2RHPZ
06-10-2004, 12:39 PM
Northern Ireland
Loughall
Northern Ireland. Two words that conjure up
images of civil strife, bomb-scarred towns
and cities, mutilated soldiers and civilians
and a hate-filled populace. For the Special
Air Service, Ulster has been the location of
its most long-running campaign, one which
appears to have no end in sight.
It is impossible in just one chapter to provide
a comprehensive history of all the Regiment's
actions in the Province. However, by using the
words of SAS soldiers themselves, an impression
can be given of the type of war being fought by
the Regiment in Ulster and the kind of skills
needed to fight the 'unseen enemy'.
But why was the SAS there in the first place?
British troops were first despatched to
Northern Ireland in August 1969 to stop the
inter-communal violence between Catholics and
Protestants. This period also saw the first
deployment of the SAS, when members of D
Squadron, 22 SAS, were engaged in the
countryside to hunt for Protestant weapons. The
war in Oman (1970-76) meant the Regiment did
not have the manpower to maintain a sizeable
presence in the Province, though individual
officers and NCOs were posted there to carry
out intelligence tasks. However, in 1976 the
British government announced in the House of
Commons that the Special Air Service was
being deployed to the Province, specifically to
South Armagh, signalling the beginning of a
squadron-sized SAS presence in Ulster.
The main adversaries of the SAS in
Northern Ireland were, and continue to be, the
nationalist Irish Republican Army (IRA), which
seeks to drive the British out by force, and the
smaller, Marxist .Irish National Liberation Army.
(INLA). There is little SAS activity against
Protestant terrorist organisations, mainly
because these groups are not engaged in a war
against the security forces. In the mid-1970s
there was much IRA. activity in South Armagh.,
but the SAS deployment there temporarily wit-
nessed a reduction in terrorist outrages. In one
incident, Peter Cleary, a senior 'player' in the
IRA, was captured near Forkhill, South Armagh,
though he was killed while trying to escape.
However, this incident notwithstanding, the
terrorist threat was not so easily dispensed with,
and the SAS settled down to a long campaign
against the men in black balaclavas.
What does the SAS do in Northern Ireland?
In the main it carries out surveillance and
intelligence-gathering missions and undertakes
ambush operations throughout the Province.
From the late 1970s, the SAS deployment in
Ulster was as follows: one troop (usually 16 men)
at Bessbrook. under the command of 3 Brigade;
one deployed to the Belfast area under 39
Brigade; one to 8 Brigade in Londonderry; and a
fourth under the personal control of the Com-
mander of Land Forces. However, in the 1980s
there was a change in SAS deployments. The
splitting up of the squadron had meant that the
Regiment's effectiveness was diluted. The Army
recognised this and pushed for the establishment
of a single, smaller SAS unit, one that could be
moved from one place to another at short notice
if required. For its part, the SAS was also
experiencing difficulties: each squadron tour
lasted between four and six months, with a
period of prior acclimatisation training and a
period of leave afterwards. With only four
operational squadrons, the Regiment found that
its soldiers were rarely away from Ulster. For a
unit that has to keep its men proficient in a wide
variety of military skills, this was not desirable.
To rectify the situation, therefore, a new
organisation called the Intelligence and Security
Group (Northern Ireland) was set up -- known as
'The Group' -- which saw a reduction in the
number of SAS soldiers serving in Northern
Ireland from a full squadron to a troop of just
over 20 men (.Ulster Troop.). By the mid-l980s,
SAS soldiers were serving for a period of one
year in Ulster Troop and were working closely
within the Group with the .14th Intelligence
Unit. The latter is a covert British Army intelli-
gence-gathering organisation that was formed in
the early 1970s and whose recruits are trained by
the SAS. In the Group the SAS contingent and
14th Intelligence Unit were commanded by a
single officer. In addition, the actions of the
Group and of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC) special units were also integrated.
Before they go 'over the water', SAS soldiers
undergo training to prepare them for the special
conditions that exist in Ulster:
'The focus of training for teams heading
for Ulster is rehearsing for covert ops.
They will carry out procedures for getting
in and out of "hides" and will practise
photographing "incidents", and all the
while they will be assessed and monitored
by Hereford's training staff.
'I remember manning one "hide" in the
Herefordshire countryside. There were
two of us hidden deep inside a roadside
hedge, with two more to our rear to cover
us. Anyway, at 0700 hours two masked
men came out of the house carrying several
weapons. They then stopped in the
driveway, giving us plenty of time to
photograph them before they jumped in a
car and left. We were well chuffed, and
when we got back to base the photographs
turned out to be excellent. So there we
were, feeling on top of the world, when
the instructors pulled out another set of
photos -- of us. Unknown to ourselves,
another team had been stalking us and, as
the pictures showed, we had failed to fully
camouflage our position. We were seen. If
it had been the real thing we might have
been killed. It put the ****s up me, I can
tell you.'
The key to winning the war in Ulster is intelli-
gence. In theory all the military and intelligence
agencies in the Province work with each other to
combat terrorism. However, there are suspicions
that many of the different agencies are at each
other's throats. "MI6, for example, often
prevents the RUC's Special Branch from seeing
certain information, and the RUC in turn often
jealously guards its intelligence. The SAS was
initially given the cold shoulder by both the
Army and the RUC, as the two believed that the
Regiment's deployment to the Province was an
indication that their efforts were judged to have
failed. Despite the veneer of unity presented by
all the security agencies, this rivalry, bickering
and pettiness continues.
In Northern Ireland the SAS operates as
covertly as possible. In 1976, for example, in the
SAS's first official tour, men from D Squadron
were attached to 40 Commando, Royal Marines,
for their tour in .,South Armagh. On the ferry to
Belfast they were wearing green berets and
standard disruptive pattern material (DPM)
smocks, and several carried L42 sniper rifles.
During this tour the SAS carried out no less
than 31 operations against the enemy.
But who exactly are the opposition? The
original ,IRA was an Irish nationalist group that
was formed in 1919 and which was dedicated to
an armed struggle in pursuit of its aims. The
organisation split into two groups in December
1969: the 'Officials', the old leadership in
Dublin, believed that an alliance between the
Protestant and Catholic working classes would
bring about a united Ireland, while the
'Provisionals', led by hardliners from Belfast,
believed the only way to achieve a united Ireland
was to drive out the British by force. The
Provisionals soon gained the upper hand, and to
this day the IRA is also known as the 'Provos'.
Its list of assassinations, murders and bombings
is long, but notable atrocities include the deaths
of 21 people in the Birmingham pub bombings
in November 1974, the bombing of the Grand
Hotel in Brighton in October 1984, and killing
11 civilians at a Remembrance Day ceremony in
Enniskillen in November 1987. Most of the
IRA's major 'players' are known to the security
forces, but catching them in the act of
committing a terrorist offence, the only way they
can be legally apprehended, is very difficult.
Nevertheless, the skills possessed by the soldiers
of the Special Air Service have proved invaluable
in the Province in arresting IRA operatives and
preventing terrorist outrages.
The following account concerns an SAS
operation in South Armagh in the late 1970s,
and is typical of the type of work the Regiment is
engaged in as part of the fight against terrorism
in Ulster. It is told by a member of 22 SAS:
'Orders were given in the full Ground,
Situation, Mission style of all operations,
with background details on the target. He
was a known 'player' who had been
involved in an attack on 3 Para and
possibly the Kingsmills massacre [on 5
January 1976, 12 IRA terrorists had
stopped a workers' minibus at Kingsmills,
County Armagh, lined up the 11
Protestant passengers by the side of the
road and riddled them with gunfire -- only
one escaped with his life]. The aim was to
take him out of the circuit and crush the
morale of the young "bulls" in Cross
[Crossmaglen], who were waiting in the
wings to follow their leaders.
'Two teams of four were tasked for the
operation and rehearsals were carried out
at a base in Ballykinler. The maximum
range we expected to engage any terrorists
was 500 metres, and so live rehearsals
were essential. The brief was headed by
two senior "Ruperts" [SAS slang for
officers], but the most important figure
was the IO [intelligence officer]. He had
been in the Province for four years and
was on the ball. A model of the local area
was used to highlight the terrain and
locate potential DLBs [dead letter boxes,
points used to drop off supplies], PUPs
[pick-up points, pre-arranged rendezvous
in case the mission was compromised] and
DOPs [drop-off points], as well as routes
in and out, including an escape route and
the location of the QRF [Quick Reaction
Force, an Army back-up].'
The target in question was a local terrorist
leader who was a major 'player'. The plan was
to catch him committing a criminal act and
arrest him. The SAS source continues:
'Both teams were inserted separately. It is
an SOP [standard operating procedure],
whether by helicopter or Q van
[unmarked vehicle], that when there are
two teams they will always travel apart.
'I was with the helicopter team that
lifted out of Bessbrook in the early hours
and landed approximately 2km from the
area. Our role was to go to ground and act
as the support group for the primary
team, and log anything and everything
that moved and which might present a
threat to the primary team.'
