Airborne jumps into northern Iraq + stories of 173rd

[2RHPZ]

Airborne jumps into northern Iraq
By KEN DILANIAN

Knight Ridder Newspapers

IN THE SKIES OVER NORTHERN IRAQ - Nearly 1,000 U.S. Army paratroops entered the
war in dramatic fashion when they jumped out of low-flying jet airplanes in the
dark of night and seized an airfield in Iraq's Kurdish-controlled region.

The bold, carefully planned mission by the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the 29th
combat jump in U.S. history, according to brigade officers. The paratroops, many
of whom are elite Army Rangers, flew directly from Aviano Air Force Base in
northern Italy, which is near their base in Vicenza.

Fifteen Air Force C-17 Globemaster transport planes deposited men and equipment
onto an air strip dubbed Objective Buford - near the city of Bashur, 30 miles
from the Turkish border. The men and a handful of women had trained to jump at
an altitude of around 500 feet and hit the ground at speeds of up to 17 miles
per hour.

Once on Iraqi soil, the units were to scramble with their rifles and 100-pound
backpacks to pre-determined meeting points, then set up a perimeter and traffic
checkpoints around the airfield, which has a runway 6,700 feet long.

The parachute assault, assisted by U.S. Special Forces soldiers working with
Kurds on the ground, was designed to establish an American combat force in a
region laced with ethnic tensions, said the 173rd's commander, Col. William
Mayville.

"I think our presence will act as a stabilizer," Mayville said. "Our presence
changes the dynamics of the environment."

The Bashur airfield was chosen as the site because it could handle repeated
landings by the 174-foot-long C-17s, Mayville said. The brigade decided to
conduct an initial parachute insertion, rather then ferry troops in by plane,
because an air assault ensured that a significant combat force could mass almost
immediately to protect itself, officers said. On Tuesday, 173rd commanders said
they were told that a Special Forces "A" Team was overrun by a force of 100
Iraqis in Irbil, about 35 miles from the drop zone.

"Nobody wants war," said Lt. Col. Dominic Caraccilo, commander of the 2nd
Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry, one of the brigade's two infantry
battalions. "But this is a paratrooper's dream."

The 173rd's operation is a major departure from the Pentagon's original plan for
northern Iraq, which called for the Army's heavy 4th Infantry Division, with
hundreds of tanks and sophisticated heavy weapons, to move into the north from a
staging ground in Turkey. The 173rd, a light infantry unit that lacks armor, was
slated to join that effort.

But the Turkish government declined to grant permission for U.S. troops to stage
from its soil, so the military's Central Command changed the plan. As it stands,
the relatively lightly armed paratroopers are "flapping out there," as Mayville
put it last week, with rifles, mortars, machine guns and anti-tank missiles. But
the colonel said he was confident that, with heavily armed AC-130 gunships
providing air cover, his brigade could handle any threat that presented itself.

The drop zone, within an autonomous Kurdish enclave, was considered
"permissive," meaning the soldiers didn't expect to be shot at as they descended
to earth with enough gear, food and water to survive for several days.

But commanders remain deeply concerned about a potential threat from Ansar al
Islam, a militant Kurdish Islamic group operating in the north. Kurdish
officials say dozens of Osama bin Laden?s fugitive followers, most of them
Arabs, have found refuge with Ansar. Last week, an airplane trying to land on
the Bashur field with Special Forces soldiers had to turn back after it was
fired upon, officials said.

"Don't underestimate what a big deal this is," Caraccilo told his troops as they
rehearsed the operation last week.

This reporter, embedded with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, was present during the
final mission rehearsals and was on one of the massive transport planes from
which troopers jumped. After the airfield is secure, the same planes will return
and land there with more soldiers and equipment. This reporter was scheduled to
fly in on one of those planes and remain embedded with the unit. Other Knight
Ridder reporters and photographers are operating independently of the military
in Northern Iraq.

The brigade is to establish its base of operations around the airfield. Future
missions could involve protecting key northern oil fields or ousting pockets of
Iraqi resistance. But among the force's main roles is to keep peace among long-feuding
Kurdish factions - and to separate the Kurds from any Turkish troops that may
cross into Iraq.

As a result, the young soldiers will find themselves having to make careful
decisions about the use of force in an area where men carrying rifles are a
feature of the landscape - but not necessarily a threat to the Americans. Two
civilian Kurdish interpreters are accompanying the unit, and last week, troopers
practiced stopping traffic at checkpoints.

"Just because someone is carrying an AK-47, men, that doesn't mean they're the
enemy," Sgt. 1st Class Jason Gueringer told his platoon on the eve of the
mission, as he helped deliver the operations order to grim-faced 19- and 20-year-olds
in a secure room on the Camp Ederle installation in Vicenza.

Summing up the area's geopolitical quandary in what he called "grunt-speak,"
Gueringer added: "The Kurds hate the Turks. The Turks don't give a s--- about
the Kurds. That presents a problem, right? The Kurds want their own state. We
don't want that, and the Turks won't have that. So, there's a huge political
sensitivity, you know, huge big pivotal things to look at here. This is big-level
political stuff, men, and it could potentially turn into a nightmare."

If American troops hope to guard against Kurdish separatist inclinations, they
are also there to dissuade Turkey from making any bold moves in Northern Iraq,
commanders said.

Among Turkey's large Kurdish population is a minority of violent extremists who
have pressed for an independent Kurdistan, and Turkey has sometimes used brutal
methods to suppress them. Turkey has threatened to invade if the Kurds try to
establish an independent state.

Turkey held up approving overflight rights for the mission until the last
possible moment, said those involved in planning it.

"I think CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] really wanted to twist a grapefruit in
the Turks' face," said one officer involved in planning the mission. "It?s like,
you want to [mess] around with us? Bam, here's 1,000 U.S. paratroopers."

The troops jumped in with their Alice rucksacks attached to their waists, packed
to the gills with ammunition and gear - including three MRE rations, six quarts
of water, a Kevlar helmet, a protective mask and chemical suit, knee pads and
wind goggles. Some carried radios and machine gun parts.

When they were about 100 feet from the ground, they were supposed to release
their packs on a 15-foot rope so those hit the ground first.

For the rest of their essential equipment, including their body armor and
additional cold weather gear, they had to pack a separate duffle bag, known as
the "A" bag, which was expected to arrive in a separate plane a few days after
the jump. A third bag, called the "B" bag, is filled with non-essential items
such as running shoes. The troops are convinced they will never see their "B"
bags.

While many in the brigade are veterans with dozens of practice parachute jumps
under their belts, some of the troops are just out of basic training, and others
hadn't jumped from an airplane for years, since the five training jumps they
completed in parachute school. Yet to a person, the troopers said they were
proud and excited about the mission.

"It's nice to be part of it after watching it on CNN," said Brian Gaudette, 20,
of Eugene, Oregon. "Our grandparents had World War II, other people had the Gulf
War. This is something we can do."

Said Spc. Jonathan Bourne, 25, of Myrtle Beach, SC: "I think we're making
history. Making history and changing the world."

Ken Dilanian reports for The Philadelphia Inquirer.

[2RHPZ]

Keen observation on patrol yields weapons cache

By Sgt. First Class Todd Oliver, SETAF Public Affairs

Under a blazing sun, with temperatures soaring to 100 degrees and above, the
paratroopers of 1st platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion 508th Infantry (Airborne)
prepared to do what they?ve been doing for the last month here in Iraqi. They
lined up on the street among rows of cinder block and adobe houses. The street,
like all the streets in this small, nameless village, is strewn with filth.
Garbage and pools of stale water do nothing but add a stench to the air under
the punishing sun.

