The "Brute", Vietnam, and the spreading Inkblot strategy...

[khalifah]

The following is from the book by Max Boot, called "The Savage Wars of Peace"


...Marine Major General Victor H. Krulak later recalled his frustrations in lobbying for a "spreading inkblot" strategy-Expanding American control slowly from the seacoast by pacifying one hamlet after another, as the US has done in the Philippines 6 decades before.

"Brute" Krulak was a first-rate fighter and thinker. His nickname derived from his days at the Naval Academy, when he had been a ferocious wrestler despite his diminutive size.

In the late 1930s, he served with the 4th Marines in Shanghai, where he helped develop a type of landing craft that was widely employed during WW2. Then he won a Navy Cross, the service's 2nd-highest decoration, fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. Along the way, he had been steeped in the Corps' small wars tradition, learning from, and serving alongside, many of the veterans of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. The plan he developed for wining Vietnam drew on those experiences.

Under his scheme, which was similar to that of other counterinsurgency experts, US forces would concentrate on cutting off the Vietcong from the population centers along the Mekong Delta and the coastal plain, where most of the South Vietnamese population was located.

80% of the people, he observed, lived in 10% of the country, the bulk of them in small farming communities. The key to winning the war was to provide security for these villagers, to reassure them that it was safe to side with the government and to resist the Vietcong's attempts to "tax" them, seek information from them, and enlist their young men to carry arms against the government.

It would be virtually impossible to hunt down and eliminate the communist forces in their jungle lairs, but if the US could cut them off from the civilian population, they would wither away. Krulak liked to quote General Giap: "Without the people we have no information...They hide us, protect us, feed us and tend our wounded."

Denying the Vietcong access to the people would call for few big-unit operations. It would take aggressive small-unit foot patrolling, especially at night, to gather intelligence and disrupt guerrilla operations. Above all, it would mean training local people to defend themselve. That was the only way to ensure the long-term security of the country. US forces could not totally forgo big-unit operations; they would sometimes be necessary to expel enemy main forces from a region and prevent them from coming back. But the chief thrust had to be on pacification, not search-and-destroy.

In December 1965...Krulak sat down in his office, situated on a mountain overlooking Pearl Harbor, and wrote a 17-page "strategic appraisal" in which he pointed out the futility of pursuing a conventional strategy. Gaining possession of the Highlands-where Westmoreland was focusing his efforts- was pointless, Krulak argued, because the people and the food in South Vietnam were located on the coastal plain.

"A key point in this:"he wrote, "the conflict between the North Vietnamese/hard core Vietcong, on the one hand, and the US on the other, could move to another planet today and we would not have won the war.

On the other hand, if the subversion and guerrilla efforts were to disappear, the war would soon collapse, and the enemy would be denied food, sanctuary and intelligence.
..........................................................................

what I want to get out of this thread, is basically a discussion of this plan by the Marine General. Would it work? Would it not?, etc.

I would greatly appreciate if some Vietnam Veterans can give us some feedback, in regards to this plan, and what they saw during their tour.

/respectfully
PS, if there some errors in the text, let me know if I've missed them

[khalifah]

heres another section of the book in support of the Inkblot plan...


The Small War
...The most immediate need was to provide villagers with security against the guerrillas who came around demanding food, shelter, intelligence, draftees. This was a job for soldiers, and the precious few of them who were assigned this task achieved impressive results. The most notable example was the Combined Action Program begun in 1965.

...Each Combined Action Platoon(CAP) consisted of a Marine rifle squad under the command of a sergeant-all volunteers chosen for their ability to work with the locals. The 12-15 Marines were paired with a platoon from the South Vietnam's Popular Forces(PF) militia, about 30 men from the local community.

Together, the Marines and militiamen worked on securing a village from the Vietcong, the Americans providing military know-how, the Vietnamese invaluable knowlege of local conditions.

The classic account of CAP in action remains "The Village," published by a Marine Captian named Francis J. West Jr. in 1972. It recounts the efforts of a dozen Marine volunteers who worked side by side with the PF militiamen to pacify the coastal village of Binh Nghia, located 300 miles north of Saigon and 400 miles south of Hanoi.

When the Marines first arrived in June 1966, Binh Nghia's seven hamlets, with their 5,000 inhabitants, were virtually run by the Vietcong. The guerrillas could come and go at will, taxing the inhabitants to support themselves and killing any South Vietnamese official who got in their way.

