BlackRain
06-11-2004, 07:25 PM
Clearing the Decks for War: CATO HANDBOOK
Terminate the Nation-Building Missions in the Balkans
The nation-building missions in Bosnia and Kosovo were foolish and
unnecessary from the outset. Despite the exertions of America and its
NATO allies, Bosnia is no closer to being a viable country today than it
was when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed more than seven
years ago. The NATO intervention in Kosovo is even worse. It merely
strengthened the hand ofAlbanian nationalists who want to create a Greater Albania and who have recently stirred up trouble across the border in Macedonia.
Clearing the Decks for War
The missions in Bosnia and Kosovo cost the United States nearly $6
billion a year. More than 3,000 U.S. troops are tied down in Bosnia in
glorified police work. More than 6,000 troops are stationed in Kosovo
performing similar tedious tasks. U.S. leaders should immediately inform
the European members of NATO that we will be withdrawing all of our
forces over the next year.
The European allies would then have to decide whether to continue the
Balkan peacekeeping missions without U.S. participation or withdraw their
own forces as well. U.S. leaders should not especially care which option
the Europeans select. The Balkans have never been an arena in which
vital American interests were at stake. The region is more important to
the nations of the European Union, and they should decide whether a
peacekeeping venture is worth the expense and bother. It is absurd to
argue that the prosperous nations of the European Union cannot police
the Balkans if they wish to do so. American money, as well as the U.S.
military personnel tied down in useless peacekeeping tasks, could be used
far more effectively to prosecute the war against terrorism.
Withdraw the 100,000 U.S. Troops Stationed in Western Europe
The U.S. troop presence in Western Europe is an utterly obsolete
commitment inherited from the Cold War. As noted in Chapter 51, the
original concept of NATO did not include the permanent stationing of
U.S. troops in Europe. Since the Cold War has been over for more than
a decade, the time is long overdue for the withdrawal of all such personnel
still deployed on the Continent.
Even the most creative defenders of the deployment would have difficulty
explaining just why the troops are still there. The U.S. forces are
apparently on duty to prevent an invasion of Western Europe by aWarsaw
Pact that no longer exists led by a Soviet Union that no longer exists.
How tank divisions stationed in Germany benefit the security of the United
States in the 21st century is truly a mystery.
The Europeans clearly can provide for their own security without relying
on U.S. troops. There is no serious security threat in Europe, nor is one
likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. The security problems that do
exist are small-scale, with the disorders in the Balkans being the primary
examples. The nations of the European Union should certainly be able to
manage their own defense and dealwith such minor security contingencies.
Collectively, the European Union has a population larger than that of the
United States as well as a larger gross domestic product. That is true even
without taking into account the new nations that will be added to the EU
within the next two years.
True, the European nations (especially the major states in the EU) might
have to raise their military budgets slightly to offset the withdrawal of
U.S. forces, but that action would hardly result in an onerous burden.
Besides, it is appropriate that the Europeans pay the full cost of their own
defense. Giving the prosperous European allies a de facto defense subsidy
made no sense even before September 11. It is a luxury the United States
simply cannot afford in a post–September 11 setting.
The U.S. military units stationed in Europe should be withdrawn by
the beginning of 2005 and demobilized. Some of the personnel should
then be reassigned to lighter, more mobile units that would be relevant
in the fight against terrorism. The military commitment to NATO costs
the United States nearly $40 billion a year. Even a partial demobilization
would save American taxpayers several billion dollars.
Withdraw the 37,000 U.S. Troops Stationed in South Korea
The U.S. troop presence in South Korea is another obsolete, Cold War–
era obligation. U.S. troops stayed in that country after the end of the
Korean War in 1953. At that time, a plausible argument could be made
for the commitment. U.S. leaders worried that a new war on the peninsula
would be merely one phase of an overall communist offensive to dominate
all of East Asia—a development that would have threatened important
American interests. Moreover, South Korea was a poor, war-torn country
incapable of defending itself. Not only did it face a hostile, well-armed
communist North Korea, but it faced a North Korea backed by both
Moscow and Beijing.
