commander of the local Iranian Pasdaran units. "They decided on a variety of measures, including well-programmed operations against Marine units," said Arab sources. For highly specialized and risky operations, Tehran authorized the establishment of the "Somali Revolutionary Guards," made of Pasdaran and HizbAllah experts already based in Sudan. These "Guards" and Somali terrorists, who are controlled and sponsored by Iran, via Sudan, would provide "support and supplies for units of the SIU trained in the art of surprise suicide operations." They can thus be effectively utilized against U.S. forces the same way the HizbAllah had been used by Syria and Iran against the U.S. peacekeepers in Beirut.
Meanwhile, the Islamist forces also increased their preparations inside Somalia for the armed struggle against U.S./Western forces. These preparations ranged from agitating the population to specific military build-up. An Arab observer in Beirut noted, "Hostility toward a U.N. presence is manifested in Friday sermons in Somalia's mosques." Trained militants and fighters gathered in the SIU's camps in northern Somalia and the Ogaden. The flow of weapons from Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, via the latter, to these forces [has] intensified since late-November.
A coherent strategy for this struggle was emerging. The most likely considered by the Islamists in December 1992 was for Somali, mainly SIU, and "Guard" terrorists, to use the growing politicization of the U.S. presence (such as involvement in 'deal making' with warlords and tribes/clans) to promote fighting the U.S. presence to drive the American forces out before the United States achieves its real objectives. The SIU considered real U.S. objectives to be: (1) controlling the new oil grid in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen, which is the ultimate reason for, and hidden agenda behind, the "humanitarian" arrival of the Marines; (2) setting up a pro-American government in Mogadishu; and (3) advancing from Somalia into southern Sudan, which will then become "a region to wear out the Islamist question" the same way that Iraqi Kurdistan is being used to wear out Saddam Hussein, according to a Beirut Arab. Thus, under the conditions prevailing in late 1992, Islamist leaders ordered the escalation of the fighting in Somalia, and activation of the elite terrorist forces, only when they perceived the American actions to be threatening the strategic interests of Tehran and Khartoum.
Back in early-December, Turabi and others decided to conduct a thorough reexamination of the situation in the entire region, even if a crisis had not erupted. These consultations took place in the context of a conference of nineteen Islamist movements linked with the Islamist Revolution in Iran to be convened in Khartoum by Turabi. The Khartoum conference would examine the prudence of initiating a major escalation in the Horn of Africa in the context of such issues as Islamist subversion of Egypt, stability in the Persian Gulf, and the long-planned revival of Islamist international terrorism in Western Europe and the U.S. Indeed, this conference would prove a milestone in the escalation of the Islamist terror campaign against the U.S./U.N. forces in Somalia in the fall of 1993.
The Mother of Battles
Back in the winter of 1992, Turabi and others decided on a joint strategy to implement an Islamist build-up in Somalia. Indeed, the implementation of the first phase of the plan began immediately. Between late 1992 and early 1993, 'Afghans' associated with Iran's al-Quds Forces were deployed to several sites in the Horn of Africa, from Sudan to Yemen, including Somalia and the Ogaden, pending escalation. They included an elite unit of some 500 members of Yemen's Islamist Jihad, all of them 'Afghans,' who brought with them weapons and tactical experts, including high explosives, sophisticated bombs with remote control, ****y-trapped dolls, and a few Stinger-missiles.
Meanwhile, Iranian Pasdaran and Somali terrorists directly controlled and sponsored by Iran, were organized in Sudan to provide support and supplies for units of the Islamist Union trained in the art of surprise suicide operations. In addition, several hundred Arab 'Afghans' earmarked for intervention in Somalia were dispatched to training camps in western Sudan near the Libyan border for advanced training pending dispatch to Somalia.
These initial preparations were completed on time, in the middle of February 1993. On February 19, 1993, Iranian terrorist experts, who had just arrived from Tehran, and members of the Armed Islamist Movement's Higher Liaison Committee convened in Khartoum to closely and thoroughly study the situation in the Horn of Africa, Egypt, as well as the latest developments in the posture of the New York terrorist network. The experts were satisfied with the preparations and ordered the execution of the planned escalation of several outstanding terrorist contingency plans, in both Somalia and the United States. Senior SIU commanders took part in these meetings and were intimately involved in the decision to markedly escalate the armed struggle against U.S./U.N. forces.
Senior commanders of Muhammad Farah Aidid also took part in some of the sessions in Khartoum and agreed wholeheartedly to implement the Iranian-Sudanese plan. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Khartoum conference, over a period of six to eight weeks, Aidid and his key military and intelligence aides travelled repeatedly to Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda, to acquaint themselves with the other components of the master plan. Aidid himself travelled clandestinely at least twice to both Sudan and Iran in order to discuss strategy and methods of "dealing with the international forces" in Somalia as well as to coordinate "increased aid should the situation escalate into military confrontations," according to Arab and Iranian sources.
While in Khartoum in the early spring of 1993, Aidid himself held important meetings with Iraqi intelligence officials in the Iraqi embassy. These meetings and the subsequent arrangement with Baghdad, were organized by Turabi as a key element of his effort to further consolidate the strategic alliance between Iran, Sudan, and Iraq, with special emphasis on saving Sudan from U.S. intervention. Consequently, Baghdad promised Aidid extensive help "in the framework of a comprehensive confrontation plan created to resist the United States and international forces in Somalia, and turn it into a new Vietnam." Furthermore, Baghdad agreed to support Turabi in expanding other Islamist militant groups all over the Horn of Africa.
In the spring of 1993, the Mogadishu operation became so important to Baghdad that Saddam Hussein nominated his son to personally supervise the anti-American operations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa as a whole. Iraqi intelligence officials in Khartoum said Hussein was determined "to achieve a Mother of Battles victory in Somalia." Soon afterwards, the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum was expanded with the arrival of several intelligence and special forces experts, including members of Hussein's own Special Security Agency, who were tasked with supporting the "war scenario against the United States and international forces in Somalia." Turabi was recognized as the senior commander of this joint effort.
Several detachments of expert Islamist terrorists, including Iranian Pasdaran, Lebanese HizbAllah, Arab, mainly Egyptian, 'Afghans,' and local Islamist elements (members of Sudan's National Islamist Front, Somalia's SIU, Kenya's Islamist Republic Organization, the Islamist Front for the Liberation of Ethiopia, Eritrea's Islamist Jihad) were deployed by May-June, 1993. Some 3,000 of them infiltrated Somalia with extensive quantities of weapons and equipment. They arrived from Khartoum via Ethiopia and the Ogaden, as well as across the border from Kenya. At first they established training camps and storage sites in the Mogadishu area and rear sites in the Ogaden. These expert terrorists are specialized in gang wars, street fighting, ****y-trapped cars, commando operations, and sniping operations and are tasked with destabilizing Mogadishu. All this time, the SIU was receiving reinforcements and supplies on the eve of the escalation. Furthermore, senior SIU commanders arrived in Marka and Mogadishu in May to prepare for the escalation, to study conditions in the theater, and then return to Khartoum for further consultations.
In the early summer, after the deployment of terrorist experts was completed, the Islamist detachments, operating in and around Aidid's part of Mogadishu, began a series of ambushes and bombing attacks on U.S./U.N. forces in order to test the validity of the senior officials' reading of their reaction. These test runs culminated in the ambush of Pakistani U.N. forces. The first major escalation of the fighting in Mogadishu took place on June 5. The Western reading of the attack was that a major ambush of General Aidid's men killed the 24 Pakistani troops. It took a major intervention of the Italian contingent to relieve the Pakistanis from the intense Somali fire.
Aidid's Widening Alliance
In Somalia, this clash had an immediate and dramatic impact on the strength and cohesion of the Islamist alliance of Aidid, under whom a unified High Command emerged. Even allies-turned-enemies acknowledged that in his confrontation with the "oppressive" U.N./U.S. troops, Aidid consolidated and solidified a widespread alliance and popular support. The former president of Somaliland called Aidid a "hero" for resisting and confronting the West, especially the Americans. Aidid's foreign affairs adviser stressed that as a result of the operations against U.N./U.S. forces, many tribes and "trends" (political/military forces) joined the coalition and recognized Aidid as their supreme leader.
However, far more important events were already taking place elsewhere. In the aftermath of the U.S./U.N. reaction to the escalation in the fighting in Mogadishu, Aidid warned of a widespread escalation. "If they [U.N./U.S.] attack somebody, it will be the general public they attack," he warned. Soon after the subsequent clashes with the Pakistanis and the Americans, Aidid and several of his senior military aids left Mogadishu. Aidid arrived in Khartoum as a special guest of Sudanese President Bashir.
Aidid and his senior aides arrived in order to take part in special consultations conducted under the cover of a special session of the People's Arab and Islamist Congress chaired by Turabi and dedicated to condemning "U.S. genocide" against Muslims in Somalia and Palestine. Khartoum urged the Somalis to unite and show defiance in the face of the American assault. The June conferees decided to escalate the struggle and increase Islamist help for the Somalis. The conference also called on all Somalis to unite and resist U.S./U.N. forces. A leader of the Egyptian Islamist Jihad, and a close ally of Tehran, took part in the Khartoum conference.
The importance of the Khartoum conference can be realized from the presence of extremely high-level Islamist terrorist experts who also discussed and approved of clandestine terrorist plans for the 4th of July in New York.
The June Khartoum conference constituted a milestone in Iran's strategic approach to the region. With Tehran increasingly concentrating on escalating terrorism in Europe, in connection with the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and especially the United States, the Iranian officials gave a green light for Baghdad to assume a greater role in running the operations in Somalia. However, these operations remain under the tight control of a high command controlled by Tehran and Khartoum.
Another Vietnam
The mid-June Khartoum conference formulated the still valid Iraqi-Sudanese-Iranian "plan to confront the Americans in Somalia aimed at drawing them into land war, street battles, attack and retreat, and ambushes, as was done in Vietnam." Once U.S. forces redeploy from Mogadishu into seemingly safe areas in the countryside, new Islamist forces will be introduced into action, attacking them wherever they may be. The Khartoum conference also established a "General Command" for the Islamist International to conduct the planned escalation. Turabi was nominated the senior leader with others serving under him and directly responsible for military activities. Indeed, all of the planned operations in Somalia are but a part of the larger plan to expand the battle to other areas of the Horn of Africa, and to a broad, armed, mass mobilization against America and the West throughout the region, in a war taking on the dimension of a grand war of vengeance between the Islamists and the United States, whose outcome would be even more worse than the result of the Vietnam War.