Still, the men say they are glad to be out of the back of the five-ton truck
that brought them here. The miles and miles driven in a constant dust cloud are
behind them for the time being, and now they can stretch their legs a bit.

A dog barks and a crowd is already forming, curious about the American presence
here. Small children, normally the most outgoing, approach curiously, saying
hello or asking, ?what you name,? in broken, memorized English.

And still, the sun beats down.
The soldiers are here to show the Iraqi people that Americans are in the
neighborhood and to look for weapons. Not the weapons of mass destruction
everyone seems to focus on, although they would surely be interested in those,
but the rifles, pistols and rocket propelled grenades that are so prevalent in
this country.

As the five-ton drives off the team moves slowly down the dirt road?kicking up
balls of dust in their wake. Faces peek out from behind gates and through
windows. A few people stand on the curb and offer a cautious wave, the
paratroopers wave back and continue their patrol down the road.

The road ends in a ?T? intersection, straight ahead is a field. ?Go right, wait,
no left,? is the command, barked from the rear of the patrol as the team
approaches the intersection.

It?s here where Spc. Eric Briggs notices something?something odd in a land of
oddities. A man, who moments before had walked into the field carrying
something, is now walking out empty-handed.

Across the street to the man´s left is Sgt. Jason Weaver. Weaver, upon hearing
the news, tells the squad to take a knee and goes with Briggs to investigate.

It pays off. Folded inside a blanket are two loaded AK-47 rifles.

A blur of activity follows. The soldiers, in an attempt to apprehend the man who
they suspected hid the rifles, quickly locate the house they believe he fled
into. A seemingly vicious and mangy dog makes threatening moves as they rush the
house. A confused, yet choreographed scene follows.

Among the wails of the distressed mother and the cries of the two small
children, several of the soldiers enter the house to search for the man they saw
and to look for more weapons.

Rifles at the ready, the men clear the building while the rest of the team
tries, without much success, to calm the family outside.

It?s all for naught though as neither can be found. He had either jumped the
fence or blended into the crowd now gathering to watch the scene unfold.

The team regroups and they move out. This time their objective was a building
with pictures of tanks and rifles painted on the sides, an abandoned Iraqi
military facility.

?Today was somewhat typical of what we?ve been doing,? said 2nd Lt. Brendan
Fitzpatrick, platoon leader, who was resting in the shade with his platoon. They
were covered head to toe in sweat and grime from the ever-present dust.
?Normally, when we go to different villages people will tell us about a weapons
cache, this is the first one we?ve found on our own.

Fitzpatrick runs though the list of weapons they´ve found in just the past week.

?Several caches of mortars, several different mortar tubes, 10 to 15 AK-47s and
couple of assorted different weapons here and there.

?Every time we hit the ground we found weapons,? said Platoon Sergeant, Sgt. 1st
Sgt. Vincent Askew. ?The squad leader just have a knack for it.

?We look at these kids, these American soldiers, who are just 18 and 19 years
old and we don?t think about what they are capable of,? said Sgt. 1st Sgt.
Vincent Askew. ?We ask them to go into a room we know has ordinance in it, or we
ask them to rush somewhere where we know someone has a weapon and they do it. We
don?t give them enough credit for their guts and skill.

?Its kind of bad to say you?re getting used to something like this, because you
don?t want to get complacent,? said squad leader Staff Sgt. Natividad. ?But at
the same time you pretty much know where you have to be and what you have to do.
This is what we?re trained for and this is what we do. It?s good to finally put
your training to use.

Outside the compound, the convoy arrives, but this time there is a crowd,
numbering around 100. The looks of distrust have seemingly disappeared, smiles
line people faces and more then a few hands are shook. Though far from a
?festive? atmosphere, it?s apparent that the presence of Americans here, at
least, isn?t something that spurs fear, resentment or anger.

We see these people and we see they?re living conditions. It could be a wealthy
place,? he continued. ?I don?t know what they?ve been through, but people come
up to you and shake your hands, some people come up crying, it?s really
heartwarming to see that these people are finally going to get something. But
it´s up to them now.

[2RHPZ]

Soldiers sweep up the filth in Al Huwija

Raid turns up Baath Party book

Spc. Brandon Aird, 173rd Public Affairs

With lights out and night vision goggles on a convoy of over a 1,000 soldiers
slipped into Al Huwija, Iraq Dec. 2. The weather was lending a helping hand this
morning with a very heavy fog settling in for the two-hour drive down concealing
the massive convoy.

The temperature this morning dipped down into the low 30?s, which further helped
keep locals off the streets until the soldiers were in position.

By the time the sun showed it?s face in Al Huwija the whole city was surrounded
by soldiers, tactical checkpoints were setup and soldiers were already searching
houses.

Paratroopers of 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry Regiment and 2nd
Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment conducted house to house searches
while soldiers of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division surrounded
the city with Bradley Fighting Vehicles, M1 Abram tanks, 113 Armored Personnel
Carriers.

The soldiers were searching for persons of interest, weapons, and improvised
explosive device making material.

Al Huwija has been a hotbed for enemy activity since the 173rd Airborne Brigade
and 4th ID arrived in the region. In recent months a string of IED?s, rocket
propelled grenade attacks on the road leading from Kirkuk to Al Huwija has sent
numerous soldiers on a one-way ticket out of Iraq.

Even though in recent months all three battalions have had soldiers wounded or
killed by residents of Al Huwija and its surrounding areas, soldiers are still
professional and respectful to residents.

Paratroopers of Chosen Company, 2-503rd, even went as far as to wipe the mud off
their boots and inform residents what they were searching for and why before
entering homes.

Were not here to kick innocent peoples doors down and scare them to death,?
said Sgt. William Higginbotham III, a squad leader in Chosen Company. ?Were not
going to let down on security, but if your respectful to residents they?ll
respect you.?

Higginbotham?s theory paid off in the first house he searched. Before searching
the house he had his interpreter explain to the man of the house that all
Higginbotham wanted were his weapons. He wasn?t here to tare apart his house or
steal his belongings.

The homeowner along with his wife and kid led Higginbotham and few members of
his squad into a back room where he pulled out a brand new AK-47 that was hidden
under some floorboards underneath the bed. Before leaving the house the resident
thanked Higginbotham for wiping the mud of his boots before entering the house
and for waiting for his wife to finish up in the bathroom.

We didn?t want to disturb the man?s wife, so we waited until she was done in
the bathroom before we searched the house,? Higginbotham said.

Higginbotham?s squad continued their search for weapons with a few more
residents turning over weapons without a search.

Half way through their search Higginbotham?s squad got very nice surprise in
abandoned lot.

I saw a fresh pile of dirt and I thought it looked suspicious,? said Sergeant 1st
Class Danny G. Boivin, a platoon leader in Chosen Company.

Boivin moved the dirt around with his foot and found a buried bag. Along with
Higginbotham, Boivin dumped the bag?s contents onto the ground and out came a
brand new AK-47.

?When we found the AK we got a call over the radio that 508th found eight rocket
propelled grenade launchers buried in someone?s front yard,? said Boivin. ?So I
had the squad (Higginbotham?s squad) continue searching the lot.?

