hist2004
06-13-2004, 10:28 AM
The Rommel Papers
Of all the theaters of operations, it was probabaly in North Afrika that the war took on its most advanched form. The protagonists on both sides were fully motorized formations, for whose employment the flat and obstruction-free desert offered hitherto undreamed-of possiblities. It was the only theatre where the principles of moterised and tank warfare, as they had been taught theoretically before the war, could be applied to the full-and further developed. It was the only theater where the pure tank battle between major formations was fought. Even though the struggle may have occasionally hardened into static warfare, it remained-at any rate in its most important stages (i.e in 1941-42 during the Cunningham-Ritchie offensive, and in the summer of 1942-Marmarica battles, capture of Tobruk)-based on the principles of complete mobility.
In military practice , this was entirely new, for our offensives in Poland and the West had been against opponents who, in all their operations, had still had to take account of their non-motorised infantry divisions and had thus had to suffer the disastrous limitation in their freedom of tactical decision which thus imposes, especially in the retreat. Often they had been forced into actions quite unsuited for the object of holding up our advance. After our break-through in Franch, the enemy infantry divisions had simply been overrun and outflanked by the out motorised forces. Once this had happened they had had no choice but to allow their operational reserves to be worn away by our assault groups, often in tactically unfavorable postions, in an endeavour to gain time for the retreat of their infantry.
Non-motorised infantry divisions are only of value against a motorised and armoured enemy when occupying prepared postions. If these postions are pierced or outflanked, a withdrawal will leave them helpless victoms of the motorised enemy, with nothing else to do but hold on in their postions to the last round. They cause terrible difficulties in a general retreat-for, as I have indicated, one has to commit one's motorised formations merely to gain time for them. I was forced to go through this myself during the Axis retreat form Cryrenica in the winter of 1941-42, when the whole of the Italian Infantry and a considerable part of the German, including the majority of what was to become 90th light Division, were without vehicles and had either to be carried by a shuttle service of lorries, or to march. It was only the gallantry of my armour that enabled the retreat of the Italo-German infantry to be covered, for our fully motorised enemy was in hot pursuit. Similarly, Graziani's failure can be attributed mainly to the fact that the greater part of the Italian Army was delivered up helpless and non-motorised in the open desert to the weaker but fully motorised British formations, while the Italian motorised forces, although too weak to oppose the British succesfully, were nevertheless compelled to accept battle and allow themselves to be destroyed in defence of the infantry.
The British forces-in contrast to ours-were all fully mobile, and the war in Afrika was, in fact, waged almost exclusively by mobile forces. Out of this pure motorised warfare, certain principles were established, principles fundamantally different from those applying in other theatres. These principles will become the standard for the future, in which the fully-motorised formation will be dominant.
The envelopment of all fully-motorised enemy in the flat and good-driving terrian of the desert has the following results:
(a) For a fully-motorised formation, encirclement is the worst tactical situation imaginable, since hostile fire can be brough to bear on it from all sides; even envelopment on only three sides is a tactically untenable situation.
(b) The enemy becomes forced because of the bad tactical situation in which the encirclement has placed him, to evacuate the area he is holding.
The encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the pocket can seldom be the direct aim of an operation; more often it is only indirect, for any fully-motorised force whose organisational structure remains intact will normally and in suitable country be able to break out at will through an improvised defensive ring. Thanks to his motorisation, the commander of the encircled force is in postion to concentrate his weight unexpectedly against any likely point in the ring and burst through it. This fact was repeatedly demonstrated in the desert.
It follows therfore that an encircled enemy force can only be destoryed
(a) when it is non-motorised or has been rendered immobile by lack of petrol, or when it includes non-mobile elements which have to be considered;
(b) when it is badly led or its command has decided to sacrifice one formation in order to save another;
(c) when its fighting strength has already been broken, and disintergration and disorganisation have set it.
Except for cases (a) and (b), which occured frequently in other theatres of war, encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the pocket can only be attempted if he has been so heavily battered in open battle that the organic cohesion of his force has been destoryed. I shall term all actions which have as their aim the wearing down of the enemy's power of resistance "battle of attrition." In motorised warfare, material attrition and the destruction of the organic cohesion of the opposing army must be the immediate aim of all planning.
Tactically, the battle of attrition is fought with the highest possible degree of mobility. The following points require particular attention:
(a) The main endeavor should be to concintrate one's own forces in space and time, while at the same time seeking to split the enemy forces spatially and to destroy them at differnt times.
(b) Supply lines are particularly sensitive, since all petro and ammunition, indispensable requirements for the battle, must pass along them. Hence, everything possible must be done to protect ones own supply lines and to upset, or better still, cut the enemy's. Operations in the enemy's supply area will lead immediatly to his breaking off the battle elsewhere, since, as I have indicated, supplies are the fundamental premise of the battle and must be given priority of protection.
(c) The armour is the core of the motorised army. Everything turns on it, and other formations are mere auxiliaries. The war of attrition against the enemy armour must be therfore be waged as far as possible by the tank destruction units. One's own armour should only be used to deal the final blow.