That is clearly no longer the case. Today, South Korea faces only one
adversary: a desperately poor and increasingly isolated North Korea. The
last thing either Moscow or Beijing desires is another war on the Korean
peninsula. Indeed, in recent years both Russia and China have distanced
their policies from those of their ostensible North Korean ally and forged
close political and economic ties with South Korea. Moreover, South
Korea now has enormous advantages in the contest with North Korea.
The South has twice the population and an economy nearly 40 times
larger than that of its adversary. A nation with those characteristics should
certainly be able to defend itself.
Unfortunately, U.S. officials seem to have adopted an American version
of the Brezhnev Doctrine when it comes to the military tie to South Korea.
That doctrine, articulated by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, asserted that
once a nation became a member of the communist camp it must always
remain in the communist camp. The U.S. version seems to be ‘‘Once a
security dependent of the United States, always a security dependent of
the United States.’’
Instead of taking responsibility for its own security, South Korea chooses
to underinvest in defense and remain dependent on the United States for
major portions of its military needs. Despite being next door to one of
the more bizarre and unpredictable regimes in the world, Seoul actually
spends a lower percentage of its gross domestic product on defense than
does the United States. Moreover, one of South Korea’s first responses
to the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s was to cut its already
anemic defense budget.
U.S. leaders should inform their South Korean counterparts that the
days of free riding on the U.S. security guarantee are over. America has
its own war to wage, and it can no longer afford to subsidize prosperous
security clients. The security commitment to South Korea costs the United
States approximately $15 billion a year. Even if some of the forces withdrawn were subsequently redeployed to wage the war on terrorism, American taxpayers would realize substantial savings.
Withdraw the Nearly 50,000 Troops Stationed in Japan
The U.S. military presence in Japan is yet another obsolete commitment.
In the decades following World War II, U.S. officials wanted to keep
Japanese rearmament to a minimum. Indeed, Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, placed in the document in response to intense pressure from the United States, renounced war and seemed to preclude the existence of
any armed forces. Because Washington soon wanted some Japanese assistance in the struggle against the Soviet Union, however, U.S. leaders
endorsed a more flexible interpretation of Article 9, and Japan developed
modest ground, air, and naval ‘‘self-defense forces.’’
Nevertheless, the United States has never fully trusted Japan and has
shown no support for Japan’s playing a vigorous security role—much
less an independent security role—in East Asia. Even the much-touted
changes in the defense guidelines for the U.S.-Japanese alliance, adopted
in 1997, authorize Japan merely to provide nonlethal logistical support
for U.S. military operations in East Asia unless Japan itself is attacked.
U.S. officials seem content to keep Japan as a barely trusted junior security helper. The tradeoff for that limitation is that Tokyo expects the United States to keep military forces in Japan and take primary responsibility for Japan’s security.
That policy needs to change. Some of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan
sit as uselessly as the troops stationed in Western Europe. The more than
18,000 Marines stationed on Okinawa fall into that category. The air and
naval units deployed in Japan arguably contribute to the overall stability
of East Asia, but they also provide a de facto defense subsidy to Japan.
It is time for Japan to step forward and assume its rightful role as the
principal stabilizing power in East Asia. Japan has the world’s second
largest economy, and its military forces—although relatively small—are
modern and capable. A modest increase in defense spending would enable
Japan to offset the withdrawal of U.S. forces in a few years. Although
the security environment in East Asia is not as benign as the environment
in Europe, there is no need for a large U.S. military presence. It should
be humiliating for Japan, with all its capabilities, to still be dependent on
the United States for its security.
The Marines on Okinawa should be withdrawn over the next two years,
and the air and naval units should depart gradually thereafter. Some of
the latter units probably would be redeployed to assist in the war on
terrorism, but even so, much of the nearly $20 billion a year cost of the
U.S. military commitment to Japan could be saved.
It is uncertain whether the United States would need to redirect all of
the money saved from terminating the foreign aid budget and ending
obsolete or unnecessary overseas military commitments to the war on
terrorism. Clearly, some additional resources ought to be devoted to beefing up our special forces units and intelligence gathering and evaluation capabilities.
They have both been shortchanged for years, and yet they are the
front-line forces in the fight against terrorism.
But there may well be some money left over. That is not a bad thing.
At the very least, such savings might head off the looming prospect of a
return to large federal budget deficits. The savings might even be enough
to give the beleaguered American taxpayer a modest break. But however
the money is used, it would be better than the current wasteful situation.