The Marines quickly changed that. A dozen of them-from Company C,1st Battalion, 7th Marines-arrived on June 10, 1966. They "left behind an American base camp with its thick barbed wire and canvas cots, solid bunkers, soupy ice cream and endless guard rosters." In Binh Nghia they lived no better and no worse than the PF.

By day the Marines and PF interacted in a friendly manner with the villagers, winning their trust and confidence. By night, they patrolled aggressively, often clashing with the Vietcong- 70 firefights in their first couple of months…

As they continued patrolling night after night, the Marines’ jungle-warfare skills rapidly improved. Before long they were moving as stealthy, and becoming as adept at setting ambushes, as their enemies. The PF also experienced a rapid improvement in their skills and confidence, thanks to the training they received from the Marines. Together, their efforts drove the Vietcong out of Binh Nghia…

…Good relations with the villagers paid off. By the time another main force attack was organized in March 1967, the defenders were ready, thanks to intelligence supplied by their informants. Knowing that an attack was on the way, their battalion commander ordered the CAP Marines to evacuate before they were hit by some 300 enemy soldiers.

The dozen Marines gathered together and decided they would not go –even if this meant risking a court-martial for disobeying orders…After one of the Communist scout was detected and killed by an alert PF militamen, the rest of the main force scuttled away, knowing that the defenders were on their guard.

The Communists never again seriously threatened Binh Nghia. By the time the Marines pulled out in October 1967, the village, once a Vietcong haven, was so secure that “the PFs were patrolling…in teams of 2, like cops on a beat.”

A few years later even the PF were no longer necessary. “By 1970 Binh Nghia was so peaceful that the new American district adviser had termed it a R&R center.”


again, any grammatical errors I missed, please let me know .

[Hollis]

I served with his son who later became CMC. The sad part, is that the war was not lost in RVN, it was lost at home. Something most people, still today, do not understand.


The Viet-Namese people deserved better. The Anti-war movement, liberals, media, partisan political agenda, the cold war etc all added to creating a culture of defeat in the US.

Just like today people with a self defacing agenda, a partisan political agenda to get elected will put our men and women in the arm forces lives at risk for their petty BS.

As Hoi would say, "sat cong, sat bac biet".

[khalifah]

If I recall correctly, I remember of reading of a US Army Colonel meeting up with an NVA Colonal, some time after the war.
The conversation went into the overall use of forces, and the US Colonel said, "You know, we didnt lose any of the battles,"

To which the NVA Colonel replied, "That is true, however it is irrelivent in the end."

In short, one could say that wars are won, and lost, by the "hearts and minds" of the people of the participating countries.

[Hollis]

In short, one could say that wars are won, and lost, by the "hearts and minds" of the people of the participating countries.


That is the power of propaganda. That is also the terrorist of today best ally. The best way to win a battle, is to get the enemy to defeat themselves.

[khalifah]

In my opinion, with what came with the Vietnam war was the loss of the vital knowledge of knowing how to fight "small wars"

This knowledge of fighting "small warfare" could have been much help to todays Iraq war. However, todays veterans learned the hard way of fighting for the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people, by trial and error.

[LaoSexMachine]

I served with his son who later became CMC. The sad part, is that the war was not lost in RVN, it was lost at home. Something most people, still today, do not understand.


The Viet-Namese people deserved better. The Anti-war movement, liberals, media, partisan political agenda, the cold war etc all added to creating a culture of defeat in the US.

Just like today people with a self defacing agenda, a partisan political agenda to get elected will put our men and women in the arm forces lives at risk for their petty BS.

As Hoi would say, "sat cong, sat bac biet".

Krulack was CMC during my enlistment.

[Hollis]

In my opinion, with what came with the Vietnam war was the loss of the vital knowledge of knowing how to fight "small wars"

This knowledge of fighting "small warfare" could have been much help to todays Iraq war. However, todays veterans learned the hard way of fighting for the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people, by trial and error.


I think you missed my points. The military has no control over the media, partisan politics, and people who have a hard on for the US.

We had the hearts and mind of the South Viet-Namese people, Charlie had terror on their side and the North Viet-Namese Military. The VC also lost the war. The North just phased them out.


The US politically Pulled out under agree with the Communist countries that all sides would not aid either combatant. The US kept it's agreement, the Communist still supplied the North.


Keep that in Mind, is still took the North two years to defeats the South who had no support.

Part of the misunderstanding of the war, is not small war tactics, But the cold war. The cold war was global. The Soviet spent a lot money supporting various proxy groups in the US and other Western countries to promote their agenda.