SAS four-man patrols, because of the intensive
training received by each team member in
weapons handling, can lay down a devastating
barrage of firepower. The teams that were on
this particular mission were heavily armed. They
were in 'bandit country' and were taking no risks:
'The primary team arrived on the ground
by Q van and had inserted themselves into
the roof of a disused barn by first light.
They were heavily armed with M16s,
shotguns and two M79s [grenade
launchers]. In addition, each man carried a
9mm Browning High Power handgun. My
team was equipped with a light machine
gun, an SLR [Self-Loading Rifle] which
could fire automatic and two M16s. The
SLR man carried light machine gun
magazines on his weapon, with his first
magazine containing tracer rounds. If any
fireworks broke out his job was to put
down instantaneous and continuous fire so
the rest of us could see the tracer and use
it as a marker.
'Each team was also equipped with a
Sarbe [surface-to-air rescue beacon],
which had one use: emergency only. For
example, if Paddy bumped us or we were
heavily compromised and couldn't use the
radio, then the SOP was to hit the Sarbe.
Another bit of kit, the strobe, was amazing
for bringing in helicopters: pilots could
locate it in all weathers and use it to find
the LS [landing site].'
Because SAS soldiers have to operate in all types
of weather conditions, they must have the right
clothing. However, the considerations of the
mission in hand must come first:
'Goretex wasn't around then, but water-
proofs were out. We didn't wear anything
that made a noise. Boots have been a
problem since the British Army was
formed, and so many blokes in the
Regiment buy their own, particularly US
Marine jungle boots, which provide plenty
of movement for the ankle but still have a
strong base. But we all wore "goon boots",
which were small, pullover shoe covers
that had lumps of rubber on the sole. The
aim was not to leave footprints as the local
farmers, Fenian to a man, were quick to
spot boot marks and would pass the
information on to their mates in the IRA.
'Everything was camouflaged: bergens,
weapons, the lot. We added a few extras to
our smocks, such as a large inside pocket to
carry a small radio and a few batteries. In
the main, though, we wore the same
uniform as other British Army units. This
was because if a team decided to break
cover, they would look like ordinary
squaddies.'
Though the SAS engaged and killed a terrorist
after three days of waiting, it turned out to be
another gunman, not the major 'player'. The
men were then forced to retire, having assumed
they had been compromised. This is a typical
example of the type of operation conducted by
the SAS in Ulster which, despite the intensive
preparations, can often end in frustration.
Observation Post (OP) work forms what is
probably the main task of the Special Air Service
in Northern Ireland. The reason is simple: SAS
soldiers, because of their training and mental
and physical stamina, are ideally suited to living
in cramped, uncomfortable OPs for days on
end. Many OP missions are conducted from
Bessbrook, the headquarters for SAS
operations in South Armagh. A large former
cotton mill, it is now a hive of activity for the
British Army. Battalions serving in the ..South
Armagh TAOR (Tactical Area of
Responsibility) base their HQ staff and support
forces at Bessbrook. The support services
include Q cars and Quick Reaction Forces,
which can fly from the Mill's heliport to any
location in the area to provide instant back-up.
The heliport, known as Bessbrook
International, is roughly the size of two football
pitches. The whole base is heavily guarded,
having been the target of numerous IRA attacks
over the years. An SAS soldier describes a
typical OP mission mounted from the Mill:
'After an intelligence brief at the Mill we
flew by Wessex to Crossmaglen SF
(security forces) base, where we were due
to meet one of our teams that had just
spent several days on the ground. Once
inside the base, we were briefed by the
company commander of the Black Watch
and an RUC officer. The aim of this was
to update us on their activity in the area
and the day's events at local level. Our
people passed on details about known
"players" seen in the TAOR, and the
movements of "targets" the Provos had
been monitoring, which was very relevant
to the operation we were about to mount.'
'The deployment of the OP had been
sanctioned after intelligence from Special
Branch indicated a big hit was being
planned against Cross. In the past Provo
machine-gun attacks had scored massive
publicity, but their favoured method was
to use mortars. They weren't very
accurate, but Paddy would lob a few shells
in which would scare the **** out of
everyone and remind the British Army
that it was in enemy territory.
'We had been told by the intelligence
boys that the attack would be very big,
and the Provos had even been boasting in
the local pubs that at least 10 British
soldiers would die, so the heat was on to
prevent it happening. There were only two
places from where the Provos could launch
such an attack, the most likely being a
football field behind the base.'
Establishing a covert OP is no easy task. A
position has to be found that will enable the SAS
team to view the target on a 24-hour basis, but
the men have to be inserted into the OP secretly.
In an area like .,South Armagh., where most pairs
of eyes are hostile, this can present problems.
Therefore elaborate tactics have to be adopted:
'A disused house on the edge of
Crossmaglen provided the perfect position
for a long-term OP. It was detached and
isolated on one side of the road, with an
occupied dwelling just 100m away. The
obvious dangers of inserting a team into
such a position required a check by an
EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] team.
We left Cross late in the afternoon as part
of a Black Watch patrol, also taking three
Royal Engineers along with us.
'Wearing standard combat gear and
helmets, we were part of a 12-strong patrol
which headed out of the main square
towards our objective. The aim was to
acquaint ourselves with the terrain around
the building which we were to occupy later
that evening. We patrolled up through
Cross, and at a given point the soldiers
from the battalion established a VCP
[vehicle checkpoint] on the Cullaville
Road, giving us the opportunity to check
the ground and the sappers the chance to
clear the building. The walk-past recce was
very useful. We were equipped with
bergens, Armalites and a full-automatic
SLR. If we'd have carried this gear in West
Belfast Paddy would probably have sussed
we were SAS, but in South Armagh, or 'the
cuds' as the area is known, soldiers carry
bergens and Armalites all the time.'
Constant vigilance is a feature of all covert
operations in Northern Ireland, as the enemy
has eyes and ears everywhere. In addition, what
is standard operating procedure in large urban
areas such as Belfast is not always applicable to
rural areas and small towns and villages. Q cars
and covert vans are not easy to operate in
Crossmaglen, for example, because the place is
so small and the base is monitored all the time
by Republican 'spatters'. Therefore, the SAS
frequently employs helicopters and foot patrols
as a way of getting teams into OPs without
attracting attention to the initial phase of the
operation. Once established in an OP, it is a
question of simply waiting and watching. The
SAS soldier continues his description of the
mission:
'We carried everything we would need to
sustain a 10-day observation: water, food,
ammunition and surveillance equipment,
as well as a variety of "live traps" which we
planted around the building as "insurance"
against any Provos who paid us an
unannounced visit. We also had an escape
route in case we were compromised.
'Living in a covert OP for 10 days in
conditions where you could be
compromised at any time by noise or
smell is very stressful, especially if your
"hide" is near an inhabited building.
Noise is a killer, and so a variety of
precautions are taken to avoid com-
promise, and these must be enforced at all
times if success is going to be achieved.
'After entering the building the
bergens are placed in ready-to-move
positions and are never moved again. Soft
shoes, trainers or desert boots are put on
and combat boots are stowed away -- they
are too heavy and are difficult to sleep in.
We had one collapsible camp bed, which
we had "liberated" from an American
para, and erected it straight away.
Cameras and night scopes were set up
and plastic bags for human waste were
put to one side. A second bag for empty
food cans was also put to one side. It is
imperative to trap all smells -- like noise
they can literally be a killer. They can
attract dogs and cats which will
compromise the operation.'
Inside the OP there is little to do except to try
to keep alert, for any lapses in concentration
can be fatal. Though the men's lives are on the
line, the temptation to take risks to relieve the
boredom is great. Only through strict self-
discipline can the pitfalls be avoided. This is
where the SAS's training comes into its own:
'Smoking is out, and I remember the
problems of trying to operate and sort
out equipment in the pitch darkness
inside the attic of the property. Even
using a torch for a few seconds is too
risky. The procedure was for one man to
get his head down, one to monitor the
radio, while the third carried out
surveillance, this is all standard SAS SOP.
'Food is a real problem. At no time did
we eat it warm, and the only time we had
hot drinks was at first light when we could
use a "bluey" with no fear of anyone being
around to hear its gas burning. We drank
tea -- coffee smells -- and ate a variety of
cold meats and tinned food.'
Never far from the soldiers' minds are thoughts
of being discovered:
'Camouflage cream is a must at all times
for two reasons. First, although we could
not see any broken or damaged tiles, a
white face shines and might therefore be
seen by a passer-by. Second, if someone
accidentally entered the property and
compromised our operation we needed
the element of shock to surprise them.'
'Wearing desert boots, combat
trousers, black roll-neck jumpers and
woolly hats kept us warm, and gave us the
opportunity to move about quietly. We
weren't too worried about getting
bumped by the opposition because we each
had a 9mm Browning High Power in a
shoulder holster and our main weapons
were always close by.
