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06-20-2004, 11:27 AM
STATEMENT BY
MARSHALL BILLINGSLEA
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ACQUISITION
APRIL 1, 2003
MR. CHAIRMAN, Congressman Meehan, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate your
invitation to testify before the committee to update you on the progress we are
making in prosecuting the war on terrorism, and to describe for you the strategy
we are implementing today, along with the significant implications that strategy
has for the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Special
Operations Forces (SOF).
I do ask your indulgence today. As we are in open session, and I am not well-equipped
to answer any specific questions regarding Iraq, I am going to stay away from
any issues that might have bearing on ongoing operations (although I will try to
provide a little context regarding the role of Special Operations Forces in that
conflict).
The Bottom Line
I will give you the bottom line at the outset. The United States and its allies
have made significant progress in destroying and disrupting key parts of the
international terrorist network with which we are at war. Al?Qaida is an
organization under great stress, with a leadership that seems increasingly less
able to plan multiple large scale attacks because they are focused on the more
immediate problem of evading coalition capture.
USSOCOM has been a key player in that effort, and is working hand-in-glove with
other parts of the U.S. government and with coalition partners. The President?s
FY04 budget initiates a significant transformation of USSOCOM into a supported
combatant command for the war on terrorism, and alleviates a number of the
mounting problems incurred by such a high OPTEMPO for the Command.
However, having given you this assessment of al?Qaida, I hasten to add a key
qualifier: we are certain that we do not know all of the planning that al?Qaida
has already done, and we are concerned that they may have set certain operations
in motion before the most recent chain of events leading to Khalid Shaikh
Muhammad?s capture. Moreover, al?Qaida and affiliated terrorist organizations
have proven capable of regenerating lost parts, and of changing tactics and
techniques to adapt to our offensive efforts.
To put it simply: Al?Qaida and other related terrorist groups today remain
intent on conducting devastating attacks against the United States, our friends
and allies. At least some of their planning seems to contemplate the use of
chemical or biological agents. But as the October 2002 attack using an
explosives-laden dhow against the French oil tanker in Yemen showed, low-tech,
conventional explosives continue to afford terrorists the ability to mount
attacks with devastating consequences.
The Nature of the Enemy
Before I describe for you specific progress that we have made to date, I first
need to explain to the Committee how we perceive the international terrorist
network. Once I have sketched that out for you, you will be able to see how we
are targeting key strands of this network.
Al?Qaida is perhaps best viewed as part of a spider web. At the center of the
web are a number of terrorist groups ? dozens actually, of varying sizes with
varying agendas. Al?Qaida and its proxy groups, such as the IMU in Uzbekistan,
and Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and EIJ in
Egypt, and various Algerian, Chechen and other radical groups. From this core of
the network spread tendrils around the globe. They reach deep into those rogue
states that the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the Secretary of State have
labelled as ?state-sponsors of terrorism? (i.e., Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria,
Sudan, Cuba, and North Korea). The web reaches deeply into the ungoverned and
less-governed zones of the earth, the triborder area in Latin America, parts of
Yemen and Pakistan and Afghanistan, certain of the islands of the Philippines
and Indonesia, parts of Lebanon, Somalia, and other parts of Africa.
The web attaches itself to thousands of points, reaching into foreign
educational systems ? the madrassas. It is woven throughout religious
institutions, where terrorists posing as religious scholars use their mosques to
spot and recruit suicide bombers, or generally use the pulpit to spread hatred
and venom against the United States. It has spread into non-governmental
organizations, and charities, that are used as Trojan Horses to move people and
finances around the world. The tendrils creep into certain banks and the
hawallah system, and into various media outlets. The tendrils are also
interwoven with other transnational ?webs.? There are linkages to weapons
smuggling, and drug running rings, and to proliferation networks.
The web, frustratingly and worrisomely, reaches well into friendly nations.
Nearly every NATO partner has uncovered one or more al?Qaida cells. In fact, the
terrorist network reaches right into our own backyard, into America. As the
President mentioned in the State of the Union address, Buffalo is but one city
that we have discovered to be penetrated by the al?Qaida network.
As you can see, this is a very different type of enemy that threatens the
American people today. The adversaries of the Cold War ? generally speaking ?
had a statist structure with centralized command and control, and a leadership
structure which could be targeted frontally, and linearly. This network has none
of those characteristics.
The spiderweb of loosely-organized terror groups has no single, integrated
command structure. While the leadership of some key organizations can be
eliminated, those organizations do not necessarily cease functioning. We have
seen cells either continue to operate quasi-independently, or begin to
coordinate with other terrorist organizations. Specific terrorist organizations
themselves have flexible lines of control that ? in some cases ? make senior
operational coordinators interchangeable with various cells. By that I mean that
they can supplant one another in event of capture, and persist in execution of
operations. Likewise, these organizations are capable of replacing lost
leadership by nominating operatives and elevating them in stature. Obviously,
key arrests can, and do, disrupt terrorist attacks. But some of the groups in
the international network (and al?Qaida in particular) have proven themselves
exceptionally patient and deliberate. We have seen instances where the planning
for an attack was temporarily suspended after an arrest or death, only to resume
a few months later with new personnel leading the charge.
Bringing to Bear All Elements of National Power
Clearly, when faced with such an adaptive organization, we cannot apply pressure
sporadically or unevenly. It has been necessary for us to engage, quite
literally, in a ?full court press,? bringing to bear all elements of our
national power. Striking at this network has necessitated an unprecedented level
of cooperation among U.S. defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic
agencies. There has been much commentary by those who have followed U.S.
counter-terror efforts over the years regarding the transformation that has
happened within the United States government, and over the strong unity of
purpose that we all have in prosecuting the global war on terrorism. Likewise,
the galvanizing effects of the September 11th attacks, and the subsequent Bali
bombings and other events, have given rise to an unparalleled level of
cooperation on a global scale between the departments and agencies of numerous
foreign governments, acting both in concert with the United States, with one
another, and on their own.
There is truly a global coalition against terrorism. That coalition has had some
stunning successes. I must say at the outset that diplomacy has proven an
essential tool in the war on terrorism, not only in maintaining coalition
cohesion, but in facilitating the direct apprehension of key individuals. Our
colleagues at the Department of State, within Ambassador Cofer Black?s office,
and at embassies around the world, are on the front line in the war on
terrorism. In our estimation, within the Department of Defense, they are doing a
superb job. In particular, I commend to members of the Committee, and to your
staff the recent testimony given by Ambassador Black before the House
International Relations Committee. His testimony provides the diplomatic context
to the Defense Department assessment I am providing you this afternoon.
Denial of Sanctuary
As I noted in my description of the terrorist network, the groups that are today
conspiring to commit mass murder of American and allied citizens operate overtly
out of a handful of terrorist sanctuaries. The United States government is
systematically draining those swamps in a denial of sanctuary campaign.
Afghanistan was the first such territory, post-September 11, that the United
States liberated from the grasp of terrorist organizations. In losing
Afghanistan, al?Qaida lost its ability to continue using the enormous, two-decades-old
infrastructure of paramilitary training camps scattered throughout the country.
Those camps, begun as a largely secular, ad hoc indigenous reaction to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, morphed over the ensuing decades into a
hodge-podge of Islamic-fundamentalist facilities churning out a network of Arab
mujahideen who earned their spurs in the Afghan-Soviet conflict and then
returned to their homes to foment wahhabist insurrection in their native lands.
The more extremist elements of that mujahideen network can be found scattered
throughout the international terrorist network, though obviously some mujahideen
did not ever, and do not today, subscribe to the wild fanaticism of a Bin Laden,
or to his terrorist tactics.