The Escalation
Meanwhile, Sudan's minister of state for presidential affairs explained the logic of Sudan's intervention in Somalia. If the U.S. succeeds there, it will turn on Islamist Sudan. However, because of the Islamist intervention "the international intervention operations conducted in Somalia have achieved no success likely to encourage a similar operation in Sudan." In Khartoum, news papers and media blasted the U.N. operations, insisting that the U.S. sent the Pakistanis intentionally to their death so that Washington would have an excuse to intervene and return with full force despite the transfer of mandate to the U.N.. Khartoum also argued that the singling out of Aidid by the U.N. (the Pakistanis operated near his radio station when ambushed) constituted proof that the U.N. was carrying out Washington's anti-Islamist policy. Sudan's foreign minister warned the U.S. that "if they decided to interfere in Sudan they would be met with resistance and a declaration of Jihad."
The implementation of the conference resolutions became clear with the escalation of fighting in Mogadishu. On June 13-15, the U.S. conducted several airstrikes by AC-130s and helicopters. Despite the damage to facilities, Somali militia responded with stiff resistance to the ground troops and escorting Cobra gunships that tried to capture Aidid's house. Meanwhile, immediately after the conclusion of the conference, several of the key terrorist experts travelled clandestinely to Somalia, even into Mogadishu, in order to personally inspect the situation and assess if changes should be made because of the escalation. For example, one expert visited Somaliland as part of a delegation of Islamist clandestine experts sent to set up a new logistical system to sustain the anticipated flow of 'Afghans' and massive quantities of weapons and ammunition for the anticipated escalation in assistance to Aidid.
By now, the Islamist infrastructure was being consolidated. The main Islamist terrorist bases in Somalia are south of Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baardheere, Marka, and Galcaio (Aidid's back-up headquarters and storage site for heavy weapons, tanks, artillery, etc.) Iran established a logistical center in Bosaso to infiltrate anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, including SA-7s. Some 900 of Iran's own Pasdaran and HizbAllah forces have been deployed in Somalia for spectacular operations, as well as some 1,200 members of Iraq's elite Strike Forces [al-Saiqah Commando]. Both forces are "prepare[d] to participate in the all-out attack," noted Arab and Iranian sources. Moreover, the Islamist experts have already trained, organized and equipped some 15,000 Somalis in these camps and are ready to lead them into combat against the Americans. Large quantities of weapons and material were rushed from Sudan to Heergheesa in Somaliland, and from there to the Aidid forces. While Aidid's forces would have an increasingly high profile in the escalation in Mogadishu, the real high quality military assistance was being provided to the elite Islamist forces for carrying out the spectacular guerrilla attacks on U.N./U.S. forces.
The U.S. attack in Mogadishu on July 12 was interpreted by the senior commanders in Khartoum as the beginning of the escalation. Any uncompleted preparations would have to be conducted as operations unfold. Immediately, a meeting of thirty senior commanders, including foreigners and members of Aidid's forces, was convened by Aidid to decide on the beginning of the escalation plan formulated in Khartoum. They ordered the activation of the Egyptian contingent in Bosaso with operatives from Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and the Horn of Africa. These Islamist expert terrorists would operate under the cover of forces of Aidid (Mogadishu), Muhammad Abshir Mussa (north east), and Omar Jays (south and Kismayo). The Islamists were confident that the "war" had already begun in Somalia in mid-July, and that only escalation initiated by them will take place from there onward. So far, events in Mogadishu confirm their self-confidence.
Meanwhile, high level consultations took place between Sudan and Iran on the situation in Somalia. On July 13, a high level delegation arrived in Khartoum to discuss "closer collaboration and resistance" against foreign enemies, according to the Iranian and Sudanese Communique.. One delegate stated that "the presence in Somalia of the United States under the umbrella of the United Nations troops is a threat against Sudan." The Sudanese delegate concurred that the aim of U.S. forces is "to eliminate the Somali people." Back in Tehran, the chief Iranian delegate concluded his visit in a major Sermon. He explained that the Americans "go to Somalia and engage in those crimes. They wish to feed the hungry with their bullets! Even there their anti-Islamist intentions are very clear. General Aidid -- for whose capture they offer a reward and whose followers they are killing" is one example of the American anti-Islamist assault, especially considering that "his major offense is that his supporters have Islamist tendencies, and this is why they should be definitely suppressed and eradicated."
Attacks on civilian aid workers expanded during early July, not just in Mogadishu, but also in the entire central Somalia. This escalation reflected the widening alliance of Aidid. On July 12, Aidid forces issued a communique vowing it "will continue to fight until the last United Nations soldier departs." Special vengeance will be delivered against the American troops because they continue "to carry out their own genocide and massacre of the Somali people." Leaflets in English and Somali were spread all over Mogadishu, warning the citizens of an imminent attack on U.S. forces. Aidid's followers were urged to strike at the Americans in order to "avenge their dead." In another manifesto, Aidid urged Somalis to take on the superior U.N./U.S. forces despite the odds, and "sacrifice themselves for freedoms" while fighting "what goes against their dignity." Indeed, Aidid forces fired at the U.S. embassy and attacked other U.N. positions all over Mogadishu. Aidid supporters continued mass rallies and demonstrations. Sporadic attacks continued until the end of July.
Between mid-July and mid-August 1993, Turabi conducted a field inspection of the theater of anticipated escalation that will be conducted as a major campaign of the "Islamist Legion/Corps." Indeed, Turabi visited Somaliland to check on the conditions of supplies and discuss military preparations, his senior 'Afghan' commanders, and Aidid's senior military aides. Turabi also visited Mombasa, Kenya, where he met with leaders of the local Oromo organization as well as Uganda's Islamists, to discuss the expansion and escalation of the Somalia campaign into the "battle of all Islamists throughout the African fatherland."
Aidid's Propaganda Campaign
The new self-confidence was clearly expressed in Aidid's propaganda in the second half of July. A senior aide argued that the U.N. pursued a "policy of neo-colonialism [that] comes under the guise of humanitarian assistance and ensuring peace. These eventually lead to direct interference in the internal affairs of a country while pursuing policies of divide and conquer, creating confrontations, inciting people against each other, and selling and splitting them into tribes, clans, subclans, right down to family levels." Another senior aide stressed that "victory always went to the righteous Somali Muslim fighters, inflicting constant destruction and catastrophe on the infidels and collaborators." He warned that in view of the disastrous effect of Western/American influence, the only viable alternative remained struggle. "Let us continue our struggle in order to protect the dignity of our country and people. Righteous fighters are always victorious." In this struggle, American troops will only suffer "terrible consequences, dishonor and defeat." Aidid's radio repeatedly reported that the U.S.-led forces were intentionally destroying mosques and other historical Islamist sites. A noted Somali writer, declared that "Somali fighters have agreed to defend their country, the dignity of their people and their religion, and to make the neo-colonialists taste hell on earth. God willing, in the hereafter they will also be cast into hell even worse than that [in Mogadishu]. Let us kill them all, right to the last of these demoralized colonialists."
The extremely high profile of Aidid's propaganda, that attracted U.S. and U.N. attention to him, was actually a cover for the arrival of new participants in the Mogadishu urban war. The new Islamist force, called The Vanguard of the Somali Islamist Salvation, is a "Somalization" of Iran's Egyptian-led 'Afghans.' On August 3, in the first communique broadcasted on their own radio station and in leaflets, the Vanguard urged Somalis to escalate their Jihad against the "satanic" U.S. forces. Somalis must "launch a Holy War against the satanic troops of the United States. . .every Muslim is obliged to take part in this war." The very same day, Aidid's radio station stressed the Iranian propaganda line that the U.S. is the organizer of the world's terrorism aimed primarily at Muslim and Third World countries.
Stockpiling Weapons for the Holy War
Meanwhile, the Islamist forces in Somalia, both Arab 'Afghans' and Somali Islamists, were receiving an intense flow of last minute reinforcements and supplies of high quality weapons. For the main infiltration of experts and sophisticated equipment, several Afghan military pilots were recruited to fly small transport planes into isolated airfields in Somalia at night. Heavier equipment is smuggled nightly into Somaliland by a flotilla of small fishing boats operating out of neighboring countries, mainly Yemen and Kenya. From these points of entry, the weapons and people are smuggled by small nomadic caravans into safe houses in the Mogadishu area. A major outcome of this resupply surge was the establishment of a clandestine headquarters in Mogadishu from where a few Somali, Afghan, and Algerian experts in urban guerrilla warfare would run the imminent escalation. Also in early August, an envoy of Aidid visited Libya in order to arrange for additional financial and military assistance in order to implement the planned escalation of fighting against U.S./U.N. forces.
A Cycle of Violence
During early August, forces of Aidid and his allies were making last minute preparations for a major escalation of the fighting in southern Mogadishu. The Islamists, according to Arab sources, anticipated that "a decisive battle will inevitably occur between General Aidid and the international and particularly the American forces." Concurrently, highly trained Islamist units from the Habar Gidir tribe were first introduced into combat against the Americans. Under the name the Somali Islamist Salvation Movement (SISM), they claimed responsibility for the 11 August blast, by a HizbAllah-style remote controlled bomb, that killed 4 American soldiers. As expressed in their communique, "SISM has so far carried out several operations aimed at eliminating Yankees and their puppets, and managed to kill four devils of the U.S. Yankees." SISM explained that it was also waging "Islamist struggle against the infidels and pagans" in order to "restore Islamist law" in Somalia. Arab observers noted that "General Aidid's calls for Jihad have come to be transmitted from the communications media of this relatively organized Islamist group that is thought to have financial resources reaching it from outside the borders."