'To give us an arc of observation for the
scope and camera we removed a small part
of a brick, which gave us plenty of vision to
monitor the road, the houses and the
potential mortar base plate on the playing
fields. Nobody talks during the day unless
it is vital, and operational details such as
DLB arrangements are made by whisper,
again its an SOP which is instinctive. At
night a team of ours at Cross mounted
DLBs in which they delivered fresh
sandwiches and supplies, such as radio
batteries and other items, and took away
our waste. This procedure centred on pre-
arranged RVs, which often gave us the
chance to exchange operational details and
receive additional orders. Goods were
exchanged or left in a bergen, and we in
turn would deliver bergens full of waste, as
well as 'shot' film that had to be returned
for developing as quickly as possible.'
SAS soldiers are trained to fight as well as gather
intelligence, and uppermost in each man's mind
was the state of his weapons:
'Magazines on our weapons were changed
every day, because a sustained period in an
OP can cause the mag spring to seize and
result in a stoppage. If this happens and
the OP is bumped, you're ****ed.
'In Ulster most of the blokes like the
M16 because it can deliver more rounds
than the SLR or even the new SA-80. It's
also fairly small, making it useful for OP
work in a covert "hide". A weapon that is
gaining in popularity with the Regiment in
Ulster is the Heckler & Koch 53, which is
basically a scaled-down version of the G3
rifle, though it also looks like the MPS.'
Relaying information back to HQ can be a real
problem for SAS teams:
'Communications can be a ****ing
nightmare, depending on which radio
band you are using. VHF, for example,
often interfered with local television sets
when they were switched on and basically
told the locals that the military were in the
area. Thus if you are operating from a
property you never transmit during
daylight hours if you can help it.'
Despite the nerve-wracking nature of OP work,
there are still the mundane, everyday matters to
attend to. These demand proper attention or the
OP can be compromised:
'Our rubbish and human waste was bagged
up and sealed all the time. Our urine was
bottled and food packed in plastic
containers, but the rats still found us. Rats
are a major problem in OP work around
Cross, and their presence can cause you to
make noise in an effort to stop them
attacking waste and refuse. The attic where
the three of us lived was crawling with the
little ****ers. They were big and would
stop at nothing to get at the food or
rubbish we had.
'We asked Cross to supply rat poison in
a future DLB, which eventually resulted in
a bag of 17 rats being shipped back to base
in a bergen. The boys back at Cross
thought it was some sort of joke, but in fact
it was a real problem because we couldn't
just leave them in the OP. By the time the
operation finished we had returned more
than 90 dead rats.'
'After several days your beard starts to
itch, your hands are black and you smell.
During insertion we had sighted a room
full of hay and, in an inspired moment, had
spread some on the floor of the attic to dull
any noise and absorb our body smells. We
were quite chuffed with ourselves. When
we got back to Crossmaglen, however,
after stripping off for a shower we realised
it wasn't such a good move: our legs were
covered in ticks and it took ages to get
them off.'
Behind the picture of this SAS trooper playing the hunchback of Notre Dame,
there is a very funny story, which in itself depicts the hardships that working
in an observation position can bring. Two men had been sent out to observe and
photograph a local barber's shop. The barber was suspected of being a member of
the IRA, and pictures were required to establish who was visiting the premises.
Eventually, the two men found a location for their OP in the ceiling of the town
hall. Working in the space between the inner ornate roof, the two men set up a
camp in the tiny maintenance space behind the town hall clock. At each side of
the clock, through which was a sloping vent, clear pictures could be taken of
the barber's shop across the street. Hot soup and sandwiches were delivered to
the men during the early morning hours via a small trap door in the town hall
ceiling. Messages, exposed film and waste were lowered down, with fresh supplies
being hauled up. A bin liner placed in the gloom at the end of the catwalk which
ran the length of the domed inner roof served as a toilet. The weather was very
sunny and after about five days, the heat which became trapped between the inner
and the outer roofs was unbearable. One of the soldiers, in need of the toilet,
worked his way along the catwalk towards the bag. Halfway along, he stopped,
shocked by something moving in the gloom. There in front of him was the biggest
spider the man had ever seen. Its body was two feet across, and large eyes
glistened in its head, The SAS man panicked, daring not to move for fear that it
would attack him. Several moments went by before he realised that spiders that
size don't exist. Then he saw what it was. The black bin liner had been twisted
and sealed up with a elastic band after use, to cut down on the smell. As the
heat had increased, the gases had expanded, creating a look-alike giant spider
lurking in the half light. With some relief, and fearing that the bag might
explode at any moment, the SAS soldier committed a second error; he opened the
sack. The smell hit him like a sledgehammer. He managed to crawl back to where
his partner was keeping watch, only to find him face up against the vent trying
to suck in clean air. Although funny, this story demonstrates the daily
hardships that SAS men encounter in the war against terrorism - the stayed in
the location undetected for three weeks.
Procedures for re-supplying covert OPs are
continually being tested and re-tested, as they are
vital and must be carried out efficiently if the OP
isn't to be compromised. In the 1970s the DLB
system was in operation, but the risk of this
being a target for an "IRA. ambush meant the
system has now changed to the Live Letter Box
(LLB) method:
'The LLB system is much better. A covert
car will drive to a pre-arranged RV with its
rear window down (there's always two
blokes in the front of the car), with
another car, a back-up, some distance
behind. Anything that has to be got rid of
-- exposed film, waste, wet sleeping bags --
will be thrown onto the back seat of the
car, while the bloke in the front passenger
seat will pass the stuff requested by the
patrol out of his window to the patrol
members. Then they will be off.'
OP work is unglamorous, dangerous and tedi-
ous, and is perhaps not everyone's idea of what
the SAS does in Ulster. However, it is vital to
the intelligence war that is being waged against
the terrorists, and is perhaps the best weapon in
the armoury of the security forces.
Ambush operations are another part of the
SAS's war against terrorism. They can be
spectacularly successful, but they can also be
controversial and raise the spectre of the Regi-
ment operating a shoot-to-kill policy in the
Province. However, the SAS is aware that any
ambush operation will be subjected to intense
legal scrutiny, and therefore impresses upon its
men the importance of adhering to the Army's
rules of engagement. An example of the diffi-
culties facing the Regiment when springing
ambushes is provided by an incident which took
place in County Tyrone in August 1988.
In June, British intelligence collected an
invaluable clue concerning a forthcoming IRA
operation to assassinate a former RUC officer
who worked in Omagh. The SAS, working in
conjunction with the Army, the intelligence
agencies and the RUC, decided to set an ambush
to prevent the murder attempt. The identities of
the local IRA operatives were known to the
security forces: Martin and Gerald Harte and
Brian Mullen, who together formed the Mid-
Tyrone Brigade. The intended victim was
informed of the IRA's plan, and he agreed to
continue driving his truck to work along his
regular route to establish a movement pattern
which would be observed by the terrorists.
The SAS plan was for the truck to 'break
down', and then a team from the Regiment
would lie in wait around it until the IRA hit
squad arrived. However, theMid-Tyrone
Brigade didn't just have this operation on its
books. On 20 August 1988, it blew up a coach
carrying 35 members of the 1st Battalion, The
Light Infantry, as it travelled along the AS from
Aldergrove Airport to the barracks in Omagh.
The IRA team used nearly 100 kilos of Semtex in
the attack, which hurled the coach 30m through
the air. It was a devastating attack: eight men
were killed, and many more were horribly
injured. For the IRA it was a spectacular victory.
The SAS did not let the incident alter its
plans: the operation went ahead as planned. On
29 August, the terrorists returned to their arms
cache, indicating the murder attempt would take
place the next day. During the early hours of 30
August an SAS soldier took the place of the
target and drove the truck to the pre-arranged
ambush point. At the same time, a three-man
SAS team left the barracks in Omagh and walked
to a derelict farmhouse near the village of
Drumnakilly. They were armed with Browning
High Power handguns and had 9mm Heckler &
Koch MP5 submachine guns as their main
weapons. When they reached the site one took
cover in a barn while the other two hid in
hedgerows on either side of the road.
At around 1900 hours the truck stopped
outside the farmhouse. The 'driver' got out of
the cab and unloaded the spare tyre to give the
impression he had broken down. He knew the
IRA would soon get to know of his whereabouts
-- the enemy had a host of eyes and ears in the
area. Sure enough, later that day the terrorists
hijacked a white Ford Sierra and, told of the
whereabouts of the truck, made their way there.
They were wearing black balaclavas, blue boiler
suits and were armed with Kalashnikov AK-47
assault rifles and Webley revolvers -- a heavily
armed team out to kill an unarmed civilian, but
that's what the IRA is all about.
