The 2030 Warfighter Initiative

[Gene2]

By now, a lot of you probably know about the Future Force Warrior and Future Warrior Concept Program(s). Well, it looks like the Natick Soldier Center has looked even farther into the future (or postponed the program again). Kind of cool:

http://fs2030i.natick.army.mil/index.htm

http://www.army.mil/-images/2008/12/02/26425/army.mil-26425-2008-12-03-081215.jpg

http://www.defensenews.com/blogs/ausa/files/2009/02/dsc00516-225x300.jpg

http://fs2030i.natick.army.mil/docs/FS2030I_WhitePaper_Feb09.pdf

[SilentType]

So basically we're going to look like storm troopers from Star Wars?

Is it me or does it look like he's wearing ski boots?

[Britboy]

IMHO its pointless planning that far ahead anyway. Thats 21 years away. 21 years ago, 1988, who thought we'd be fighting the wars we are fighting today, and who'd have thought we'd be doing it the way we are with the kit we have? Anyone in 1988 seriously foresee battlefield internet-enabled network centric warfare, or for that matter, properly bulletproof body armour for every man?

By the time that 2030 rolls around and all the technology has changed umpteen times, I'm willing to bet the vision of this project now will be obsolescent. Better to roll with it evolutionary than get overtaken trying to be revolutionary, no?

Also, do we really think that dressing up in motorbike helmets with ACU-painted gats is going to be the silver bullet to all our future woes? Surely we should be working more on military doctrine, national security concept and foreign policy more than trying to look cool at industry shows and failing...

[Alpha-17]

You'd think that Natick would focus on constantly updating our gear, or at least reaching the goals they've already set, then keep putting in place a future date? C'mon, don't develop a program for years with a date of implementation, only to cancel the whole thing a couple of years early.

[crazyman]

just look back at some of our old "future" plans and you'll see one heck of a waste of money if you ask me. I'd say anything beyond 5-10 years out (FCS, land warrior) is a bit silly. I dont see the point of planning for technology that doesnt exist. Rather, I'm a fan of how FCS went...optimization of existing technologies. I agree with the various people who have said we should worry about next year, not two decades out. We have literally hundreds of projects that could use the money...JLTV, FCS, all the various stuff on PEO-soldier

[Polygon]

It'll be just like Battlefield 2142...Enemy walker spotted!

[szr]

Surely we should be working more on military doctrine, national security concept and foreign policy more than trying to look cool at industry shows and failing...Roger that. Let's just send all those engineers at Natick back to school so they can all get degrees in something really useful like political science!

Or not.

You miss the point. They're not designing the "loadout" (haha) for 2030. Essentially these programs are giant sandboxes to experiment in, and the theme of this particular sandbox is 'technologies and capabilities we'd like to have in the next 15-20 years'.

Technologies they never thought of when the program started will emerge, be incorporated and become cornerstones of future development. Technologies that initially might have been central to the program will fall away because doctrine changed, priorities changed, funding changed or they just realised 'that's actually a really dumb idea'. And some technologies will be such obvious winners, and will mature fast enough that they'll be fast-tracked into service long before 2030.


As for the goofy costumes, that's just what happens when you put nerdy, cosplay-loving engineers and dog & pony show-loving career officers on the same team. p-)

Now please say a prayer, tonight, for the poor E-4-6 who has to wear that thing in public.

Attendee: What are those?

Soldier: These are Joint Tactical Lightweight Networked Modular Objective Force Precision Standoff Munitions.

Attendee: Look like nerf darts to me...

[deagle]

lets either make cyborgs or terminators.

[MichaelF]

So basically we're going to look like storm troopers from Star Wars?

If we're lucky.

[James]

IMHO its pointless planning that far ahead anyway. Thats 21 years away. 21 years ago, 1988, who thought we'd be fighting the wars we are fighting today, and who'd have thought we'd be doing it the way we are with the kit we have? Anyone in 1988 seriously foresee battlefield internet-enabled network centric warfare, or for that matter, properly bulletproof body armour for every man?

Saying we shouldn't plan is naive and simplistic. If we're not actively engaged in a war, do you think our military should not bother to train either? Besides, all Natick does is design and test gear. Speaking of body armor, there were early plate hangers and groin protectors way back then that were meant to augment the PASGT vest and perform in a similar fashion to our soft armor+plates combos today.