Terminate the Nation-Building Missions in the Balkans
The nation-building missions in Bosnia and Kosovo were foolish and
unnecessary from the outset. Despite the exertions of America and its
NATO allies, Bosnia is no closer to being a viable country today than it
was when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed more than seven
years ago. The NATO intervention in Kosovo is even worse. It merely
strengthened the hand ofAlbanian nationalists who want to create a Greater Albania and who have recently stirred up trouble across the border in Macedonia.
Clearing the Decks for War
The missions in Bosnia and Kosovo cost the United States nearly $6
billion a year. More than 3,000 U.S. troops are tied down in Bosnia in
glorified police work. More than 6,000 troops are stationed in Kosovo
performing similar tedious tasks. U.S. leaders should immediately inform
the European members of NATO that we will be withdrawing all of our
forces over the next year.
The European allies would then have to decide whether to continue the
Balkan peacekeeping missions without U.S. participation or withdraw their
own forces as well. U.S. leaders should not especially care which option
the Europeans select. The Balkans have never been an arena in which
vital American interests were at stake. The region is more important to
the nations of the European Union, and they should decide whether a
peacekeeping venture is worth the expense and bother. It is absurd to
argue that the prosperous nations of the European Union cannot police
the Balkans if they wish to do so. American money, as well as the U.S.
military personnel tied down in useless peacekeeping tasks, could be used
far more effectively to prosecute the war against terrorism.
Withdraw the 100,000 U.S. Troops Stationed in Western Europe
The U.S. troop presence in Western Europe is an utterly obsolete
commitment inherited from the Cold War. As noted in Chapter 51, the
original concept of NATO did not include the permanent stationing of
U.S. troops in Europe. Since the Cold War has been over for more than
a decade, the time is long overdue for the withdrawal of all such personnel
still deployed on the Continent.
Even the most creative defenders of the deployment would have difficulty
explaining just why the troops are still there. The U.S. forces are
apparently on duty to prevent an invasion of Western Europe by aWarsaw
Pact that no longer exists led by a Soviet Union that no longer exists.
How tank divisions stationed in Germany benefit the security of the United
States in the 21st century is truly a mystery.
The Europeans clearly can provide for their own security without relying
on U.S. troops. There is no serious security threat in Europe, nor is one
likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. The security problems that do
exist are small-scale, with the disorders in the Balkans being the primary
examples. The nations of the European Union should certainly be able to
manage their own defense and dealwith such minor security contingencies.
Collectively, the European Union has a population larger than that of the
United States as well as a larger gross domestic product. That is true even
without taking into account the new nations that will be added to the EU
within the next two years.
True, the European nations (especially the major states in the EU) might
have to raise their military budgets slightly to offset the withdrawal of
U.S. forces, but that action would hardly result in an onerous burden.
Besides, it is appropriate that the Europeans pay the full cost of their own
defense. Giving the prosperous European allies a de facto defense subsidy
made no sense even before September 11. It is a luxury the United States
simply cannot afford in a post–September 11 setting.
The U.S. military units stationed in Europe should be withdrawn by
the beginning of 2005 and demobilized. Some of the personnel should
then be reassigned to lighter, more mobile units that would be relevant
in the fight against terrorism. The military commitment to NATO costs
the United States nearly $40 billion a year. Even a partial demobilization
would save American taxpayers several billion dollars.
Withdraw the 37,000 U.S. Troops Stationed in South Korea
The U.S. troop presence in South Korea is another obsolete, Cold War–
era obligation. U.S. troops stayed in that country after the end of the
Korean War in 1953. At that time, a plausible argument could be made
for the commitment. U.S. leaders worried that a new war on the peninsula
would be merely one phase of an overall communist offensive to dominate
all of East Asia—a development that would have threatened important
American interests. Moreover, South Korea was a poor, war-torn country
incapable of defending itself. Not only did it face a hostile, well-armed
communist North Korea, but it faced a North Korea backed by both
Moscow and Beijing.
That is clearly no longer the case. Today, South Korea faces only one
adversary: a desperately poor and increasingly isolated North Korea. The
last thing either Moscow or Beijing desires is another war on the Korean
peninsula. Indeed, in recent years both Russia and China have distanced
their policies from those of their ostensible North Korean ally and forged
close political and economic ties with South Korea. Moreover, South
Korea now has enormous advantages in the contest with North Korea.