The security forces had been trailing the
IRA team on the day of the ambush to give the
waiting SAS soldiers information concerning
their whereabouts. However, the surveillance
was abandoned when it was feared one of the
unmarked cars had been identified by a
potential hostile. The SAS team was blind. The
SAS man at the truck, therefore, didn't realise
who was in the white Sierra as it raced towards
him, although his instincts told him something
was wrong. He was right. He sprinted to a
nearby wall as the IRA men opened up with a
hail of automatic fire. As bullets kicked up the
earth around him he made a frantic dash for
cover, and made it.
The car screeched to a halt and the
terrorists prepared to jump out and finish him
off. At that moment a ferocious barrage of 9mm
bullets hit the car as the three hidden SAS
soldiers opened fire. The Harte brothers and
Mullen were killed instantly, the Mid- Tyrone
Brigade had ceased to exist. The SAS soldiers
radioed for a Lynx helicopter to take them back
to Omagh as RUC and Army units sealed off
the immediate area. The operation had been a
stunning success.
What was to follow was a public relations
debacle, as the British government remained
silent on the operation as the media and
Republican commentators screamed that it was
a revenge killing for the bus bombing. The SAS
in particular was disturbed that no one officially
contradicted these claims. Only belatedly did
the Defence Secretary, Tom King, deny that
the SAS was operating a shoot-to-kill policy.
The operation was a brilliant military action
which then turned into a propaganda victory for
the IRA and its supporters.
A few months before there had been an
even greater victory for the SAS, one which had
gone down in the annals of the Regiment as one
of its greatest successes against the IRA: the am-
bush at Loughall. In late 1986 and early 1987,
the IRA had increased its campaign of terror in
Northern Ireland with a series of bombings,
beatings and murders. The Republican move-
ment had stepped up its military activity in an
attempt to make Ulster ungovernable. For their
part, the security forces were on a state of high
alert. But they received a godsend when, during
routine surveillance, an IRA member was
overheard on the telephone talking about a
planned attack on the RUC station at Loughall,
County Armagh, by the East Tyrone Brigade.
The East Tyrone Brigade was known as the
'A Team' within the IRA, and for good reason. It
had carried out a number of daring attacks
against the RUC and the British Army. In
December 1985, for example, it had assaulted
Ballygawley RUC barracks with AK-47 assault
rifles and Armalites. Killing the two guards on
the gate, the IRA team then raked the barracks
with gunfire before planting a large bomb inside
the building. The subsequent explosion totally
destroyed the barracks. The RUC station at the
Birches, County Tyrone, was also attacked by
the team. They loaded a large bomb in the
shovel of a mechanical digger and rammed it
against the wall of the building after first
breaching the security fence. The explosion
blew the barracks to smithereens, though the
terrorists still felt the need to rake the area with
gunfire after they had detonated the bomb. The
attack on Loughall would be very similar, apart
from one small difference: the SAS and RUC
would be ready and waiting.
Loughall is a small Protestant enclave in an
overwhelmingly Catholic area. The village is a
symbol of Protestant power, being the birthplace
of the Orange Order. It had also been relatively
untouched by the 'Troubles'; however, the IRA
was determined to change that. The police
station itself was a part-time, undermanned
RUC office, and the IRA planned to carry out an
attack that would totally wreck the building.
The SAS was taking no chances. It was
decided to reinforce Ulster Troop with more
men from England. Therefore, the Regiment's
headquarters at Hereford was ordered to send
over more men. Soon afterwards, a 16-man troop
from D Squadron was on its way to Ulster.
Operation 'Judy', the codename for the ambush
at Loughall, was under way. Because of the IRA's
slackness, the authorities knew the date of the
attack: 8 May. The SAS men and RUC snipers
were infiltrated into the area many hours before
the IRA terrorists were due to make an appear-
ance. The SAS contingent was commanded by a
staff sergeant from Ulster Troop, a man of great
experience who would make sure the operation
would be perfectly executed. At the prior briefing
the men were told that the mission was an
OP/React -- an Observation Post able to React, a
coded term for an ambush. The enemy would
drive into a pre-arranged killing ground where
they would be engaged and destroyed. The East
Tyrone Brigade's luck was about to run out.
The SAS soldiers were heavily armed: those
of Ulster Troop were carrying Heckler & Koch
G3 assault rifles, those from England had M16
rifles, and there were at least two General
Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs). The men
were deployed in two groups. The first, the larger
one, was deployed in the copse overlooking the
RUC station close to the Armagh road. In this
way the soldiers, who also had the two GPMGs,
could concentrate fire on the football field in
front of the police station. The second group was
in the station itself, with the men being at the
rear and at the far end of the building in relation
to where the gates were. There were also at least
two cut-off groups in the village and another SAS
unit close to the church.
There has been questions raised sub-
sequently concerning the wisdom of placing men
in the building, as it was known that the IRA
bomb would be large and would thus damage the
building and perhaps injure any occupants. Mark
Urban, in his book Big Boys' Rules, believes the
men were placed in the station because the SAS
wanted to be seen acting within the guidelines of
the British Army's Yellow Card rules concerning
the use of force against terrorists, ie if the
station was unoccupied when the IRA attacked
it might be hard to justify killing the terrorists,
because they did not present an immediate
danger to life. However, with men in the
building at the time of the attack, the IRA
gunmen would be threatening the lives of
security forces personnel and could therefore be
fired upon legitimately.
Whatever the reasoning behind placing
men in the police station, it did contain SAS
soldiers as the IRA team approached its target in
two vehicles:
'From my position in the copse I
remember seeing the van slowly driving
past the police station and then stop,
followed some time later by the digger.
There were three men on the digger and
they all appeared to be armed [five more
were in the van]. I eased the safety catch
off my G3 and eased the weapon into a
comfortable firing position. I could feel
my heart pounding and the ardenalin
flowing in my veins. Then the digger
crashed into the gates of the police station
and stopped, its bucket holding the bomb
raised high. The terrorists then jumped
from the digger and formed up in a line
on the road. What the hell are they up to?
They were all armed, a couple of them
were carrying what looked to me to be
G3s. ****ing good piece of kit the G3:
compact, light and, most important, it
rarely jams. That's the thing about the
Provos, they always have the best that's
available. Then they started shooting at
the police station in an act of what could
have only been bravado.
'Then our guys in the police station
opened up with a hail of fire which cut
down one of the terrorists. This was our
cue, and the blokes all around me started
to fire bursts. The amount of ammunition
being expended was incredible. I began
firing my weapon. Then, Armageddon!
The bomb exploded and the whole police
station seemed to cave in. Everyone
stopped firing momentarily, somewhat
dazed, then, after what seemed like an
eternity but was probably only a couple of
seconds, we started up again as the dust
settled. I emptied a magazine and clipped a
fresh one in the receiver. The whole area
was alive with the sound of gunfire. Two
terrorists had tried to make a dash for the
van, but were cut down before they
reached it. Bullets were still hitting their
lifeless bodies as they lay in the road.
Another terrorist tried to escape from the
Toyota by running across the football field
by the side of the road, but he too was cut
down.
'Bullets were spraying everywhere. By
this time everyone was directing their fire
at the van, and it was taking so many hits
that I thought it would disintegrate (I saw
it some time after the ambush, it was
literally covered in blood and guts).
Squeeze the trigger, squeeze the trigger,
reload. I reached for a fresh mag and
began firing again. Empty cartridge cases
were flying all over the place, and in the
background I could hear the rippling firing
pattern of the GPMGs. I knew whoever
was in the van would be dead for certain.'
All eight terrorists were dead. But the killing
didn't stop there. Unfortunately a white Citroen
car carrying two brothers, Oliver and Anthony
Hughes, was fired upon by the cut-off groups in
the mistaken belief that it contained IRA men.
Tragically, Anthony was killed.
When the shooting died down the area was
sealed off by armed police, and overhead
helicopters scoured the countryside for any
other terrorists who might be in the area. The
SAS soldiers themselves, after ensuring there
was no longer a threat, were evacuated by
helicopter. The Regiment had just fought its
most successful battle in Northern Ireland.
When the police station at Loughall was attacked by two service units of the
IRA, they were met with the full force of the SAS. It started when masked men
stole a Toyota van from Dungannon. It was suspected that the van would be used
in an attack. Surveillance by E4A had identified the target as Loughall. At a
little past 7pm, the blue Toyota van drove down the road past the police
station. It shortly returned from the direction of Portadown, this time followed
by a JCB, in the cab where three hooded IRA terrorists. Declan Arthurs was
driving, with Michael Gromley and Gerald O'Callaghan riding shotgun. The bucket
was filled with explosive contained in an oil drum. While the blue van charged
pas the police station. the JCB slammed through the gate. One of the two IRA men
jumped out and opened fire in the direction of the RUC station. At this stage
the ambush was activated. All eight members of the IRA fell. hit by the
devastating SAS fire. At the height of the fire-fight, the bomb exploded, taking
with it half of the RUC station. Without doubt, Loughall was one of the most
successful operations ever mounted against the IRA, who were totally stunned by
the loss of two complete active units. This is all that was left of the van. The
rods indicate bullet holes.