The loss of those camps had an immediate and obvious impact on al?Qaida. Gone
were the training facilities, and the chemical and biological research
laboratories they had created, along with some of the equipment they had
procured. The leadership now is scattered, and trustworthy communications are
much harder to have. But the loss of Afghanistan has had a deeper, intangible
effect on terrorist organizations that is hard to describe. There no longer is
an equivalent place where aspiring young terrorists can go to demonstrate their
commitment to fundamentalist extremism, and to receive a rigorous physical and
operational regimen. The camps of Afghanistan had a deep, unifying psychological
effect on the international terrorist network, as operatives trained in the same
camp claim a bond of ?kinship? and unity of purpose that cannot be easily
replicated when those camps have been destroyed.
Of course, al?Qaida and other terrorist groups continue to find sanctuary in
other countries, and are seeking to set up new camps. Iraq is one such place. We
are now in the process of denying al?Qaida and other terrorist groups sanctuary
there. At a very early phase of the campaign in Iraq, the United States struck
multiple terrorist training facilities and encampments in Iraq. The facilities,
run by an extremist Kurdish organization called Ansar al?Islam, had become over
the past year and a half, safe-haven to several al?Qaida operatives and home to
part of al?Qaida?s chemical warfare program. In the months prior to Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Ansar camps had grown with foreign fighters seeking an
opportunity to conduct terror attacks against the United States. It is difficult
to say, at this stage, how much damage has been inflicted on Ansar al?Islam and
al?Qaida. In total, we believe there to be more than a dozen terrorist groups
operating from sanctuaries in Iraq. Our goal is to eradicate their presence from
this country.
Finally, al?Qaida and other key terrorist organizations operate in the
ungoverned areas of the earth, in between the seams of civilizations and
governance. And we are striking at those terrorist concentrations when and where
we find them.
Degrading Terrorist Finances
Denial of sanctuary is but one aspect of the campaign. Degrading terrorist
finances also is crucial. Degradation of finances translates into a degradation
in operational capability. For instance, without funds, terrorists cannot move
around as easily or as quickly. Weaponry on the black and grey markets,
especially explosives, still takes a fair amount of cash, and there are always
living expenses and other costs that have to be defrayed. The Secretary of
State, working with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, and with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities, has taken steps to freeze the assets
of, block travel by, and criminalize relationships with, 36 different foreign
terrorist organizations. Sixty entities have been listed under Executive Order
13224, and 48 groups have been designated pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act. These
legal tools, taken in conjunction with a number of international legal
instruments, provide a critical basis for working with the global financial
community to block assets, and to expose and dismantle terrorist-run or
terrorist-penetrated non-governmental organizations, charities, and banks.
That said, it does take a great deal of money to conduct terrorist operations.
Tens of thousands of dollars, not even hundreds of thousands, are often all it
takes to spin up a cell to commence operational planning. That is why the
freezing of more than $100 million in terrorist finances is so significant.
Equally important, we have been able to identify several key terrorist
financiers, and take steps against them. The al?Qaida financier, Hawsawi, has
been captured, as have some key couriers and al?Qaida ?bag men.? Further, some
parts of al?Qaida?s Southeast Asian network of front companies, NGOs, and bank
accounts have been rolled up. The United States continues to track the
activities of other key financiers in the Middle East, and are pressing key
coalition members to take greater steps to curtail their activities.
Disrupting Terrorist Leadership
The United States and coalition partners also have made progress in
systematically reducing terrorist rank and file, and in capturing or killing
terrorist leadership and senior operational planners. Since September, 2001,
more than 55 terrorist leaders and planners have been captured or killed. In the
past six months alone, there have been more than 30 arrests and seizures in 20
different countries, not counting ongoing U.S. military operations in various
countries.
Two prominent al?Qaida, Muhammad Atef and Abu Ali al-Harithi, have been killed.
Several other prominent operatives, such as al-Nashri, Abu Zubayda, Ramzi bin
al?Shibh, al-Libi, and al-Jazairi are in custody. And, of course, the terrorist
we believe was the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh
Muhammad, is now under coalition control.
I suspect, that with Khalid Shaikh Muhammad?s arrest, Bin Laden and other key
members of al?Qaida sleep less easily at night. Khalid?s arrest is only the
latest in a string, following on the January arrests by Spanish authorities of
more than a dozen terrorists along with a significant weapons cache; and the
February arrests in Italy of more than two dozen al?Qaida ?sleepers.? His arrest
was, in turn, followed by the March 2003 captures of al?Qaida operatives
reported in Kenya. When you add to this the previous progress made in destroying
part of the al?Qaida ?Poisons Network? through arrests in London, Paris, and
Spain, and some of the progress that has been made in the United States (with
arrests in several cities) you see an organization that surely must be feeling
the effects of our combined efforts.
Jemaah Islamiyah ? a terror group closely tied to al?Qaida -- also is under
strain. There has been an unprecedented level of cooperation between the nations
of Southeast Asia in destroying this network. In the past 6 months, Singapore
has rolled up at least 21 JI members; Indonesia has arrested the senior JI
spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, the JI Operations Chief (Mukhlas) and a
senior member (Kasteri); there have been other key arrests in Malaysia,
Thailand, and the Philippines, although a key JI figure ? Hambali ? is still on
the run.
I could go on at length through the other groups that comprise the international
terrorist network. Abu Sayyaf which has several links to al?Qaida, has suffered
some key losses. But though the Armed Forces of the Philippines has mounted a
major operation on Jolo Island, ASG continues to pose a significant threat in
the Philippines, and we are seeing renewed violence from the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the Communist Party?s insurgency ? the New People?s
Army. Similarly, notwithstanding some significant successes by the Uribe
Government in Colombia, the FARC and ELN continue to pose a threat to U.S.
citizens, and are holding 3 DoD government contractors hostage, having already
executed one. We also continue to take efforts against the IMU in Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan, Hekmatyar and his group in Afghanistan, and numerous other
organizations.
Destroying Terrorist Cells
With respect to ?terrorist cadre? ? the footsoldiers and cell members ? more
than 3000 operatives have been captured in over 100 countries by the
international coalition. The United States itself today detains at Guantanamo
Bay nearly 700 enemy combatants including operatives and mid-level planners
encountered on the battlefield. These enemy combatants are being questioned for
information they hold regarding planned future terrorist attacks. The
information they are providing has enabled us to better understand the nature of
the global terrorist network ? how key organizations operate, build cells, move
money and people, and recruit individuals ? and thus how to dismantle these
groups. Based on their information, and that extracted from other sources under
foreign control, the U.S. has been able to disrupt, or cause to fail, more than
a score of planned attacks.
Disrupted Attacks
Failed and/or disrupted terrorist attacks have run the gamut in terms of target
and venue, and scope, ranging from the ?dirty bomb? (radiological dispersion
device) plan against the United States, to plots in Italy, London, France,
Germany, Colombia, Israel, Singapore, Morocco, Russia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Spain, and Turkey ? to name only a few.
As an aside, it also is important for the Committee to know that the United
States, working with a number of key coalition partners, has been able to
disrupt and avert a string of terrorist activities being orchestrated by the
Iraqi Intelligence Service using terror groups as proxies. For instance, in the
Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group publicly announced the financial support it
was getting from Iraq to conduct terror attacks against U.S. nationals. You may
have noticed the large number of Iraqi operatives being evicted or arrested
worldwide. We do not know the extent to which we have stopped Saddam?s
operatives from mounting terror attacks, but we certainly have thwarted some of
their plans.
Ongoing Threat of Terrorism
That said, the United States and its coalition partners have not been able to
prevent key terror attacks. Jeemah Islamiyah?s bombing of the Bali resort killed
more than 200 innocents, including 7 Americans. Despite several seizures of car
bombs by Colombian authorities, the FARC recently executed a bombing against a
club in Bogota, which killed 34 and wounded 150. Similarly, the bombing of the
Synagogue in Tunisia, and the attacks on the hotel in Kenya and the El Al
flight, are examples of operations that we were not able to avert. Moreover,
some groups have adjusted their planning to account for our efforts, and have
?gone small-scale and local?. The assassination of Lawrence Foley, a US AID
employee, is an example; although the Jordanian government recently did catch
two of the terrorists involved in that attack, I am pleased to report. Other
examples include the bombings launched by Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and the
targeting of U.S. Marines by terrorists operating in Kuwait. And, as I said at
the outset, we know that al?Qaida and other groups continue operational planning
for significant terror attacks, and may have some plans nearing the execution
stage.