(d) Reconnaissance reports must reach the commander in the shortest possible time' he must take his decisions immediately and put them into effect as fast as he can. Speed of reaction decides the battle. Commanders of motorised forces must therefore operate as near as possible to their troops, and must have the closest possible signal communication with him.
(e) Speed of movement and the organisational cohesion of one's own forces are decisive factors and require particular attention. Any sign of dislocation must be dealt with as quickly as possible by reorganisation.
(f) Concealment of intentions is of the upmost importance in order to provide surprise for one's own operations and thus make it possible to exploit the time taken by the enemy command to react. Deception measures of all kinds should be encouraged, if only to make the enemy commander uncertain and cause him to hesitate and hold back.
(g) Once the enemy has been thoroughly beaten up, success can be exploted by attempting to overrun and destroy major parts of his disorginized formations. Here again, speed is everything. The enemy must never be allowed time to reorganise. Lightning regrouping for the pursuit and reorganisation of supplies for the pursuing forces are essential.
Concerning the technical and organisational aspect of desert warfare, particular regard must be paid to the following points:
(a) The prime requirements in the tank are maneuvrability, speed and a long-range gun-for the side with the bigger gun has the longer arm and can be the first to engage the enemy. Weight of armour cannot make up for the lack of gun-power, as it can only be provided at the expense of manevrability and speed, both of which are indispensable tactical requirements.
(b) The artillery must have great range and must, above all, be capable of great mobility and of carrying with it ammunition in large quantities.
(c) The infantry serves only to occupy and hold postions designed either to prevent the enemy from particular operations, or to force him into other ones. Once this object has been achieved, the infantry must be able to get away quickly for employement elsewhere. It must therefore be mobile and be equipped to enable it rapidly to take up defence postions in the open at tactically important points on the battlefield.
It is my experience tha bold decisions give the best promise of success, But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficent forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lean to either victory or to the complete destruction of one's forces. Situations can arise where even a gamble may be justified-as, for instance, when in the normal course of events defeat os just merely a matter of time, when the gaining of time is therefore pointless and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk.
The only occasion when a commander can calculate the course of a battle in advance is when his forces are so superior that victory is a forgone conclusion; then the problem is no longer one of "the mean" but only of "the method". But even in this situation, I still think it is better to operate on the grand scale rather than creep about the battlefield anxiously taking all possible security measures against every conceivable enemy move.
Normally, there is no ideal solution to military problems; every course has its advantages and disadvantages. One must select that which seems best from the most varied aspects and than pursue it resolutely and accept the consequences. Any compromise is bad.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Of all the theaters of operations, it was probabaly in North Afrika that the war took on its most advanched form. The protagonists on both sides were fully motorized formations, for whose employment the flat and obstruction-free desert offered hitherto undreamed-of possiblities. It was the only theatre where the principles of moterised and tank warfare, as they had been taught theoretically before the war, could be applied to the full-and further developed. It was the only theater where the pure tank battle between major formations was fought. Even though the struggle may have occasionally hardened into static warfare, it remained-at any rate in its most important stages (i.e in 1941-42 during the Cunningham-Ritchie offensive, and in the summer of 1942-Marmarica battles, capture of Tobruk)-based on the principles of complete mobility.
In military practice , this was entirely new, for our offensives in Poland and the West had been against opponents who, in all their operations, had still had to take account of their non-motorised infantry divisions and had thus had to suffer the disastrous limitation in their freedom of tactical decision which thus imposes, especially in the retreat. Often they had been forced into actions quite unsuited for the object of holding up our advance. After our break-through in Franch, the enemy infantry divisions had simply been overrun and outflanked by the out motorised forces. Once this had happened they had had no choice but to allow their operational reserves to be worn away by our assault groups, often in tactically unfavorable postions, in an endeavour to gain time for the retreat of their infantry.
Non-motorised infantry divisions are only of value against a motorised and armoured enemy when occupying prepared postions. If these postions are pierced or outflanked, a withdrawal will leave them helpless victoms of the motorised enemy, with nothing else to do but hold on in their postions to the last round. They cause terrible difficulties in a general retreat-for, as I have indicated, one has to commit one's motorised formations merely to gain time for them. I was forced to go through this myself during the Axis retreat form Cryrenica in the winter of 1941-42, when the whole of the Italian Infantry and a considerable part of the German, including the majority of what was to become 90th light Division, were without vehicles and had either to be carried by a shuttle service of lorries, or to march. It was only the gallantry of my armour that enabled the retreat of the Italo-German infantry to be covered, for our fully motorised enemy was in hot pursuit. Similarly, Graziani's failure can be attributed mainly to the fact that the greater part of the Italian Army was delivered up helpless and non-motorised in the open desert to the weaker but fully motorised British formations, while the Italian motorised forces, although too weak to oppose the British succesfully, were nevertheless compelled to accept battle and allow themselves to be destroyed in defence of the infantry.