Loughall
Northern Ireland. Two words that conjure up
images of civil strife, bomb-scarred towns
and cities, mutilated soldiers and civilians
and a hate-filled populace. For the Special
Air Service, Ulster has been the location of
its most long-running campaign, one which
appears to have no end in sight.
It is impossible in just one chapter to provide
a comprehensive history of all the Regiment's
actions in the Province. However, by using the
words of SAS soldiers themselves, an impression
can be given of the type of war being fought by
the Regiment in Ulster and the kind of skills
needed to fight the 'unseen enemy'.
But why was the SAS there in the first place?
British troops were first despatched to
Northern Ireland in August 1969 to stop the
inter-communal violence between Catholics and
Protestants. This period also saw the first
deployment of the SAS, when members of D
Squadron, 22 SAS, were engaged in the
countryside to hunt for Protestant weapons. The
war in Oman (1970-76) meant the Regiment did
not have the manpower to maintain a sizeable
presence in the Province, though individual
officers and NCOs were posted there to carry
out intelligence tasks. However, in 1976 the
British government announced in the House of
Commons that the Special Air Service was
being deployed to the Province, specifically to
South Armagh, signalling the beginning of a
squadron-sized SAS presence in Ulster.
The main adversaries of the SAS in
Northern Ireland were, and continue to be, the
nationalist Irish Republican Army (IRA), which
seeks to drive the British out by force, and the
smaller, Marxist .Irish National Liberation Army.
(INLA). There is little SAS activity against
Protestant terrorist organisations, mainly
because these groups are not engaged in a war
against the security forces. In the mid-1970s
there was much IRA. activity in South Armagh.,
but the SAS deployment there temporarily wit-
nessed a reduction in terrorist outrages. In one
incident, Peter Cleary, a senior 'player' in the
IRA, was captured near Forkhill, South Armagh,
though he was killed while trying to escape.
However, this incident notwithstanding, the
terrorist threat was not so easily dispensed with,
and the SAS settled down to a long campaign
against the men in black balaclavas.
What does the SAS do in Northern Ireland?
In the main it carries out surveillance and
intelligence-gathering missions and undertakes
ambush operations throughout the Province.
From the late 1970s, the SAS deployment in
Ulster was as follows: one troop (usually 16 men)
at Bessbrook. under the command of 3 Brigade;
one deployed to the Belfast area under 39
Brigade; one to 8 Brigade in Londonderry; and a
fourth under the personal control of the Com-
mander of Land Forces. However, in the 1980s
there was a change in SAS deployments. The
splitting up of the squadron had meant that the
Regiment's effectiveness was diluted. The Army
recognised this and pushed for the establishment
of a single, smaller SAS unit, one that could be
moved from one place to another at short notice
if required. For its part, the SAS was also
experiencing difficulties: each squadron tour
lasted between four and six months, with a
period of prior acclimatisation training and a
period of leave afterwards. With only four
operational squadrons, the Regiment found that
its soldiers were rarely away from Ulster. For a
unit that has to keep its men proficient in a wide
variety of military skills, this was not desirable.
To rectify the situation, therefore, a new
organisation called the Intelligence and Security
Group (Northern Ireland) was set up -- known as
'The Group' -- which saw a reduction in the
number of SAS soldiers serving in Northern
Ireland from a full squadron to a troop of just
over 20 men (.Ulster Troop.). By the mid-l980s,
SAS soldiers were serving for a period of one
year in Ulster Troop and were working closely
within the Group with the .14th Intelligence
Unit. The latter is a covert British Army intelli-
gence-gathering organisation that was formed in
the early 1970s and whose recruits are trained by
the SAS. In the Group the SAS contingent and
14th Intelligence Unit were commanded by a
single officer. In addition, the actions of the
Group and of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC) special units were also integrated.
Before they go 'over the water', SAS soldiers
undergo training to prepare them for the special
conditions that exist in Ulster:
'The focus of training for teams heading
for Ulster is rehearsing for covert ops.
They will carry out procedures for getting
in and out of "hides" and will practise
photographing "incidents", and all the
while they will be assessed and monitored
by Hereford's training staff.
'I remember manning one "hide" in the
Herefordshire countryside. There were
two of us hidden deep inside a roadside
hedge, with two more to our rear to cover
us. Anyway, at 0700 hours two masked
men came out of the house carrying several
weapons. They then stopped in the
driveway, giving us plenty of time to
photograph them before they jumped in a
car and left. We were well chuffed, and
when we got back to base the photographs
turned out to be excellent. So there we
were, feeling on top of the world, when
the instructors pulled out another set of
photos -- of us. Unknown to ourselves,
another team had been stalking us and, as
the pictures showed, we had failed to fully
camouflage our position. We were seen. If
it had been the real thing we might have
been killed. It put the ****s up me, I can
tell you.'
The key to winning the war in Ulster is intelli-
gence. In theory all the military and intelligence
agencies in the Province work with each other to
combat terrorism. However, there are suspicions
that many of the different agencies are at each
other's throats. "MI6, for example, often
prevents the RUC's Special Branch from seeing
certain information, and the RUC in turn often
jealously guards its intelligence. The SAS was
initially given the cold shoulder by both the
Army and the RUC, as the two believed that the
Regiment's deployment to the Province was an
indication that their efforts were judged to have
failed. Despite the veneer of unity presented by
all the security agencies, this rivalry, bickering
and pettiness continues.
In Northern Ireland the SAS operates as
covertly as possible. In 1976, for example, in the
SAS's first official tour, men from D Squadron
were attached to 40 Commando, Royal Marines,
for their tour in .,South Armagh. On the ferry to
Belfast they were wearing green berets and
standard disruptive pattern material (DPM)
smocks, and several carried L42 sniper rifles.
During this tour the SAS carried out no less
than 31 operations against the enemy.
But who exactly are the opposition? The
original ,IRA was an Irish nationalist group that
was formed in 1919 and which was dedicated to
an armed struggle in pursuit of its aims. The
organisation split into two groups in December
1969: the 'Officials', the old leadership in
Dublin, believed that an alliance between the
Protestant and Catholic working classes would
bring about a united Ireland, while the
'Provisionals', led by hardliners from Belfast,
believed the only way to achieve a united Ireland
was to drive out the British by force. The
Provisionals soon gained the upper hand, and to
this day the IRA is also known as the 'Provos'.
Its list of assassinations, murders and bombings
is long, but notable atrocities include the deaths
of 21 people in the Birmingham pub bombings
in November 1974, the bombing of the Grand
Hotel in Brighton in October 1984, and killing
11 civilians at a Remembrance Day ceremony in
Enniskillen in November 1987. Most of the
IRA's major 'players' are known to the security
forces, but catching them in the act of
committing a terrorist offence, the only way they
can be legally apprehended, is very difficult.
Nevertheless, the skills possessed by the soldiers
of the Special Air Service have proved invaluable
in the Province in arresting IRA operatives and
preventing terrorist outrages.
The following account concerns an SAS
operation in South Armagh in the late 1970s,
and is typical of the type of work the Regiment is
engaged in as part of the fight against terrorism
in Ulster. It is told by a member of 22 SAS:
'Orders were given in the full Ground,
Situation, Mission style of all operations,
with background details on the target. He
was a known 'player' who had been
involved in an attack on 3 Para and
possibly the Kingsmills massacre [on 5
January 1976, 12 IRA terrorists had
stopped a workers' minibus at Kingsmills,
County Armagh, lined up the 11
Protestant passengers by the side of the
road and riddled them with gunfire -- only
one escaped with his life]. The aim was to
take him out of the circuit and crush the
morale of the young "bulls" in Cross
[Crossmaglen], who were waiting in the
wings to follow their leaders.
'Two teams of four were tasked for the
operation and rehearsals were carried out
at a base in Ballykinler. The maximum
range we expected to engage any terrorists
was 500 metres, and so live rehearsals
were essential. The brief was headed by
two senior "Ruperts" [SAS slang for
officers], but the most important figure
was the IO [intelligence officer]. He had
been in the Province for four years and
was on the ball. A model of the local area
was used to highlight the terrain and
locate potential DLBs [dead letter boxes,
points used to drop off supplies], PUPs
[pick-up points, pre-arranged rendezvous
in case the mission was compromised] and
DOPs [drop-off points], as well as routes
in and out, including an escape route and
the location of the QRF [Quick Reaction
Force, an Army back-up].'
The target in question was a local terrorist
leader who was a major 'player'. The plan was
to catch him committing a criminal act and
arrest him. The SAS source continues:
'Both teams were inserted separately. It is
an SOP [standard operating procedure],
whether by helicopter or Q van
[unmarked vehicle], that when there are
two teams they will always travel apart.
'I was with the helicopter team that
lifted out of Bessbrook in the early hours
and landed approximately 2km from the
area. Our role was to go to ground and act
as the support group for the primary
team, and log anything and everything
that moved and which might present a
threat to the primary team.'