I always find it amazing, that the Soviet role is often completely ignored. They were a major player and fighting for their mandate and existence.

I feel it is error to view Viet-Nam as a stand alone conflict.

[Hollis]

Krulack was CMC during my enlistment.


He was a very respected CO. Very fine Marine.

[khalifah]

I do understand what you were talking about Hollis, I was just pointing out America's ability, or know-how, to impliment small warfare tactics has been lost since the Viet Nam conflict.

For example, the early quarter of the 20th was full of "small war" engagements, (Nicaragua, Haiti, Dominican Republic, etc.) However, the later half of the 20th is virtually void conflicts fought in a "small war" manner.

The one exception is, (arguably), the engagment in Somolia in the early 90's.

In the case of todays war in Iraq, the lessons learned in stablization, nation building, and overall support of the local population.(military operations that are deemed "small war") Are lessons that will benifit the US military for the years to come.

To quote Chesty Puller, "The Constabulary Detachment, where I saw it in both Haiti and Nicaragua, was the best school the Marine Corps has ever devised."

[USMCRTop]

Rich republics often lack the political will to endure long conflicts

[Laconian]

One of the major problems with comparing our fighting a "small war" in VN and a "small war" today is the Cold War perspective Hollis mentioned. The spectre of a Soviet menace storming through the Fulda Gap and other spots along the East-West Border in Europe was THE fundamental military concern of the US despite hot spots that sprung up in Greece, Korea and VN.

Unlike the Soviets, we treated VN as a operational concern (a localized problem - if you will). The Soviets always viewed it as part of a strategic concern (a global problem) so they viewed their involvement in VN, Africa, and other parts of the world as part of their national policy. The US on the other hand tried to fight a limited war in VN, a Cold War almost everywhere else, and wage a war on poverty at home.

Although our (as a nation) defeat in VN was a culmination of media, political, and social wrangling, the guys running the head shed in DC were not blameless. Most of the folks running the war (from the JCS down to theater commanders) cut their teeth fighting a maneuver war in NW Europe as Bn and Bde commanders. There were vast disagreements as to whether VN was a guerrilla war or "standard" war of belligerents, was a debate throughout the conflict.

It has persisted to effect the psyche of the military and politicians to this day.

BTW your quote, khalifah, came from Col (ret) Harry Summers' book On Strategy a look at why the US lost the VN war. Good read.

[Elfstone44]

Khilifah, I'll have to get his book. Thanks for the recommendation.

From experience, however, and from LTG Palmer's book, "Summons of the Trumpet," I'm not sure the problem in SVN was the VC...It was, I believe, the regulars of the NVA. Numerous schemes were tried to secure hamlets; with security one could create government. Nothing worked if a mainforce battalion could march through and destroy what was built.

One of the problems we faced was our own propaganda...that the war was primarially a guerrilla war. It was not...in the end the war resembled France vs Germany rather than the Phillippines. We kept referring to "revolutionary war," "people's war, peoples army," guerrilla war...we should have been talking about the 1 million NVA regulars which kept the fighting in the south going and the supply line which kept them provisioned.

I'll heartily recommend again both Palmer's book and Harry Sumner's, "On Strategy; A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War."

[Hollis]

Elfstone, good point, the NVA were conventional forces and there was a lot of them in SVN. There was nothing guerrilla about the NVA. To add to them where the VC regulars.

[khalifah]

Although one cannot disregard the deployments of regular army units from NV, how effective would they have been without the aid of their guerrilla counterparts?

Traveling throughout the SV country, how were they feed?, Who had given them intel of the area they are entering? etc. ect. I would argue that it goes back to who has the support of the locals in the area(wether it be by force or bribe).

To quote Sun Tzu "Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army's ability to move."(chapterXIII paragraph 27)
..........................................................................................
Furthermore, in regards to large scale operations conducted by the NVA, involving Soviet armor. A force must be met by at least a equally strong force. This is of course where the US's unquestionable industrial ability to fight conventional war shines.

Of course, throughout the course of the war US forces went through a buildup and a downsizeing of US troops in Viet Nam. In the end, as well as the beginning, their were advisors, their students/troops, and the limited support of US aircraft. These tools, were able to stand its own ground against the NVA

Case in point was the NVA offensive of 1972, March 30th. With much support from US Warplanes, the SVA were able to stand their ground. US ground troops mainly consisted of advisors for the SVA units involved.