A few yards away from where the AK-47 was buried a stack of old tires revealed a
large bag of AK-47 and MP-5 magazines loaded with new ammo.

?After finding the bag of ammo we removed all the tires and found another bag,?
said Higginbotham.

Inside that bag was a DVD box with 2.5 million new Iraqi Dinars inside- about
year and half?s salary in Iraq ($1250 U.S. dollars).

Boivin called Capt. Arie Richards, Chosen Company?s commander, on the radio and
informed him what they had found. At the same time a man who lived next door to
the vacant lot claimed the money was his, but the AK-47 wasn?t.

Richards arrived on the scene and told the translator to tell the man he knew he
was lying and if he didn?t start telling the truth he was going to jail. The man
admitted he buried the weapon, magazines and the money when he saw American
troops because he was afraid they?d steal his money.

Were not here to take your money,? said Richards. ?But we can?t let you keep
the AK-47 and ammo.

The money was returned to the surprised man, but the weapon and ammo was
confiscated.

Higginbotham?s squad stopped searching for a few minutes to enjoy a Jimmy Dean.
After eating Higginbotham got the call that his squad was to pull security for a
speaker team who?s mission was to patrol through Al Huwija broadcasting a
message explaining why Coalition forces were searching homes.

We drove around trying to get the enemy to shoot at us,? said Pfc. Noorani
Aleem, a Mark 19 gunner in Chosen Company. ?If someone would have shot at us we
would of opened up like it was the Fourth of July.

No one shot at the speaker team. Residents came outside and stood in the muddy
streets cheering on the paratroopers and giving them the thumbs up.

After Chosen?s Company?s area was searched and cleared they waited for the rest
of the battalion and then started the long convoy back to Kirkuk in the rain.

The mission ended up being a complete success,? said 1st Sgt. Michael
Stribiling, First Sergeant of Alpha Company, 1-508th. ?My company alone nabbed
one person of interest (a local Ba?ath Party Official). We also had a guy walk
up to us at a TCP and give us a book listing over 200 Ba?ath Party Officials.
That was a massive find and I?m pretty sure it made Colonel?s day (Col. William
Mayville, Commander of 173rd Airborne Brigade).

[2RHPZ]

Securing Northern Iraq is harder then it looks

Tough decisions, real answers

Spc. Brandon Aird, 173d Airborne Brigade Public Affairs

Paratroopers from 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne), 173rd Airborne
Brigade, haven?t had it easy in Iraq. Throughout most of their deployment, the
1-508th Inf. (Abn) has been deployed in forward operating urban patrol bases,
far forward from the rest of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Because 1-508th has
been deployed forward and usually live in the most dangerous towns in Northern
Iraq, they?ve sustained the most casualties in the brigade.

During the hot summer months in Al Huwija, 1-508th Inf (Abn) was constantly
ambushed during the day. The only thing they had to look forward to at night was
a barrage of mortars, courtesy of the ?Mad Mortarmen.? The Mad Mortarmen is what
1-508th Inf (Abn) named the group of Iraqis who constantly harassed them at
night with mortar barrages. Luckily for the 1-508th, the Mad Mortarmen didn?t
have the best aim.

After moving operations southwest to Daquq and Tuz, to prevent people like the
Mad Mortarmen from entering Northern Iraq, 1-508th Inf (Abn) was met with more
ambushes and attacks. The unit commander, Lt. Col. Harry Tunnell?s convoy was
ambushed with rocket-propelled grenades and machinegun fire. Tunnell was shot in
the leg and was medevaced out of Iraq.

Shortly after Tunnell?s convoy was ambushed, 1st Lt. David Bernstein and Pfc.
John Hart, soldiers in Charlie Company, were killed when their convoy also came
under attack from rocket-propelled grenades and machinegun fire.

Bernstein and Hart were in the last vehicle in a quick reaction force convoy.
They got cut off from the rest of the convoy when guerilla fighters shot a RPG
at their vehicle causing the driver, Spc. Joshua Sams, Charlie Company, to lose
control of the vehicle and crash into a dirt berm. The vehicle came to a stop on
top of Sams? arm. Bernstein, mortally wounded from a gunshot wound to the leg,
crawled over to Sams? side under direct fire, and pushed on the gas pedal with
his hand, moving the vehicle forward off of Sams? arm. Bernstein collapsed
shortly afterward and died. The RPG explosion caused killed Hart who was in the
back of the humvee.

A tactical checkpoint, Echo Four, was set up 35 miles south of Tuz by Alpha
Company in an effort to prevent such ambushes, and keep the guerilla fighters in
Southern Iraq. A platoon of soldiers was manning Echo Four when it came under a
massive coordinated attack.

?It was a scene right out of Full Metal Jacket,? said 1st Sgt. Michael
Stribling, first sergeant of Alpha Company, comparing it to a famous movie based
during the Vietnam War. ?My guys were down at Echo Four when armor-piercing
rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and machinegun fire bombarded the compound.
The attackers were firing on my guys from behind a second ridgeline. At night,
it looked to my guys that they were being fired upon from the first ridgeline.
These Iraqis were pretty smart.?

No one was injured in that attack, but it caused a lot of work to be done at
Echo Four, which is 45 minutes away from any help. The 1st Platoon built two
bunkers inside the compound and 16 heavily sandbagged guard towers along the
walls. They even renamed the tactical checkpoint ?Helm?s Deep?? inspired by the
fortress that couldn´t be taken by the Armies of Mordor in the fantasy movie
Lord of the Rings.

A platoon of Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) has been assigned to Helm?s Deep.
Alpha Company is training the ICDC soldiers so when the time comes for Alpha
Company to leave Iraq the Iraqi soldiers will be physically and mentally
prepared to take over Helm?s Deep.

The last few weeks at Helm?s Deep have been relatively quiet. Iraqis show up
with tales of being robbed by the notorious highway bandits, but unfortunately
nothing can usually be done.

One night a man walked up to the checkpoint and told Abut Halik, an ICDC
soldier, how one of the bandits robbed him of his car at gunpoint.

The driver was asked to give a sick man a ride to a hospital in Kirkuk. He drove
through the checkpoint coming from south of Tuz and was searched by two ICDC
soldiers. After driving a little bit north, the passenger said, ?he needed to
relieve himself.? The driver pulled over and the ?sick man? pulled a pistol on
the driver. The driver had to walk five miles back to the checkpoint, and was
mad at the ICDC soldiers for not finding the weapon.

The guy was mad at me,? said Halik. Not my fault: he is idiot.

Many of these minor altercations with the bandits the ICDC soldiers can handle.
Alpha Company has switched roles, and is only there to train, observe and
protect the ICDC soldiers in event of another large attack.

?We?ve been giving the them classes on field sanitation, muzzle awareness, basic
rifle marksmanship, and different patrol procedures,? said Staff Sgt. Antonio C.
Medina, a squad leader in 3rd Platoon. ?Every night we take them out on patrols.
We?ve handed over the actual checkpoint over to the ICDC soldiers, but we still
keep one of our guys out there to keep the ICDC soldiers honest.?

The Iraqi soldiers that are living at Helm?s Deep are the same ones Alpha
Company helped train a few months earlier.

?The ICDC soldiers have come along way since the first day of training,? Medina
said. ?Their appearance and discipline has improved enormously. The care of
their equipment is still lacking, but their slowly picking it up.?