It was in Khartoum that the full gravity of the mid August escalation was best expressed. After consultations with Tehran, Sudanese President Bashir concluded that a U.S. military intervention against Sudan can be expected in late December or early January. Turabi and his deputy conducted consultations in early August on how to prepare for such an eventuality with emphasis being put on prevention of an intervention. Reflecting the mood in Khartoum, Brig. General Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Hussayn affirmed that Sudan was "on the road of Jihad and bearing arms to defend faith and the homeland." Simultaneously, Tehran linked the pressure on Sudan with the U.S. oppression in Somalia as part of the U.S. strategy to seize control of the Red Sea. In the aftermath of the escalation of the fighting in Mogadishu, Tehran warned of "the probability of a U.S. military operation against Sudan," as announced on Radio Tehran. Tehran was confident that, despite threats, Khartoum remained determined to continue its "struggle" with the U.S. Osman urged the establishment of an Iranian-Sudanese "common strategy" against the U.S. in order to prevent the collapse of the Islamist stand in the region.
Meanwhile, in Mogadishu, Aidid's radio stated that the crisis was "deepening day by day" and anticipated an inevitable explosion. Aidid also declared all U.N. forces legitimate targets in the struggle against the U.S. because the U.N. was serving U.S. interests and its troops were taking part in "the genocide and destruction pedalled by the United States of America." The propaganda theme repeated all over Mogadishu was that the U.S. was planning "to massacre innocent Somalis. . .to attain its colonialist objectives." Fighting in Mogadishu was but a part of a major offensive aimed at subverting the Somalis and inciting civil war. Aidid accused the U.S. of masterminding a campaign of massacres and terrorism, and urged Islamist solidarity with the plight of the Somalis. Aidid's radio predicted an imminent escalation in the attacks on civilian quarters of Mogadishu.
As before, the anticipated escalation was not without foundations. In early September, on order from Khartoum, the Islamist elite forces, under the banner of the SIU, entered battle against American forces. Even though they had been preparing for combat before the arrival of U.S. forces on 9 December 1992, SIU forces did not intervene in the fighting until now with Aidid conducting most of the fighting. On 3 September the SIU announced in Tehran that it had launched a series of attacks on U.N. positions in the Mogadishu area. On September 5, Aidid's forces joined battle and ambushed the Nigerian forces, killing seven soldiers. It took a massive intervention of U.S. troops and heavy fire support to relieve the hard pressed Nigerians.
Meanwhile, an Islamist religious leader went on Aidid's radio and urged "the Somali people to wage legitimate Jihad against the infidels, who have rolled up their sleeves to exterminate the Muslim Somalis." He also decreed that "it is obligatory for [people] to prepare for Jihad," and that therefore "[he] and the Sunni community are prepared to partake in a legitimate Jihad against provocative infidels." Aidid "called on all Somali people to trust in God and wage the sacred Jihad in unison against the imperialist United States."
Khartoum was now confident that the time was ripe for the next escalation. Expressing the Islamists' strategy, Aidid instructed his troops to "be ready, in concert with our friends and allies, to get rid of the Western occupiers of our country," and "send back American and Pakistani soldiers home in coffins." September 10 was the turning point, when the true escalation in the Islamist confrontation with U.S. forces started. The escalation began with a series of diversionary attacks by the Islamist Habar Gidir tribal forces on Somalis considered friendly to the U.N.. The U.S./U.N. forces that intervened fell into an Islamist trap. What appeared an intra-Somali clash suddenly turned into an organized ambush and attack on the U.N./U.S. forces. U.S. forces retaliated and escalated the conflict. Over the next day, they attacked sites of Aidid's forces even though they played only a minor role in the clash. Aidid interpreted the attack, and not without reason, as an intentional U.S. effort to affect the balance of power in Mogadishu. He ordered his followers into massive anti-U.S./U.N. street demonstrations as well as the shelling of U.N./U.S. facilities.
The inevitable result was the eruption on September 13 of fierce fighting between U.S. forces and Aidid's, including Cobra attacks on Aidid's key sites. Aidid's people claimed that American forces killed numerous civilians in their attacks and vowed revenge. A cycle of violence had begun. On September 15, Aidid and the Islamists launched a daylight mortar attack on the U.N. headquarters, and, in retaliation, the U.S. forces fired mortar shells at the site of Aidid's headquarters. Meanwhile, Aidid's supporters, mainly women and children, stoned U.N. patrols in the streets of Mogadishu. U.N. soldiers opened fire on the crowd in order to breakaway, further exacerbating the crisis. Confusion was increased by the repeated claims of Somali officials, all supporters of Ali Mahdi Muhammad, and Arabs that "Gen. Aidid is the one responsible for this confrontation."
In late September, Khartoum interpreted the marked escalation in the fighting in Mogadishu as a turning point in the Somali Islamist struggle that would ultimately lead to U.S. losses and withdrawal from Somalia. Tehran ridiculed the U.S. accusations of Iranian relations ("tactical alliance") with Aidid as a mere excuse for the U.S. inability to confront, let alone prevail over, the Islamist trend in Somalia. Aidid's foreign affairs man lamented the change in the character of the U.N. role in Mogadishu. "They [U.N./U.S.] came to help the Somali people but their operational method has become one of destruction, bombardment, and arrests with no recourse to law -- but rather to the use of force and the barrel of the gun."
The Explosion
The vastly improved capabilities of the Islamist-supported Somalis was clearly demonstrated on the afternoon of 3 October 1993. On that date, U.S./U.N. forces learned of the presence of two of Aidid's senior foreign policy advisers, Osman Salah and Mohammed Hassan Awale, at the Olympic Hotel. A hastily organized heliborne assault of less than 100 American troops was launched and both Salah and Awale, as well as 22 other Aidid supporters, were captured. However, what seemed at first to be a highly successful raid rapidly degenerated into a major clash for which the Americans were totally unprepared.
As the U.S. troops departed by helicopter, they fell into a well organized ambush led by over a thousand Somalis. Two UH-60s were shot down and a third crash landed at a Mogadishu airport. The troops established a defensive perimeter around the crash site, but were then surrounded and subjected to a sustained fire attack for some 11 hours until relieved by a U.S./U.N. rescue force. In the battle, 18 U.S. troops were killed, 78 were wounded, and one helicopter pilot was captured (and was released 11 days later). At least 700 Somalis, both fighters and civilians, were casualties of the battle, some 300 of them fatalities. The next day. Mogadishu celebrated a great victory as Somali demonstrators dragged the bodies of the American servicemen through the streets.
Numerous sources insist that the Mogadishu fighting of late September and early October was the beginning of an "Islamist" escalation. They attribute the sudden improvement in the performance of the Somali forces to the fact that Iranian-trained Somalis and Arab "Afghans," as well as troops of the Iraqi Saiqah Commando force, were directly involved in the Mogadishu fighting, particularly the fighting of October 3rd. The numerous reports provide a coherent, though not fully substantiated and independently corroborated picture of the events of that date.
Most sources agree that the October 3rd operation was the first major undertaking by Ayman al-Zawahiri, commander and field coordinator of the Islamist forces, and his staff in the Mogadishu area. These sources also agree that there were additional Iranian senior advisors, posing as journalists, with Aidid and his military commanders. (The Iranians' presence is also clearly reflected in the repeated interviews with Aidid on Radio Tehran and in Iranian magazines.) It is also believed that the intelligence information that tipped off the U.N. to the presence of Aidid's people at the Olympic Hotel seems to have been released as bait to trap the Americans.
The ensuing ambush was conducted by a hard core Islamist force led by Arab "Afghans" and Iraqis. The main strike force was comprised of SIU troops trained by the Iranians and Iraqis. The Arab "Afghans" (including Algerians and Egyptians) played a major role in organizing and executing the ambush and siege of the U.S. ground troops, while the Iraqis organized the heavy weapons, mainly dual-use 23mm guns and RPG-7s, for use against the American helicopters. The Iraqis were also instrumental in maintaining the external perimeter, blocking repeated U.S./U.N. attempts to relieve the besieged force. Reportedly, "Afghans" were in command of some of the Somali blocking forces.
There are conflicting reports as to the extent of Iraqi participation in the actual fighting. A few Saiqah Commando troops were definitely present on October 3, giving instructions to SIU fighters. It is not clear, though, to what extent these Iraqis actually participated in the fighting, that is, whether they were explicitly engaged in combat or acted in a purely advisory capacity. However, it is known that the Arab "Afghans" did take part in the fighting, with forces actively engaged at the front. As for Aidid's people, both militiamen and civilians; they were introduced to the battlefield in huge numbers in order to create the image of an enraged mob, to join the onslaught, take casualties, and ultimately to take blame for the attack.
In any event, the October 3 battle clearly demonstrated the growing Iranian and Islamist influence over Aidid and his entire Somali National Alliance. On the eve of the main clash, Tehran endorsed Aidid's position, as stated in a long interview with the Iranian newspaper Resalat, that the clashed with the U.S. forces were a spontaneous reaction by the Somali people to attacks on civilians by American forces. Aidid stressed that his Alliance was not involved in these attacks because
by
Yossef Bodansky
NSCF Senior Fellow
Attacks on U.S. and U.N. forces in Somalia were an integral part of an Iranian and Sudanese plan to transform Mogadishu into a "second Beirut" for Americans. Furthermore, this escalation is the first manifestation of a strategic alliance between Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. In early 1993, Iraq embarked upon a revitalization of its terrorist campaign under an Islamist banner, with active support from Sudan and Sudan's Spiritual Leader, Hassan al-Turabi. Baghdad is using 'Afghans' who have been retrained in Iraqi intelligence camps and who operate in close cooperation with the Iranian-controlled Islamist international terror network. Since late September 1993, these multi-national Islamist forces were able to inflict sizeable casualties on U.S. forces in Mogadishu in a series of urban battles that were popularly attributed to the forces of Somali warlord Muhammad Farah Aidid.
Powder Keg in the Horn of Africa
In the summer of 1991, events throughout the Horn of Africa highlighted an important process rapidly developing all over sub-Saharan Africa: the collapse of the state system and the re-definition of boundaries along ethnic and tribal lines. This process reflects the genuine aspirations of the local populations in their quest for self identity.
In reaction to these events, the West, the self-nominated guardian of the new world order, is suddenly confronted with this dilemma: To support the process in order to reduce the levels of violence and famine and to ensure as smooth a transformation as possible; or to help centralized regimes impose the retention of current state boundaries and political identities, thus further exacerbating turmoil and internal violence.
Although the lengthy revolutionary struggles throughout the Horn of Africa have been against ruthless, dictatorial regimes in both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, it is extremely important to closely examine the ideological motivations of the groups challenging these regimes. By the summer of 1991, these revolutionary forces had endured and prevailed after decades of armed struggle, maintaining the trust and support of the local population through times of unprecedented hardship and famine. This fact alone should have been sufficient in pointing to the genuine popular dedication to the leadership of these revolutionary movements and the ideologies for which they stand.