That brings me to an important point. The war on terror has come at great cost
to the American people, and our losses on September 11th were not the last of
it. Since that time, a number of American patriots have given their lives in
service of the nation. Several U.S. departments and agencies have lost people; I
mentioned Lawrence Foley. The Special Operations Community, in particular, has
lost several of its best and brightest: to date, there have been 137 SOF
wounded, 91 of whom sustained injuries during combat. Thirty eight SOF have been
killed in the course Operation Enduring Freedom and related counter-terror
operations.
The Role of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
For the Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Forces are at the ?tip of
the spear? in waging the war against terrorism. One of the first blows struck in
the war against terrorists was the fight to topple the Taliban and deny al?Qaida
sanctuary in Afghanistan. That effort was waged, on the ground, by less than 500
Special Forces personnel. They mounted an unconventional warfare effort, tied
closely to indigenous forces and linked with the United States Air Force, in a
way that provided for a rapid, decisive, and crushing defeat of the Taliban?s
conventional forces. The operation in Afghanistan was prosecuted by small units
that operated with autonomy in a highly fluid environment. It was won by people
who could meld with friendly Afghan forces, who could and would:
operate without a safety net;
develop such a ******* that they could trust their security to their Afghan
allies;
live without a huge logistics train to provide equipment and supplies;
be able to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in an environment
where civilians and fighters, Taliban and non-Taliban, and ex-Taliban, were all
jumbled together; and
able to engineer combined arms operations between U.S. B-52s and the Northern
Alliance?s Soviet era tanks.
There is a reason that SOF were called upon to lead Operation Enduring Freedom,
and why SOCOM will be called upon to lead future operations to destroy terrorist
networks. The SOF operator is distinguished from other military personnel by his
language capabilities, his extensive overseas experience, his ability to work
closely with indigenous forces and to train them, his ability to blend into the
fabric of the society in which he operates, his independence and maturity, and
an unparalleled degree of training. These Americans truly are one of a kind ?
each one. That is why there are so few of them. They cannot be mass produced.
Nor can their equipment. They are one of the nation?s most scarce and precious
resources, and they should not be employed casually.
But, when we do call on them, as we saw in Afghanistan, and as we have seen time
and again in other military operations ? we know that the interests of the
nation will be well served.
SOF demonstrated their myriad of capabilities during Operation Enduring Freedom
? within Afghanistan and simultaneously throughout the rest of the world. While
Army Special Forces conducted unconventional warfare with the Northern Alliance
to destroy the Taliban?s warfighting capability, other Army and Navy SOF were
conducting special reconnaissance and direct action to destroy Al Qaeda. Army
Rangers demonstrated their strategic reach and prowess in night operations. Air
Force and Army special operations aviators performed their intrepid work under
conditions where investments in specialized training and equipment produced
capabilities unique to SOF. Air Force Special Tactics airmen transformed the
role of SOF by integration of every U.S. Service?s airpower into the operation ?
their unique ability to ?rack and stack? multiple types of aircraft, procedures,
and communications frequencies and to bring precision and ?dumb? ordnance
?danger close? and on target proved crucial to halting and reversing Taliban
offensives throughout the countryside, and to crushing Taliban resistance around
key cities. The result of this combined push by SOF was a Taliban uprooted and
an Al Qaeda on the run.
Other SOF capabilities have assumed a newfound importance. We all have heard the
term ?winning hearts and minds.? SOCOM?s Civil Affairs men and women are
deployed worldwide long before hostilities erupt. They also remain long after
the guns fall silent to help rebuild the instruments of effective governance.
While the bulk of the mission in Afghanistan has now fallen to the conventional
military, the most important part ? winning the peace ? still is in the hands of
the Civil Affairs operators who are working with the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the State Department to rebuild a society torn by
war and frayed by fanaticism. Stability of the Karzai government, promoted
through consistent and measurable improvement in the quality of life for the
Afghan people, is essential to U.S. national security. The work of the
international community, and SOCOM?s Civil Affairs personnel, are crucial to
that effort.
The work of Civil Affairs in Afghanistan also sends an important message to the
Muslim world. Our quarrel is not with Islam. Our fight is with terrorists and
those who support or harbor them. By removing the Taliban, we have made life
livable, once again, for the Afghan people. The same will be true for the people
of Iraq. It already is the case for the southern part of Iraq today, as
humanitarian aid has begun to flow in. That is a message that the Muslim world
needs to hear and understand.
Which brings me to another invaluable part of the Special Operations Community,
the servicemen and women in our Psychological Operations detachments. These
people are spearheading U.S. efforts in a war of words and a battle of ideas.
Their success is fundamental to victory in the war on terrorism. After all, we
can spend endless time and effort chasing terrorist operatives. Unless we can
address the root causes of terrorism, the conflict in which we are now engaged
will never end. On a strategic level, PSYOP programs offset the shrill and
distorted propaganda of our adversaries by offering alternative sources of
information to those denied the basic rights of freedom of speech and
expression. At the tactical level, SOF capabilities to transmit radio
broadcasts, to distribute leaflets and to use loudspeakers provide opportunities
for enemy soldiers to surrender and prevent civilians from getting in harm?s
way.
Now, despite the fact that SOCOM was deeply committed to the Afghanistan
theater, in support of CENTCOM, the Command proved that the United States could
mount other major SOF-run operations concurrent with, and shortly following,
Operation Enduring Freedom. Some of those efforts are ongoing today. Activities
in the Philippines, Colombia, Cote d?Ivoire, and Georgia were a few examples.
Today, with Special Operations Forces heavily committed in Iraq, there
nevertheless are concurrent operations being run in Afghanistan, Yemen and the
Horn of Africa, and SOF advisors scattered throughout numerous other countries
conducting indigenous training and facilitating the flow of tactical information
for host-nation run operations against terrorist groups.
Transforming USSOCOM
That said, we are learning a number of lessons from the war on terrorism.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense has begun a significant ?retooling? of
USSOCOM to enable the Command to lead the war effort in an even more effective
manner. Congress will see that re-engineering effort manifested in the
President?s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request. Perhaps the most profound change is
a shift in expectation by the Department that USSOCOM will no longer serve as
primarily a supporting command, but rather will plan and execute certain key
missions as a supported command.
The change from supporting command to supported command will necessitate some
significant funding changes and the addition of certain types of personnel and
units. Additionally, USSOCOM will look to move certain collateral SOF missions ?
either in part or in full ? to conventional branches of the military in order to
free up special operators for their primary mission ? to wage war against
terrorists.
In the President?s Budget for Fiscal Year 2004 (FY2004), an increase of about 47
percent has been proposed for USSOCOM, totaling approximately $4.5 billion. This
increase includes an additional $391 million for operations and related
expenses, and about $1.1 billion in procurement of critical equipment. These
increases facilitate the addition of 2,563 personnel in critical mission areas.
Military personnel costs which are included in the budgets of the Military
Departments total another $1.2 billion.
Some of the increase in funding will allow SOF to forward deploy into, and
sustain operations in, areas where terrorist networks are operating. Additional
funding also is devoted to investments in critical ?low-density/high-demand?
aviation assets that provide SOF with the mobility necessary to deploy quickly
and to execute their missions quickly, safely and with the necessary low, or
invisible, profile.