?The ICDC soldiers are still giving us some heart attacks,? said Pfc. Nicholas
Duplesis, a M-249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner in 3rd Platoon. ?The ICDC
soldiers have had four accidental discharges in the last two weeks while manning
checkpoint. Believe it or not, that?s an improvement.?

The ICDC soldiers are improving and have started participating in all of Alpha
Company?s missions. With new information, Alpha Company along with the ICDC
soldiers raided different homes in the Tuz area Jan. 2 looking for the highway
bandits.

Staff Sgt. Randy Morrow?s squad (Alpha Company) along with ICDC soldiers were
going through a gate when a suspected bandit closed the gate on Morrow,
separating him from his squad.

After I kicked the gate open, the Iraqi who shut the gate tried to grab my
weapon,? said Morrow. ?A guy from my squad ?sucker-punched? him sending him to
the ground, and that?s when I saw a guy come out a side door with a AK-47 ready
to fire. My left hand was holding the guy down on the ground so I brought my M-4
up underneath my left arm with my right hand and gave him some of ?Chicago?s
finest.??

The man Morrow shot and killed was the father of the Iraqi who tried to grab
Morrow?s weapon. Through an interpreter at the local police station the son
said, he didn?t know it was Americans. It was really early in the morning and
we thought you were thieves. My father was just trying to protect me.?

What happened was a tragedy,? said Capt. Ned C. Ritzman, commander of Alpha
Company. ?But even the dead man?s brother, who is a local school teacher, said
he was an idiot for coming out of the house with an AK-47.?? Paratroopers like
Morrow in the 173rd Airborne Brigade may sometimes have only a second to decide
how to react to a situation. They rely on their training and past experience to
come to the right conclusion. In the last 10 months paratroopers in 1-508th Inf
(Abn) have had to deal with guerilla fighters placing improvised explosive
devices on the road, and being shot at by RPG?s, 105 mm rockets, mortars, and
automatic weapons fire.

Morrow saw a man coming out of a side door with an AK-47 aimed at one of his
squad members, Ritzman said. Morrow was just protecting his fellow paratrooper.
The event was a tragedy, but Morrow did the right thing.

[2RHPZ]

Paratroopers jump into Iraq after queasy ride

By KEN DILANIAN

Knight Ridder Newspapers

BASHUR, Iraq - Sometime before midnight Wednesday, Chalk Six, an Air Force C-17 jet carrying 99 paratroopers from the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade, finished its gut-churning descent into Kurdish territory.
Many of the men had dozed through much of the four-hour, 45-minute flight from their air base in Europe. Now they were standing, their giant, green rucksacks fastened around their waists, their parachutes hooked to two steel lines that ran down each side of the vast jet toward the two doors.
The jet engines emitted a deafening whine during the steep dive, then fell eerily quiet. Suddenly, dust and wind whipped through the plane as the two doors, marked "Emergency Exit Only," were thrust open.
The lights of an Iraqi Kurdish village were visible below.
"One minute," yelled the jumpmasters, 1st Sgt. Timothy Watson and Sgt. 1st Class Jason Gueringer, each holding up a single finger for those out of earshot in the rear.
Some men were throwing up.
Others were on their knees, sagging under the weight of their gear. The largest combat parachute assault since World War II was under way.
From 15 jet planes, the 173rd Airborne dropped nearly 1,000 of its soldiers onto Kurdish-controlled Bashur airfield northeast of Irbil, in what commanders hoped would be a first step toward opening a northern front in Iraq.
The United States intended the operation to be a "show of force," aimed not only at Saddam Hussein, but also at Turkey and at Kurdish warlords.
But with the doors open and the chutes rigged, the men of Chalk Six were not thinking about strategic considerations. They were wondering if anyone would shoot at them as they floated helplessly to earth, or whether their parachutes would become entangled, or whether they could hit the ground at 17 mph without breaking a leg.
There were men on Chalk Six who had jumped dozens of times, and there were men who hadn't jumped since paratroop school.
There were lots of men with young children, and one, Pfc. Neri Lattimore, 20, whose fiancee is due to give birth in April.
They knew that the brigade surgeon was jumping with them, and they knew why. They knew that and laughed at it.
Earlier, they had loaded ammunition on an open field at their air base listening to "Blood upon the Risers," a strange, a cappella anthem of paratroop bravado sung to the tune of "Battle Hymn of the Republic": "Glory, glory what a helluva way to die," goes the chorus, "And he ain't gonna jump no more He hit the ground the sound was splat, the blood went spurting high There was blood upon the risers, there was brains upon his chute."
The soldiers had been told that they had just 58 seconds to get out of the plane, and that "jumping the red light" - sneaking out a second or two after the stop signal flashes - would not be allowed, since it could mean death as the C-17 powered up to make its violent escape from Iraqi airspace. But none of them wanted to be the one who didn't get his "mustard stain," as they call the gold insignia that denotes a parachute jump in combat.
They also knew that every man who did not jump was one less defender should things go wrong on the ground.
"Remember, men, no baby steps - walk right out that door with a purpose," Watson, the primary jumpmaster, screamed to the paratroops. "We've got one second between jumps, and we've got to get every rifle on the ground."
Then the amber jump light turned green.
"Go, go, go!"
Laden with more than 100 pounds of gear, the men sprang into fast motion, pouring out of the two doors at numbing speed. Those who stumbled or hesitated were pushed by the two "safeties," paratroopers whose job is to stay on the plane and to coordinate the jump.
Fifty-eight seconds later, the light turned red just as the last jumpers had cleared each door. The plane banked steeply and climbed away in what one of the pilots called "the most aggressive exit I have ever seen."
Only 36 jumpers didn't manage to leap out of the 15 jets.

[2RHPZ]

Pilots tell of harrowing drop of 173rd:

http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=13497&archive=true

[kapral]

Great story.
I realy have enjoyed while reading.
Thanks a lot.

173rd is my favourite unit. I reenact 173rd in viet nam era :)

[2RHPZ]

Story and photos by Sgt. 1st Class Todd Oliver

The men and women of 2d Battalion, 503d infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, are
feeling the heat. One soldier´s watch has a built-in temperature gauge, it says
it´s 134 degrees.

Who cares 134, 130, 128 with body armor on, sitting in armored Humvee?s they
just become numbers. It?s just hot -- hotter then anything most people can
imagine.

?It?s like turning on a hairdryer and holding it inches from your face,? remarks
one paratrooper, sweating profusely.

Yes, it?s hot. Bottled water, if not cared for and tended to, quickly turns so
hot as to make it impossible to drink. Almost impossible, that is. If you don?t
drink out here, bad things can, and do, happen.

The paratroopers are unconcerned though. They handle the heat in a matter-of-factly.
They know they have to drink water, they know they have to be ready for
anything, and they know that a mission is about to begin.

While Kirkuk once seemed a boring, tedious place to be stuck, far from the
comforts of home and the arms of loved ones, they now view it with an almost
loving affection. Safe houses with air conditioning units and refrigerators
await their return.

For now though they sit and wait on an Iraqi Airfield, waiting for darkness. As
the mid afternoon inferno slowly, almost begrudgingly, gives way to cooler night
temperatures the paratroopers line up vehicles and prepare their attack.

As night falls and the earliest hours of morning creep in the vehicles roll out
with a vengeance, kicking up the fine dirt power into an enormous cloud that
covers everything, every crack and crevice, every inch of everything.

Everyone is hyper-alert, everyone is ready, everyone is nervous. Anyone who has
a brain is scared, if only just a little bit.