By the time that 2030 rolls around and all the technology has changed umpteen times, I'm willing to bet the vision of this project now will be obsolescent. Better to roll with it evolutionary than get overtaken trying to be revolutionary, no?

It most certainly will be obsolescent. Natick is no stranger to dropping programs that aren't working out; XM-29, the Future Force Warrior (or whatever it was called) from a decade ago, with all the optics on an M4 that ran to a computer in your gear to a HUD attached to your helmet. A lot of what they do is to prove a concept, then see how that concept works for the end user. I'd argue that they are both revolutionary and evolutionary.


Also, do we really think that dressing up in motorbike helmets with ACU-painted gats is going to be the silver bullet to all our future woes? Surely we should be working more on military doctrine, national security concept and foreign policy more than trying to look cool at industry shows and failing...

The only reason they used that pattern is because it's modern. In the past, they've used the multicam. In 20 years that shifting chameleon camouflage will probably be in service.

Natick develops gear for the U.S. Military. That's all they do. They have nothing whatsoever to do with doctrine, setting national security policies, or foreign policy. That is set by TRADOC, the President and National Security Council, and the State Department.

[T for Tetrapod]

2030 huh. That seems to be planning way the **** ahead of time. IMO it would be wise to invest in practical programs that will be useful for now and the near future...thats my 2 cents of armchair strategy.

[Victory]

www.inventortroy.com (http://www.inventortroy.com)

'Nuff said.

:-P

-Vic

[T for Tetrapod]

^^^ haha nice

Dr. Manhattan would work well too.

[James]

2030 huh. That seems to be planning way the **** ahead of time. IMO it would be wise to invest in practical programs that will be useful for now and the near future...thats my 2 cents of armchair strategy.

$.02 is about right...

The USAF made the initial RFP for replacement of the F-15 in 1986. They chose the YF-22 in 1991 after testing it against the YF-23. The first production line F-22s became active in squadrons in 2005. 19 Years.

The JSF was conceived in 1993. We now have flying prototypes, but this AC has yet to be mass produced and deployed, and we are 16 years into the program.

The B-2 was conceived in 1979, but didn't fly until 1989, and didn't enter active service until 1997. 18 years.

This is just one program that Natick is working on also. How many changes in body armor and load bearing equipment have we seen in the past five years? Even uniforms? Natick does more than one thing, and the article posted by the OP was about a single program, not Natick in general. I for one think it's great that we plan so far ahead. Most other militaries around the world do exactly what most of the posters in this thread are suggesting - plan ahead for 5 years. Then, when they're at war with America, they get crushed before they even know what's happened because we are so far ahead of them in terms of technology and ability. Ironically, it is in many ways more difficult for us now to fight low tech enemies like the Taliban. Anyway, the whole point, which it seems almost everyone is missing, is not only to be a generation ahead of everyone now, but in 20 or 25 years.

[Britboy]

My point is, whilst buying aircraft ships and tanks is a long term thing, it doesnt take decades to buy that body armour or such. In fact purchases such as that are often made in double-quick time due to political pressure to protect troops - Osprey body armour and the MRAPs for example were not 20yr projects but benefitted from taking what was available and fielding it quickly. Now if this project is a testing ground for possible future technologies, fair enough, but isn't that what universities have traditionally researched?

As for the foreign policy vs equipment development argument, I think James hints at the same sentiment I have when he talks of difficulty dealing with low-tech enemies like the Taliban. It could be argued that the contemporary campaigns are trying to apply a military solution to a political problem. Now in a military geared up for high-tech war like the US's is, there could be a danger of technology and further equipment being seen as some sort of panacea, which is not the case when dealing with sub-state actors as we are now.

Of course I desire for us to have the right tools for the job, and damn right I believe in protecting our lads the best we can, but sometimes it gets to me that there have been so many incarnations and developments in what are really the small things - such as uniform and the minor details of weapons for example - when the big things, like actually having a coherent grand strategy for Afghanistan, have been conspicuous by their absence, despite having since 2001 to get to grips with that.

The military, as an instrument, needs to be kept the best one we can make it, but to what end is that, if they are applied in the wrong way, or for the wrong purpose altogether? I would rather have a regular tool applied intelligently (I refer to at the political level now I hasten to add) than the sharpest tool in the box applied carelessly.

Put it this way, the blokes at Natick are obviously trying to squeeze an extra ounce of capability for your/our guys wherever they can, by optimising even the minutest details. Is that effort being matched elsewhere, in arguably more crucial policy areas?