Additional funding is requested to fix command and control shortfalls in both
equipment and personnel that could have potentially diminished USSOCOM?s ability
to simultaneously prosecute a variety of expanded missions. The increases will
allow USSOCOM to provide both a strategic planning and operations capability for
missions launched from the United States, and to run operations via the several
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) that are now dual-hatted, with
responsibilities to both the regional combatant commander and to USSOCOM. In
addition, several of the TSOCs will receive additional personnel and equipment
to support the continuing war-level pace of the activity in theater. For
example, we plan to begin forward basing of additional SOF units and mobility
platforms in CENTCOM, including Navy SEAL teams and Army and Air Force SOF
aviation units, although specific basing decisions have not been finalized. In
toto, the TSOCs will receive 232 additional personnel and additional command,
control and communications equipment.
Also, we are allocating funding to sustain equipment that was acquired in the
Fiscal Year 2002 supplemental. Some additional equipment and sustainment costs
associated with transfers of personnel from the service departments to USSOCOM
will also be covered by the increases in funding.
The Equipment
Several critical equipment acquisitions are being put into motion with FY2004
increases. The budget will mitigate a shortage of critical aviation assets,
including through the life extension or modification of existing platforms.
Specifically, USSOCOM will begin modification of 16 additional CH-47s into MH-47Gs,
fund an MH-60 service life extension program which will improve the avionics and
give those airframes another 20 years of life, accelerate the MC-130H aerial
refueling modifications, continue the modification of 4 C-130s into AC-130U
gunships, and weapons kits and ammunition for 10 additional MH-60 Defensive
Armed Penetrators. I will note that the MH-47E has proven a workhorse in
offensive combat operations, but that the handful of available platforms have
taken a beating. More than half of the MH-47 fleet has been destroyed or damaged
at some point, and there is a great deal of ?tired iron? in the USSOCOM
inventory at this stage. When you measure your assets in 1?s and 2?s or even
10?s, as USSOCOM does, the loss of a single system can have far-reaching
effects. Fixing USSOCOM?s mounting aviation problems that are accruing simply
due to the high OPTEMPO of counter-terror operations is a top priority within
this budget. And because we know to expect future loss of systems and platforms,
we have begun planning an attrition reserve for the Command.
There is other additional funding which allow the procurement of new
capabilities. The FY2004 budget begins a long overdue modernization of PSYOP
media production, broadcast and leaflet delivery systems. U.S. PSYOP
capabilities have proven their worth in Afghanistan, and now in Iraq, and we are
going capitalize upon the recent revolution in telecommunications technology by
providing the Command with a research and development program to demonstrate the
utility of technologies such as satellite radio and UAVs for PSYOP messaging.
The People
I mentioned earlier in my testimony the exceptionally high caliber of individual
who serves as a SOF operator. Recruiting, training, and retaining this kind of
person is a constant challenge for the Department of Defense and the Command.
Increases in funding will allow USSOCOM to increase by an additional 2,563
personnel in FY2004 for an end strength of 49,848 personnel. About one-third of
the uniformed personnel are in reserve component units.
In addition to personnel ?adds? for key operational planners in Tampa, and with
various subunified commands (SOCs), additional manpower is applied to existing
units to increase SOF?s responsiveness and provide continuous forward-staged
assets. Many of the additional numbers will support the Army?s aviation crews
who specialize in flying combat troops behind enemy lines. Additionally, more
than 1,200 forces will be forward-deployed operational, support and command and
control elements.
The increases will also allow for the addition of new units, including the
establishment of a unit to coordinate trans-regional PSYOP activities as well as
additional Civil Affairs units (an asset stretched very thin by current
OPTEMPO), support units and an aviation unit. In FY2004, USSOCOM will add a
reserve Civil Affairs battalion, an active Civil Affairs company, an active MH-47
aviation battalion, and an active PSYOP company. In FY2005, USSOCOM plans to add
an active Civil Affairs support company, an active regional PSYOP company, four
reserve regional PSYOP companies, and two special operations support companies.
Recruiting, training and retaining SOF will not be without challenges. Several
initiatives were implemented over the past year to improve the effectiveness of
these efforts. While we continue to track this issue closely, and are
particularly watchful of retention metrics, our analysis to date indicates that
the Command will have the right numbers to sustain the SOF forces the nation
needs. Training instructors and the number of training slots available have
increased for Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP training. A
recruiting initiative was launched in which new Army recruits can sign up for
Special Forces directly, rather than awaiting selection from a conventional
unit. This is an option that has not been possible since 1988. Also, special pay
and bonuses were implemented to improve retention in highly specialized areas
and units.
Possible Transition of SOF Mission Tasks to Non-SOF Forces
Additionally, two other issues need mention: the possible transition of certain
mission tasks traditionally done by SOF to other military forces, and the
evolving operational relationship between USSOCOM and the Marine Corps,.
The question about a possible trade-off between effectiveness in execution of
?core? SOF missions and fulfilling all the responsibilities set out for USSOCOM
in Title 10 is not new. Still, the centrality of SOF in the war on terror, and
USSOCOM?s lead military role, again give that question renewed importance.
Simply put, should SOF be responsible for certain mission tasks during wartime
when other parts of the military can assume those roles?
It is not a question of whether certain tasks are essential for the U.S.
military to undertake and perform to the highest standard, but rather whether
SOF have to perform that mission in all cases. One of the primary purposes of
explicitly outlining the missions of USSOCOM in statue was to ensure that these
particular missions were the responsibility of a single, unified entity.
The combination of a joint environment, and the specialized capabilities that
are hallmarks of SOF, have made USSOCOM an innovator or incubator for new
techniques, missions, organization, and technologies. Over time, as the big
services have grasped the utility of USSOCOM innovations, the entire U.S. force
structure has benefited. Much of what is developed for SOF becomes the norm in
the conventional military as missions and technologies evolve. An example is
Theater Search and Rescue, which is a core competency and a USSOCOM mission, but
one which has been adapted and assumed by many other parts of the military. Air
Combat Command, for example, retains its own theater search and rescue
capability that is fully supported by the Air Force and does not depend on
USSOCOM.
As the process of innovation and dissemination continues, and the missions and
capabilities that were once unique to SOF become evident elsewhere in the
military, it is reasonable to reexamine whether primary responsibility for
certain tasks can be divested. We do not have an answer to this question, yet,
but I assure the Committee that the Office of the Assistant Secretary for SO/LIC
? together with the Command ? is looking at this very hard.
The Marine Corps
The relationship between the Marine Corps and SOF continues to evolve in a very
healthy direction. For the first time in history, USSOCOM and the Marine Corps
have established a construct for joint warfighting. A Marine detachment is in a
one-year proof of concept phase that began last fall. On October 1 of this year,
we expect it will be fully integrated into a Naval Special Warfare Squadron and
serve there on a rotating basis. Additionally, last year, SOF and the Marines
began joint wargaming exercises called ?Expeditionary Warrior,? which focuses on
cooperation (with naval support) in combating terrorism and counter-proliferation
contingencies.
As USSOCOM assumes its role as a supported command in the war on terrorism, and
can draw on all services? assets in a theater of operation, the joint capability
being established between the Marines and SOF will undoubtedly grow. We can
expect that we will realize ways in which such cooperation is possible or even
essential.
In Closing?
We are making progress, and are ?taking the fight? to terrorist organizations
wherever we can find them. SOF are in the vanguard of that effort, having proved
their mettle, and value to the nation, during Operation Enduring Freedom and
numerous other operations. That said, the pace and intensity of our operations
cannot be diminished or relaxed in any way, at any time.
If given any respite, al?Qaida and other groups will rebuild themselves and
strike in ways ever more horrific. Each element of SOF has a role to play in the
sustained campaign against al?Qaida and other terror networks or states, from
deconstruction of terrorist cells to reconstruction of societies in Afghanistan,
and in a future, liberated Iraq.
Although this posture already has stretched and tested the limits of the current
force, the Administration is bringing to bear additional resources, is forging
new partnerships, and may transition some missions to ensure that SOF resources
are not depleted during the global campaign. With that assessment, and with a
request for your support for both the President?s FY04 budget and the
Supplemental ? which is urgently needed by the Command. I am prepared to take
any questions that you might have.