The British forces-in contrast to ours-were all fully mobile, and the war in Afrika was, in fact, waged almost exclusively by mobile forces. Out of this pure motorised warfare, certain principles were established, principles fundamantally different from those applying in other theatres. These principles will become the standard for the future, in which the fully-motorised formation will be dominant.
The envelopment of all fully-motorised enemy in the flat and good-driving terrian of the desert has the following results:
(a) For a fully-motorised formation, encirclement is the worst tactical situation imaginable, since hostile fire can be brough to bear on it from all sides; even envelopment on only three sides is a tactically untenable situation.
(b) The enemy becomes forced because of the bad tactical situation in which the encirclement has placed him, to evacuate the area he is holding.
The encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the pocket can seldom be the direct aim of an operation; more often it is only indirect, for any fully-motorised force whose organisational structure remains intact will normally and in suitable country be able to break out at will through an improvised defensive ring. Thanks to his motorisation, the commander of the encircled force is in postion to concentrate his weight unexpectedly against any likely point in the ring and burst through it. This fact was repeatedly demonstrated in the desert.
It follows therfore that an encircled enemy force can only be destoryed
(a) when it is non-motorised or has been rendered immobile by lack of petrol, or when it includes non-mobile elements which have to be considered;
(b) when it is badly led or its command has decided to sacrifice one formation in order to save another;
(c) when its fighting strength has already been broken, and disintergration and disorganisation have set it.
Except for cases (a) and (b), which occured frequently in other theatres of war, encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the pocket can only be attempted if he has been so heavily battered in open battle that the organic cohesion of his force has been destoryed. I shall term all actions which have as their aim the wearing down of the enemy's power of resistance "battle of attrition." In motorised warfare, material attrition and the destruction of the organic cohesion of the opposing army must be the immediate aim of all planning.
Tactically, the battle of attrition is fought with the highest possible degree of mobility. The following points require particular attention:
(a) The main endeavor should be to concintrate one's own forces in space and time, while at the same time seeking to split the enemy forces spatially and to destroy them at differnt times.
(b) Supply lines are particularly sensitive, since all petro and ammunition, indispensable requirements for the battle, must pass along them. Hence, everything possible must be done to protect ones own supply lines and to upset, or better still, cut the enemy's. Operations in the enemy's supply area will lead immediatly to his breaking off the battle elsewhere, since, as I have indicated, supplies are the fundamental premise of the battle and must be given priority of protection.
(c) The armour is the core of the motorised army. Everything turns on it, and other formations are mere auxiliaries. The war of attrition against the enemy armour must be therfore be waged as far as possible by the tank destruction units. One's own armour should only be used to deal the final blow.
(d) Reconnaissance reports must reach the commander in the shortest possible time' he must take his decisions immediately and put them into effect as fast as he can. Speed of reaction decides the battle. Commanders of motorised forces must therefore operate as near as possible to their troops, and must have the closest possible signal communication with him.
(e) Speed of movement and the organisational cohesion of one's own forces are decisive factors and require particular attention. Any sign of dislocation must be dealt with as quickly as possible by reorganisation.
(f) Concealment of intentions is of the upmost importance in order to provide surprise for one's own operations and thus make it possible to exploit the time taken by the enemy command to react. Deception measures of all kinds should be encouraged, if only to make the enemy commander uncertain and cause him to hesitate and hold back.
(g) Once the enemy has been thoroughly beaten up, success can be exploted by attempting to overrun and destroy major parts of his disorginized formations. Here again, speed is everything. The enemy must never be allowed time to reorganise. Lightning regrouping for the pursuit and reorganisation of supplies for the pursuing forces are essential.
Concerning the technical and organisational aspect of desert warfare, particular regard must be paid to the following points:
(a) The prime requirements in the tank are maneuvrability, speed and a long-range gun-for the side with the bigger gun has the longer arm and can be the first to engage the enemy. Weight of armour cannot make up for the lack of gun-power, as it can only be provided at the expense of manevrability and speed, both of which are indispensable tactical requirements.
(b) The artillery must have great range and must, above all, be capable of great mobility and of carrying with it ammunition in large quantities.
(c) The infantry serves only to occupy and hold postions designed either to prevent the enemy from particular operations, or to force him into other ones. Once this object has been achieved, the infantry must be able to get away quickly for employement elsewhere. It must therefore be mobile and be equipped to enable it rapidly to take up defence postions in the open at tactically important points on the battlefield.
It is my experience tha bold decisions give the best promise of success, But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficent forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lean to either victory or to the complete destruction of one's forces. Situations can arise where even a gamble may be justified-as, for instance, when in the normal course of events defeat os just merely a matter of time, when the gaining of time is therefore pointless and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk.
The only occasion when a commander can calculate the course of a battle in advance is when his forces are so superior that victory is a forgone conclusion; then the problem is no longer one of "the mean" but only of "the method". But even in this situation, I still think it is better to operate on the grand scale rather than creep about the battlefield anxiously taking all possible security measures against every conceivable enemy move.
Normally, there is no ideal solution to military problems; every course has its advantages and disadvantages. One must select that which seems best from the most varied aspects and than pursue it resolutely and accept the consequences. Any compromise is bad.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004