Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International
Vol. 7, No. 4
Summer 2001
Wrath of God: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre
By Thomas B Hunter
"Vengeance is mine; I will repay, sayeth the Lord."
Romans 12:19
Overview
In September 1972, the world was shaken with the kidnapping and murder of eleven Israeli athletes at the hands of Palestinian terrorists. Images of the incident were emblazoned across television screen around the world, and the incident brought immediate global condemnation. While the world mourned, however, group of senior Israeli officials met secretly to discuss retribution for the murders. What followed was one of the most aggressive and deadly covert assassination campaigns ever conducted by a government intelligence agency against known terrorists. It would become known as Operation Wrath of God.
Black September Strikes
In the early morning hours of 05 September 1972, eight men clad in civilian clothing scaled fences surrounding the Olympic Village in Munch, Germany. Unseen by security officers, they quietly made their way to the apartments housing Israeli athletes and coaches participating in the XXth Olympiad. At the first apartment, one of the men slid a passkey into the door control and passed the word to his compatriots that he had unlocked the door. The Arab voices startled Yossef Gutfreund, a 275-pound wrestling referee who threw himself against the now-unlocked door. This action enabled one of his roommates to escape; however, he was quickly subdued and taken hostage. Similar actions took place in the neighboring apartments. One hour after the attack began, the eight members of the Black September Organization had taken nine hostages, and killed two. Two athletes who managed to escape quickly alerted the authorities.
After dumping the body of one of the hostages onto the street near the apartments, the terrorists released a list of demands. The demands included the release from prison of 234 Arab and German prisoners held in Israel and West Germany, including two leaders of the infamous German-based Baader-Meinhof Gang. They also demanded that three planes be fueled and made ready for takeoff at nearby Furstenfeldbruck airport. Upon their arrival with the hostages, the terrorists stated, they would then select one of the planes to fly them to Cairo where they would meet up with the released prisoners.
Rejecting offers from Israel to send a team of veteran hostage rescue commandos, the German Police instead deployed five officers to the airfield equipped with sniper rifles, one for each of the terrorists. The plan was to wait until the Arabs were a "safe" distance from the hostages, then to open fire simultaneously, killing all the terrorists before they could harm the hostages.
This plan, however, quickly began to unravel. When the terrorists arrived with the hostages, the Germans realized that there were eight gunmen, not the five they had planned for. With only five snipers there was no way for the sharpshooters to engage all the terrorists at the same time. Remarkably, none of the men selected had sniper training or experience in engaging live targets. The shooters also lacked vital equipment such as nightvision devices, helmets, and flak jackets. German soldiers who were to hide in the airplane demanded by the gunmen and open fire when they entered decided that the mission was too dangerous and left the scene without telling their commanders.
The order was given to open fire. One of the terrorists lobbed a grenade into the helicopter where it exploded and ignited a catastrophic fire. When the smoke finally cleared, the full scope of the failure-to-rescue operation was clear. All nine of the remaining hostages, one German police officer, and five of the eight terrorists were dead.
Later investigations would reveal that agents attached to the East German Olympic team deployed to the airport to observe the operation. One such report indicates that the agents communicated the movements of the German police to the terrorists, possibly betraying the security plan.
Israel Responds
Israeli retaliation was swift and massive. Three days later, an air strike was launched involving approximately 75 aircraft, the largest such attack since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Fighter-bombers struck guerrilla targets in Lebanon and Syria, killing 66 and leaving hundreds injured. Israeli fighters even managed to shoot down three Syrian planes over the Golan Heights, with a loss of two of its own. Israeli troops were also ordered into Lebanon to engage Palestinian terrorists who had been mining Israeli roads.
Despite this aggressive military response, a select group of high-ranking Israeli officials felt that more had to be done. They decided that a message had to be sent not only to those who participated in the Munich massacre, but also to those who might be considering terrorist attacks against their country in the future. Designated "Committee X" and chaired by Israeli Premier Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the group authorized the assassination of all individuals involved - directly or indirectly - in the Munich attack. There would be no captures, no arrests. The goal was to kill those they could find, and in so doing, terrorize those they could not.
In order to carry out this task, Mossad activated its assassination unit, known as the kidon - Hebrew for "bayonet." Kidon teams have been responsible for a number of high profile assassinations, including Dr. Gerald Bull, designer of the Iraqi supergun, and Nasser Issa, also known as "The Engineer," a master bombmaker for the terrorist group HAMAS. These teams would be commanded by Mike Harari, a senior Mossad agent.