House Armed Services Committee
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
MARSHALL BILLINGSLEA
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ACQUISITION
APRIL 1, 2003
MR. CHAIRMAN, Congressman Meehan, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate your
invitation to testify before the committee to update you on the progress we are
making in prosecuting the war on terrorism, and to describe for you the strategy
we are implementing today, along with the significant implications that strategy
has for the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Special
Operations Forces (SOF).
I do ask your indulgence today. As we are in open session, and I am not well-equipped
to answer any specific questions regarding Iraq, I am going to stay away from
any issues that might have bearing on ongoing operations (although I will try to
provide a little context regarding the role of Special Operations Forces in that
conflict).
The Bottom Line
I will give you the bottom line at the outset. The United States and its allies
have made significant progress in destroying and disrupting key parts of the
international terrorist network with which we are at war. Al?Qaida is an
organization under great stress, with a leadership that seems increasingly less
able to plan multiple large scale attacks because they are focused on the more
immediate problem of evading coalition capture.
USSOCOM has been a key player in that effort, and is working hand-in-glove with
other parts of the U.S. government and with coalition partners. The President?s
FY04 budget initiates a significant transformation of USSOCOM into a supported
combatant command for the war on terrorism, and alleviates a number of the
mounting problems incurred by such a high OPTEMPO for the Command.
However, having given you this assessment of al?Qaida, I hasten to add a key
qualifier: we are certain that we do not know all of the planning that al?Qaida
has already done, and we are concerned that they may have set certain operations
in motion before the most recent chain of events leading to Khalid Shaikh
Muhammad?s capture. Moreover, al?Qaida and affiliated terrorist organizations
have proven capable of regenerating lost parts, and of changing tactics and
techniques to adapt to our offensive efforts.
To put it simply: Al?Qaida and other related terrorist groups today remain
intent on conducting devastating attacks against the United States, our friends
and allies. At least some of their planning seems to contemplate the use of
chemical or biological agents. But as the October 2002 attack using an
explosives-laden dhow against the French oil tanker in Yemen showed, low-tech,
conventional explosives continue to afford terrorists the ability to mount
attacks with devastating consequences.
The Nature of the Enemy
Before I describe for you specific progress that we have made to date, I first
need to explain to the Committee how we perceive the international terrorist
network. Once I have sketched that out for you, you will be able to see how we
are targeting key strands of this network.
Al?Qaida is perhaps best viewed as part of a spider web. At the center of the
web are a number of terrorist groups ? dozens actually, of varying sizes with
varying agendas. Al?Qaida and its proxy groups, such as the IMU in Uzbekistan,
and Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and EIJ in
Egypt, and various Algerian, Chechen and other radical groups. From this core of
the network spread tendrils around the globe. They reach deep into those rogue
states that the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the Secretary of State have
labelled as ?state-sponsors of terrorism? (i.e., Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria,
Sudan, Cuba, and North Korea). The web reaches deeply into the ungoverned and
less-governed zones of the earth, the triborder area in Latin America, parts of
Yemen and Pakistan and Afghanistan, certain of the islands of the Philippines
and Indonesia, parts of Lebanon, Somalia, and other parts of Africa.
The web attaches itself to thousands of points, reaching into foreign
educational systems ? the madrassas. It is woven throughout religious
institutions, where terrorists posing as religious scholars use their mosques to
spot and recruit suicide bombers, or generally use the pulpit to spread hatred
and venom against the United States. It has spread into non-governmental
organizations, and charities, that are used as Trojan Horses to move people and
finances around the world. The tendrils creep into certain banks and the
hawallah system, and into various media outlets. The tendrils are also
interwoven with other transnational ?webs.? There are linkages to weapons
smuggling, and drug running rings, and to proliferation networks.
The web, frustratingly and worrisomely, reaches well into friendly nations.
Nearly every NATO partner has uncovered one or more al?Qaida cells. In fact, the
terrorist network reaches right into our own backyard, into America. As the
President mentioned in the State of the Union address, Buffalo is but one city
that we have discovered to be penetrated by the al?Qaida network.
As you can see, this is a very different type of enemy that threatens the
American people today. The adversaries of the Cold War ? generally speaking ?
had a statist structure with centralized command and control, and a leadership
structure which could be targeted frontally, and linearly. This network has none
of those characteristics.
The spiderweb of loosely-organized terror groups has no single, integrated
command structure. While the leadership of some key organizations can be
eliminated, those organizations do not necessarily cease functioning. We have
seen cells either continue to operate quasi-independently, or begin to
coordinate with other terrorist organizations. Specific terrorist organizations
themselves have flexible lines of control that ? in some cases ? make senior
operational coordinators interchangeable with various cells. By that I mean that
they can supplant one another in event of capture, and persist in execution of
operations. Likewise, these organizations are capable of replacing lost
leadership by nominating operatives and elevating them in stature. Obviously,
key arrests can, and do, disrupt terrorist attacks. But some of the groups in
the international network (and al?Qaida in particular) have proven themselves
exceptionally patient and deliberate. We have seen instances where the planning
for an attack was temporarily suspended after an arrest or death, only to resume
a few months later with new personnel leading the charge.
Bringing to Bear All Elements of National Power
Clearly, when faced with such an adaptive organization, we cannot apply pressure
sporadically or unevenly. It has been necessary for us to engage, quite
literally, in a ?full court press,? bringing to bear all elements of our
national power. Striking at this network has necessitated an unprecedented level
of cooperation among U.S. defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic
agencies. There has been much commentary by those who have followed U.S.
counter-terror efforts over the years regarding the transformation that has
happened within the United States government, and over the strong unity of
purpose that we all have in prosecuting the global war on terrorism. Likewise,
the galvanizing effects of the September 11th attacks, and the subsequent Bali
bombings and other events, have given rise to an unparalleled level of
cooperation on a global scale between the departments and agencies of numerous
foreign governments, acting both in concert with the United States, with one
another, and on their own.
There is truly a global coalition against terrorism. That coalition has had some
stunning successes. I must say at the outset that diplomacy has proven an
essential tool in the war on terrorism, not only in maintaining coalition
cohesion, but in facilitating the direct apprehension of key individuals. Our
colleagues at the Department of State, within Ambassador Cofer Black?s office,
and at embassies around the world, are on the front line in the war on
terrorism. In our estimation, within the Department of Defense, they are doing a
superb job. In particular, I commend to members of the Committee, and to your
staff the recent testimony given by Ambassador Black before the House
International Relations Committee. His testimony provides the diplomatic context
to the Defense Department assessment I am providing you this afternoon.
Denial of Sanctuary
As I noted in my description of the terrorist network, the groups that are today
conspiring to commit mass murder of American and allied citizens operate overtly
out of a handful of terrorist sanctuaries. The United States government is
systematically draining those swamps in a denial of sanctuary campaign.
Afghanistan was the first such territory, post-September 11, that the United
States liberated from the grasp of terrorist organizations. In losing
Afghanistan, al?Qaida lost its ability to continue using the enormous, two-decades-old
infrastructure of paramilitary training camps scattered throughout the country.
Those camps, begun as a largely secular, ad hoc indigenous reaction to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, morphed over the ensuing decades into a
hodge-podge of Islamic-fundamentalist facilities churning out a network of Arab
mujahideen who earned their spurs in the Afghan-Soviet conflict and then
returned to their homes to foment wahhabist insurrection in their native lands.
The more extremist elements of that mujahideen network can be found scattered
throughout the international terrorist network, though obviously some mujahideen
did not ever, and do not today, subscribe to the wild fanaticism of a Bin Laden,
or to his terrorist tactics.