SAS four-man patrols, because of the intensive
training received by each team member in
weapons handling, can lay down a devastating
barrage of firepower. The teams that were on
this particular mission were heavily armed. They
were in 'bandit country' and were taking no risks:
'The primary team arrived on the ground
by Q van and had inserted themselves into
the roof of a disused barn by first light.
They were heavily armed with M16s,
shotguns and two M79s [grenade
launchers]. In addition, each man carried a
9mm Browning High Power handgun. My
team was equipped with a light machine
gun, an SLR [Self-Loading Rifle] which
could fire automatic and two M16s. The
SLR man carried light machine gun
magazines on his weapon, with his first
magazine containing tracer rounds. If any
fireworks broke out his job was to put
down instantaneous and continuous fire so
the rest of us could see the tracer and use
it as a marker.
'Each team was also equipped with a
Sarbe [surface-to-air rescue beacon],
which had one use: emergency only. For
example, if Paddy bumped us or we were
heavily compromised and couldn't use the
radio, then the SOP was to hit the Sarbe.
Another bit of kit, the strobe, was amazing
for bringing in helicopters: pilots could
locate it in all weathers and use it to find
the LS [landing site].'
Because SAS soldiers have to operate in all types
of weather conditions, they must have the right
clothing. However, the considerations of the
mission in hand must come first:
'Goretex wasn't around then, but water-
proofs were out. We didn't wear anything
that made a noise. Boots have been a
problem since the British Army was
formed, and so many blokes in the
Regiment buy their own, particularly US
Marine jungle boots, which provide plenty
of movement for the ankle but still have a
strong base. But we all wore "goon boots",
which were small, pullover shoe covers
that had lumps of rubber on the sole. The
aim was not to leave footprints as the local
farmers, Fenian to a man, were quick to
spot boot marks and would pass the
information on to their mates in the IRA.
'Everything was camouflaged: bergens,
weapons, the lot. We added a few extras to
our smocks, such as a large inside pocket to
carry a small radio and a few batteries. In
the main, though, we wore the same
uniform as other British Army units. This
was because if a team decided to break
cover, they would look like ordinary
squaddies.'
Though the SAS engaged and killed a terrorist
after three days of waiting, it turned out to be
another gunman, not the major 'player'. The
men were then forced to retire, having assumed
they had been compromised. This is a typical
example of the type of operation conducted by
the SAS in Ulster which, despite the intensive
preparations, can often end in frustration.
Observation Post (OP) work forms what is
probably the main task of the Special Air Service
in Northern Ireland. The reason is simple: SAS
soldiers, because of their training and mental
and physical stamina, are ideally suited to living
in cramped, uncomfortable OPs for days on
end. Many OP missions are conducted from
Bessbrook, the headquarters for SAS
operations in South Armagh. A large former
cotton mill, it is now a hive of activity for the
British Army. Battalions serving in the ..South
Armagh TAOR (Tactical Area of
Responsibility) base their HQ staff and support
forces at Bessbrook. The support services
include Q cars and Quick Reaction Forces,
which can fly from the Mill's heliport to any
location in the area to provide instant back-up.
The heliport, known as Bessbrook
International, is roughly the size of two football
pitches. The whole base is heavily guarded,
having been the target of numerous IRA attacks
over the years. An SAS soldier describes a
typical OP mission mounted from the Mill:
'After an intelligence brief at the Mill we
flew by Wessex to Crossmaglen SF
(security forces) base, where we were due
to meet one of our teams that had just
spent several days on the ground. Once
inside the base, we were briefed by the
company commander of the Black Watch
and an RUC officer. The aim of this was
to update us on their activity in the area
and the day's events at local level. Our
people passed on details about known
"players" seen in the TAOR, and the
movements of "targets" the Provos had
been monitoring, which was very relevant
to the operation we were about to mount.'
'The deployment of the OP had been
sanctioned after intelligence from Special
Branch indicated a big hit was being
planned against Cross. In the past Provo
machine-gun attacks had scored massive
publicity, but their favoured method was
to use mortars. They weren't very
accurate, but Paddy would lob a few shells
in which would scare the **** out of
everyone and remind the British Army
that it was in enemy territory.
'We had been told by the intelligence
boys that the attack would be very big,
and the Provos had even been boasting in
the local pubs that at least 10 British
soldiers would die, so the heat was on to
prevent it happening. There were only two
places from where the Provos could launch
such an attack, the most likely being a
football field behind the base.'
Establishing a covert OP is no easy task. A
position has to be found that will enable the SAS
team to view the target on a 24-hour basis, but
the men have to be inserted into the OP secretly.
In an area like .,South Armagh., where most pairs
of eyes are hostile, this can present problems.
Therefore elaborate tactics have to be adopted:
'A disused house on the edge of
Crossmaglen provided the perfect position
for a long-term OP. It was detached and
isolated on one side of the road, with an
occupied dwelling just 100m away. The
obvious dangers of inserting a team into
such a position required a check by an
EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] team.
We left Cross late in the afternoon as part
of a Black Watch patrol, also taking three
Royal Engineers along with us.
'Wearing standard combat gear and
helmets, we were part of a 12-strong patrol
which headed out of the main square
towards our objective. The aim was to
acquaint ourselves with the terrain around
the building which we were to occupy later
that evening. We patrolled up through
Cross, and at a given point the soldiers
from the battalion established a VCP
[vehicle checkpoint] on the Cullaville
Road, giving us the opportunity to check
the ground and the sappers the chance to
clear the building. The walk-past recce was
very useful. We were equipped with
bergens, Armalites and a full-automatic
SLR. If we'd have carried this gear in West
Belfast Paddy would probably have sussed
we were SAS, but in South Armagh, or 'the
cuds' as the area is known, soldiers carry
bergens and Armalites all the time.'
Constant vigilance is a feature of all covert
operations in Northern Ireland, as the enemy
has eyes and ears everywhere. In addition, what
is standard operating procedure in large urban
areas such as Belfast is not always applicable to
rural areas and small towns and villages. Q cars
and covert vans are not easy to operate in
Crossmaglen, for example, because the place is
so small and the base is monitored all the time
by Republican 'spatters'. Therefore, the SAS
frequently employs helicopters and foot patrols
as a way of getting teams into OPs without
attracting attention to the initial phase of the
operation. Once established in an OP, it is a
question of simply waiting and watching. The
SAS soldier continues his description of the
mission:
'We carried everything we would need to
sustain a 10-day observation: water, food,
ammunition and surveillance equipment,
as well as a variety of "live traps" which we
planted around the building as "insurance"
against any Provos who paid us an
unannounced visit. We also had an escape
route in case we were compromised.
'Living in a covert OP for 10 days in
conditions where you could be
compromised at any time by noise or
smell is very stressful, especially if your
"hide" is near an inhabited building.
Noise is a killer, and so a variety of
precautions are taken to avoid com-
promise, and these must be enforced at all
times if success is going to be achieved.
'After entering the building the
bergens are placed in ready-to-move
positions and are never moved again. Soft
shoes, trainers or desert boots are put on
and combat boots are stowed away -- they
are too heavy and are difficult to sleep in.
We had one collapsible camp bed, which
we had "liberated" from an American
para, and erected it straight away.
Cameras and night scopes were set up
and plastic bags for human waste were
put to one side. A second bag for empty
food cans was also put to one side. It is
imperative to trap all smells -- like noise
they can literally be a killer. They can
attract dogs and cats which will
compromise the operation.'
Inside the OP there is little to do except to try
to keep alert, for any lapses in concentration
can be fatal. Though the men's lives are on the
line, the temptation to take risks to relieve the
boredom is great. Only through strict self-
discipline can the pitfalls be avoided. This is
where the SAS's training comes into its own:
'Smoking is out, and I remember the
problems of trying to operate and sort
out equipment in the pitch darkness
inside the attic of the property. Even
using a torch for a few seconds is too
risky. The procedure was for one man to
get his head down, one to monitor the
radio, while the third carried out
surveillance, this is all standard SAS SOP.
'Food is a real problem. At no time did
we eat it warm, and the only time we had
hot drinks was at first light when we could
use a "bluey" with no fear of anyone being
around to hear its gas burning. We drank
tea -- coffee smells -- and ate a variety of
cold meats and tinned food.'
Never far from the soldiers' minds are thoughts
of being discovered:
'Camouflage cream is a must at all times
for two reasons. First, although we could
not see any broken or damaged tiles, a
white face shines and might therefore be
seen by a passer-by. Second, if someone
accidentally entered the property and
compromised our operation we needed
the element of shock to surprise them.'
'Wearing desert boots, combat
trousers, black roll-neck jumpers and
woolly hats kept us warm, and gave us the
opportunity to move about quietly. We
weren't too worried about getting
bumped by the opposition because we each
had a 9mm Browning High Power in a
shoulder holster and our main weapons
were always close by.
