2RHPZ
06-09-2004, 03:36 PM
Cambodia
In 1985, in the last chapter of the surrogate Cold War, an
SAS training team of one officer and six rankers was sent
to Thailand to train Cambodian resistance groups prepared
to fight the Vietnamese occupation of their country. The
scheme had the blessing of the Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher
following the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1979, when
a dangerously expansionist (and Communist) regular army
crushed the bloodthirsty power base of the Khmer Rouge,
another left-wing dictatorship. Even by Asian standards, the
Khmer Rouge is remarkable for its lavish body count. It is
generally held responsible for the murder of millions of fellow
Cambodians.
The political sensitivity of the SAS role at a time when
any Western intervention could be identified as a Cold War
initiative, dangerous to world peace, was not what inflamed
the controversy which came to surround this operation. There
was never any question that the regiment was involved. The
argument was about which Cambodian groups resisting the
Vietnamese actually benefited from SAS instruction. In 1991,
a few months after the operation ended, the Armed Forces
Minister Mr Archie Hamilton disclosed that Britain had trained
insurgents of the Khmer People's National Liberation and
another group, the Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne.
Critics of the SAS argued that since these groups shared a
common aim with the Khmer Rouge -- to drive the Vietnamese
out of Cambodia -- it followed that the SAS had been training
the Khmer Rouge also. This was a logical fallacy known to
philosophers as the undistributed middle. Mr Derek Tonkin,
British ambassador to Thailand from 1986 to 1989, acidly
pointed out in June, 1991: 'The three resistance factions have
spent most of the past twelve years in mutual recrimination.'
Partly as a result of the SAS's efforts, the Cambodian people
had a non-Communist option, other than the Khmer Rouge,
for their future government after the Vietnamese withdrew in
September 1989. Towards the end of the Second World War,
many other countries had experienced the war-after-the-war,
a contest between resistance groups fighting over the spoils of
victory. UK intervention in Cambodia and Thailand, based on
that experience, was aimed at ensuring that the ultimate winner
was not the Khmer Rouge. In spite of that was it true, as some
journalists alleged, that there was some linkage, or co-operation,
between the teams trained by the SAS (the KPNLF and ANS)
and Khmer Rouge?
Ambassador Tonkin argued: 'In 1990, there were isolated
reports of local tactical co-ordination, notably between ANS
and Khmer Rouge troops. These reports, though few and
far between, caused concern in the United States. They were
thoroughly investigated both by the administration and openly
in Congress. The conclusion was reached that there might
have been a few instances of military liaison between local
commanders but overall there was no evidence of strategic
planning and central command and control,'
Although the SAS teams had been withdrawn by the time
these incidents were reported, it did not diminish the wrath
of the critics. Dr Peter Carey, a tutor in Modern History at
Trinity College, Oxford, detected a link between the type of
weapon most frequently used by the Khmer Rouge and SAS
instruction. He claimed:
The Khmer Rouge's most devastating weapon is a Chinese-
made anti-personnel device... known as the 'wind mine'
... virtually undetectable... Today Cambodia has what
is probably the highest percentage of disabled inhabitants of
any country in the world... There are now at least 100,000
amputees, blinded and disabled people in Cambodia out of a
population of 8.5 million...
The US and its allies have been so concerned with driving
out the Vietnamese that they never fully understood, or
perhaps minded, that the guerrilla coalition they supported
in order to achieve this aim might lead eventually to the
return of the Khmer Rouge. It was a policy which at its
worst, from 1985 until 1989 when public opinion forced a
termination of the contract, saw British special forces on the
border providing training in mine warfare and demolition
techniques to the army of Prince Sihanouk -- until recently
the West's symbol of legitimacy in the guerrilla coalition. It
is hard to imagine a more despicable and irresponsible use of
the SAS in recent history. The Khmer Rouge use of mines is
part of a long-term strategy to regain power...
Dr Carey then returned to the theme of the 'wind mine' as a
main source of civilian casualties yet to come. It is clear from
his own account, in the Independent, that the Khmer Rouge
depended on China, not the UK, as the source of this material.
He does not specify the type or source of the ordnance allegedly
linking the the SAS with future Khmer Rouge victims.
SAS soldiers familiar with the operation, which had been
running since the early 1980s, say that it covered basic weapons
training and jungle tactics. 'There was nothing we could teach
the locals about mines', said one. 'In fact, they could teach us a
thing or two.' They also believe that this was a politically useful
operation but not one which was militarily decisive.
Claims unproven and unprovable abounded during the con-
troversy. The UN as well as the SAS was targeted. The writer
William Shawcross, always his own man and an authority on
Cambodia, reported that the UN Border Relief Operation in
the area had demanded public retraction by journalists of a
claim that one of its warehouses was being used by the Khmer
Rouge.
In 1991, two British military advisers alleged to have trained
the Khmer Rouge at first hand to plant mines that maimed
and killed Cambodian civilians successfully sued the journalists
involved for libel and were awarded damages. The journalists'
counsel, Mr Geoffrey Shaw, QC, read a statement reported as
follows in the Daily Telegraph:
The defendants now accept that neither plaintiff has ever
trained Khmer Rouge or any other guerrillas and particularly
not in mine-laying or any other military techniques which
would be directed against civilians. Neither plaintiff would
ever contemplate any such thing and would refuse to do it if
ordered.