The loss of those camps had an immediate and obvious impact on al?Qaida. Gone
were the training facilities, and the chemical and biological research
laboratories they had created, along with some of the equipment they had
procured. The leadership now is scattered, and trustworthy communications are
much harder to have. But the loss of Afghanistan has had a deeper, intangible
effect on terrorist organizations that is hard to describe. There no longer is
an equivalent place where aspiring young terrorists can go to demonstrate their
commitment to fundamentalist extremism, and to receive a rigorous physical and
operational regimen. The camps of Afghanistan had a deep, unifying psychological
effect on the international terrorist network, as operatives trained in the same
camp claim a bond of ?kinship? and unity of purpose that cannot be easily
replicated when those camps have been destroyed.
Of course, al?Qaida and other terrorist groups continue to find sanctuary in
other countries, and are seeking to set up new camps. Iraq is one such place. We
are now in the process of denying al?Qaida and other terrorist groups sanctuary
there. At a very early phase of the campaign in Iraq, the United States struck
multiple terrorist training facilities and encampments in Iraq. The facilities,
run by an extremist Kurdish organization called Ansar al?Islam, had become over
the past year and a half, safe-haven to several al?Qaida operatives and home to
part of al?Qaida?s chemical warfare program. In the months prior to Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Ansar camps had grown with foreign fighters seeking an
opportunity to conduct terror attacks against the United States. It is difficult
to say, at this stage, how much damage has been inflicted on Ansar al?Islam and
al?Qaida. In total, we believe there to be more than a dozen terrorist groups
operating from sanctuaries in Iraq. Our goal is to eradicate their presence from
this country.
Finally, al?Qaida and other key terrorist organizations operate in the
ungoverned areas of the earth, in between the seams of civilizations and
governance. And we are striking at those terrorist concentrations when and where
we find them.
Degrading Terrorist Finances
Denial of sanctuary is but one aspect of the campaign. Degrading terrorist
finances also is crucial. Degradation of finances translates into a degradation
in operational capability. For instance, without funds, terrorists cannot move
around as easily or as quickly. Weaponry on the black and grey markets,
especially explosives, still takes a fair amount of cash, and there are always
living expenses and other costs that have to be defrayed. The Secretary of
State, working with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, and with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities, has taken steps to freeze the assets
of, block travel by, and criminalize relationships with, 36 different foreign
terrorist organizations. Sixty entities have been listed under Executive Order
13224, and 48 groups have been designated pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act. These
legal tools, taken in conjunction with a number of international legal
instruments, provide a critical basis for working with the global financial
community to block assets, and to expose and dismantle terrorist-run or
terrorist-penetrated non-governmental organizations, charities, and banks.
That said, it does take a great deal of money to conduct terrorist operations.
Tens of thousands of dollars, not even hundreds of thousands, are often all it
takes to spin up a cell to commence operational planning. That is why the
freezing of more than $100 million in terrorist finances is so significant.
Equally important, we have been able to identify several key terrorist
financiers, and take steps against them. The al?Qaida financier, Hawsawi, has
been captured, as have some key couriers and al?Qaida ?bag men.? Further, some
parts of al?Qaida?s Southeast Asian network of front companies, NGOs, and bank
accounts have been rolled up. The United States continues to track the
activities of other key financiers in the Middle East, and are pressing key
coalition members to take greater steps to curtail their activities.
Disrupting Terrorist Leadership
The United States and coalition partners also have made progress in
systematically reducing terrorist rank and file, and in capturing or killing
terrorist leadership and senior operational planners. Since September, 2001,
more than 55 terrorist leaders and planners have been captured or killed. In the
past six months alone, there have been more than 30 arrests and seizures in 20
different countries, not counting ongoing U.S. military operations in various
countries.
Two prominent al?Qaida, Muhammad Atef and Abu Ali al-Harithi, have been killed.
Several other prominent operatives, such as al-Nashri, Abu Zubayda, Ramzi bin
al?Shibh, al-Libi, and al-Jazairi are in custody. And, of course, the terrorist
we believe was the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh
Muhammad, is now under coalition control.
I suspect, that with Khalid Shaikh Muhammad?s arrest, Bin Laden and other key
members of al?Qaida sleep less easily at night. Khalid?s arrest is only the
latest in a string, following on the January arrests by Spanish authorities of
more than a dozen terrorists along with a significant weapons cache; and the
February arrests in Italy of more than two dozen al?Qaida ?sleepers.? His arrest
was, in turn, followed by the March 2003 captures of al?Qaida operatives
reported in Kenya. When you add to this the previous progress made in destroying
part of the al?Qaida ?Poisons Network? through arrests in London, Paris, and
Spain, and some of the progress that has been made in the United States (with
arrests in several cities) you see an organization that surely must be feeling
the effects of our combined efforts.
Jemaah Islamiyah ? a terror group closely tied to al?Qaida -- also is under
strain. There has been an unprecedented level of cooperation between the nations
of Southeast Asia in destroying this network. In the past 6 months, Singapore
has rolled up at least 21 JI members; Indonesia has arrested the senior JI
spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, the JI Operations Chief (Mukhlas) and a
senior member (Kasteri); there have been other key arrests in Malaysia,
Thailand, and the Philippines, although a key JI figure ? Hambali ? is still on
the run.
I could go on at length through the other groups that comprise the international
terrorist network. Abu Sayyaf which has several links to al?Qaida, has suffered
some key losses. But though the Armed Forces of the Philippines has mounted a
major operation on Jolo Island, ASG continues to pose a significant threat in
the Philippines, and we are seeing renewed violence from the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the Communist Party?s insurgency ? the New People?s
Army. Similarly, notwithstanding some significant successes by the Uribe
Government in Colombia, the FARC and ELN continue to pose a threat to U.S.
citizens, and are holding 3 DoD government contractors hostage, having already
executed one. We also continue to take efforts against the IMU in Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan, Hekmatyar and his group in Afghanistan, and numerous other
organizations.
Destroying Terrorist Cells
With respect to ?terrorist cadre? ? the footsoldiers and cell members ? more
than 3000 operatives have been captured in over 100 countries by the
international coalition. The United States itself today detains at Guantanamo
Bay nearly 700 enemy combatants including operatives and mid-level planners
encountered on the battlefield. These enemy combatants are being questioned for
information they hold regarding planned future terrorist attacks. The
information they are providing has enabled us to better understand the nature of
the global terrorist network ? how key organizations operate, build cells, move
money and people, and recruit individuals ? and thus how to dismantle these
groups. Based on their information, and that extracted from other sources under
foreign control, the U.S. has been able to disrupt, or cause to fail, more than
a score of planned attacks.
Disrupted Attacks
Failed and/or disrupted terrorist attacks have run the gamut in terms of target
and venue, and scope, ranging from the ?dirty bomb? (radiological dispersion
device) plan against the United States, to plots in Italy, London, France,
Germany, Colombia, Israel, Singapore, Morocco, Russia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Spain, and Turkey ? to name only a few.
As an aside, it also is important for the Committee to know that the United
States, working with a number of key coalition partners, has been able to
disrupt and avert a string of terrorist activities being orchestrated by the
Iraqi Intelligence Service using terror groups as proxies. For instance, in the
Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group publicly announced the financial support it
was getting from Iraq to conduct terror attacks against U.S. nationals. You may
have noticed the large number of Iraqi operatives being evicted or arrested
worldwide. We do not know the extent to which we have stopped Saddam?s
operatives from mounting terror attacks, but we certainly have thwarted some of
their plans.
Ongoing Threat of Terrorism
That said, the United States and its coalition partners have not been able to
prevent key terror attacks. Jeemah Islamiyah?s bombing of the Bali resort killed
more than 200 innocents, including 7 Americans. Despite several seizures of car
bombs by Colombian authorities, the FARC recently executed a bombing against a
club in Bogota, which killed 34 and wounded 150. Similarly, the bombing of the
Synagogue in Tunisia, and the attacks on the hotel in Kenya and the El Al
flight, are examples of operations that we were not able to avert. Moreover,
some groups have adjusted their planning to account for our efforts, and have
?gone small-scale and local?. The assassination of Lawrence Foley, a US AID
employee, is an example; although the Jordanian government recently did catch
two of the terrorists involved in that attack, I am pleased to report. Other
examples include the bombings launched by Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and the
targeting of U.S. Marines by terrorists operating in Kuwait. And, as I said at
the outset, we know that al?Qaida and other groups continue operational planning
for significant terror attacks, and may have some plans nearing the execution
stage.