Tracer rounds fly low over rooftops and the sounds of automatic gunfire crack
through the drone of the convoy. Then again as the fire is returned and again a
third time is what can only be, well who knows what that can be.

Something?s happened, something up ahead, something to the convoy. Something?s
happened.

Nothing stops. Everything keeps rolling, making turns, zipping down streets,
around obstacles, around corners and then into the fight.

Or rather, where the fight just was.

As the lead element, Able Company, continues to push towards its objective it
drives through the site of the firefight that occurred seconds before. The
bodies of paratroopers are on the ground, pulled close to barriers to afford
them protection, being worked on by medics.

No one is sure if they are alive or dead. They are wounded, who knows how bad,
there isn?t time to determine that. As soon as you see them, you?ve driven past
them and on into the city.

If this were a work of fiction, some paperback novel titled ?men of guts and
honor? or ?sacrifice city? the rest would be a tale of fierce, bloody battles.
But this isn?t that and the rest of the story, to borrow from Paul Harvey, works
out a bit differently.

?The mission of 2-503d Inf (Abn) was a direct action, a direct attack on an
assailant area known to have enemy actions,? said Lt. Col. Dominic Caraccilo,
commander 2-503d Inf (Abn) toward the conclusion of the seven-day mission.
?There have been a number of strikes in the last few weeks and the 4th Infantry
Division commander decided to do some deliberate attacks in this particular
area, surrounded by the tigress river, to destroy, detain or seize any high
value targets that are suspected to be working in the area.?

Now that it?s almost over and the paratroopers are preparing to move back to
Kirkuk from this small Sunni enclave just north of Baghdad there is a sense of
celebration in the air. Chickens, purchased at a local market through the
interpreters, are grilling in the backyard of a temporary safe house alongside
the Tigress river as the brutal sun finally starts to set. Sodas are being iced
down and more then a few hands of spades are dealt. Caraccilo himself is in a
good mood and occasionally tackles one of his staff officers between cigars and
hands of spades, played with his sergeant major, his executive officer and his
S3. The colonel and his sergeant major win, in case you keep track of that sort
of thing.

Besides the search for and capture of high-ranking Ba?ath party officials the
operation was also meant to show a strong U.S. presence in an area that, until
recently, had been the site of one U.S. death per day on average, Caraccilo
explains, taking a break from the din of the radios that constantly chatter.
Even mid hand in a game of spades he runs into the house several times to
monitor this patrol or that checkpoint.

No soldiers assigned to the Rock, as the 2-503d Inf (Abn) is known, were killed.
Four soldiers were wounded, none seriously, when their vehicles drove through an
ambush that erupted only seconds earlier. A fifth soldier was also injured when
he fell from a rooftop during the operation.

?We also wanted to show a U.S. presence in an area that has yet to be covered by
a U.S. force,? Caraccilo said. ?Forces have driven over this area but no U.S.
personnel have driven or patrolled or conducted any kind of military operation
inside this particular peninsula.?

?The intent was to come here and go after some specific individuals, knowing
perfectly well that most of the time when something like this is based off of
human sources that the chances are your target wont be there when you arrive,
none the less there has been a lot of action here so we know there are some
unsavory figures. We had to screen more then 400 detainees in just the first two
nights,? he explained.

And the screening paid off.

More then 50 of those 300 have been confirmed as Feydayeen, Caraccilo explained.
?That?s a big deal. These people that we?re looking for are still husbanding the
old regime as a way of life. By removing a pocket of Feydayeen soldiers we?ve
done a pretty big thing.?

While no one was willing to call the locals here friendly there was a change in
their demeanor over the course of the mission. While The 173d comes in full
force they are quick to change tact?s, talking to leaders, talking to merchants
and explaining why they are there, listening to concerns and generally trying to
make everyone feel more at ease.

?I really do think that there are some unfriendly people here that don?t like
Americans but I think you would find that anywhere in Iraq or even any part of
the world,? he said. ?But I think that mostly in this area the people are just
confused. Confused and scared. When you come in here with eight large
helicopters, a battalion of Bradley fighting vehicles and a bunch of paratroops
to swarm the area you scare some people. You hit them hard but then you pull
back and you go out and you start talking to them and you tell them what you?re
there for.?

And the colonel isn?t above doing some of that talking.

?I sat yesterday having tea with some of the people here. We were driving by and
they waved at us and invited us inside for tea. We just talked to them. We
described what it was we were doing and why. Come to find out two of the
individuals had just gotten out of (an American) jail in Tikrit. Where else in
the world can you sit with people you just detained for questioning and drink
tea?? he said laughing.

It?s a struggle to understand the culture. I think we?re starting to figure it
out. Once you understand the conditions, the right and left limit, I think you
can get a lot accomplished.?

[2RHPZ]

Targeting in postconflict operations in Iraq

Military Review
Jan-Feb, 2004
by Dominic J. Caraccilo, Andrew M. Rohling

ON 26 MARCH 2003, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry Regiment (2-503d) ("The Rock"), 173d Airborne Brigade, deployed from Aviano Airbase, Italy, to conduct a nighttime parachute assault on Bashur Airfield in Iraq. The mission was to open Operation Iraqi Freedom's northern front.

Two weeks later, with special operations forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga ("those who face death") militia, the brigade attacked south to seize Kirkuk. After 10 April 2003, when Kirkuk was liberated, the 2-503d conducted raids against anticoalition forces; day and night combat patrols; civil reconnaissance and surveillance; and established a police force to bolster the region's security. The battalion's paratroopers were vigilant, protected Kirkuk's civilian population, and demonstrated that they were a capable force that could tailor itself to the mission at hand.

Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 September 1997), defines rules of engagement (ROE) as "directives issued by competent authority, which delineate the circumstances and limitations with which U.S. forces will initiate and/ or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered."

Most U.S. Army units have a firm grasp of rules of engagement as they apply before and during combat operations. In fact, most units have developed effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to disseminate ROE and enforce them. The 2-503d had a clear understanding of the rules of engagement for combat operations in Iraq for the period of 26 March to 1 September 2003, but what of postconflict operations (in Iraq commonly referred to as Phase IV operations) where coalition forces had to deal with targets in a "nonkinetic" manner? Do the same rules printed on the 3- by 5-inch laminated ROE card that the Army issues to each U.S. soldier still apply? With regard to force protection, the answer is "yes," but in terms of delineating "the circumstances and limitations with which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat" engagements, the answer is "not quite."

At the strategic level, one hopes commanders have properly identified an end state before the initial phases of an operation. A tactical unit does not have that luxury. At the conclusion of combat operations, the unit must quickly identify an achievable end state, hopefully as part of a war-termination strategy, focus its efforts, and properly develop postconflict rules of engagement.

In addition to standing or evolving ROE, commander's guidance must also evolve. Rules of engagement cannot stand alone; the commander must inject actions, and directives for nonaction, to achieve the desired end state. End states vary from region to region depending on security, the mission, and the higher commander's intent.

The 2-503d's end state for Kirkuk was to ensure that the Kirkuk police force, the local government, and public service organizations could perform effectively and independently. Coalition forces were to remain in a custodial role, teaching, coaching, and mentoring community leaders.

Community *******

Developing a ******* with the Kirkuk community was decisive to success. After arrival in Kirkuk, the 2-503d delineated company sectors, established safe houses, and instituted an aggressive patrolling schedule. Interface with the community involved three key elements: disarmament, presence, and involvement.