One can argue that the SVA were able to hold their ground, due to the training from their advisors.Advisors who specialize in "training locals"and other small warfare tactics.

[okieJack]

I was in Nam 65-66 when Krulak was in charge. He was not "demunitive" at all but rather was a bear of a man. I saw him almost every morning as he was heading for his chopper and I was headed for the Comm Center. His staff officers had to run to keep up with Krulak's walking.

As for why we lost the Vietnam War. The military was hamstrung by the politicians back home and Westmoreland in country. We operated under rediculously PC ROEs. We couldn't persue the NVA or the VC accross boarders and the Marines were held back by lack of funding etc. Westmoreland didn't like Marines at all and would not listen when he was advised by our Marine Officers.

The Dominoe theory was true and our cut and run cost millions of lives. We broke our word to our SVN friends and that's a shame and a sham.

[Mastermind]

I found that to understand the enormous complexities of the Vietnam war, it is absolutely necessary to get an objective history of the whole country and the people. Vietnam was probably one of the most complex political and military situations as had ever existed since the days of Sun Tzu.

We in the west have a western conception of hamlets, rural people, communisim, and crime. In Vietnam, the "rural" people were not the simple farmers we think of. They were people who had been on the same land for fifteen or more generations. They were very sophisiticated thinkers, adept at complex political maneuverings and deeply loyal to their family and neighbors.

We had a political science and pro west view of what communisim was...the Vietnamese people, north or south of the DMZ did not have any misconceptions about communists...but, their concepts of "communism" were always compared to their first hand experience of brutal and humilitaitng colonialism at the hands of the French. Vietnam was a fight to the death for Freedom from that...in otherwords, they would have gladly become communists or capitalists so long as the leadership and the control of the nation was all Vietnamese, independant of any other world power. This was the golden calf that the North embraced. A detailed study of Ho Chi Minh reveals, the "Teacher" had an extroadinary life that was almost entirely focused on achieving independance from France and achieving Vietnamese independance rather than developing Vietnam into a communist regime. World war II and the occupation by the Japanese and the breaking of the French yoke was the spark that ignited the war as we ulitamtely came to know it.

I know this seems a bit off topic...but, to get a handle on why the US efforts were constantly ever expanding in order to hold onto success, one must understand the larger picture...Most Vietnamese people viewed the US as merely a replacement of the French...at least Ho and his regime were Vietnamese. The farmers had no loyalty to any regime...they only knew the land and would keep on working the land under what ever group ran the country. They knew that people still had to eat and that was their primary ace in the hole...why they really did not give a damn. All they knew was that at night, the NVA or Viet Cong came and abused them and by day, the Americans and the petty Sotuh Vietnamese tyrants came and exploited or bombed them. A massive influx of American food aid, utterly destroyed their farm-to-market economy.

The misconceptions about democracy were another massive obstical to getting things right. In the US...the Kennedy and Johnson administrations fully understood that before any real help could go to the south, the American people would have to have a model of "democracy" in place in Saigon before they would get behind any salvation effort. The government that existed in the south after the defeat of the French at Dein Bien Phu was weak, massively corrupt, riddled with Generals and Colonels and wealthy plantation owners and could hardly be called "represenative"...it was the worst form of power elitism that could be imagined and the US demanded an elected, represenative government before any real help could be given. Thus the litttle Presidencys came to exist after shame elections.

Up north, the communists were in the same pickle...Ho was not a hard core commie...He was a Vietnamese patriot before anything...and had actually extended his hand to America first before going to the communists...he despised and deeply distrusted the Chinese, like most Vietnamese. His primary difficulties up north revolved around the religous conflicts between the Buddists and the Catholics. The communists offered the solution most communists go for...kill everyone who is causing problems with the revolution...Ho went for it (much to his later stated and deep regrets) after the rebuffs by both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (who foolishly rejected Vietnamese independance in worry over pissing off their new and testy French allies in Europe...the British, with colonial problems of their own, rejected any involvement out of hand...and so, the only hope left to Ho was in the communist realm.

Down south, the militarists, the crooks and the elisits formed a kind of "pretend" democracy that was, on the surface, at least, acceptable to the American palate...and gave the CIA a stage from which they could satisfy the audience of congressmen and senators and shallow journalists...the war was on, much to the delight of the western manufacturing and global security experts. Johnson and the global situation was perfect for the circumstances that exploded in Vietnam...