In Somalia, a clique of military officers loosely identified as the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP) had been in power since the 1969 coup. President Siyad Barre and most of the officers came from Somalia's smaller tribes, the bulk of whose population inhabits north east Kenya and eastern Ethiopia. "Pan-Somalism" -- the unification of all areas inhabited by Somalis -- has become the most distinct ideological character of the SSRP. For Somalia's indigenous population, however, there has emerged a contradiction between Mogadishu's preoccupation with the plight of Somalis across the border and the mounting oppression and impoverishment of the main clans inside Somalia.
The main revolutionary forces are ethnically based. Most important are the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). There are numerous smaller tribes, clans, and families which have allied themselves to these larger revolutionary force movements. By mid 1991, they were divided into two distinct groups: the northern movements -- the SNM and its challengers -- and the central movements -- the USC and its challengers. The natural inhabitation zone of the two groups roughly overlap the ex-British and ex-Italian colonies that had been united by the British in 1960 to form independent Somalia. Thus, the anti-Siyad Barre revolutionary struggle during the late 1980s was in essence a popular struggle against the centralized pan-Somalian identity and for the promotion of self-determination by the main clans.
Self-Determination at any Cost
A closer examination of the revolutionary struggle in the Horn of Africa, not just Somalia, demonstrates that the common denominator of all rebel movements is that of ethnic-, tribal- and/or clan- distinct population groups rising against a central government in a quest for self-identity and self-determination. Their declared objectives range from drastically changing the character of the states to dismemberment and the establishment of new states. Moreover, the movements demanding total independence were the dominant forces in the liberation struggle. In Somalia, for example, the SNM declared the independence of the northern province (recognizing the colonial boundaries of British Somaliland) on 17 May, 1991.
The situation in the Horn of Africa is further complicated by the strategic importance of the region. The Arab and Iranian-declared objective to "transform the Red Sea into a Green Lake" served as the catalyst for explosion. Toward this objective, which has been expressed repeatedly in Middle Eastern documents and in the media, Somalia was originally recognized as part of the Arab league and subsidized by Saudi Arabia. In 1991, the well-financed Somali Islamic Union (SIU) launched a propaganda campaign to unify all Muslim peoples along the Horn of Africa, namely, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. Several conservative Arab regimes led by Saudi Arabia began pouring money into this Islamist unity program. However, it would not be long before the SIU would become a close ally of Iran and Sudan.
The Crisis In Somalia: Playing Off U.S. Interests
By the fall of 1992, the Western World, including the United States, was horrified by the famine in Somalia. However, the crisis in Somalia was more intentionally man-made than the result of any natural disaster. The famine brought about not only massive fatalities among the civilian population, but reduced Somalia to a state of anarchy.
The main reason for this man-made catastrophe was the escalating tribal warfare for independence. By the fall of 1992, the struggle for self-determination was becoming increasingly Islamist, as was the power struggle between rival groups. Furthermore, this convoluted warfare was taking place within the context of an Islamist radical surge throughout the whole Horn of Africa. The key leaders of the Somali struggle for power were using famine as a decisive weapon of choice for determining the character of the civilian population in their fiefdoms. These leaders intentionally denied food to segments of the population they wanted to destroy, and fed only those groups whose allegiance they sought.
In late 1992, on the eve of the U.S. military intervention, the primary fighting in the Mogadishu area and the central coastal area were between extended families and sub-clans who were rallying behind key figures on the basis of personal loyalties. The main protagonists were General Mohammad Farah Aidid, the USC Chairman, who was supported by his own sub-clan and a loose alliance of extended families, and Ali Mahdi Mohammad, the so-called interim president of Somalia, and his sub-clan and a loose alliance of smaller extended familial clans.
The most notorious and cruel fighters of Aidid were the members of the Habar Gidir sub-clan. Historically notorious for its banditry, the Habar Gidir forces were lured into Mogadishu by promises of plunder and rape. Meanwhile, because of the anti-Siyad Barre revolt in the summer and fall of 1991, members of Barre's clans who had provided most of the city's services, including police, escaped in fear of the revenge of advancing Aidid forces. Thus Mogadishu was deprived of any semblance of police resistance. Moreover, the USC won support from an Ethiopian clan by allowing them to profit from selling stolen food in Ethiopia in return for ammunition.
At the same time, Aidid continued to criticize the U.N. and the West for supporting Mahdi Mohammad, and insisted that all the humanitarian aid was being brought into Somalia in order to consolidate Mohammad's power. Therefore, the USC's fierce struggle for the food was presented as a liberation struggle. On the other hand, Mohammad insisted that only he had the right to distribute the food and humanitarian aid. When the U.N. refused Mahdi Mohammad, his forces shelled the Mogadishu harbor and attacked distribution facilities. He attributed the attacks to frustrated "uncontrolled elements" in his force. In fact, Mahdi Mohammad remained resolutely determined to prevent others from eating if he could not control the food.
In the fall, Mohammad insisted that the anticipated deployment of U.S. forces meant recognition of his right to power. Indeed, Aidid threatened any foreign deployment with "unprecedented bloodshed" on 2 November. The U.S.C issued a more moderate communique on 27 November announcing that Aidid "consider[ed] the deployment of armed troops in Somalia damaging for our sovereignty and for our territorial integrity." However, on 1 December, both Aidid and Mohammad welcomed the deployment of U.S. forces on condition that the U.S. recognize each as the legitimate political authority in the country. They considered the role of U.S. forces to "help the transitional government to deliver food supplies," as expressed in a joint communique from Mogadishu. Both leaders also insisted that U.S. forces should fight the "gunmen preventing food from reaching the starving;" thus, in essence, each expected the U.S. to fight their respective rival.
However, in late 1992, it was Aidid who was taking the more credible steps to affect the distribution of aid. In early November, he organized and chaired a major meeting of the "elders and wise men" and other pillars of traditional Somali society in order to gain their support and the loyalty of their various forces. Having accomplished this, Aidid's forces immediately stormed and successfully seized control of fifteen main road junctions and local road blocks from "free lancer" bands.
From 13 November to 1 December, Aidid visited Kismayo, a key port, airport, and road juncture in the south and established several alliances with smaller revolutionary forces. Aidid reached agreements with revolutionary leaders in north and central Somalia, thus blocking any resistance from Somaliland and covering USC's central flanks. In this summit, Aidid described to the commanders "their obligations in areas under their control and told them to be wary of elements bent on harming the unity of the Somali people."
At the same time, Mohammad met with representatives of Ethiopia and Eritrea in an effort to establish his own coalition against Aidid forces.
Islamist Influence and Intervention in Somalia
Leaders of the Saudi and Persian Gulf Emirates supported the Islamist World Association and the World Muslim Relief Organization in their declaration that "only Muslim organizations have been doing [true] humane work in Somalia." Shaykh Abd-al-Rahman, a Saudi Islamist, accused the West of distributing humanitarian aid in order to implement "a suspicious plan aimed at partitioning Somalia [among] European countries. . .by fanning the flames of dissension among Somali factions fighting for government control." Dr. Muhammad Khalid Diftirdar, another Saudi Islamist, pointed out that the Muslim charities are committed "to safeguarding Somalia against the pitfalls into which it is being driven by foreign organizations through the aid they make available." This is part of a scheme in which the West "plans the downfall" of Somalia as part of effort "to infiltrate Muslim countries." The crisis, he explained, was part of "the battle that Muslim peoples face" all over the world. Therefore, the Islamist organizations focus on "returning the people to the Holy Koran and Islamist teachings and challenging the concepts fostered in the region by hostile and imperialistic forces."
The position of these Islamist organizations is important in view of the financial and political power behind them. The Islamist World Association and the World Muslim Relief Organization are a part of a wide network of organizations that answer to the Saudi fundamentalist, Islamist proselytization movement. The Saudi Government and the rich supporters of the Saudi fundamentalist movement financed Siyad Barre and his regime after he broke relations with the U.S.S.R in 1978 and until his downfall in mid-1991. The money was then transferred to, and handled by, a Somalian middleman named Mohammad Sheikh Osman. In the summer of 1991, Osman suddenly converted and became a member of Aidid's U.S.C central committee. He brought with him the continued financial and political support of the Saudi fundamentalist movement. (It should be emphasized that there is no known precedent of this Saudi movement, or these organizations, doing anything without the full, albeit tacit, support of, and encouragement from, the highest levels of the Saudi royal family.)
The escalation of fighting and deterioration of order in Somalia in the fall of 1992 was not accidental. It was an integral component in the Iranian-Sudanese struggle to consolidate and expand their strong hold in eastern Africa.
Additional Islamist Front training camps were opened and expanded in Sudan for fighters from Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. In the fall, Turabi, Sudan's Spiritual Leader, ordered the escalation of the campaign to destabilize eastern Africa as part of his desire "to realize his dream of becoming supreme Imam of a fundamentalist Islamist empire." Soon after, new cadres and expert terrorists were sent from Sudan to their countries in east Africa. The training and deployment of these terrorists has expanded since November.
The Somali terrorists were provided with equipment and weapons for the militia that they would train and lead. Some of these militia were operating within the ranks of the main Somali parties, while others remained completely independent, answering only to Khartoum. The Somali terrorists controlled and sponsored by Iran, via Sudan, were to be used against the U.S. forces the same way the HizbAllah had been used by Syria and Iran against the U.S. peacekeepers in Beirut in the early 1980s.
In mid-November 1992, Iran intensified its construction of major facilities in Port Sudan, including radio stations and command, control and communications facilities. Reportedly, Tehran and Khartoum signed a 25-year lease on the port. Iran also built military facilities in Suakin in the east. Both bases constitute the main forward Iranian military posts for regional operations and allow virtually unrestricted access to all of Sudan's airports and sea ports.
The Iranian-Sudanese Surge
In early January 1993, the mission of the U.S. Marines in Somalia had gone peacefully and without any major clash with local forces. However, the Marines had not yet made contact with the country's Islamist forces. For more than a year, Iran and Sudan had been engaged in a fierce campaign to consolidate their control over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. A Sudanese source in Cairo warned that "the Islamists' presence in Somali, Ethiopian, and Kenyan territories" are an integral part of "Sudanese efforts to impose Khartoum's influence in the Horn of Africa and set up an Islamist belt around Sudan."