Disarmament. The 2-503d began immediately to disarm all warring political factions. Combat ROE allowed the battalion's companies to take aggressive actions early in the fight. Any Iraqi caught with a weapon for any reason was brought to the brigade's enemy prisoner of war collection point regardless of the type of weapon he was carrying or using. The 2-503d's soldiers destroyed large-caliber weapons and explosives and confiscated small arms to outfit Kirkuk's fledgling police force. As the security situation changed, so did the methods used for disarmament. The battalion commander's initial guidance allowed company commanders to determine whether to detain persons for weapons violations and has since progressed to the point that possession of illegal weapons is strictly a civil affair handled by Kirkuk police.

Presence. The 2-503d established a visible, credible presence in the city the moment it left the Bashur airbase. Each company, including headquarters and headquarters company (which was employed as a maneuver force), established safe houses as bases of operations. The 2-503d sent patrols to all corners of the city at all hours. Although the Kirkuk airbase remained the logistical hub for the battalion, units maximized patrolling opportunities by using different routes each time they traveled.

ROE dictated that patrols interact with the population and mandated that an interpreter accompany each patrol. Soldiers could thus talk with Kirkuk residents and other locals, determine their problems, and understand their culture. Because misunderstanding breeds mistrust, no other action at such a low cost has done more to improve U.S.-Iraqi relations.

Involvement. Involvement in the community is the next logical step in establishing a presence. Involvement entails doing far more than just driving around and enforcing laws. Involvement means participating in community events such as weddings and funerals; building soccer fields and forming a team to challenge the local champs; and meeting periodically with local leaders to better understand their needs. The 2-503d contacted mullahs, muktars (community leaders), unofficial leaders, and government officials. United States Air Force command guidance in Kirkuk prohibits airmen from venturing off the base; the 2-503d's guidance mandated it.

How did building ******* with a community help the 2-503d reach its end state? It built relationships. To teach, coach, and mentor community leaders, the 2-503d's leaders built personal relationships with individual Iraqis. The ******* the battalion established helped it understand issues, lead by example, inspire confidence, and instill ethics.

A New Kind of Targeting

The most dramatic change to the 2-503d's ROE, as it shifted from combat to postconflict operations, was a fundamental change of focus in the targeting process. The targeting process leads units to a given location and determines their subsequent actions. Traditional targeting procedures focus on exploiting weaknesses to delay, disrupt, destroy, or defeat enemy forces. Postconflict targeting is completely the opposite. During postconflict operations, the 2-503d's goal was to identify weaknesses and then leverage its forces not to defeat but to strengthen local capabilities.

But the 2-503d had to establish a safe, secure environment for postconflict operations, which meant targeting individuals and organizations. This required a significant mental shift. During a raid, conventional ROE often become, "Shoot first, and ask questions later." This is not the case in the postconflict phase. The development of suspects for apprehension; inadequate or nonexistent local services; the potential for ethnic strife; and times and places where the battalion was vulnerable drove the ROE.

The 2-503d conducted most direct-action raids based on human intelligence (HUMINT). At times, multiple HUMINT sources corroborated intelligence information; sometimes only one person did so. When the battalion received intelligence, the intelligence officer (S2) checked the information against previous reports for similarities in names and locations to try to determine the validity of accusations and charges against a suspect. If the staff decided to conduct a direct-action raid or "hit," it developed a detailed target packet using available imagery, descriptions, and threat assessments.

Raids. During combat operations, the 2-503d habitually took HUMINT and other information and conducted raids, but when the 2-503d transitioned to a Phase IV stance, the command required a higher threshold of certainty in deciding when to act. Also, the battalion augmented raids with immediate civil action to maintain the local community's trust and confidence.

To raise the threshold for direct-action operations, the 2-503d developed simple ROE for postconflict operations. The 2-503d's guidance was: "With single-source information or a low-threat target, knock on the door. With multiple-source information or a high-threat target, kick in the door." This was not a hard-and-fast rule. The nature of the target determined how much force to use. For example, if intelligence reports described the target as a Saddam Fedayeen (Saddam's "Men of Sacrifice") terrorist, the battalion would be prepared to kick in the door whether the information was corroborated or not. If the target was a propagandist who simply painted anticoalition graffiti on walls and public property, the battalion usually decided to "go soft" on the target from the outset. In either case, after any action, 2-503d soldiers followed up within 12 hours to repair any damaged property, talk with the target's neighbors, explain the unit's reasons for conducting the raid, and perform other civic actions to maintain a good ******* with the community.

In July 2003, the 2-503d's Battle Company conducted two raids. The first, based on a single report developed by a 173d Airborne Brigade tactical HUMINT team, targeted Mohamoud Aziz, an Iraqi who was reportedly an ex-Saddam Fedayeen member. After the company's 2d platoon isolated the target's house, the platoon leader, an interpreter, and a fire team knocked on the front gate of the house. A middle-aged Arab man quickly came out of the house to meet them while a woman and several small children looked on. The man, subsequently identified as the target's brother, told the platoon leader that Aziz was not home and asked the platoon leader to come in for a cup of tea. The platoon leader accepted. While the platoon leader, the interpreter, and Aziz's brother drank tea together in one room, the platoon searched the premises. When he and his guests finished drinking tea, he told the platoon leader he would have Aziz turn himself in the next morning to coalition forces. The following morning, Aziz did just that.

The platoon later conducted another raid that was dramatically different from the first. The target was a man multiple intelligence sources claimed was an Al Aouda (Return Party) member planning attacks on coalition forces. Again, the platoon isolated the target's house, but this time, the platoon breached the front gate of the property with demolitions, rushed in through the breach, and cleared the house in minutes. When the objective was secure, the platoon had three male suspects under coalition control and had condiscated numerous small arms and several rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

These vignettes illustrate two methods of accomplishing the same type of task. In both instances, soldiers took potentially dangerous individuals off the streets. The rules of engagement and accompanying guidance that the battalion established during targeting meetings gave subordinate commanders tactical flexibility but also curbed young infantrymen's innate desires to kick in every door, every time. As one might expect, Kirkuk residents would tend to react more favorably to a knock on their front door than to the detonation of C4 explosives.

Patrolling. A change in ROE was also necessary for basic patrolling operations in the postconflict period. Throughout the early phases of the war, the 2-503d found that traffic control points (TCPs) were the key to effective urban patrolling and a bastion of sorts in the battalion's effort to disarm Kirkuk. Unlike military police, most infantry units have little to no experience with TCPs, so the 2-503d developed ROE that were a mixture of TTPs, force-protection measures, and paratrooper ingenuity.

With multiple avenues of approach in abundance in Kirkuk's urban environment, static TCPs quickly lost their effectiveness when locals (subversive or otherwise) eventually found alternate routes around them. To catch the stray anticoalition infiltrator, 2-503d platoons set up "snap TCPs" throughout Kirkuk that operated for only about 15 to 20 minutes. As a car approached a TCP, a blocking force standing behind concertina wire would stop the vehicle while an overwatch section with standoff capability provided security. The 2-503d adjusted its ROE to allow soldiers to shoot at vehicles that tried to run the TCP or were obviously turning away quickly to avoid being stopped.

The 2-503d adjusted ROE as the security situation improved. When the local police force became more proficient, the 2-503d turned over more and more TCPs to them. This handover limited the exposure of U.S. troops to danger and brought the 2-503d closer to accomplishing one of its goals, creating an independent police force.