As for the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong...they were, in the beginning, the patriots of the land...they were the ones who held the militarists and the land barrons of the south at bay and out of the hair of the "peasants". When you read about how the rural areas had been partitioned to the southern generals in order to guarantee their continued loyalty, you can see a pattern of ultimate disaster forming. The CIA and the drug money was a whole extra can of gasoline to toss into the mix. The politics of Cambodia, Thailand and Laos and their relations with the west and how they played the communists agaisnt the western powers in order to gain full advantages are yet another.

The whole history of the land, the people, the religions, the colonists, and the full spectrum of global economy and politics must be considered before you can even begin to grasp the truths of what was going on...and I don't just mean in the grass hut hamlets. What we refer to as "Vietnam" is much, much larger than the Marines landing, or the Gulf of Tonkin, or Giap, and Ho and Viet Cong guerillas collecting taxes. These people were litterally ripped to shreds by a world gone mad. No one came away with anything except an insane asylum memory.

If there was "peace" in the villages and patrols could be sent out in units as small as "pairs, it was becasue of utter and complete exhaustion on a local level. The Americnas were still sweeping the roads every morning, the communists and CIA people walking around in Hawaian shirst were still a reality, and American money and GI script were all that came to matter.

55,000 American and allied lives, American society savaged at home, two and a half million dead Vietnamese, five million wounded, maimed, missing, a trillion dollars up in smoke..none of that ultimately came to mean anything....in the end, the result was practically the same as if the French had just done the right thing in the first place.

[Delta Niner]

thanks for your insight Mastermind :)

[khalifah]

I appreciate all of the input you all provided in this thread,It seems a thread about a proposed strategy has grown into somthing more enlightening.

thanks again for the input
/respectfully

[Dragonscript]

Krulack was CMC during my enlistment.


Same here. He made sure every Marine got a set of Gore-tex, not just the officers. Also, i love the USMC ICBs. I still remember when we got them, i think we had to pay 20$ to get them issued to us to help defray the cost since they were almost 200$. They are over 10 years old and are on my feet right now, even though they are about to get re-soled soon.

[LaoSexMachine]

I found that to understand the enormous complexities of the Vietnam war, it is absolutely necessary to get an objective history of the whole country and the people. Vietnam was probably one of the most complex political and military situations as had ever existed since the days of Sun Tzu.

We in the west have a western conception of hamlets, rural people, communisim, and crime. In Vietnam, the "rural" people were not the simple farmers we think of. They were people who had been on the same land for fifteen or more generations. They were very sophisiticated thinkers, adept at complex political maneuverings and deeply loyal to their family and neighbors.

We had a political science and pro west view of what communisim was...the Vietnamese people, north or south of the DMZ did not have any misconceptions about communists...but, their concepts of "communism" were always compared to their first hand experience of brutal and humilitaitng colonialism at the hands of the French. Vietnam was a fight to the death for Freedom from that...in otherwords, they would have gladly become communists or capitalists so long as the leadership and the control of the nation was all Vietnamese, independant of any other world power. This was the golden calf that the North embraced. A detailed study of Ho Chi Minh reveals, the "Teacher" had an extroadinary life that was almost entirely focused on achieving independance from France and achieving Vietnamese independance rather than developing Vietnam into a communist regime. World war II and the occupation by the Japanese and the breaking of the French yoke was the spark that ignited the war as we ulitamtely came to know it.

I know this seems a bit off topic...but, to get a handle on why the US efforts were constantly ever expanding in order to hold onto success, one must understand the larger picture...Most Vietnamese people viewed the US as merely a replacement of the French...at least Ho and his regime were Vietnamese. The farmers had no loyalty to any regime...they only knew the land and would keep on working the land under what ever group ran the country. They knew that people still had to eat and that was their primary ace in the hole...why they really did not give a damn. All they knew was that at night, the NVA or Viet Cong came and abused them and by day, the Americans and the petty Sotuh Vietnamese tyrants came and exploited or bombed them. A massive influx of American food aid, utterly destroyed their farm-to-market economy.

The misconceptions about democracy were another massive obstical to getting things right. In the US...the Kennedy and Johnson administrations fully understood that before any real help could go to the south, the American people would have to have a model of "democracy" in place in Saigon before they would get behind any salvation effort. The government that existed in the south after the defeat of the French at Dein Bien Phu was weak, massively corrupt, riddled with Generals and Colonels and wealthy plantation owners and could hardly be called "represenative"...it was the worst form of power elitism that could be imagined and the US demanded an elected, represenative government before any real help could be given. Thus the litttle Presidencys came to exist after shame elections.