I hope you see this post for what it is, my genuine concern, rather than as some sort of flamebait. I would not be in the armed forces if I just wanted to have a pop at how they are used, of course not - I just hope the effort and cost, both human and material, are working towards something constructive in a coherent way.

Regards
BB

[T for Tetrapod]

$.02 is about right...

The USAF made the initial RFP for replacement of the F-15 in 1986. They chose the YF-22 in 1991 after testing it against the YF-23. The first production line F-22s became active in squadrons in 2005. 19 Years.

The JSF was conceived in 1993. We now have flying prototypes, but this AC has yet to be mass produced and deployed, and we are 16 years into the program.

The B-2 was conceived in 1979, but didn't fly until 1989, and didn't enter active service until 1997. 18 years.

This is just one program that Natick is working on also. How many changes in body armor and load bearing equipment have we seen in the past five years? Even uniforms? Natick does more than one thing, and the article posted by the OP was about a single program, not Natick in general. I for one think it's great that we plan so far ahead. Most other militaries around the world do exactly what most of the posters in this thread are suggesting - plan ahead for 5 years. Then, when they're at war with America, they get crushed before they even know what's happened because we are so far ahead of them in terms of technology and ability. Ironically, it is in many ways more difficult for us now to fight low tech enemies like the Taliban. Anyway, the whole point, which it seems almost everyone is missing, is not only to be a generation ahead of everyone now, but in 20 or 25 years.

Like I said, I'm an armchair strategist (and I didn't put much thought into my post when I wrote it) and I see your point.

[MichaelF]

2030 huh. That seems to be planning way the **** ahead of time. IMO it would be wise to invest in practical programs that will be useful for now and the near future...thats my 2 cents of armchair strategy.

You don't really know much about either PEO-Soldier or Natick, do you?

This is an overarching project. The gear doesn't materialize at midnight EST, December 31 2029. The majority of it will be spiraled out to the Field in the 'teens. The most advanced stuff will be spiraled whenever it's ready. Most likely, it will change (evolve) several times, as items become OBE or turn out to be unsuitable, and new stuff pops up.

In the meantime, Natick (and PEO-Soldier) are responsible for everything from MRE menus to uniforms.

[MichaelF]

My point is, whilst buying aircraft ships and tanks is a long term thing, it doesnt take decades to buy that body armour or such.

Shall I get you some M5 Fiber, a little Magnetorheological Fluid, a battery pack, PZ sensor, and a sewing machine? It takes decades to come up with breakthroughs in materials science. The cutting edge personal armor used right now is based on science done in the 1970's, as the PASGT before it was based on kevlar technologies developed in the 1950's.

Natick is charged to develop systems across the chronological spectrum. Both the stuff that can fly out to the field in ten days AND the stuff that is only on the drawing board.

If it's only on the drawing board, it's not going to be aquired any time soon. OTOH, a lot of it is beyond the research capacities of the Academic system (they tend to do single-item contracts that consist of fundamental modelling and theory, not system development). That's where Natick comes in.

More importantly, if Natick doesn't start fundamental R&D now, none of this stuff is going to exist in 2030. Most of it is without a civilian analogue.

TBH, the "they are working on lazer gunz, but have no Grand Strategy" argument is ridiculous, as the two have nothing to do with one another. Trust me, Natick is not sucking down budget dollars that would have otherwise gone to the War fund....

[Britboy]

I don't see that comparison as ridiculous at all. While Natick themselves et al have no connection to foreign policy, military strategy and such, there is clearly some level of prioritisation at a higher level, that appears to be delivering in one area and not so much in the other.

Call it what you want, but I find it rather depressing that we seem to be focussing on new kit and not really on the 'how' or the even the 'why' of ops particularly. I'm certainly not blaming Natick for it, thats not their show. But someone has a lot to answer for.

[vajt]

Interesting how in the PDF they say the weapons will be caseless. Let's see if caseless tech finally takes off by then!

-----JT-----

[Gene2]

You don't really know much about either PEO-Soldier or Natick, do you?

This is an overarching project. The gear doesn't materialize at midnight EST, December 31 2029. The majority of it will be spiraled out to the Field in the 'teens. The most advanced stuff will be spiraled whenever it's ready. Most likely, it will change (evolve) several times, as items become OBE or turn out to be unsuitable, and new stuff pops up.