Somalia, a Muslim country stretching along the all-important littoral of the Horn of Africa, had long attracted the attention of Khartoum and Tehran. The chaos in that country, fractured along tribal lines and immersed in fierce struggles for self-determination and power, made segments of the population and their power-hungry leaders susceptible to close cooperation with, as well as manipulation and exploitation by, Turabi's Khartoum. Indeed, by the time the U.S. forces arrived in Somalia, Islam was spreading among the ranks of the various tribal militia, and the armed Islamist movements in Somalia were growing rapidly.
The success of the Iranian-Sudanese surge in the Horn of Africa is a result of the personalities of the leaders in charge of these activities. Turabi himself was personally close to some of the local Islamist leaders. Indeed, he supervised many of the regional activities. The Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [of Iran] (IRGC), Gen. Rahim Safavi, and Turabi's deputy, Ali Uthman Taha, were directly in charge of the operations in Somalia itself. The training of Somali terrorists and others who would operate in Somalia was conducted under Dr. Ali al-Haj, one of Turabi's close aides and confidants.
Since the summer of 1992, the most experienced terrorist trainees were sent to the Iranian-controlled camps in Sudan. The Sudanese Labor Minister, who defected to Egypt in August 1992, described the situation in these camps at the time of his defection: "They receive tough training in all types of combat, violence, and assassinations -- to be sent, from time to time, to some neighboring countries to explore the situation, carry out limited and swift operations, and await the major plan devised by the Front to send its members to the countries chosen as targets for intensive activity. The list includes, respectively, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, and Chad."
In the fall of 1992, additional Islamist Front training camps were opened and expanded in Sudan for fighters from Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. This expansion was carried out under the personal direction of Dr. Ali al-Haj. New cadres and expert terrorists were sent from Sudan to their countries in east Africa. The training, arming, and deployment of these terrorists expanded in November.
Meanwhile, anticipating the need for a major escalation in the fighting in the region, Khartoum began organizing and training local 'armed forces' capable of engaging U.S. military forces. The main facilities of these semi-organized forces are located in a camp in Somalia's central province under the command of Col. Sulayman Muhammad Sulayman, a member of Sudan's Ruling Council. The militia force allocated for east Africa includes six companies and three battalions manned by 3,000 troops from Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Somalia, and Kenya (500 from Kenya alone). They are trained by IRGC experts from Iran and military officers from Pakistan. During the summer of 1992, a company from this camp fought alongside the forces of General Muhammad Farah Aidid against Ali Mahdi Muhammad's forces in Somalia.
As with all Islamist terrorist and subversive forces, the key to the effectiveness of the center -- Khartoum and Tehran -- to implement their grand designs is their access to, and influence over, the local strongmen. The key regional allies of Khartoum and Tehran clearly demonstrate the extent of Turabi's influence and appeal.
Turabi is very close to the leader of Somaliland, who proclaimed the Sharia [Islamic religious law) as the law of the land, and consequently enjoys Sudanese-Iranian assistance. In central Somalia, the most active and loyal strongman to Turabi is the former chief of police in Mogadishu. In addition, in late 1992, General Muhammad Farah Aidid was already receiving material and logistical aid from al-Turabi's front.
In Ethiopia, the combination of Iranian money and Sudanese pressure and subversion transformed the Oromo Liberation Front into the Islamist Front for the Liberation of Oromo. (As will be discussed below, this transformation has direct impact on the situation in Somalia.) In Djibouti, Turabi's strongest supporter is the uncle of the nation's chief of security.
Several of the local terrorist and irregular forces were under the influence of Sudan and Iran. Since early-1992, Turabi oversaw the emergence of numerous Jihad organizations of highly trusted Islamists from Eritrea and Somalia. The local Islamist organizations were strengthened in the Mogadishu area.
Turabi also created the Somali Islamic Union (SIU), as an umbrella for a few Islamist organizations with clan/tribal loyalties. Some of the organizations have been operating underground since 1985, while some of the newer groups act as the main vehicle for Iranian-Sudanese operations. In Somalia, the SIU was mainly "influenced by the guidance of Turabi in Sudan," according to Arab sources. Muhammad Uthman is the SIU's nominal leader, who issues political communiques via London but is not involved in actual activities in Somalia. The first massive military supplies arrived at Bosaso by ship from Sudan in May 1991.
Initial military operations of elements of the SIU took place in late-1991. The first organized operations occurred in June 1992 in an attack in the Bosaso area which proved indecisive. Therefore, on-site activities were consolidated in August 1992 by an Iranian-Sudanese delegation that arrived in Marka, Somalia for a major conference with local SIU commanders on future operations. The two senior officers in charge of Somalia operations personally led the delegation, thus indicating its importance for both Tehran and Khartoum.
Consequently, by the fall of 1992, the armed Islamist movement in Somalia was growing. The centers of Islamist militants were in Mogadishu, Marka, and Bosaso. Operating via Sudan, Iran was the primary source of weapons and funds for these movements. Several additional training camps for Islamists were established in Somalia and across the border in Ethiopia. Weapons and funds were channelled via Djibouti. In addition, since the summer of 1992, local Somali gangs have been reinforced by expert terrorists from Sudan and have been armed by both Sudan and Iran.
In the fall of 1992, once the media campaign in the West for a military-humanitarian intervention in Somalia began having an impact in political circles, Sudanese-Iranian activities escalated markedly. "In Somalia, Turabi's and Iran's horses are running at full speed in a feverish attempt to align a base, disciples, and followers in the atmosphere of the current famine," said Arab sources. The most important preparations were virtually completed on the eve of the arrival of the first U.S. Marines. In Mogadishu, for example, a new Islamist organization emerged and joined the fighting alongside the forces of General Muhammad Farah Aidid and received material and logistical aid from Turabi's Front. However, these Islamist forces disappeared just in time, virtually days and hours before the U.S. Marines hit the beaches.
The initial Islamist reluctance to fight U.S. forces was determined by Iran's and Sudan's overall strategy. The tenets of this strategy are clearly expressed in their reaction to the U.S. intervention. Islamists throughout the Middle East provide indications of the American threat and their desire to act as perceived by Khartoum and Tehran.
The Egyptian Islamist analysis of U.S. intervention, later emphasized by the Muslim Brotherhood, set the tone. They argued that the dispatch of U.S. forces to Somalia was part of a U.S.-Israeli conspiracy to prevent Arab/Muslim control over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Palestinian Islamists were apprehensive that the forces amassed by the U.S. under the excuse of supporting Somalia were essentially a prelude to a U.S. military strike against Sudan. As they stated, the U.S. was "annoyed by Sudan's successes in the Horn of Africa, especially Sudan's increasing influence in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the opposition in Kenya, which is expected to win the next elections." Even official Cairo conceded that "Sudan's turn [may] come after Somalia."
Old Imperialists in a New Game
In early December 1992, Dr. Hatim al-Husayni, a London-based Islamist ideologist, provided the most coherent Islamist analysis of the situation. He concluded that only a drastic, 'all-Islamist' action aimed against both Arab/Muslim regimes and the foreign forces could prevent another catastrophe. "This U.S. military intervention, on the pretext of humanitarian aid for the hungry, will consolidate the U.S. military presence in a new strategic region and strengthen the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. The direct cause of this U.S. military intervention is the Arab and Islamist failure to solve the problems of the Arab and Islamist nations. . .It is the return of Western imperialism against a background of Arab and Islamist differences and backwardness. It is a new Western direct military control of important and sensitive areas in the heart of the Islamist nation. It is a new proof of the Arab and Islamist governments' failure to solve the Islamist nations' problems through joint unified actions."
Expressing Tehran's view of the situation, the HizbAllah warned that the real objective of the U.S. intervention in Somalia is Sudan. The U.S. cannot tolerate the existence of Sudanese policy based on the Sharia that challenges and confronts U.S. interests. According to an official statement read on HizbAllah radio and extensively published in the media, "the [U.S.] return to the Horn of Africa is intended to confront the Islamist revival that shines from the Horn of Africa. This is not the first intervention and will not be the last. Washington must throw its weight and military strength against every Islamist or national awakening in any area that seeks to achieve independence and end subservient policies. This will be a common phenomenon by the end of this century and into the next." Therefore, only a resolute action could reverse this dire trend and ensure the progress of the Islamist revolution in the entire region.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1992, the military and organizational capabilities of the Islamists, especially the SIU, were not yet tested because their leaders had avoided exposure. This inaction, according to Arab sources in Beirut, "must be viewed as part of Turabi's strategy aimed at building an Islamist belt around Sudan. Turabi believes that such a belt would protect the experiment of making the country Islamist and turning it into a base for the Islamist movement in the Arab and African regions. The SIU has counterparts in Kenya, Djibouti, and other African countries. The common denominator is that they are almost wholly guided by Turabi's instructions."
At the same time, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Chad and Kenya were areas of major escalation of the Islamist drive. In these countries, Sudan and Iran were already engaged in a silent war with the local regimes over the future of the region, and not just the countries themselves. As Arab sources asserted, "Turabi's front is making penetration attempts as part of a plan coordinated with Tehran to export the Islamist Revolution." Indeed, some of the regional operations were already having a direct impact on the U.S. presence in Somalia. For example, in Kenya, the Islamist Party controls Mombasa, the main port of entry for West/U.S. cargoes, including supplies for Somalia. The SIU was maintaining "an almost daily relationship" with the Islamist Republic Organization in Mombasa. Moreover, Tehran controls the local economic elite made of the Oromo tribe of Ethiopian-origin that facilitates multi-faceted support for the Islamist subversive forces. As indicated above, the Iranian-Sudanese control over the Islamist Front for the Liberation of Oromo in Ethiopia enables them to penetrate, subvert, and strongly influence the Kenyan community through family and clan loyalties.
Another Beirut: An Islamist Strategy to Counter The Great Satan
Both Sudan and Iran were not only explicitly opposed to U.S. intervention in Somalia, but were apprehensive about the strategic ramifications of the presence of U.S. forces in the Horn of Africa. Thus, on November 28, 1992, the moment the U.S. declared its intention to deploy to Somalia, a large Iranian delegation, as well as some thirty members of "the intelligence, security and military services, economic experts and diplomats" rushed to Khartoum for an urgent meeting. As a result of the visit, a new "protocol for security cooperation" between Iran and Sudan was signed in Tehran by the two intelligence services. The primary objective of the new agreement is to expedite Tehran's support for the Sudanese security agencies in sponsoring terrorism against, and subversion of, both domestic opposition and "other Arab regimes," according to Egyptian sources.