That brings me to an important point. The war on terror has come at great cost
to the American people, and our losses on September 11th were not the last of
it. Since that time, a number of American patriots have given their lives in
service of the nation. Several U.S. departments and agencies have lost people; I
mentioned Lawrence Foley. The Special Operations Community, in particular, has
lost several of its best and brightest: to date, there have been 137 SOF
wounded, 91 of whom sustained injuries during combat. Thirty eight SOF have been
killed in the course Operation Enduring Freedom and related counter-terror
operations.
The Role of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
For the Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Forces are at the ?tip of
the spear? in waging the war against terrorism. One of the first blows struck in
the war against terrorists was the fight to topple the Taliban and deny al?Qaida
sanctuary in Afghanistan. That effort was waged, on the ground, by less than 500
Special Forces personnel. They mounted an unconventional warfare effort, tied
closely to indigenous forces and linked with the United States Air Force, in a
way that provided for a rapid, decisive, and crushing defeat of the Taliban?s
conventional forces. The operation in Afghanistan was prosecuted by small units
that operated with autonomy in a highly fluid environment. It was won by people
who could meld with friendly Afghan forces, who could and would:
operate without a safety net;
develop such a ******* that they could trust their security to their Afghan
allies;
live without a huge logistics train to provide equipment and supplies;
be able to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in an environment
where civilians and fighters, Taliban and non-Taliban, and ex-Taliban, were all
jumbled together; and
able to engineer combined arms operations between U.S. B-52s and the Northern
Alliance?s Soviet era tanks.
There is a reason that SOF were called upon to lead Operation Enduring Freedom,
and why SOCOM will be called upon to lead future operations to destroy terrorist
networks. The SOF operator is distinguished from other military personnel by his
language capabilities, his extensive overseas experience, his ability to work
closely with indigenous forces and to train them, his ability to blend into the
fabric of the society in which he operates, his independence and maturity, and
an unparalleled degree of training. These Americans truly are one of a kind ?
each one. That is why there are so few of them. They cannot be mass produced.
Nor can their equipment. They are one of the nation?s most scarce and precious
resources, and they should not be employed casually.
But, when we do call on them, as we saw in Afghanistan, and as we have seen time
and again in other military operations ? we know that the interests of the
nation will be well served.
SOF demonstrated their myriad of capabilities during Operation Enduring Freedom
? within Afghanistan and simultaneously throughout the rest of the world. While
Army Special Forces conducted unconventional warfare with the Northern Alliance
to destroy the Taliban?s warfighting capability, other Army and Navy SOF were
conducting special reconnaissance and direct action to destroy Al Qaeda. Army
Rangers demonstrated their strategic reach and prowess in night operations. Air
Force and Army special operations aviators performed their intrepid work under
conditions where investments in specialized training and equipment produced
capabilities unique to SOF. Air Force Special Tactics airmen transformed the
role of SOF by integration of every U.S. Service?s airpower into the operation ?
their unique ability to ?rack and stack? multiple types of aircraft, procedures,
and communications frequencies and to bring precision and ?dumb? ordnance
?danger close? and on target proved crucial to halting and reversing Taliban
offensives throughout the countryside, and to crushing Taliban resistance around
key cities. The result of this combined push by SOF was a Taliban uprooted and
an Al Qaeda on the run.
Other SOF capabilities have assumed a newfound importance. We all have heard the
term ?winning hearts and minds.? SOCOM?s Civil Affairs men and women are
deployed worldwide long before hostilities erupt. They also remain long after
the guns fall silent to help rebuild the instruments of effective governance.
While the bulk of the mission in Afghanistan has now fallen to the conventional
military, the most important part ? winning the peace ? still is in the hands of
the Civil Affairs operators who are working with the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the State Department to rebuild a society torn by
war and frayed by fanaticism. Stability of the Karzai government, promoted
through consistent and measurable improvement in the quality of life for the
Afghan people, is essential to U.S. national security. The work of the
international community, and SOCOM?s Civil Affairs personnel, are crucial to
that effort.
The work of Civil Affairs in Afghanistan also sends an important message to the
Muslim world. Our quarrel is not with Islam. Our fight is with terrorists and
those who support or harbor them. By removing the Taliban, we have made life
livable, once again, for the Afghan people. The same will be true for the people
of Iraq. It already is the case for the southern part of Iraq today, as
humanitarian aid has begun to flow in. That is a message that the Muslim world
needs to hear and understand.
Which brings me to another invaluable part of the Special Operations Community,
the servicemen and women in our Psychological Operations detachments. These
people are spearheading U.S. efforts in a war of words and a battle of ideas.
Their success is fundamental to victory in the war on terrorism. After all, we
can spend endless time and effort chasing terrorist operatives. Unless we can
address the root causes of terrorism, the conflict in which we are now engaged
will never end. On a strategic level, PSYOP programs offset the shrill and
distorted propaganda of our adversaries by offering alternative sources of
information to those denied the basic rights of freedom of speech and
expression. At the tactical level, SOF capabilities to transmit radio
broadcasts, to distribute leaflets and to use loudspeakers provide opportunities
for enemy soldiers to surrender and prevent civilians from getting in harm?s
way.
Now, despite the fact that SOCOM was deeply committed to the Afghanistan
theater, in support of CENTCOM, the Command proved that the United States could
mount other major SOF-run operations concurrent with, and shortly following,
Operation Enduring Freedom. Some of those efforts are ongoing today. Activities
in the Philippines, Colombia, Cote d?Ivoire, and Georgia were a few examples.
Today, with Special Operations Forces heavily committed in Iraq, there
nevertheless are concurrent operations being run in Afghanistan, Yemen and the
Horn of Africa, and SOF advisors scattered throughout numerous other countries
conducting indigenous training and facilitating the flow of tactical information
for host-nation run operations against terrorist groups.
Transforming USSOCOM
That said, we are learning a number of lessons from the war on terrorism.
Accordingly, the Department of Defense has begun a significant ?retooling? of
USSOCOM to enable the Command to lead the war effort in an even more effective
manner. Congress will see that re-engineering effort manifested in the
President?s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request. Perhaps the most profound change is
a shift in expectation by the Department that USSOCOM will no longer serve as
primarily a supporting command, but rather will plan and execute certain key
missions as a supported command.
The change from supporting command to supported command will necessitate some
significant funding changes and the addition of certain types of personnel and
units. Additionally, USSOCOM will look to move certain collateral SOF missions ?
either in part or in full ? to conventional branches of the military in order to
free up special operators for their primary mission ? to wage war against
terrorists.
In the President?s Budget for Fiscal Year 2004 (FY2004), an increase of about 47
percent has been proposed for USSOCOM, totaling approximately $4.5 billion. This
increase includes an additional $391 million for operations and related
expenses, and about $1.1 billion in procurement of critical equipment. These
increases facilitate the addition of 2,563 personnel in critical mission areas.
Military personnel costs which are included in the budgets of the Military
Departments total another $1.2 billion.
Some of the increase in funding will allow SOF to forward deploy into, and
sustain operations in, areas where terrorist networks are operating. Additional
funding also is devoted to investments in critical ?low-density/high-demand?
aviation assets that provide SOF with the mobility necessary to deploy quickly
and to execute their missions quickly, safely and with the necessary low, or
invisible, profile.