Up north, the communists were in the same pickle...Ho was not a hard core commie...He was a Vietnamese patriot before anything...and had actually extended his hand to America first before going to the communists...he despised and deeply distrusted the Chinese, like most Vietnamese. His primary difficulties up north revolved around the religous conflicts between the Buddists and the Catholics. The communists offered the solution most communists go for...kill everyone who is causing problems with the revolution...Ho went for it (much to his later stated and deep regrets) after the rebuffs by both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (who foolishly rejected Vietnamese independance in worry over pissing off their new and testy French allies in Europe...the British, with colonial problems of their own, rejected any involvement out of hand...and so, the only hope left to Ho was in the communist realm.

Down south, the militarists, the crooks and the elisits formed a kind of "pretend" democracy that was, on the surface, at least, acceptable to the American palate...and gave the CIA a stage from which they could satisfy the audience of congressmen and senators and shallow journalists...the war was on, much to the delight of the western manufacturing and global security experts. Johnson and the global situation was perfect for the circumstances that exploded in Vietnam...

As for the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong...they were, in the beginning, the patriots of the land...they were the ones who held the militarists and the land barrons of the south at bay and out of the hair of the "peasants". When you read about how the rural areas had been partitioned to the southern generals in order to guarantee their continued loyalty, you can see a pattern of ultimate disaster forming. The CIA and the drug money was a whole extra can of gasoline to toss into the mix. The politics of Cambodia, Thailand and Laos and their relations with the west and how they played the communists agaisnt the western powers in order to gain full advantages are yet another.

The whole history of the land, the people, the religions, the colonists, and the full spectrum of global economy and politics must be considered before you can even begin to grasp the truths of what was going on...and I don't just mean in the grass hut hamlets. What we refer to as "Vietnam" is much, much larger than the Marines landing, or the Gulf of Tonkin, or Giap, and Ho and Viet Cong guerillas collecting taxes. These people were litterally ripped to shreds by a world gone mad. No one came away with anything except an insane asylum memory.

If there was "peace" in the villages and patrols could be sent out in units as small as "pairs, it was becasue of utter and complete exhaustion on a local level. The Americnas were still sweeping the roads every morning, the communists and CIA people walking around in Hawaian shirst were still a reality, and American money and GI script were all that came to matter.

55,000 American and allied lives, American society savaged at home, two and a half million dead Vietnamese, five million wounded, maimed, missing, a trillion dollars up in smoke..none of that ultimately came to mean anything....in the end, the result was practically the same as if the French had just done the right thing in the first place.


Goddam! Very insightful. You and the other vets need to write a book.

[Jacknola]

I haven’t participated in this or the “VC” thread because it is depressing. So many people have such a misguided view of events in Vietnam that it is very difficult communicate reality. And unfortuantely much of what Mastermind has posted in this last post in my opinion is mostly just a cypher for conventional "wisdom" about Vietnam, somewhat shallow, not necessarily accurate, and most important, not especially germane to the conduct or results of the War.

After reading what master wrote in his last post (he has posted much that is excellent), my first reaction was siimply... so what? So what if all of what he posted was true? What does any of that have to do with the conduct or result of the war? To believe it had any relevance, you would have to believe that the "hearts and minds" (H&Ms) or "support" of the farmers was a secret weapon that somehow made a military difference. I don't think H&M had much of an impact one way or the other. To believe it did is to entertain a fundamental misconception about the War in my opinion.

That misconception about the conflict in Vietnam unfortunately too often forms the parameters of any discussion about the war. And the "ink blot" strategy was proven on the ground to be erroneously based on that same fundamental misunderstanding. In fact, the “ink blot” approach was abandoned by Westmoreland in 1966 when the realities of the war demanded a different approach.

Even on this board many thoughtful and well read commentators such as Mastermind, seem to accept basic assumptions about the war that are erroneous. These base assumptions are the military equivalent of “urban myths” that have become so deeply ingrained that they have become the default explanation of the War.

One of the myths is that Mao's Revolutionary warfare theories guided the war in Vietnam. Those theories were early discarded by the NVA and those theories are suspect when an attempt is made to apply them outside of the context of early 20th C China.

But the biggest "urban myths" of Vietnam was the belief in an all-powerful secret weapon, a soft-power, "win the hearts and minds" military strategy.