Meanwhile, Tehran and Khartoum decided on activating several existing contingency plans and some new drastic measures. A special committee including Sudanese and Iranian senior officials would be in charge of Somali operations. Egyptian sources stated the "purpose" of the committee is "to turn Somalia into a trap and quagmire for the U.S. forces through a guerrilla war against them." It was decided not to do anything before the situation in Somalia was closely studied. "The committee will follow developments in the American military intervention in Somalia and draft plans to resist it" through local organizations and the SIU.
Indeed, the committee's decisions were immediately reflected in the passivity of the SIU forces, as well as other Islamist forces, and their reluctance to confront or resist U.S. forces. According to a very knowledgeable Arab in Beirut, "It is no secret that in its monitoring of the American action in Somalia, SIU will not proceed out of Somalia's interests alone, but also from what the party considers to be the interest of Islamist internationalism, which Turabi seeks to establish through several frameworks he derived to attract Islamist trends worldwide. The SIU military action against the American presence in Somalia will be linked with developments in regional sensitivities connected with the international forces' scope of action in the region."
In late December 1992, Tehran and Khartoum were already anticipating a major escalation against U.S./Western forces. It was decided that a three-man team be established to oversee the crisis management. A Sudanese-Iranian joint command was also established including the head of Sudan's Military Intelligence, the head of Intelligence, a senior Iranian intelligence official in Khartoum, and the commander of the local Iranian Pasdaran units. "They decided on a variety of measures, including well-programmed operations against Marine units," said Arab sources. For highly specialized and risky operations, Tehran authorized the establishment of the "Somali Revolutionary Guards," made of Pasdaran and HizbAllah experts already based in Sudan. These "Guards" and Somali terrorists, who are controlled and sponsored by Iran, via Sudan, would provide "support and supplies for units of the SIU trained in the art of surprise suicide operations." They can thus be effectively utilized against U.S. forces the same way the HizbAllah had been used by Syria and Iran against the U.S. peacekeepers in Beirut.
Meanwhile, the Islamist forces also increased their preparations inside Somalia for the armed struggle against U.S./Western forces. These preparations ranged from agitating the population to specific military build-up. An Arab observer in Beirut noted, "Hostility toward a U.N. presence is manifested in Friday sermons in Somalia's mosques." Trained militants and fighters gathered in the SIU's camps in northern Somalia and the Ogaden. The flow of weapons from Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, via the latter, to these forces [has] intensified since late-November.
A coherent strategy for this struggle was emerging. The most likely considered by the Islamists in December 1992 was for Somali, mainly SIU, and "Guard" terrorists, to use the growing politicization of the U.S. presence (such as involvement in 'deal making' with warlords and tribes/clans) to promote fighting the U.S. presence to drive the American forces out before the United States achieves its real objectives. The SIU considered real U.S. objectives to be: (1) controlling the new oil grid in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen, which is the ultimate reason for, and hidden agenda behind, the "humanitarian" arrival of the Marines; (2) setting up a pro-American government in Mogadishu; and (3) advancing from Somalia into southern Sudan, which will then become "a region to wear out the Islamist question" the same way that Iraqi Kurdistan is being used to wear out Saddam Hussein, according to a Beirut Arab. Thus, under the conditions prevailing in late 1992, Islamist leaders ordered the escalation of the fighting in Somalia, and activation of the elite terrorist forces, only when they perceived the American actions to be threatening the strategic interests of Tehran and Khartoum.
Back in early-December, Turabi and others decided to conduct a thorough reexamination of the situation in the entire region, even if a crisis had not erupted. These consultations took place in the context of a conference of nineteen Islamist movements linked with the Islamist Revolution in Iran to be convened in Khartoum by Turabi. The Khartoum conference would examine the prudence of initiating a major escalation in the Horn of Africa in the context of such issues as Islamist subversion of Egypt, stability in the Persian Gulf, and the long-planned revival of Islamist international terrorism in Western Europe and the U.S. Indeed, this conference would prove a milestone in the escalation of the Islamist terror campaign against the U.S./U.N. forces in Somalia in the fall of 1993.
The Mother of Battles
Back in the winter of 1992, Turabi and others decided on a joint strategy to implement an Islamist build-up in Somalia. Indeed, the implementation of the first phase of the plan began immediately. Between late 1992 and early 1993, 'Afghans' associated with Iran's al-Quds Forces were deployed to several sites in the Horn of Africa, from Sudan to Yemen, including Somalia and the Ogaden, pending escalation. They included an elite unit of some 500 members of Yemen's Islamist Jihad, all of them 'Afghans,' who brought with them weapons and tactical experts, including high explosives, sophisticated bombs with remote control, ****y-trapped dolls, and a few Stinger-missiles.
Meanwhile, Iranian Pasdaran and Somali terrorists directly controlled and sponsored by Iran, were organized in Sudan to provide support and supplies for units of the Islamist Union trained in the art of surprise suicide operations. In addition, several hundred Arab 'Afghans' earmarked for intervention in Somalia were dispatched to training camps in western Sudan near the Libyan border for advanced training pending dispatch to Somalia.
These initial preparations were completed on time, in the middle of February 1993. On February 19, 1993, Iranian terrorist experts, who had just arrived from Tehran, and members of the Armed Islamist Movement's Higher Liaison Committee convened in Khartoum to closely and thoroughly study the situation in the Horn of Africa, Egypt, as well as the latest developments in the posture of the New York terrorist network. The experts were satisfied with the preparations and ordered the execution of the planned escalation of several outstanding terrorist contingency plans, in both Somalia and the United States. Senior SIU commanders took part in these meetings and were intimately involved in the decision to markedly escalate the armed struggle against U.S./U.N. forces.
Senior commanders of Muhammad Farah Aidid also took part in some of the sessions in Khartoum and agreed wholeheartedly to implement the Iranian-Sudanese plan. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Khartoum conference, over a period of six to eight weeks, Aidid and his key military and intelligence aides travelled repeatedly to Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda, to acquaint themselves with the other components of the master plan. Aidid himself travelled clandestinely at least twice to both Sudan and Iran in order to discuss strategy and methods of "dealing with the international forces" in Somalia as well as to coordinate "increased aid should the situation escalate into military confrontations," according to Arab and Iranian sources.
While in Khartoum in the early spring of 1993, Aidid himself held important meetings with Iraqi intelligence officials in the Iraqi embassy. These meetings and the subsequent arrangement with Baghdad, were organized by Turabi as a key element of his effort to further consolidate the strategic alliance between Iran, Sudan, and Iraq, with special emphasis on saving Sudan from U.S. intervention. Consequently, Baghdad promised Aidid extensive help "in the framework of a comprehensive confrontation plan created to resist the United States and international forces in Somalia, and turn it into a new Vietnam." Furthermore, Baghdad agreed to support Turabi in expanding other Islamist militant groups all over the Horn of Africa.
In the spring of 1993, the Mogadishu operation became so important to Baghdad that Saddam Hussein nominated his son to personally supervise the anti-American operations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa as a whole. Iraqi intelligence officials in Khartoum said Hussein was determined "to achieve a Mother of Battles victory in Somalia." Soon afterwards, the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum was expanded with the arrival of several intelligence and special forces experts, including members of Hussein's own Special Security Agency, who were tasked with supporting the "war scenario against the United States and international forces in Somalia." Turabi was recognized as the senior commander of this joint effort.
Several detachments of expert Islamist terrorists, including Iranian Pasdaran, Lebanese HizbAllah, Arab, mainly Egyptian, 'Afghans,' and local Islamist elements (members of Sudan's National Islamist Front, Somalia's SIU, Kenya's Islamist Republic Organization, the Islamist Front for the Liberation of Ethiopia, Eritrea's Islamist Jihad) were deployed by May-June, 1993. Some 3,000 of them infiltrated Somalia with extensive quantities of weapons and equipment. They arrived from Khartoum via Ethiopia and the Ogaden, as well as across the border from Kenya. At first they established training camps and storage sites in the Mogadishu area and rear sites in the Ogaden. These expert terrorists are specialized in gang wars, street fighting, ****y-trapped cars, commando operations, and sniping operations and are tasked with destabilizing Mogadishu. All this time, the SIU was receiving reinforcements and supplies on the eve of the escalation. Furthermore, senior SIU commanders arrived in Marka and Mogadishu in May to prepare for the escalation, to study conditions in the theater, and then return to Khartoum for further consultations.
In the early summer, after the deployment of terrorist experts was completed, the Islamist detachments, operating in and around Aidid's part of Mogadishu, began a series of ambushes and bombing attacks on U.S./U.N. forces in order to test the validity of the senior officials' reading of their reaction. These test runs culminated in the ambush of Pakistani U.N. forces. The first major escalation of the fighting in Mogadishu took place on June 5. The Western reading of the attack was that a major ambush of General Aidid's men killed the 24 Pakistani troops. It took a major intervention of the Italian contingent to relieve the Pakistanis from the intense Somali fire.
Aidid's Widening Alliance
In Somalia, this clash had an immediate and dramatic impact on the strength and cohesion of the Islamist alliance of Aidid, under whom a unified High Command emerged. Even allies-turned-enemies acknowledged that in his confrontation with the "oppressive" U.N./U.S. troops, Aidid consolidated and solidified a widespread alliance and popular support. The former president of Somaliland called Aidid a "hero" for resisting and confronting the West, especially the Americans. Aidid's foreign affairs adviser stressed that as a result of the operations against U.N./U.S. forces, many tribes and "trends" (political/military forces) joined the coalition and recognized Aidid as their supreme leader.
However, far more important events were already taking place elsewhere. In the aftermath of the U.S./U.N. reaction to the escalation in the fighting in Mogadishu, Aidid warned of a widespread escalation. "If they [U.N./U.S.] attack somebody, it will be the general public they attack," he warned. Soon after the subsequent clashes with the Pakistanis and the Americans, Aidid and several of his senior military aids left Mogadishu. Aidid arrived in Khartoum as a special guest of Sudanese President Bashir.