'To give us an arc of observation for the
scope and camera we removed a small part
of a brick, which gave us plenty of vision to
monitor the road, the houses and the
potential mortar base plate on the playing
fields. Nobody talks during the day unless
it is vital, and operational details such as
DLB arrangements are made by whisper,
again its an SOP which is instinctive. At
night a team of ours at Cross mounted
DLBs in which they delivered fresh
sandwiches and supplies, such as radio
batteries and other items, and took away
our waste. This procedure centred on pre-
arranged RVs, which often gave us the
chance to exchange operational details and
receive additional orders. Goods were
exchanged or left in a bergen, and we in
turn would deliver bergens full of waste, as
well as 'shot' film that had to be returned
for developing as quickly as possible.'
SAS soldiers are trained to fight as well as gather
intelligence, and uppermost in each man's mind
was the state of his weapons:
'Magazines on our weapons were changed
every day, because a sustained period in an
OP can cause the mag spring to seize and
result in a stoppage. If this happens and
the OP is bumped, you're ****ed.
'In Ulster most of the blokes like the
M16 because it can deliver more rounds
than the SLR or even the new SA-80. It's
also fairly small, making it useful for OP
work in a covert "hide". A weapon that is
gaining in popularity with the Regiment in
Ulster is the Heckler & Koch 53, which is
basically a scaled-down version of the G3
rifle, though it also looks like the MPS.'
Relaying information back to HQ can be a real
problem for SAS teams:
'Communications can be a ****ing
nightmare, depending on which radio
band you are using. VHF, for example,
often interfered with local television sets
when they were switched on and basically
told the locals that the military were in the
area. Thus if you are operating from a
property you never transmit during
daylight hours if you can help it.'
Despite the nerve-wracking nature of OP work,
there are still the mundane, everyday matters to
attend to. These demand proper attention or the
OP can be compromised:
'Our rubbish and human waste was bagged
up and sealed all the time. Our urine was
bottled and food packed in plastic
containers, but the rats still found us. Rats
are a major problem in OP work around
Cross, and their presence can cause you to
make noise in an effort to stop them
attacking waste and refuse. The attic where
the three of us lived was crawling with the
little ****ers. They were big and would
stop at nothing to get at the food or
rubbish we had.
'We asked Cross to supply rat poison in
a future DLB, which eventually resulted in
a bag of 17 rats being shipped back to base
in a bergen. The boys back at Cross
thought it was some sort of joke, but in fact
it was a real problem because we couldn't
just leave them in the OP. By the time the
operation finished we had returned more
than 90 dead rats.'
'After several days your beard starts to
itch, your hands are black and you smell.
During insertion we had sighted a room
full of hay and, in an inspired moment, had
spread some on the floor of the attic to dull
any noise and absorb our body smells. We
were quite chuffed with ourselves. When
we got back to Crossmaglen, however,
after stripping off for a shower we realised
it wasn't such a good move: our legs were
covered in ticks and it took ages to get
them off.'
Behind the picture of this SAS trooper playing the hunchback of Notre Dame,
there is a very funny story, which in itself depicts the hardships that working
in an observation position can bring. Two men had been sent out to observe and
photograph a local barber's shop. The barber was suspected of being a member of
the IRA, and pictures were required to establish who was visiting the premises.
Eventually, the two men found a location for their OP in the ceiling of the town
hall. Working in the space between the inner ornate roof, the two men set up a
camp in the tiny maintenance space behind the town hall clock. At each side of
the clock, through which was a sloping vent, clear pictures could be taken of
the barber's shop across the street. Hot soup and sandwiches were delivered to
the men during the early morning hours via a small trap door in the town hall
ceiling. Messages, exposed film and waste were lowered down, with fresh supplies
being hauled up. A bin liner placed in the gloom at the end of the catwalk which
ran the length of the domed inner roof served as a toilet. The weather was very
sunny and after about five days, the heat which became trapped between the inner
and the outer roofs was unbearable. One of the soldiers, in need of the toilet,
worked his way along the catwalk towards the bag. Halfway along, he stopped,
shocked by something moving in the gloom. There in front of him was the biggest
spider the man had ever seen. Its body was two feet across, and large eyes
glistened in its head, The SAS man panicked, daring not to move for fear that it
would attack him. Several moments went by before he realised that spiders that
size don't exist. Then he saw what it was. The black bin liner had been twisted
and sealed up with a elastic band after use, to cut down on the smell. As the
heat had increased, the gases had expanded, creating a look-alike giant spider
lurking in the half light. With some relief, and fearing that the bag might
explode at any moment, the SAS soldier committed a second error; he opened the
sack. The smell hit him like a sledgehammer. He managed to crawl back to where
his partner was keeping watch, only to find him face up against the vent trying
to suck in clean air. Although funny, this story demonstrates the daily
hardships that SAS men encounter in the war against terrorism - the stayed in
the location undetected for three weeks.
Procedures for re-supplying covert OPs are
continually being tested and re-tested, as they are
vital and must be carried out efficiently if the OP
isn't to be compromised. In the 1970s the DLB
system was in operation, but the risk of this
being a target for an "IRA. ambush meant the
system has now changed to the Live Letter Box
(LLB) method:
'The LLB system is much better. A covert
car will drive to a pre-arranged RV with its
rear window down (there's always two
blokes in the front of the car), with
another car, a back-up, some distance
behind. Anything that has to be got rid of
-- exposed film, waste, wet sleeping bags --
will be thrown onto the back seat of the
car, while the bloke in the front passenger
seat will pass the stuff requested by the
patrol out of his window to the patrol
members. Then they will be off.'
OP work is unglamorous, dangerous and tedi-
ous, and is perhaps not everyone's idea of what
the SAS does in Ulster. However, it is vital to
the intelligence war that is being waged against
the terrorists, and is perhaps the best weapon in
the armoury of the security forces.
Ambush operations are another part of the
SAS's war against terrorism. They can be
spectacularly successful, but they can also be
controversial and raise the spectre of the Regi-
ment operating a shoot-to-kill policy in the
Province. However, the SAS is aware that any
ambush operation will be subjected to intense
legal scrutiny, and therefore impresses upon its
men the importance of adhering to the Army's
rules of engagement. An example of the diffi-
culties facing the Regiment when springing
ambushes is provided by an incident which took
place in County Tyrone in August 1988.
In June, British intelligence collected an
invaluable clue concerning a forthcoming IRA
operation to assassinate a former RUC officer
who worked in Omagh. The SAS, working in
conjunction with the Army, the intelligence
agencies and the RUC, decided to set an ambush
to prevent the murder attempt. The identities of
the local IRA operatives were known to the
security forces: Martin and Gerald Harte and
Brian Mullen, who together formed the Mid-
Tyrone Brigade. The intended victim was
informed of the IRA's plan, and he agreed to
continue driving his truck to work along his
regular route to establish a movement pattern
which would be observed by the terrorists.
The SAS plan was for the truck to 'break
down', and then a team from the Regiment
would lie in wait around it until the IRA hit
squad arrived. However, theMid-Tyrone
Brigade didn't just have this operation on its
books. On 20 August 1988, it blew up a coach
carrying 35 members of the 1st Battalion, The
Light Infantry, as it travelled along the AS from
Aldergrove Airport to the barracks in Omagh.
The IRA team used nearly 100 kilos of Semtex in
the attack, which hurled the coach 30m through
the air. It was a devastating attack: eight men
were killed, and many more were horribly
injured. For the IRA it was a spectacular victory.
The SAS did not let the incident alter its
plans: the operation went ahead as planned. On
29 August, the terrorists returned to their arms
cache, indicating the murder attempt would take
place the next day. During the early hours of 30
August an SAS soldier took the place of the
target and drove the truck to the pre-arranged
ambush point. At the same time, a three-man
SAS team left the barracks in Omagh and walked
to a derelict farmhouse near the village of
Drumnakilly. They were armed with Browning
High Power handguns and had 9mm Heckler &
Koch MP5 submachine guns as their main
weapons. When they reached the site one took
cover in a barn while the other two hid in
hedgerows on either side of the road.
At around 1900 hours the truck stopped
outside the farmhouse. The 'driver' got out of
the cab and unloaded the spare tyre to give the
impression he had broken down. He knew the
IRA would soon get to know of his whereabouts
-- the enemy had a host of eyes and ears in the
area. Sure enough, later that day the terrorists
hijacked a white Ford Sierra and, told of the
whereabouts of the truck, made their way there.
They were wearing black balaclavas, blue boiler
suits and were armed with Kalashnikov AK-47
assault rifles and Webley revolvers -- a heavily
armed team out to kill an unarmed civilian, but
that's what the IRA is all about.