At the time of the Munich attack, the kidon were housed within Mossad's Metsada department, known today as Komemiute. The kidon was composed of approximately 36 operators divided into three 12-man teams. Typically, two of these teams were undergoing training in Israel at any given time, with the remaining team out on a "real-world" operation. Payment for these personnel was deposited into Swiss bank accounts and would be made available to the operators upon completion of their assigned mission.
These teams were unique from those fielded previously by Israel. Instead of informing all operators involved in the operation of the goals, team structure, and other information, the teams were instead tightly compartmentalized: no team was aware of the existence of the others. Additionally, Mossad covertly supported the assassination teams, both operationally and financially. In this way, they would be able to operate with complete autonomy, completely outside the Israeli governmental structure. The only mutual point of contact between all the personnel was Harari. He would provide the list of target names and all other information necessary to achieving the group's goal of hunting down and killing the terrorists.
Harari allowed his men great latitude in their operations, removing rank structure and encouraging them to be creative with their assassinations. Harari didn't just want his targets eliminated, he wanted the terrorists to feel that there was nowhere - absolutely nowhere - that they could go and feel safe from Israeli reprisal. He wanted them to experience the same terror they had inflicted on the Israeli athletes and their families, and would settle for nothing less.
Harari did have one rule, however, about which there could be no doubt: targets would only be acted against after the team had attained one hundred percent identification. If this could not be achieved, no matter how much time or energy had been devoted to a target, the hit was to be called off. He would not permit any "collateral damage."
The List
There were thirty-five targets for whom death warrants had been issued, so the terrorists were divided amongst the teams. On the list of one such team were eleven terrorists known to have played a role in the Munich massacre.
Operating from a covert location in Geneva, this team set out to track down their eleven targets. These included the following:
-Adwan, Kamal - Chief of sabotage operations for Al Fatah in Israeli occupied territories
-Al-Chir, Hussein Abad - PLO contact with KGB in Cyprus
-Al-Kubaisi, Dr. Basil Paoud - Responsible for logistics within the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
-Boudia, Mohammed - Linked with European PLO
-Daoud, Abu - Admitted member of the Black September Organization
-Haddad, Dr. Wadi - Chief terrorist linked with Dr. George Habash
-Mahshari, Mohmoud - PLO member and coordinator of Munich incident
-Nassir, Kamal - Official PLO spokesman and member of the PLO Executive Committee
-Salameh, Ali Hassan - Developed and executed the Munich operation
-Yussuf, Abu - High ranking PLO official
-Zwaiter, Wael - Cousin to Yassir Arafat, organizer of PLO terrorism in Europe
The first selection from the list was Wael Zwaiter, who was then living in an apartment near Rome. The group's weapons specialist facilitated the delivery of five Beretta .22-cailber pistols from Geneva to Italy via a clandestine arms supply network. These were then distributed to the action team that had taken up residence in three separate locations.
The decision to move against Zwaiter was made on 16 October 1972. A support team delivered two shooters to a location near Zwaiter's apartment, while support personnel took up observation posts within visual range of the hit team. Acting according to plan, one of the support vehicles pulled away from the curb and drove off. This clandestinely signaled the shooters that Zwaiter was approaching.
The two men assigned to kill the Palestinian entered the apartment lobby ahead of their quarry. Zwaiter stopped off at a pub across the street in order to make a phone call. The action team expected this, as it had learned that his phone service had been turned off by the local telephone company for lack of payment. His phone call concluded, Zwaiter then walked toward the lobby.
Acting in accordance with Harari's edict, one of the shooters turned on additional lights in the dimly lit space in order to ensure they could positively identify their target. When Zwaiter walked through the door and into the lobby, a voice asked, "Are you Wael Zwaiter?" The answer gave the shooters the confirmation they needed. Simultaneously they drew their Berettas and fired eighteen shots into the terrorist. He died instantly. The action team quickly disappeared, traveling by van to a prearranged safe house.
Israel's second attempt at revenge would differ slightly from the first in that special attention was given to instilling fear into the terrorists that it was stalking. It was becoming clear through the first killing that Israel was capable of conducting assassinations far from the streets of Beirut or Lebanon. The decision was made to make the Palestinian extremists feel that they were not safe, even in the safety of their own homes.