In 1985, in the last chapter of the surrogate Cold War, an
SAS training team of one officer and six rankers was sent
to Thailand to train Cambodian resistance groups prepared
to fight the Vietnamese occupation of their country. The
scheme had the blessing of the Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher
following the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1979, when
a dangerously expansionist (and Communist) regular army
crushed the bloodthirsty power base of the Khmer Rouge,
another left-wing dictatorship. Even by Asian standards, the
Khmer Rouge is remarkable for its lavish body count. It is
generally held responsible for the murder of millions of fellow
Cambodians.
The political sensitivity of the SAS role at a time when
any Western intervention could be identified as a Cold War
initiative, dangerous to world peace, was not what inflamed
the controversy which came to surround this operation. There
was never any question that the regiment was involved. The
argument was about which Cambodian groups resisting the
Vietnamese actually benefited from SAS instruction. In 1991,
a few months after the operation ended, the Armed Forces
Minister Mr Archie Hamilton disclosed that Britain had trained
insurgents of the Khmer People's National Liberation and
another group, the Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne.
Critics of the SAS argued that since these groups shared a
common aim with the Khmer Rouge -- to drive the Vietnamese
out of Cambodia -- it followed that the SAS had been training
the Khmer Rouge also. This was a logical fallacy known to
philosophers as the undistributed middle. Mr Derek Tonkin,
British ambassador to Thailand from 1986 to 1989, acidly
pointed out in June, 1991: 'The three resistance factions have
spent most of the past twelve years in mutual recrimination.'
Partly as a result of the SAS's efforts, the Cambodian people
had a non-Communist option, other than the Khmer Rouge,
for their future government after the Vietnamese withdrew in
September 1989. Towards the end of the Second World War,
many other countries had experienced the war-after-the-war,
a contest between resistance groups fighting over the spoils of
victory. UK intervention in Cambodia and Thailand, based on
that experience, was aimed at ensuring that the ultimate winner
was not the Khmer Rouge. In spite of that was it true, as some
journalists alleged, that there was some linkage, or co-operation,
between the teams trained by the SAS (the KPNLF and ANS)
and Khmer Rouge?
Ambassador Tonkin argued: 'In 1990, there were isolated
reports of local tactical co-ordination, notably between ANS
and Khmer Rouge troops. These reports, though few and
far between, caused concern in the United States. They were
thoroughly investigated both by the administration and openly
in Congress. The conclusion was reached that there might
have been a few instances of military liaison between local
commanders but overall there was no evidence of strategic
planning and central command and control,'
Although the SAS teams had been withdrawn by the time
these incidents were reported, it did not diminish the wrath
of the critics. Dr Peter Carey, a tutor in Modern History at
Trinity College, Oxford, detected a link between the type of
weapon most frequently used by the Khmer Rouge and SAS
instruction. He claimed:
The Khmer Rouge's most devastating weapon is a Chinese-
made anti-personnel device... known as the 'wind mine'
... virtually undetectable... Today Cambodia has what
is probably the highest percentage of disabled inhabitants of
any country in the world... There are now at least 100,000
amputees, blinded and disabled people in Cambodia out of a
population of 8.5 million...
The US and its allies have been so concerned with driving
out the Vietnamese that they never fully understood, or
perhaps minded, that the guerrilla coalition they supported
in order to achieve this aim might lead eventually to the
return of the Khmer Rouge. It was a policy which at its
worst, from 1985 until 1989 when public opinion forced a
termination of the contract, saw British special forces on the
border providing training in mine warfare and demolition
techniques to the army of Prince Sihanouk -- until recently
the West's symbol of legitimacy in the guerrilla coalition. It
is hard to imagine a more despicable and irresponsible use of
the SAS in recent history. The Khmer Rouge use of mines is
part of a long-term strategy to regain power...
Dr Carey then returned to the theme of the 'wind mine' as a
main source of civilian casualties yet to come. It is clear from
his own account, in the Independent, that the Khmer Rouge
depended on China, not the UK, as the source of this material.
He does not specify the type or source of the ordnance allegedly
linking the the SAS with future Khmer Rouge victims.
SAS soldiers familiar with the operation, which had been
running since the early 1980s, say that it covered basic weapons
training and jungle tactics. 'There was nothing we could teach
the locals about mines', said one. 'In fact, they could teach us a
thing or two.' They also believe that this was a politically useful
operation but not one which was militarily decisive.
Claims unproven and unprovable abounded during the con-
troversy. The UN as well as the SAS was targeted. The writer
William Shawcross, always his own man and an authority on
Cambodia, reported that the UN Border Relief Operation in
the area had demanded public retraction by journalists of a
claim that one of its warehouses was being used by the Khmer
Rouge.
In 1991, two British military advisers alleged to have trained
the Khmer Rouge at first hand to plant mines that maimed
and killed Cambodian civilians successfully sued the journalists
involved for libel and were awarded damages. The journalists'
counsel, Mr Geoffrey Shaw, QC, read a statement reported as
follows in the Daily Telegraph:
The defendants now accept that neither plaintiff has ever
trained Khmer Rouge or any other guerrillas and particularly
not in mine-laying or any other military techniques which
would be directed against civilians. Neither plaintiff would
ever contemplate any such thing and would refuse to do it if
ordered.