The security forces had been trailing the
IRA team on the day of the ambush to give the
waiting SAS soldiers information concerning
their whereabouts. However, the surveillance
was abandoned when it was feared one of the
unmarked cars had been identified by a
potential hostile. The SAS team was blind. The
SAS man at the truck, therefore, didn't realise
who was in the white Sierra as it raced towards
him, although his instincts told him something
was wrong. He was right. He sprinted to a
nearby wall as the IRA men opened up with a
hail of automatic fire. As bullets kicked up the
earth around him he made a frantic dash for
cover, and made it.
The car screeched to a halt and the
terrorists prepared to jump out and finish him
off. At that moment a ferocious barrage of 9mm
bullets hit the car as the three hidden SAS
soldiers opened fire. The Harte brothers and
Mullen were killed instantly, the Mid- Tyrone
Brigade had ceased to exist. The SAS soldiers
radioed for a Lynx helicopter to take them back
to Omagh as RUC and Army units sealed off
the immediate area. The operation had been a
stunning success.
What was to follow was a public relations
debacle, as the British government remained
silent on the operation as the media and
Republican commentators screamed that it was
a revenge killing for the bus bombing. The SAS
in particular was disturbed that no one officially
contradicted these claims. Only belatedly did
the Defence Secretary, Tom King, deny that
the SAS was operating a shoot-to-kill policy.
The operation was a brilliant military action
which then turned into a propaganda victory for
the IRA and its supporters.
A few months before there had been an
even greater victory for the SAS, one which had
gone down in the annals of the Regiment as one
of its greatest successes against the IRA: the am-
bush at Loughall. In late 1986 and early 1987,
the IRA had increased its campaign of terror in
Northern Ireland with a series of bombings,
beatings and murders. The Republican move-
ment had stepped up its military activity in an
attempt to make Ulster ungovernable. For their
part, the security forces were on a state of high
alert. But they received a godsend when, during
routine surveillance, an IRA member was
overheard on the telephone talking about a
planned attack on the RUC station at Loughall,
County Armagh, by the East Tyrone Brigade.
The East Tyrone Brigade was known as the
'A Team' within the IRA, and for good reason. It
had carried out a number of daring attacks
against the RUC and the British Army. In
December 1985, for example, it had assaulted
Ballygawley RUC barracks with AK-47 assault
rifles and Armalites. Killing the two guards on
the gate, the IRA team then raked the barracks
with gunfire before planting a large bomb inside
the building. The subsequent explosion totally
destroyed the barracks. The RUC station at the
Birches, County Tyrone, was also attacked by
the team. They loaded a large bomb in the
shovel of a mechanical digger and rammed it
against the wall of the building after first
breaching the security fence. The explosion
blew the barracks to smithereens, though the
terrorists still felt the need to rake the area with
gunfire after they had detonated the bomb. The
attack on Loughall would be very similar, apart
from one small difference: the SAS and RUC
would be ready and waiting.
Loughall is a small Protestant enclave in an
overwhelmingly Catholic area. The village is a
symbol of Protestant power, being the birthplace
of the Orange Order. It had also been relatively
untouched by the 'Troubles'; however, the IRA
was determined to change that. The police
station itself was a part-time, undermanned
RUC office, and the IRA planned to carry out an
attack that would totally wreck the building.
The SAS was taking no chances. It was
decided to reinforce Ulster Troop with more
men from England. Therefore, the Regiment's
headquarters at Hereford was ordered to send
over more men. Soon afterwards, a 16-man troop
from D Squadron was on its way to Ulster.
Operation 'Judy', the codename for the ambush
at Loughall, was under way. Because of the IRA's
slackness, the authorities knew the date of the
attack: 8 May. The SAS men and RUC snipers
were infiltrated into the area many hours before
the IRA terrorists were due to make an appear-
ance. The SAS contingent was commanded by a
staff sergeant from Ulster Troop, a man of great
experience who would make sure the operation
would be perfectly executed. At the prior briefing
the men were told that the mission was an
OP/React -- an Observation Post able to React, a
coded term for an ambush. The enemy would
drive into a pre-arranged killing ground where
they would be engaged and destroyed. The East
Tyrone Brigade's luck was about to run out.
The SAS soldiers were heavily armed: those
of Ulster Troop were carrying Heckler & Koch
G3 assault rifles, those from England had M16
rifles, and there were at least two General
Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs). The men
were deployed in two groups. The first, the larger
one, was deployed in the copse overlooking the
RUC station close to the Armagh road. In this
way the soldiers, who also had the two GPMGs,
could concentrate fire on the football field in
front of the police station. The second group was
in the station itself, with the men being at the
rear and at the far end of the building in relation
to where the gates were. There were also at least
two cut-off groups in the village and another SAS
unit close to the church.
There has been questions raised sub-
sequently concerning the wisdom of placing men
in the building, as it was known that the IRA
bomb would be large and would thus damage the
building and perhaps injure any occupants. Mark
Urban, in his book Big Boys' Rules, believes the
men were placed in the station because the SAS
wanted to be seen acting within the guidelines of
the British Army's Yellow Card rules concerning
the use of force against terrorists, ie if the
station was unoccupied when the IRA attacked
it might be hard to justify killing the terrorists,
because they did not present an immediate
danger to life. However, with men in the
building at the time of the attack, the IRA
gunmen would be threatening the lives of
security forces personnel and could therefore be
fired upon legitimately.
Whatever the reasoning behind placing
men in the police station, it did contain SAS
soldiers as the IRA team approached its target in
two vehicles:
'From my position in the copse I
remember seeing the van slowly driving
past the police station and then stop,
followed some time later by the digger.
There were three men on the digger and
they all appeared to be armed [five more
were in the van]. I eased the safety catch
off my G3 and eased the weapon into a
comfortable firing position. I could feel
my heart pounding and the ardenalin
flowing in my veins. Then the digger
crashed into the gates of the police station
and stopped, its bucket holding the bomb
raised high. The terrorists then jumped
from the digger and formed up in a line
on the road. What the hell are they up to?
They were all armed, a couple of them
were carrying what looked to me to be
G3s. ****ing good piece of kit the G3:
compact, light and, most important, it
rarely jams. That's the thing about the
Provos, they always have the best that's
available. Then they started shooting at
the police station in an act of what could
have only been bravado.
'Then our guys in the police station
opened up with a hail of fire which cut
down one of the terrorists. This was our
cue, and the blokes all around me started
to fire bursts. The amount of ammunition
being expended was incredible. I began
firing my weapon. Then, Armageddon!
The bomb exploded and the whole police
station seemed to cave in. Everyone
stopped firing momentarily, somewhat
dazed, then, after what seemed like an
eternity but was probably only a couple of
seconds, we started up again as the dust
settled. I emptied a magazine and clipped a
fresh one in the receiver. The whole area
was alive with the sound of gunfire. Two
terrorists had tried to make a dash for the
van, but were cut down before they
reached it. Bullets were still hitting their
lifeless bodies as they lay in the road.
Another terrorist tried to escape from the
Toyota by running across the football field
by the side of the road, but he too was cut
down.
'Bullets were spraying everywhere. By
this time everyone was directing their fire
at the van, and it was taking so many hits
that I thought it would disintegrate (I saw
it some time after the ambush, it was
literally covered in blood and guts).
Squeeze the trigger, squeeze the trigger,
reload. I reached for a fresh mag and
began firing again. Empty cartridge cases
were flying all over the place, and in the
background I could hear the rippling firing
pattern of the GPMGs. I knew whoever
was in the van would be dead for certain.'
All eight terrorists were dead. But the killing
didn't stop there. Unfortunately a white Citroen
car carrying two brothers, Oliver and Anthony
Hughes, was fired upon by the cut-off groups in
the mistaken belief that it contained IRA men.
Tragically, Anthony was killed.
When the shooting died down the area was
sealed off by armed police, and overhead
helicopters scoured the countryside for any
other terrorists who might be in the area. The
SAS soldiers themselves, after ensuring there
was no longer a threat, were evacuated by
helicopter. The Regiment had just fought its
most successful battle in Northern Ireland.
When the police station at Loughall was attacked by two service units of the
IRA, they were met with the full force of the SAS. It started when masked men
stole a Toyota van from Dungannon. It was suspected that the van would be used
in an attack. Surveillance by E4A had identified the target as Loughall. At a
little past 7pm, the blue Toyota van drove down the road past the police
station. It shortly returned from the direction of Portadown, this time followed
by a JCB, in the cab where three hooded IRA terrorists. Declan Arthurs was
driving, with Michael Gromley and Gerald O'Callaghan riding shotgun. The bucket
was filled with explosive contained in an oil drum. While the blue van charged
pas the police station. the JCB slammed through the gate. One of the two IRA men
jumped out and opened fire in the direction of the RUC station. At this stage
the ambush was activated. All eight members of the IRA fell. hit by the
devastating SAS fire. At the height of the fire-fight, the bomb exploded, taking
with it half of the RUC station. Without doubt, Loughall was one of the most
successful operations ever mounted against the IRA, who were totally stunned by
the loss of two complete active units. This is all that was left of the van. The
rods indicate bullet holes.