By using analogy, I'll illustrate the problems in the belief that "soft power" issues were of prime or even decisive importance. They were not. Please suppose someone seriously advanced the following statements as part of an academic discussion of WWII, the American Revolution, Caesar’s Gaelic wars, and the Cambodian “civil war.” I contend the following "beliefs" would be the butt of a lot of scorn, yet similar "beliefs" are often accepted as true about Vietnam.

1. "In May, 1940, the French Army completely failed to fully win the commitment of the “hearts and minds” of the people of France to their cause. This key mistake led directly to the German victory." or "ditto the Hungarian people in Budapest in 1956."

2. "During the American Revolution War of 1776-83, the British should have adopted the “ink blot” approach. They should have split their army into small platoons and slowly gained control of village after village, creeping inland in an ever expanding pacified area. This approach would have defeated the American Independence forces because pacification was the core issue of the war." [What would those isolated platoons do when the American Continental regiments suddenly advanced in line of battle?]

3. "When Caesar brought his army into Gaul in 50 BC, the Gauls should have fought an insurgent guerrilla war. They should have pretended to be farmers by day. Then they could have slowly progressed to fielding larger formations. This type of resistance would have worn Caesar down." [Ceasar had several answer to this type of illusion... one being kill all the farmers and sell their families into slavery].

4. "The victory of the forces led by Pol Pot proved that the the Khmer Rouge had the support of the people. The so-called “killing fields” were simply an expression of the just anger of the Cambodian people toward the corrupt and oppressive portion of their society that was then 're-educated'." [Since "hearts and minds" are an ulitmate weapon, you cannot lose if you have H&Ms, and if you lose it means you didn't have H&Ms].

5. re: the Terminator; "...you can't reason with it, it knows no pity...that's what it does!" [true].

In my opinion, Vietnam was not a “people’s revolutionary guerrilla war.” It was not a spontaneous revolution launched by the proletariat against corrupt, cruel and venal land owners and officials (not a new phenomena in SE Asia). The “hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese people had little effect on the course of the war, or on the War's result because the true local "guerrilla forces" were pretty inconsequential on a military scale. The key element in the entire Vietnam war, start to finish, was...simply... the projection of military power by the North Vietnamese.

Don’t believe it? Than ask yourself these questions. How did the Vietnam War end? Can anyone explain how “hearts and minds” could have stopped the tanks of the NVA in 1975? When the people of South Vietnam fled the fighting, which way did they flee?...toward the communists or away from the communist forces?

Civic action, hearts and minds, pacification, will of the people, etc., had virtually nothing to do with the beginning, or end of the war, or with much in-between. At no time in the war did anything more than a small percentage actively support the communists ... and at all times a much larger percentage actively opposed them. But that didn't matter. The truth is... nation-building, hearts and minds etc., is worthless if you cannot militarily protect your people. Whether military factors were 10 percent or 90 percent of the total picture of the war, they were always the [I]first 10 percent, or 90 percent of the equation.

The South Vietnamese people were almost completly united and mobilized in defense of their country at the end of the War, moreso than at any other time. It made no difference in the outcome. A population simply cannot reason with an armored division (France-'40, Budapest-'56, Kuwait v Saddam '90, etc.).

And once an invading army has won and defeated and dispersed the opponent, occupied the country, they can do whatever their moral philosophy allows them to do. They can nation-build, support the creation of civic institutions, re-build infrastructure, create schools, institute justice, free enterprise and democracy... or they can en-slave, loot, murder, rape, pillage, or create death camps, killing fields, and/or "re-education camps."

To understand the Vietnam War, I suggest the student concentrate on the military issues, including the geo-political ones ("War" is policy and diplomacy pursued by other means). Understand those military issues from tactics to strategy, and one can begin to understand the course of the war. Then, the lessons learned may be valuable when applied in the future. Ignoring the military lessons of Vietnam and failure in future similar military situations becomes more likely.


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[Jacknola]

Uh oh… I went back and re-read my post (above) and it doesn’t read like I thought meant. I apologize.

What mastermind wrote is pretty accurate in the main. What I was trying to convey was not that Mastermind was wrong, but that the soft-power issues of Vietnam have been over-emphasized.

The national identiy issues may have been pretty complex, as mastermind indicated … but the main competing national objectives which started the war can be simply stated. The pursuit of those objectives was primarily military.

Sorry about the tone of my previous post.