Aidid and his senior aides arrived in order to take part in special consultations conducted under the cover of a special session of the People's Arab and Islamist Congress chaired by Turabi and dedicated to condemning "U.S. genocide" against Muslims in Somalia and Palestine. Khartoum urged the Somalis to unite and show defiance in the face of the American assault. The June conferees decided to escalate the struggle and increase Islamist help for the Somalis. The conference also called on all Somalis to unite and resist U.S./U.N. forces. A leader of the Egyptian Islamist Jihad, and a close ally of Tehran, took part in the Khartoum conference.
The importance of the Khartoum conference can be realized from the presence of extremely high-level Islamist terrorist experts who also discussed and approved of clandestine terrorist plans for the 4th of July in New York.
The June Khartoum conference constituted a milestone in Iran's strategic approach to the region. With Tehran increasingly concentrating on escalating terrorism in Europe, in connection with the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and especially the United States, the Iranian officials gave a green light for Baghdad to assume a greater role in running the operations in Somalia. However, these operations remain under the tight control of a high command controlled by Tehran and Khartoum.
Another Vietnam
The mid-June Khartoum conference formulated the still valid Iraqi-Sudanese-Iranian "plan to confront the Americans in Somalia aimed at drawing them into land war, street battles, attack and retreat, and ambushes, as was done in Vietnam." Once U.S. forces redeploy from Mogadishu into seemingly safe areas in the countryside, new Islamist forces will be introduced into action, attacking them wherever they may be. The Khartoum conference also established a "General Command" for the Islamist International to conduct the planned escalation. Turabi was nominated the senior leader with others serving under him and directly responsible for military activities. Indeed, all of the planned operations in Somalia are but a part of the larger plan to expand the battle to other areas of the Horn of Africa, and to a broad, armed, mass mobilization against America and the West throughout the region, in a war taking on the dimension of a grand war of vengeance between the Islamists and the United States, whose outcome would be even more worse than the result of the Vietnam War.
The Escalation
Meanwhile, Sudan's minister of state for presidential affairs explained the logic of Sudan's intervention in Somalia. If the U.S. succeeds there, it will turn on Islamist Sudan. However, because of the Islamist intervention "the international intervention operations conducted in Somalia have achieved no success likely to encourage a similar operation in Sudan." In Khartoum, news papers and media blasted the U.N. operations, insisting that the U.S. sent the Pakistanis intentionally to their death so that Washington would have an excuse to intervene and return with full force despite the transfer of mandate to the U.N.. Khartoum also argued that the singling out of Aidid by the U.N. (the Pakistanis operated near his radio station when ambushed) constituted proof that the U.N. was carrying out Washington's anti-Islamist policy. Sudan's foreign minister warned the U.S. that "if they decided to interfere in Sudan they would be met with resistance and a declaration of Jihad."
The implementation of the conference resolutions became clear with the escalation of fighting in Mogadishu. On June 13-15, the U.S. conducted several airstrikes by AC-130s and helicopters. Despite the damage to facilities, Somali militia responded with stiff resistance to the ground troops and escorting Cobra gunships that tried to capture Aidid's house. Meanwhile, immediately after the conclusion of the conference, several of the key terrorist experts travelled clandestinely to Somalia, even into Mogadishu, in order to personally inspect the situation and assess if changes should be made because of the escalation. For example, one expert visited Somaliland as part of a delegation of Islamist clandestine experts sent to set up a new logistical system to sustain the anticipated flow of 'Afghans' and massive quantities of weapons and ammunition for the anticipated escalation in assistance to Aidid.
By now, the Islamist infrastructure was being consolidated. The main Islamist terrorist bases in Somalia are south of Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baardheere, Marka, and Galcaio (Aidid's back-up headquarters and storage site for heavy weapons, tanks, artillery, etc.) Iran established a logistical center in Bosaso to infiltrate anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, including SA-7s. Some 900 of Iran's own Pasdaran and HizbAllah forces have been deployed in Somalia for spectacular operations, as well as some 1,200 members of Iraq's elite Strike Forces [al-Saiqah Commando]. Both forces are "prepare[d] to participate in the all-out attack," noted Arab and Iranian sources. Moreover, the Islamist experts have already trained, organized and equipped some 15,000 Somalis in these camps and are ready to lead them into combat against the Americans. Large quantities of weapons and material were rushed from Sudan to Heergheesa in Somaliland, and from there to the Aidid forces. While Aidid's forces would have an increasingly high profile in the escalation in Mogadishu, the real high quality military assistance was being provided to the elite Islamist forces for carrying out the spectacular guerrilla attacks on U.N./U.S. forces.
The U.S. attack in Mogadishu on July 12 was interpreted by the senior commanders in Khartoum as the beginning of the escalation. Any uncompleted preparations would have to be conducted as operations unfold. Immediately, a meeting of thirty senior commanders, including foreigners and members of Aidid's forces, was convened by Aidid to decide on the beginning of the escalation plan formulated in Khartoum. They ordered the activation of the Egyptian contingent in Bosaso with operatives from Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and the Horn of Africa. These Islamist expert terrorists would operate under the cover of forces of Aidid (Mogadishu), Muhammad Abshir Mussa (north east), and Omar Jays (south and Kismayo). The Islamists were confident that the "war" had already begun in Somalia in mid-July, and that only escalation initiated by them will take place from there onward. So far, events in Mogadishu confirm their self-confidence.
Meanwhile, high level consultations took place between Sudan and Iran on the situation in Somalia. On July 13, a high level delegation arrived in Khartoum to discuss "closer collaboration and resistance" against foreign enemies, according to the Iranian and Sudanese Communique.. One delegate stated that "the presence in Somalia of the United States under the umbrella of the United Nations troops is a threat against Sudan." The Sudanese delegate concurred that the aim of U.S. forces is "to eliminate the Somali people." Back in Tehran, the chief Iranian delegate concluded his visit in a major Sermon. He explained that the Americans "go to Somalia and engage in those crimes. They wish to feed the hungry with their bullets! Even there their anti-Islamist intentions are very clear. General Aidid -- for whose capture they offer a reward and whose followers they are killing" is one example of the American anti-Islamist assault, especially considering that "his major offense is that his supporters have Islamist tendencies, and this is why they should be definitely suppressed and eradicated."
Attacks on civilian aid workers expanded during early July, not just in Mogadishu, but also in the entire central Somalia. This escalation reflected the widening alliance of Aidid. On July 12, Aidid forces issued a communique vowing it "will continue to fight until the last United Nations soldier departs." Special vengeance will be delivered against the American troops because they continue "to carry out their own genocide and massacre of the Somali people." Leaflets in English and Somali were spread all over Mogadishu, warning the citizens of an imminent attack on U.S. forces. Aidid's followers were urged to strike at the Americans in order to "avenge their dead." In another manifesto, Aidid urged Somalis to take on the superior U.N./U.S. forces despite the odds, and "sacrifice themselves for freedoms" while fighting "what goes against their dignity." Indeed, Aidid forces fired at the U.S. embassy and attacked other U.N. positions all over Mogadishu. Aidid supporters continued mass rallies and demonstrations. Sporadic attacks continued until the end of July.
Between mid-July and mid-August 1993, Turabi conducted a field inspection of the theater of anticipated escalation that will be conducted as a major campaign of the "Islamist Legion/Corps." Indeed, Turabi visited Somaliland to check on the conditions of supplies and discuss military preparations, his senior 'Afghan' commanders, and Aidid's senior military aides. Turabi also visited Mombasa, Kenya, where he met with leaders of the local Oromo organization as well as Uganda's Islamists, to discuss the expansion and escalation of the Somalia campaign into the "battle of all Islamists throughout the African fatherland."
Aidid's Propaganda Campaign
The new self-confidence was clearly expressed in Aidid's propaganda in the second half of July. A senior aide argued that the U.N. pursued a "policy of neo-colonialism [that] comes under the guise of humanitarian assistance and ensuring peace. These eventually lead to direct interference in the internal affairs of a country while pursuing policies of divide and conquer, creating confrontations, inciting people against each other, and selling and splitting them into tribes, clans, subclans, right down to family levels." Another senior aide stressed that "victory always went to the righteous Somali Muslim fighters, inflicting constant destruction and catastrophe on the infidels and collaborators." He warned that in view of the disastrous effect of Western/American influence, the only viable alternative remained struggle. "Let us continue our struggle in order to protect the dignity of our country and people. Righteous fighters are always victorious." In this struggle, American troops will only suffer "terrible consequences, dishonor and defeat." Aidid's radio repeatedly reported that the U.S.-led forces were intentionally destroying mosques and other historical Islamist sites. A noted Somali writer, declared that "Somali fighters have agreed to defend their country, the dignity of their people and their religion, and to make the neo-colonialists taste hell on earth. God willing, in the hereafter they will also be cast into hell even worse than that [in Mogadishu]. Let us kill them all, right to the last of these demoralized colonialists."
The extremely high profile of Aidid's propaganda, that attracted U.S. and U.N. attention to him, was actually a cover for the arrival of new participants in the Mogadishu urban war. The new Islamist force, called The Vanguard of the Somali Islamist Salvation, is a "Somalization" of Iran's Egyptian-led 'Afghans.' On August 3, in the first communique broadcasted on their own radio station and in leaflets, the Vanguard urged Somalis to escalate their Jihad against the "satanic" U.S. forces. Somalis must "launch a Holy War against the satanic troops of the United States. . .every Muslim is obliged to take part in this war." The very same day, Aidid's radio station stressed the Iranian propaganda line that the U.S. is the organizer of the world's terrorism aimed primarily at Muslim and Third World countries.
Stockpiling Weapons for the Holy War
Meanwhile, the Islamist forces in Somalia, both Arab 'Afghans' and Somali Islamists, were receiving an intense flow of last minute reinforcements and supplies of high quality weapons. For the main infiltration of experts and sophisticated equipment, several Afghan military pilots were recruited to fly small transport planes into isolated airfields in Somalia at night. Heavier equipment is smuggled nightly into Somaliland by a flotilla of small fishing boats operating out of neighboring countries, mainly Yemen and Kenya. From these points of entry, the weapons and people are smuggled by small nomadic caravans into safe houses in the Mogadishu area. A major outcome of this resupply surge was the establishment of a clandestine headquarters in Mogadishu from where a few Somali, Afghan, and Algerian experts in urban guerrilla warfare would run the imminent escalation. Also in early August, an envoy of Aidid visited Libya in order to arrange for additional financial and military assistance in order to implement the planned escalation of fighting against U.S./U.N. forces.