Dismounted patrolling's mainstay was the stand-to that each company conducted at its safe house. Most infantrymen are accustomed to the traditional stand-to an hour before and after sunrise, but through pattern analysis, the 2-503d found most enemy attacks occurred between 0100 and 0400. The 2-503d conducted detailed threat analysis of the enemy's likely avenues of approach, RPG firing positions, mortar firing points, and weapon cache points near safe houses. During stand-tos, units set up ambushes and conducted aggressive patrolling in these high-threat areas. The ROE that authorized first strikes quickly made attacks on the battalion's safe houses too costly for the enemy to undertake.

Battalion TTPs evolved that included a mounted quick-reaction force located in a hide position outside the operating base; the use of Javelin night-sight equipment on rooftops, which greatly increased standoff and situational awareness; and incorporating the local police in the patrolling plan, which became a great combat multiplier. As an added benefit, Kirkuk's police force soon began protecting its precinct houses in the same fashion during hours of vulnerability.

Curfews. The word curfew implies that martial law is in effect, and during the combat phase of Iraqi operations, the 2-503d did enforce a dusk-to-dawn curfew. After transitioning to postconflict operations, a Kirkuk city council was established and U.S. forces abolished the curfew.

Aware that enemy activity peaked between 0100 and 0400, Kirkuk's mayor, acting on behalf of the local government and not U.S. forces, declared a citywide curfew every night from 2359 to 0400. The mayor's declaration greatly reduced the enemy's greatest advantage--his ability to blend in with the local population. Because the mayor and not U.S. forces declared the curfew, Kirkuk's residents resoundingly bought into the policy. They understood that fewer attacks would lead to a sense of security, which in turn, would promote a thriving economy. Because civilian authorities issued the curfew and the police department enforced it, the 2-503d was closer to achieving another declared end state, a functioning, independent city government.

Police force. The battalion's main effort was to develop a legitimate, independent Kirkuk police force. The collapse of Saddam's regime in Baghdad brought the collapse of civil government throughout Iraq. Looting was rampant and violent and petty crime the norm. Anarchy reigned. Nothing was more urgent than creating a police force to provide law and order. The need for security was paramount.

The 2-503d's first goal was to create a secure environment by establishing some semblance of a police force. Realizing that the initial police organization put in place would not be the final one, the 2-503d began recruiting, vetting, and hiring Iraqis based solely on their enthusiasm and willingness to work with coalition forces. The 2-503d chose vacant buildings near U.S. tactical boundaries as police stations and chose police leaders based on their force of personality or because battalion soldiers were familiar with them.

The new police recruits had no equipment, and the battalion's initial guidance to them was simple: do nothing without U.S. approval. Getting a visible Iraqi police presence on the street, in any form, was the 2-503d's immediate goal, and within a month, the 2-503d achieved that goal. Then the battalion developed a detailed, long-term campaign plan to man, equip, and train the Kirkuk police force.

Manning meant hiring a force that reflected Kirkuk's ethnic demographics. Commanders paid detailed attention to the ethnic composition of policemen at each station, appointed leaders from a variety of ethnic groups, and identified skill levels. This was not just a staffing action. It was a significant information operations campaign to legitimize the police force in the eyes of the Kirkuk community.

Unfortunately, the 2-503d found that many of Kirkuk's newly appointed police "generals" had been nothing more than watermelon salesmen a few weeks earlier. The 2-503d also discovered large numbers of the force had come from outside Kirkuk and were paid by factions to exert ethnic influence. The situation called for drastic measures. The 2-503d basically started over.

The battalion hired a new police force that fit Kirkuk's true ethnic demographics, appointed persons to leadership positions based on skill, and restructured the police rank system. The battalion identified one two-star general at police headquarters as the chief of police; designated a brigadier general to serve as his deputy; appointed three colonels as assistants for internal affairs, operations, and support; and put a captain in charge of each station with lieutenants and sergeants to staff the stations and patrolmen to "walk their beats."

When Iraqi police officers received a demotion, it was a severe emotional event for them. To reduce the pain involved in a reduction in rank, the 2-503d replaced the familiar Iraqi military insignia on police uniforms with new insignia similar to those worn by members of the U.S. Armed Forces. Kirkuk's new policemen donned the emblems of their rank on the collars of new, blue police uniforms that looked less like Iraqi military uniforms. These changes made the changes in rank more tolerable to the police and the community. In the end, only Kirkuk residents who denied any association with political factions were allowed to serve on the police force.

Equipping the force proved to be the greatest challenge. In the chaos that followed the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad, any property owned by the regime's former Kirkuk police force disappeared. Police stations had no electricity, and because of looting, they also had no windows, doors, or even plumbing. Kirkuk's new police officers had no weapons, uniforms, police cars, or citywide communication. To equip a new police force, the 2-503d had to begin from scratch.

The battalion's first step was to install or refurbish basic quality-of-life fixtures and facilities at each precinct house, an action that often entailed moving the station house to a new location that supported the neighborhood. To repair the stations, the 2-503d employed contractors who fit the ethnic make-up of each precinct's neighborhood or sector. Next, the 2-503d attacked the police force's lack of mobility. To avoid any perception of favoritism, the unit purchased and distributed police cars in a manner that gave each precinct an equal number of vehicles.

Because of war damage to complex and costly equipment, communications took the greatest time to improve. Again, the battalion took great care to distribute assets equally among the police precincts. The 2-503d "re-missioned" confiscated small arms to the Kirkuk police, greatly alleviating weapons shortages. In time, however, this procurement method lost its effectiveness; there were no more small arms left for the battalion to confiscate. Success tends to breed its own problems.

The 2-503d recognized the need for a standardized training program for the police force. Most modern cities have police academies with a detailed program of instruction (POI) that new recruits attend before ever walking a beat. The 2-503d did not have the luxury of training the entire Kirkuk police force before activating it. The battalion set up a police academy with a 13-day POI focused on ethics and entry-level policing tasks. The goal was to cycle as many volunteers as possible through the POI to seed the force with trained policemen. The 2-503d introduced incentives of greater pay and rank to encourage attendance and completion of the POI, and in keeping with the coalition forces' goal of disengagement, the police academy soon offered an Iraqiled POI with minimal U.S. oversight.

The battalion's most unusual challenge was building a police-force roster that accurately reflected neighborhood ethnic demographics. This was a perception problem in the Arab, Assyrian, and Turkish sectors, and the Kurds made a very real attempt to skew the balance. An ethnically balanced force was the goal, with each precinct reflecting the ethnic composition of the population in its surrounding neighborhood. For example, even though 42 percent of Kirkuk's population was Kurdish citywide, it made no sense to have 42 percent Kurdish police in a precinct in a neighborhood that was 98 percent Arab.

Today Kirkuk's police operate with a sense of autonomy that was previously unimaginable. The police routinely investigate and prevent crimes; respond to calls for assistance throughout the city; coordinate across precinct and other boundaries; and act on orders from higher headquarters. While continued coalition oversight and resources are still required, coalition forces are on the way to complete disengagement.

Fire stations and emergency medical services (EMS). Like all government buildings, Kirkuk's fire stations were thoroughly looted, but most firefighting equipment remained protected because the previous regime's firemen took great pride in their jobs and secured most of their equipment before the regime's collapse. Also, the U.S. Agency for International Development spent a considerable sum of money to refurbish firefighting equipment and facilities. The battalion focused on synchronizing the firefighters' efforts with those of contractors, first responders, and police throughout Kirkuk.