Mahmoud Hamshiri was selected as the second target. For this action, a third party was directed to phone him at home, posing as an Italian journalist. Hamshiri agreed to the "journalist's" request for a telephone interview, which was set for 8 December 1972. Unbeknownst to the terrorist, however, members of the action team had visited his apartment the previous day while their target was out.
So, when the phone rang that afternoon, Hamshiri answered. The voice on the other end asked him to identify himself. When he did, an action team member depressed a button on a remote control device. This sent a silent signal to a detonator and the explosive charge placed in the telephone ignited. Hamshiri, like Zwaiter before him, died quickly and violently.
Four more terrorists, Dr. Basil al-Kubasi, Abad al-Chir, Zaid Muchassi, and Mohammed Boudia met similar fates, and were dead within the next few months at the hands of the Israeli kidon. Muchassi, not on the original list, was included when he assumed the position of PLO contact with the KGB in Cyprus, a position recently vacated by Abad al-Chir. Acting in accordance with their autonomous nature, the kidon personnel determined that if al-Chir had been a target due to the nature of his position, then his replacement would be considered an equally viable selection.
This decision, while proper from the perspective of an clandestine Israeli operator tasked with eliminating a known terrorist, clearly went beyond the mandate laid down by Committee X. Nonetheless, Muchassi was deemed a "target of opportunity" and plans were made to eliminate him. And while the action team did soon achieve its objective, it nearly violated Harari's second mandate covering collateral damage. This occurred when the hit squad attempted to leave the scene of Muchassi's assassination. It found its escape route blocked by his KGB contact. The Israelis shot and killed the Russian when he reached under his coat, a move that signaled he was possibly reaching for a weapon. There was apparently no retaliation against the action team by Harari for this incident, most likely because the KGB agent, though not a terrorist, was not deemed to enjoy same level of innocence as a unwitting civilian.
Having successfully eliminated five of their eleven assigned targets (not including Muchassi), the action team was ordered to return to Israel. Upon their arrival, the team was notified that three original members of the list--Kemel Adwan, Mohamed Youssef Al-Najjar, and Kamal Nasser--had been removed from the list for unspecified reasons. Despite this, the Israeli government still wanted them dead. The three, along with known terrorists, were expected to be present at a meeting in Beirut. Harari wanted the kidon personnel on hand to provide support for a Mossad-directed military action targeting the meeting participants. This joint operation, though a clear departure from the independent covert action conducted previously, proved successful.
On 10 April 1973, Israel launched Operation Spring of Youth. This involved the participation of approximately forty elite commandos from Sayeret Matkal, Sayeret T'zanahim, S-13 (the Israeli equivalent of the U.S. Navy SEALs), and Unit 707 (a since-disbanded Navy special operation unit). The commandos covertly came ashore across a Beirut beach and were delivered to their targets by Mossad drivers. Some of these personnel were assigned specifically to go after Adwan, Al-Najjar and Nasser. These terrorists were killed when their apartments were raided during the assault. Some reports indicate that the current Foreign Minister in Israel, Ehud Barak, took part in this operation while dressed as an Arab woman. By the time Operation Spring of Youth was over, one hundred Palestinians were killed, along with two Israeli commandos.
Tragedy in Lillehammer
After one full year of searching, Israeli hit squads were able to locate an individual they were convinced was Ali Hassan Salameh, a senior PLO official and commander of Force 17, Yassir Arafat's elite personal security squad.
Acting on previously gained intelligence, a small surveillance team was dispatched to Lillehammer, Norway to investigate a lead that Salameh had been seen in the city. On 21 July 1993, the surveillance team watched the individual as he entered a local public swimming pool. The man appeared physically identical to Salameh, so much so that the surveillance team called in the group's action team, which arrived soon thereafter and registered under assumed names at the Oppland Tourist Hotel.
The man soon left the pool, with a pregnant woman not previously identified, and later attended a film at a nearby theater. When the movie ended, at approximately 10:35 p.m., the assumed Salameh and his female friend took a bus to a stop a short distance from his apartment. As they approached the building, two kidon personnel exited their Mazda automobile, pulled out their .22-caliber pistols and opened fire. Their target dropped to the ground, dying in a pool of blood. Tragically, the man targeted by the kidon was not Salameh, but a man who looked remarkably like him; Moroccan-born waiter Ahmed Bouchiki.
