hist2004
06-10-2004, 03:48 PM
The "Groupement des Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes" was created in 1951 by French Special Forces and had a short existence as the program was terminated in 1954 after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the withdrawal of the French Forces of Indochina. The GCMA’s mission in the French Indochina territory was the formation amongst the ethnic minorities of guerrilla units (maquis) in enemy controlled area (mission similar to the USSF A-teams) , the gathering of intelligence, the destruction of Viet Minh installation and forces, prisoner snatches, radio relays (mission similar to SOG) and the organization of escape routes for possible evacuation of isolated French posts/camps.
In 1953 the GCMA was renamed the GMI Groupement Mixtes D'intervention and would be controlling 15,000 irregulars by the end of 1954.The official reason behind the GCMA new name was supposedly for security and secrecy but the real reason behind was the usual financial one and the desire by the French high command to have to GCMA severed from the TAPI (Troupe Aeroportee d'Indochine) (Airborne). In effect the GMI officers and NCO will no longer receive jump pay and it will no longer be recruited amongst General Gilles paras (Gilles was opposed to the GCMA concept). During its life the GCMA suffered from a lack of human and material resources. It is interesting to note that despite the high success of the GCMA program it suffered from a lack of support and hostile incomprehension of the French Military High command as well as of the local government. The CIDG program and USSF in Vietnam suffered similar problems during the Vietnam war.
It is interesting to note that after the cease fire of 1954, the two US Army officers attached to the GMI were offered to take over the various maquis in North Vietnam, but refusal came from higher US authorities.
As soon as WWII ended, the Viet-Minh (VC), armed and trained by the US to fight the Japanese during WWII, started their movement for independence. But the "Corps Expeditionaire Francais" came back in October 1945 to take over their old colony and the 1st Indochina war started.
Being under-manned and under equipped, the French were only able to exercise effective French control in the lowlands and in populated areas. The low populated central highlands, therefore, was definitely VC country.
In 1951, the GCMA program was born as the French realized that most of the ethnic minorities of Vietnam were prepared to fight the VC in exchange of protection and civic aids. The French had belatedly discovered that commando units working behind the lines could effectively deal with the Viet Minh. The Groupement des Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes, better known by their initials, GMAC, were remarkably successful, but deployed too late in the war to turn the tide of their ultimate defeat. Yet, after Dien Bien Phu had fallen and French control over the region slipped into the hands of Communist general Vo Nguyen Giap in 1954, the GMAC commandos managed to fight on effectively for several more years. The "little wars" of the guerrilla fighter were very often effective.
The GCMA functioned in a more guerrilla like mode than any other organization. Its members were dropped into enemy territory to organize local mountain tribesman to fight the Viet Minh. The unit eventually grew to some 15,000 troops, which meant that more than 300 tons of airlifted supplies were required per month. Unlike the Chindits and the Marauders of WWII, the GCMA's job was to remain permanently behind enemy lines. Two or three French officers or noncommissioned officers led each company -- the remainders were native tribesmen.
The GCMA tied down 10 battalions of Viet Minh troops, and by the end of the French Indochina War the 5,000 remaining GCMA members were being hunted by 14 Viet Minh battalions. The long-range penetration principles espoused nearly 15 years earlier had finally been convincingly proven effective. The GCMA saga ended in a July 1954 cease-fire between the French and the Viet Minh. The last French troops left the area in April 1956. Two years after the cease-fire, a GCMA leader's radio plea was monitored, requesting, "at least some ammunition, so that we can die fighting instead of being slaughtered like animals." As late as 1959, a GCMA trooper made his way out of North Vietnam, but the rest of the French troops trapped behind the lines fought to the death, and their final resting places were never discovered by the French government. The "Group de Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes" soldiers like most of the French army during the French Indochina war were ill equipped and wore a mixture of French, American and English uniform and equipment.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
In 1953 the GCMA was renamed the GMI Groupement Mixtes D'intervention and would be controlling 15,000 irregulars by the end of 1954.The official reason behind the GCMA new name was supposedly for security and secrecy but the real reason behind was the usual financial one and the desire by the French high command to have to GCMA severed from the TAPI (Troupe Aeroportee d'Indochine) (Airborne). In effect the GMI officers and NCO will no longer receive jump pay and it will no longer be recruited amongst General Gilles paras (Gilles was opposed to the GCMA concept). During its life the GCMA suffered from a lack of human and material resources. It is interesting to note that despite the high success of the GCMA program it suffered from a lack of support and hostile incomprehension of the French Military High command as well as of the local government. The CIDG program and USSF in Vietnam suffered similar problems during the Vietnam war.
It is interesting to note that after the cease fire of 1954, the two US Army officers attached to the GMI were offered to take over the various maquis in North Vietnam, but refusal came from higher US authorities.
As soon as WWII ended, the Viet-Minh (VC), armed and trained by the US to fight the Japanese during WWII, started their movement for independence. But the "Corps Expeditionaire Francais" came back in October 1945 to take over their old colony and the 1st Indochina war started.
Being under-manned and under equipped, the French were only able to exercise effective French control in the lowlands and in populated areas. The low populated central highlands, therefore, was definitely VC country.
In 1951, the GCMA program was born as the French realized that most of the ethnic minorities of Vietnam were prepared to fight the VC in exchange of protection and civic aids. The French had belatedly discovered that commando units working behind the lines could effectively deal with the Viet Minh. The Groupement des Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes, better known by their initials, GMAC, were remarkably successful, but deployed too late in the war to turn the tide of their ultimate defeat. Yet, after Dien Bien Phu had fallen and French control over the region slipped into the hands of Communist general Vo Nguyen Giap in 1954, the GMAC commandos managed to fight on effectively for several more years. The "little wars" of the guerrilla fighter were very often effective.
The GCMA functioned in a more guerrilla like mode than any other organization. Its members were dropped into enemy territory to organize local mountain tribesman to fight the Viet Minh. The unit eventually grew to some 15,000 troops, which meant that more than 300 tons of airlifted supplies were required per month. Unlike the Chindits and the Marauders of WWII, the GCMA's job was to remain permanently behind enemy lines. Two or three French officers or noncommissioned officers led each company -- the remainders were native tribesmen.
The GCMA tied down 10 battalions of Viet Minh troops, and by the end of the French Indochina War the 5,000 remaining GCMA members were being hunted by 14 Viet Minh battalions. The long-range penetration principles espoused nearly 15 years earlier had finally been convincingly proven effective. The GCMA saga ended in a July 1954 cease-fire between the French and the Viet Minh. The last French troops left the area in April 1956. Two years after the cease-fire, a GCMA leader's radio plea was monitored, requesting, "at least some ammunition, so that we can die fighting instead of being slaughtered like animals." As late as 1959, a GCMA trooper made his way out of North Vietnam, but the rest of the French troops trapped behind the lines fought to the death, and their final resting places were never discovered by the French government. The "Group de Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes" soldiers like most of the French army during the French Indochina war were ill equipped and wore a mixture of French, American and English uniform and equipment.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004