In the meantime, Natick (and PEO-Soldier) are responsible for everything from MRE menus to uniforms.


That is a very good point. This 2030 concept doesn't neccesarily mean that the soldier will look completely, or even partially, like the images. Everything you see is just a relative idea of what types of systems/technologies will hopefully be matured enough to be integrated into the soldier platform. Natick is thinking on terms of conflict evolving from today, rather it being in the sands of Iraq/Afghanistan or elsewhere, and how the soldier will generally be able to deal with any obstacle. Like Michael said above, it will most likely go through several versions/concepts (aka. spirals) before the true form actually takes shape.

[MichaelF]

I don't see that comparison as ridiculous at all. While Natick themselves et al have no connection to foreign policy, military strategy and such, there is clearly some level of prioritisation at a higher level, that appears to be delivering in one area and not so much in the other.

Call it what you want, but I find it rather depressing that we seem to be focussing on new kit and not really on the 'how' or the even the 'why' of ops particularly. I'm certainly not blaming Natick for it, thats not their show. But someone has a lot to answer for.

Really, so the fact that we have rewritten our strategic, counterinsurgency and tactical doctrine (and it seems to be working) in the last 2-3 years means nothing? The fact that the guy who cowrote our new counterinsurgency doctrine is actually running the show in Iraq (hint: his name is Petreaus) isn't good enough?

Wind thy neck in. The scale of investments is so mismatched between our warfighting development and what goes on at Natick that you aren't even remotely near the target.

[MichaelF]

Interesting how in the PDF they say the weapons will be caseless. Let's see if caseless tech finally takes off by then!

-----JT-----

LSAT. cough cough.

[deagle]

is the 2030 war a new one or the same one we're fighting since 2001 ??

i think the people would rather we have peace in 2030 instead.

[lachesis]

The guy who created this concept of "future warriors" is a big fan of Tom Clancy book.

[Britboy]

Really, so the fact that we have rewritten our strategic, counterinsurgency and tactical doctrine (and it seems to be working) in the last 2-3 years means nothing? The fact that the guy who cowrote our new counterinsurgency doctrine is actually running the show in Iraq (hint: his name is Petreaus) isn't good enough?

Wind thy neck in. The scale of investments is so mismatched between our warfighting development and what goes on at Natick that you aren't even remotely near the target.

Of course I'm not having a pop at Petraeus. The new COIN FM and his getting anthropologists onboard is good stuff in my view. Interesting this is only really coming to the fore in the last couple of years though, as you alude to.

Before that, what planning was made for Iraq after the initial war?

What nationbuilding took place in Afghanistan post-01 apart from setting up AIA, renaming it TISA after their grand shura, and delivering only 1/5th of promised aid, that probably was unevenly distributed?

Things may be getting better, because of people learning from experiences in Iraq/Afg, but I would find it hard not to take the position that for many years, such matters and doctrine was not prioritised when compared to more technologically-based high intensity type projects.

And when that means what it has meant for the troops and for the people of Iraq (insurgency and near-civil-war) and Afg (rise of Taliban, open warfare, now insurgency), thats pretty indefensible.

[MichaelF]

Of course I'm not having a pop at Petraeus. The new COIN FM and his getting anthropologists onboard is good stuff in my view. Interesting this is only really coming to the fore in the last couple of years though, as you alude to.

Before that, what planning was made for Iraq after the initial war?

What nationbuilding took place in Afghanistan post-01 apart from setting up AIA, renaming it TISA after their grand shura, and delivering only 1/5th of promised aid, that probably was unevenly distributed?

Things may be getting better, because of people learning from experiences in Iraq/Afg, but I would find it hard not to take the position that for many years, such matters and doctrine was not prioritised when compared to more technologically-based high intensity type projects.

And when that means what it has meant for the troops and for the people of Iraq (insurgency and near-civil-war) and Afg (rise of Taliban, open warfare, now insurgency), thats pretty indefensible.

The Army (and all the Armed Services, in general) must dominate across all spectrums of combat. Hence planning for a high-intensity technological conflict. It was that same planning and doctrine that enabled us to annihilate the Iraqi forces. Twice.

While much concentration has gone (and is going) into counterinsurgency (as opposed to the post-Vietnam hatred of all things Low Intensity), we are not neglecting to secure our dominance in high-intensity conflict.

None of this is germane to the topic at hand. If you want to, start a new thread.