Unaware of their mistake, the action team immediately drove to a predetermined location and switched to a rented Peugeot. In the hours and days that followed, however, Norwegian police managed to track down the hit team as it attempted to board a plane at a nearby airport. The following investigation led to the arrests of six Israelis, all of whom went on trial for their actions. One of the operators was acquitted, but five would receive sentences ranging from two years to five and half years. Despite this, Norwegian authorities would release all within twenty-two months.
The Hunt for Salameh
In January 1974, the kidon action team deployed covertly to Switzerland after receiving word that Salameh was scheduled to meet other POL leaders in a church on 12 January. When two shooters entered the church at the time of the meeting, however, three men who appeared to be Arab met them. One of these men made a move for his weapon and the Israelis opened fire, killing all three. Despite the commotion caused by the gunfire, the kidon personnel continued into the church, looking for Salameh. In a short time, however, the decision was made to abort the mission and escape.
It was not long, however, before the Israelis acted on another lead regarding the whereabouts of Salameh. Three kidon members traveled to London to meet with a source who agreed to meet to provide information on the elusive terrorist. When the source failed to show for the meeting, however, the team began to believe that they were under surveillance by unknown parties.
These concerns may have been well founded. One night, a team member met a woman in the bar of the Europa Hotel. Time passed, and after a brief conversation, he excused himself and headed back to his room for a short time. On the way, he passed his partner in hallway as he walked down to the bar for a drink. Shortly thereafter, he returned to the bar to find that both his partner and the woman had disappeared.
In time, he retired to his room, which shared a common foyer with the room of his compatriot. Oddly, he noticed that his room smelled of the same perfume worn by the woman in the bar. He also noticed the sound of a woman laughing from his partner's room, though he thought no more about it. The following morning, his partner failed to meet him for breakfast, so he went up to the room and knocked. There was no answer, so he let himself in. There, on the floor, was his partner, naked with a bullet wound to his chest.
Remarkably, the woman was located three months later, living just outside Amsterdam. Covert inquiries into her identity were provided by local sources. It was revealed that she was a freelance assassin, working for anyone who could afford her services. On 21 August, kidon team members avenged their partner's death by shooting and killing the woman near her home. Later, the kidon team leader would be reprimanded for acting outside the assigned scope of their mission. It was never learned who contracted the assassin to kill the kidon agent.
Following this incident, the third failed attempt to kill Salameh, Harari gave the order to abort the mission. The kidon team, however, elected to ignore the order and instead planned one more time to kill Salameh.
Intelligence placed the terrorist at a house in Tarifa, on the westernmost point of Gibraltar's Atlantic coast. As three action team members made their way toward the house, they were again intercepted by an Arab security guard. The guard raised his AK-47 and was gunned down. The operation was aborted and the team exited back to the safe house.
The final assassination of the Wrath of God campaign came in 1979. Ironically, the final target would be the individual that was the subject of the very first kidon assassination operation: Ali Hassan Salameh. Mossad finally caught up with their elusive quarry on the streets of Beirut. Following a short period of surveillance, the team was able to positively identify the long-sought terrorist. As he passed a vehicle while walking down a street, he passed a car that had been placed there by Mossad operatives. The car contained a high explosive charge, which was remotely detonated by kidon personnel. The blast killed Salameh and ended the six-year long campaign to kill and terrorize those responsible for the 1972 Munich massacre.
Postscript
While the Wrath of God operation had been successful in terms of both eliminating those the Israelis had deemed reponsible as well as striking fear into the heart of the PLO, one important target remained: Jemel Al-Gashey, the only gunman involved in the Munich operation that was still alive.
In 1999, a documentary film crew managed to accomplish something that Israeli intelligence could not: it located Al-Gashey and managed to arrange an interview. Largely by learning from the mistakes of his compatriots, Al-Gashey severed all ties with his relatives and disappeared. During the interview, the heavily disguised terrorist remained unrepentant and proud of his actions and those of his compatriots in September of 1972.
It is not known if the Israeli government is still actively seeking Al-Gashey; however, if the labors of those who hunted Nazi war criminals following World War II is any indication of resolve, it is likely that Al-Gashey will remain a man on the run. And if Israel's goal was to terrorize those that it could not kill, appears that they succeeded.
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