A Cycle of Violence
During early August, forces of Aidid and his allies were making last minute preparations for a major escalation of the fighting in southern Mogadishu. The Islamists, according to Arab sources, anticipated that "a decisive battle will inevitably occur between General Aidid and the international and particularly the American forces." Concurrently, highly trained Islamist units from the Habar Gidir tribe were first introduced into combat against the Americans. Under the name the Somali Islamist Salvation Movement (SISM), they claimed responsibility for the 11 August blast, by a HizbAllah-style remote controlled bomb, that killed 4 American soldiers. As expressed in their communique, "SISM has so far carried out several operations aimed at eliminating Yankees and their puppets, and managed to kill four devils of the U.S. Yankees." SISM explained that it was also waging "Islamist struggle against the infidels and pagans" in order to "restore Islamist law" in Somalia. Arab observers noted that "General Aidid's calls for Jihad have come to be transmitted from the communications media of this relatively organized Islamist group that is thought to have financial resources reaching it from outside the borders."
It was in Khartoum that the full gravity of the mid August escalation was best expressed. After consultations with Tehran, Sudanese President Bashir concluded that a U.S. military intervention against Sudan can be expected in late December or early January. Turabi and his deputy conducted consultations in early August on how to prepare for such an eventuality with emphasis being put on prevention of an intervention. Reflecting the mood in Khartoum, Brig. General Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Hussayn affirmed that Sudan was "on the road of Jihad and bearing arms to defend faith and the homeland." Simultaneously, Tehran linked the pressure on Sudan with the U.S. oppression in Somalia as part of the U.S. strategy to seize control of the Red Sea. In the aftermath of the escalation of the fighting in Mogadishu, Tehran warned of "the probability of a U.S. military operation against Sudan," as announced on Radio Tehran. Tehran was confident that, despite threats, Khartoum remained determined to continue its "struggle" with the U.S. Osman urged the establishment of an Iranian-Sudanese "common strategy" against the U.S. in order to prevent the collapse of the Islamist stand in the region.
Meanwhile, in Mogadishu, Aidid's radio stated that the crisis was "deepening day by day" and anticipated an inevitable explosion. Aidid also declared all U.N. forces legitimate targets in the struggle against the U.S. because the U.N. was serving U.S. interests and its troops were taking part in "the genocide and destruction pedalled by the United States of America." The propaganda theme repeated all over Mogadishu was that the U.S. was planning "to massacre innocent Somalis. . .to attain its colonialist objectives." Fighting in Mogadishu was but a part of a major offensive aimed at subverting the Somalis and inciting civil war. Aidid accused the U.S. of masterminding a campaign of massacres and terrorism, and urged Islamist solidarity with the plight of the Somalis. Aidid's radio predicted an imminent escalation in the attacks on civilian quarters of Mogadishu.
As before, the anticipated escalation was not without foundations. In early September, on order from Khartoum, the Islamist elite forces, under the banner of the SIU, entered battle against American forces. Even though they had been preparing for combat before the arrival of U.S. forces on 9 December 1992, SIU forces did not intervene in the fighting until now with Aidid conducting most of the fighting. On 3 September the SIU announced in Tehran that it had launched a series of attacks on U.N. positions in the Mogadishu area. On September 5, Aidid's forces joined battle and ambushed the Nigerian forces, killing seven soldiers. It took a massive intervention of U.S. troops and heavy fire support to relieve the hard pressed Nigerians.
Meanwhile, an Islamist religious leader went on Aidid's radio and urged "the Somali people to wage legitimate Jihad against the infidels, who have rolled up their sleeves to exterminate the Muslim Somalis." He also decreed that "it is obligatory for [people] to prepare for Jihad," and that therefore "[he] and the Sunni community are prepared to partake in a legitimate Jihad against provocative infidels." Aidid "called on all Somali people to trust in God and wage the sacred Jihad in unison against the imperialist United States."
Khartoum was now confident that the time was ripe for the next escalation. Expressing the Islamists' strategy, Aidid instructed his troops to "be ready, in concert with our friends and allies, to get rid of the Western occupiers of our country," and "send back American and Pakistani soldiers home in coffins." September 10 was the turning point, when the true escalation in the Islamist confrontation with U.S. forces started. The escalation began with a series of diversionary attacks by the Islamist Habar Gidir tribal forces on Somalis considered friendly to the U.N.. The U.S./U.N. forces that intervened fell into an Islamist trap. What appeared an intra-Somali clash suddenly turned into an organized ambush and attack on the U.N./U.S. forces. U.S. forces retaliated and escalated the conflict. Over the next day, they attacked sites of Aidid's forces even though they played only a minor role in the clash. Aidid interpreted the attack, and not without reason, as an intentional U.S. effort to affect the balance of power in Mogadishu. He ordered his followers into massive anti-U.S./U.N. street demonstrations as well as the shelling of U.N./U.S. facilities.
The inevitable result was the eruption on September 13 of fierce fighting between U.S. forces and Aidid's, including Cobra attacks on Aidid's key sites. Aidid's people claimed that American forces killed numerous civilians in their attacks and vowed revenge. A cycle of violence had begun. On September 15, Aidid and the Islamists launched a daylight mortar attack on the U.N. headquarters, and, in retaliation, the U.S. forces fired mortar shells at the site of Aidid's headquarters. Meanwhile, Aidid's supporters, mainly women and children, stoned U.N. patrols in the streets of Mogadishu. U.N. soldiers opened fire on the crowd in order to breakaway, further exacerbating the crisis. Confusion was increased by the repeated claims of Somali officials, all supporters of Ali Mahdi Muhammad, and Arabs that "Gen. Aidid is the one responsible for this confrontation."
In late September, Khartoum interpreted the marked escalation in the fighting in Mogadishu as a turning point in the Somali Islamist struggle that would ultimately lead to U.S. losses and withdrawal from Somalia. Tehran ridiculed the U.S. accusations of Iranian relations ("tactical alliance") with Aidid as a mere excuse for the U.S. inability to confront, let alone prevail over, the Islamist trend in Somalia. Aidid's foreign affairs man lamented the change in the character of the U.N. role in Mogadishu. "They [U.N./U.S.] came to help the Somali people but their operational method has become one of destruction, bombardment, and arrests with no recourse to law -- but rather to the use of force and the barrel of the gun."
The Explosion
The vastly improved capabilities of the Islamist-supported Somalis was clearly demonstrated on the afternoon of 3 October 1993. On that date, U.S./U.N. forces learned of the presence of two of Aidid's senior foreign policy advisers, Osman Salah and Mohammed Hassan Awale, at the Olympic Hotel. A hastily organized heliborne assault of less than 100 American troops was launched and both Salah and Awale, as well as 22 other Aidid supporters, were captured. However, what seemed at first to be a highly successful raid rapidly degenerated into a major clash for which the Americans were totally unprepared.
As the U.S. troops departed by helicopter, they fell into a well organized ambush led by over a thousand Somalis. Two UH-60s were shot down and a third crash landed at a Mogadishu airport. The troops established a defensive perimeter around the crash site, but were then surrounded and subjected to a sustained fire attack for some 11 hours until relieved by a U.S./U.N. rescue force. In the battle, 18 U.S. troops were killed, 78 were wounded, and one helicopter pilot was captured (and was released 11 days later). At least 700 Somalis, both fighters and civilians, were casualties of the battle, some 300 of them fatalities. The next day. Mogadishu celebrated a great victory as Somali demonstrators dragged the bodies of the American servicemen through the streets.
Numerous sources insist that the Mogadishu fighting of late September and early October was the beginning of an "Islamist" escalation. They attribute the sudden improvement in the performance of the Somali forces to the fact that Iranian-trained Somalis and Arab "Afghans," as well as troops of the Iraqi Saiqah Commando force, were directly involved in the Mogadishu fighting, particularly the fighting of October 3rd. The numerous reports provide a coherent, though not fully substantiated and independently corroborated picture of the events of that date.
Most sources agree that the October 3rd operation was the first major undertaking by Ayman al-Zawahiri, commander and field coordinator of the Islamist forces, and his staff in the Mogadishu area. These sources also agree that there were additional Iranian senior advisors, posing as journalists, with Aidid and his military commanders. (The Iranians' presence is also clearly reflected in the repeated interviews with Aidid on Radio Tehran and in Iranian magazines.) It is also believed that the intelligence information that tipped off the U.N. to the presence of Aidid's people at the Olympic Hotel seems to have been released as bait to trap the Americans.
The ensuing ambush was conducted by a hard core Islamist force led by Arab "Afghans" and Iraqis. The main strike force was comprised of SIU troops trained by the Iranians and Iraqis. The Arab "Afghans" (including Algerians and Egyptians) played a major role in organizing and executing the ambush and siege of the U.S. ground troops, while the Iraqis organized the heavy weapons, mainly dual-use 23mm guns and RPG-7s, for use against the American helicopters. The Iraqis were also instrumental in maintaining the external perimeter, blocking repeated U.S./U.N. attempts to relieve the besieged force. Reportedly, "Afghans" were in command of some of the Somali blocking forces.
There are conflicting reports as to the extent of Iraqi participation in the actual fighting. A few Saiqah Commando troops were definitely present on October 3, giving instructions to SIU fighters. It is not clear, though, to what extent these Iraqis actually participated in the fighting, that is, whether they were explicitly engaged in combat or acted in a purely advisory capacity. However, it is known that the Arab "Afghans" did take part in the fighting, with forces actively engaged at the front. As for Aidid's people, both militiamen and civilians; they were introduced to the battlefield in huge numbers in order to create the image of an enraged mob, to join the onslaught, take casualties, and ultimately to take blame for the attack.
In any event, the October 3 battle clearly demonstrated the growing Iranian and Islamist influence over Aidid and his entire Somali National Alliance. On the eve of the main clash, Tehran endorsed Aidid's position, as stated in a long interview with the Iranian newspaper Resalat, that the clashed with the U.S. forces were a spontaneous reaction by the Somali people to attacks on civilians by American forces. Aidid stressed that his Alliance was not involved in these attacks because