Supported by the 173d Airborne Brigade's forward surgical team, Kirkuk's EMS steadily improved. As coalition forces came into the city, questions of how and when to treat local casualties were of great concern. Local EMS consisted of little more than a taxicab ride to a hospital that was barely able to dispense a band-aid. Kirkuk now operates a fleet of ambulances that routinely respond to emergencies throughout the city. Two hospitals can perform major, life-saving surgeries. To truly integrate the city's first responders, the battalion's medical platoon taught combat lifesaver courses to ambulance crews and to fire and police departments.

In August 2003, a city bus caught fire in the southern sector of Kirkuk. Within 15 minutes, the fire department responded with trucks from two fire stations and began to extinguish the fire. Police from the local precinct responded, cordoned off the area, and investigated the incident. Three ambulances arrived to treat the wounded and evacuate the dead. All this occurred promptly and without the intervention or prompting of coalition forces.

Utilities. Restoring reliable electricity, water, and lines of communications were significant challenges; looters and coalition forces had hit these areas hard. The 2-503d focused its effort on restoring services to first responders. An antiquated power grid and looting hampered restoration of electricity. The 2-503d and the 173d Airborne Brigade had power-generation capabilities sufficient only for internal use. Even though the 2-503d knew that consistent power was a key to stability, it could not do much to actually restore electric power, but it could and did do much to alleviate local misconceptions.

After determining which areas had no power at all, whether from the city power grid or local generators, the 2-503d relayed this information to the brigade's civil affairs team which then directed money and equipment to that area. Realizing that extensive looting of high-tension power lines was occurring on the outskirts of the city, the 2-503d set up ambushes and conducted aggressive patrols. ROE allowed for direct-fire engagement, and the battalion killed several looters, captured saboteurs, and then rolled up the entire organization--from transporters and smelters to money brokers.

Running water is tied almost directly to restoring electric power. If there is no electric power, there is no running water, and most residents must rely on local wells and electrically powered pumps. Fortunately, multiple nongovernmental organizations were more than willing to help restore running water. The 2-503d's identification of capabilities and limitations, by neighborhood, was instrumental in rebuilding the systems.

Because of extensive damage to Kirkuk's infrastructure, restoring landline communications to first responders was not an immediate option. The 2-503d overcame this obstacle by buying several satellite phones and distributing them to each service and by using commander's discretionary funds to purchase vehicle and hand-held radios. The police precinct captains could then dispatch patrols, communicate between stations, and control vehicles. When local phone lines became available, the 2-503d had one installed in its tactical operations center so it could bridge the communications gap between Iraqi services and coalition forces. The 2-503d's quick fixes enabled first responders to be effective.

Targeting for Success

The 2-503d's end state was to enable Kirkuk to function on its own. The 2-503d quickly realized that ROE developed for traditional combat operations were unsuitable in many situations in the postconflict environment. Quickly and deliberately adapting standing ROE, and in many instances, developing nontraditional ROE was difficult but absolutely necessary. For the 2-503d, using the criteria and discipline of the targeting process to focus on nontraditional targets like city infrastructure was the key to developing sound ROE and TTPs.

While the battalion's successes in postconflict operations in Kirkuk might lead some to think that they can reduce the 2-503d's experiences to a laundry list of duties that other units can replicate, the effort to superimpose such a list on any other city would probably be futile. Each city has its own challenges, its own ethnic diversity, and its own starting point on the road to self-government. Nevertheless, the 2-503d's successes in Kirkuk suggest that commanders should use the methodical targeting process to define problems and project combat power (both traditional and nontraditional) to develop effective ROE and TTPs in a postconflict environment.

Lieutenant Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo, U.S. Army Commander, 2-503, 173d Airbone Brigade

Major Andrew M. Rohling, U.S. Army

Operations Officer, 2-503, 173d Airbone Brigade

[Freibier]

Interesting read, thanks !

[lunatic2T2]

No mention of the Air Force Combat Control (CCT) and Combat Weather temas that were positioned days before the jump and guided the C-17s in. No respect I tell ya'!

[Jedburgh]

The source for most of those stories - and more - is right here: SETAF's 173rd Airborne in Iraq (http://www.setaf.army.mil/SETAF's%20173rd%20Airborne%20in%20Iraq.htm)

[panzerjager]

"they were told that a Special Forces "A" Team was overrun by a force of 100
Iraqis in Irbil, about 35 miles from the drop zone. "

Anyone have info on this?

[11F5S]

The bold, carefully planned mission by the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the 29th
combat jump in U.S. history, according to brigade officers. The paratroops, many
of whom are elite Army Rangers, flew directly from Aviano Air Force Base in
northern Italy, which is near their base in Vicenza.

Elite Army Rangers....the 173 isn't the Rangers.

Carefully planned combat jump.... onto a secure DZ.

Airborne!

[Beowulf]

The bold, carefully planned mission by the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the 29th
combat jump in U.S. history, according to brigade officers. The paratroops, many
of whom are elite Army Rangers, flew directly from Aviano Air Force Base in
northern Italy, which is near their base in Vicenza.

Elite Army Rangers....the 173 isn't the Rangers.

Carefully planned combat jump.... onto a secure DZ.

Airborne!

many of whom are rangers. i.e. tabbed.

Secure DZ or not it was still probably planned carefully....

[11F5S]

The bold, carefully planned mission by the 173rd Airborne Brigade was the 29th
combat jump in U.S. history, according to brigade officers. The paratroops, many
of whom are elite Army Rangers, flew directly from Aviano Air Force Base in
northern Italy, which is near their base in Vicenza.

Elite Army Rangers....the 173 isn't the Rangers.

Carefully planned combat jump.... onto a secure DZ.

Airborne!

many of whom are rangers. i.e. tabbed.

Secure DZ or not it was still probably planned carefully....

Being Ranger qualified doesn't make one an "Elite Army Ranger", serving in the Ranger Battalions does, at least in my book.

IMHO, That jump was a well planned PR event.

Americans have made 70,995 , U.S. Combat Jumps in 41 operations. Since some paratroopers made more then one combat jump, it is impossible to say how many American paratroopers have made combat jumps. According to http://www.173rdairborne.com/cbtjumps.htm

[FuturePara]

Is that 70.000 number in reference to individual paratroopers jumping or actual number of orchestrated combat jumps involving multiple people?

[OzMan]

No mention of the Air Force Combat Control (CCT) and Combat Weather temas that were positioned days before the jump and guided the C-17s in. No respect I tell ya'!

This is very vital role that rarely ever gets any airtime. The Battlefield Airmen have been down there kicking ass, paving the way for the Airborne big boys since Vietnam.

1. Surveying the airfield in preparation for airborne assault
2. Relaying weather information to airborne commanders
3. Removing obstacles that could hinder the airborne assaulters and clearing the runway of obstacles for landing aircraft
4. Establishing commo net and airhead with area aircraft
5. Providing ATC for airborne drops and later incoming aircraft

Sounds like this was a bread-and-butter operation for the CCTs. Sounds quite a bit like their final exam at IFAM.

[lunatic2T2]

It's good to see that others are aware of the Air Force's role in roles like this. The 23 or 24 STS, cant remember, were the actual controllers that night.

[Falco]

Good read mate

[OzMan]

I figured that it would be a small number of CCTs and possibly SOWTs attached to the 173rd, but I haven't done too much of my homework.