The South has twice the population and an economy nearly 40 times
larger than that of its adversary. A nation with those characteristics should
certainly be able to defend itself.
Unfortunately, U.S. officials seem to have adopted an American version
of the Brezhnev Doctrine when it comes to the military tie to South Korea.
That doctrine, articulated by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, asserted that
once a nation became a member of the communist camp it must always
remain in the communist camp. The U.S. version seems to be ‘‘Once a
security dependent of the United States, always a security dependent of
the United States.’’
Instead of taking responsibility for its own security, South Korea chooses
to underinvest in defense and remain dependent on the United States for
major portions of its military needs. Despite being next door to one of
the more bizarre and unpredictable regimes in the world, Seoul actually
spends a lower percentage of its gross domestic product on defense than
does the United States. Moreover, one of South Korea’s first responses
to the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s was to cut its already
anemic defense budget.
U.S. leaders should inform their South Korean counterparts that the
days of free riding on the U.S. security guarantee are over. America has
its own war to wage, and it can no longer afford to subsidize prosperous
security clients. The security commitment to South Korea costs the United
States approximately $15 billion a year. Even if some of the forces withdrawn were subsequently redeployed to wage the war on terrorism, American taxpayers would realize substantial savings.
Withdraw the Nearly 50,000 Troops Stationed in Japan
The U.S. military presence in Japan is yet another obsolete commitment.
In the decades following World War II, U.S. officials wanted to keep
Japanese rearmament to a minimum. Indeed, Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, placed in the document in response to intense pressure from the United States, renounced war and seemed to preclude the existence of
any armed forces. Because Washington soon wanted some Japanese assistance in the struggle against the Soviet Union, however, U.S. leaders
endorsed a more flexible interpretation of Article 9, and Japan developed
modest ground, air, and naval ‘‘self-defense forces.’’
Nevertheless, the United States has never fully trusted Japan and has
shown no support for Japan’s playing a vigorous security role—much
less an independent security role—in East Asia. Even the much-touted
changes in the defense guidelines for the U.S.-Japanese alliance, adopted
in 1997, authorize Japan merely to provide nonlethal logistical support
for U.S. military operations in East Asia unless Japan itself is attacked.
U.S. officials seem content to keep Japan as a barely trusted junior security helper. The tradeoff for that limitation is that Tokyo expects the United States to keep military forces in Japan and take primary responsibility for Japan’s security.
That policy needs to change. Some of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan
sit as uselessly as the troops stationed in Western Europe. The more than
18,000 Marines stationed on Okinawa fall into that category. The air and
naval units deployed in Japan arguably contribute to the overall stability
of East Asia, but they also provide a de facto defense subsidy to Japan.
It is time for Japan to step forward and assume its rightful role as the
principal stabilizing power in East Asia. Japan has the world’s second
largest economy, and its military forces—although relatively small—are
modern and capable. A modest increase in defense spending would enable
Japan to offset the withdrawal of U.S. forces in a few years. Although
the security environment in East Asia is not as benign as the environment
in Europe, there is no need for a large U.S. military presence. It should
be humiliating for Japan, with all its capabilities, to still be dependent on
the United States for its security.
The Marines on Okinawa should be withdrawn over the next two years,
and the air and naval units should depart gradually thereafter. Some of
the latter units probably would be redeployed to assist in the war on
terrorism, but even so, much of the nearly $20 billion a year cost of the
U.S. military commitment to Japan could be saved.
It is uncertain whether the United States would need to redirect all of
the money saved from terminating the foreign aid budget and ending
obsolete or unnecessary overseas military commitments to the war on
terrorism. Clearly, some additional resources ought to be devoted to beefing up our special forces units and intelligence gathering and evaluation capabilities.
They have both been shortchanged for years, and yet they are the
front-line forces in the fight against terrorism.
But there may well be some money left over. That is not a bad thing.
At the very least, such savings might head off the looming prospect of a
return to large federal budget deficits. The savings might even be enough
to give the beleaguered American taxpayer a modest break. But however
the money is used, it would be better than the current wasteful situation.