Additional funding is requested to fix command and control shortfalls in both
equipment and personnel that could have potentially diminished USSOCOM?s ability
to simultaneously prosecute a variety of expanded missions. The increases will
allow USSOCOM to provide both a strategic planning and operations capability for
missions launched from the United States, and to run operations via the several
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) that are now dual-hatted, with
responsibilities to both the regional combatant commander and to USSOCOM. In
addition, several of the TSOCs will receive additional personnel and equipment
to support the continuing war-level pace of the activity in theater. For
example, we plan to begin forward basing of additional SOF units and mobility
platforms in CENTCOM, including Navy SEAL teams and Army and Air Force SOF
aviation units, although specific basing decisions have not been finalized. In
toto, the TSOCs will receive 232 additional personnel and additional command,
control and communications equipment.
Also, we are allocating funding to sustain equipment that was acquired in the
Fiscal Year 2002 supplemental. Some additional equipment and sustainment costs
associated with transfers of personnel from the service departments to USSOCOM
will also be covered by the increases in funding.
The Equipment
Several critical equipment acquisitions are being put into motion with FY2004
increases. The budget will mitigate a shortage of critical aviation assets,
including through the life extension or modification of existing platforms.
Specifically, USSOCOM will begin modification of 16 additional CH-47s into MH-47Gs,
fund an MH-60 service life extension program which will improve the avionics and
give those airframes another 20 years of life, accelerate the MC-130H aerial
refueling modifications, continue the modification of 4 C-130s into AC-130U
gunships, and weapons kits and ammunition for 10 additional MH-60 Defensive
Armed Penetrators. I will note that the MH-47E has proven a workhorse in
offensive combat operations, but that the handful of available platforms have
taken a beating. More than half of the MH-47 fleet has been destroyed or damaged
at some point, and there is a great deal of ?tired iron? in the USSOCOM
inventory at this stage. When you measure your assets in 1?s and 2?s or even
10?s, as USSOCOM does, the loss of a single system can have far-reaching
effects. Fixing USSOCOM?s mounting aviation problems that are accruing simply
due to the high OPTEMPO of counter-terror operations is a top priority within
this budget. And because we know to expect future loss of systems and platforms,
we have begun planning an attrition reserve for the Command.
There is other additional funding which allow the procurement of new
capabilities. The FY2004 budget begins a long overdue modernization of PSYOP
media production, broadcast and leaflet delivery systems. U.S. PSYOP
capabilities have proven their worth in Afghanistan, and now in Iraq, and we are
going capitalize upon the recent revolution in telecommunications technology by
providing the Command with a research and development program to demonstrate the
utility of technologies such as satellite radio and UAVs for PSYOP messaging.
The People
I mentioned earlier in my testimony the exceptionally high caliber of individual
who serves as a SOF operator. Recruiting, training, and retaining this kind of
person is a constant challenge for the Department of Defense and the Command.
Increases in funding will allow USSOCOM to increase by an additional 2,563
personnel in FY2004 for an end strength of 49,848 personnel. About one-third of
the uniformed personnel are in reserve component units.
In addition to personnel ?adds? for key operational planners in Tampa, and with
various subunified commands (SOCs), additional manpower is applied to existing
units to increase SOF?s responsiveness and provide continuous forward-staged
assets. Many of the additional numbers will support the Army?s aviation crews
who specialize in flying combat troops behind enemy lines. Additionally, more
than 1,200 forces will be forward-deployed operational, support and command and
control elements.
The increases will also allow for the addition of new units, including the
establishment of a unit to coordinate trans-regional PSYOP activities as well as
additional Civil Affairs units (an asset stretched very thin by current
OPTEMPO), support units and an aviation unit. In FY2004, USSOCOM will add a
reserve Civil Affairs battalion, an active Civil Affairs company, an active MH-47
aviation battalion, and an active PSYOP company. In FY2005, USSOCOM plans to add
an active Civil Affairs support company, an active regional PSYOP company, four
reserve regional PSYOP companies, and two special operations support companies.
Recruiting, training and retaining SOF will not be without challenges. Several
initiatives were implemented over the past year to improve the effectiveness of
these efforts. While we continue to track this issue closely, and are
particularly watchful of retention metrics, our analysis to date indicates that
the Command will have the right numbers to sustain the SOF forces the nation
needs. Training instructors and the number of training slots available have
increased for Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP training. A
recruiting initiative was launched in which new Army recruits can sign up for
Special Forces directly, rather than awaiting selection from a conventional
unit. This is an option that has not been possible since 1988. Also, special pay
and bonuses were implemented to improve retention in highly specialized areas
and units.
Possible Transition of SOF Mission Tasks to Non-SOF Forces
Additionally, two other issues need mention: the possible transition of certain
mission tasks traditionally done by SOF to other military forces, and the
evolving operational relationship between USSOCOM and the Marine Corps,.
The question about a possible trade-off between effectiveness in execution of
?core? SOF missions and fulfilling all the responsibilities set out for USSOCOM
in Title 10 is not new. Still, the centrality of SOF in the war on terror, and
USSOCOM?s lead military role, again give that question renewed importance.
Simply put, should SOF be responsible for certain mission tasks during wartime
when other parts of the military can assume those roles?
It is not a question of whether certain tasks are essential for the U.S.
military to undertake and perform to the highest standard, but rather whether
SOF have to perform that mission in all cases. One of the primary purposes of
explicitly outlining the missions of USSOCOM in statue was to ensure that these
particular missions were the responsibility of a single, unified entity.
The combination of a joint environment, and the specialized capabilities that
are hallmarks of SOF, have made USSOCOM an innovator or incubator for new
techniques, missions, organization, and technologies. Over time, as the big
services have grasped the utility of USSOCOM innovations, the entire U.S. force
structure has benefited. Much of what is developed for SOF becomes the norm in
the conventional military as missions and technologies evolve. An example is
Theater Search and Rescue, which is a core competency and a USSOCOM mission, but
one which has been adapted and assumed by many other parts of the military. Air
Combat Command, for example, retains its own theater search and rescue
capability that is fully supported by the Air Force and does not depend on
USSOCOM.
As the process of innovation and dissemination continues, and the missions and
capabilities that were once unique to SOF become evident elsewhere in the
military, it is reasonable to reexamine whether primary responsibility for
certain tasks can be divested. We do not have an answer to this question, yet,
but I assure the Committee that the Office of the Assistant Secretary for SO/LIC
? together with the Command ? is looking at this very hard.
The Marine Corps
The relationship between the Marine Corps and SOF continues to evolve in a very
healthy direction. For the first time in history, USSOCOM and the Marine Corps
have established a construct for joint warfighting. A Marine detachment is in a
one-year proof of concept phase that began last fall. On October 1 of this year,
we expect it will be fully integrated into a Naval Special Warfare Squadron and
serve there on a rotating basis. Additionally, last year, SOF and the Marines
began joint wargaming exercises called ?Expeditionary Warrior,? which focuses on
cooperation (with naval support) in combating terrorism and counter-proliferation
contingencies.
As USSOCOM assumes its role as a supported command in the war on terrorism, and
can draw on all services? assets in a theater of operation, the joint capability
being established between the Marines and SOF will undoubtedly grow. We can
expect that we will realize ways in which such cooperation is possible or even
essential.
In Closing?
We are making progress, and are ?taking the fight? to terrorist organizations
wherever we can find them. SOF are in the vanguard of that effort, having proved
their mettle, and value to the nation, during Operation Enduring Freedom and
numerous other operations. That said, the pace and intensity of our operations
cannot be diminished or relaxed in any way, at any time.
If given any respite, al?Qaida and other groups will rebuild themselves and
strike in ways ever more horrific. Each element of SOF has a role to play in the
sustained campaign against al?Qaida and other terror networks or states, from
deconstruction of terrorist cells to reconstruction of societies in Afghanistan,
and in a future, liberated Iraq.
Although this posture already has stretched and tested the limits of the current
force, the Administration is bringing to bear additional resources, is forging
new partnerships, and may transition some missions to ensure that SOF resources
are not depleted during the global campaign. With that assessment, and with a
request for your support for both the President?s FY04 budget and the
Supplemental ? which is urgently needed by the Command. I am prepared to take
any questions that you might have.
House Armed Services Committee
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515