[Mastermind]

I thought much of what you wrote was very insightful. Really, there are no fully correct assumptions about the war on any scale. Here is what I mean by that. Every aspect of the conflict is a fragment that was taken over the whole long debacle and you could say, one effort was militarily correct...while at the same time politically disasterous. Or, the reverse. Take, for example, the Tet of '68 era. The North gambled that they had the right timing to achieve military dominace ont he ground and that by doing so, the South would crumble. The facts were all present to prove they would have a very high probablity of success. However, getting in close, assimilating with the civilian populace, did force a nullification, to a large extent, the American air power....the ground battles were highly even. Our superioroty in artillery and armor were negated, to a large degree, by the very close combat the NVA exhibited. But, the casualties ont he part of the North were terrible. the VC were practically wiped out as a viable organization. The effort, at the finaly retaking of the Citadel, proved the Communists had failed miserably on their military objective. BUT...they were unexpectedly highly successful in their political success. A huge prize just fell into their laps, that I believe, ultimately decided the fate of the South. The massive outrage and campus unrest at home exploded much to the delight of the communists. America was heavily damged morale wise by the gigantic "last gasp" of the northern military forces. All they had to do was maintain pressure...even mild pressure and the win would be theirs.

In the USA, no one expected a sudden and disgusting turnn of the media elites against the American military. That was totally unexpected. Americans have always supported their men in the battles. With inept handling and underestimation of the enemy resolve the government had exceeded their time limits to win the thing. We were winning hands down on the battlefileds...but, we had lost the will to continue the never ending disaster....Tet had proven, there was no "Light at the end of the tunnel." Leadership had proven itself in the North...while leadership had failed miserably in the American homeland. Everyone was right...everyone was smart, everyone just absolutely knew they had all the answers...on both sides...and yet, overall, no one was right about much at all. Essentialy, Vietnam was something no one could really wrap his head around...it was just one grim experiment after another.

In retrospect, we can debate the matter forever...and what one says was right and shourl have been will quickly and correctly be offest by another pointing out some obscure writing, or military doctrine or governemntal largess that will prove the point. All that can then be countered by merely jumpting a head a few months or a year and offer proof of yet another element of fact to make the point.

Like any war that dragged on and on and on, through one king or knight or president or Great Leader, the outcome on the last day of battle simply ends all debate. We lost it...they won it...what happened in between the begining and the end is merely what it is.

[Hollis]

A thought about who lost:

Viet Minh, they lost when it became part of the global liberation movement, with new global partners and bosses. They were no longer in the conflict for the Viet-Namese, but for other global player's interests.

Viet-Namese people, their land and lives paid dearly for the contest between the East and West.

Viet-Cong, over runned and taken over by the North, who were not a partner in the global liberation movement.

South Viet-Nam, abandon and left alone to fight a war against the East (Communist Block countries).

Most of the Communist block countries, they went with the wall in Berlin.

I would say the US neither won or lost, it was like She Sanh, we were there until we decide it was time to leave. Taking into consideration the US military and veterans lost the terms of the propaganda war, I think we can list the US among the losers in the conflict.


China neither won or lost, Like the Soviet Union, their interests did not align with the interests of the Viet-Namese people. Viet-Nam was useful as a battlefield with the West and what ever propaganda victories that came from that conflict.

The winners;

Indonesia, did not go communist, so maybe win.

North Viet-Nam, they are the obvious winners, the new occupiers and voice of South Viet-Nam.

I think to be open, all players in the conflict should be viewed. Their involvement needs to be understood along with what they had to gain or loose.


The Viet-Nam war is a complex issue and often only myths and a very limited view of the players in that conflict is explored. If anything, the war demonstrated how effective a propaganda campaign against the West can be waged and won, especially using Western resources.

[Elfstone44]

***Sorry guys, wrong thread...I was trying to post on the VC topic**** I was given a set of Green Beret Magazines for Christmas...from mid-1966 to 1970. It was an in-country magazine published sometimes monthly which included articles on various camps in I, II, III and IV Corps plus Mike-Force. There are some good photos there.

The thing that struck me is that there are very few articles mentioning the "Viet Cong." What there are are in the 1966 or early 1968 issues and usually pretty well limited to IV Corps or to the Coastal areas of the country. The rest of the A Camps were fighting NVA regulars. This confirms what I thought and what was my experience in II Corps at least...that the NVA ruled the roost...that the VC were the water boys.

I'll see if there is an article worth posting. I know the thread is about the VC...but perhaps a picture on one of the RF/PF units and IV village fortifications might give some perspective to the topic.

[Elfstone44]

Please see my post on the VC line which bears on "ink-blot." Thanks.

[Mastermind]

Great insight there, Hollis. :-)